The article is structured as follows. We start with the policy framework in all three countries and then proceed to the discussion of major macroeconomic parameters, including data for the economy as a whole, the fiscal policy and external sectors, and labour market. In the end, we provide conclusions.
The purpose of the Financial Stability Report is to provide an overview of the developments in Latvia's financial system and the systemic risks potentially threatening the stability of Latvia's financial system.
The Report includes several boxes on specific topics: development and structure of credit institution customer payments, credit institutions' search for new funding sources via web platforms, branchification, growing importance of the state support programme for house purchase, assessment of household access to credit, potential impact of Brexit on Latvia's financial sector as well as credit institutions' capacity to absorb potential liquidity, market and credit risk shocks.
Deputy Governor Marja Nykänen
Bank of Finland
Financial stability assessment: Coronavirus pandemic demonstrates the necessity of risk buffers
Bank of Finland Bulletin press conference 5 May 2020
www.eurojatalous.fi
Title : External Debt Statistics of Indonesia - April 2020
Date :
15-04-2020
Data Source : Statistic Department
Contact : Andy Johan Prasetyo at +62 (21)2981-4182 or
Ferry Zadreba at +62 (21)2981-8249 or
Vika Karinta Novienda at +62 (21)2981-4677
Email: andy_jp@bi.go.id , fzadreba@bi.go.id , vika_kn@bi.go.id
Azerbaijan’s current fiscal stance is quite strong; however, this stability is completely based on oil-related revenues. In the meantime, the situation with alternative sources of fiscal revenues is uncertain. A large part of fiscal management is built on opacity and an assessment of budget spending efficiency has never been done. It is likely that Azerbaijan will only be able to maintain its fiscal stability through the next ten years or so, i.e. until the end of the active oil-extraction period. In the more distant future, a substantial fiscal correction will be necessary.
Authored by: Dmytro Boyarchuk
Published in 2012
The purpose of the Financial Stability Report is to provide an overview of the developments in Latvia's financial system and the systemic risks potentially threatening the stability of Latvia's financial system.
The Report includes several boxes on specific topics: development and structure of credit institution customer payments, credit institutions' search for new funding sources via web platforms, branchification, growing importance of the state support programme for house purchase, assessment of household access to credit, potential impact of Brexit on Latvia's financial sector as well as credit institutions' capacity to absorb potential liquidity, market and credit risk shocks.
Deputy Governor Marja Nykänen
Bank of Finland
Financial stability assessment: Coronavirus pandemic demonstrates the necessity of risk buffers
Bank of Finland Bulletin press conference 5 May 2020
www.eurojatalous.fi
Title : External Debt Statistics of Indonesia - April 2020
Date :
15-04-2020
Data Source : Statistic Department
Contact : Andy Johan Prasetyo at +62 (21)2981-4182 or
Ferry Zadreba at +62 (21)2981-8249 or
Vika Karinta Novienda at +62 (21)2981-4677
Email: andy_jp@bi.go.id , fzadreba@bi.go.id , vika_kn@bi.go.id
Azerbaijan’s current fiscal stance is quite strong; however, this stability is completely based on oil-related revenues. In the meantime, the situation with alternative sources of fiscal revenues is uncertain. A large part of fiscal management is built on opacity and an assessment of budget spending efficiency has never been done. It is likely that Azerbaijan will only be able to maintain its fiscal stability through the next ten years or so, i.e. until the end of the active oil-extraction period. In the more distant future, a substantial fiscal correction will be necessary.
Authored by: Dmytro Boyarchuk
Published in 2012
The #government of #Bangladesh has proposed the National #Budget for #FY2021 on 11 June 2020. CPD has analysed the budget proposal overnight and presented through a virtual media briefing on 12 June 2020 under its flagship programme 'Independent Review of Bangladesh’s Development (IRBD)'.
See here how CPD analysed the budget proposal in view of tackling #COVID19 #pandemic.
The paper outlines the probable fiscal consequences of the accession process for the candidate countries and presents specific, fiscally sensitive aspects of acquis communautaire adoption. Apart from membership contribution fees, enlargement-related expenditures, never financed from the budget before, may additionally influence a public expenditure increase and a further deterioration of fiscal deficit to a level exceeding current values. To estimate the future net fiscal positions of acceding countries, the paper calculates the net financial position of each acceding country as a net gain from the negotiated EU transfers. The net financial position illustrates the net effect of the transfer flow to a given acceding country (including the government sector and other beneficiaries of the EU assistance) and from that country into the EU budget. The net fiscal position represents the net effect of accession on the government sector with the consideration of EU transfer flows to that sector, accession-related expenditures from the budget, as well as the positive fiscal effects of accession. The paper discusses the crucial issue in assessing the net fiscal position in the AC-10, namely the fact that negotiated transfers barely cover the latest and major budget obligations.
Authored by: Malgorzata Antczak
Published in 2003
Finland's Economic Policy Council published their annual report in January 29, 2020. In the report, the Council evaluates the government’s fiscal policy and its employment-promoting policies. As in the previous reports, in addition to fiscal policy, the Council concentrates on fiscal sustainability and on the connections between social security and employment.
This year, one of the background reports looks at the assessment of risks of the Finnish Government Guarantee System. Professor of Economics Juha Junttila of the University of Jyväskylä, presented key finding in the report launch seminar, in Helsinki, on 29 January 2020.
For more information, including the full EPC 2019 report and all five background reports, please see: https://www.talouspolitiikanarviointineuvosto.fi/en/home/
The paper presents series of medium term economic simulations, evaluating fiscal costs of different EMU entry scenarios for six of the new EU members. Projections cover period of 2004- 2012 and use basic macroeconomic equations in an attempt to assess the value of public debtrelated costs that may occur in each of the countries, under specific assumptions. Four series of simulations were run, assuming two different EMU entry dates (2007 and 2012), and two growth scenarios (2% and 5% of real GDP growth p.a.). For each growth variant the early and late accession projections are compared in order to evaluate the net fiscal effect of delaying the EMU entry. Those effects depend on country’s starting position and are quite significant for most of the countries in question. Poland and Hungary are the biggest winners of the earlier EMU entrysimulations, both saving equivalence of 18-20% of their 2004 GDP levels (as compared to results of the late accession scenarios). It appears that the GDP growth rate does not seriously affect thevolume of the gains, which are rather generated by the faster interest rate reduction and tighter fiscal policies in case of the earlier EMU accession.
Authored by: Michal Gorzelak
Published in 2004
The government of Bangladesh has placed the budget for FY2020-21. In this backdrop, CPD has organised the Budget Dialogue 2020 to share views on various aspects of the proposed budget. This budget analysis has been prepared to assess the coherence of fiscal measures, assumptions and credibility of macroeconomic forecast, soundness of fiscal framework and priorities of budgetary allocations.
The proposed budget for FY2019-20 does not adequately address the commitments made in the election manifesto of the current government. CPD presented an analysis of the proposed budget keeping in view the targets set in the Seventh Five Year Plan (7FYP), election pledges, current macroeconomic scenario and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Appreciating some of the tax measures, CPD welcomed initiatives like raising VAT exemption threshold which will protect small and medium traders, tax measures for selected import items, VAT exemption on non-mechanical carriage for disabled persons (wheel chair) and hearing aids and VAT exemption on pacemaker, heart valve, Haemodialyser (Artificial Kidney), cancer medicines, etc., among others.
The budget has proposed the existing provisions about undisclosed money to continue. CPD strongly feels that investing undisclosed money in various sectors will not change the investment scenario much nor it will change the behaviour of the tax evaders rather it will continue to discourage regular taxpayers. Personal income tax measures and increase in net wealth exemption limit proposed in the budget, suggest that the budget is likely to benefit the higher-income group while the situation remains unchanged for the lower and middle-income group.
These views, among others, were shared at the CPD media briefing on analysis of the proposed National Budget FY2019-20 on Friday, 14 June 2019 at La Vita Hall, Lakeshore Hotel, Dhaka. Following the presentation of the proposed budget by the Hon’ble Finance Minister at the National Parliament on the day before, the analysis was prepared overnight by the CPD team. Following the welcome remarks from Dr Khondaker Golam Moazzem, Executive Director (a.i.), CPD, Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya, Distinguished Fellow, CPD, made the presentation titled, “National Budget for FY2019-20: An Analytical Perspective”. Ms Anisatul Fatema Yousuf, Director, Dialogue and Communication and CPD’s Senior Research Fellow, Mr Towfiqul Islam Khan, among others, were present at the event. Like every year, the media briefing was broadcasted live by Channel i to reach the mass people.
Read More: https://bit.ly/2RhpSb0
In this brief, Elena Jarocinska summarizes the main thrust of Russian federal fiscal institutions and discusses their specific features. She describes the evolution of federal fiscal regulations since the establishment of the Russian federal state. As a conclusion, she offers the following policy recommendations: tax autonomy of subnational governments which is currently very limited should be increased; federal aid should be further formalized and made more transparent; regulations should not be changed from year to year to provide for a more stable environment; and subnational interests should be better protected at the institutional level.
Authored by: Elena Jarocinska
Published in 2014
Viability of Nigeria State Governments Independent of Statutory Allocations: ...paperpublications3
Abstract: This broad study empirically evaluates the viability of Nigeria state governments independent of statutory allocations. The study was basically motivated by the persistent dependence of Nigeria State Governments on allocations from the Federation Account to the neglect of internally–generated revenues; this being so even with the current down–turn in the crude oil market, which is the main source of revenue to the federation account. The study employed the ex- post facto research design and used the regression model to determine the causal relationship between states internally–generated revenue and statutory allocations on the one hand, and states total expenditures and total revenues on the other hand, during the period 1999–2013. The results of the analysis show that, though generally, internally-generated revenues and statutory allocations have significant effects on the dependent variables (total expenditures and total revenues) their contributions to total expenditures and total revenues vary significantly. While internally–generated revenues contribute insignificantly to total expenditures and total revenues, statutory allocations contribute maximally to those dependent variables. This confirmed the dependency assumption which formed the theoretical framework of this study. The implication of this is that currently state governments cannot finance their fiscal operations without statutory allocations and/or external borrowings, thereby posing a threat to their future viability in view of the current down – ward trend in the prices of oil in the world oil marked upon which the Nigerian national budget is bench – marked. It is therefore, recommended that state governments should begin to direct more efforts toward effectively tapping the potentials of their internal sources of revenue as a safeguard against further fall in oil prices and hence, reduction in statutory allocations.
Despite significant economic reforms in many Southern Mediterranean EU neighbour countries, their growth performance has on average been subdued. This study analyses the differences in growth performance and macroeconomic stability across Mediterranean countries, to draw lessons for the future. The main findings are that Southern Mediterranean countries should benefit from closer ties with the EU that result in higher levels of trade and FDI inflows, once the turbulence of the ‘Arab Spring’ is resolved, and from the development of financial markets and infrastructure. They will also benefit in keeping inflation under control, which will depend in great part on their ability to maintain fiscal discipline and sustainable current accounts. One of the main challenges for the region will be to implement structural reforms that can help them absorb a large pool of unemployed without creating upward risks to inflation.
Authored by: Leonor Coutinho
Published in 2012
The #government of #Bangladesh has proposed the National #Budget for #FY2021 on 11 June 2020. CPD has analysed the budget proposal overnight and presented through a virtual media briefing on 12 June 2020 under its flagship programme 'Independent Review of Bangladesh’s Development (IRBD)'.
See here how CPD analysed the budget proposal in view of tackling #COVID19 #pandemic.
The paper outlines the probable fiscal consequences of the accession process for the candidate countries and presents specific, fiscally sensitive aspects of acquis communautaire adoption. Apart from membership contribution fees, enlargement-related expenditures, never financed from the budget before, may additionally influence a public expenditure increase and a further deterioration of fiscal deficit to a level exceeding current values. To estimate the future net fiscal positions of acceding countries, the paper calculates the net financial position of each acceding country as a net gain from the negotiated EU transfers. The net financial position illustrates the net effect of the transfer flow to a given acceding country (including the government sector and other beneficiaries of the EU assistance) and from that country into the EU budget. The net fiscal position represents the net effect of accession on the government sector with the consideration of EU transfer flows to that sector, accession-related expenditures from the budget, as well as the positive fiscal effects of accession. The paper discusses the crucial issue in assessing the net fiscal position in the AC-10, namely the fact that negotiated transfers barely cover the latest and major budget obligations.
Authored by: Malgorzata Antczak
Published in 2003
Finland's Economic Policy Council published their annual report in January 29, 2020. In the report, the Council evaluates the government’s fiscal policy and its employment-promoting policies. As in the previous reports, in addition to fiscal policy, the Council concentrates on fiscal sustainability and on the connections between social security and employment.
This year, one of the background reports looks at the assessment of risks of the Finnish Government Guarantee System. Professor of Economics Juha Junttila of the University of Jyväskylä, presented key finding in the report launch seminar, in Helsinki, on 29 January 2020.
For more information, including the full EPC 2019 report and all five background reports, please see: https://www.talouspolitiikanarviointineuvosto.fi/en/home/
The paper presents series of medium term economic simulations, evaluating fiscal costs of different EMU entry scenarios for six of the new EU members. Projections cover period of 2004- 2012 and use basic macroeconomic equations in an attempt to assess the value of public debtrelated costs that may occur in each of the countries, under specific assumptions. Four series of simulations were run, assuming two different EMU entry dates (2007 and 2012), and two growth scenarios (2% and 5% of real GDP growth p.a.). For each growth variant the early and late accession projections are compared in order to evaluate the net fiscal effect of delaying the EMU entry. Those effects depend on country’s starting position and are quite significant for most of the countries in question. Poland and Hungary are the biggest winners of the earlier EMU entrysimulations, both saving equivalence of 18-20% of their 2004 GDP levels (as compared to results of the late accession scenarios). It appears that the GDP growth rate does not seriously affect thevolume of the gains, which are rather generated by the faster interest rate reduction and tighter fiscal policies in case of the earlier EMU accession.
Authored by: Michal Gorzelak
Published in 2004
The government of Bangladesh has placed the budget for FY2020-21. In this backdrop, CPD has organised the Budget Dialogue 2020 to share views on various aspects of the proposed budget. This budget analysis has been prepared to assess the coherence of fiscal measures, assumptions and credibility of macroeconomic forecast, soundness of fiscal framework and priorities of budgetary allocations.
The proposed budget for FY2019-20 does not adequately address the commitments made in the election manifesto of the current government. CPD presented an analysis of the proposed budget keeping in view the targets set in the Seventh Five Year Plan (7FYP), election pledges, current macroeconomic scenario and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Appreciating some of the tax measures, CPD welcomed initiatives like raising VAT exemption threshold which will protect small and medium traders, tax measures for selected import items, VAT exemption on non-mechanical carriage for disabled persons (wheel chair) and hearing aids and VAT exemption on pacemaker, heart valve, Haemodialyser (Artificial Kidney), cancer medicines, etc., among others.
The budget has proposed the existing provisions about undisclosed money to continue. CPD strongly feels that investing undisclosed money in various sectors will not change the investment scenario much nor it will change the behaviour of the tax evaders rather it will continue to discourage regular taxpayers. Personal income tax measures and increase in net wealth exemption limit proposed in the budget, suggest that the budget is likely to benefit the higher-income group while the situation remains unchanged for the lower and middle-income group.
These views, among others, were shared at the CPD media briefing on analysis of the proposed National Budget FY2019-20 on Friday, 14 June 2019 at La Vita Hall, Lakeshore Hotel, Dhaka. Following the presentation of the proposed budget by the Hon’ble Finance Minister at the National Parliament on the day before, the analysis was prepared overnight by the CPD team. Following the welcome remarks from Dr Khondaker Golam Moazzem, Executive Director (a.i.), CPD, Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya, Distinguished Fellow, CPD, made the presentation titled, “National Budget for FY2019-20: An Analytical Perspective”. Ms Anisatul Fatema Yousuf, Director, Dialogue and Communication and CPD’s Senior Research Fellow, Mr Towfiqul Islam Khan, among others, were present at the event. Like every year, the media briefing was broadcasted live by Channel i to reach the mass people.
Read More: https://bit.ly/2RhpSb0
In this brief, Elena Jarocinska summarizes the main thrust of Russian federal fiscal institutions and discusses their specific features. She describes the evolution of federal fiscal regulations since the establishment of the Russian federal state. As a conclusion, she offers the following policy recommendations: tax autonomy of subnational governments which is currently very limited should be increased; federal aid should be further formalized and made more transparent; regulations should not be changed from year to year to provide for a more stable environment; and subnational interests should be better protected at the institutional level.
Authored by: Elena Jarocinska
Published in 2014
Viability of Nigeria State Governments Independent of Statutory Allocations: ...paperpublications3
Abstract: This broad study empirically evaluates the viability of Nigeria state governments independent of statutory allocations. The study was basically motivated by the persistent dependence of Nigeria State Governments on allocations from the Federation Account to the neglect of internally–generated revenues; this being so even with the current down–turn in the crude oil market, which is the main source of revenue to the federation account. The study employed the ex- post facto research design and used the regression model to determine the causal relationship between states internally–generated revenue and statutory allocations on the one hand, and states total expenditures and total revenues on the other hand, during the period 1999–2013. The results of the analysis show that, though generally, internally-generated revenues and statutory allocations have significant effects on the dependent variables (total expenditures and total revenues) their contributions to total expenditures and total revenues vary significantly. While internally–generated revenues contribute insignificantly to total expenditures and total revenues, statutory allocations contribute maximally to those dependent variables. This confirmed the dependency assumption which formed the theoretical framework of this study. The implication of this is that currently state governments cannot finance their fiscal operations without statutory allocations and/or external borrowings, thereby posing a threat to their future viability in view of the current down – ward trend in the prices of oil in the world oil marked upon which the Nigerian national budget is bench – marked. It is therefore, recommended that state governments should begin to direct more efforts toward effectively tapping the potentials of their internal sources of revenue as a safeguard against further fall in oil prices and hence, reduction in statutory allocations.
Despite significant economic reforms in many Southern Mediterranean EU neighbour countries, their growth performance has on average been subdued. This study analyses the differences in growth performance and macroeconomic stability across Mediterranean countries, to draw lessons for the future. The main findings are that Southern Mediterranean countries should benefit from closer ties with the EU that result in higher levels of trade and FDI inflows, once the turbulence of the ‘Arab Spring’ is resolved, and from the development of financial markets and infrastructure. They will also benefit in keeping inflation under control, which will depend in great part on their ability to maintain fiscal discipline and sustainable current accounts. One of the main challenges for the region will be to implement structural reforms that can help them absorb a large pool of unemployed without creating upward risks to inflation.
Authored by: Leonor Coutinho
Published in 2012
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 led to a renewed increase in government deficits and debts in many EU countries, causing a full-fledged fiscal crisis in Greece and severe fiscal pressures in other euro-area countries. This has prompted a series of proposals for improving the fiscal framework of the European Monetary Union, the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact. The first part of this paper reviews the main properties and developments of that framework until 2007. On that basis, it discusses the recent proposals for reform, which range from marginal improvements of the existing framework to the introduction of an explicit framework for managing fiscal crises in the member states, and the expansion of the scope of policy coordination to address macro economic imbalances and the competitiveness of the member states. We find the proposal of a mechanism for dealing with government default most useful. Attempts to suppress current account imbalances and to target national competitiveness positions would most likely result in serious economic losses and do damage to the internal market of the EU. This would increase the wedge between members and non-members of the euro area.
Authored by: Jurgen von Hagen
Published in 2010
Macroeconomic Developments Report. March 2021Latvijas Banka
Based on data from Latvijas Banka, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Ministry of Finance, and Financial and Capital Market Commission, this publication assesses developments of the external sector and exports, financial market, domestic demand and supply, prices and costs, and balance of payments, and provides forecasts for the economic development and inflation.
The Recommendation on Financial Literacy was adopted by the OECD Council on 29 October 2020, during the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting. It presents a single, comprehensive, instrument on financial literacy to assist governments, other public authorities, and relevant stakeholders in their efforts to design, implement and evaluate financial literacy policies. It is part of a holistic approach to financial-consumer issues, where financial literacy, together with improved financial access, adequate consumer protection, and regulatory frameworks, are expected to support financial resilience and well-being. Find out more about OECD work on financial literacy at www.oecd.org/financial/education
Resume
• Real GDP growth slowed down due to problems with access to electricity caused by the destruction of manoeuvrable electricity generation by Russian drones and missiles.
• Exports and imports continued growing due to better logistics through the Ukrainian sea corridor and road. Polish farmers and drivers stopped blocking borders at the end of April.
• In April, both the Tax and Customs Services over-executed the revenue plan. Moreover, the NBU transferred twice the planned profit to the budget.
• The European side approved the Ukraine Plan, which the government adopted to determine indicators for the Ukraine Facility. That approval will allow Ukraine to receive a EUR 1.9 bn loan from the EU in May. At the same time, the EU provided Ukraine with a EUR 1.5 bn loan in April, as the government fulfilled five indicators under the Ukraine Plan.
• The USA has finally approved an aid package for Ukraine, which includes USD 7.8 bn of budget support; however, the conditions and timing of the assistance are still unknown.
• As in March, annual consumer inflation amounted to 3.2% yoy in April.
• At the April monetary policy meeting, the NBU again reduced the key policy rate from 14.5% to 13.5% per annum.
• Over the past four weeks, the hryvnia exchange rate has stabilized in the UAH 39-40 per USD range.
Резюме
• Темпи зростання реального ВВП сповільнились через проблеми з доступом до електроенергії внаслідок руйнування маневреної генерації електроенергії російськими дронами та ракетами.
• Експорт та імпорт продовжили зростати завдяки ліпшій логістиці як Українським морським коридором, так і автомобільним транспортом. Зокрема, польські фермери та перевізники припинили блокування кордонів в кінці квітня.
• В квітні як податкова, так і митна служби перевиконали розпис доходів, тоді як НБУ перерахував до бюджету вдвічі більше прибутків.
• Європейська сторона схвалила План України, який було ухвалено урядом для визначення індикаторів у межах Механізму для України (Ukraine facility). Це дозволить в травні отримати 1,9 млрд євро позики від ЄС. При цьому ЄС вже надав Україні 1,5 млрд євро позики в квітні, оскільки уряд вже виконав п’ять індикаторів за Планом України.
• США нарешті схвалили пакет допомоги Україні, в якому 7,8 млрд дол. США передбачено на бюджетну підтримку: однак умови та час надання допомоги досі невідомі.
• У квітні, як і у березні, річна споживча інфляція склала 3,2% дпр.
• НБУ на квітневому засідання з монетарної політики знову знизив облікову ставку з 14,5% до 13,5% річних.
• За останні чотири тижні курс гривні стабілізувався у проміжку 39-40 грн за дол. США.
ІЕД готує публікацію Макроекономічного моніторингу України за фінансової підтримки Європейського Союзу в рамках проєкту «Економіка України під час війни та підтримка українців, постраждалих від війни».
Вперше за два роки відсоток українського бізнесу, який вважає небезпеку найбільшою перешкодою для ділової активності, досяг 55%. Про це свідчать результати щомісячного опитування підприємств New Monthly Enterprises Survey (#NRES), яке Інститут економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій провів у квітні 2024-го.
Частка підприємств, які повідомили, що працювати небезпечно, суттєво зросла, збільшившись із 46% до 55%. Це найвищий показник за весь період досліджень з травня 2022-го з травня 2022-го. Ця перешкода для ведення бізнесу стала головною у квітні для українських підприємств.
Водночас зростають позитивні очікування бізнесу щодо 6-місячної перспективи: як щодо фінансово-економічної ситуації на підприємстві, так і стосовно загально-економічного середовище в країні. Оцінка ситуації за цими двома параметрами позитивна вже другий місяць поспіль.
«Зважаючи на складну безпекову ситуацію, можна було б очікувати песимістичні настрої бізнесу, але насправді вийшло навпаки. Ми стикнулися з небувалим оптимізмом щодо бачення фінансово-економічної ситуації на підприємстві та в країні в цілому в піврічній перспективі. Невизначеність піврічної перспективи діяльності підприємств задекларували 20% опитаних компаній – і це можна вважати базовим рівнем. Продовжується тренд щодо зміцнення визначеності стосовно подальшої роботи підприємства у довгостроковій, тобто дворічній перспективі. При цьому ускладнюється ситуація з пошуком працівників – як кваліфікованих, так і некваліфікованих. Тренд щодо зростання цих труднощів спостерігаємо з вересня 2023 року», - зазначила виконавча директорка ІЕД Оксана Кузяків.
Так, частка підприємств, яким стало складніше знайти кваліфікованих працівників зросла з 38,9% у березні до 43 % у квітні. Аналогічний показник щодо некваліфікованої робочої сили зріс із 31,7% у березні до 36,6% у квітні.
Рейтинг перешкод для бізнесу суттєвих змін не зазнав, змінилося ранжування.
«Три головні перешкоди для ведення підприємницької діяльності залишилися такими ж, як минулого місяця, але у квітні «лідером» стала небезпека працювати (55% опитаних), на другому місці – зростання цін на сировину, матеріали, товари (51%), на третьому - брак робочої сили (43%). Значення небезпеки для роботи значно зросло для великого та середнього бізнесу. Дещо інша картина у розрізі перешкод для зростання бізнесу в контексті довгострокових тенденцій. Так, серед перешкод для зростання виробництва у квітні 2024 року найчастіше називали війну та несприятливу безпекову ситуацію. Наступними йшли, відповідно, низький попит, несприятлива політична ситуація та брак кваліфікованих працівників», - зазначив експерт ІЕД Євген Ангел.
Дисклеймер:
У щомісячному опитуванні Інституту економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій беруть участь понад 500 українських промислових підприємств, що розташовані у 21 із 27 областей України. Опитування у даному форматі проводиться з травня 2022 року. Польовий етап 23-ї хвилі дослідження тривав з 15 по 30 квітня 2024 року.
Інститут економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій (ІЕД) випустив 23-тє Щомісячне опитування підприємств «Український бізнес під час війни» за березень 2024 року.
Метою проєкту є швидкий збір інформації про поточний стан економіки на рівні підприємства.
Польовий етап опитування тривав з 18 по 29 березня 2024 року.
Усього в 23й хвилі було опитано 523 підприємства. Підприємства розташовані у Вінницькій, Волинській, Дніпропетровській, Закарпатській, Запорізькій, Житомирській, Івано-Франківській, Київській, Кіровоградській, Львівській, Одеській, Полтавській, Рівненській, Сумській, Тернопільській, Харківській, Хмельницькій, Черкаській, Чернівецькій, Чернігівській областях та в місті Києві.
Ключові результати 23-го щомісячного опитування підприємств:
• Дворічна невизначеність зараз знаходиться на найнижчій точці за два роки з покращеними найближчими очікуваннями виробництва, але коротко- та середньострокова невизначеність зросла.
• Індекс Відновлення Ділової Активності та Агрегований Показник Перспектив Промисловості зростають, водночас, відсоток підприємств, що працюють на повну потужність, залишається без суттєвих змін.
• Шестимісячні очікування щодо фінансово-економічної активності підприємств та загальноекономічного середовища покращились, а виробничі показники два місяці поспіль покращуються.
• Результати роботи підприємств з експорту та очікування в тримісячній перспективі покращились.
• Разом із цим, зростають труднощі з пошуком працівників потрібної кваліфікації, брак кваліфікованих працівників посідає 2-ге місце в рейтингу перешкод із найвищим значенням від травня 2022 року.
• Після обстрілів енергетичної інфраструктури значення перешкоди «перебої з електрикою» суттєво зросло, а «небезпечно працювати» залишається без суттєвих змін.
• Оцінки економічної політики уряду залишаються переважно нейтральними.
Summary
• Businesses faced problems with access to electricity due to the russian shelling of energy facilities. This restrained GDP growth.
• Transportation by railway and through the Ukrainian Sea Corridor is growing, contributing to the development of several sectors of the economy.
• The value of goods exports declined sharply in March on a year-on-year basis amid continued decline in grain and iron ore prices.
• In March, a record external financing of USD 9 bn was received. Half the funds came from the EU as bridge financing under the Facility for Ukraine.
• The Government approved the Ukraine Plan, which defines priority steps and measures, the implementation of which should become the basis for the EU budget support.
• State fiscal revenues continued to grow, partly due to the windfall taxation of banks' profits.
• Inflation slowed to 3.2% yoy in March. Inflation was last at this level in the COVID year of 2020 and before the start of the russian aggression in 2014.
• The NBU lowered the policy rate to 14.5% p.a. in response to the low inflation and the resumption of aid from donors to Ukraine. However, the NBU moved cautiously as the Ukrainian economy faces serious risks.
• The hryvnia weakened to UAH 39 per USD as the NBU paced its support.
Резюме
• Підприємства стикнулись із обмеженнями у на постачання електроенергії внаслідок російських обстрілів енергетичних об’єктів. Це стримувало приріст ВВП.
• Транспортні перевезення Укрзалізницею та через Український морський коридор зростають, що сприяє розвитку ряду секторів економіки.
• Вартість товарного експорту різко скоротилась у березні у вимірі рік до року на тлі продовження зниження цін на зерно та залізні руди.
• В березні надійшло рекордне зовнішнє фінансування у сумі 9 млрд дол. США. Половина коштів надійшла від ЄС в межах перехідного фінансування за Механізмом для України.
• Уряд ухвалив План України, який визначає пріоритетні кроки та заходи, виконання яких має стати основою для надання бюджетної підтримки з боку ЄС.
• Доходи Державного бюджету продовжують зростати, частково завдяки оподаткуванню надприбутків банків.
• В березні інфляція сповільнилась до 3,2% дпр. До цього інфляція була на такому рівні у ковідному 2020 році та до початку російської агресії у 2014 році.
• НБУ знизив ставку до 14,5% річних на фоні низької інфляції та відновлення надходження допомоги від донорів України. Втім, НБУ рухався обережно через значні ризики.
• Гривня ослабла до 39 грн за дол. США на фоні стриманих інтервенцій НБУ.
Бізнес оптимістичніше дивиться у майбутнє, виробничі показники другий місяць поспіль покращуються, кількість працівників на підприємствах продовжує зростати. Водночас ускладнився пошук працівників та стало більше проблем з електропостачанням.
Такі висновки можна зробити з щомісячного опитування підприємств New Monthly Enterprises Survey (#NRES), яке Інститут економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій провів у березні 2024-го.
Основні результати спостережень
У березні частка компаній, що не можуть передбачити свою діяльність на наступні два роки, опустилась нижче 40% (до 39,4%). Тобто частка тих, хто планує свою діяльність у дворічній перспективі, збільшилась до 60,6%. Це найкращий показник з початку проведення щомісячних опитувань бізнесу під час війни – тобто з жовтня 2022.
У березні дещо зріс Індекс Відновлення Ділової Активності (ІВДА) - із 0,34 до 0,37 (за шкалою від -1 до +1). Частка підприємств, які повідомили, що їх ділова активність краща, ніж у попередньому році, збільшилась із 44,8% у лютому до 47,4% у березні. Показник ІВДА корелює із розміром підприємств. У березні значення ІВДА суттєво не змінилось і є найнижчим для мікропідприємств та поступово зменшується для малих. Водночас показник для середніх та великих підприємств збільшився.
Виробничі показники другий місяць поспіль покращуються, очікування щодо виробництва в перспективі на 3 місяці покращились. Частка підприємств, які планують зростання виробництва в найближчі 3-4 місяці, зросла із 43,8% до 54,4%.
“Дані, які ми отримали в ході березневого опитування, дають підстави говорити про весняне пробудження українського бізнесу. Минулого місяця невизначеність бізнесу на дворічну перспективу стала найнижчою за останні півтора роки, тобто з початку наших спостережень у жовтні 2022 року. На фоні цього ми спостерігали покращення короткострокових очікувань бізнесу щодо завантаженості власних потужностей, наявності клієнтів тощо, але разом з тим — і деяке зростання середньострокової та короткострокової невизначеності”, — зазначила Оксана Кузяків, виконавча директорка ІЕД.
Кількість працівників на підприємствах продовжує зростати одночасно зі зростанням труднощів у пошуку працівників необхідної кваліфікації.
“Результати опитування відображають складну ситуацію щодо доступу бізнесу до робочої сили. Фактично вперше половина українського підприємництва вказує про те, що це є суттєвою перешкодою. Наприклад, у 2022 році про це говорили лише близько 20% опитаних, минулого року ця перешкода трохи актуалізувалася і про неї вказувало близько третини опитаних. Але під кінець 2023 року ця перешкода в них опитуваннях почала постійно зростати”, - пояснив Євген Ангел, старший науковий співробітник ІЕД.
22-ге Щомісячне опитування підприємств «Український бізнес під час війни» (лютий 2024)
Інститут економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій (ІЕД) випустив 22-ге Щомісячне опитування підприємств «Український бізнес під час війни» за лютий 2024 року.
Метою проєкту є швидкий збір інформації про поточний стан економіки на рівні підприємства.
Польовий етап опитування тривав з 19 до 29 лютого 2024 року..
Усього в 22й хвилі було опитано 542 підприємства. Підприємства розташовані у Вінницькій, Волинській, Дніпропетровській, Закарпатській, Запорізькій, Житомирській, Івано-Франківській, Київській, Кіровоградській, Львівській, Одеській, Полтавській, Рівненській, Сумській, Тернопільській, Харківській, Хмельницькій, Черкаській, Чернівецькій, Чернігівській областях та в місті Києві.
Ключові результати 22-го щомісячного опитування підприємств:
• У лютому 2024 року на тлі покращення короткострокових очікувань і традиційно високого рівня дворічної невизначеності дефіцит працівників став однією з ключових перешкод для розвитку бізнесу.
• Агрегований показник перспектив промисловості зріс, як і частка підприємств, що працюють на повну потужність.
• Водночас Індекс Відновлення Ділової Активності зменшується вже другий місяць поспіль.
• Невизначеність залишається високою у довгостроковій перспективі, та зросла для загальноекономічного середовища у піврічній перспективі.
• Очікування бізнесу на дворічну та піврічну перспективи залишаються без суттєвих змін.
• Виробничі показники та очікування на три місяці покращились, водночас очікування щодо експорту залишаються без змін.
• Незначною мірою зросла частка підприємств, які працюють на повну потужність порівняно з довоєнним періодом.
• Вперше за кілька місяців перервалась тенденція до скорочення кількості працівників, проте брак робочої сили як перешкода у веденні бізнесу займає другу позицію рейтингу перешкод ведення бізнесу, а проблеми із пошуком працівників залишились без змін порівняно до попереднього місяця.
• «Небезпечно працювати» хоча і не змінилась суттєво у відсотковому значенні, проте опустилась з першого на третє місце у рейтингу перешкод.
• Продовжується стагнація відновлення експортної діяльності.
• Відсоток негативних оцінок державної політики незначним чином зріс.
Resume
• According to the IER, real GDP growth accelerated to 5.6% yoy (year-on-year) in February 2024 from 3.1% yoy in January, partly due to the calendar effect.
• The power system survived the winter: the use of coal from thermal power plants and nuclear reactors increased. During this heating season, Ukraine used only gas of its own production for the first time in its history.
• Sea and rail transport had record performance against the backdrop of the blockade of the Polish border for trucks: 8 million tons and 14.6 million tons, respectively.
• According to preliminary customs estimates, trade in goods in February remained at the level of January 2024.
• State Budget revenues increased in February due to advance payment of dividends by state-owned banks and enterprises.
• In February, international financial assistance remained low, but we expect EUR 4.5 bn of bridge financing from the EU under the Ukraine Facility in March.
• Consumer inflation decelerated further to 4.3% yoy in February due to moderate growth in consumer demand and lower global commodity prices.
• Hryvnia remained stable for most of the first quarter of 2024, likely due to lower demand for foreign currency, including cash.
The Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER) has released the 21-th monthly enterprise survey “Ukrainian business in wartime” for January 2024.
The goal of the project is to quickly collect information on the current state of the economy at the enterprise level.
The field stage of the 21-th wave lasted from January 16 to January 31, 2024. The enterprise managers compared the work results in January 2024 with December 2023, assessed the indicators at the time of the survey (January 2023), and gave forecasts for the next two, three, or six months, depending on the question. In certain issues (where indicated), the work results were compared with the pre-war period (before February 24, 2022).
In January 2024, 552 companies were surveyed.
Main results of the 21-th monthly enterprise survey:
• In January 2024, long-term expectations are improving, and uncertainty is easing, but the "here and now" recovery is stagnating amid business concerns about security, labor shortages, and demand issues.
• The Business Activity Recovery Index is positive but lower than a month ago.
• The Industrial Confidence Indicator is also positive, but the downward trend continues for the second month in a row.
• Uncertainty in the 2-year perspective has decreased. Uncertainty in the six-month perspective for the business activity continued to decrease gradually and remained unchanged for the overall economic environment. Uncertainty in the 3-month perspective is decreasing (or not increasing) for core expectations, excluding exports.
• Production indicators in January significantly worsened compared to December. At the same time, expectations regarding production in the three months horizon have not changed for the fourth month.
• Employment indicators are declining, and businesses are having trouble finding skilled workers.
• The enterprises' export results have worsened, but the expected changes in the short term remain positive. The share of enterprises operating at full capacity has remained unchanged for the third month in a row.
• The first place in the list of obstacles is shared by "unsafe to work" and "rising prices."
• The main events that businesses are waiting for are the end of the war and the reduction of taxes.
• More than half of the respondents have a neutral assessment of the Government's economic policy.
Резюме
• За оцінкою ІЕД темпи приросту реального ВВП прискорились до 5,6% дпр (до попереднього року) в лютому 2024 року з 3,1% дпр в січні частково через календарний ефект.
• Енергосистема витримала зиму: збільшилось використання вугілля ТЕС, а також атомних реакторів. В цьому опалювальному сезоні Україна вперше використовувала газ лише власного видобутку.
• На фоні блокади польського кордону для вантажівок морський та залізничний види транспорту б’ють рекорди з перевезень: 8 млн т та 14,6 млн т відповідно.
• За попередніми оцінками митниці, показники торгівлі товарами у лютому залишились на рівні січня 2024 року.
• Доходи Держбюджету в лютому зросли через авансову сплату дивідендів державними банками та підприємствами.
• Міжнародна фінансова допомога залишилась низькою в лютому, але вже в березні очікуємо 4,5 млрд євро перехідного фінансування від ЄС в межах Механізму для України.
• В лютому споживча інфляція надалі сповільнилась до 4,3% дпр на фоні помірного зростання споживчого попиту та зниження світових цін на сировину.
• Гривня залишалась стабільною протягом (більшості) першого кварталу 2024 року ймовірно через нижчий попит на іноземну валюту в тому числі готівкову.
ГО «Інститут економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій» (ІЕД) в рамках співпраці з регіонами підготував спеціальний звіт «Бізнес під час війни: Черкаська область» (грудень 2023).
Команда ІЕД зробила моніторинг економічної ситуації в Черкаській області в співпраці з Черкаською обласною державною адміністрацією. На основі Нового щомісячного опитування підприємств «Український бізнес під час війни» експерти ІЕД підготували шостий випуск дослідження для Черкаської області.
Щомісячне опитування підприємств проводиться за допомогою поєднання декількох методів збору даних: самостійне заповнення онлайн-форми та особисте опитування представників бізнесу із внесенням відповідей до онлайн-форми.
Польовий етап опитування тривав із 13 до 31 грудня 2023 року.
У листопаді 2023 року у Черкаській області було опитано 30 підприємств.
Серед них представлені підприємства від мікро до великого розмірів (найчастіше – середні). Усі опитані підприємства – промислові. Серед них найбільшу частку складають підприємства харчової промисловості.
Основне з дослідження:
• У грудні 2023 року керівники підприємств Черкаської області оцінюють власну фінансово-економічну ситуацію гірше, ніж загалом по країн.
• Спостерігається погіршення оцінок загальноекономічного середовища.
• Прогнози на піврічну перспективу щодо фінансово-економічної ситуації та загальноекономічного середовища, хоча і залишаються гіршими, ніж загалом по країні, але без суттєвих змін.
• При цьому, підприємці області утримуються від прогнозів на дворічну перспективу, тоді як загальноукраїнський показник довгострокових очікувань погіршився.
• Результати виробництва покращились і для регіону, і загалом по країні.
• На підприємствах Черкаської області відчувають незначні труднощі у пошуку кваліфікованих працівників, тоді як загалом по Україні збільшились труднощі і для кваліфікованих, і для некваліфікованих працівників.
ГО «Інститут економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій» (ІЕД) продовжує багаторічну роботу з українськими регіонами.
На основі Нового щомісячного опитування підприємств «Український бізнес під час війни» експерти ІЕД підготували черговий випуск дослідження для Київської області «Бізнес Київської області під час війни» за грудень 2023.
Польовий етап опитування тривав із 13 до 31 грудня 2023 року.
У грудні 2023 року в Київській області було опитано 21 підприємство. Серед них представлені підприємства від малого до великого розміру (найчастіше – великі). Усі опитані підприємства – промислові. Серед них найбільшу частку складають підприємства харчової промисловості.
Основне з дослідження:
• У грудні 2023 року оцінки підприємців Київської області щодо фінансово-економічної ситуації суттєво не змінились порівняно з листопадом, проте спостерігається поступове погіршення очікувань на піврічну перспективу.
• Оцінки та очікування щодо загальноекономічної ситуації по області поступово погіршуються, на відміну від загальноукраїнських значень, за якими суттєвих змін не відбувається.
• Динаміка відновлення в порівнянні з аналогічним періодом минулого року для області погіршилась, тоді як загалом по країні змін не відбулось.
• Очікування щодо дворічних перспектив погіршились як загалом по країні, так і для області.
• На відміну від загальноукраїнських показників, за якими спостерігається незначне покращення виробничих результатів та відсутні різкі зміни щодо очікувань на короткострокову перспективу, по області погіршились як показники результатів, так і очікування.
• Темпи скорочення зайнятості прискорились як по області, так і загалом по країні. Водночас, підприємці Київщини не відчувають труднощів у пошуку кваліфікованих або некваліфікованих працівників.
• На підприємствах Київської області рівень завантаження потужностей вищий ніж в цілому по Україні.
Інститут економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій (ІЕД) випустив 21-ше Щомісячне опитування підприємств «Український бізнес під час війни» за січень 2024 року.
Метою проєкту є швидкий збір інформації про поточний стан економіки на рівні підприємства.
Польовий етап опитування тривав з 16 по 31 січня, 2024 року.
Усього в 21й хвилі було опитано 552 підприємства. Підприємства розташовані у Вінницькій, Волинській, Дніпропетровській, Закарпатській, Запорізькій, Житомирській, Івано-Франківській, Київській, Кіровоградській, Львівській, Одеській, Полтавській, Рівненській, Сумській, Тернопільській, Харківській, Хмельницькій, Черкаській, Чернівецькій, Чернігівській областях та в місті Києві.
Ключові результати 21го щомісячного опитування підприємств:
• У січні 2024 довгострокові очікування покращуються, невизначеність зменшується, але відновлення «тут та тепер» стагнує на фоні занепокоєнь бізнесу щодо безпеки, браку працівників та проблем із попитом.
• Індекс Відновлення Ділової Активності додатний, але менший ніж місяць тому. Агрегований показник перспектив промисловості також додатний, але два місяці поспіль триває тренд до зменшення.
• Невизначеність у дворічній перспективі знизилася.
• Невизначеність у піврічній перспективі для фінансово-економічної ситуації продовжує поступово зменшуватись та залишається без змін для загально-економічного середовища.
• Невизначеність у тримісячній перспективі зменшується (або не зростає) для основних очікувань, за винятком експорту.
• Виробничі показники в січні порівняно з груднем значно погіршилися, водночас, очікування щодо виробництва в перспективі на три місяці не змінюються вже чотири місяці.
• Показники зайнятості знижуються, а бізнес має проблеми з пошуком кваліфікованих працівників.
• Результати роботи підприємств з експорту погіршилися, але очікувані зміни в короткостроковій перспективі залишаються позитивними.
• Частка підприємств, що працюють на повну потужність, три місяці поспіль залишається без суттєвих змін.
• Перше місце в списку перешкод ділять перешкоди «працювати небезпечно» та «зростання цін».
• Головні події, на які очікує бізнес, - завершення війни та зниження податків.
• Більше половини опитаних нейтрально оцінюють економічну політику уряду.
Період моніторингу: з 1 січня по 15 лютого 2024 року
У цьому випуску:
Парламент погодив норми Податкового кодексу України з Митним тарифом України
Уряд вніс технічні зміни до переліків товарів, експорт та імпорт яких підлягає ліцензуванню, та квот на 2024 рік
Держмитслужба затвердила формат обміну даними з магазинами безмитної торгівлі
Підготовлено чергові зміни до Митного кодексу України в контексті його наближення до норм ЄС
Держмитслужба разом із молдовськими колегами запустила спільний контроль у п/п “Кучурган-Новосавицьке” для залізничного сполучення
Держмитслужба розпочала пілотний проєкт щодо здійснення постмитного контролю
На порталі «Єдине вікно для міжнародної торгівлі» додано можливість перегляду митної декларації в актуальному стані - із урахуванням коригувань
На двох митних постах – «Ужгород-автомобільний» і «Астей» Закарпатської митниці - буде встановлено сучасні модульні конструкції
Одним з пріоритетів у повоєнній відбудові України повинна стати безбар’єрність, адже в результаті війни суттєво зростає кількість осіб з інвалідністю - впевнена Олександра Бетлій, провідна наукова співробітниця Інституту економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій (ІЕД). Своє бачення майбутньої безбар’єрної України вона представила під час обговорення лютневого моніторингу “Контролю витрат на відновлення України” консорціуму RISE, в який входить ІЕД.
Як пояснює Бетлій, наразі лише 22% обстежених Мінсоцполітики адміністратвних будівель є доступними, ще 32% – частково доступними. Найкраща ситуація — у ЦНАПах та закладах охорони здоров’я. Найгірша — у будинках, де розташовані органи держвлади.
На думку експертки, для покращення ситуації важливо ухвалити Національну стратегію зі створення безбар’єрного простору в Україні на період до 2030 року. Ця стратегія має на меті сформувати загальний підхід до формування та імплементації державної політики для забезпечення безперешкодного доступу всіх груп населення до різних сфер життєдіяльності.
Також, як вважає Бетлій, надзвичайно важливим є підвищення обізнаності о принципах безбар’єрності на місцях. Місцеві органи влади повинні включати принципи безбар’єрності при підготовці планів та програм відновлення. А громадська ініціатива спонукати чиновників швидше впроваджувати зміни. Крім того, потрібна подальша зміна будівельних стандартів та їх гармонізація з правилами ЄС.
Загалом, як витікає з оприлюдненої 15 лютого третьої редакції звіту про потреби відновлення України (RDNA-3), який відображає узгоджені оцінки Світового банку, ЄС та ООН загальна сума прямих збитків України внаслідок російської агресії становить $152,5 млрд, а потреби коштів на відновлення – $486 млрд. Звіт охоплює період з 24 лютого 2022-го по 31 грудня 2023-го.
Оцінка потреб у відновленні на 2024 рік становить $15 млрд, або 2% від загальних потреб. Втім, навіть за таких цифр у 2024 році брак фінансування становить $9,5 млрд, чи 62% від необхідного обсягу.
Дискусію можна подивитися на YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLtuUJpz2kg
Long-term prospects are on the rise, and uncertainty is gradually subsiding. However, the current recovery is at a standstill, plagued by business apprehensions regarding security, labor shortages, and demand issues. This encapsulates the sentiment among businesses in January 2024, as revealed by the research conducted by the IER team as part of the 21st #NRES monthly enterprise survey.
Of the surveyed enterprises, 56% reported that 2023 met their expectations, with 8% even surpassing expectations. Notably, there's a correlation between meeting 2023 expectations and enterprise size, with 77% of large enterprises reporting meeting or exceeding expectations compared to only 54% among micro-businesses.
"The results we obtained are quite optimistic. Given the turbulence experienced by Ukrainian businesses in 2023, I didn't expect to see such figures. It indicates that most enterprises are realistic in their planning," remarked Oksana Kuziakiv, executive director of IED.
According to the survey, three-month uncertainty regarding new orders and headcount expectations decreased among surveyed businesses (though it increased for exports). Uncertainty over the 6-month economic outlook decreased overall but rose for exports.
In addition to heightened uncertainty surrounding export prospects, surveyed companies also reported reduced exports. 34% of respondents had to decrease their exports in January compared to 20% in December. Meanwhile, the proportion of enterprises reporting increased exports dropped from 31% to 19%.
Overall, production indicators of surveyed enterprises worsened in January compared to December. The percentage of enterprises reducing production rose from 16.8% to 23.2%, and employment rates decreased slightly, with businesses facing challenges in finding qualified workers. However, Kuziakiv noted that the decline in employment might also be a seasonal trend.
Moreover, in January 2024, the index of business activity recovery worsened, with the proportion of enterprises reporting better business activity than the previous year decreasing from 64% in December to 56% in January.
The most cited obstacles to production growth among interviewed entrepreneurs include the war and unfavorable security situation, low demand, a shortage of qualified workers, and an unfavorable regulatory climate. However, corruption and pressure from law enforcement agencies were not deemed significant problems, according to the study.
Furthermore, over a fifth of surveyed Ukrainian enterprises identified lifting the blockade of western borders as a necessary change to improve the business climate in the country. For the first time, the survey also inquired about the impact of border closures on their businesses.
The survey included 552 enterprises from 21 regions of Ukraine operating in the manufacturing industry, retail, and agribusiness sectors. It was conducted from January 16 to 31, 2024.
Monthly Economic Monitoring of Ukraine
No.229, February 2024
Resume
• According to the IER, the real GDP growth rate was 3.1% yoy in January 2024.
• The power system remains balanced despite russian shelling. Due to the cold weather, industry and the population increased electricity consumption.
• The Ukrainian Sea Corridor is working well, but trucks at the border are blocked again. Exports by sea in January amounted to 8.7 m tons, and another 2.7 m tons were transported by rail.
• The strike of Polish farmers hinders Ukraine's foreign trade. Since February 12, they have blocked five border crossing points on the Ukrainian-Polish border.
• The current account deficit in 2023 was 5.5% of GDP. The key factors are sharply increased goods trade deficit against reduced grants and expanded investment payments.
• In January 2024, a minimal amount of external financial assistance was received. Expenditures were significantly lower than planned.
• The EU almost approved aid to Ukraine, while a heated debate continues in the United States.
• At the beginning of 2024, consumer inflation decelerated to 4.7% yoy. It was below 5% for the first time since 2020.
• The hryvnia stabilized in 2024 due to a better balance between exports and imports.
• The NBU left the key policy rate at 15% per annum in January and confirmed that there are currently no plans to reduce the rate significantly in 2024.
Місячний Економічний Моніторинг України
№229, лютий 2024 року
Резюме
• За оцінкою ІЕД темпи приросту реального ВВП становили 3,1% дпр у січні 2024 року
• Енергосистема зберігає збалансованість попри російські обстріли. Через холодну погоду зростає споживання електроенергії як промисловістю, так і населенням.
• Український морський коридор працює добре, але знову заблокований автотранспорт. Експорт морським транспортом в січні становив 8,7 млн т, ще 2,7 млн т перевезли залізницею.
• Страйк польських фермерів перешкоджає зовнішній торгівлі України. З 12 лютого ними заблоковано п’ять пунктів пропуску на україно-польському кордоні.
• Дефіцит рахунку поточних операцій у 2023 році склав 5.5% від ВВП. Ключові фактори – різке збільшення дефіциту торгівлі товарами на тлі скорочення грантової допомоги та розширення інвестиційних виплат.
• У січні 2024 року надійшла надзвичайна мала сума зовнішньої фінансової допомоги. Видатки були суттєво нижчі за план.
• ЄС майже схвалив допомогу Україні, тоді як в США тривають гарячі дебати.
• На початку 2024 року споживча інфляція сповільнилась до 4,7 % дпр. Вона була нижча 5% вперше з 2020 року.
• Гривня стабілізувалась у 2024 році через кращий баланс між експортом та імпортом
• НБУ залишив облікову ставку на рівні 15% річних у січні і підтвердив, що значного зниження ставки у 2024 році наразі не планується
New Monthly Enterprises Survey. Issue 20. (12.2023) Ukrainian Business in Wartime
The Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER) has released the 20-th monthly enterprise survey “Ukrainian business in wartime” for December 2023.
The goal of the project is to quickly collect information on the current state of the economy at the enterprise level.
The field stage of the 20-th wave lasted from December 13 to December 31, 2023. The enterprise managers compared the work results in December 2023 with November, assessed the indicators at the time of the survey (December 2023), and gave forecasts for the next two, three, or six months, depending on the question. In certain issues (where indicated), the work results were compared with the pre-war period (before February 24, 2022).
In December, 535 companies were surveyed.
Main results of the 20-th monthly enterprise survey:
• In December 2023, Ukrainian business considered danger the most acute problem, but entrepreneurs continued to adapt to work in war conditions.
• Despite the deteriorating security situation and high uncertainty affecting long-term plans, businesses are showing resilience by focusing on finding solutions for the present and the near future.
• Business activity recovery index remains high for two months in a row. Production indicators improved in December compared to November.
• Production expectations in the short term are positive but have not been growing for several months.
• Long-term expectations worsened for the first time, although the percentage of "optimists" still outweighs "pessimists."
• Half-yearly expectations regarding the business activity at the enterprise and the overall economic environment have not changed compared to November, but the annual trend towards a gradual deterioration of the values is recorded.
• Employment indicators continued their seasonally slowing trend, while the labor market experienced a shortage of both unskilled and skilled workers.
• In December, the list of obstacles changed significantly; security issues and "labor shortages" ranked 1st and 2nd, with price increases obtained 3rd place.
• Negative assessments of the government's economic policy decreased, and the percentage of neutral ones increased.
More from Інститут економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій (20)
how can I sell my pi coins for cash in a pi APPDOT TECH
You can't sell your pi coins in the pi network app. because it is not listed yet on any exchange.
The only way you can sell is by trading your pi coins with an investor (a person looking forward to hold massive amounts of pi coins before mainnet launch) .
You don't need to meet the investor directly all the trades are done with a pi vendor/merchant (a person that buys the pi coins from miners and resell it to investors)
I Will leave The telegram contact of my personal pi vendor, if you are finding a legitimate one.
@Pi_vendor_247
#pi network
#pi coins
#money
Even tho Pi network is not listed on any exchange yet.
Buying/Selling or investing in pi network coins is highly possible through the help of vendors. You can buy from vendors[ buy directly from the pi network miners and resell it]. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal vendor.
@Pi_vendor_247
how can I sell pi coins after successfully completing KYCDOT TECH
Pi coins is not launched yet in any exchange 💱 this means it's not swappable, the current pi displaying on coin market cap is the iou version of pi. And you can learn all about that on my previous post.
RIGHT NOW THE ONLY WAY you can sell pi coins is through verified pi merchants. A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins and resell them to exchanges and crypto whales. Looking forward to hold massive quantities of pi coins before the mainnet launch.
This is because pi network is not doing any pre-sale or ico offerings, the only way to get my coins is from buying from miners. So a merchant facilitates the transactions between the miners and these exchanges holding pi.
I and my friends has sold more than 6000 pi coins successfully with this method. I will be happy to share the contact of my personal pi merchant. The one i trade with, if you have your own merchant you can trade with them. For those who are new.
Message: @Pi_vendor_247 on telegram.
I wouldn't advise you selling all percentage of the pi coins. Leave at least a before so its a win win during open mainnet. Have a nice day pioneers ♥️
#kyc #mainnet #picoins #pi #sellpi #piwallet
#pinetwork
Currently pi network is not tradable on binance or any other exchange because we are still in the enclosed mainnet.
Right now the only way to sell pi coins is by trading with a verified merchant.
What is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone verified by pi network team and allowed to barter pi coins for goods and services.
Since pi network is not doing any pre-sale The only way exchanges like binance/huobi or crypto whales can get pi is by buying from miners. And a merchant stands in between the exchanges and the miners.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant. I and my friends has traded more than 6000pi coins successfully
Tele-gram
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins in South Korea profitably.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network coins in South Korea or any other country, by finding a verified pi merchant
What is a verified pi merchant?
Since pi network is not launched yet on any exchange, the only way you can sell pi coins is by selling to a verified pi merchant, and this is because pi network is not launched yet on any exchange and no pre-sale or ico offerings Is done on pi.
Since there is no pre-sale, the only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners. So a pi merchant facilitates these transactions by acting as a bridge for both transactions.
How can i find a pi vendor/merchant?
Well for those who haven't traded with a pi merchant or who don't already have one. I will leave the telegram id of my personal pi merchant who i trade pi with.
Tele gram: @Pi_vendor_247
#pi #sell #nigeria #pinetwork #picoins #sellpi #Nigerian #tradepi #pinetworkcoins #sellmypi
how to sell pi coins effectively (from 50 - 100k pi)DOT TECH
Anywhere in the world, including Africa, America, and Europe, you can sell Pi Network Coins online and receive cash through online payment options.
Pi has not yet been launched on any exchange because we are currently using the confined Mainnet. The planned launch date for Pi is June 28, 2026.
Reselling to investors who want to hold until the mainnet launch in 2026 is currently the sole way to sell.
Consequently, right now. All you need to do is select the right pi network provider.
Who is a pi merchant?
An individual who buys coins from miners on the pi network and resells them to investors hoping to hang onto them until the mainnet is launched is known as a pi merchant.
debuts.
I'll provide you the Telegram username
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins in all Africa Countries.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network for other cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, usdt , Ethereum and other currencies And this is done easily with the help from a pi merchant.
What is a pi merchant ?
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how can i use my minded pi coins I need some funds.DOT TECH
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Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024 - Ricerca sulle Startup e il Sistema dell'Innov...Quotidiano Piemontese
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024
Una ricerca de il Club degli Investitori, in collaborazione con ToTeM Torino Tech Map e con il supporto della ESCP Business School e di Growth Capital
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Overview of macroeconomic trends in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine under the Association Agreements since 2014
1. July 8, 2020
Overview of macroeconomic trends in
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine under the
Association Agreements since 2014
Oleksandra Betliy 1
1 Leading Research Fellow, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Kyiv.
2. Content
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ 3
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................... 3
1. Introduction.................................................................................................... 4
2. Policy framework............................................................................................ 4
3. GDP................................................................................................................. 9
Summary .................................................................................................................. 9
Georgia................................................................................................................... 10
Moldova .................................................................................................................. 10
Ukraine ................................................................................................................... 11
4. Sectoral trends.............................................................................................. 11
Summary ................................................................................................................ 11
Georgia................................................................................................................... 12
Moldova .................................................................................................................. 13
Ukraine ................................................................................................................... 13
5. External balance ........................................................................................... 14
Summary ................................................................................................................ 14
Georgia................................................................................................................... 17
Moldova .................................................................................................................. 18
Ukraine ................................................................................................................... 19
6. Fiscal balance and state debt........................................................................ 21
Summary ................................................................................................................ 21
Georgia................................................................................................................... 22
Moldova .................................................................................................................. 22
Ukraine ................................................................................................................... 23
7. Consumer prices ........................................................................................... 23
8. Labour market .............................................................................................. 24
9. Households’ income and poverty.................................................................. 26
10. Conclusions................................................................................................... 27
Annex: Expectations of the AA cumulative impact on three DCFTA economies .. 29
Literature ............................................................................................................ 30
3. 3
Abbreviations
AA Association agreement
CIS Commonwealth Independent States
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease
DCFTA Deep and comprehensive free trade area
DPL Development Policy Loan Program
ECF Extended Credit Facility
EFF Extended Fund Facility
EU European Union
FDI Foreign direct investments
GDP Gross domestic product
GEL Georgian lari
ICT Information and communication technology
IFI International financial institutions
IMF International Monetary Fund
NBG National Bank of Georgia
NBM National Bank of Moldova
NBU National Bank of Ukraine
PPP Purchasing power parity
SBA Stand-By Arrangement
SIGMA Support for Improvement in Governance and Management
TAIEX Technical Assistance Information Exchange
UAH Ukrainian hryvnia
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USD US dollar
VAT Value added tax
WB World Bank
WJP World Justice Project
WTO World Trade Organisation
bn billion
m million
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Michael Emerson (CEPS, Belgium) for the idea to write this article
and the most useful comments. I am grateful to Tamara Kovziridze and Lali Gogoberidze
(Reformatics, Georgia), and Adrian Lupusor (Expert-Grup, Moldova) for their insightful
comments and suggestions. I would also like to extend my thanks to Veronika Movchan
(IER, Ukraine) for her encouragement and advice.
4. 4
1. Introduction
The year 2020 has brought enormous challenges for the entire world. The COVID-19
triggered the global economic crisis with risks of high unemployment, a decline in real
disposable income, and the need to find fiscal space to finance increased health needs and
support the business during lockdowns.
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine got a chance to strengthen their economies after 2014,
when they signed the Association Agreements (AAs) with the EU, embedding the
establishment of the DCFTAs. The AAs envisaged a broad spectrum of reforms, aimed at
making all three economies more resilient and sustainable, partly thanks to deeper economic
ties with the EU.
Moreover, between 2014 and 2019, all three countries were supported by the IMF on
their path towards the implementation of much-needed reforms. All three succeeded in
achieving macroeconomic stabilisation, although the implementation of the reform programs
was not smooth.
Another common factor for all three countries is their unresolved secessionist
confrontations with Russia. However, only Ukraine is in active military conflict with Russia
after the latter annexed Crimea and occupied a part of Donbas in 2014. In the case of
Georgia, a creeping occupation takes place at the so-called dividing line with occupied South
Ossetia, while there is a standstill situation with occupied Abkhazia.
In this article, we analyse whether the three countries used the window of opportunity
provided by the AA/DCFTAs to become more sustainable, prosperous and resilient by the
time they entered the coronacrisis in 2020. The economic developments during the
coronacrisis are not considered.
The article is structured as follows. We start with the policy framework in all three
countries and then proceed to the discussion of major macroeconomic parameters, including
data for the economy as a whole, the fiscal policy and external sectors, and labour market.
In the end, we provide conclusions.
2. Policy framework
The provisional application of the Association Agreements between the EU and Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine began in 2014. The AAs envisages extensive institutional changes and
legal harmonisation with the EU acquis in multiple political and economic spheres, with the
particular focus on trade-related changes foreseen in the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Areas (DCFTAs).2 The broad scope of reforms and tasks embedded in the AAs has
affected the reform agenda in all three countries. The reform efforts have been supported
by the EU technical assistance through TAIEX, SIGMA and Twinning and financial support,
funded under the European Neighbourhood Instrument.
The implementation of the AAs, including the embedded DCFTAs, was expected to result
in the acceleration of economic development in all countries (see Annex). Real GDP was
expected to grow faster, taking into account better access to the EU market and higher
2
See https://3dcftas.eu/publications/ for Handbooks reviewing three AA/DCFTAs and for other publications on the
reforms implementation in all three countries
5. 5
inflow of investments. At the same time, the implementation of the DCFTA was also
expected to help in lowering consumer inflation.
Moreover, between 2014 and 2019, the IMF supported the three countries in support of
their macroeconomic and financial stability, and to put them on the path of sustainable
economic growth.3 The IMF support was essential for each of them in this period.
Table 1: The “3” DCFTAs and the IMF*
Country The IMF program
Georgia SBA in July 20144 (SDR 100 m), cancelled in 2017
In 2014, the external outlook worsened, which opened a balance
of payments needs. The widespread poverty and high
unemployment were among the challenges faced by the
Government, and the response required fiscal stimulus. Only two
disbursements were made in the program (in 2014 and 2015).
EFF-supported program in April 2017 (SDR 484 m)
Georgia is not graduate from the SBA program due to lack of
political will to implement intended changes. After the October 2016
parliamentary elections, the authorities committed to implement
policy reforms to boost economic growth. High level of state debt,
broadened fiscal deficit, as well as external vulnerabilities, were the
focus of the new EFF program. The Program implementation
delayed, and it was extended to 2021.
Moldova Arrangements under the EFF and the ECF in November 2016
(SDR 86.3 m and SDR 43.1 m, respectively)
Moldova faced a substantial banking crisis in 2014 after USD 1.0
bn was fraudulently taken from the banking system with the
apparent collusion of public authorities. As a result, the country
suffered a political crisis. Simultaneously, the economic crisis
occurred in 2015 with a decline of real GDP due to several reasons,
including in the sharp drop in real exports due to the trade embargo
imposed by Russia, and a bad harvest due to unfavourable weather
conditions.
The political turmoil did not permit fast cooperation with the
IMF. Only at the end of 2016, the Government formulated the reform
agenda to assure a sound banking sector and a more robust
3
The IMF web-site contains all the respective documents on the cooperation with three DCFTAs:
https://www.imf.org/en/countries
4
The previous Fund-supported program expired in April 2014.
6. 6
Country The IMF program
economy overall. The country was generally on track with the
program in 2016 and 2017.
In 2018, the IMF suspended the program after the Government
passed a package of controversial tax and capital amnesty laws. The
corrective measures to return program on the track were approved
in 2019. As a result, the IMF Executive Board completed the 4th, and
the 5th reviews under the program and the program extension was
approved. The Program was successfully completed in March 2020.
Ukraine SBA in 2014 (about SDR 11 bn), cancelled in 2015
Ukraine’s economy suffered a severe economic downturn in
2014 after Russia annexed Crimea and occupied part of the Donbas
region. High external vulnerabilities, high fiscal pressure, and the
substantial general government deficit all required support from the
IMF and other international partners. The program arrangement was
prompt due to the fast decisions taken by the Government. It was
substituted by the EFF in 2015.
EFF-supported program in 2015 (SDR 12.3 bn), cancelled in
2018
The economic crisis appeared to be deeper than initially
expected in 2014. The war required a substantial increase in fiscal
spending on defence and security, while the economic downturn
negatively affected fiscal revenues. The country faced double
deficits: high general government deficit as well in the balance of
payments. As a result, there was an urgency to substitute the SBA-
2014 with the longer and larger support under the EFF. The Program
was not completed but replaced by the SBA in 2018.
Bridge SBA in 2018 (SDR 2.8 bn)
Ukraine did not implement all the reforms envisaged in the EFF
while approaching double elections scheduled for 2019. The EFF
program was to expire in spring 2019. Therefore, the Government
asked the IMF to arrange the SBA to help the country to pass
through the election period. The Program again was not completed
(only the first tranche was disbursed).
After the elections of the president and the parliament, the new
Government started the negotiations with the IMF on a new EFF-
supported program in September 2019. The staff-level agreement
was reached at the end of 2019; however, two prior actions were
7. 7
Country The IMF program
not fulfilled. As a result, the negotiations continued into 2020. The
new staff-level agreement on the program was approved in May
2020.
SBA in 2020 (SDR 3.6 bn)
New 18-months SBA was approved by the IMF Executive Board
on June 9, 2020 (with access equivalent to about USD 5 bn). The
focus of the program is made on mitigating the economic impact of
the coronacrisis and ensuring economic and financial stability.
Note:* SBA – Stand-By Arrangement, EFF - Extended Fund Facility, and ECF - Extended Credit Facility.
Source: https://www.imf.org/en/countries
The IMF programs in all three countries created an additional push for market-oriented
reforms. The following measures were present to some extent in all programs:
- Fiscal consolidation with the extension of the tax base and containment of current
expenditures;
- Price stability through improved inflation targeting;
- Greater exchange rate flexibility that allows for an increase in international reserves;
- Financial sector strengthening; and
- Structural reforms implementation.
The EU contributed co-funding of all three IMF programmes.
The international rankings of three countries did not show consistent results, though
the rankings by the Doing Business and Index of Economic Freedom improved for all three
countries (see Table 2). Moldova and Ukraine have achieved substantial progress in the
improvement of business regulation, while Georgia had good positions in rankings already
in 2014. At the same time, there was slight or insignificant changes in the Corruption
Perception Index, the Global Competitiveness Index, and the Human Development Index.
Table 2: The “3” DCFTAs in international rankings
Name of index
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
2014
recent
year*
2014
recent
year*
2014
recent
year*
Index of economic
freedom
22 12 110 87 155 134
Doing Business 8 7 78 48 112 64
Global Competitiveness
Index, 2013/14 and
2019
72 74 89 86 84 85
8. 8
Name of index
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
2014
recent
year*
2014
recent
year*
2014
recent
year*
WB Government
Effectiveness Index
(Percentile Rank**),
2014 and 2015
72 74 39 36 40 38
WJP Rule of Law
Index, 2015 and 2020
29 42 69 82 70 72
Logistics Performance
Index (LPI), 2014 and
2018
116 119 94 116 61 66
Corruption perception
index, 2014 and 2019
51 44 103 120 142 126
Human Development
Index, 2013 and 2019
79 70 114 107 83 88
The Legatum
Prosperity Index, 2014
and 2019
57 53 88 81 94 96
Note: * 2020, if not specified otherwise
** Percentile rank indicates the country’s rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0
corresponding to the lowest rank, and 100 to the highest rank.
Source: the web-pages of respective indices
The indices reveal that Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine share the same problems,
including a weak rule of law and low efficiency of the judicial system, which is depicted by
the WJP Rule of Law Index. Improvements in the effectiveness of government
administration are required in all three countries, even though the situation varies. Ukraine
and Moldova are reported to have higher levels of corruption, which create a challenge for
the investment climate.
Still, the improved macroeconomic situation and gradual progress in reforms
implementation resulted in the improvement of credit ratings of all three countries:
- Georgia: Fitch improved the credit rating from BB- in October 2014 to BB in February
2019. Standard & Poor’s credit rating for Georgia stands at BB.
- Ukraine: Fitch gradually improved the credit rating from CCC in 2014 to B in 2019.
S&P’s credit rating improved from CCC- in December 2014 to B in September 2019.
- Moldova: Moody’s set the credit ranking for Moldova at B3 in 2015 and 2017, though
the outlook was improved from negative to stable. The rating B3 with stable outlook was
affirmed in 2019.
All three states suffered costs from trade restrictions imposed by Russia during the
period under review. Moreover, the continuous conflicts with Russia result in higher
9. 9
uncertainty in all countries hampering investment climate. In particular, Ukraine’s economy
was harmed by broken supply chain due to the annexation of Crimea by Russia and
occupation of part of Eastern Donbas. Moreover, Ukraine should spend up to 5% of GDP on
defence and security due to the military conflict in the East. Moldova has not solved the
issue of Transnistria, which is de facto under the control of Russia, which imposes
restrictions on government policies. Meanwhile, Georgia did not achieve the progress on the
reconciliation with regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, Russian forces are
continuously pushing further the dividing line with occupied South Ossetia on the territory
controlled by Georgia and kidnapping people, which results in broken supply chains and
contributes to poverty.
Overall, between 2014 and 2019, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have conducted a large
set of reforms on the path of implementation of the AA with the EU and/or the IMF
programs. These reforms impacted the economic development of all three countries. Still,
the list of structural reforms to be conducted remains substantial. In particular, there is a
need for improvement of the rule of law, with an increase in fairness and efficiency of the
judicial system.
3. GDP
Summary
The economic dynamics of the three countries was quite different between 2013 and
2016, but in 2017-2019 all three countries achieved stable economic growth. Domestic
demand was a driving force of economic growth in all countries. External vulnerabilities
declined during these years, but all three economies remained highly dependent on external
factors. Still, the growth rates remained rather low, given the need to increase income levels.
One of the reasons for that was low productivity. Besides, tensions with Russia (either trade
or real wars) was a negative factor.
Figure 1: Real GDP in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Real GDP growth rates, % Real GDP index, 2012 = 100
Source: WEO, April 2020
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
10. 10
Georgia
The economy of Georgia showed resilience despite the deterioration of the economic
performance of main trading partners in 2014. Still, the economic growth in the country
decelerated to 2.9% on average in 2015-2016 due to the weak external environment in
main trading partners (in particular, Russia and Greece) and low productivity (which
hampers competitiveness). As a result, industrial production declined by 1% in 2015. At the
same time, growth was supported by the growth of non-tradable sectors.
Real GDP growth accelerated to 4.8% in 2017 and remained close to this level in 2018.
Economic performance of Georgia was supported by increased domestic and external
demand.
In 2019, Russia imposed sanctions in the tourist sector on Georgia, which resulted in
the GEL’s depreciation and acceleration in inflation. Still, the economy turned out to be
resilient to this external shock, and real GDP grew by 5.1%. Private consumption, net
exports, and public investments positively contributed to economic growth.
Still, structural weaknesses undermine the potential economic growth in the country.
They include low productivity, high unemployment (despite its decline) and skills
mismatches.
Moldova
Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe. It relies heavily on remittances by
migrants and foreign trade.
The trade ban of Russia imposed in 2013-2015 and simultaneous reduction of
remittances from Moldovans working in Russia hampered the economic development of the
country in 2014 and 2015 due to lower exports and domestic demand. In particular, in 2015
exports to Russia declined by 43.2%, while remittances from labour migrants in Russia
reduced by about 30%. Besides, Moldova’s exports to Ukraine more than halved due to the
economic crisis in Ukraine.
Additionally, the economic development in 2015 was also seriously harmed by the
banking crisis that occurred in late 2014, taking into account that three banks had to be
liquidated. This as well as political turmoil resulted in a termination of international financial
assistance by the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU in summer 2015. All factors above
resulted in sharp deceleration of leu against US dollar (by 10% in 2014 and an additional
25% in 2015). Overall, the economic growth at 5.0% in 2014 switched to the decline in real
GDP at 0.3% in 2015.
Financial assistance of international partners was restored at the end of 2016 after the
Moldovan Government introduced reforms under the IMF program. Overall, financial support
of the IMF and other donors, including the EU, have been essential for the macroeconomic
sustainability of the country.
Investments and private consumption were crucial drivers of economic growth in 2016-
2019. Still, during recent years public and private investments started playing a higher role
in economic growth. Consumption was supported mainly by remittances, even though the
part of the latter declined during recent years. Net exports had a negative contribution to
economic growth.
11. 11
Ukraine
Ukraine faced a steep reduction in real GDP in 2014-2015 due to military aggression
from Russia and the loss of territories, couples to the banking and foreign exchange crisis.
The Government had to respond with the implementation of major reforms, which were
backed up by the IMF. That included the banking reform, which resulted in the closure of
numerous banks. Besides, the Government went through an unprecedented fiscal
consolidation. Administrative tariffs for gas and heating for the population were sharply
increased, which along with the sharp depreciation, resulted in a surge of inflation by almost
50% in 2015. At the same time, social safety nets were introduced in the form of housing
and utility subsidies for households to pay higher housing and utility bills. A new transparent
public procurement system was built, tax administration improved, and the transparency of
public data was increased.
All these measures achieved macroeconomic stability. In 2016 real GDP increased by
2.4% It accelerated in 2017-2018, but it remained insufficient to compensate for the initial
drop. Domestic demand – both investment and final consumption – were the major driving
forces, while the contribution of net exports to economic growth was negative.
Still, hryvnia depreciation and decline in purchasing power of households against the
background of somewhat favourable external conjuncture contributed to the improvement
of the current account balance (which was positive in 2015). Increase in remittances from
labour migrants (in particular, working in the EU) also had a positive impact on the current
account balance.
In 2019, real GDP increased by 3.2% after a sharp deceleration of growth in the last
quarter of the year. In particular, industrial output declined due to weak external demand,
the decline in world prices of metals, hryvnia appreciation, and reduction in the production
of tobacco products. Consumer inflation reduced to the lower bound of the inflation target
and was equal to 4.1% year on year in December 2019 due to the decline in the price of
imported natural gas and hryvnia appreciation. The current account deficit narrowed to only
0.7% of GDP in 2019 due to high remittances and exports.
4. Sectoral trends
Summary
At the aggregate level, the structures of the three economies are very similar to the
services sector as the primary source of the value added. Despite the traditional perception
of agriculture playing a dominant role in the region, the share of the agriculture has been
rather small primarily due to low productivity, varying from 7.8% of gross value added in
Georgia to 12% in Moldova and Ukraine.
12. 12
Figure 2: The structure of value added in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine
Source: World Bank database
Georgia
Services account for nearly two-thirds of GDP with most services, apart from tourism,
dependent on domestic demand: domestic trade, transport, restaurants, financial services,
and communication.
In manufacturing, the largest share is attributed to food, beverages, and metal and
mineral products. Then more or less similar shares belong to, chemicals (e.g. fertilisers),
medicines, plastics and rubber, and apparel products.
Agriculture accounts for about 7% of Georgia’s GDP. The efficiency and productivity of
the sector are rather low due to outdated machinery, small land plots and low labour
productivity. There is also a lack of access to cheap and long-term financing from banks,
although there are several state programmes providing farmers with grants and loans co-
financing. Besides, the output in the sector depends on the external factors that cannot be
controlled. In 2017, agricultural output declined due to a stink bug invasion.
Figure 3: Trends in sectoral structure, Georgia, 2013-2018
Real growth rates of sector value
added, % yoy
Sector contribution to gross
value added growth, percentage
points
Source: World Bank database, own estimates for 2019
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2013 2019 2013 2019 2013 2019
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Industry (including construction) Services
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Agriculture, forestry
Industry, construction
Services
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
percentagepointscontributionto
valueaddedgrowth
Agriculture, forestry
Industry, construction
Services
13. 13
Moldova
Agricultural sector plays a crucial role in Moldova. It stands for about 10% of GDP but
employs around 30% of the workforce (from which about one fifth are classified as self-
employed) due to low labour productivity. The main products include vegetables, fruits,
grain, grape, sunflower seeds, milk and milk.5 Agriculture is a strategic supplier of raw
materials for the agri-food sector and is essential for exports.
The role of the industrial sector declined over the years, even though it is still a large
employer (of about 17% of the workforce). Manufacturing stands for 11% of GDP. The
automotive sector in free economic zones saw strong growth in recent years and is the
largest exporter. Food processing and textiles, apparel and footwear are also among the
largest sectors in generating value added. Construction growth over recent years was
attributed to increasing pubic investments.
Insurance, legal consultancy, and ICT drive growth of the services sector, which now
accounts for slightly more than half of GDP. Besides, the increase in private consumption
contributes to the strong growth of retail trade.
Figure 4: Trends in sectoral structure, Moldova, 2013-2019
Real growth rates of sector value
added, %
Sector contribution to gross value
added growth, percentage points
Source: World Bank database, own estimates for 2019
Ukraine
Services and agriculture are the main drivers of the economic growth in Ukraine. The
recovery of industrial production after the recession in 2012-2015 has lagged, dampened by
both domestic and external factors. After slow growth in 2016-2018, industrial output again
declined in 2019 due to the fall in metal prices, the drop in production of tobacco products
(due to lower consumption), as well as the termination of work of some companies at the
end of the year (due to the repairs and maintenance). Besides, the warm winter negatively
impacted the production and distribution of gas, heating and water.
5
https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/analyse-markets/moldova/economic-outline
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Agriculture, forestry
Industry, construction
Services
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
percentagepointscontributionto
valueaddedgrowth
Agriculture, forestry
Industry, construction
Services
14. 14
Agricultural production is highly dependent on the weather. However, during recent
years the grain harvest reached new record levels. At the same time, livestock production
still does not demonstrate strong growth with a decline in cattle breeding. However, poultry
and egg production were on a growth path supported by both strong domestic and external
demand.
The ICT sector remains one of the key drivers in the services sector and plays an
essential role in exports of services. Domestic demand growth during recent years
contributed to the growth of retail trade as well as passenger transports. At the same time,
the inefficiencies on railroad transportation became a bottleneck in logistics of metals and
grain from Ukraine to exports.
Figure 5: Trends in sectoral structure, Ukraine, 2013-2018
Real growth rates of sector value
added, %
Sector contribution to gross value
added growth, percentage points
Source: World Bank database, own estimates for 2019
5. External balance
Summary
The trade policies of the “3” are framed not only by the provisions of the AAs but also
by WTO rules. Currently, the European Union is the major trading partner for all three
countries, stimulated by the DCFTAs.
The 3 DCFTA countries feature negative current account balances driven by deficits in
goods and services trade. The trade deficit is balanced by remittances inflows (reducing the
current account deficit) and foreign direct investments (financing it).
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Agriculture, forestry
Industry, construction
Services
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
percentagepointscontributionto
valueaddedgrowth
Agriculture, forestry
Industry, construction
Services
15. 15
Figure 6: Current account balance, 2013-2018, % of GDP
Source: World Bank database
External vulnerabilities in all three countries were exceptionally high at the beginning of
2014 with substantial depreciation of the national currencies, and lower than required
foreign capital inflows. Moldova and Ukraine were challenged by trade sanctions imposed
by Russia, which resulted in reduced exports to Russia. Over several years, trade with the
EU increased with the implementation of the DCFTA.
One of the sources of external vulnerabilities is energy (natural gas and oil) imports,
which comprise a high share of imports in all three countries and for years this was another
example of their exposure to Russia’s policies. However, since then Ukraine has substantially
increased its energy independence from Russia through supplies of natural gas from the EU.
Figure 7: External balance of goods and services, 2013-2018, % of GDP
Source: World Bank database
-14%
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
-35%
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
16. 16
Remittances play an essential role in all three countries. While in Georgia, remittances
are rather stable at around 12% of GDP on average, in the other two countries, there were
diverged trends reported. However, the sharp increase in remittances as reported for
Ukraine is primarily attributed to the change in methodology by the NBU (which did not
recalculate the inflow for the previous years). At the same time, the decline in remittances
in Moldova was explained by much lower income from labour migration to Russia partially
due to depreciation of Russian rouble as well as the consolidation of migrant families
abroad.6
Figure 8: Inflow of personal remittances, 2013-2018 (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank database
FDI inflow is higher than remittances only in Georgia due to its favourable investment
climate, including the strong protection of investors’ rights and strong policies to encourage
foreign investors. In Moldova and Ukraine, inflows remain low due to unfavourable
investment climates; overall, in these countries, FDI is significantly lower than remittances.
Figure 9: FDI Inflow, 2013-2018, % of GDP
Source: World Bank database
6
https://www.expert-grup.org/media/k2/attachments/MEGA_editia_XXI_engleza.pdf
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
17. 17
Georgia
The current account deficit in 2014-2016 widened relative to GDP to 12% in 2015-2016.
It was a result of the decline in remittances, the widened trade deficit, as well as the GEL’s
depreciation. In particular, remittances in 2015 (primarily from Russia and Greece) dropped
by 23% (in USD terms).
However, since 2017 the situation started improving with exports growing faster than
imports and remittances regaining their lost momentum. Revenues from tourism grew in
2016-2018 rapidly.
In mid-2019, Russia imposed sanctions on tourism in Georgia, which along with the
decline in FDI inflow resulted in the lari depreciation by 7.3% against the US dollar. That
negatively contributed to imports last year. Russia’s sanctions stopped the growth of inflows
from tourism. Meanwhile, exports of goods increased by 12% due to higher external demand
for wine and fertilisers, as well as re-export of cars and copper ores. As a result, the current
account balance narrowed significantly to 4.4% of GDP in 2019.
Figure 10: Exports and imports of goods in Georgia, USD bn
Exports of goods, USD bn Imports of goods, USD bn
Source: NBG
The share of exports to the EU increased from 20.9% in 2013 to 29.3% in 2015 primarily
due to a drop in exports to Russia. In 2018 and 2019, it reduced as Russia lifted sanctions
from the trade with Georgia: exports to the EU in 2019 equalled to 21.0%. Still, between
2013 and 2019 exports increased by 34.9% in nominal terms but more than doubled in real
terms due to the implementation of the DCFTA.
At the same time, imports from the EU countries increased by only 2.6% in 2013-2019.
Its share declined from 28.2% in 2013 to about 25% in 2019.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
18. 18
FDI and official loans remain the major sources of external financing. The EU is the
major donor of the support to Georgia (under the European Neighbourhood Instrument).
Another notable donor is the USA (through the USAID).
FDI inflow is strong, which is attributed to favourable national legislation: overall, the
same national legislation is applied to both domestic and foreign companies and investors.7
Besides, the Georgia National Investment Agency plays a proactive role in supporting all
investors, including foreign investors.
Moldova
After Moldova signed the AA with the EU, Russia in 2014 imposed trade bans on
Moldova’s exports of fruits, canned products, and meat in addition to the already banned
exports of alcohol in 2013. The EU could only partially compensate for the lost market of
Russia in 2014 and 2015 but fully compensated it in the following years.8 In particular, the
DCFTA increased exports to the EU, with a notable effect on agri-food exports.
Overall, between 2013 and 2019 exports of goods increased by 11.5% (to USD 2.1 bn),
while exports of services grew by 34.3% (to USD 1.5 bn). In particular, exports to the EU
increased from USD 1.0 bn in 2013 to USD 1.6 bn in 2018 due to the implementation of the
DCFTA (Italy and Romania are vital destinations). The share of Moldova’s exports to the EU
increased by 22 p.p. to 69% in 2018.
Exports of automotive industry products accounted for about 23.3% of all exports in
2019. Agri-food exports accounted for 22.9%, and manufacturing products (primarily
apparel and consumer good) totalled 20.9% of goods exports. At the same time, energy
resources and goods with high value added (including spare parts for the automotive
industry) are essential imports products. Even though imports of goods increased by only
7.8% between 2013 and 2019, the merchandise trade deficit remained high reaching USD
3.3 bn in 2019.
Remittances play an important role in the economy. They account for about 17% of
GDP on average during recent years and support consumption as well as private
investments. Still, they declined from 19% of the total income of the population in 2014 to
16% in 2018. Remittances positively contribute to the current account balance. The share
of remittances generated in the EU has gradually increased, while those from CIS declined,
which reflects the changes in the countries of destination of labour migrants.
Official development aid plays a vital role in the financial balance of the country. The EU
and the European institutions largely supported Moldova through different instruments,
which were extended due to the implementation of the AA between Moldova and the EU.
The USA is also an important donor of the country. The IMF has supported the country
during the considered period with loans provided both to the international reserves of the
NBM and for budget purposes.
7
2019 Investment Climate Statements: Georgia, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-investment-climate-
statements/georgia/
8
https://www.expert-grup.org/media/k2/attachments/Studiul_4_ani_DCFTA_en.pdf
19. 19
Figure 11: Exports and imports of goods in Moldova, USD bn
Exports of goods, USD bn Imports of goods, USD bn
Source: National statistical office of Moldova
FDI flows are essential for the economic sustainability of the country. However, the FDI
inflow is insufficient for assuring adequate job creation, despite the provision of tax breaks
to several large foreign companies.9 The investment climate is hampered by political
uncertainty, lack of qualified labour, high emigration, weak property rights protection.
Ukraine
Ukraine has started 2014 with the balance of payment problem due to the economic
crisis. Negative financial account balance resulted in the balance of payment deficit of 10.1%
of GDP in 2014. At the same time, the current account deficit narrowed in 2014 to 3% of
GDP from 9% of GDP in 2013.
The decline in purchasing power of households and worsened financial results of
companies against the background of sharp hryvnia depreciation and high inflation in 2014-
2015 resulted in the narrowing of trade balance deficit (and current account surplus in 2015)
due to sharp decline in imports. Besides, Ukraine sharply reduced its energy imports due to
lower consumption as well as diversification of energy imports.
Prices of major Ukraine’s exports, namely grain and metals, were lower in 2019 than in
2013. Overall, between 2013 and 2019 the exports of goods and services decline by 22%,
while imports dropped by 25.6%.
9
2019 Investment Climate Statements: Moldova, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-investment-climate-
statements/moldova/
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
20. 20
Figure 12: Exports and imports of goods in Ukraine, USD bn
Exports of goods, USD bn Imports of goods, USD bn
Source: NBU
During the period, Russia lost the role of the major trading partner. At the same time,
the share of Ukraine’s exports to the EU increased by 13.1 percentage points to 37.1%,
while the share of imports from the EU grew by 9.5 percentage points to 43.1%. Moreover,
the value of exports to the EU increased by 20.1% to USD 23.5 bn, while imports remained
at the level of 2013 (USD 32.6 bn). Increase in exports is attributed to the DCFTA
implementation.
Increase in remittances also contributed to the sustainable levels of current account
deficits in 2016-2019.
Foreign investors are attracted to Ukraine by its large consumer market, high-educated
labour, and natural resources endowment. Still, FDI in Ukraine remained low throughout
2014-2019 due to economic and political uncertainty, the military conflict with Russia in the
East of the country, as well as weak property rights protection and poor infrastructure.10 To
fight corruption, which is one of the impediments to the FDI, under pressure from the IMF
and the EU Ukrainian authorities has started building the institutional framework from
entities aimed at the fight and prevention of corruption.
10
2019 Investment Climate Statements: Ukraine, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-investment-climate-
statements/ukraine/
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
21. 21
6. Fiscal balance and state debt
Summary
Public finances were the subject of close attention by the IMF during 2014-2019 as all
three countries were under the IMF programs of in negotiations with the IMF. Overall the
fiscal deficits of countries were mainly under 3% of GDP (with Ukraine as an exception in
2014-2015).
During 2014-2016 Ukraine and Moldova went through substantial fiscal consolidation
due to the economic challenges they faced. Overall they followed the provisions of the IMF
programs: to reduce the size of the Government, keep deficits low and conduct prudent
fiscal policies.
Georgia has occasionally exceeded the IMF target and run budget deficits close to 4%
of GDP. It also conducted corporate profit tax reform, which resulted in the loss of fiscal
revenues from this tax, partly compensated by the increase in excise rates for tobacco and
fuel.
Figure 14: General Government Balance (% of GDP)
Source: WEO 2019
The public debt in Moldova remains relatively low at below 30% of GDP. In Georgia,
public debt increased to around 40% of GDP in 2016 and remained at that level. In Ukraine,
the sharp hryvnia depreciation in 2014 and 2015 contributed to the increase in public debt
relative to GDP. All three countries are reliant on concessional lending, including from the
IMF, the EU, and other IFIs.
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Ukraine Moldova Georgia
22. 22
Figure 15: General government gross debt (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank database, Ministry of Finance of Georgia
Georgia
Georgia overall attempted to run prudent fiscal policies with a view to smooth
cooperation with the IMF. Still, occasionally it runs fiscal deficits above the IMF target, which
resulted in the termination of the IMF program in 2017.
Since 2017, Georgia introduced an exit capital tax (Estonia type dividend tax) in the
framework of corporate profit tax reform. To compensate for the loss of respective fiscal
revenues, the Government increased excise rates for fuel and tobacco products, which
contributed to the one-off acceleration of inflation. At the same time, current spending was
frozen to free space of high public investments.
Overall, during recent years the Government defined the financing of public investments
as the priority, even though pension expenditures were also increased.
Public debt increased to about 40% in 2016, primarily due to the GEL’s depreciation as
external debt accounts for about 80% of total debt. The further depreciation of national
currency did not allow the Government to reduce the debt to GDP ratio despite substantial
economic growth. Besides, the Government increased borrowings for financing investment
projects, intended to improve the economic performance of the country in the medium and
long run. Overall, in 2019 public debt increased marginally to 40.6% of GDP.
Moldova
The Government of Moldova has successfully restrained the fiscal deficit, which on
average in 2014-2019 comprised 1.4% of GDP. In 2019 higher expenditures were allocated
to social spending and wage increases against the background of elections. Budget capital
spending was under-executed.
The state debt of Moldova is not high as compared to peer countries as the country
relies on the revenues to the budget and grants provided by official creditors. The general
government debt is estimated to decline to 27.3% of GDP in 2019 after rising to 37.8% in
2015.
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Ukraine Moldova Georgia
23. 23
In 2018 the Government narrowed the tax base and increased tax expenditures on the
eve of the elections and conducted a new tax amnesty, which undermined the IMF program.
However, in 2019 the Government approved a set of measures to increase revenues and
strengthen the tax administration as prior actions to renew the cooperation with the IMF.
Ukraine
The economic crisis in 2014, with the paramount need to increase financing of defence
and security, pushed the Government to conduct two substantial budget sequesters11. The
IMF tranches under the new program were partially allocated for budget purposes, while
the EU has provided loans under its macro-financial assistance programs. The World Bank
provided financing primarily in the form of Development Policy Loan Program (DPL), while
the EU launched assistance under programs of macro-financial assistance. Other IFIs also
provided as concessional loans, which helped to finance investment projects.
Since 2015, fiscal decentralisation became one of the essential reforms in the country,
which are evaluated to have been notably successful. It was aimed at the strengthening of
local government entities both financially and economically. Ukraine has created many
amalgamated territorial communities (the process is to be finalised in 2020) to ensure higher
efficiency of the public finance system. These communities received higher revenues as well
as more substantial liabilities, which are expected to increase the equity in access to services
at a local level.
The number of taxes was reduced since 2015, and the payroll tax rate was halved in
2016. Besides, the tax administration was improved between 2015 and 2019, even though
there was no comprehensive tax reform. In particular, the efficiency of VAT administration
was improved, and VAT refunds became automatic. In 2019, the State Fiscal Service reforms
were launched with its separation into State Tax and State Custom Services. The increase
in concessional lending, sharp hryvnia depreciation in 2014 and 2015, as well as
recapitalisation of state-owned banks (including the nationalisation of one of the largest
banks – PrivatBank) resulted in the surge of public debt to 81.2% of GDP by the end of
2016. Overall, Ukraine secured increased concessional lending, primarily from the IMF, the
EU, and other IFIs to return to the sustainable economic path of growth. During recent three
years, fiscal consolidation (with fiscal deficit at about 2.2% of GDP and positive primary
surplus), improved efficiency of state debt management and economic growth resulted in a
sharp reduction of state debt level to 50.1% of GDP by the end of 2019.
7. Consumer prices
The national banks of all three countries use inflation targeting as a monetary policy
regime: Georgia since 2009, Moldova since 2013, and Ukraine since 2016. Georgia gradually
reduced the target from 6% in 2010-2014 to long-term value of 3% in 2019. Moldova and
Ukraine defined 5% as their long-term value for inflation. The exchange rate in all three
countries is flexible, with interventions of national banks to reduce excessive volatility and
increase international reserves.
In 2014 and 2015 all three countries were challenged by the sharp depreciation of
national currencies that resulted in the acceleration of inflation but to a different degree.
Still, inflation in Georgia increased only to 4.0% in 2015. Inflation in Georgia and Moldova
11
As the Government faced substantial contraction of revenues the budget expenditures were reduced for most of spending
items including not only capital outlays, but also financing of social spending and wages.
24. 24
decelerated again already in 2016 to levels of below boundaries of inflation targets of the
national banks. The hike in inflation in Georgia in 2017 was attributed to the increase in
excise rates.
In Moldova, inflation accelerated to 4.9% in 2019 from 3.1% in 2018 due to the
increases in regulated prices and imported-food prices. In December, it picked up to 7.5%
year on year.
In Georgia, average inflation also accelerated to 4.9% on average in 2019 due to GEL’s
depreciation and increase in excise rates on tobacco products (with inflation at 7.0% year
on year in December 2019).
Figure 16: CPI in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (annual average, %)
Source: World Bank database, National statistical services
Ukraine faced double-digit inflation in 2014-2017 (with inflation at 48.7% in 2015),
which was attributed not only to the sharp hryvnia depreciation but also to the war on the
East and annexation of Crimea as well as increases in administrative prices (e.g. gas and
heating). Inflation in Ukraine reached to a single-digit number only in 2018 thanks to
prudent fiscal policy and tight monetary policy. In 2019, the inflation decelerated to the
lower boundary of the inflation target of the NBU (4.1% year on year in December) mainly
due to hryvnia appreciation and no increases in administrative prices. The latter was partly
attributed to the lower imported natural gas prices. Still, inflation on average was 7.9% in
2019.
8. Labour market
All three countries have structural problems in the labour market. All three have low
labour productivity, what hampers competitiveness. Informal employment is also
widespread, which impacts negatively social safety systems. Skill mismatch is a challenge
for them, which puts high into agenda education reform, including the education of adults.
Labour migration is substantial, which creates pressure on the domestic labour markets.
However, it supports economic development through high remittances.
Unemployment is at two-digit numbers only in Georgia, declining gradually to 11.6% in
2019, which is the lowest level for the last 16 years. The unemployment rate for women is
lower than for men. However, more employed women are self-employed (especially in
agriculture), which often is in the informal sector.
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
25. 25
The unemployment rate in Moldova remains low at about 5%. It is explained by high
emigration and employment in the agricultural sector employing around 30% of the
population.
In Ukraine, the unemployment rate increased from 7.2% in 2013 to 9.3% in 2014 due
to the economic crisis. It remained close to these levels in 2015-2018. In 2019, economic
growth resulted in a decline in the unemployment rate to 8.2%.
Figure 17: Unemployment rate (percent of the total labour force), %
Source: World Bank data, National statistical services
Average wages in all three countries increased in real terms (see Figure) primarily
against the background of economic growth and tight labour market conditions. Wages in
US dollar terms increased only in Moldova, while it declined in Georgia and even more in
Ukraine due to substantial depreciation of national currencies.
In Ukraine, the pattern of real wages changed from a sharp drop in 2014 and 2015 due
to high inflation to the rapid growth of wage in recent years due to minimum wage increase
and high labour market pressure created by labour migration.
Figure 18: Average wage in 2013-2019
Source: National statistical services and National banks of 3DCFTAs
0
5
10
15
20
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
0
100
200
300
400
500
50
70
90
110
130
150
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Georgia, real, 2013=100 Moldova, real, 2013=100 Ukraine, real, 2013=100
Georgia, USD Moldova, USD Ukraine, USD
Index, 2013=100 USD
26. 26
9. Households’ income and poverty
Household income levels in Georgia and Moldova in USD terms as well as their trends
are similar. In Ukraine, incomes per capita are higher. However, the difference narrowed
between 2014 and 2019, as Ukraine faced the period of sharp hryvnia depreciation and high
inflation. The income difference is more substantial in PPP terms when the price level
differences between countries are taken into account.
Overall, the factors that influence income in all three countries over the considered
period are similar. Moderate economic growth and tight labour markets stimulated increases
in average nominal wages in all three DCFTA countries. Remittances play an essential role
in fuelling household consumption in all three countries. Still, the external vulnerabilities,
namely depreciation of national currencies, negatively impacted the purchasing power of
households.
In Georgia and Moldova, household income per capita grew slightly in real terms
between 2013 and 2019 due to wage and pension increases. It did not change much in USD
equivalent due to the depreciation of national currencies in 2014 and 2015. At the same
time, household income is estimated to increase by about 20% in the PPP terms.
In Ukraine, household income per capita declined in real terms and USD equivalent due
to sharp hryvnia depreciation and high inflation in 2014 and 2015. In 2016-2019, household
income resumed growth backed by an increase in all income components.
Figure 19: Household income per capita*
Note: for Ukraine disposable household income; for Moldova and Georgia average household income
Source: National statistical services and National banks of 3DCFTAs
In Georgia, the poverty headcount ratio declined from 26.2% in 2013 to 20.1% in 2018.
According to the World Bank, the poverty headcount ratio at USD 1.90 a day (2011 PPP)
declined from 6.6 to 4.5% of the population during this period. Poverty remains substantially
higher in the rural area than in urban. Households with children are more like to be in
poverty. Income inequality in Georgia remains high, and the Gini coefficient had only
somewhat reduced from 38.6% in 2013 to 36.4% in 2018. The social exclusion factor is
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Georgia, real, 2013=100 Moldova, real, 2013=100 Ukraine, real, 2013=100
Georgia, USD Moldova, USD Ukraine, USD
USDIndex, 2013=100
27. 27
estimated to be high due to low education attainment, inequity in healthcare, and high
unemployment.12 Access to credit is also unequal.
Figure 20: Gini coefficient
Note: High numbers indicate greater inequality
Source: World Bank database
In Ukraine and Moldova, the poverty headcount ratio at USD 1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is
close to zero, according to the World Bank estimates. Inequality levels are still high, even
though lower than in Georgia.
10. Conclusions
The economies of all three DCFTA countries have in common their dependence on the
external conjuncture and political cycles. Still, between 2014-2019 the countries managed
to introduce structural reforms envisaged in the AAs with the EU, signed in 2014, as well as
in IMF programs. All countries faced the times of sharp depreciation of their national
currencies, which contributed to higher inflation and negatively affected the growth of
income and wages as well as state debt levels relative to GDP. The EU became a major
trading partner for all three countries. Exports increased rapidly in nominal terms, while high
demand for investment goods stimulated the growth of imports. All three countries had
important IMF support programmes The EU also provided countries with financial support
as well as technical support for the implementation of reforms.
Georgia showed the best economic performance among the three countries. After slow
growth in 2015-2016 (about 3%), real economic growth picked to about 5% in 2017-2019.
Inflation was under control (higher inflation in 2017 was a result of an increase in excise
rates). The growth was supported by external and domestic demand. The external
vulnerabilities in the country declined due to the growth of exports, tourism and remittances,
even though external debt remains high. Fiscal sustainability was achieved, alongside
increases in public investments. The banking sector was stable, despite the GEL’s sharp
depreciation in 2014-2015. Georgia enjoyed strong FDI inflows due to the favourable
investment climate and attractive location (on the “Silk Road”).
12
https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/geo/
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
28. 28
In Moldova the economy started the period under review with serious difficulties:
political turmoil, trade ban imposed by Russia, banking crisis, and unfavourable weather
conditions, resulting in a decline of real GDP in 2015 by 0.3%. At the end of 2014 three of
the largest banks were involved in the fraudulent appropriation of an amount close to 15%
of the country’s GDP from Moldova. Since then, the economic performance was rather strong
with real GDP growth at 4.4% in 2016 and similar growth rates in the following two years.
Growth was supported by government spending and household consumption. In 2019, real
GDP growth decelerated to 3.6% due to a decline in industrial production in the 4th quarter
of the year. Over the years, the FDI inflow remained lower than needed for job creation as
the country was not able to ensure economic and political stability and effective property
rights protection. At the same time, high labour migration resulted in high remittances,
which exceeded FDI inflow.
Ukraine lags in catching up economic growth after a sharp economic decline in 2014-
2015 due to the war in the East of the country and annexation of Crimea by Russia. Sharp
hryvnia depreciation and two-digit inflation resulted in a decrease in the purchasing power
of households in 2014 and 2015. At the same time, the external trade deficit narrowed. The
state debt increased primarily due to hryvnia depreciation as well as new concessional
lending. A series of several factors - fiscal consolidation, increase in efficiency of the tax
system, reform of the banking sector, the proper monetary policy of the independent NBU,
sound public procurement system and many other reforms, a more favourable external
environment against the background - allowed the economy to grow by 3.4% in 2018. The
prudent fiscal policy resulted in a decline in state debt relative to GDP. The economic
performance improved substantially during the first nine months of 2019 but sharply
deteriorated in the 4th quarter of the year due to the drop in industrial production. Over the
years, the FDI inflow remained low as the investment climate was still weak against the
background of weak property rights protection as well as the military conflict in the East.
Even though all countries improved their places in several international rankings, they
still face common challenges, which include political turbulence, still low productivity, and
emigration. To increase productivity, countries require investments, which still requires
further reforms. Corruption and lack of property rights protection is a particular challenge
for economic development in Moldova and Ukraine.
Overall, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine improved their macroeconomic situation in 2014-
2019. They entered 2020 with a more solid base and stable path of economic growth, though
at still low rates. All three countries, therefore, entered ‘coronacrisis’ with stronger fiscal,
financial, and external buffers to fight with the negative impact of COVID-19 on the economy
in 2020.
29. 29
Annex: Expectations of the AA cumulative impact on three DCFTA
economies
Georgia
Short term Long term
GDP, % 1.7 4.3
Exports, % 8.9 12.4
Sectors of exports
increase
Fruits and vegetables, livestock and meat products,
electronics, chemicals
Imports, % 4.4 7.5
Wages, % 1.5 3.6
CPI, % -1.0 -0.6
* No-Doha results
Source: Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of negotiations of a DCFTA between the
EU and Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. Final report. By Ecorys and Case, 2012/12: EU-Georgia
and EU-Moldova DCFTA,
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150105.pdf
Moldova
Short term Long term
GDP, % 3.2 5.4
Exports, % 14.8 16.2
Sectors of exports
increase
Grains and crops, sugar, chemicals, metals, vehicles
Imports, % 6.4 7.7
Wages, % 3.1 4.8
CPI, % -1.0 -1.3
Source: Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of negotiations of a DCFTA between the
EU and Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. Final report. By Ecorys and Case, 2012/12: EU-Georgia
and EU-Moldova DCFTA,
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150105.pdf
Ukraine
Short term Long term
GDP, % 2.3 5.3
Wages for high-skilled, % 2.5 3.1
Wages for low-skilled, % 5.0 5.0
Sectors of exports
increase
Meat and animal fats, machinery & electronics, metallurgy
and distribution services
Source: Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment for the FTA between the EU and Ukraine within the
Enhanced Agreement, Ref: TRADE06/D01, By Ecorys and Case, 2007/12: EU-Ukraine Free Trade
Agreement (FTA), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/january/tradoc_137597.pdf
30. 30
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IMF publications on the Republic of Moldova, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/MDA
IMF publications on Ukraine, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/UKR
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