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Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste CIKR Sector: Case Study of the Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island
1. Running Head: NUCLEAR CIKR & TMI-2 LOCA
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector:
Case Study of the Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island
Lindsey Landolfi
Towson University
Critical National Infrastructures, IHSM 611-001
Professor William J. Lahneman, PhD
November 2011
2. NUCLEAR CIKR & TMI-2 LOCA 2
It is necessary to protect the Nuclear Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR)
from manmade and natural disasters in order to preserve the American lifestyle. A major nuclear
meltdown or detonation would severely compromise CIKR in the area surrounding the accident.
The immediate damage resulting from the impact would obliterate CIKR at the incident
hypocenter; the destruction radius will be proportionate to the yield of the explosion. It is also
important to consider the secondary effects of a nuclear accident on CIKR. For example, the
negative affects of intense electromagnetic pulse (EMP) on electronic communication devices.
EMP can interrupt satellite based communication systems or potentially damage the electrical
power grid. Lack of communications will drastically hinder incident planning and response,
confusion due to miscommunication can prove dangerous to the handling of an emergency
management situation. Thermal radiation could spark fires; if uncontrolled a firestorm can
destroy CIKR such as gasoline lines and fuel tanks. Other CIKR sectors would also be afflicted
by a nuclear disaster for example, structural damage to buildings, roads, and concrete. The Latent
radiation or fall-out will cause further detriment such as the short and long term effects of
radioactive pollution on public health safety. The radiological release on the environment may
cause terrain irregularities such as the destruction of agricultural land, livestock, aquatic life and
the contamination of flora and fauna. The environmental damage will hinder the associated aqua
and agriculture economy.
The risk of radiation leakage is a part of the nature of nuclear power plant facilities. “The
primary danger from nuclear power stations is the potential for the release of is the release of
radioactive materials produced in the reactor core as a result of fission.” (U.S. President's
Commission, 1979, p.88) In Pennsylvania USA, 1979 a nuclear partial core meltdown occurred
at Metropolitan Edison‟s and General Public Utilities‟ Three Mile Island commercial nuclear
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power plant. The core reactor of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI‑2) overheated as a result of a
series of mechanical or electrical failure caused by the combination of equipment malfunctions
and operator confusion and error. The TMI accident spanned across five days and resulted in low
levels of radiological release. The accident “was the most serious in U.S. commercial nuclear
power plant operating history.” (U.S. NRC, 2011) The Three Mile Island accident ranked at level
five in the seven levels International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) for prompt communication of
safety significance. The International Atomic Energy Agency‟s (IAEA) INES provides a general
scale for accident and incident description, facilitating standardized communications and
corresponding incident interpretations. A level five accident signifies an accident with off-site
risk for wider consequences. The TMI accident after-math included heath and environmental
repercussions, enhancements to U.S. nuclear policy and emergency preparedness, and increased
coordination efforts within the nuclear sector.
TMI nuclear facilities used a pressurized water reactor (PWR) type to generate
electricity. All commercial U.S. PWRs use uranium based fission process to produce heat; this
heat is then converted into electric power using steam. “At TMI-2, the reactor core holds some
100 tons of uranium.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.87) Failures within the coolant
system can cause overheating; excessive water evaporation may expose the reactor core. An
exposed core is highly dangerous as it may overheat and damage the fuel rods and pellets
causing the release of radioactive materials. Nuclear plants are designed with three main safety
protection features to prevent radiation leakage. First is the fuel rod core assembly; the fuel rods
absorb radioactive materials produced from the uranium fuel pellets. Second feature is the
reactor vessel constructed of steal which creates a hermetic seal around the reactor core.
Contained within the reactor vessel are the closed reactor coolant system loop and the control
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rods. The third basic safety barrier is the containment building; according to the Final Safety
Analysis Report for TMI-2 the containment building was “a 193-foot high, reinforced-concrete
structure with walls 4 feet thick.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p. 90) Nuclear facilities
have a variety of safety systems and back-up systems designed to protect against general system
failure. “The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) automatically uses existing plant
equipment to ensure that cooling water covers the core.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979,
p.93)
TMI-2 suffered a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) resulting in major damages to the
reactor and fuel. Water supply pumps for the steam generator in TMI-2‟s rector malfunctioned
resulting in loss of vital cooling water. The excessive heat caused the pressurizer level to rise
triggering the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) to open. According to a reading in the control
room electric power to the PORV was shut off, operators assumed that the PORV had properly
re-closed and the core was being cooled. “But the PORV was stuck open, and would remain
open for 2 hours and 22 minutes, draining needed coolant water -- a LOCA was in progress”
(U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.95), the reactor core was overheating. A design error
involving an inverse response from the pressurizer level indicator lead the control room
operators to believe that PRW volume was too high. In response, operators reduced the flow
coolant to a minimum by shutting down the emergency High Pressure Injection (HPI) pumps of
TMI-2‟s ECCS. This precautionary measure, in fact, further reduced cooling lowering water
levels and possibly exposing the core. The reactor core and internal vessel temperatures
continued to escalate causing an automatically scram. A reactor scram or trip is a term used by
the nuclear industry to describe the emergency shutdown of a nuclear reactor. Scram is produced
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by the immediate release of all control rods into the reactor core which stops the chain reaction
fission process.
Summarized in the paragraphs below is the chronology of the LOCA in accordance to the
NRC report and Governor R. Thornburgh reflections of the TMI accident. The TMI crisis began
early morning Wednesday, March 28, 1979 when control systems alerts indicated
malfunctioning. Control room operators performed designated procedures in response to the
systems warning signals. Workers reported the unusual system activities and took precautionary
measures in attempt to resume normal reactor functionality; situational confusion persisted
throughout the emergency response procedures. When it became clear to TMI employees that a
general emergency had occurred at the site the TMI Director of Emergency Management
reported to the accident to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) who
informed local and state government. “The NRC‟s regional office in King of Prussia, Pa., was
notified at 7:45 a.m. on March 28.” (U.S. NRC, 2011) NRC headquarters were alerted of the
scram and by approximately 8:00 am NRC Operations Center was activated. Information on the
accident was first relayed to the public via a local radio report. Upon official release of the TMI
accident the Associated Press filed a national news story on the catastrophe.
Approved emergency radiation exposure rate calculations indicated contamination
leakage at the site. However, on Thursday Met. Ed. and G.P. Utilities were assuring the public
that the incident was well managed and that public was safe. Skepticism of the utilities
credibility and the potential danger involved with nuclear accidents lead to official intervention.
The TMI crisis became the responsibility of the local governance. Governor R. Thornburgh
created an ad-hoc bureaucracy to address the accident. Official authorities instructed the local
residential areas to remain indoors and turn off ventilation systems. Meanwhile in Washington
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DC, congressional committees consulted with the NRC about the accident. That night Met. Ed.
and G.P. Utilities held their first official public press conference on the accident.
Early morning day three, children attended school as usual, there still no mandatory
public precautionary safety measures in place. At the TMI-2 facility controls indicated a pressure
build-up; in response shift operators opened the release value to vent steam and the contained
radioactive materials into the atmosphere. The PORV release was conducted with no prior
authorization and employees did not report venting activities until after the fact. The lack of
communication would facilitate information misinterpretation and negatively effect vital
decisions dependent on that information. Radiation readings reported from a helicopter over TMI
that morning “indicated a very high radiation exposure rate – 1200 millirems per hour – a rate
certainly high enough to warrant an evacuation.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.4) The radiation
measurements were reported to the NRC management team who then issued a five mile general
evacuation recommendation to Pennsylvania‟s Emergency Management Director. This
information was relayed to the local civil defense director and then to the public via local radio.
Additionally, at 9:30 A.M. an emergency siren at TMI was mysterious tripped. Prompted by
NRC recommendations, sensationalized media reports, and the fear of radiation exposure
voluntary evacuations coupled by public hysteria ensued in the residential areas near the TMI
facility. In response state authorities sought federal expertise and assistance. NRC radiation
experts further investigated the situation and announced that the evacuation warning was
mistakenly issued, the public was immediately alerted. Mr. H. Denton, the NRC‟s director of
nuclear reactor regulation, and approximately twelve other NRC experts were sent by President
J. Carter to join the official staff in Pennsylvania. After deliberation with NRC Chairman Mr. J.
Hendrie, around noon day three Governor R. Thornburgh advised all “pregnant women and
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preschoolers leave the area within five miles of the plant until further notice, and that all schools
within that zone be closed as well.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.4) A press conference was conducted
that evening with H. Denton providing a credible and trustworthy source to publics in order to
gain a better understanding of the actual technical situation at TMI.
The weekend starting on Saturday March 31st, was associated with the hydrogen bubble
scare. During the TMI-2 LOCA hydrogen gases were released by chemical reactions between the
exposed reactor core and the remaining coolant water causing pressure to build with in the
reactor vessel. NRC officials feared that the pressure may rupture or explode the reactor vessel.
These fears manifested in the media reports and public actions. It was later investigated and
reported by Mr. H. Denton that there was no imminent source of explosive danger. Immediate
press releases were issued to the media stating that there was no cause for alarm. The public was
also informed of President J. Cater plans visit TMI with Governor R. Thornburgh; the actions of
these two prominent officials would pacify public fears. His visit assured public of the safety
security at TMI and that the situation was being well managed.
The immediate crisis had been resolved, by the fifth day the public was assured by
officials that the TMI-2 accident was managed and their safety secured. A full meltdown was
averted; the majority of the radiation was contained within the plant. The detectable
contamination released into the external atmosphere caused only negligible amounts of harm to
public heath and the environment, there were no direct fatalities. Ten days following the initial
LOCA reports all official precautionary evacuation measures were withdrawn. However, there
was still much to consider in respects to the TMI-2 cleanup operations and the proper disposal of
waste materials from the nuclear plant. Governor R. Thornburgh initiated the development of a
national cost-sharing financial plan to fund the approximated billion-dollar cleanup efforts.
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Funding came from TMI owners Metropolitan Edison and General Public Utilities, the nuclear
industry, state and federal governments. Public issues with decontamination legality and safety
lead to safety demonstrations and public hearings. In response, Governor R. Thornburgh
contracted the Union of Concerned Scientists to study and develop a safe venting radioactive gas
plan. “When that organization concluded that it posed no physical threat to public health and
safety, the venting proceeded peacefully.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.7) TMI-2 has been permanently
decommissioned since the LOCA due to the damage incurred, approximately 12 years later TMI-
2 clean-up processes were completed and the reactor was officially shutdown and defueled in
1993. “NRC issued a possession-only license” (U.S. NRC, 2011) which authorizes the facility to
possess specific nuclear materials and prohibits the operation of TMI-2.
Immediately after the disaster, President J. Carter ordered the creation of a special
commission to investigate the TMI accident. The results from this commission were used as
evidence in the TMI legal trials. The commission, also known as the Kemeny Report, determined
that the accident was a result of human and organization error and not due to failure of the large-
scale technical systems. The NRC conducted its own study of the TMI-2 LOCA which yielded
results similar to the Kemeny Report. Complicated organizational structure of the utility and
ambiguous TMI-2 control room design fostered employee confusion. For instance, engineers
misread equipment in respects to the PORV operations and assumed that emergency processes
were active and that the reactor core was being properly cooled, in fact, it was not. Human
misinterpretation of the reactor control system's user interface contributed to the severity of the
LOCA. Additional contributing factor to human operational misjudgments in the TMI-2 control
room was the combination of misleading instrument information and a lack of emergency worker
training. An example was that the TMI-2 pressurizer level indicator design used volume and not
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mass as a measure for pressure levels, therefore excessive heat caused by the LOCA created
steam-pockets at the bottom of the reactor and falsely raised the PRW volume.“The operators
had been taught to keep the system from "going solid" -- a condition that would make controlling
the pressure within the reactor coolant system more difficult and that might damage the system.”
(U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.98) TMI-2 control room operators followed the approved
safety regulations and protocols to prevent the system from overheating or going solid. However,
employee training was not sufficient enough to enable them to quickly recognize system errors
and remedy malfunctions in order to prevent general operational failure. A lack of
comprehensive and user-friendly safety regulations and protocols also hampered employees‟
ability to respond to the confusion regarding the system warning signs.
A major contributing factor to the TMI LOCA and public crisis was poor communication
and coordination. A number of private and public agencies at the local, state and federal were
involved in incident response planning; delayed, ambiguous, and inconsistent interagency
communications between involved parties negatively reflected on emergency response. The
Kemeny Report indicated that prior to the TMI-2 LOCA similar PORV incidents had been
reported in facilities with PWR type reactors using the same brand of equipment as TMI. If this
information was shared by the NRC, the utilities, or the equipment manufacture repair
maintenance could have been performed and the accident prevented. In respects to emergency
operations, the rapid dissemination of information is vital to response efficiency and
effectiveness. Information on the TMI-2 LOCA was not delivered in a timely manner, “the local
NRC office was not manned, and telephone calls were answered by answering machines until
8:00 A.M.” (Osif, Baratta, & Contling, 2004, p.26), approximately four hours after the LOCA
occurred. The potential assistance from NRC experts during this timeframe may have resulted in
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a more timely resolution of the LOCA in turn reducing the resulting negative consequences. A
lack of communication coordination between the government and the utility was also evident in
NRC‟s accidental issuance of a general evacuation. NRC‟s evacuation recommendation was
issued prior to consulting Pennsylvania‟s radiation protection director. Further investigation into
the radiation measurements would have indicated that the reading was faulty due to additional
external influences such as the location of the reading and operational activities at the TMI-2
reactor. Media coverage and public perception of the accident were influenced by the official
handling of the LOCA. Comprehensive communications could have prevented unnecessary mass
public panic and confusion.
The delay in the dissemination of information regarding the incident from the plant
operator fostered negative speculation and increased public fear. Additionally, the utility
concealed pertinent information from the public for example, technicians at Met. Ed. and G.P.
Utilities were aware that radioactivity levels in areas surrounding the factory were elevated about
normal measurements yet this data was not disclosed in their public statements. Another example
of information deliverance aversion was when Met. Ed. employees vented radioactive steam into
the atmosphere without authorization or alerting the public until after the fact. By down-playing
the magnitude of the incident to the public the utility diminished their credibility with the public
and government. “The utility, its regulators and other groups and institutions appeared to be
contradicting each other, or telling the public either less than they knew or more than they
knew.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.2) Residents experienced situational confusion as a result of the
contradictions between the reassuring official news reports and sensationalized national media.
With the lack of credible sources and general information confusion such as the NRC errored
evacuation issuance, it was difficult for the public to evaluate and select which information to
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consume. When people believe that they have been deceived there is a higher probability for
negative speculation.
The TMI accident generated massive media coverage. There was high news value of
publicizing and sensationalizing the TMI-2 LOCA. Media dramatization of the situation
exaggerated public fear and rumors of an imminent “China Syndrome” situation. “The China
Syndrome” was released in theaters twelve days prior to the TMI accident. “The China
Syndrome” dramatized the dangers of nuclear power; the script even described how a nuclear
meltdown could contaminate an area “the size of the state of Pennsylvania.” (Thornburgh, 1999,
p.3) The film‟s title was developed from the concept that a molten nuclear reactor core could
melt the earth penetrating through to the opposite side. In actuality a major nuclear plant
meltdown involves excessive overheating of the reactor core that breaches the physical safety
barriers; when uncontained the radioactive materials would be externally released into the
environment. Chernobyl, Ukraine 1986 nuclear meltdown, described as a level seven accident
according to the INES, is an ideal example of the potential dangers and safety significance of a
worst-case scenario nuclear accident. However, at the time the majority of the public was
unaware of the potential dangers involving a nuclear accident. Many people assumed that
mushroom cloud style nuclear explosion would ensue. As explained in the Kemeny report; “an
accident we [the public] cannot see or taste or smell . . .is an accident that is invisible. I think the
fact that it is invisible creates a sense of uncertainty and fright that may well go beyond the
reality of the accident itself.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.85)
The TMI accident created an ideal environment for nuclear opposition to express the
growing pubic dissent against the use of nuclear power. The TMI-2 accident resulted in
increased and vocalized anti-nuclear sentiments. Anti-Nuclear Power Campaigns peaked
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following the TMI accident; mass demonstrations conveyed the public‟s health safety and
environmental concerns. Negative public perception of nuclear generated energy hindered
expansion of the nuclear power industry. “New construction was stopped dead in its tracks and
no new plants have been undertaken since 1979.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.7) The TMI accident
resulted in severe image and monetary ramifications for the nuclear industry as a whole. Major
federal and commercial contributions from the nuclear industry supported the TMI-2 cleanup
operation. “The cleanup cost nearly a billion dollars, one third of which was passed on to rate
payers, making nuclear power more expensive than other energy options.” (Thornburgh, 1999,
p.1) The nuclear industry incurred additional monetary costs in order to be in compliance with
new safety standards established in response to TMI accident. The resolution of the TMI-2
accident resulted in large initial investments and long-term monetary consequences for the
nuclear industry active after the TMI accident. The TMI-2 LOCA and public relations crisis
damaged the nuclear industry‟s core advertising campaign message of nuclear power as the most
financially and environmentally friendly energy option.
The radioactive material release at TMI-2 promoted investigations regarding the risk of
threat of latent radioactivity on public health safety and the surrounding environment. The EPA
was responsible for the initial official nuclear post-monitoring program to document the health
and environmental effects of the radiation released as a result of the TMI-2 LOCA. Met. Ed. and
G.P. Utilities in cooperation with the Pennsylvania Department of Health continue to monitor the
vicinity for rates radiation disease. Government officials confirmed that statistical evidence of
radiological measurement indicated minimal possibility for negative health consequences
correlated to the TMI accident. The Kemeny Report concluded “On the basis of present scientific
knowledge, the radiation doses received by the general population as a result of exposure to the
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radioactivity released during the accident were so small that there will be no detectable
additional cases of cancer, developmental abnormalities, or genetic ill-health as a consequence of
the accident at TMI.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.39) Epidemiological studies have
produced conflicting results. Numerous commercially sponsored scientific studies have revealed
a positive correlation between the contamination leakage and radiation-related diseases. Reports
indicated increases of numerous forms of cancer, respiratory illness, and stress related disorders
resulting from the long-term psychological effects of the disaster such as heart disease. For
example, “an annual volume issued by the National Center for Health Statistics, showed that the
1978–1979 rate increase in Pennsylvania exceeded the national increase in three crucial
categories: infant deaths, births under 3.3 pounds, and percent of newborns with low Apgar
scores.” (Mangano, 2004, p.3) The TMI catastrophe affected more than the local human
population, multiple sources of anecdotal evidence reported disease among the area‟s wildlife
and livestock. The local environment was negatively impacted by soil and ground water
radioactive contamination. Negative biological effects resulted from the external and internal
exposure to the radioactive pollution produced from the TMI-2 LOCA.
To date there has TMI residential publics have not been able to file a class action lawsuit
to address the concerns of Pennsylvania residents in respect to the TMI accident and personal
health effects. Met. Ed. and G.P. Utilities settled quietly out of court paying out over a million
dollars worth of damages for personal injury and loss claims. “In 1981, citizens' groups won a
class-action suit against the Three Mile Island facility, an out-of court settlement of $25 million.”
(Greene, 2001, p.178) A portion of this settlement was allocated towards the creation of the TMI
Public Health Fund which is responsible for overseeing research linking negative health
consequences to the radiation exposure absorbed by publics in the TMI area. In 1983, Met. Ed.
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was indicted by a federal grand jury of criminal charges of falsifying system test results prior to
the TMI-2 LOCA. “The indictment charges the company with five counts of violating provisions
of its license to operate a nuclear power plant, five counts of violating NRC regulations and one
count of violating a federal statue against false statements.” (AP, 1983, p.6) It was determined
that Met. Ed. and G.P. Utilities did not intentionally withhold or distort public or private
information. However, Met. Ed.‟s faced additional financial ramifications and their competency
as a nuclear facility operator was challenged; the accused violations could have increased the
severity of the TMI accident.
As a result of the TMI-2 LOCA and NRC sponsored research of the safety failures at
TMI, the NRC enacted a post-TMI action plan designed to enhance industry regulations and the
operational safety and security of U.S. nuclear facilities. The NRC reorganized and enhanced the
management of nuclear power facilities. Tactics such as more facility safety upgrade
requirements, increased authoritative control, and stricter regulations were the foundation for
substantial safety performance improvements in U.S. nuclear power plants. The NRC also raised
standards of operator training and qualification requirements and added the requirement for all
U.S. nuclear plants to have a developed emergency operational plan intact. The NRC and
commercial nuclear industry adapted recommendations from the commission becoming
increasingly proactive in respect to nuclear safety standards.
Major US CIKR accidents such as the Three Mile Island Nuclear Meltdown have assisted
the United States government in recognizing the importance of preparedness in respect to the
security of US CIKR. In response to the federal challenges with incident response at TMI
President J. Carter enacted Executive Order (EO) 12127, in 1979 establishing the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a part of the National Homeland Security strategy.
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FEMA was designed to centralize and integrate the numerous federal agencies with emergency
response responsibilities. EO 12148 authorized FEMA to provide the guidelines for response
policy, specifically organization and operational coordination of incident management. Having a
standardized structure created unity between these multiple entities. While at the same time the
flexibility of FEMA‟s comprehensive guidance documents for emergency preparedness response
allows for modifications to best suit each situation. FEMA‟s all-hazard approach for complex
incident response situations can be easily adapted to scenarios such as a nuclear meltdown.
FEMA plays a major role in Nuclear CIKR FEMA emergency planning and response
management specifically the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program. FEMA
assumed responsibility for the coordination of off-site activities, specifically government
emergency planning and response while NRC maintained responsibility of the regulation of on-
site emergency planning and response activities.
Federal emergency response frameworks provide the most robust and comprehensive
recommendations based off of existing experience, knowledge, and resources and are adaptable
to operational capabilities. National guides in response planning support coordinated and
comprehensive incident response efforts are consistent with National Response Framework
(NRF) standardization, National Incident Management System (NIMS) terminology, and the
Incident Command System (ICS) structure. The NRF predefines the organizational structure for
large scale domestic incident response from local, state, federal, to headquarters such as DHS‟s
National Operations Center (NOC). The NRF replaced the Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan which was developed in response to the government‟s experience with the TMI
accident. Scenario specific planning documents such as NRF‟s national planning scenarios or
National Infrastructure Protection Plan‟s (NIPP) Sector Specific Plans (SSP) are useful in the
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development of strategic and operational emergency planning for CIKR protection and
resilience.
Federal involvement in CIKR is delegated by the DHS to Sector-Specific Agencies
(SSAs). The Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector is one of the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan‟s (NIPP) eighteen designated SSAs responsible for the collaboration of the
public and private protective activities for a specific critical infrastructure sector. The Nuclear
SSA is located within the Sector-Specific Agency Executive Management Office (SSA EMO)
under the DHS, Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP). The Nuclear SSA is one of the primary
CIKR sectors involved in emergency support functions for oil and hazardous materials, and
energy response. The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) provides the
legal frame work for the Nuclear Government Coordinating Council (NGCC) and Nuclear Sector
Coordinating Council (NSCC) to work in collaboration towards the protection of Nuclear CIKR
as identified and prioritized in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7) as well as
supporting the implementation of the NIPP. The all-hazards Nuclear SSA approach is dependent
on the collaboration of multiple partnerships. The capabilities of numerous appropriately selected
responding agencies are aligned via the NRF, National Operations Center (NOC), National
Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and National Infrastructure Coordinating Center
(NICC). The Nuclear SSP delegates CIKR protection responsibilities for the Federal, State, and
local governments, the private sector, non-government organizations, and international
participants for the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector.
The Nuclear SSP supports the implementation of NIPP through risk assessment,
mitigation actions, operational planning, cooperation efforts, and response and recovery
strategies. The Nuclear SSP outlines an array of strategies and tactics to ensure the protection
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and resilience of the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector. The Nuclear SSP has an
established framework delegating responsibilities to the agencies accountable for the protection
of Nuclear CIKR via capabilities-based planning and performance standards. The Nuclear SSA
collaborates with the DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC)
National Infrastructure Risk Analysis Program (NIRAP) through participation in the Strategic
Homeland Infrastructure Risk Analysis (SHIRA) process. SHIRA is a DHS standardized CIKR
risk assessment and analysis program. Nuclear SSP supports a risk-informed approach in the
development of protective measures.
The Nuclear Sector goals explained in the Nuclear SSP highlight the importance of five
major factors awareness, prevention, protection, response, and recovery. Interagency awareness
is developed through appropriate information sharing with relevant security partners such as the
NRC, DOE, DOD, and private sector. Awareness involves international cooperation and sharing
technical knowledge on nuclear safety. Clear, open, and consistent, proactive and reactive
communications between the different organizations involved improves the coordination of
responsibilities and operational activities. Pre-emptive emergency educational materials with
preventative action recommendations such as self decontamination, physical protective
measures, ideal sheltering locations, water advisories, ad-hoc protection, and hazard and areas
should be distributed to the publics of a vulnerable area. Public awareness and engagement is
beneficial to good radiation exposure management since it would help to minimize the negative
immediate and long-term consequences. Information sharing with government and public is
necessary to best achieve recovery goals.
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Successful emergency management efforts require prioritizing actions in planning and
response operations. Development and coordination of evacuation plans are dependent on
planning zones. The three planning areas as specified in the Nuclear SSP are the Exclusion Area
Boundar (EAB), the plume exposure pathway (10 mile EPZ), and the Ingestion Exposure
Pathway (50-mile EPZ). In 1979, TMI lacked a conceptual model to use in evacuation planning
and response to an unexpected nuclear accident. While it is now required for all U.S. Nuclear
Sites to have an evacuation plan, the issuance of an evacuation should be handled with carful
deliberation. Evacuations require significant preparation and resources and should be issued on
situational bases in respects to an analysis cost to benefit ratio. Certain incidents may not require
the complications of evacuation. When issued an evacuation should be limited to those most at
risk in order to prevent unnecessary hysteria. Emergency response arrangements should be
developed by identifying CIKR and prioritizing related protection and restoration activities.
Proposed zone delineation for nuclear explosion response planning according to the 2009
Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation included low-damage (LD), moderate-
damage (MD) and No-Go (NG) zones recognized by the degree of observable damage. The
dangerous fall-out (DF) zone is identified by radiation levels. Incident recovery efforts are
maximized by the enhanced resources of cooperative interagency coordination. To be effective
emergency response plans must be comprehensive and efforts coordinated at all levels.
Communication and coordination are the primary focus in emergency response. Interoperable
communications promote situational awareness at all government levels and private sector to
manage resources and share incident specific information from the first responders to higher
level responders and so forth to headquarters.
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In the event of a major nuclear accident, the regional city management, emergency
managers, and first responders would be the first to respond to the disaster and its consequences.
Once situational awareness is established by conducting initial damage assessments, the need for
additional assistance can be determined. If necessary, the local government should issue a
national presidential alert of disaster to the public using FEMA‟s Emergency Alert System
(EAS). Disaster declaration and requests are first handled by an established Joint Field Office
(JFO) who primarily serves to organize and coordinate the overall incident management efforts.
Emergency response shelter and evacuation strategies should be implemented immediately and
facilitating infrastructures such as medical support, properly managed. Coordination between
jurisdictions and state assets via mutual aid or assistance agreements help to supply necessary
resources and support. Federal government response efforts will greatly enhance technical and
financial resources. The use of national communication systems such as ICS and Joint
Information Center (JIC) enable rapid information dissemination and response between involved
authorities. Government regulatory authorities collaborate with the private sector to further
enhance incident response. Private sector involvement includes private sector CIKR operators
and owners, industry partners, and NGOs such as the Red Cross. Interagency coordination and
collaboration must be established between involved response parties to achieve successful
incident preparation and response.
In coordination with FEMA‟s All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning framework,
state and local authorities are responsible for the offsite nuclear facility management, emergency
planning and response. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the major federal
coordinating agency for radiological regulation and incident response, collaborates with the
DHS, the Nuclear SSA, and the Department of Energy (DOE) to ensure the protection of
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commercial and non-power nuclear reactors through implementing protective programs and
enforcing industry regulations. The DHS is one of the lead coordinating and management
agencies in CIKR response efforts. In the event of an oil, hazardous material, or energy disaster
responsibility will primarily rest in the Office of Infrastructure Protection: Nuclear Reactors,
Materials, and Waste SSA. The interrelated CIKR structure may call for involvement from
multiple SSAs and associated agencies for example, the Department of Transportation (DOT) in
coordination with the DOE would be responsible for hazardous material disposal. The DOE also
contributes to the development of new nuclear technologies. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) contributes to environmental radiation standards. The Clean Air Act (CAA), 1990
required that the EPA and other authoritative sources to establish and enforce national emissions
standards for hazardous air pollutants. EPA‟s Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT)
is specifically responsible for emergency radiological incident response. Emergency response
efforts may require involvement from the Emergency Services SSA, the Public Health and
Healthcare Sector SSA, and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). Possible additional
federal involvement may include assistance from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and
U.S. military aid in response efforts, or FBI and DOJ involvement to investigate the possibility
terrorist threat and attacks on Nuclear CIKR. The Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
Support Annex establishes the delineation of roles and responsibilities relative to NRF structure
and NIMS guidance in establishing operational activities for CIKR security planning and
response.
Lessons learned from the TMI accident provoked safety and security adjustments for new
generation of power plants in order to prevent future accidents. Nuclear industry reform post-
TMI enhanced technical, operational, and managerial safety and performance. Modern plant
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designs and equipment feature improvements in the physical structure of the reactor and more
competent and user-friendly control designs for example, a clear and constant display of all
equipment statuses in a centralized local. A culture of nuclear safety and emergency
preparedness was developed in the industry reformation. Information dissemination of new
technological and safety developments and feedback communications on the functional of new
developments was more openly share within the U.S. nuclear industry and international partners.
Constant enforcement of safety analysis procedures such as radiological assessments and
inspection reports have aided in the prevention of design based accidents and over all quality
control.
Performance and safety enhancements of nuclear facilities lead up to a recent revival of
the nuclear industry. Government and private nuclear partners have increased their vocalizations
of nuclear power as a sustainable and environmentally friendly energy solution. Industry
expansion has been facilitated by the U.S. government through the allocation of federal loans to
support the development of new U.S. nuclear facilities. The DOE Loan Guarantee Program was
established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The $18.5 billion allocated to the DOE is intended
to “reduce the economic risk of deploying the first two or three "first-of-a kind" units of
innovative reactor designs new to the American market.” (Energy Hearing on Nuclear Energy
Development, 2009, p.3) The functionality of the active commercial nuclear industry was
secured through the issuance NRC extensions of current operating licenses. In 2008, the new
TMI facilities owner post-TMI-2 LOCA, the Exelon Corporation, applied for license renewal of
TMI-1 in 2008. According to the U.S. NRC operating reactor licensing, the TMI Unit-1 license
was renewed in 2009 extending approved nuclear operations until 2034. With the license
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extension the Exelon Byron Nuclear Generating Station at TMI-1 is currently running at
capacity.
The TMI-1 Nuclear Generating Station, “like all U.S. nuclear energy facilities, is based
on a „defense-in-depth‟ design, which means there are redundant layers of safety.” (Exelon
Corporation, 2011)The defense-in-depth system supports nuclear safety thorough multiple layers
or independently functioning safety control measures designed to avert human or system failure
at a nuclear facility. Nuclear facilities designed with multiple, diverse data sensors and redundant
warning systems are more likely to prevent and withstand major accidents. The safety enhanced
facility design is supported through highly trained operators and experience management. In
addition, emergency planning and preparedness activities promote a company culture of safety
awareness, provides substantial guidance for emergency response and responders, and exhibits
Exelon‟s commitment to occupation and public health and safety.
Exelon has a sophisticated emergency plan in place designed to protect the public health
and safety in event of a nuclear emergency. The current TMI Emergency Plan is approved by
the NRC and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The TMI Emergency Plan explains the public
alert system that would be implemented and details instructions for individuals unable to use the
traditional systems. Situational information such as directions to shelter indoors or evacuation
locations would be disseminated via warning sirens and through the FEMA‟s Emergency Alert
System (EAS). The plan outlines the emergency procedures to be followed by local publics
specifically those located within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), a ten mile radius from a
nuclear facility. Emergency instructions are broken-down by county and township detailing risk
and host schools, reception center addresses and driving directions, as well as transportation
assistance numbers. The TMI evacuation plan was developed with consideration of traffic flow
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23. NUCLEAR CIKR & TMI-2 LOCA 23
patterns and alternative housing locations; the evacuation map illustrates the evacuation routes,
reception centers, and township divisions. The Exelon emergency plan also uses the NRF
classification system used at TMI in order to foster media consistency and public clarity in
respects to reporting unusual activities or crisis situations. The classification system uses four
levels as follows; unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency. The use of
Exelon emergency procedures, sector specific planning, and federal general emergency planning
frameworks provide the guidance necessary for successful emergency response planning.
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References
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