The document explores the differences in social media risk communication patterns among citizens in the U.S. and South Korea during the 2013 North Korean nuclear test, highlighting challenges in risk communication. Using data from Twitter, the authors identify how intermediary actors shaped the dissemination of risk information in varying social contexts. The findings emphasize the significance of social networks in enhancing homeland security communication strategies.

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Kyujin Jung
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Public Administration
University of North Texas
Han Woo Park
Full Professor
Department of Media & Communication
YeungNam University

2. Acknowledgement
• Jung, K.J., & Park, H.W.@ (2014 Online First). Citizens' Social
Media Use and Homeland Security Information Policy: Some
Evidences from Twitter Users during the 2013 North Korea
Nuclear Test. Government Information Quarterly*. DOI:
10.1016/j.giq.2014.06.003
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0740624X14001166
• The earlier version of the current article was presented at the
Summer Seminar of Asia Triple Helix Society in Daegu, South
Korea. The authors wish to acknowledge Dr. Ralph Schroeder,
Dr. Seong-Jun Lee, sand Dr. YonSoo Lee for their suggestions
in the formative stages of the article as well as their review of
the manuscript. They also wish to acknowledge Dr. Paul T.
Jaeger and anonymous reviewers for their critical comments

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How did citizens in the U.S. and South Korea form different dynamically evolving patterns of risk
communication on social media during the 2013 North Korean nuclear test?
How did intermediary actors disseminating risk information on social media facilitate information
diffusion in different social contexts of South Korea and the United States?

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 Risk communication in Homeland Security
 Risk communication is defined as “an interactive
process of exchange of information and opinion on
risk among individuals, groups, and institutions”
(National Research Council, 1989, p. 12)
 Within the homeland security information policy,
risk communication with the public is formally
composed of three stages (Decker, 2001; Purpura,
2007)
• Assessing threats
• Selecting methods
• Distributing information

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 Challenges in risk communication
 Current literature shows that governments and
principal agencies may not recognize the challenges
involved in administering risk communication
(Purpura, 2007; Cole & Follows, 2008; Pidgeon,
2012)
 Providing more detailed information on how
difficult it is for U.S. citizens can strengthen positive
aspects of risk communication on social media,
although U.S. government agencies monitor other
countries' WMD development and seek to protect
citizens from the spread of nuclear weapons
(Chapman, 2008)

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 Social media use in risk communication
 In terms of risk communication, it have shed critical
light on the behavior of the public, including the types
of information sought by the public before, during,
and after a threat (Jung et al. 2014)
 As the case of the 2010 Haitian earthquake, in crisis
communication management, social media use
effectively influenced the process of sharing and
disseminating information (Yates and Paquette, 2011)
 In practice, the US Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) has employed diverse social media
tools such as Twitter (@fema, @ReadydotGov, and
@citizen_corps), Facebook
(www.facebook.com/FEMA), and YouTube
(www.youtube.com/user/FEMA)

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 Situational Theory of Publics
 The STP aims to examine when and why individual
citizens become active in risk communication
behaviors such as information seeking and
processing (Grunig, 1997, 2003)
 The STP provides a key framework for identifying
not only patterns of citizens’ risk communication
behaviors but also key actors in risk communication
on social media
RQ1: How did citizens in the U.S. and South Korea form different
dynamically evolving patterns of risk communication on social media
during 2013 North Korean nuclear test?

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 Social Amplification of Risk Framework
 The SARF focuses on the key notion that citizens’ risk
communication behaviors are shaped by different social,
institutional, and cultural contexts that constantly
interact with threats such as hazards and terrors (Binder,
2011; Renn, 2011)
 The SARF posits that social contexts closely connected to
crisis management organizations such as the Department
of Homeland Security can amplify or attenuate citizens’
risk communication (Rogers et al., 2007)
RQ2: How did intermediary actors who disseminated risk information on
social media during the 2013 North Korean nuclear test facilitate
information diffusion under different social contexts of South Korea and
the U.S.?

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 The 2013 North Korean Nuclear Test
 On February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted its third
nuclear test in Punggye-ri, near the site of previous two
tests, in Mantapsan, Kilju-gun, Hamkyeongbuk-do
Source: Stars and Stripes (February 11, 2013)

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 Data
 To investigate the differences in patterns of citizens’
risk communication on social media between the
U.S. and South Korea during the 2013 North Korean
nuclear test, NodeXL, which accumulates and
estimates network structure statistics, including
diverse actors on Twitter, was employed (Hansen et
al., 2011)
 Based on the NodeXL data collection strategy, data
on Twitter mentions with key wordsin English and
Korean for North Korea (“ 북한” and “North Korea,”
respectively) were collected over a 24-day period
from January 30, 2013, when North Korea
promulgated martial law, to February 24, 2013

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 Methods
 Social network analysis (SNA) indicators, i.e.,
network density, closeness and betweenness
centrality, and the vertex property, were employed
for identifying the patterns of risk communication
on Twitter during the 2013 nuclear test by North
Korea
 Specifically, two sets of network indices derived
from macro and micro perspectives were employed
• Macro perspective: Numbers of vertices, edges,
connected components, single-vertex-connected
components, unique edges, edges with duplicates,
maximum vertices, and maximum edges
• Micro perspective: the page rank and betweenness
centrality based on cross-sectional ego networks

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 Macro Network Perspective (Korean Keyword)

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 Macro Network Perspective (English Keyword)

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 Micro Network Perspective (Korean Keyword)

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 Micro Network Perspective (English Keyword)

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 Interpersonal Risk Communication Networks
(Korean Keyword)
*Red nodes indicate influential actors with high betweenness centrality

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 Interpersonal Risk Communication Networks
(English Keyword)
*Red nodes indicate influential actors with high betweenness centrality

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 Top Five Influential Actors in Risk
Communication Networks Based on Keywords
Networks Based on the Korean Keyword Networks Based on the English Keyword
Twitter User
Name
Page
Rank
Betweenness
Centrality
Twitter User
Name
Page
Rank
Betweenness
Centrality
biguse 24.46 25479.23 joshrogin 10.44 840.00
hypar2k1 23.05 2352.00 loudobbsnews 4.42 424.00
funronga 11.84 14839.70 rationalists 3.76 42.00
suahpin 7.91 5830.43 kjon 2.84 20.00
hwsearth 5.76 17263.74 swin24 2.38 12.00

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 By mapping risk communication networks
during the 2013 North Korean nuclear test, the
findings highlight the power of social networks
in the context of homeland security
 As highlighted by the STP, risk communication
networks emerging from those actors who are
threatened by potential terrorist attacks tend to
evolve in a dynamic manner through the
development of a close-knit structure
 From the SARF, risk communication can be
dramatically extended by intermediary actors
can play crucial roles in the diffusion of risk
information
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20. TThhaannkk yyoouu
Kyujin Jung
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Public Administration
University of North Texas
Han Woo Park
Full Professor
Department of Media & Communication
YeungNam University