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- 1. MAKING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CONVENTIONAL GENE PUERTA Seeing Through the Sandstorm
- 2. The Reason behind the Research https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_IZ.html al Askari Before After
- 5. Breakdown of Terminology Definitions courtesy of: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ Force Force Force Network Conventional Force
- 6. Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Theory Research concludes that the best way to go about defeating an insurgency influenced by a network is for the conventional “force” to influence the opinion of the population by providing basic needs and services such as security, sanitation and social services thus making it harder for an insurgent to coerce the population in to giving in to their demands. An example of how unconventional tactics and strategy could be incorporated in the war on terror may be to send out platoon sized elements in each neighborhood with the sole mission of working side-by-side with police forces-in training (and national guards men) while conducting missions with them and not for them. This would be a hybrid of Poole’s tactical approach and Kilcullen’s emphasis on getting a more regional view of the campaign along with the native force’s show of force and commitment to security, which the populace will see the effects of on a daily basis. It is a complete about face on conventional force-on-force strategy while maintaining the integrity of unconventional tactics of immersing in the population and pushing them to take the fight to the enemy: the insurgent.
- 8. Works Cited 1. Abbas, Saleh. Iraq on the Brink of Civil War The Plight of a Nation. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2006. 2. Sarah Kenyon Lischer. “Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced Migration Crisis." International Security 33 , no. 2 (2008): 95-119. http://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed March 9, 2009). 3. O’Donnell, K. and K. Newland. 2008. The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: The Need for Action . Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 4. Greg Bruno, “Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia),” Council on Foreign Relations, December 14, 2007. http://www.cfr.org/publication/14811/ (accessed March 10, 2009). 5. Jean E. Krasno and James S. Sutterlin, The United Nations and Iraq: Defanging The Viper . Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003. 6. Cockburn, Patrick. Muqtada Al-Sadr and the Battle for the Future of Iraq. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2008. 7. Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: a French view of counterinsurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964. 8. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009. 9. Poole, John H. Terrorist Trail. Emerald Isle, NC: Posterity Press, 2006. 10. Long, Austin. On “Other War”: Lessons from five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2006. 11. John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy. Rethinking Counterinsurgency. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2008. 12. Beede, Benjamin R. Intervention and Counterinsurgency: An Annotated Bibliography of the Small Wars of the United States, 1898-1984. New York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc, 1985.
- 9. Works Cited (cont.) 13. Joes, Anthony James. Modern Guerrilla Insurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992. 14. Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991. 15. LTC Bruce Floersheim, “Forging the Future of American Security with a Total Force Strategy ”, Orbis , Volume 53, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 471-488, ISSN 0030-4387, DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.04.012. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W5V-4W9V7N1-1/2/f6cca0ae75e909e912b0e8c6e124d737) 16. Michael C. Horowitz, Dan A. Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy”, Orbis , Volume 53, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 300-318, ISSN 0030-4387, DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.01.013 (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W5V-4VP1CV1-9/2/0ad8b4207bcd89fb2b4c2364666d8cfa) 17. Myerson, Roger B. “A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization: Theory of Leadership and Lessons of Iraq . ” Journal of Conflict Resolution , 2009 53: 470-482 18. Roper, Daniel S. "Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War." Parameters: US Army War College 38, no. 3 (September 2008): 92-108. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed June 12, 2009). 19. Daniel H. Levine, “Organizational Disruption and Change in Mozambique’s Peace Process,” International Peacekeeping 14, 3 (2007): 368-383. 20. Bush, George W. 2007. "Statement on the Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 43, no. 24: 798-798. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 12, 2009). 21. Headquarters U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual No. 3-24: Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: GPO, 15 December 2006.
- 10. Works Cited (cont.) 22. Nelson, Lewis. Interview by Gene Puerta. Cellular phone. Champaign, IL. 03 June 2009. Champaign, IL. 23. Placchetti, Ryan. Interview by Gene Puerta. Cellular phone. Champaign, IL. 03 June 2009. Champaign, IL. 24. Hawks, Stephen. Interview by Gene Puerta. Cellular phone. Champaign, IL. 08 June 2009. Champaign, IL. 25. Alaa. THE MESOPOTAMIAN: TO BRING ONE MORE IRAQI VOICE OF THE SILENT MAJORITY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE WORLD. November 30, 2003. http://messopotamian.blogspot.com/ (accessed July 4, 2009). 26. Unknown (Riverbend). Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog From Iraq. August 31, 2003. http://riverbendblog.blogspot.com/ (accessed July 4. 2009).
- 11. Acknowledgements OMSA The entire McNair Staff Dr. Hoganson Friends and Family
Editor's Notes
- Ladies, Gentlemen and distinguished guests, thank you for attending my brief presentation on the project I’m researching this summer. My name is Gene Puerta, I will be a junior come this fall, my major is Political Science and my mentor concerning this research is Dr. Hoganson. (click x2) Today I will be briefing you about my findings on counterinsurgency theory based upon the US reaction in Baghdad during the months after the Samarra mosque bombing of February 22 nd , 2006. Consulted sources include recent and past books and articles upon the subject of COIN, veteran testimonials concerning their opinion on tactics and strategy, and in lieu of refugee interviews I have consulted Iraqi weblogs (focusing on Baghdad) six months before and after the date of the bombing.
- This research concerns the events that took place on February 22 nd , 2006 in Samarra, Iraq. There, the golden dome of al-Askari mosque was destroyed due to explosives placed by infiltrators disguised as mosque security guards. I was stationed in the capital of Baghdad at the time and remember vividly how the surrounding area was dramatically changed by this single event. Being totally clueless as to why Baghdad and the surrounding area was erupting in sectarian violence unseen since my unit arrived in Iraq last November, I did what most intelligence analysts would do and looked up what was going on and why. Most sources in the news concluded that the destruction of the mosque caused the violence between Sunni and Shia. As you probably have already guessed, my thesis contends otherwise.
- Since February 22 nd 2006: IDP: an increase of IDPs An increase of violent activity involving Shia insurgent groups Sunni reprisals against sectarian violence in the form of groups of men randomly killing Shias An increase of American troops in Baghdad and the surrounding area.
- Sectarian violence in Iraq comes down to a Sunni/Shia context, this is true especially after the Samarra mosque bombing of February 22, 2006.
- Straight from the abstract: Contrary to common viewpoint that the mosque bombing in Samarra was the source of sectarian violence in Iraq, research concluded that it was simply a snap shot of an event in a larger mosaic that comprises the history of Islamic sectarian conflict in Iraq, the endgame of which is currently out of reach. This study addresses the shortcomings of conventional thinking that the regular military operates under when it comes to post-invasion standard operating procedures. These standard operating procedures need to be replaced with unconventional strategy and tactics (akin to Special Forces, for example) which tends to be more population-centric when dealing with known and unknown challenges. The definitions of “conventional” and “unconventional” are shown to give you a sense of the point I am trying to convey today. What sticks out the most with “conventional” is “ordinary, commonplace” and with “unconventional” I would like to point out “being out of the ordinary”. Basically what “conventional” means in relation to this paper is the classic military force-on-force action as shown by my illustration. “ Conventional” ways of thinking is hard to implement when the enemy encountered isn’t a unit based organization like yourself but a network of individuals working together towards a common goal or ideology. As you can infer, a conventional force against a network is akin to smashing flies with a sledgehammer. You can do it but it’s too much force for the task at hand. The larger issue within the response of the mosque bombing in Samarra is “How does one implement unconventional tactics/strategy?” and “What are these necessarily?” (click for graph)
- Population centric counterinsurgency theory is not as complicated as you see it right now, the gist of it is that: people matter. How is it generally implemented? Well, it varies from environment to environment but the basics I’ve noticed is: Security, Improvement of Life, Presence among the population. Summarize the two paragraphs and reiterate the main point of population centric counterinsurgency theory. Click for graph. Why do people matter? Why does this research matter? The population mattered during the months after the mosque bombing due to the national relevance that Baghdad had in Iraq, since the capital city had the same ratio of ethno-religious sects as the rest of the nation, it acted as the center of a nation-wide pond, events that happened outside of Baghdad had a consequence inside of the city in the form of violence and political demonstrations. This research has public policy implications, most importantly a simple switch of strategy may cost less money than the current one being employed, where technology gets second place to proven strategy. One of the sources for this research: Gathering Iraqi interviews posited a challenge due to the fact that the nature of the research conducted; the only Iraqis who could have a concise opinion of the consequences of the mosque bombing would be those that had entered the country during or after February 22, 2006. This would leave, according to varied sources, about 1012 Iraqi refugees (data current as of 2008) in the US that have left Iraq around 2006. The veteran interviews and Iraqi weblogs provided great insight on how people can be impacted the most by: “ Targeted missions were successful by bottom up (boots on the ground, interacting with Iraqi’s everyday, collecting information) when you had lowest level driven going after targets were effective. Yes-man culture inside of the military influenced the scaling back of operations due to the public relations issue of lost of lives. Public relations of the home front were taken into consideration.“ ~ Ryan Placchetti, Oral interview 03JUN09 8:38pm And from the “Mesopotamian” an Iraqi weblog: The present situation is untenable gentlemen ; and cannot continue like this. I have said it before and say it again; controlling Baghdad is controlling the country .” and “The answer however is very simple: Sectarian prejudice , i.e. the pathological hatred of the Shiaa sect, which is the majority in only one Arab country which is Iraq. Indeed, the only Sunnis who are inclined to be more tolerant towards the Shiaa’s are the Iraqi Sunnis , especially in cities, having lived side by side for many centuries. Thus the fury of the Arabs and other Moslems against the Americans is not because they invaded and occupied Iraq , but because as a result of this action and the fall of the Saddam regime, the Shiaas have become liberated and acquired a louder voice .” (pause for drink)