This document discusses whether the "global war on terrorism" (GWoT) declared by the United States after 9/11 could become the new dominant framing of global security in the same way that the Cold War was. It argues that while the GWoT has had some success in being constructed as a threat, it is unlikely to achieve the same level of sustained dominance as the Cold War due to differences in its scope and means pursued potentially threatening liberal values and Western unity.
httptcs.sagepub.comTheory, Culture & Society DOI 1.docxsheronlewthwaite
http://tcs.sagepub.com
Theory, Culture & Society
DOI: 10.1177/026327690007002017
1990; 7; 295 Theory Culture Society
Arjun Appadurai
Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy
http://tcs.sagepub.com
The online version of this article can be found at:
Published by:
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On behalf of:
The TCS Centre, Nottingham Trent University
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SLIDE 1 This week we’re going to do some collective thinking a.docxbudabrooks46239
SLIDE 1
This week we’re going to do some collective thinking about the future of U.S. Power.
SLIDE 2
In the next slide there is a graphic that illustrates the proliferation of academic and think-tank literature that argues that U.S. Power and influence around the world is shrinking dramatically.
SLIDE 3
The next slide continues that symbolism, some arguing that we are becoming just another graveyard of fallen empires. But I think, to be more optimistic in the next slide, some are writing our obituaries a bit prematurely. I like this definition of what a superpower is and what it requires or what it takes to be a super power. And I think if you kind of cogitate on that a little bit, study it a little bit, after the lecture, I think you’ll agree this applies to the United States and no other country in the world at the present time.
That last bullet indicates some hesitation, a big “but”, there are other variables. I think the problem is a paradox of power. Power today no longer translates into an immediate ability to influence, and the reason for that, many argue, is that historically emerging multi-polar systems are much more unstable than a bipolar or unipolar world might be. There is an emerging multipolar system which I think we face today. Greater diversity, growing power, and less cohesiveness. Emerging countries want a greater share, a greater say, and they reject the notion that any single power has the ability to be a global hegemony. In a very colorful language of a French diplomat, he argued this case by saying we need allies but not chaperones or adult supervision.
SLIDE 4
The next slide is based on an article written several years ago by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross called “Competing Images of Global Strategy”. I want to go through these as an exercise in strategic thinking. There are really no right or wrong answers for our purposes and our goal is to get each of you to pull together some of our previous course tools and apply them to some good strategic thinking. And these are the strategic postures that we’ll look at: Neo Isolationism, Selective 2
Engagement, Cooperative Security, Primacy, and then I’ll add off-shore balancing which doesn’t come from Posen and Ross but from another article that I will talk about and you will be reading.
SLIDE 5
The next slide then looks at the posture of neo-isolationism. Their argument is that we simply can’t afford the cost of World Order, they take a very minimalist defense posture, low defense budgets based upon what you see there. They argue that geography makes us secure from peer threats. There is little public support for this posture. Libertarians hold this and if you’ve been paying attention or did pay attention to the republican primary you know that Ron Paul represented this point of view. Commentator Pat Buchannan would be another one who represents this particular point of view. Of course I think their real argument or to critique it, you would have to really analyze th.
1. The document discusses how globalization has changed the nature of international security threats. Whereas states were previously the main security threats, new threats have emerged from global criminal networks and failed states.
2. It argues that the future of international security will be a "consociational" system with a bipolar structure dominated by the US and China as emerging hegemonic powers. States will align with Western or Eastern societies but there will be no single global identity.
3. Accepting conflicting ideologies through open trade, addressing the root causes that enable threats like terrorism, and developing a shared understanding of threats will be key to providing security within this new global structure.
This review summarizes and critiques three books about Cold War history and American foreign policy:
1) Richard Saull's "The Cold War and after: capitalism, revolution and superpower politics" which takes a Marxist view of the Cold War but is difficult to follow due to lengthy sentences and parentheses.
2) Don Munton and David Welch's "The Cuban Missile Crisis: a concise history" which provides a clear overview of the crisis and its causes/aftermath but could be strengthened by discussing additional context points.
3) Christopher Layne's "The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present" which argues US foreign policy has long been driven by economic
The document discusses the strategy of containment during the Cold War and its successes and failures. It argues that containment was initially successful in Western Europe by aligning European countries against the Soviet Union through economic support from the US. However, containment ultimately failed due to increasing global interdependence. Countries today have significant economic reliance on both Russia and China, decreasing the ability of the US to isolate them. The emerging multipolar global system reduces US unilateral power compared to the bipolar system of the Cold War.
The document discusses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the role of the US as a mediator. It provides historical context on the roots of the conflict dating back to the late 1800s and Jewish immigration to Palestine. It also discusses the expectations created by the media on policymaking, particularly the pressure to respond quickly to crises in a world of instant access and transparency. Shock events that challenge expectations can create opportunities for conflict resolution if they cause adversaries to revise their strategies. The US role as a stakeholder and mediator is examined in working towards a durable resolution through utilizing conflict resolution strategies.
The document discusses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the role of the US as a mediator. It provides historical context on the roots of the conflict dating back to the late 1800s and Jewish immigration to Palestine. It also discusses the expectations created by the media on policymaking, and how instant access to information in today's transparent world poses new challenges for crisis response. Shock events that challenge expectations can create opportunities for conflict resolution if they cause adversaries to revise their strategies. The US role as a stakeholder and mediator is examined in working towards a durable resolution through utilizing shock events to facilitate changed expectations between the parties.
The Israeli – Palestinian conflict will be examined in how the U.S. policies and involvement has contributed to issue management resolution. This case is no so unique that a general model of the de-escalation of protracted conflicts cannot be applied to a wider range of cases as the Israel and the PLO straddle the conceptual boundaries of internal and external actors.
httptcs.sagepub.comTheory, Culture & Society DOI 1.docxsheronlewthwaite
http://tcs.sagepub.com
Theory, Culture & Society
DOI: 10.1177/026327690007002017
1990; 7; 295 Theory Culture Society
Arjun Appadurai
Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy
http://tcs.sagepub.com
The online version of this article can be found at:
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
The TCS Centre, Nottingham Trent University
can be found at:Theory, Culture & Society Additional services and information for
http://tcs.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts:
http://tcs.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions:
http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:
http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:
http://tcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/7/2/295 Citations
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SLIDE 1 This week we’re going to do some collective thinking a.docxbudabrooks46239
SLIDE 1
This week we’re going to do some collective thinking about the future of U.S. Power.
SLIDE 2
In the next slide there is a graphic that illustrates the proliferation of academic and think-tank literature that argues that U.S. Power and influence around the world is shrinking dramatically.
SLIDE 3
The next slide continues that symbolism, some arguing that we are becoming just another graveyard of fallen empires. But I think, to be more optimistic in the next slide, some are writing our obituaries a bit prematurely. I like this definition of what a superpower is and what it requires or what it takes to be a super power. And I think if you kind of cogitate on that a little bit, study it a little bit, after the lecture, I think you’ll agree this applies to the United States and no other country in the world at the present time.
That last bullet indicates some hesitation, a big “but”, there are other variables. I think the problem is a paradox of power. Power today no longer translates into an immediate ability to influence, and the reason for that, many argue, is that historically emerging multi-polar systems are much more unstable than a bipolar or unipolar world might be. There is an emerging multipolar system which I think we face today. Greater diversity, growing power, and less cohesiveness. Emerging countries want a greater share, a greater say, and they reject the notion that any single power has the ability to be a global hegemony. In a very colorful language of a French diplomat, he argued this case by saying we need allies but not chaperones or adult supervision.
SLIDE 4
The next slide is based on an article written several years ago by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross called “Competing Images of Global Strategy”. I want to go through these as an exercise in strategic thinking. There are really no right or wrong answers for our purposes and our goal is to get each of you to pull together some of our previous course tools and apply them to some good strategic thinking. And these are the strategic postures that we’ll look at: Neo Isolationism, Selective 2
Engagement, Cooperative Security, Primacy, and then I’ll add off-shore balancing which doesn’t come from Posen and Ross but from another article that I will talk about and you will be reading.
SLIDE 5
The next slide then looks at the posture of neo-isolationism. Their argument is that we simply can’t afford the cost of World Order, they take a very minimalist defense posture, low defense budgets based upon what you see there. They argue that geography makes us secure from peer threats. There is little public support for this posture. Libertarians hold this and if you’ve been paying attention or did pay attention to the republican primary you know that Ron Paul represented this point of view. Commentator Pat Buchannan would be another one who represents this particular point of view. Of course I think their real argument or to critique it, you would have to really analyze th.
1. The document discusses how globalization has changed the nature of international security threats. Whereas states were previously the main security threats, new threats have emerged from global criminal networks and failed states.
2. It argues that the future of international security will be a "consociational" system with a bipolar structure dominated by the US and China as emerging hegemonic powers. States will align with Western or Eastern societies but there will be no single global identity.
3. Accepting conflicting ideologies through open trade, addressing the root causes that enable threats like terrorism, and developing a shared understanding of threats will be key to providing security within this new global structure.
This review summarizes and critiques three books about Cold War history and American foreign policy:
1) Richard Saull's "The Cold War and after: capitalism, revolution and superpower politics" which takes a Marxist view of the Cold War but is difficult to follow due to lengthy sentences and parentheses.
2) Don Munton and David Welch's "The Cuban Missile Crisis: a concise history" which provides a clear overview of the crisis and its causes/aftermath but could be strengthened by discussing additional context points.
3) Christopher Layne's "The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present" which argues US foreign policy has long been driven by economic
The document discusses the strategy of containment during the Cold War and its successes and failures. It argues that containment was initially successful in Western Europe by aligning European countries against the Soviet Union through economic support from the US. However, containment ultimately failed due to increasing global interdependence. Countries today have significant economic reliance on both Russia and China, decreasing the ability of the US to isolate them. The emerging multipolar global system reduces US unilateral power compared to the bipolar system of the Cold War.
The document discusses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the role of the US as a mediator. It provides historical context on the roots of the conflict dating back to the late 1800s and Jewish immigration to Palestine. It also discusses the expectations created by the media on policymaking, particularly the pressure to respond quickly to crises in a world of instant access and transparency. Shock events that challenge expectations can create opportunities for conflict resolution if they cause adversaries to revise their strategies. The US role as a stakeholder and mediator is examined in working towards a durable resolution through utilizing conflict resolution strategies.
The document discusses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the role of the US as a mediator. It provides historical context on the roots of the conflict dating back to the late 1800s and Jewish immigration to Palestine. It also discusses the expectations created by the media on policymaking, and how instant access to information in today's transparent world poses new challenges for crisis response. Shock events that challenge expectations can create opportunities for conflict resolution if they cause adversaries to revise their strategies. The US role as a stakeholder and mediator is examined in working towards a durable resolution through utilizing shock events to facilitate changed expectations between the parties.
The Israeli – Palestinian conflict will be examined in how the U.S. policies and involvement has contributed to issue management resolution. This case is no so unique that a general model of the de-escalation of protracted conflicts cannot be applied to a wider range of cases as the Israel and the PLO straddle the conceptual boundaries of internal and external actors.
The strategic narrative outlines five key shifts: from control to credible influence in an open system; from containment to sustainment and domestic focus; from deterrence and defense to civilian engagement and embracing competition; from zero-sum to positive-sum global politics; and from national security to national prosperity and security. It argues the US should invest in sustainable prosperity at home and tools of global engagement to strengthen its influence, compete fairly, and leverage interdependencies to achieve security and prosperity.
Victory Amongst People - Mills- Richards - Ewen McLayEwen McLay
The document summarizes and reviews the book "Victory Among People – Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States". It makes the following key points:
1) The book provides a rich starting point for studying insurgencies and is a must-read for counterinsurgents.
2) It examines regional case studies of 16 counterinsurgency campaigns across different continents and decades. Common themes that emerge can inform how to counter insurgencies.
3) The authors have extensive first-hand operational experience, giving credibility to the analysis and recommendations in the book.
How to Reverse the Tide of War. A Global People’s Movement. Say No to Nuclear...Chris Helweg
- The document discusses the need for a legitimate anti-war movement that challenges the propaganda and lies used to justify wars. It argues that an effective movement must: 1) Fully expose the lies and complicity of governments in terrorist attacks like 9/11 that are used as pretexts for war. 2) Question the legitimacy of political leaders rather than just protest their policies. 3) Work to undermine the propaganda that sustains public support for wars by spreading truthful information. A movement funded or influenced by those who profit from war will not succeed in preventing war.
PNAC - PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURYVogelDenise
Understanding the United States Of America's Attempts to MONOPOLIZE The World! Yes, to date, the United States' CORRUPT Government Officials and their Lawyer/Attorney (Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz) are hard at work to DOMINATE THE WORLD through their TERRORISTS ACTS and WHITE SUPREMACIST PRACTICES - i.e. with its and its ALLIES sights SET ON THE MIDDLE EASTERN REGION!
1) The document discusses the historical role and power of nation-states in international politics and foreign policy. It argues that the power of nation-states, especially the United States, is eroding due to forces of globalization and the rise of non-state actors.
2) It analyzes factors that historically contributed to US power such as its military capabilities and geopolitical advantages. However, it asserts that organizations like NGOs and IGOs are now undermining state sovereignty and US hegemony through shared decision-making and increasing economic interdependence between states.
3) The rise of transnational threats like terrorism exemplify how non-state groups can challenge states, and globalization is enhancing the
The New Nonaligned Movement Is Having a Moment.pdfAndrewCheatham7
The nonaligned movement (NAM) is experiencing a resurgence as countries look to avoid taking sides in great power competition between the US, Russia, and China. While fence-sitting and neutrality can benefit NAM countries by allowing them to leverage relationships, they should not be excuses for refusing to condemn clear violations of international law like Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The NAM was founded in the 1950s and 1960s by countries that did not want to align with either the capitalist West or communist East and saw itself as advocating for decolonized nations. Today, the NAM includes over 100 countries and its members have been reluctant to criticize Russia's actions, though the movement was founded on principles of sovereignty and non
11-9-9-11- The Brave New World Order- Peace through Law - BeyondPatrick Bratton
This article discusses the geopolitical context surrounding two major events: the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 ("11/9") and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 ("9/11"). 11/9 marked the end of the Cold War but also increased instability as the balance of power shifted. 9/11 was an act of violence that undermined security. The article examines the challenges faced by the international community and the US in responding to threats in this "brave new world" and maintaining peace through existing legal and institutional frameworks.
Democratic Peace or Clash of CivilizationsTarget States and.docxsimonithomas47935
Democratic Peace or Clash of Civilizations?
Target States and Support for War in Britain
and the United States
Robert Johns University of Essex
Graeme A. M. Davies University of Leeds
Research on public support for war shows that citizens are responsive to various aspects of strategic context. Less
attention has been paid to the core characteristics of the target state. In this comparative study we report survey
experiments manipulating two such characteristics, regime type and dominant faith, to test whether the ‘‘democratic
peace’’ and the ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ theses are reflected in U.S. and British public opinion. The basic findings show
small differences across the two cases: both publics were somewhat more inclined to use force against dictatorships than
against democracies and against Islamic than against Christian countries. Respondent religion played no moderating
role in Britain: Christians and nonbelievers were alike readier to attack Islamic states. However, in the United States,
the dominant faith effect was driven entirely by Christians. Together, our results imply that public judgments are
driven as much by images and identities as by strategic calculations of threat.
T
he ‘‘Bush doctrine’’ is one of preemption. If
force is to be used in response not only to actual
but also to potential future threats, the question
arises of how such threats are to be identified. One
answer is that key characteristics of the target state act
as a guide to its likely behavior. In justifications of
action in Afghanistan and Iraq, two such characteristics
were often invoked. One was the undemocratic nature
of the incumbent regimes. Tony Blair expressed his fear
‘‘that we wake up one day and we find that one of these
dictatorial states has used weapons of mass destruc-
tion’’ (BBC 2004). And, as George W. Bush put it: ‘‘we
know that dictators are quick to choose aggression,
while free nations strive to resolve their differences in
peace’’ (CBS News 2004). This encapsulates the ‘‘dem-
ocratic peace’’: that democracies rarely go to war with
one another (Doyle 1983; Russett 1993). The second,
seldom as explicit but often discernible in these leaders’
rhetoric, is that these were Islamic countries. Bush
notoriously referred to the ‘‘war on terror’’ as a
‘‘crusade’’ (White House 2001), and Blair described
the ‘‘mutual enmity toward the West’’ of Islamic
extremists and their host regimes (BBC 2004). This
calls to mind the ‘‘clash of civilizations,’’ a term coined
by Samuel Huntington for whom ‘‘the most pervasive,
important and dangerous conflicts . . . are along the
line separating peoples of Western Christianity, on the
one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox people on the
other’’ (1996, 28). In short, it appears that U.S. and
U.K. elite military decisions are influenced by both the
regime type and the dominant faith in the target state.
This article is about public support for war and
whether it too is influenced by these factors. Are the
democ.
The BRICS and the future of R2P. Was Syria or Libya the exception?FGV Brazil
This article assesses the BRICS’ position on the emerging global norm of the Responsibility to Protect, analyses the year 2011, when all the BRICS occupied a seat on the UN Security Council, and asks how the rise of the BRICS will affect R2P’s prospects of turning into a global norm. It argues that while it is generally thought that ‘nonWestern’ emerging powers are reluctant to embrace R2P, rising powers’ views on the norm in question are far more nuanced. Common accusations depicting the BRICS as ‘irresponsible stakeholders’ are misguided, as emerging powers have supported R2P in the vast majority of cases. The BRICS are in fundamental agreement about the principle that undergirds R2P, and their support for R2P’s pillar I and II is absolute. Regarding pillar III, the BRICS at times diverge from Western countries not about the existence of the norm, but about when and how to apply it.
Political Science Paper by Oliver Stuenkel;
School of Social Sciences (FGV CPDOC).
www.fgv.br/cpdoc
ri.fgv.br/en
Human vs National Security in the International arenaGabriel Orozco
This document discusses security studies and different perspectives on international order. It analyzes three trends in security studies since the Cold War: 1) Those who argue the international system has not fundamentally changed; 2) The Copenhagen School's securitization theory which examines how issues become security issues; 3) Rational choice theory which views security as affecting states' use of force based on calculations. The document concludes that security studies provides a framework for interpreting phenomena and there are challenges in balancing human and national security perspectives.
Jack Oughton - Science Challenges The Nation State.docJack Oughton
The document discusses how nuclear weapons have profoundly impacted politics and international relations. It argues that science's development of nuclear weapons disrupted the balance of power between nation states and introduced the threat of mutually assured destruction. This existential threat caused countries to engage in arms races, proxy wars, and develop strategies of deterrence and nonproliferation during the Cold War. The document expresses concerns that nuclear proliferation to additional states and non-state actors could undermine deterrence and increase the likelihood of nuclear conflict or terrorism in the modern era.
This document discusses the evolution of public diplomacy from its origins to its current state. It argues that public diplomacy has shifted from being focused on mutual understanding between states and publics to serving national security objectives, especially after 9/11. Key figures like Elihu Root and Edmund Gullion helped establish public diplomacy's focus on influencing global public opinion to support foreign policy goals. However, 9/11 marked a tipping point where public diplomacy became more militarized and aimed at strategic communication in the war on terror, with the military taking a larger role than the Department of State. This has diluted public diplomacy's impact but increased its credibility among national security circles.
PS 1010, American Government 1 Course Learning Out.docxtarifarmarie
This document outlines the learning outcomes and activities for Unit VIII of the course PS 1010 American Government. The unit focuses on the three branches of government, how the US government functions at different levels, the role of political parties, how policies affect change, and the impact of media on public opinion and politics. Students will complete readings, lessons, and a final project to meet the learning outcomes of describing these concepts and identifying related examples. Activities include readings on policymaking, the debate between isolationism and internationalism, and the use of force against presidents.
Brinkmanship is the ostensible escalation of threats to achieve one's aims. The word was probably coined by the American politician Adlai Stevenson in his criticism of the philosophy described as "going to the brink" during an interview with US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during the Eisenhower administration.
This document is a strategy research project analyzing key international relations concepts and the Bush Doctrine. It provides historical context on the evolution of US foreign policy from 1776 through the post-9/11 era. It discusses concepts like exceptionalism, unilateralism, preemption, and hegemonic stability. It examines how US strategy shifted from isolationism to engagement following World War II and the Cold War. It analyzes how the Bush Doctrine articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy expanded the use of preemption in response to new threats like terrorism.
This document discusses potential definitions of globalization and proposes that there may be four possible definitions that become increasingly radical:
1. Globalization as a historical epoch that succeeds the Cold War period. It represents a distinct time period with its own characteristics, just as the Cold War was a distinct period.
2. Globalization as a process of increasing interconnectivity and flows of people, capital, goods, and ideas across borders.
3. Globalization as a theory that posits the world is becoming more integrated and interdependent.
4. Globalization as a new paradigm that represents a fundamental change in how the global system is organized with authority shifting away from nation states.
The document analyzes each
Lecture 19 changeconflictcrisis 3 war on terrordavid roberts
1) The document discusses the crisis of terrorism in the context of the "war on terror" following major attacks such as 9/11, Bali, Madrid, and London.
2) It examines the origins and root causes of crises, arguing that terrorism stems from more complex factors than "sub-humans", such as the end of the Cold War power balance and crises in borderlands and failed states.
3) The document also analyzes different approaches to managing crises, such as the Bush Doctrine, as well as differing perceptions of the crises, questioning who should truly be considered "terrorists".
1-2paragraphsapa formatWelcome to Module 6. Divers.docxjasoninnes20
1-2
paragraphs
apa format
Welcome to Module 6. Diversity can help ensure that a team has the skills and knowledge necessary for the successful completion of tasks. Diverse teams, as long as they are well managed, tend to be more creative and achieve goals more efficiently. Leaders must understand and appreciate the diversity that exists in their team. Answer the following question as you think about the diversity that exists within your own organization.
How does this diversity help your team achieve its goals?
Have you noticed any barriers to team unity that may be attributed to the diversity of team members' backgrounds?
How has your background and experience prepared you to be an effective leader in an organization that holds diversity and inclusion as core to its mission and values?
.
1-Post a two-paragraph summary of the lecture; 2- Review the li.docxjasoninnes20
1-Post a two-paragraph summary of the lecture;
2- Review the links and select one. Briefly explain how they support our curse.
http://www.fldoe.org/
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/Home.portal
http://firn.edu/doe/sas/ftce/ftcecomp.htm
Use APA 7.
each work separately.
.
1-What are the pros and cons of parole. Discuss!2-Discuss ways t.docxjasoninnes20
1-What are the pros and cons of parole. Discuss!
2-Discuss ways to improve parole so that offenders have a better chance of being successful in the community
3-What are the barriers that parolees face when they return to the community that contribute to them failing. Give a relative example!
Submit in 3 paragraphs
.
1-page (max) proposal including a Title, Executive Summary, Outline,.docxjasoninnes20
1-page (max) proposal including a Title, Executive Summary, Outline, Team members, Task Assignment and Duration (who is doing what part). Include your anticipated dataset(s) and techniques/software. Please provide a list of the main references you want to use for your project in any appropriate format, e.g. Vancouver or APA style.
proposal is due by october 7th 2020 at 12pm est
project by 25th october
instructions for project are in the folder
.
1-Identify the benefits of sharing your action research with oth.docxjasoninnes20
1-Identify the benefits of sharing your action research with others.
-How does sharing your action research assist you in achieving your goal to improve the lives of your students?
2-Describe the criteria used to judge action research.
-What determines if your action research study gets published?
3-Identify one Web site resource (ERIC)and describe how it assisted you in designing, implementing, evaluating, writing and/or sharing your action research. Choose any one of the Web site sources listed in chapter 10(last page of attachment)
4-Why does Mills suggest in the last chapter of his book that this is really the beginning of your work?( start page 291)
Source:
Mills, G. E. (2000). Action research: A guide for the teacher researcher. Prentice-Hall, Inc., One Lake Street, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458.
.
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1-2paragraphsapa formatWelcome to Module 6. Divers.docxjasoninnes20
1-2
paragraphs
apa format
Welcome to Module 6. Diversity can help ensure that a team has the skills and knowledge necessary for the successful completion of tasks. Diverse teams, as long as they are well managed, tend to be more creative and achieve goals more efficiently. Leaders must understand and appreciate the diversity that exists in their team. Answer the following question as you think about the diversity that exists within your own organization.
How does this diversity help your team achieve its goals?
Have you noticed any barriers to team unity that may be attributed to the diversity of team members' backgrounds?
How has your background and experience prepared you to be an effective leader in an organization that holds diversity and inclusion as core to its mission and values?
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http://www.fldoe.org/
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http://firn.edu/doe/sas/ftce/ftcecomp.htm
Use APA 7.
each work separately.
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1-
Watch the movie
Don Quixote
, which is an adaptation of Cervantes' novel
Don Quixote
. Then, write at least two paragraphs (minimum five well-developed sentences per paragraph) to explain a lesson one could learn from the characters. You need to incorporate at least three of the ideas provided below:
The value of friendship
Humility and nobility
Importance of time
Importance of reading
Importance of optimism
The role of imagination and vision
Justifying commitment
Sense of self and disciple
Building leadership
.
1- reply to both below, no more than 75 words per each. PSY 771.docxjasoninnes20
1- reply to both below, no more than 75 words per each.
PSY 7710
4 days ago
Karissa Milano
unit 9 discussion scenario 3
COLLAPSE
ABA Procedure: A DRO (differential reinforcement of other behavior) to address SIB exhibited by a toddler in a home setting.
Special Methods: Any appropriate behaviors other than SIB will be reinforced through a specific amount of time (every five minutes). Reinforcement is only given when the individual does not engage in SIB behaviors.
Risks
Notes
1 Implementing the plan at home can be difficult.
1 The family might be concerned with their safety and the safety of the child. There should be a protocol before implementing this intervention.
2 Family members and client could be at risk for danger.
2 The parents might be concerned for the safety of themselves and their child.
3 Possible increase in SIB
3 SIB behaviors might increase before it decreases due to an extinction burst. The behavior analyst should have a protocol before implementing this intervention.
4 SIB behaviors could remain the same.
4 If there is no change in the clients SIB behaviors then a preference test should be conducted to determine motivating reinfoncers.
Benefits
Notes
1 Generalization
1 The client will learn to use this skill at home as well as be able generalize this skill into other settings.
2 Improved learning environment
2 SIB behaviors will decrease and appropriate behavior will be taught. SIB will no longer impact the client and family in the future.
3 Increase in appropriate behaviors
3 Appropriate behaviors will be taught and replace the SIB behavior.
4 Least intrusive intervention
4 Using reinforcement to decrease the problem behavior and increase appropriate behaviors. This is a least restrictive method of treatment.
5 Parent training and involvement
5 Parents will feel confident about implementing this evidence based treatment at home. This will can lead to an increase a buy in from the family and they will feel comfortable implementing other interventions in the future.
Summary: DRO is an intervention that is used when the client does not engage in the problem behavior (SIB) (Bailey & Burch, 2016). Reinforcement should only be given to the individual after a certain amount of time that the client is not engaging in the problem behavior; in this case it should be after five minutes of the client not engaging in SIB. The person who is implementing this treatment should not reinforce the problem behavior. The benefits of implementing DRO outweigh the risks of implementing DRO. DRO is a good intervention to use when decreasing SIB behavior. Although there are some risks, the individual who is implementing DRO should have the knowledge, training and experience and be confident when implementing DRO ( Bailey & Burch, 2016).
Reference
Bailey, J. S., & Burch, M. R. (2016).
Ethics for behavior analysts
(3rd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.
PSY 7711
3 days ago
Emily Gentile
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Chapter 3
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Chapter 6
Environmental Engineering: Environmental Pollution, Environmental Acts and Regulations, Functional Concepts of Ecology, Basics of Species, Biodiversity, Ecosystem, Hydrological Cycle; Chemical Cycles: Carbon, Nitrogen & Phosphorus; Energy Flow in Ecosystems.
Water Pollution: Water Quality standards, Introduction to Treatment & Disposal of Waste Water. Reuse and Saving of Water, Rain Water Harvesting. Solid Waste Management: Classification of Solid Waste, Collection, Transportation and Disposal of Solid. Recycling of Solid Waste: Energy Recovery, Sanitary Landfill, On-Site Sanitation. Air & Noise Pollution: Primary and Secondary air pollutants, Harmful effects of Air Pollution, Control of Air Pollution. . Noise Pollution Harmful Effects of noise pollution, control of noise pollution, Global warming & Climate Change, Ozone depletion, Greenhouse effect
Text Books:
1. Palancharmy, Basic Civil Engineering, McGraw Hill publishers.
2. Satheesh Gopi, Basic Civil Engineering, Pearson Publishers.
3. Ketki Rangwala Dalal, Essentials of Civil Engineering, Charotar Publishing House.
4. BCP, Surveying volume 1
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Philippine Edukasyong Pantahanan at Pangkabuhayan (EPP) CurriculumMJDuyan
(𝐓𝐋𝐄 𝟏𝟎𝟎) (𝐋𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐧 𝟏)-𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐦𝐬
𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐄𝐏𝐏 𝐂𝐮𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐮𝐦 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐡𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬:
- Understand the goals and objectives of the Edukasyong Pantahanan at Pangkabuhayan (EPP) curriculum, recognizing its importance in fostering practical life skills and values among students. Students will also be able to identify the key components and subjects covered, such as agriculture, home economics, industrial arts, and information and communication technology.
𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐩𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐮𝐫:
-Define entrepreneurship, distinguishing it from general business activities by emphasizing its focus on innovation, risk-taking, and value creation. Students will describe the characteristics and traits of successful entrepreneurs, including their roles and responsibilities, and discuss the broader economic and social impacts of entrepreneurial activities on both local and global scales.
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2. idea that would
enable it to reassert and legitimize its leadership of global
security. The demand
for such an idea was palpable throughout the 1990s. When the
Cold War ended,
Washington seemed to experience a threat defi cit, and there
was a string of attempts
to fi nd a replacement for the Soviet Union as the enemy focus
for US foreign and
military policy: fi rst Japan, then China, ‘clash of civilizations’
and rogue states.
None of these, however, came anywhere close to measuring up
to the Cold War
and the struggle against communism, which for more than 40
years had created a
common cause and a shared framing that underpinned US
leadership of the West.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 off ered a solution to this problem,
and right from the
beginning the GWoT had the feel of a big idea that might
provide a long-term
cure for Washington’s threat defi cit. If it could be successfully
constructed and
embedded as the great new global struggle, it would also
underpin the shaky legiti-
macy of US unipolarity, maintenance of which was a key goal in
the US National
Security Strategy (USNSS) of 2002, and is still visible, albeit in
more muted tones,
in the 2006 USNSS.2 Will this strategy succeed? Will the
GWoT become the new
Cold War?
* I am grateful to Ole Wæver and Lene Hansen and an
anonymous reviewer for International Aff airs for comments
on an earlier draft of this article.
3. 1 ‘Rumsfeld off ers strategies for current war: Pentagon to
release 20-year plan today’ and ‘Abizaid credited
with popularizing the term, “long war”’, Washington Post, 3
Feb. 2006, p. A08, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/02/AR2006020202296.html
and www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/02/02/AR2006020202242.html, accessed 17
Feb. 2006.
2 Morten Kelstrup, ‘Globalisation and societal insecurity: the
securitization of terrorism and competing strate-
gies for global governance’, in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich
Jung, eds, Contemporary security analysis and Copen-
hagen peace research (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 106–16.
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Barry Buzan
5. Keeping this distinction in mind, the explicit ‘long war’ framing
of the GWoT
is a securitizing move of potentially great signifi cance. If it
succeeds as a widely
accepted, world-organizing macro-securitization, it could
structure global security
for some decades, in the process helping to legitimize US
primacy. This is not to
confuse the GWoT with US grand strategy overall, despite the
GWoT’s promi-
nence in the 2006 USNSS. US grand strategy is much wider,
involving more tradi-
tional concerns about rising powers, global energy supply, the
spread of military
technology and the enlargement of the democratic/capitalist
sphere. US military
expenditure remains largely aimed at meeting traditional
challenges from other
states, with only a small part specifi cally allocated for the
GWoT. The signifi cance
of the GWoT is much more political. Although a real threat
from terrorists does
exist, and needs to be met, the main signifi cance of the GWoT
is as a political
framing that might justify and legitimize US primacy,
leadership and unilater-
alism, both to Americans and to the rest of the world. This is
one of the key
diff erences between the GWoT and the Cold War. The Cold
War pretty much was
US grand strategy in a deep sense; the GWoT is not, but, as a
brief glance at the
USNSS of 2006 will show, is being promoted as if it were.
Whether this promo-
tion succeeds or not will be aff ected by many factors, not least
6. how real and how
deep the threat posed by terrorism actually is.
The next section surveys the rise of the GWoT as a successful
macro-
securitization. The one following examines conditions that will
aff ect the sustain-
ability of the GWoT securitization. The conclusions refl ect on
the consequences
of the GWoT should it become successfully embedded as the
new Cold War. The
argument is that it is unlikely, though not impossible, that the
GWoT will be
anything like as dominant and durable as the macro-
securitization of the Cold
3 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger, ‘Apocalypse
now? Continuities or disjunctions in world poli-
tics after 9/11’, International Aff airs 82: 3, 2006, pp. 539–52.
4 Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and desecuritization’, in Ronnie
D. Lipschutz, ed., On security (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1995), pp. 46–86; Barry Buzan, Ole
Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a new framework for
analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
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8. the Cold War to legitimize US leadership. Washington saw
itself as representing
the future, and therefore having the right and the duty to speak
and act for human-
kind, and this claim was, up to a point, accepted in much of the
rest of the West.
Right from the start the GWoT was also presented in this way:
At the beginning of this new century, the United States is again
called by history to use
our overwhelming power in defense of freedom. We have
accepted that duty, because we
know the cause is just … we understand that the hopes of
millions depend on us … and
we are certain of the victory to come.5
So far, the GWoT has been a rather successful macro-
securitization.6 That Al-
Qaeda and its ideology are a threat to western civilization is
widely accepted
outside the Islamic world, and also within the Islamic world,
though there opinion
is divided as to whether or not this is a good and legitimate
thing. The US-led war
against the Taleban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan shortly after
September 11 was
generally supported at the time, and NATO is still playing the
leading role in the
(so far not very successful) attempt to stabilize and rebuild that
country. Beneath
its exaggeration, there is some real substance to President
Bush’s boast about the
coalition backing the GWoT:
the cooperation of America’s allies in the war on terror is very,
very strong. We’re grate-
9. ful to the more than 60 nations that are supporting the
Proliferation Security Initiative to
intercept illegal weapons and equipment by sea, land, and air.
We’re grateful to the more
than 30 nations with forces serving in Iraq, and the nearly 40
nations with forces in Af-
ghanistan. In the fi ght against terror, we’ve asked our allies to
do hard things. They’ve risen
to their responsibilities. We’re proud to call them friends.7
Immediately following 9/11 NATO invoked article 5 for the fi
rst time, thereby
helping to legitimize the GWoT securitization. Since then
leaders in most western
5 Dick Cheney, ‘Success in war is most urgent US task, Cheney
says: remarks to the Commonwealth Club of
California’, 7 Aug. 2002, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-
se1585.html, accessed 26 Dec. 2005.
6 Kelstrup, ‘Globalisation’, pp. 112–13.
7 George W. Bush, ‘President Bush discusses progress in the
war on terror’, White House, 12 July 2004, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040712–5.html,
accessed 28 Dec 2005.
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11. of trade, fi nance, information and (skilled) people is generally
to be promoted,
such opening also has its dark side in which illiberal actors,
mainly criminals and
terrorists, can take advantage of liberal openness in pursuit of
illiberal ends. The
problem is that the liberal structures that facilitate business
activity cannot help but
open pathways for uncivil society actors as well. Concern about
criminal activity
(particularly the drugs trade) has—at least within the United
States—been framed
in security terms (the ‘war on drugs’) for some decades. And
concern about trade
in WMD is institutionalized in the nuclear non-proliferation
regime as well as in
conventions about chemical and biological weapons technology.
The securitizing
moves supporting the GWoT have linked all of these issues.
Within the United
States, the link between terrorism and drugs seeks to graft a
newer securitization
on to an older one.8 The link predates 2001, and its essence is
the charge that terror-
ists engage in the drugs trade as a principal source of funding
for their activities,
one of which is seeking WMD:
As we enter the 21st century, the greatest threats to our freedom
and security will come
from a nexus of new threats: rogue states, terrorism,
international crime, drug traffi cking
and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.9
And:
12. Structural links between political terrorism and traditional
criminal activity, such as drugs
traffi cking, armed robbery or extortion have come increasingly
to the attention of law
enforcement authorities, security agencies and political decision
makers. There is a fairly
accepted view in the international community that in recent
years, direct state sponsorship
has declined, therefore terrorists increasingly have to resort to
other means of fi nancing,
including criminal activities, in order to raise funds. These
activities have traditionally
been drug traffi cking, extortion/collection of ‘revolutionary
taxes’, armed robbery, and
kidnappings. The involvement of such groups as the PKK,
LTTE, and GIA in these activi-
ties has been established.10
8 Dan Gardner, ‘Terrorists get cash from drug trade: traffi
cking prime source of funds for many groups’, 14 Sept.
2001, http://www.cfdp.ca/terror.htm#trc, accessed 28 Sept.
2004; US Drug Enforcement Administration,
Drug Intelligence Brief, ‘Drugs and terrorism: a new
perspective’, Sept. 2002, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
pubs/intel/02039/02039.html, accessed 19 Aug 2004.
9 Fact sheet, 24 Sept. 1996, ‘Clinton initiatives on terrorism,
crime, drugs’, http://nsi.org/library/terrorism/
terrorcrimedrugs.html, accessed 20 Sept. 2004.
10 INTERPOL General Secretariat, written testimony of Ralf
Mutschke (assistant director, Criminal Intelli-
gence Directorate, INTERPOL) before a hearing of the
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
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14. immigration, organized crime
and drug—thereby depicting immigrants as the root problem.12
Even before 9/11,
these themes were echoed by some Third World spokespersons
seeking to increase
their leverage for reform of the LIEO. Nigerian President
Olusegun Obasanjo, for
example, argued:
We recognise the grave threat posed by the debt question,
poverty, corruption, looted
funds, terrorism and drug-traffi cking to the stability and
prosperity not only of the devel-
oping world but of all countries. They are essentially global
challenges for development
and peace, security, stability and development.13
In relation to the securitization of WMD, the new twist is the
addition of a
strong concern that not only ‘rogue states’, but also terrorist
organizations, might
acquire nuclear weapons or other WMD.
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of
radicalism and technology.
Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking
weapons of mass destruction, and
evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.
The United States will not
allow these eff orts to succeed … History will judge harshly
those who saw this coming
danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the
only path to peace and
security is the path of action.14
And, from Europe:
15. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the
greatest threat to our se-
curity … The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist
groups acquire weapons
of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able
to infl ict damage on a scale
previously possible only for States and armies.15
One benchmark for the success achieved in linking the GWoT to
WMD has
been the ability of the United States since 2003 to set up the
Proliferation Security
13 Dec. 2000, ‘The threat posed by the convergence of
organized crime, drugs traffi cking and terrorism’,
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/muts1213.htm, accessed 28
Sept. 2004.
11 Javier Solana, A secure Europe in a better world: European
Security Strategy (Paris: European Union Institute for
Security Studies, 2003), pp. 6–9.
12 Didier Bigo, Polices en Résaux: l’expérience européenne
(Paris: Presses de Sciences Politiques, 1996); Barry Buzan
and Ole Wæver, Regions and powers: the structure of
international security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), p. 359.
13 Agence France-Presse, ‘Nigerian president urges rich–poor
partnership’, Global Policy Forum, 20 July 2000,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ff d/nigeria1.htm,
accessed 4 April 2005.
14 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America (Washington DC: White House,
17. GWoT’s success. An Action Aid report on the distorting impact
of the GWoT on
aid fl ows notes that ‘The war on terror is like a new Cold War
where everything is
subordinated to a single purpose.’17
On this evidence, there can be little doubt that during the half-
decade since
September 2001 the GWoT has achieved considerable progress
as a macro-
securitization. It has been successfully tied in to some pre-
existing securitizations
and has achieved a broad acceptance within international
society. The question
is: does its success to date give the GWoT the potential to
become embedded as
the successor to the Cold War? How will events from here on
either reinforce or
weaken the GWoT’s bid to be the new Cold War?
Will the GWoT securitization be durable?
As the recent furor over the Danish cartoons shows, events are
largely unpredict-
able: we cannot say who will die when, or get elected when, or
when some natural
disaster will occur. Nor can we forecast the impact of events,
which may depend
much on context and timing. Some events could be so big that
they wipe out most
or even all assumptions based on historical continuities and
trends (e.g. a large and
rapid rise in sea levels caused by a faster than expected
meltdown of the Greenland
and Antarctic ice sheets). Nevertheless, concentrating only on
the types of event
18. that are both plausibly probable and closely related to the
GWoT, it is possible to
think in a systematic way about their impact on the intensity
and durability of
the GWoT securitization. There are fi ve obvious types of event
that could signifi -
cantly reinforce or undermine the GWoT securitization:
ü the impact of further terrorist plans and/or attacks (or plans or
attacks success-
fully attributed to terrorists);
ü the commitment of the United States to the GWoT
securitization;
ü the legitimacy of the United States as a securitization leader
within interna-
tional society;
ü the (un)acceptability and (il)legitimacy of both the GWoT
securitization as a
whole or of particularist securitizations that get linked to it;
ü the potency of securitizations competing with the GWoT.
The impact of terrorist attacks and/or plans
Easily the most obvious type of event to infl uence the
durability of the GWoT
securitization will be the success of Al-Qaeda and its imitators
and successors in
16 Mark Valencia, The Proliferation Security Initiative, Adelphi
Paper 376 (London: International Institute for Secu-
rity Studies, 2005).
17 John Cosgrave, ‘The impact of the war on terror on aid fl
ows’, Action Aid, 1 March 2004, p. 1, http://www.
20. ahead’—not least because, with networks in 60 countries, Al-
Qaeda is ‘the most
widely dispersed non-state terrorist network in history’.18
While it is impossible
to predict what terrorists will do, the spectrum of options ranges
from reduction,
through more of the same, to escalation. Reduction means that
the terrorist threat
fades into the background and becomes an acceptable part of
everyday life risks.
This could happen because the terrorist cause loses steam for
internal reasons, and/
or because countermeasures become eff ective enough to foil
most attacks. More of
the same means something like what we have had since 9/11,
with a fairly regular
drumbeat of medium-sized attacks suffi cient to cause local
disruption and some
general angst, but not on a scale suffi cient either to threaten
the operation of the
global economy or to cause major upheavals in the relationship
between state and
society. Escalation means that the terrorists’ motivation and
organization remain
strong, countermeasures are only partly eff ective, and
periodically, or even worse
regularly, some eff ective, high-casualty and/or high-cost
attacks are mounted on
soft targets, with the worst case being use of WMD. The
escalation option would
strengthen the GWoT securitization, and the reduction option
would weaken it.
More of the same does not look suffi cient to sustain the costs
of a long-term macro-
securitization unless the fear of escalation can be maintained at
a high level.
21. One cannot rule out the possibility that governments with a
strong vested
interest in maintaining the GWoT securitization (most obviously
Russia, China,
India and the Bush and Blair administrations) might resort to
agent provocateur
actions in order to strengthen a terrorist ‘threat’ that had itself
become too weak
to serve the political purposes of maintaining the GWoT
securitization. Since the
agencies that deal with counterterrorism are among the most
secretive in govern-
ment, and since these agencies control reporting of alleged
terrorist plots uncov-
ered and foiled, there is quite a bit of scope for manipulations
ranging from spin to
wholesale fabrication. There will always, of course, be
conspiracy theorists who
will think this anyway; but we have already been treated to
enough government
lying, secrecy, deception, and abandonment of legal and moral
principles during
the GWoT to give this option some plausibility. And, as will
become clear below,
what the terrorists do, or are thought to be capable of doing,
may well be the most
crucial variable aff ecting the sustainability of the
securitization. If done convinc-
ingly, such action could help to sustain the GWoT. But if done
and exposed, it
would help to undermine its legitimacy.
The commitment of the US to the GWoT securitization
Since the United States was the initiator of the GWoT after
23. commitment will stay strong. Legions of the commentariat on
both sides of the
Atlantic have observed how deeply the 9/11 attacks impacted on
the United States,
and this impact has been played to and strengthened by the
subsequent rhetoric of
the Bush administration.19 On the other hand, that same
administration could well
be the agency that delegitimizes the GWoT securitization. Its
gigantic strategic
error in invading Iraq, its incompetence as an occupier, its
appalling behaviour
over torture and prisoners of war, and the visible damage all
this has done to its
reputation abroad could be enough to discredit the GWoT
securitization simply
by its association with a particular administration, even within
the United States.
The campaign rhetoric and the outcome of the 2004 presidential
election would
suggest not, but the continuing catastrophe in Iraq, and the
shocking spectacle
of the US Vice-President defending the right to torture, might
yet be enough
to turn public opinion. The observation attributed to Alexis de
Tocqueville that
‘America is good. And if America ever ceases to be good,
America will cease to be
great’ plays strongly in US domestic politics, and politicians
seen to be violating
America’s goodness need to watch their backs.
The outcome of this is again impossible to predict, and is likely
to be strongly
aff ected by how the terrorist threat unfolds. Americans, like
most other citizens of
24. democracies, quite willingly surrender some of their civil
liberties in times of war.
But it is easy to see the grounds within American society for
reactions against the
GWoT securitization, especially if its legitimacy becomes
contested. One source
of such reactions would be civil libertarians and others opposed
to the reasser-
tion of government powers through a state of permanent fear
and emergency.
Another would be isolationists and ‘off shore balancers’ who
oppose the current
levels and logics of US global engagement. A Pew poll from
October 2005 found
42 per cent of Americans favouring a more isolationist policy,
on a steeply rising
trend that already surpassed the highest level on the question
reached immedi-
ately after the Vietnam War.20 There is also room for a
similarly informed dispute
over what kinds of emergency action are legitimized by the
GWoT, including
treatment of prisoners of war (aka ‘enemy combatants’), torture,
pre-emptive war,
regime change and unilateralism generally. It will be interesting
to see whether the
present substantial consensus on the need to improve ‘homeland
security’, both in
the United States and in many other countries, becomes
embedded or is increas-
ingly attacked. Grounds for opposition include its costs, in
terms of both money
and liberty, and the ineff ectiveness of a permanent increase in
the state’s surveil-
lance over everything from trade and fi nance to individual
patterns of travel and
25. consumption. The refusal of Congress in late 2005 to grant the
administration’s
request for a long-term extension of the Patriot Act, and the
political fi reworks
19 Pierre Hassner, The United States: the empire of force or the
force of empire?, Chaillot Paper 54 (Paris: European Union
Institute for Security Studies, 2002), pp. 8–9; Melvyn P. Leffl
er, ‘9/11 and the past and future of American
foreign policy’, International Aff airs 79: 5, 2003, p. 1049.
20 ‘Public unenthused by democracy push’, Pew Research
Centre, 3 Feb. 2006, http://people-press.org/commen-
tary/display.php3?AnalysisID=126, accessed 18 Feb. 2006.
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Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?
27. society
Even if the US itself holds to the GWoT securitization, will it
be able to hold
others in a suffi cient consensus to sustain it as a dominant
macro-securitization?
The answer to this question depends on several factors, not least
the importance of
the terrorist threat remaining strong enough, as discussed above.
It also depends on
the credibility and legitimacy of the United States as a leader
within international
society, which will be the subject of this subsection, and on the
acceptability and
legitimacy of the GWoT securitization itself, which will be the
subject of the
next.
The US successfully generated and led the macro-securitization
of the Cold
War against communism generally and the military power of the
Soviet Union in
particular. It was aided in this both by the broad acceptability of
its own qualities as
a leader in the West, and up to a point even in the Third World,
and by the fact that
other states, especially west European ones, plus Turkey, Japan
and South Korea,
shared the fear of communism and Soviet military power. The
GWoT has the
potential to draw together an even wider grouping, comprising
not just the western
states and Japan, but also other major states such as Russia,
China and India, all of
which have reason to bandwagon with the GWoT as a way of
addressing their
28. own internal confl icts. It is, however, hardly controversial at
this point to observe
that the legitimacy and acceptability of the United States as a
leader have declined
sharply under the stewardship of the Bush administration. The
embracing of
21 ‘Daschle: wiretaps never discussed with Congress: former
Senate Majority Leader domestic war powers were
also rejected’, CNN.com, 23 Dec. 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/23/domestic.spying.ap/
,
accessed 26 Dec. 2005.
22 Kim R. Holmes, ‘What’s in a name? “War on terror” out,
“struggle against extremism” in’, Heritage Foun-
dation Policy Research and Analysis, 26 July 2005,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecu-
rity/wm805.cfm, accessed 8 Dec. 2005; Eric Schmitt and Thom
Shanker, ‘Washington recasts terror war as
“struggle”’, 27 July 2005, New York Times as reprinted in
International Herald Tribune, http://www.iht.com/
articles/2005/07/26/news/terror.php, accessed 8 Dec. 2005.
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30. other is about whether the GWoT itself, or more particularly the
specifi c way in
which the Bush administration has defi ned and pursued it, is
itself undermining
the legitimacy and attractiveness of US leadership. These
questions refl ect sets of
dynamics that are in principle separate, but which can easily
become linked. A
United States that had remained committed to multilateralism
might have weath-
ered better the disagreements, particularly those concerning
Iraq, that have arisen
over the GWoT. But a unilateralist United States that has made
itself unpopular
fi nds that this unpopularity and the disagreements over Iraq
become mutually
reinforcing.
This situation raises interesting questions about the position of
the United States
within international society, and about the nature of
international society; and it
is these questions that underpin the potential political signifi
cance of the GWoT
securitization. Tim Dunne argues that US unilateralism has been
taking it outside
international society, though he is uncertain about whether this
means that inter-
national society has, in eff ect, shrunk by losing a member, or
been pushed into a
more hierarchical form by the suzerain behaviour of its most
powerful member.24
Kelstrup reaches a clearer formulation.25 He sees that the
successful securitization
of the GWoT has created a ‘formative moment’ in the global
system in which the
31. United States is bidding for ‘a new strategy of governance in
the global system’ that
rejects the traditional multilateralism and favours a more
power-based unilateralism.
Such a shift would normally, as Dunne partly argues it is doing,
take the United
States outside international society. But Kelstrup’s concern is
that a successful and
durable securitization of the GWoT might be strong enough to
legitimize a shift
towards the more hierarchical form of international society also
pointed to by
Dunne, echoing the wider debate about whether the United
States is now a type of
empire. If the combined force of reactions against US
unilateralism and its conduct
of the GWoT take it outside international society, then both its
leadership position,
and international society at the global level, are gravely
weakened. If the GWoT
securitization is strong enough to legitimize a more hierarchical
inter national
23 Michael Cox, ‘Beyond the West: terrors in Transatlantia’,
European Journal of International Relations 11: 2, 2005,
pp. 203–33.
24 Tim Dunne, ‘Society and hierarchy in international
relations’, International Relations 17: 3, 2003, pp. 308, 314–
15.
25 Kelstrup, ‘Globalisation’, pp. 113–15.
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33. leadership position,
having broadly failed to translate its unquestioned power to
destroy into a basis of
legitimacy for a more hierarchical international society.
To the extent that the United States is unpopular apart from the
GWoT, its
attempt to use the GWoT securitization to consolidate its sole
superpower position
could encounter resistance simply because it could do so. In
other words, states
might support or oppose the GWoT not only on its merits, but
also because of
how it plays into the global hierarchy of power.27 The
unfolding of events at the
time of writing suggest that Press-Barnathan’s position is
closest to the likely
outcome, though successful escalation by the terrorists could
easily rewrite this
script to match Kelstrup’s scenario.
The unacceptability and illegitimacy of the GWoT securitization
as a
whole and/or of associated particularist securitizations
The durability of the GWoT securitization, and the ability of the
United States to
lead it, are also aff ected by the extent to which both the GWoT
securi tization as a
whole and/or particularist securitizations that get linked to it
become unacceptable
and illegitimate. Although the general GWoT macro-
securitization has in many
respects been rather successful, it has not gone entirely
unopposed, and it is not
diffi cult to imagine where additional lines of opposition might
34. come from. So far,
opposition is not so much to the general securitization itself as
to the framing of it
as a ‘war’ and, increasingly, to the practices that the US tries to
legitimize within
the GWoT frame. Even if the general securitization continues to
command wide
support, reaction against it could also grow from US attempts to
link to it issues
that are either related, but hotly contested (most obviously
Israel’s own WoT), or
hotly contested because the facts of the link to the GWoT are
themselves contro-
versial (most obviously the invasion of Iraq on the grounds of
its alleged possession
of WMD and its links to Al-Qaeda).
In terms of the GWoT securitization as a whole, some of the
lines of opposition
are the same in the rest of the world as they are in US domestic
debates, particu-
larly over what kinds of emergency action it legitimizes. To the
extent that the
GWoT becomes associated with actions that seem to contradict
the values that
the West seeks to represent against the likes of Al-Qaeda, the
legitimacy of the
securitization is corroded. If the GWoT means that prisoners or
war are denied
26 Galia Press-Barnathan, ‘The war against Iraq and
international order: from Bull to Bush’, International Studies
Review 6: 2, 2004, pp. 195–212.
27 I am grateful to Ole Wæver for this point.
36. ‘the civilized world’. Wilkinson, who has solid credentials as a
hard foe of the
terrorists, echoes a sentiment widely held across the political
spectrum when he
says that ‘If we undermine or destroy our hard-won liberties and
rights in the
name of security against terrorism we will give the terrorists a
victory they could
never win by the bomb and the gun.’28 In this respect it is of
more than passing
interest that all of the current strategies being used to pursue
the GWoT seem
actively to damage the liberal values they purport to defend. I
shall return to this
point in my conclusions.
It is also conceivable that the GWoT securitization will come
under attack
because of the way in which it facilitates the linkage of religion
and politics. Most
western leaders (the ever undiplomatic Berlusconi having been a
notable excep-
tion) have tried hard right from the beginning not to stage the
GWoT as a war
between the West and Islam. They have trodden the diffi cult
line of maintaining
that, while most of the terrorists speak in the name of Islam,
that does not mean
that most adherents of Islam are terrorists or supporters of
terrorists. But despite
this, the profoundly worrying relinking of religion and politics
in the United
States, Israel and the Islamic world easily feeds zero-sum confl
icts. This linkage
could help to embed the securitization of the GWoT, as it seems
to have done
37. within the United States and Israel. If religious identities feed
the growth of a
‘clash of civilizations’ mentality, as seems to have happened in
the episode of
the Danish cartoons, this too could reinforce the GWoT
securitization. It could,
equally, create a reaction against it from those who feel that
their particular
religion is being mis represented by fundamentalists, and/or
from those who object
to religious infl uence on politics. The latter is certainly part of
what has widened
the gap between the US and Europe.
Another weakness of the GWoT macro-securitization is that Al-
Qaeda and
its like, while clearly posing a threat to the West, do not
represent a plausible
political alternative to it, Islamist fantasies about a new
caliphate notwithstanding.
The contrast with the Cold War could not be more striking.
Then, the designated
opponent and object of securitization was a power that
represented what seemed
a plausible political alternative: one could easily imagine a
communist world. The
post-9/11 securitization focused neither on an alternative
superpower nor on an
alternative ideology, but on the chaos power of embittered and
alienated minori-
ties, along with a handful of pariah governments, and their
ability to exploit the
openness, the technology, and in some places the inequality,
unfairness and failed
states generated by the western system of political economy.
While serious, the
39. values, contested
linked securitizations also threaten the legitimacy and
attractiveness of the wider
securitization. The most obvious, widespread and deepest
dispute of this kind has
been over the invasion of Iraq. The US and British governments
attempted to justify
the invasion by linking Saddam Hussein’s regime to both
terrorists and WMD.
This securitizing move was successful within the United States,
but vigorously
contested in many other places, resulting in serious and
damaging splits in both the
EU and NATO. Russia was generally very supportive of the
GWoT securitization,
seeking to link its own diffi culties in Chechnya to it, but Putin
joined Germany
and France in strong opposition to the US-led invasion of Iraq.
The ill-prepared
occupation that followed the successful blitzkrieg against Iraq
only deepened the
splits, with many opponents of the war agreeing with Dana
Allin’s assessment that
‘Iraq was probably the war that bin Laden wanted the United
States to fi ght’,29
and Wilkinson’s that it was ‘a gratuitous propaganda gift to bin
Laden’.30 During
the 2004 US election, even John Kerry began to argue the point
that invasion of
Iraq was distracting eff ort away from the GWoT.31 As the
political disaster in Iraq
continues to unfold, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it
was both a tactical and
strategic blunder of epic proportions in relation to the problem
of global terrorism
represented by Al-Qaeda. The steady fl ow of bad news from
40. Iraq, and the lack of
sound options for either staying in or getting out, corrodes the
legitimacy of the
GWoT securitization by associating it with bad decisions and
unsuccessful, even
counterproductive, actions. Whether this type of association is
suffi cient to bring
down the GWoT securitization is an interesting question. If the
Vietnam War is
taken as an analogy, then the answer is probably no. Vietnam
weakened the United
States because, probably like Iraq, it came to be seen both as a
mistake and as a
defeat. But it did not much damage the wider macro-
securitization of the Cold
War, despite being closely linked to it.
Somewhat diff erent from Iraq, but similar in creating tension
over the broader
GWoT securitization, was Israel’s attempt to link its own war
against the Arabs to
America’s GWoT. This move was largely successful in the
United States, where it
increased the already strong US tilt towards Israel, and largely
rejected everywhere
else (where Israel’s problems were seen to be largely of its own
making because of
its expansionist settlement policy). Like the invasion of Iraq,
this particular securi-
tization divided the United States from many of its allies in the
GWoT, and so
weakened the consensus on the overall securitization of the
GWoT. This type
of linkage strengthened the view that the GWoT represents not
just a legitimate
response to a genuine threat, but also a manoeuvre by the Bush
41. administration to
manipulate the 9/11 trauma to create a climate of fear which
could help it achieve
the radical political goals which it brought with it to offi ce.
The attacks of 9/11
29 Dana H. Allin, ‘The Atlantic crisis of confi dence’,
International Aff airs 80: 4, 2004, p. 652.
30 Wilkinson, International terrorism, p. 21.
31 ‘Bush, Kerry clash on Iraq war’, Chicago Sun Times, 30
Sept. 2004, http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/
01bush.html#, accessed 26 Dec. 2005.
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Barry Buzan
1114
International Aff airs 82: 6, 2006
43. new killer plague,
could easily put planetary environmental concerns at the top of
the securitiza-
tion agenda. But in conventional mode the most likely threat to
the GWoT as
dominant macro-securitization comes from the rise of China.
That the GWoT did
not eliminate other, more traditionally state-centric, US
securitizations is shown
by the 2002 National Security Strategy, which pointedly
reasserted the US inten-
tion to retain military superiority over all others: ‘We must
build and maintain
our defenses beyond challenge … Our forces will be strong
enough to dissuade
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes
of surpassing, or
equaling, the power of the United States.’33 The idea of China
rising to superpower
status and becoming a peer competitor to the United States has
been strong in the
US since the end of the Cold War,34 and the empirical case for
China achieving
superpower capabilities within the next couple of decades is
plausible.35 It was
perhaps only the perceived remoteness in time of China
achieving superpower
status that prevented this securitization from becoming the
dominant rhetoric in
Washington during the 1990s. As time marches on, the rise of
China becomes more
real and less hypothetical.
32 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America unbound: the
Bush revolution in foreign policy (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 78–97.
44. 33 Bush, The National Security Strategy, pp. 29–30.
34 Richard K. Betts, ‘Wealth, power and instability: East Asia
and the United States after the Cold War’, Interna-
tional Security 18: 3, 1993/4, pp. 34–77; Thomas J. Christensen,
‘Posing problems without catching up: China’s
rise and challenge for US security policy’, International
Security 25: 4, 2001, pp. 5–40; Adam Ward, ‘China and
America: trouble ahead?’, Survival 45: 3, 2003, pp. 35–56;
Robert S. Ross, ‘The geography of peace: East
Asia in the twenty-fi rst century’, International Security 23: 4,
1999, pp. 81–118; Denny Roy, ‘Hegemon on the
horizon? China’s threat to East Asian security’, International
Security 19: 1, 1994, pp. 149–68; David Shambaugh,
‘Containment or engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s
responses’, International Security 21: 2, 1996, pp.
180–209.
35 Barry Buzan, The United States and the great powers
(Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
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46. course impact strongly on the role of the United States as leader
of the GWoT
securitization. The two are not likely to merge because China
has no interest in
supporting Islamic terrorists. It is also entirely possible that if
competition with
China becomes the dominant securitization for the United
States, this securitiza-
tion will have little appeal or use as a macro-securitization to
audiences outside
the United States. Indeed, so long as China conducts its so-
called ‘peaceful rise’
in such a way as not to threaten its neighbours or the general
stability of interna-
tional society, many outside the United States might actually
welcome it. Europe
is likely to be indiff erent, and many countries (e.g. Russia,
China, India, Iran,
France, Malaysia) support a rhetoric of multipolarity as their
preferred power
structure over the predominance of the United States as sole
superpower. If played
cleverly, China’s rise might seem threatening only to the United
States, and not to
most other countries. If so, such a rise might well weaken the
GWoT as a macro-
securitization by lowering it in US priorities, while not
replacing it with any other
macro-securitization. Only if China rises in such a way as to
threaten its neigh-
bours would it provide the basis for a securitization that the
United States could
share with others.
In sum, the durability of the GWoT as a macro-securitization
looks quite doubtful.
47. Although outcomes for each of the factors above are diffi cult
to predict with any
certainty, the GWoT macro-securitization is vulnerable to being
derailed if any
one of them ceases to be supportive of it in a major way. In
other words, every-
thing has to go right if the GWoT is to inherit the mantle of the
Cold War. This
could, of course, happen, especially if the terrorists succeed in
escalating their
attacks. But given the number of things that could plausibly go
wrong for it, the
chance that the GWoT securitization will endure does not look
all that strong.
Conclusions
To conclude, I want to focus on the contradiction between
pursuit of the GWoT
macro-securitization and maintenance of both domestic and
international polit-
ical and (especially) economic orders based on liberal values.
The argument is that
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49. wider dimension gets added. The openness of a liberalized
economy provides
opportunities for transnational criminals and terrorists and
extremists of all sorts
to operate on a global scale. As a consequence, the traditional
Hobbesian domestic
security agenda gets pushed up to the international level.
Because a world govern-
ment is not available, the problem pits international society
against global uncivil
society. An additional diffi culty, as Wilkinson notes, is that
Al-Qaeda and its ilk
have such profoundly revolutionist objectives that a negotiated
solution is not
really an option.36 Rumsfeld is quite right that the struggle is to
the death.
The dilemma arises out of the policy choices faced by liberal
societies in
responding to terrorism. The three options currently in play all
require that
terrorism be securitized and emergency action of some sort
taken to try to counter
and eliminate it. In each case, the necessary action requires
serious compromising
of liberal values.
Insulation
Insulation is exemplifi ed by homeland security and hardening
the state both against
penetration by terrorists and against vulnerability of
infrastructure to terrorist
attack. Pursuing the logic of homeland security quickly begins
to undermine some
core elements of the LIEO. The free movement of people for
50. purposes of business,
education and the arts is restricted by tighter controls on travel
and immigration.
The free movement of goods is restricted both by increased
requirements for
inspection and traceability, and by the imposition of more
controls on the export
of technology related to WMD. The free movement of money is
restricted by
the measures taken to disrupt the fi nancial networks of
terrorists. By hardening
borders, homeland security measures erode some of the
principles of economic
liberalism that they are designed to defend; and the same
argument could be made
about the trade-off between enhanced surveillance under the
GWoT and the civil
liberties that are part of the core referent object of western
civilization.37 At various
points insulation blends into the next option: repression.
36 Wilkinson, International terrorism, pp. 133–16.
37 Jef Huysmans, ‘Minding exceptions: the politics of
insecurity and liberal democracy’, Contemporary Political
Theory 3: 3, 2004, pp. 321–41. See also Stephen Gill, ‘The
global panopticon: the neoliberal state, economic life
and democratic surveillance’, Alternatives 20: 1, 1995, pp. 1–
49.
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52. Bay and elsewhere)
of individuals. War is seldom good for liberal values even when
fought in defence
of them. It undermines civil liberties, peace, the openness that
the LIEO requires
and, as US practice shows, the commitment to human rights.
Equalizing
Equalizing starts from the assumption that the root causes of
terrorism lie in the
inequalities and injustices that are both a legacy of human
history and a feature
of market economies. The long-term solution to terrorism in this
perspective is
to drain the waters in which the terrorists swim by redressing
the inequalities and
injustices that supposedly generate support for them. It is not
my concern here to
argue whether this contested cause–eff ect hypothesis is correct
or not. My point
is that if a policy along these lines is pursued, it cannot avoid
undermining the
foundations of a competitive market economy. Redistribution on
the scale required
would put political priorities ahead of market logics, and in
doing so quench the
fi res of the market which fuel the liberal project. A possible
liberal counter to this
view is that a liberal policy would be not so much redistributive
as ameliorative,
making the liberal system work better by, for example,
eliminating rich country
protectionism in agriculture. However, while this might reduce
inequalities in the
very long run, in the short and medium term it is likely to cause
53. huge amounts of
pain (as in the recent shift in the textile regime, which enabled
China to drive many
Third World producers out of the market). If inequality is the
source of terrorism,
neo-liberal economics does not provide a quick enough solution.
It thus becomes clear that terrorism poses a double threat to
liberal democratic
societies: open direct assaults of the type that have become all
too familiar, and
insidious erosion as a consequence of the countermeasures
taken. It is easy to see
how this dilemma drives some towards seeking a solution in
total victory that will
eliminate both the terrorists and the contradiction. But if it is
impossible to elimi-
nate terrorists, as is probably the case, then this drive risks the
kind of permanent
mobilization that inevitably corrodes liberal practices and
values.
If the priority is to preserve liberal values, one is pushed
towards the option
of learning to live with terrorism as an everyday risk while
pursuing counter-
measures that stop short of creating a garrison state. This choice
is not to securitize
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55. accidents: a struc-
tural problem dealt with through normal politics, despite the
quite large number
of deaths and injuries involved. Citizens would have to accept
the risk of being
killed or injured by terrorists in the same way that they accept
the risk of accident
when they enter the transport system. In principle, this should
be possible—trans-
port accidents kill far more people than terrorists do—though
whether any form
of polity, and especially a democratic one, could in practice
sustain it is an inter-
esting and diffi cult question. Perhaps, with brave, honest,
charismatic and deter-
mined leadership, it could be done. But these qualities are not
abundant in political
life, and there is a question whether such a policy could or
should be sustained
if terrorist violence escalated beyond current levels. Short of
such escalation, a
strategy along these lines should be possible. But if terrorism is
a problem of the
long term, as it well might be for advanced industrial societies,
it would require a
level of democratic sophistication and commitment rather
higher than anything
yet seen.
If this is the way to go, then Europe, which has already learned
to live with
a degree of terrorism as normal politics, may have much more to
off er than the
United States, which is driven by much higher demands for
national security.
Robert Kagan had a point when he noted that the US and
56. European positions in the
world were determined by their respective power and
weakness.40 But in relation
to the GWoT, and the defence of liberal values, the positions
may be reversed.
Europe is more resilient and better able to defend its values
without resorting to
excesses of securitization. By comparison, the United States
seems a softer target,
too easily pricked into intemperate reactions that in themselves
work to under-
mine what it claims to stand for.
38 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of international politics (Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 112.
39 Buzan, The United States and the great powers, pp. 172–3.
40 Robert Kagan, Paradise and power: America and Europe in
the new world order (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).
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57. UAE Hires American Ex-Soldiers To Kill Its Political Enemies.
This Could Be The Future Of War_.pdf
REPORTING TO YOU
Alvaro Dominguez for BuzzFeed News
A Middle East Monarchy Hired American Ex-Soldiers
To Kill Its
Political Enemies. This Could Be The Future Of
War.
“There was a targeted assassination program in
Yemen. I was running it. We did it.”
By Aram Roston
Posted on October 16, 2018, at 5:53 a.m. ET
Cradling an AK-47 and sucking a lollipop, the
former American Green Beret bumped along
in the back of an
armored SUV as it wound through the darkened
streets of Aden. Two othercommandos on
the mission were former
Navy SEALs. As elite US special operations
fighters, they had years of specialized training
by the US military to
protect America. But now they were working for a
different master: a private US company that
had been hiredby
the United Arab Emirates, a tiny desert monarchy on
the Persian Gulf.
On that night, December 29, 2015, their job was to
carryout an assassination.
58. Their armed attack, described to BuzzFeed News
by two of its participants and corroborated by
drone surveillance
footage, was the first operation in a startling for-
profit venture. For months in war-torn Yemen,
someof America’s
most highly trained soldiers worked on a
mercenary mission of murky legality to
kill prominent clerics and Islamist
political figures.
Their target that night: Anssaf Ali Mayo,
the local leader of the Islamist political party
Al-Islah. The UAE considers
Al-Islah to be the Yemeni branch of the
worldwide Muslim Brotherhood, which the
UAE calls a terrorist
organization. Many experts insist that Al-Islah,
one of whose members won the Nobel Peace
Prize, is no terror
A Middle East Monarchy Hired American Ex-Soldiers
To Kill Its Political Enemies. This Could Be
The Future
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/author/aramroston
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/07/tawakkul-
karman-profile
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
group. They say it's a legitimate political partythat
threatens the UAE not through violence but by
speaking out
59. against its ambitions in Yemen.
If you want to see more reporting like this, become a
BuzzFeed News supporter.
The mercenaries’ plan was to attach a bomb
laced with shrapnel to the door of Al-Islah’s
headquarters, located near
a soccer stadium in central Aden, a key
Yemeni port city. The explosion, one of the
leaders of the expedition
explained, was supposed to “kill everybody in
that office.”
When they arrived at 9:57 at night, all seemed
quiet. The men creptout of the SUV, guns at
the ready. One carried
the explosive charge toward the building. But just as
he was about to reach the door, another
member of the team
opened fire, shooting back along the dimly lit
street, and their carefully designed plan went
haywire.
Drone footage of the operation in Yemen to
assassinate a Yemeni leader of Al-Islah, an
Islamist political party.
Obtained by BuzzFeed News
The operation against Mayo — which was
reported at the time but until now was not known
to have been carried
out by American mercenaries — marked a pivot
pointin the war in Yemen, a brutal conflict
that has seen children
starved, villages bombed, and epidemics of cholera
60. roll through the civilian population. The
bombing was the first
salvo in a string of unsolved assassinations
that killed more than two dozen of the group’s
leaders.
https://bzfd.it/mercenaries
The company that hiredthe soldiers and carried out
the attack is Spear Operations Group,
incorporated in Delaware
and founded by Abraham Golan, a charismatic
Hungarian Israeli security contractor who lives
outside of Pittsburgh.
He led the team’s strike against Mayo.
“There was a targeted assassination program in
Yemen,” he told BuzzFeed News. “I was running
it. We did it. It was
sanctioned by the UAE within the coalition.”
The UAE and Saudi Arabia lead an alliance of
nine countries in Yemen, fighting what is largely
a proxy war against
Iran. The US is helping the Saudi-UAE side by
providing weapons, intelligence, and othersupport.
The pressoffice of the UAE’s US Embassy, as
well as its US public affairs company,
Harbour Group, did not respond
to multiple phone calls and emails.
The revelations that a Middle East monarchy hired
Americans to carryout assassinations comes at
a moment when
61. the world is focused on the alleged murder of
dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi
Arabia, an autocratic
regime that has closeties to both the US and the
UAE. (The Saudi Embassy in the US did
not respond to a request for
comment. Riyadh has denied it killed Khashoggi,
though news reports suggest it is considering
blaming his death
on a botched interrogation.)
Golan said that during his company’s months-long
engagement in Yemen, his team was responsible
for a number of
the war’s high-profile assassinations, though he
declined to specify which ones. He argued
that the US needs an
assassination program similar to the model he
deployed. “I just want thereto be a debate,” he
said. “Maybe I’m a
monster. Maybe I should be in jail. Maybe
I’m a bad guy. But I’m right.”
Spear Operations Group’s private assassination
mission marks the confluence of three
developments transforming
the way war is conducted worldwide:
Modern counterterrorism combat has shifted away
from traditional military objectives — such as
destroying
airfields, gun emplacements, or barracks — to killing
specific individuals, largely reshaping war into
organized
assassinations.
62. War has become increasingly privatized, with many
nations outsourcing most military support
services to
private contractors, leaving frontline combat as
virtually the only function that the US and many
other
militaries have not contracted out to for-profit
ventures.
The long US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have relied
heavily on elite special forces, producing tens of
thousands
of highly trained American commandos who can
demand high private-sector salaries for defense
contracting or
outright mercenary work.
With Spear Operations Group’s mission in Yemen,
thesetrends convergedinto a new and incendiary
business:
militarized contract killing, carried out by skilled
American fighters.
Experts said it is almost inconceivable that the
United States would not have known that
the UAE — whose military
the US has trained and armed at virtually every
level — had hiredan American company staffed by
American
veterans to conduct an assassination program in a
war it closely monitors.
One of the mercenaries, according to threesources
familiar with the operation, used to work with the
CIA’s “ground
branch,” the agency’s equivalent of the military’s
63. special forces. Another was a special forces
sergeant in the
Maryland Army National Guard. And yet another,
according to four people who knew him, was
still in the Navy
Reserve as a SEAL and had a top-secret
clearance. He was a veteran of SEAL Team
6, or DEVGRU, the sources told
Got a tip? You can email [email protected] To
learnhow to reach us securely, go to
tips.buzzfeed.com.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-probe-details-
fallout-of-proxy-war-in-yemen-between-saudi-coalition-and-
iran-/2018/01/11/3e3f9302-f644-11e7-9af7-
a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.c64bf6a1c93e
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/verabergengruen/khasho
ggi-congress-yemen-saudi-arabia-military-aid
https://www.odwyerpr.com/story/public/9954/2018-01-02/uae-
extends-harbour-groups-10m-pact.html
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-politics-dissident-
minister/saudi-arabia-denies-allegations-regarding-murder-of-
khashoggi-interior-minister-idUSKCN1MM2PM
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/16/middleeast/khashoggi-saudi-
pompeo-intl/index.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/us/politics/trump-saudi-
king-journalist-
khashoggi.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=
Homepage
https://tips.buzzfeed.com/
BuzzFeed News. The New York Times once described
that elite unit, famous for killing Osama bin
Laden, as a “global
64. manhunting machine with limited outside oversight.”
The CIA said it had no information about the
mercenary assassination program, and the Navy's
Special Warfare
Command declined to comment. A former CIA official
who has worked in the UAE initially told
BuzzFeed News there
was no way that Americans would be allowed to
participate in such a program. But after
checking, he called back:
“There were guys that were basically doing what you
said.” He was astonished, he said, by what he
learned: “What
vetting procedures are thereto make sure the
guy you just smoked is really a bad guy?”
The mercenaries, he said,
were “almost like a murder squad.”
Whether Spear’s mercenary operation violates US
law is surprisingly unclear. On the one hand,
US law makes it
illegal to “conspire to kill, kidnap, maim”
someone in another country. Companies that
provide military services to
foreign nations are supposed to be regulated by
the StateDepartment, which says it has never
granted any company
the authority to supply combat troops or
mercenaries to another country.
Yet, as BuzzFeed News has previously reported,
the US doesn’t ban mercenaries. And with some
exceptions, it is
perfectly legal to serve in foreign militaries,
whether one is motivated by idealism or money.
65. With no legal
consequences, Americans have served in the Israel
Defense Forces, the French Foreign Legion,
and even a militia
fighting ISIS in Syria. Spear Operations Group,
according to threesources, arranged for the UAE to
give military
rank to the Americans involved in the mission,
which might provide them legal cover.
Despite operating in a legal and political gray zone,
Golan heralds his brand of targeted
assassinations as a precision
counterterrorism strategy with fewer civilian
casualties. But the Mayo operation shows
that this new form of
warfare carries many of the same old problems.
The commandos’ plans went awry, and the
intelligence proved
flawed. And their strike was far from surgical: The
explosive they attached to the door was designed to
kill not one
person but everyone in the office.
Aside from moral objections, for-profit targeted
assassinations add new dilemmas to modern
warfare. Private
mercenaries operate outside the US military’s chain
of command, so if they make mistakes or
commit war crimes,
thereis no clear system for holding them accountable.
If the mercenaries had killed a civilian in
the street, who
would have even investigated?
The Mayo mission exposes an even more central
66. problem: the choice of targets. Golan insists
that he killed only
terrorists identified by the government of the UAE,
an ally of the US. But who is a terrorist
and who is a politician?
What is a new form of warfare and what is
just old-fashioned murder for hire?Who has the
right to choose who lives
and who dies — not only in the wars of a
secretive monarchy like the UAE, but also those
of a democracy such as the
US?
BuzzFeed News has pieced together the inside
storyof the company’s attack on Al-Islah’s
headquarters, revealing
what mercenary warfare looks like now — and
what it could become.
“What vetting procedures are thereto make
sure the guy you just
smoked is really a bad guy?”
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/world/asia/the-secret-
history-of-seal-team-6.html
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2015-
title18/html/USCODE-2015-title18-partI-chap45-sec956.htm
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id
=b9a933addb7c930044f9ff621f961932
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/aramroston/stephen-
toumajan-general-us-uae-yemen-contractor
Left to right: IsaacGilmore, Mohammed Dahlan,
and Abraham Golan.
Provided to BuzzFeed News
67. The deal that brought American mercenaries to the
streets of Aden was hashed out over a
lunch in Abu Dhabi, at an
Italian restaurant in the officers’ club of a UAE
military base.Golan and a chiseled former
US Navy SEAL named
IsaacGilmore had flown in from the US to make
their pitch. It did not, as Gilmore recalled,
begin well.
Their host was Mohammed Dahlan, the fearsome
former security chieffor the Palestinian
Authority. In a well-
tailored suit, he eyed his mercenary guests coldly
and told Golan that in another context they’d
be trying to kill each
other.
Indeed, they made an unlikely pair. Golan, who
says he was born in Hungary to Jewish parents,
maintains long-
standing connections in Israel for his security
business, according to several sources, and he
says he livedtherefor
several years. Golan once partied in London
with former Mossad chiefDanny Yatom,
according to a 2008 Mother
Jones article, and his specialty was “providing
security for energy clients in Africa.” One of
his contracts, according
to threesources, was to protect shipsdrilling in
Nigeria’s offshore oil fields from sabotage and
terrorism.
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/11/kurdistan-k-
68. street-2/
Golan, who sports a full beard and smokes
Marlboro Red cigarettes, radiates enthusiasm. A
good salesman is how
one former CIA official described him. Golan
himself, who is well-read and oftencites philosophers
and novelists,
quotes André Malraux: “Man is not what he
thinks he is but what he hides.”
Golan says he was educated in France, joined
the French Foreign Legion, and has traveled
around the world, often
fighting or carrying out security contracts. In
Belgrade, he says, he got to know the
infamous paramilitary fighter
and gangster Željko Ražnatović, better known as
Arkan, who was assassinated in 2001. “I
have a lot of respect for
Arkan,” he told BuzzFeed News.
BuzzFeed News was unable to verify parts of
Golan’s biography, including his military service,
but Gilmore and
another US special operations veteran who has
been with him in the field said it’s clear he has
soldiering experience.
He is considered competent, ruthless, and
calculating, said the former CIA official. He’s
“prone to exaggeration,” said
another former CIA officer, but “for crazy shit
he’s the kind of guy you hire.”
Dahlan, who did not respond to multiple messages
69. sent through associates, grew up in a refugee
camp in Gaza, and
during the 1980s intifada he became a major
political player. In the ’90s he was named
the Palestinian Authority’s
head of security in Gaza, overseeing a harsh
crackdown on Hamas in 1995 and 1996.
He later met President George
W. Bush and developed strong ties to the CIA,
meeting the agency’s director, George Tenet,
several times. Dahlan
was once touted as a possible leader of the
Palestinian Authority, but in 2007 he fell
from grace, accused by the
Palestinian Authority of corruption and by Hamas
of cooperating with the CIA and Israel.
A man without a country, he fled to the UAE.
There he reportedlyremade himself as a
key adviser to Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, or MBZ,
known as the true ruler of Abu Dhabi. The
former CIA officer who knows
Dahlan said, “The UAE took him in as their pit bull.”
Now, over lunch in the officers’ club, the pit
bull challenged his visitors to tell him what
was so special about fighters
from America. Why were they any better than Emirati
soldiers?
Golan replied with bravado. Wanting Dahlan to
know that he could shoot, train, run,
and fight better than anyone in
the UAE’s military, Golan said: Give me your best
man and I’ll beat him. Anyone.
70. The Palestinian gestured to an attentive young
female aide sitting nearby. She’s my best
man, Dahlan said.
The joke released the tension, and the men settled
down. Get the spaghetti, recommended Dahlan.
Mohammed Dahlan on a video conference
last year.
Said Khatib / AFP / Getty Images
"For crazy shit he’s the kind of guy you hire.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/magazine/15HAMAS-
t.html
https://www.ft.com/content/e943240e-a21d-11e4-aba2-
00144feab7de
https://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/The-
controversial-Mohammed-Dahlan-463624
Left: Gilmore. Right: Golan.
Taehoon Kim for BuzzFeed News; Courtesy Abraham
Golan
The UAE, with vast wealth but only about 1
million citizens, relies on migrant workers
from all over the world to do
everything from cleaning its toilets to teaching its
university students. Its military is no different,
paying lavish
sums to eager US defense companies and former
generals. The US Department of Defense has
approved at least $27
billion in arms sales and defense services to the
71. UAE since2009.
Retired US Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal once
signed up to sit on the board of a
UAE military company. Former
Navy SEAL and Vice Admiral Robert Harward
runs the UAE division of Lockheed Martin. The
security executive Erik
Prince, now entangled in special counsel Robert
Mueller’s investigation into Russian election
interference, set up
shop therefor a time,helping the UAE hire Colombian
mercenaries.
And as BuzzFeed News reported earlier this year,
the country embeds foreigners in its military
and gave the rank of
major general to an American lieutenant colonel,
Stephen Toumajan, placing him in command of
a branch of its
armed forces.
The UAE is hardly alone in using defense
contractors; in fact, it is the US that helped
pioneer the worldwide move
toward privatizing the military. The Pentagon pays
companies to carryout many traditional
functions, from feeding
soldiers to maintaining weapons to guarding
convoys.
The US draws the line at combat; it does not
hire mercenaries to carryout attacks or engage
directly in warfare. But
that line can get blurry. Private firms provide
heavily armed security details to protect
72. diplomats in war zones or
intelligence officers in the field. Such contractors
can engage in firefights, as they did in
Benghazi, Libya, when two
contractors died in 2012 defending a CIA post. But,
officially, the mission was protection, not
warfare.
Outside the US, hiring mercenaries to conduct
combat missions is rare, though it has
happened. In Nigeria, a strike
forcereportedlyled by longtime South African
mercenary Eeben Barlow moved successfully
against the Islamist
militant group Boko Haram in 2015. A
company Barlow founded, Executive Outcomes,
was credited with crushing
the bloody RUF rebelforcein war-torn Sierra Leone
in the 1990s.
The US draws the line at combat; it does not
hire mercenaries to carry
out attacks. But that line can get blurry.
https://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/actions/Bill_Hartung
_UAE_Arms_Report_92117.docx.pdf
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/aramroston/stephen-
toumajan-general-us-uae-yemen-contractor
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=cor
e&id=6247a35a5d9816a4b5e4f067b8758ecc&_cview=0
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianoc
ean/nigeria/11596210/South-African-mercenaries-secret-war-
on-Boko-Haram.html
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/04/opinion/saving-sierra-
leone-at-a-price.html
73. But over spaghetti with Dahlan, Golan and Gilmore
were offering an extraordinary form of mercenary
service. This
was not providing security details, nor was it even
traditional military fighting or
counterinsurgency warfare. It was,
both Golan and Gilmore say, targeted killing.
Gilmore said he doesn’t remember anyone using
the word “assassinations” specifically. But it
was clear from that
first meeting, he said, that this was not about
capturing or detaining Al-Islah’s leadership. “It
was very specific that
we were targeting,” said Gilmore. Golan said he
was explicitly told to help “disrupt and destruct”
Al-Islah, which he
calls a “political branch of a terrorist
organization.”
He and Gilmore promised they could pull together a
team with the right skillset, and quickly.
In the weeks after that lunch, they settled on
terms. The team would receive $1.5 million a
month, Golan and
Gilmore told BuzzFeed News. They’d earn bonuses
for successfulkills — Golan and Gilmore
declined to say how
much — but they would carryout their first
operation at half priceto prove what they could
do. Later, Spear would
also train UAE soldiers in commando tactics.
Golan and Gilmore had another condition: They wanted
74. to be incorporated into the UAE Armed Forces.
And they
wanted their weapons — and their target list — to
come from uniformedmilitary officers. That was
“for juridical
reasons,” Golan said. “Because if the shit hits the
fan,” he explained, the UAE uniform and dog
tags would mark “the
difference between a mercenary and a military
man.”
Dahlan and the UAE government signed off on
the deal, Golan and Gilmore said, and Spear
Operations Group got to
work.
BuzzFeed News
Standing in front of a UAE military plane are
Gilmore (middle left), Golan (middle right),
and two soldiers on their mercenary team.
Courtesy Abraham Golan
Back in the US, Golan and Gilmore started
rounding up ex-soldiers for the first, proof-of-
concept job. Spear
Operations Group is a small company —
nothing like the security behemoths such as
Garda World Security or
Constellis — but it had a huge supply of talent
to choose from.
A little-known consequence of the war on terror,
and in particular the 17 combined years of
75. US warfare in Iraq and
Afghanistan, is that the number of special
operations forces has more than doubled since
9/11,from 33,000 to
70,000. That’s a vast pool of crack soldiers
selected, trained, and combat-tested by the most
elite units of the US
military, such as the Navy SEALs and Army
Rangers. Some special operations reservists
are known to engage in for-
profit soldiering, said a high-level SEAL officer
who asked not to be named. “I know a
number of them who do this
sort of thing,” he said. If the soldiers are not on
active duty,he added, they are not obligated to
report what they’re
doing.
But the options for special operations veterans
and reservists aren’t what they were in the early
years of the Iraq
War. Private security work, mostly protecting US
government officials in hostile environments,
lacksthe excitement
of actual combat and is more “like driving Miss
Daisy with an M4” rifle, as one former
contractor put it. It also
doesn’t pay what it used to. While starting rates
for elite veterans on high-end security jobs used to
be $700 or $800
a day, contractors said, now those rates have
dropped to about $500 a day. Golan and
Gilmore said they were
offering their American fighters $25,000 a month —
about $830 a day — plus bonuses, a
generous sum in almost any
76. market.
Still, the Yemen gig crossed into uncharted territory,
and someof the best soldiers declined. “It was
still gray
enough,” Gilmore said, “that a lot of guys were like,
‘Ah, I’m good.’ ”
Gilmore himself said he has an imperfect record.
During a live-fire training mission he led,
back in his Navy days, he
says he accidentally shot another SEAL. Gilmore
said that’s what prompted him to leave the
Navy, in 2011. His last
major job before joining Spear was as an
executive at an artisanal Tequila company.
That stain on his military career, he said, is also
what prompted him to take the risk with Spear:
He was an outsider,
he wasn’t in the reserves, and he didn’t have a
pension to worry about.
By the end of 2015, Golan, who led the
operation, and Gilmore had cobbled together a
team of a dozen men. Three
were American special ops veterans, and most of the
rest were former French Foreign Legionnaires,
who were
cheaper: only about $10,000 per month, as
Gilmore remembers it, less than half of what he
and Golan said they
budgeted for their American counterparts.
77. They gathered at a hotelnear Teterboro Airport in
New Jersey. Theywere dressed in an assortment
of military
fatigues, somein camouflage, somein black. Some
were bearded and muscled, others tattooed and
wiry.
When it was time to go, they convinced the hotel
staff to give them the US flag flying outside,
Gilmore said. In a
makeshift ceremony,they folded it up into a small
triangle and took it with them.
They also packed a few weeks’ worth of
military “meals ready to eat,” body armor,
communications gear, and
medical equipment. Gilmore said he brought a
utility knifewith a special crimping tool to
prepare the blasting caps
on explosives. The team was sure to stock up on
whiskey, too — threecases of BasilHayden’s
sinceit would be
impossible to get any alcohol in Yemen, let
alone the good stuff.
On December 15, they boarded a chartered Gulfstream
G550. Onceairborne, Gilmore walked to the
cockpit and told
the pilots that therewas a slight change to
their flight plan. After refueling in Scotland,
they wouldn’t be flying to
Abu Dhabi’s main commercial airport but to a
UAE military base in the desert.
Left: Business cards for Spear Operations Group;
Right: Gilmore's dog tags
78. Obtained by BuzzFeed News
From that base,the mercenaries took a UAE Air
Force transport plane to another base in
Assab, Eritrea. During that
flight, Gilmore recalled, a uniformedEmirati officer
briefed them and handed them a hit list — 23
cards with 23
names and 23 faces. Each card featured rudimentary
intelligence: the person’s role in Yemeni
politics, for example,
or grid coordinates for a residence or two.
Gilmore said somewere members of Al-Islah, somewere
clerics, and somewere out-and-out terrorists —
but he
conceded he couldn’t be sure.
http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/montalvo-spirits-
appoints-isaac-gilmore-as-chief-business-development-officer-
otcqb-tqla-1917210.htm
BuzzFeed News has obtained one of the target
cards. On it is a man’s name,
photograph, telephone number, and
otherinformation. At the top right is the insignia of
the UAE Presidential Guard.
Conspicuously absent is why anyone wanted him
dead, or even what group he was associated
with.The man could
not be reached for comment, and it is not known
if he is alive or dead.
Assassinations have historically played a limited
79. part in US warfare and foreign policy. In
1945, “Wild Bill” Donovan,
the director of the CIA’s predecessor agency,
the OSS,was handed a finalized plan to deploy
kill teams across Europe
to attack Nazi leaders such as Hitler, Himmler,
and Goering, as well as SS officers with a
rank of major or above,
according to a biography of Donovan by Douglas
Waller. But the OSS chiefgot queasy about
the “wholesale
assassination” project and canceled it.
During the Cold War, the CIA played a role in
plots to assassinate foreign leaders, such as
Patrice Lumumba of the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rafael Trujillo of
the Dominican Republic, and Ngo Dinh Diem of
South Vietnam.
Later in the Vietnam War, the US launched the
Phoenix program, in which the CIA oftenteamed
up with US military
units to “neutralize” — or, critics say, assassinate
— Viet Cong leaders. Even so, targeted killings
were not a central
pillar of US military strategy in Vietnam. And
after Congress exposed CIA activities in the 1970s,
the US banned
assassinations of foreign leaders.
Then camethe war on terror.
Under President George W. Bush, the CIA and
the military used drones to kill terrorists, and
the CIA developed
covert assassination capabilities. President Barack
80. Obama halted the agency’s secret
assassination program but
drastically ramped up the use of drone strikes
in Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia.
Soonthe CIA and the
Obtained by BuzzFeed News
https://www.amazon.com/Wild-Bill-Donovan-Spymaster-
Espionage/dp/1416567445/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=
UTF8&qid=1539032910&sr=1-1
military were using the aircraft — piloted
remotely using video monitors — to kill
people whose names the US didn’t
even know, through “signaturestrikes” based solely
on a target’s associations and activities.
President Donald
Trump has further loosened the rules for drone
strikes.
But while private contractors oftenmaintain the
drones and sometimes even pilot them, thereis
one action they
reportedlycannot take: Only a uniformedofficer can
push the button that fires the drone’s missile
and kills the
target.
With organized assassinations having become a routine
part of war in the region, the UAE developed its
own
appetite. The country had begun to flex more
military muscle, and by 2015 it had become a
major player in the war
81. in Yemen. It quickly targeted Al-Islah, an
Islamist political partythat won more than 20% of
the vote in Yemen’s
most recent parliamentary election, held in 2003.
Elisabeth Kendall, an expert on Yemen at the
University of Oxford, points out that unlike
al-Qaeda or otherterrorist
groups, which try to seizepower through
violence, Al-Islah participates in the political
process. But, she said, the US
rationale for drone strikes has legitimized other
countries’ pursuit of their own assassinations: “The
whole very
watery, vague notion of a war on terror
has left the door wide open to any regime saying,
‘This is all a war on terror.’
”
At the top of the deck of targets they got from
the UAE, Gilmore and Golan said, was Mayo,
Al-Islah’s leader in Aden.
Mayo had close-cropped hair, wire-rimmed glasses,
and a wisp of goatee to go with his
mustache. He had spoken out
against US drone strikes in Yemen, telling
the Washington Post in 2012 that rather than
stopping al-Qaeda they had
instead fueled its growth.
Asked about the ethics and legality of killing
unarmed Al-Islah political leaders, as opposed to
armed terrorists,
Golan responded, “I thinkthis dichotomy is a
purely intellectual dichotomy.”
82. Golan said he models his assassination business on
Israel’s targeted killing program, which has
been underway since
the country was founded, and which, despite some
high-profile errors and embarrassments, he
claims is done
properly. He argues thereare someterrorist enemies so
dangerous and implacable — and so difficult to
arrest — that
assassination is the best solution.
He insists his team is not a murder squad. As
evidence, Golan recounted how, as their mission
continued, the UAE
provided names with no affiliation to Al-Islah or
any group, terrorist or otherwise. Golan
said he declined to pursue
those individuals, a claim that could not be
verified.
The people Spear did target, he and Gilmore
said, were legitimate because they were selected by
the government of
the UAE, an ally of the United States that
was engaged in a military action supported by
the US. Gilmore said that he
and Golan told the UAE they would never act
against US interests. And Golan claimed that,
based on his military
experience, he could tell if a target was a
terrorist after just a weekor two of surveillance.
Still, Gilmore acknowledged that someof the targets
may have been people who merely fell out of
favor with the
ruling family. Referring to the country’s Crown