Nebosh unit ia questions matrix - ans

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NEBOSH UNIT-IA Questions Matrix
S# - UNIT -
S. #
Questions
Dates
Element IA 1 : PRINCIPLE OF HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT
01-IA1-01
RRC-IA1-
LAQ2
An organization is proposing to move from a health and safety management system based on the ILO OHS
2001 model to one that aligns itself with BS OHSAS 18001.
Outline the possible advantages AND disadvantages of such a change. (10)
Advantages includes:
- The move from ILO OHS 2001 model to BS OHSAS 18001 would facilitate easier integration with BS EN
ISO 14001 and ISO 9001:2000 to produce an integrated management system
- Publicity value;
- Improved customer perception;
- International recognition; a clearer standard for benchmarking and commitment to continual improvement.
- External registration and independent external assessment would be available and that a more
prescriptive system is easier to assess.
Examples of possible Disadvantages could have included
- The models like ILO OSH 2001 is the system recognized and used by the regulator and they are likely to
audit an organisation against this standard, as much of the published guidance is often directly linked to
the model.
- The direct on-costs of changing a system;
- How time consuming the model can be;
- The cost of external registration;
- The likelihood of increased paper work to satisfy assessors and the fact that the model may be too
sophisticated for small to medium sized enterprises.
- Additionally, since the 18001 system is often used alongside the other ISO standards of 9001 and 14001,
there is a possibility that those auditing it may not be health and safety specialists.
Q3. Jul 2012
Q1. Jul 2009
02-IA1-02
RRC-IA1-
SAQ02
(a) An extract from a company annual report is given below.
Comment critically on the suitability of the content in providing information to the stakeholders. (5)
„The company has done much better at health and safety in the last year compared to previous years.
In 2008 there were 170 accidents that required first-aid treatment compared to 180 in 2007, 185 in 2006 and
240 in 2005.
This significant reduction is due to our new health and safety manager and a reduction in staff numbers from
1500 in 2005 to 1400 in 2006 and 1300 in 2007 to 900 in 2008, which also helps reduce business costs.
Fatalities were also reduced from 11 in 2007 to 4 in 2008, a significant decrease.‟ The management team is
Q2. Jul 2012

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confident of further reductions in 2009.
(b) Calculate the non-fatal accident incidence rates AND comment on the findings. (5)
Ans a
- The report showed no commitment to health and safety;
- There was no recognition of proactive and reactive management;
- The data was shown in an unclear way and could be improved by using graphical
representation; and
- There was no remorse shown in the fatality comments.
b
Year No of accident Avg Employees non-fatal accident incidence rates
2008 170 900 1888
2007 180 1300 1384
2006 185 1400 1321
2005 240 1500 1600
Accident incident rate = (No. of accident / AVG number employee) x 10, 000.
Once the Accident – incident rates are calculated the actual performances are revealed. Here
accident numbers decrease but the ratios / rates increase.
Since the raw accident data may give the impression that safety performance is actually improving.
But the reality may be the contrary.
Therefore, the annual reports must not show the raw accident data instead the accident – incident
rates or booths should be written for the better understanding of the readers.
NEBOSH Examiners reports says - It was generally well answered, although it did identify
candidates who did not know how to calculate the rates.

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03-IA1-03 You are preparing a detailed report intended to persuade senior management to make resources available for
the management of health and safety.
Outline reasons for managing health and safety that you would include in the report. (20)
the legal, moral and financial reasons, refer 05-IA1-05
Q7. Jul 2012
04-IA1-04 a) Outline the purpose of the ‘organization’ and ‘arrangements’ sections of a health and safety policy. (4)
b) Outline why it is important that all workers are aware of their roles and responsibilities for health and
safety in an organization. (8)
c) Identify the issues that could be included in the ‘arrangements’ section of an organization’s health and
safety policy giving an example in EACH case. (8)
(a) The purpose of the organization section of a health and safety policy is
 To identify health and safety responsibilities within the company and ensure effective delegation
and reporting lines.
 To set out in detail the specific systems and procedures that aim to assist in the implementation of
the general policy
(b) Making all persons in an organization aware of their roles for health and safety will
 Assist in defining their individual responsibilities and will indicate the commitment and leadership of
senior management.
 A clear delegation of duties will assist in sharing out the health and safety workload, will ensure
contributions from different levels and jobs, will help to set up clear lines of reporting and
communication
 Assist in defining individual competencies and training needs particularly for specific roles such as
first aid and fire.
 Increase their motivation and help to improve morale throughout the organization.
(c) Safe systems of work
 Such as permit to work procedures;
 Arrangements for carrying out risk assessments;
 Controlling exposure to specific hazards for example noise, radiation and manual handling;
 Monitoring standards of health and safety in the organisation by means of safety tours,
inspections and audits;
 The use of personal protective equipment such as harnesses and RPE;
 Arrangements for reporting accidents and unsafe conditions;
 Procedures for controlling and supervising contractors and visitors;
Q7 Jan 2010

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 Arrangements for maintenance whether routine or planned preventative;
 Welfare arrangements such as the provision of washing facilities; procedures for dealing with
emergencies such as fire, flooding and bomb threats; the provision of safety training;
 Arrangements for consultation with the workforce through safety representatives or safety
committees; and
 Environmental control including noise monitoring and the disposal of waste.
05-IA1-05
RRC – IA 1
– LAQ3
A financial review within your organisation has resulted in a proposal to the Board of Directors to cut its
health and safety budget and to cancel a capital project that was designed to lead to significant
improvements in the working environment.
WRITE a report to the Board giving reasons why the proposal should be rejected.
[20 – June 2000 National, Jul 2008]
There are legal, moral and economic benefits for maintaining good standard by investing in health and safety
by the organisation.
Such investments would also result in compliance with legal requirements and avoidance of legal action
particularly in view of the possible liability of directors and /or managers
The investment in improving the working environment would also indicate the organisation’s commitment to
health and safety and would have a beneficial effect on the morale of the workforce which could lead to an
improvement in productivity, efficiency, quality and employment relations.
On the other hand, the potential costs to the organisation of a decision to reduce the health and safety budget
would include those normally associated with an accident involving
 Injury and / or plant failure or fire such as
 The interruption to normal production and product damage
 The cost of replacement labour and equipments
 The cost associated with a criminal prosecution
 Potential increase in insurance premium
 Damage of organisation reputation
 Lose of public confidence which in turn could affect the demand of its product
Therefore the budget should not be reduced.
Or…RRC.
This report has been prepared following the proposal to the board to cut the health and safety budget and
cancel the health and safety capital project.
The report will argue for the rejection of this proposal based on three basic principles –
- The sound economic argument – that underpins good health and safety management within this
Q10. Jul 2008
[20 – June
2000
National, Jul
2008]

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organisation
- The legal implications of failing to manage H&S effectively
- The moral imperative
The Economic Argument: H&S failings cost money. They can cost a lot of money. While it is true that putting
good H&S standards in place also costs money, but the costs associated with failures far outweighs those
costs. There are two ways in which this organisation may fail to ensure H&S.
- One is a failure to ensure safety, which leads to accidents.
- The other is to failure to ensure health, leading ill-health, sickness and chronic diseases.
Both have direct costs associated with them for example – a work place accident leads to
- Production downtime
- Damage to equipment, plant and premises – needs to be repaired
- Loss of product – must be remade, incurs over time or additional labor costs
- Person who got injury – remain absent from the work place, they are paid full salary during these absence
- Deployment of temporary labor to cover their (injured) job, if this is not suitable then other workers have to
pick up the work for their absent co-workers which leads to over-working, fatigue, stress increasing the
likelihood of human error.
The above mentioned costs are quite apparent and countable but there some more costs which are non-
discoverable in nature. Such costs are unrecoverable too, for example –
- If the industrial relations are severely damaged by a workplace accident that reflects in poor productivity,
higher absence rates and reduced efficiency, but how could that be exactly costed out?
- If bad publicity were to result from a workplace accident that might have direct effects on our customers
willingness to do business with us.
- Loss of reputation due to poor accident statistics will result in facing difficulties to regain the Trusts of
customers to get another jobs
These costs are very significant and would be difficult to quantify and discover.
Now the other failure that is ill-health, which often results from poor working conditions and poor working
environments. Such ill-health leading Workplace absence may be severe enough to warrant dismissal on
medical grounds. Studies which have analysed workplaces looking for the costs associated with
workplace accidents suggests that the uninsured losses to an organisation are greater than insured losses
by a factor of 8X as a minimum.
In other words our insurance company cannot be approached to fund the vast majority of losses that we incur
when we injure people at work or make them sick. We fund those losses ourselves.
The Legal arguments: there are legal standards that we must comply with and failure to comply can lead to
- Enforcement action being taken against us in form of legally binding notices that require us to carry out
such improvements or to stop certain activities.

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- Such enforcement always carries with its costs associated with
o Carrying out the improvement to the enforcement officer’s timescale or
o Stopping an activity that we find to be financially beneficial.
- In other instances, failure to achieve legal compliances may results in prosecutions
- Payment of huge prosecution legal fees in mounting a defence in event of the case being lost
- In addition, injure a worker or cause ill health and we may well sued by injured party. THESE cases may
results in
o Payment of compensation to injured victims
- Increased premium costs - Though this compensation money may paid by insurers in first instance, it
invariably leads to higher insurance premium in the short and long term as the insurance company
attempts to claw back their losses from us
The Moral Arguments:
We have a clear policy obligation to our staff to ensure their on-going health, safety and welfare. That has
been made clear in the statement of intent signed by our managing director as head line of our health and
safety policy. Aside from above two kind of arguments, we must also consider the huge personal impact of
accidents and ill-health that can do occur as result of our H&S standards.
One worker may be injured or made ill but tha one person has a family and love ones, they have friends
and colleagues. The impacts of serious accident or case of ill health have very wide ranging implications.
We must reflect on our own personal values and decide whether we would wish to see the unpleasant and
sometime tragic consequences of poor H&S standards occurring in our organisation.
In conclusion I would state that cutbacks cannot be made to the H&S budget, nor to capital project, on the basis
of three arguments described above. We owe it to ourselves, to our workforce and to our shareholders to retain
our H&S budgets so that we are the best able to avoid the losses that workplace accidents and ill-health might
cause.
06-IA1-06
RRC – IA 1
– SAQ3
OUTLINE the way in which a health and safety practitioner could evaluate and develop their own competence
whilst working in an advisory role
[10 – Jan 2009]
H&S practitioners might evaluate their own practice in a number of ways including
 Measuring the effect of changes and developments they have introduced and implemented in their
organisation.
 By setting personal objectives and targets and assessing their performance against them
 By reviewing failure or unsuccessful attempts to produce change
 By benchmarking their practice against that of other practitioners (who are in similar role) and
 By benchmarking against good practice and case studies or information
 By seeking advice from other competent professionals.
 By seeking feedback from others such as clients, their bosses, colleagues as a part of the annual
Q2 Jan 2011
Q1. Jan 2009

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appraisal of their performance by senior management.
They may also develop their practice through
 Work Appraisal Scheme - by agreeing a Personal Development plan with their manager means a
scheme of training and experience building that will enable them to perform better. This might include
non HSE related topics too – such as
o Management skills, interview skills, IT skills etc
 Participating in CPD (continual professional development) schemes. Such as that operated by IOSH will
enhance performance.
 Expanding their core knowledge and competence in obtaining a recognised professional qualification –
such as Undertaking academic qualifications – NEBOSH Diploma
 Background reading and periodicals , etc, also provides an opportunity to increase knowledge and
understanding.
 Keeping up to date by undertaking training in relevant areas
 Ensuring they have access to suitable information sources
 By networking with their peers at safety groups (www.buildsafeuae.com) and conferences
 By seeking advice from other competent practitioners and consultants
07-IA1-07 EXPLAIN the benefits of:
a. an integrated health and safety, environment, and quality management system;
b. separate health and safety, environment, and quality management system;
OR
Q. A multi-site business in the UK has a quality management system compliant with ISO9001:2000. It also
has a health and safety management system and an environmental management system that operate
independently. The Board of Directors is now considering the possibility of developing an integrated
management system encompassing all three elements. In order that a decision can be made objectively,
prepare a brief for the Board that outlines the key potential benefits of:-
(i) An integrated management system
(ii) retaining the existing system of separate management systems
a. The benefits of an integrated management system includes
 Reduced documentation and Promotion of a single system to reduce resources to manage the
system
 More efficient system – removes duplication;
 It lower the cost through the avoidance of duplication in work standards, procedures and systems of
work, record keeping, compliance auditing and software areas
 Consistency of formats
 Easier to prioritise on key issues - More concise reporting structure
 Avoiding conflicts and narrow decision making that solves a problem in one area but creates a
problem in another;
 Encouraging priorities and resource utilisation that reflect the overall needs of the organisation rather
Q7. Jan 2013
Q9. Jan 2012
Q11. Jan 2009
June 2004
July 2005

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than an individual discipline
 Applying the benefits from good initiatives in one area to other areas
 Encouraging closer working and equal influence amongst specialists
 Encouraging the spread of a positive culture across all three disciplines
 Providing scope for the integration of other risk areas such as security or product safety
b. Benefits of retaining separate systems or Formal management systems includes
 Providing a more flexible approach tailored to business needs in term of system complexity and
operating philosophy – for example safety standards must meet minimum legal requirements
whereas quality standards can be set internally.
 Separate system might be clearer for external stakeholders or regulators to understand and work
with.
 It promotes clear management structure delegating authorities and responsibilities.
 It promotes continues identification of legal and other requirements
 It encourages more detailed and focused approach for auditing the standards.
 It has clear set of objectives for improvement, with measurable results
 A structured approach to risk assessment within the organisation
It allows close monitoring of all the systems, auditing of performance and review of policies and objectives.
08-IA1-08 DESCRIBE using appropriate example, the possible functions of health and safety practitioner within a medium
sized organisation.
[20 – Jan 2008]
The functions of a health and safety practitioner in medium sized organisation are as below:
 Helping to develop, implement and revise health and safety policies
 Giving advice on risk in work place and appropriate control measures to be adopted
 Drawing up procedures for vetting the design and commissioning of new plant and machinery
 Assisting management in setting performance standards Carry out proactive and reactive monitoring
 Advising management on the requirements of health and safety legislation
 Organising and reviewing emergency procedures
 Promoting positive health and safety culture within the organisation
 Investigating accidents and case of ill health
 Accident analysis and maintaining safety statistics
 Carry out or assisting safety audit of the health and safety management system
 Liaising with enforcement authority and maintaining health and safety information system
 Preparation of training requirements and organising training sessions to employees
Q6 July 2011
Q7 July 2010
Q10. Jan 2008
09-IA1-09 (a) Outline the concept of the organisation as a system. (4)
(b) Identify suitable risk controls at EACH point within the system AND give an example in EACH case. (6)
(a)
Just as a system is comprised of a number of interlinked components so might an organization,
Q1 Jul 2010

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 The components which could be identified as inputs, such as design, procurement, recruitment of
personnel, and information; processes for example operations both routine and non-routine, plant and
maintenance and
 Outputs such as products, packaging and transport.
 The system as a whole – the organisation – would need to interact with the environment in responding
to matters such as the current markets and client needs and would need to be subjected to monitoring
procedures and react to any changes found to be necessary.
(b), an identification of the risk controls for each component was necessary.
 For inputs, this would involve controlling the quality of physical resources such as
o Managing the supply chain and
o Ensuring conformance with set standards;
 Human resources by adopting strict recruitment standards designed to
o Ensure competence in those who were invited to join the organization and
o Information by ensuring it is always up to date, relevant and comprehensible.
 Control of the process and work activities would be concerned with the premises, plant, procedures and
people and would, by the use of risk assessment,
 Involve the application of hierarchical measures such as risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer, risk
retention and behavior safety.
 The control of outputs would be concerned with products and services and would address matters such
as waste management, product liability insurance, contractual obligations and customer aftercare.
RRC-IA1-
LAQ01
Explain the purpose and key feature of each stage of the safety management model described in the HSE
documents ‘successful health and safety management (HSG65). 20 marks
RRC-IA1-
SAQ01
OUTLINE the difficulties that organizations face in trying to ascertain the True cost of accidents and incidents
10m
Explain how the principles of corporate governance would support good safety management in an organization
10m

10
RRC-IA1-
SAQ02
A company’s annual report for 2002 includes the following section on health and safety
“The year 2002 produced the lowest lost time accident frequency rate, at 2.1, for the last five years (compared
with 3.3 in 2001
3.6 in 2000
2.4 in 1999
2.2 in 1998
The relocation of teeside works during the year led to some significant improvement in working condition on that
site has facilitated the successful implementation of OHSAS 18001. The major cause of accidents across the
company in 2002 was slips, trips and falls (39%), followed by manual handling (21%) and contact with moving
or stationary objects (15%).
With reference to both the style and content of the section provide notes to suggest how the annual summary of
health and safety performance might have been improved.
 The style of annual report is abrupt, reactive and riddle with technical jargon.
 There is no topic, headlines for the proactive success – for example the successful implementation of
OHSAS 18001 should be presented as headlines “news and Major Achievement of the year”.
 The report focuses on reactive data and therefore is concerned for negative performance.
 Little information on proactive performance.
 Overall the report is Dry and uninteresting, it fails to hold the readers attention or clearly communicate
the message.
 In term of contents the report deals with several sets of numeric data in a very dry way. This data have
been presented in the form of graph. Perhaps a line graph of bar chart for historic data on rates and piw
chart for accident cause data.
 There is also a lack of interpretation or explanation of this data. It is left to the reader to make their
minds if this data shows an improvement or not. Any rates used should also be explained to the reader.
 There would also appear to be missing content in the report, for ex
o There is no mention of occupational health issue;
o There is no comment about initiative taken during the year;
o Comparison against set targets and industry sectors.
END OF UNIT 1

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Element IA2 LOSS CAUSATION AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
10-IA2-01
RRC-IA2 –
SAQ02
The accident rate of two companies is different although they have the same size workforce and produce
identical products.
Outline possible reasons for this difference. (10)
The possible Reason can be categorized in Two section:
a) Artificial Reason – reporting culture, rate calculation
b) Real Reasons – lay out, maintenance, workers, trainings, hours and shifts
- Variation in the level of accident reporting – this might result from different safety culture and different
reporting systems and recording accidents, so the accident rate in reality be very similar, but reporting
rates are not.
- Differences in the way that accident rates are calculated; leading two different sets of accident rates
from sets of similar raw data
- There could be management issues such as a difference in the level of commitment;
- Policies and procedures such as monitoring may be different and that disciplinary procedures for non-
compliance by workers may vary.
- Differences in workplace layout, resulting in higher rate of accidents at one site than another.
- Difference in selection, age and type of the equipment used; again resulting in higher accident rates.
- Difference in the nature of workers recruited into each workplace (staff selection) perhaps coupled with
difference in staff retention rates (turnover); this may result in less well qualified, less adept staff, working
at one site for shorter periods of time while better qualified staff, with higher ability, works at second site
for longer period of time.
- Human resource issues such as the selection, training and competence of the workforce together with a
possible
- Training and competence of workforce in each workplace may vary depending on the amount of
training conducted and the effectiveness of those trainings.
- Difference in the companies’ level of communication and consultation with the staff; such that one
workplace can respond quickly to issues raised, while the other cannot.
- Risk control issues such as the adequacy of risk assessments and the associated control measures, the
existence of safe systems of work and procedures for the use and maintenance of personal protective
equipment;
- Straightforward variations in production volumes and the rates and the numbers of hours worked at
each of the two companies. Longer hours and busier workplaces give rise to higher number of incidents,
which may not be factored in the accident rates.
- Issues connected with production such as piece work and the winning of bonus payments which could
lead to the taking of risks; and
- Different work patterns and shift system / out turn system at the two sites may result in difference in
Q1. Jan 2012
Q1. Jan 2010

12
worker fatigue. Tired workers who are changing their shift patter frequently and working long hours have
more accidents.
- Cultural Issues such as the attitude, motivation and behavior of individuals and the effect that peer
pressure might have on health and safety culture within the organization.
11-IA2-02 a. EXPLAIN the difference between accident incident rate and accident frequency rate. [2]
An accident incident rate is calculated by dividing the number of accidents occurring over a period of time by
the average number of person employed during the period with the result being multiplied by 10, 000.
Accident incident rate = (No. of accident / AVG number employee) x 10, 000.
An accident frequency rate is calculated by dividing the number of accident occurring during a period by total
hours worked during the period and multiplying the result by 1000,000.
Accident frequency rate = (No. of accident / Total man Hrs worked) x 1000,000
Important Info (only)
number of accidents in the period
____________________________________________ X 10,000
Average number employed during the period
SHEillds emma’s opinion
There are many different multiplier that can be used - the HSE use different ones than the ILO, the USA uses different
ones from both these - small companies uses lower numbers to keep the figures in line with the size of the company to
make it easier to do the calculations and make them more relevant.
As long as you use the same multiplier in your company each time then the results will be comparable.
Accident Severity Rate = (total Man Day Lost / Total man hrs worked)1000,000
Q6. Jan 2013
Q2. Jul 2008

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b. A site is divided into a small number of large departments and number of workers in each department is
variable. You have been asked to collate details of first aid treatment cases for the site and to present on a
monthly basis, data in graphical and / or numerical format, in a way that would be helpful to site and department
management.
DESCRIBE how you could presents this data indicating clearly the types of graphical presentation you would
use AND in EACH case the data it would contain.
The way to collate and present the first aid treatment for a site comprising a number of departments is as
below:-
As the intention is to present the information in a way that would helpful to both site and departmental
management, it is necessary to collate details firstly from the site as a whole and then for each department.
The first option is to produce a line graph to show the total number of first aid treatment cases each month and
then indicate the trend by the use of trend line.
Using a frequency or incidence rate will enable changes in employee numbers to be taken into account. A line
graph could also be used to show any trends in specific causes or types of injury whilst a chart or histogram
could highlight the number by site or department.
Another option would be to use pie chart, bar charts or histograms to present information both for the whole site
and individual departments on the cause of the injuries requiring treatment and for the site of the injuries by
body part.

14
12-IA2-03 A chemical reaction vessel is partially filled with a mixture of highly flammable liquids. It is possible that the
vessel headspace may contain a concentration of vapour which, in the presence of sufficient oxygen, is capable
of being ignited. A powder is then automatically fed into this vessel.
Adding the powder may sometimes cause an electrostatic spark to occur with enough energy to ignite any
flammable vapour. There is concern that there may be an ignition during addition of the powder.
To reduce the risk of ignition, an inert gas blanket system is used within the vessel headspace designed to keep
oxygen below levels required to support combustion. In addition, a sensor system is used to monitor
vessel oxygen levels. Either system may fail. If the inert gas blanketing system and the oxygen sensor fail
simultaneously, oxygen levels can be high enough to support combustion.
Probability and frequency data for this system are given below.
(a) Draw a simple fault tree AND using the above data calculate the frequency of an ignition.(16)
(b) Describe, with justification, TWO plant OR process modifications that you would recommend to reduce
the risk of an ignition in the vessel headspace. (4)
ANS a.
Q8 July 2011
Q7. July 2008

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ANS b: The two modifications can be.
 Replacement of power feed with a slurry in conducting liquid
 Selecting and using materials with higher flashpoint to minimise the probability of a flammable
atmosphere
 Redesigning the nitrogen blanketing system to improve reliability
13-IA2-04 Below is an extract from an incident investigation report form.
XYZ LTD. INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
Q8. July 2009
Q9. July 2008

17
A) EVALUATE the report in the term of its suitability to provide adequate information for record keeping
purposes and for subsequent statistical analysis.
[10– July 2008]
To evaluate the suitability it is required to know the deficiencies in the incident investigation report.
The report is incomplete as it provided no information on
 The time of the incident
 The type of first aid that was given
 The precise action taken to prevent a recurrence
It is vague in its description of the injury actually received, of the treatment given at the hospital, of the actual
circumstances which caused the punch to fall and thus immediate and underlying causes of the incidents.
The report is inconsistent as
 It failed to provide information on the details and findings of the investigation
 Inappropriate nature of recommendation given
 Identification of the injured person with different names being used
Additionally, it was perhaps unnecessary to name the injured person as a witness of the incident in the
absence of any other witnesses.
B) With reference to a suitable model (HSG 245, investigating accidents and incidents) OUTLINE the key
stages in health and safety incident investigations.
[10– July 2008]
The key stages of incident investigations
 Gathering all relevant information to establish exactly what had happened including the location and
time of the incident and the persons who might have been affected.
 Visual inspection of the location
 Interviewing witnesses
 Reviewing relevant documentations
Once all the information had been gathered, it would be necessary to analyse it by making use of FTA or a
similar tool, to establish the immediate and underlying cause of incident.
This would then enable the investigators to identify the appropriate risk control measures to prevent a
recurrence of similar incident.
The final stage would be to produce an action plan, setting out objective to be achieved, clearly identifying
responsibilities for their completion and maintaining record of the progress being made.
14-IA2-05 A large warehousing and distribution facility uses contractors for many of its maintenance activities.
Contractors make up approximately 5% of the total workforce but an analysis of the accident statistics for the
previous two years has shown that accidents to contractor personnel, or arising from work undertaken by
Q9. Jul 2009

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contractors, account for 20% of the lost-time accidents on site.
(a) Assuming that the accident statistics are correctly recorded, outline possible reasons for the
disproportionate number of accidents involving contract work. (6)
(b) Describe the organisational and procedural measures that should be in place to provide effective control of
the risks from contract work. (14)
b.Issues that could have been covered to outline the reasons behind disproportionate number of accidents
associated with work by contractors.
- Those related to the nature of the work – for instance, maintenance work might be more complex,
higher risk, harder to control satisfactorily and with fewer well-established work methods than other
warehousing and distribution activities;
- A lack of established procedures and training for the management of third parties including
inadequate contractor selection and
- The provision of information from the client to contract workers;
- Poor planning and risk assessment and
- Poor communication and coordination between the parties affected by the contract work;
- Inadequate supervision of contractor workers either by the client or by the contractor;
- Staff turnover and a lack of contract worker competence and the
- Effect of contractual or financial pressures on the contractor.
c. A description of the key organisational and procedural measures required to minimise the risks
associated with contract work. Measures that could have been described include:
- The selection of a competent Contractor by obtaining evidence of past performance, Safety
Management
Arrangements, the adequacy of resources and risk control proposals;
- The provision of adequate information to the contractor prior to the work starting, on the nature of
the work to be carried out and the known hazards and site safety rules with an induction briefing to be
given to all contract personnel before admittance to site;
- The preparation of job specific risk assessments and method statements;
- The appointment of a client representative with contractor management responsibility including
communication arrangements; and
- The introduction of arrangements for coordinating and reviewing risk assessments and method
statements, for active and reactive monitoring of performance and for job completion and hand over
including a safety performance review.
Candidates who chose to answer this question were able to demonstrate a reasonable understanding
of the issues of contract work although there were a few omissions including reference to the
procedural measure in relation to handover and the completion of a safety performance review.

19
15-IA2-06
RRC–IA02–
SAQ-1
DESCRIBE the requirements of an interview process that would help to obtain from witnesses the best
quality of information relating to a workplace accident.
[10 – Jan 2009]
The interview must be conducted as soon as possible after the event though it may be necessary to postpone
the interview if the witness is injured or in shock;
To obtain the best quality of information from witness by
 Interview as soon as possible after the event – injury / shock make this difficult
 Providing a suitable environment for the interview, where the witness can be put at ease.
 Putting the witness at ease – witness may be reluctant to discuss the accident particularly if they think
that someone will get in trouble
 Interviewing only one witness at a time, with the interviewer – taking time to establish good relation.
 Explaining the purpose of interview (that it is fact finding process only) and the need to record it.
 Using an appropriate questioning technique to establish key facts and avoiding leading questions (such
as Why was the forklift operator driving recklessly) rather asking open-ended questions like what did you
see? What happened?
 Not making suggestion – if the witness is stumble over a word or concept, do not help them out.
 Taking care to stress the preventive purpose of the investigation rather than the apportioning of blame
 Using appropriate sketches or photographs to help with the interview
 Listening to the witness without interruptions and allowing sufficient time to give their answers
 Adjusting language to suit the witness
 Summarising and checking agreement at the end of the interview
 Establishing a good report by getting written signed statement from the witness
 Asking the witness for recommendations to prevent recurrence
Q2. Jan 2009
16-IA2-07
(a)Giving reasons in EACH case, identify FIVE persons` who could be interviewed to provide information for an
investigation into a workplace accident. (5)
(b)Outline the issues to consider when preparing the accident investigation interviews for workers from within
the organisation. (5)
(a) Five persons who could be interviewed and would be able to provide information for the investigation of a
Workplace accident. They were also expected to give reasons for their choice. They could have chosen from
potential interviewees such as
- The injured person who would be able to relate what happened;
- An eye witness or the first person on the scene who might have observed what happened;
- The first aid person who attended to the injured party at the scene of the accident with respect to the
injuries received;
- The injured person’s manager and/or supervisor who would have knowledge of the process
Q1 Jan 2011

20
involved, the existing safe systems of work, the procedures that should have been followed and the
training and instruction that had been given to the victim;
- A technical expert with specialist knowledge of the process or machine involved;
- A Trade Union representative who would have knowledge of any previous complaints or incidents
associated with the machine or process; and
- The safety advisor who would be fully briefed on the systems of work that should have been followed
and any possible breaches of the legislation.
(b), One of the important issues to be considered would be the need to
- Carry out the investigation interviews as soon as possible after the event though it may be
necessary to postpone the process if the witness is injured or in shock.
- A suitable date would have to be provided taking into account the availability of the people to be
called since shift patterns might have a part to play.
- That done, the next step would be to identify the interviewers, to consider where the interviews
would be held and how they would be recorded whether by tape recorder, by dictaphone or hand
written and to gather together any relevant documentation such as risk assessments or training
records.
- It would also be important to bear in mind the requirements of employment law and trade union issues
such as employee rights, the right to be accompanied or to have legal representation.
- Finally consideration would have to be given to the format and distribution of the final accident report
and how the information gathered might be used to introduce measures to prevent a recurrence or as
a possible defence in any possible prosecution or civil law suit.
17-IA2-08
RRC –IA2–
LAQ - 02
A forklift truck is used to move loaded pallets in a large distribution warehouse. On one particular occasion the
truck skidded on a patch of oil. As a consequence the truck collided with an unaccompanied visitor and
crushed the visitor's leg.
(A) STATE reasons why the accident should be investigated. (4)
[4+8+8 – Jan 2008]
A- There are many reasons to investigate accidents such as
a. To identify the causes of the accident ( immediate & root causes ) in order to prevent recurrence,
b. For Identifications of corrective actions necessary to prevent recurrence
c. To determine compliance with relevant legislation
d. To demonstrate management commitment to H&S and to restore employee morale
e. To collect information and evidence that may be needed in the event of a civil claim,
f. To provide useful information for the costing of accidents and for identifying trends
g. To identify the need to review risk assessments and safe system of work.
(B) Assume that the initial responses of reporting and securing the scene of the accident have been carried
out. OUTLINE the steps which should be followed in order to collect evidence for an investigation of the
accident. (8)
Q11. Jan 2013
Q8. Jan 2010
Q11. Jan 2008

21
 Photographs, sketches and measurements may be taken before the scene of the accident is disturbed
 Examining and retaining any available CCTV footage,
 Checking the condition of the forklift truck and if possible determining it's speed at the time of the
accident,
 Checking the load that was being carried & the safe working load of the truck.
 Have there been any issues with visibility as the load was being carried?
 Finding the reasons of oil spillage,
 Determining whether emergency spillage procedures are there in place & why they were not followed in
this occasion?
 Assessing the competence of forklift driver
 Examining the workplace to determine any contributing environmental factors e.g. adequate lighting,
condition of floor?
 If possible, Interviewing relevant witness and visitors, and
 Checking existing procedures for dealing with visitors, what are reception staffs meant to do when
meeting visitors?
(C) The investigation reveals that there have been previous incidents of forklift trucks skidding which had not
been reported. The company therefore decides to introduce a formal system for reporting 'near miss'
incidents.
OUTLINE the factors that should be considered when developing and implementing such a system. (8)
 First of all, determine what a near miss is, and ensure that everyone is clear about the meaning of it,
 Carry out consultations with employees on the purpose of the proposed system,
 Arranging necessary training and information for employees,
 Ensure that the new reporting method is simple to understand and operate,
 Establishing a clear reporting lines
 Introducing and practicing no blame culture to encourage employees to report incidents,
 Arranging for investigation of incidents by line management to ensure identification and implementation
of remedial action needed,
 A procedure for reporting back is to be established in order for affected individuals or groups to be
informed of conclusions and future action to prevent recurrence.
 The introduction of a system to collate, analyse and monitor data periodically.
18-IA2-09
IA02-LAQ2
/ 3
A forklift truck skidded on an oil spill causing a serious injury to a visitor.
(a) Explain why the accident should be investigated. (4)
(b) Outline the steps to follow in order to investigate the accident. (10)
(c) Identify the possible underlying causes of the accident. (6)
(a) Reasons for investigating accidents such as
- To identify their causes, both immediate and underlying;
- To prevent a recurrence;
Q7 July 2011

22
- To assess compliance with legal requirements;
- to demonstrate management’s commitment to health and safety and to restore employee morale;
- to obtain information and evidence for use in the event of any subsequent civil claim or criminal
prosecution;
- to provide useful information for the costing of accidents and for identifying trends and
- To identify the need to review risk assessments and safe systems of work.
(b) The steps to be followed in a realistic chronological order including
- Gathering information such as taking photographs and making sketches and taking measurements of
the scene of the accident before anything was disturbed;
- Obtaining any CCTV footage available;
- Examining the condition of the fork lift truck and determining its speed at the time of the accident;
- Determining the load that was being carried, the safe working load of the truck and any forward
visibility problems with the load in place;
- Inspecting maintenance records and defect reports;
- Finding out the reasons for the oil spillage, the emergency spillage procedures in place and the
reasons why they were not followed on this occasion;
- Assessing the competence of the fork lift truck driver and examining the workplace to determine any
contributing environmental factors such as the condition of the floor and the standard of lighting and
interviewing relevant witnesses including the injured person if possible.
- When all the information has been gathered,
o It would need to be analysed to establish the immediate and underlying causes of the accident
and a decision made on the measures to be put in place to control similar risks.
o The actions to be taken should be prioritised with responsibilities clearly identified and periodic
reviews carried out to assess progress with the completion of the work.
(c), The possible underlying causes such as
- Inadequate or the absence of risk assessments;
- Cultural and organisational factors and work pressures;
- Poor visitor control on the premises;
- Inadequate or poorly signed pedestrian routes and walkways;
- Environmental factors such as lighting, floor conditions and spillage control;
- Poor maintenance and defect reporting procedures;
- Inadequate monitoring procedures; and
- A failure to train and supervise the workforce.
RRC – IA02-LAQ2 – c: Describe the factors which should be considered in analysis of the information
gathered in the evidence collection.

23
21-IA2-12
The employer should set up appropriate arrangements to notify occupational accidents, occupational
diseases, dangerous occurrences and commuting accidents to the competent authority in accordance with
national laws.
(a) Outline appropriate arrangements which the employer should have in place for notifying such events.
(10)
(b) The following information is from a company’s annual report :
The company has done much better at health and safety in the last year compared to previous years. The
significant reduction in accidents and fatalities shown in the table below is due to our new health and safety
advisor and a reduction in staff numbers. The management team are confident of further reductions in 2010.
Year Accidents Staff No Fatalities
2006 240 1500 ?
2007 185 1400 ?
2008 180 1300 11
2009 170 900 4
(i) Calculate the accident incidence rates AND comment on the findings. (5)
(ii) Assess the company’s management of health and safety from the information in the annual report. (5)
ANS a
- The employer should first identify a competent person who will be responsible for reporting accidents
and other reportable events to the competent authority.
- If the workplace is shared, an agreement will need to be reached on who accepts the responsibility for
reporting.
- All reported incidents should be investigated again by a competent person and information on all
accidents provided to the workers.
- Workers will have to be informed of the system that is adopted and what is expected of them and their
cooperation ensured.
- Records should be kept of any incident that occurs and these should be easily retrievable though the
medical confidentiality of individuals will have to be respected.
(b)(i), in calculating the accident incidence rates from the information given, candidates should have divided
the number of accidents that occurred by the number of persons employed and then multiplied the answers
by a common and appropriate multiplier (in this case 1000 workers). The rates would thus appear as follows:
2006: (240/1500) x 1000 = 160
2007 (185/1400) x 1000 = 132
Q9 Jul 2010

24
2008 (180/1300) x 1000 = 138
2009 (170/900) x 1000 = 188
Whilst the number of accidents decreased between 2006 and 2009 so did the number of workers but in 2009
there was a rise in the incidence rate. This part of the question was in general well answered, though a few
candidates did err in their calculations while others appeared not to notice the rise in the incidence rate for
2009.
(b)(ii). The annual report was expressed in very general terms, gave no commitment to the management of
health and safety and lacked detail both on the causes of the accidents and on the safety management
systems in place.
The fatality rate seemed to be tolerated and accepted and the company expressed no remorse about their
accident performance.
Whilst the directors might be confident that further reductions in the number of accidents would occur,
apparently ignoring the rise in the incidence rate, they gave no indication of how this would occur.
END OF UNIT 2

25
Element IA3 IDENTIFYING HAZARD ASSESSING AND EVALUATING RISKS
22-IA3-01
RRC – IA3-
SAQ - 01
For a range of internal and external information sources outline how each source contributes to hazard
identification or risk assessment. (10)
OR
OUTLINE the range of internal and external information sources that may be useful in the identification of
hazards and assessment of the risks. For each source indicated the type of information available and how it
contributes in hazard identification or risk assessment.
Internal sources such as
 Incident: Accident, Near-miss Reports, Ill-health data / Investigation Reports: these reports are
useful information as they clearly identify hazards that either have or had potential to cause injury / ill
health.
These data are useful during the risk assessment as they help in the evaluation of likelihood and
severity of injury and hence contributing to estimate the degree of risk involved;
 Proactive Monitoring data such as Inspection reports – may be useful in identifying the easily
observed hazardous conditions in the work place and also common type of control failures. This process
not only aids the hazard identification process but also influence risk assessment; the effectiveness of
various control options can be better estimated based on current controls
 Audit reports may be useful in similar way; in identifying hazards that have been overlooked and
identifying the effectiveness / reliability of existing control measures.
 Maintenance Records – may be useful in determining the effectiveness of particular control in the work
place, such as automatic warning system, guards, PPEs etc.
External source of information that might prove useful during the risk assessment process would include:
 National Governmental enforcement agencies such as UK’s HSE, USA’s OSHA, Western Australia’s
worksafe. These all produce legal and best practices Guidance.
 These organization also produced statistics such as accident and ill-health data which again assist
with the identification of hazards and the probability of their associated risk;
 International bodies – such as International Labour organization, the world health organization, the
European Agency for Safety and Health (EU OSHA)
 Professional bodies such as IOSH, IIRSM
 Trade Unions / Trade associates – they produces information on safety and health matters, specially
the awareness for compensation among the workers.
 Insurance companies – set the level of premiums and need the data to calculate the probable risks of
any venture. The average risks involved in the most activities can be found in the insurance tables.
Since the risk manager is involved in managing risks, these tables will be extremely useful.
 Finally information can be obtained from manufacturers / suppliers which can indicate the extent
of hazards and relevant control option that might be necessary for example MSDS from chemical
suppliers provides essential information on the chemical nature of a hazardous substances and
necessary control measures.
 Similarly the noise and vibration magnitude data from a machinery supplier can give an insight into the
potential noise or vibration exposure and the subsequent exposure controls necessary.
Q1. Jan 2013
Q2. Jul 2009

26
23-IA3-02 (a) Explain the purpose of Job Safety Analysis.(2)
(b) Outline the methodology of Job Safety Analysis. (8)
a)
A method to review job procedures or practices to identify hazards and subsequently determine appropriate
equipment and controls for implementation during performance of the job or task.
b) The methodology of Job Safety Analysis
1) Selecting jobs for analysis;
2) Breaking the job into steps;
3) Identifying hazards, unsafe conditions and unsafe work practices associated with the steps; and
4) Identifying the correct and safe way to perform the steps.
Q4. Jan 2012
24-IA3-03
RRC – IA3-
SAQ - 02
(a) Identify the objectives of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). (2)
(b) Outline the methodology of FMEA AND give an example of a typical safety application. (8)
The objective of FMEA is to analyse each component of a system in order to identify the possible causes of a
component failure and the subsequent effects of the failure on the system as a whole.
The methodology of FMEA includes
- Break down the system into component parts and
- Identify how each component could Fail, and the possible causes of failure of the component;
- Identify the effects on the system as a whole;
- Assess the probability and severity of failure
- Identify the means of detection of the failure : for example by a sensor;
- Prioritise failures in terms of severity and probability
- Determine actions to reduce risks to an acceptable level
- Record / Document the findings
Memorizing Mantra: B F Effects P&S Means P D act R
A typical safety application would be chemical process or nuclear safety. Where a failure of a simple
component could have disastrous consequences.
Q5. Jul 2010
25-IA3-04
RRC – IA3-
SAQ - 03
a. OUTLINE the factors that need to be considered to ensure that a risk assessment is suitable and sufficient. 5
b. Identify the circumstances that would necessitate a risk assessment to be reviewed.
ANS a
The following factors to be considered to determine that the Risk assessment is suitable and sufficient

27
- The RA must address the significant hazards that are existing.
- The RA must clearly identify those exposed to the significant hazard. This might include broad groups
of people; staff, vulnerable groups (e.g.; young persons) and individuals (e.g.; a pregnant woman).
- The assessment must correctly evaluate the risk generated (likelihood and severity) and
- The RA must include the adequacy of existing controls.
- It must correctly recognize the need for any further controls.
- It must be recorded suitably (significant findings in a retrievable medium).
- Reference to relevant standards and legislation should be made.
- The complexity of the assessment process and the competence of the assessors must be
proportionate to the complexity and level of risk.
- Finally it should remain valid for reasonable period of time.
-
B
A risk Assessment might be reviewed because of a variety of circumstances.
- A RA must be reviewed on significant change or if the employer has reason to suspect that it is no
longer valid.
- Change might include –
o A change in nature of work
o Introduction of new materials / equipments
o The modification of plants / premises
o Change / revision in legal requirements
- Reasons to suspect that the RA is no longer valid would include –
o Following an accident,
o A report of ill health linked to the circumstances that the risk assessment relate too
o Good practice would indicate that a risk assessment should be reviewed periodically as well.
The review period might be determined by the level of risk inherent in the operation to which the assessment
relates.
26-IA3-05
RRC – IA3-
LAQ - 01
A Fuel storage depot situated close to a residential housing area contains a vessel for the storage of liquefied
petroleum gas. It is estimated that a major release of the contents of the vessel could occur once every one
hundred years (frequency = 0.1/yr). Such a release, together with the presence of an ignition source
(probability, p=0.1), could lead to a flash fire or a vapor cloud explosion on site. Alternatively, if the wind is in
certain direction (p=0.7) and there is stable wind speed of less than 8 m/s (p=0.5) a vapor cloud may drift to
the residential housing area where it could be ignited (p=0.8)
a. Using the data provided construct an event tree to calculate the expected frequency of fire / explosion
BOTH on site AND in nearby residential housing area.
b. Comment on the significance of the results obtained
c. OUTLINE, with example a hierarchy of control options to minimize the risks.
Q1. Jan 2013

28
Ans:
a. The Event Tree should be
(Remember that the probabilities on each yes / no branch point must add up to 1, So having been given
- The probability of there being an ignition source on site as 0.1
- The probability of there NOT being an on site ignition source (and therefore no on-site explosion) must
be 1 – 0.1 = 0.9
This is a vital step to remember when calculating the probability of an off-site explosion because the question
itself will not give u this vital number – you have to work it out for yourself)
An explosion will only occur on-site if the release encounter the on-site ignition source. The frequency of
such an occurance on-site is 0.01 x 0.1 = 0.001/ year, which is once in every 1000 years (i.e. 1 / 0.001).
An offsite ignition will only occur if:
- The vapour is not ignited on site AND
- the wind is in a certain direction AND
- the wind speed is < 8m/s AND
- the vapour finds and ignition source in the housing estate.
Thus, the expected frequency of offsite explosion is (0.01 / yr x 0.9 x 0.6 x 0.5 x 0.9 = 0.00243 per year)
This result can be alternatively expressed as approximately once in about 411 years.

29
Formulae
0.00243 IN A 1 YEAR
1 IN A = 1/0.00243 = 411 YEARS
b.Comment on the significance of the results obtained
- Risks to members of public greater than risk to employees. Figures allow comparision with benchmark
data; e.g. UK HSE proposes individual risk of death from workplace activities as on in a million per
annum.
- The greater risk to members of the public is clearly unacceptable and given the fact that an explosion is
likely to cause multiple fatalities, both of these expected frequencies would appear unacceptable.
c.A standard hierarchical approach – elimination, substitution or minimization of quantity / use of LPG, reduce
probability of release (protective systems, maintenance, operations, ignition sources, emergency procedures,
siting of tanks )
27-IA3-06 a. OUTLINE the principles, application and limitations of EVENT TREE ANALYSIS as risk assessment
techniques. [6]
[6+10+4 – Jan 2008]
b. A mainframe computer suits has a protective system to limit the effects of fire. The system comprises a
smoke detector connected by power supply to a mechanism for releasing extinguishing gas. It has been
estimated that a fire will occur once in a five years (f=0.2 / year).
Reliability data for the system components are as follows
i)Construct an event tree for the above scenario to calculate the frequency of an uncontrolled fire in the
computer suit. [10]
ii)Suggest ways in which the reality of the system could be improved. [4]
ANS
A. the principles, application and limitations of EVENT TREE ANALYSIS as risk assessment techniques
Event Tree Analysis is based upon binary logic and is often used to estimate the likelihood of success or
failure of safety systems.
In other words, An event tree is a visual representation of all the events which can occur in a system. As the
number of events increases, the picture fans out like the branches of a tree.
Event trees can be used to analyze systems in which all components are continuously operating, or for
Q7 Jan 2011
Q7. Jan 2008

30
systems in which some or all of the components are in standby mode – those that involve sequential
operational logic and switching. The starting point (referred to as the initiating event) disrupts normal system
operation. The event tree displays the sequences of events involving success and/or failure of the system
components.
ETA is limited by the lack of knowledge of components reliabilities – success or failure – it does not take
into account partial downgrade i.e. limited success.
AN EXAMPLE
b. i
Formulae
0.031 IN A 1 YEAR
1 IN A = 1/0.031 = 32 YEARS
b.ii.The ways to improve the reality of system includes:
 Choosing more reliable components
 Using components is parallel
 The detector should be logical first choice for such techniques as it least reliable components.
 Installation of second independent but parallel system is a additional way to improve the
reliability of the system

31
 Introduction of a regular programme of maintenance and testing.

32
28-IA3-07 A manufacturing company with major on and off site hazards is analysing the risks and controls associated
with a particular process and containment failure.
Following a process containment failure (f=0.5/yr), a failure detection mechanism should detect the
release. Once detected, an alarm sounds then a suppressant is activated. Finally, in order to control the initial
release, an operator is required to initiate manual control measures following the release of the suppressant.
As part of the analysis, the company has decided to quantify the risks associated with a substance release
from the process and develop a quantified event tree from the data.
Activity Frequency/reliability
Process containment failure 0.5 per year
Failure detection 0.95
Alarm sounders 0.99
Release suppression 0.85
Manual control measures activated 0.8
(a)Using the data provided, draw an event tree that shows the sequence of events following a process
containment failure.6
(b) Calculate the frequency of an uncontrolled release resulting from process containment failure. (6)
(c) Outline the factors that that should be considered when determining whether the frequency of the
uncontrolled risk is tolerable or not.(5)
(d) If the risk is found to be intolerable, outline the methodology for a cost benefit analysis with respect to
the process described. (3)
a. Event Tree could be like
10 Jan, 2012

33
b. The frequency of an uncontrolled release resulting from process containment failure.
Release 1 = 0.5 x 0.05 = 0.025/yr
Release 2 = 0.5 x 0.95 x 0.01 = 0.00475/yr
Release 3 = 0.5 x 0.95 x 0.99 x 0.15 = 0.071/yr
Release 4 = 0.5 x 0.95 x 0.99 x 0.85 x 0.2 = 0.08/yr
The frequency of an uncontrolled release would therefore be:
0.025 + 0.00475 + 0.071 + 0.08 = 0.181/yr. or once every 5.5 years.
(c), Factors to be considered in determining whether the frequency of the uncontrolled risk is tolerable or not
include
- The plant location taking into account the health and environmental implications of a release;
- The cause of the release such as for example, as a result of a catastrophe together with the inevitable
public outrage that it would arouse;
- Historical data;
- Relevant legal requirements;
- The impact that a failure would have on production and the cost of control measures; and
- Published risk data such as those contained in Reducing Risks Protecting People.
(d) The first step of the methodology for a cost benefit analysis would
- Comprise the quantification of process losses and improvement costs in terms of monetary value.
Should a comparison indicate that process losses together with other possible losses such as
o Damage to the organisation’s reputation exceeds improvement costs, the improvement work
should be carried out. A payback period would need to be established with due consideration
being given to the value of the money involved spread over the period of time.
Answers to the first two parts of the question were generally to a good standard but were not matched by
those provided for parts (c) and (d) where many described how the system could be improved by the use of
more reliable components or by the provision of parallel systems.

34
29-IA3-08
RRC – IA3
– LAQ3
(A) Outline the use and limitations of fault tree analysis. (4)
(B) A machine operator is required to reach between the tools of a vertical hydraulic press between each
cycle of the press. Under fault conditions, the operator is at risk from a crushing injury due to either
(a) the press tool falling by gravity
Failure type Frequency (per year) Effect
Flexible hose failure 0.2 a
Detachment of press tool 0.1 a
Hydraulic valve failure 0.05 a
Activation button failure 0.05 b
Electrical fault 0.1 b
or (b) an unplanned(powered) stroke of the press. The expected frequencies of the
failures that would lead to either of these effects are given in the
table below:
(i) Given that the operator is at risk for 20 per cent of the time that the machine is operating, construct and
quantify a simple fault tree to show the expected frequency of the top event (a crushing injury to the
operator‟s hand). 10
(ii) Outline, with reasons, whether or not the level of risk calculated should be tolerated. (4)
(iii)Assuming that the nature of the task cannot be changed, explain how the fault tree might be used to
prioritise remedial actions. (2)
a. Limitation of FTA:
FTA is used for analysis of events which may have multiple causes. The probability / frequency of the
“top event” can be quantified provided there is sufficient data on the probabilities / frequencies of the
underlying events. It also helps identify critical stages where intervention might be most effective (to
reduce probability of top event).
However complex events require skill to work out and of course the top event probability calculation is
only as good as the data which is input into the calculation.
b.i.
Q8. July 2012

35
b.ii.
If the frequency of a crush injury to an operators hand is once every ten years and there are ten such presses,
then across the entire workshop the crush injury frequency will be (0.1 / yr x 10) = 1 year. Given the nature of
the likely disabling injury this frequency is obviously far too high to be tolerable without some attempt to reduce
the risk.
b.iii.
Looking at the fault tree priority should be given to those factors that would give greatest reduction in frequency
of top event.
In the diagram flexible hose failure makes the greatest contribution to the frequency of the top event, followed
by detachment of the tool and electrical fault. Controls include:
- Solid pipe instead of flexible hose
- More reliable components
- Maintenance and testing.
30-IA3-09
RRC – IA3
– LAQ2
Dental practitioner often works alone or in small teams in the community.
a.OUTLINE the type of hazards to which the dentist or his / her staff may be exposed.
b. Explain how the risks from the hazards identified can be minimized to protect the dentists and others.

36
31-IA3-10 An employer wishes to build a new gas compression installation to provide energy for its manufacturing
processes. An explosion in the installation could affect the public and a nearby railway line. In view of this the
employer has been told that a qualitative risk assessment for the new installation may not be adequate and
some aspects of the risk require a quantitative risk assessment.
a. EXPLAIN the terms ‘Qualitative Risk Assessment’ AND ‘’Quantitative risk assessment’ [5]
[10 – Jan 2009]
a. Qualitative risk assessment involves the use of broad categories to arrive at broad measures of risk.
Following a comprehensive identification of hazards, broad categories are used to classify the likelihood
of hazards being realised and the severity of their consequences. The categories may be descriptors or
numbers. Most everyday risk assessments are quantitative and such assessments tend to be
subjective.
Quantitative risk assessment on the other hand is a numerical representation of actual frequency and
/or probability of an event and its consequences. It often involves comparison with specific criteria and is
objectives.
b. IDENTIFY the external sources of information and advice that the employer could refer to when deciding
whether the risk from the new installation is acceptable. [5]
In identifying external sources of information and advice the company could referred to
i. the acceptability or tolerability criteria for risk for example a set down in the prevention of
major industrial hazards;
ii. Guidance from enforcing authorities which identify hazards and sets risk control
standards to meet legal and good practice requirements.
iii. Statistics and guidance from other authoritative sources such as professional bodies,
trade associations and insurer.
iv. Instructions from plant manufactures and guidance from similar companies.
b. A preliminary part of risk assessment process is to be a hazard and operability study. Describe the
principles and methodology of a hazard and operability (HAZOP) Study.
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS) is designed for dealing with complicated systems, such as large
chemical plants or a nuclear power station, where a small error or fault can have drastic consequences.
The purpose of a HAZOP study is to identify deviations from intended normal operation and is the best used
at the design stage or when modifications are proposed for an existing installation.
Studies are carried out by a multidisciplinary team who make a critical examination of a process to discover
any potential hazards and operability problems.
The process is first fully described and then every part is questioned to discover all possible deviations from
the intended design which might occur, and what their causes and consequences might be.
The methodology of HAZOP Study
Q7. Jan 2009

37
The HAZOP study process involves applying in a systematic way all relevant keyword combinations to the
plant in question in an effort to uncover potential problems. The results are recorded in columnar format under
the following headings:
DEVIATIO
N
CAUS
E
CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION
A number of 'guide words' are applied to the statement of intention, so that every possible deviation from the
required intention is considered. The main guide words are:
 NO or NOT
 MORE
 LESS
 AS WELL AS
 OTHER THAN
 PART OF
 REVERSE
There are slight differences between the method for a continuous process and a batch process.
For a continuous process, the working document is normally the flow diagram. Each pipe is examined in turn,
checking flow, pressure, temperature and concentration, using a checklist of guide words. The study should
also consider the situation during commissioning, start-up and shut-down.
32-IA3-11
RRC –
SAQ - 01
OUTLINE a range of external individuals and bodies to whom, for legal or good practice reasons, an
organisation may need to provide health and safety information
In EACH case, indicate the broad type of information to be provided. [10 – Jan 2008]
Body / Individual Type of information
Enforcing authorities
Information required by law or in accordance with ILO code of practice or as
a part of inspection or investigation activities
Emergency services
Inventories of potentially hazardous and flammable materials used or store
on the site and on the means of access and egress to the site
Customers
Health and Safety Information on articles and substances they might use for
work activities
Members of public Information on emergency action plan for major hazards
Visiting contractors Information on safe working arrangements and procedures.
Waste disposal contractors Information on controlled or hazardous waste produced by the organisation
Transport companies
Information on precautions to be taken in transporting hazardous
substances from the organisation’s site
Legal representative or courts To be informed regarding Civil claims
Q3. JAN 2012
Q4. Jan 2008
END OF UNIT 3

38
Element IA4 RISK CONTROL AND EMERGENCY PLANNING
33-IA4-01
RRC-IA4-
SAQ-01
Outline, with appropriate examples, the key features of the following risk management concepts:
(a) Risk Avoidance; (2)
(b) Risk Reduction; (2)
(c) Risk Transfer; (3)
(d) Risk Retention. (3)
Identify the key features of EACH of these concepts AND give an appropriate example in EACH case.
Risk Avoidance: actively avoiding or eliminating the risk for example –
- By discontinuing the process, avoiding the activity or eliminating hazardous substances such as
o Using water based paint instead of solvent based paint eliminate the FIRE risk.
o Using a paint roller instead of using paint brush along with ladders / work platform to paint the
wall of a house.
o Closing down butchery operation in food factory (with hazard associated with that operation)
and buying a ready –prepared meat from supplier.
Risk reduction: reducing the level of residual risk. For example –
- By adopting a hierarchy of measures to control the risks / evaluating the risks and developing risk
reduction strategies. Such as
o Removing one hazardous agent and introducing another less hazardous agent in its place, or
such as replacing a toxic chemical with one that is not dangerous or less dangerous, use less
noisy pumps, using battery operated power tools instead of electrical power tools
o Adopting an engineering control by guarding a piece of machinery or
o Adopting a safe person strategy by training workers so that they are aware of hazards and can
behave accordingly
Risk transfer:: transfer of risk to a third party. For example
- By transferring risk to other parties but paying a premium for this for example by the use of insurance;
if the risk realised and a loss occurs then the insurance policy will pay for the loss. Thus the financial
risk has been transferred from the workplace on to the insurer (at a cost).
o Alternatively risk might be transferred to a contractor. Here, a separate organisation is
retained to undertake an activity that work place does not want to carry out directly.
o The use of third parties for the business interruption recovery planning or outsourcing a
process or processes.
Risk retention: accepting a residual level of risk within a company. This is often done with the knowledge of
workplace (i.e; knowingly) where the risk is small and the costs of reducing risk seem disproportionate / not
balanced to any benefits. If a loss occurs then organisation will have to cover the losses from revenues.
Sometimes the risk may be retained without knowledge (i.e.; unknowingly). This can occur
Q6. July 2012
Q3. Jan 2011
Q3. Jan 2009

39
- when a risk has not been recognised (and therefore goes uninsured) or
- when a risk is recognised and insurance is put in place, but insurance fails to cover the loss. This
might occur if the loss is greater that the amount of insurance cover purchased, if there is a large
excess, or if there are policy exclusions that mean the insurer avoids payment.
34-IA4-02
RRC – IA4-
SAQ-02
Production line workers in a textile plant are required to use knives routinely as part of their work.
OUTLINE the factors to be considered when developing a system of work designed to minimize the risk to
these employees. 10 m
- The first factor to consider is the identification of the tasks requiring the use of knives (by tasks
analysis for example)
- The people at risk, the hazards and various risk factors must be identified and recorded in this risk
assessment.
- The correct methods needed to control the risk must be designed and implemented.
- During the risk assessment process the potential for risk elimination by automation or process change
should be considered ( though it must be expected that use of knives will remain)
- Consideration must be given to the types of knives, its safety features, safe storage of knives, safe
carrying of knives, and safe sharpening arrangements.
- The environment must be considered (factors such as space constraints and lighting), as must
- Individual factors relevant to staff using knives (age, attitude, skill).
- Suitable PPE must be selected and supplied.
- Staff training in much of above will be necessary.
35-IA4-03
RRC – IA4-
SAQ-03
a. A production process has a safety critical control system that depends on a single component to remain
effective.
OUTLINE ways of reducing the likelihood of the failure of this component AND describe additional ways to
increase the reliability of the system. 10 marks (RRC)
b. Describe the meaning of common mode failure AND Outline equipments design features which could help
to minimise the probability of such failure.
[4 – July 2008]
ANS A.
Ways to reduce likelihood of the failure of the component:
 Burning in the component before placing it correctly in the system
 Planned replacement of the component before wear out
 Increasing its useful life by a planned programme of maintenance
 Initial design of and material specification for the component together with the use of quality
assurance
Ways to increase the reliability of the system:
Q4 July 2011
Q3. Jan 2010
Q8. JUL 2008

40
Use of Reliable Components:
 Suitable, good quality and well proven components from reputed supplier to be used in the
system
 To meet the legal specification a quality check on components should be ensured.
Planned Preventive Maintenance
 Planned preventive maintenance will improve safety and plant integrity as well as reliability. It is
a means of detecting and dealing with problems before a breakdown occurs.
 For example, car manufacturers recommend that the oil is changed at specified intervals to
prevent failure of the system and increase reliability.
Parallel redundancy / Circuit
 Additional components can be added in parallel series so that if one component fails the other
one will keep the system going.
Standby Systems
 A standby system can be installed so that should part of the system or a component stop
working, then an alternative system automatically steps in to continue operation. This type of
system is invaluable where failure of the system could affect safety, e.g. lighting in an operating
theatre.
Minimising Failures to Danger
 When a system does fail, it is important that the failure does not end with the production of a
hazardous situation. For this reason, it is vital that systems fail to safety. Through good design,
e.g. ensuring that dangerous machinery has an automatic power cut out as soon as a hazardous
component fails.
Other ways:
 Operational and detection protective system to maintain the system within its design
specifications
 The use of hazard analysis system techniques to predict failure routes
 Collection and use of failure data.
Minimising Human Error
Human error does occur but can be minimised by ensuring that:
 The 'right' person is doing the 'right' job.
 The individual has adequate training and instruction.
 The individual receives appropriate rest breaks.
 The man-machine interface is ergonomically suitable.
 The working environment is comfortable, e.g. noise, lighting, heating, etc.
ANS B:
The common mode failure can be defined as the termination of the ability of an item to perform a required

41
function.
Common mode failure is type or cause of failure that could affects more than one component at a time, even
when the components are supposed to be arranged to operate independently of each other. It is particularly
relevant for components in parallel designed to improve reliability of a system by redundancy.
Measures that could help to minimise the probability of such failure include:
 Functional diversity where reliance is placed on safety components designed to act by different
mechanism. For example one detector for pressure and another for temperature, and one hydraulic
interlock and one electrical interlock;
 Equipments Diversity where components are sourced from different manufacturers or from different
manufacturing processes to avoid common manufacturing defects and vulnerabilities
 Isolating components from each other and from the environment so that they do not fail from common
causes such as high temperature or vibration
 Routing cables by multiple routes so that local physical damage does not affect all components
 Using well known and established equipment designs where most of the failure modes will have been
understood.
36-IA4-04 a. A mixing vessel that contains solvent and product ingredients must be thoroughly cleaned every two days
for process reasons. Cleaning requires an operator to enter the vessels, for which a permit to work is
required. During a recent audit of permit records it has been discovered that many permits have not been
completed correctly or have not been signed back.
OUTLINE possible reason why the permit system is not being followed correctly.
[5+5 – Jan 2008]
b. A sister company operating the same process has demonstrated that the vessel can be cleaned by
installing fixed, high pressure spray equipment inside the vessels which would eliminate the need for vessel
entry. You are keen to adopt this system for safety reasons but the board has requested a cost-benefits
analysis for the proposal.
OUTLINE the principle of cost-benefits analysis in such circumstances. (Detailed discussion of individual cost
elements is not required)
Ans a.
There are many reasons to account for the failure to adhere to a permit to work system. They includes
 The lack of competence of both permit issuer and permit receiver
 The level of training and information that has been given to both
 A poor health and safety culture within the organisation
 Routine violation
 Pressure to complete the task and
 The complexity and impracticability of the system which makes it difficult to understand
 Inadequate level of supervision
Q3. JAN 2008

42
 Lack of routine monitoring and the non-availability of the permit issuer to activate the sign back
procedure and cancel the permit once the work had been completed.
b.
Cost benefits analysis in this scenario can be prepared after considering the below requirements
 The total cost of the system should be calculated including capital and ongoing of each option
 The benefits that would accrue from the use of proposed system should be quantified.
 The benefits includes process efficiency gains, lower operating costs and a reduction in accidents
and cases of ill health and their associated costs
By replacing the manual washing with high pressure spray equipment will definitely eliminate the personal
entry which will stop any personal injury due to entry inside the vessel.
Once the cost and benefits of the proposal have been identified a comparison might then be made with those
of the system currently in use.
37-IA4-05 A maintenance workers was asphyxiated when working in an empty fuel tank. A subsequent investigation
found that the worker had been operating without a permit-to-work.
(a) Outline why a permit-to-work would be considered necessary in these circumstances. 3
(b) Outline possible reasons why the permit-to-work procedure was not followed on this occasion. (7)
a) A risk assessment of the work to be done would have identified the need for a permit to work since the
activity involved was a non-routine high risk task in a confined space where the precautions to be taken
were complex particularly since additional hazards might be introduced as the work progressed and it
was, therefore an activity requiring a structural and systematic approach.
b) Possible reasons why the permit-to-work procedure was not followed
- One possible reason might have been that no, or an inadequate risk assessment had been carried
out and consequently the potential hazards had not been identified.
- There could also have been a poor health and safety culture within the organization
o where violations were routine and
o where a permit to work system was considered to be too bureaucratic and
o where complying with the terms of a permit prevents a task being finished quickly particularly
when there is pressure to complete.
- Other reasons such as the difficulty in organizing the required control measures before starting work,
particularly if a competent person was not at hand to authorize the permit;
- The failure on the part of management to stress the importance of using a permit in such
circumstances and ultimately the possibility that the organization had failed to introduce and operate a
permit to work system.
Q2. Jul 2010

43
38-IA4-06
RCC-IA4-
LAQ-03
(a) An organisation has decided to introduce a permit-to-work system for maintenance and engineering
work at a manufacturing plant which operates continuously over three shifts.
Outline the issues that will need to be addressed in introducing and maintaining an effective permit-to-
work system in these circumstances. (10)
(b) A year after the introduction of the permit-to-work system an audit shows that many permits-to-work
have not been completed correctly or have not been signed back.
Outline possible reasons why the system is not being properly adhered to.
(a) The key issues that could have been outlined include:
- Arriving at a clear definition of the jobs and areas for which permits will be required;
- Consideration of the operation of the system where contractors are involved;
- Developing a permit to work procedure that defines how the system will operate;
- Developing the permit format and multi-copy documentation system to encompass issues such as job
description, hazard identification, specification of risk control measures, time limits and authorising, and
receiving and cancellation signatures and
- The allocation of a unique reference number; arrangements for the return of permits and record keeping;
- Arrangements for the display of multiple live permits;
- Arrangements for communication between shifts;
- Identification of the training needs for, and the delivery of training to, persons authorising or receiving
permits and those working in areas where permits may be required;
- Provision of supporting arrangements and equipment for safe working such as lock-off, isolation or gas
testing facilities;
- And arrangements for routine monitoring and auditing the effectiveness of the system.
(b) Possible reasons for the fact that there is not strict adherence to the permit to work system include:
- Permit issuers and receivers are not competent and have not been adequately trained;
- There is no routine monitoring or auditing of the system and the level of supervision is poor;
- There is a lack of perceived importance of the system with production seen as having the greater
importance and violations have become routine;
- The permit system is seen as too complex and cumbersome and difficult to understand; the potential
hazards of maintenance and engineering work are not fully identified or understood and the required
controls are not fully understood by the permit issuer;
- The difficulties that arise in organising controls before the start of the work to be carried out; a lack of
effective communication between shifts and the person responsible for issuing permits is not always
available.
This was a popular question and most answers produced were to a reasonable standard though others lacked
context in relation to the points made leaving examiners unable to award all the marks available.
Q6.Jan 2012
Q7.Jul 2009

44
39-IA4-07 A new maintenance activity is being planned
a. Describe the components of the safe system of work that should be considered for the maintenance
activity.
b. OUTLINE TWO reasons why Permit to work may be required for the maintenance activity. 8 + 2
Q2. Jan 2013
40-IA4-08
RCC-IA4-
LAQ-03
Q . An investigation of a serious accident has concluded that maintenance operation in a particular area of a
factory should have been subject to a permit to work system.
Identify and Explain the main factors that should be considered when setting up such system
Maintenance operation in a factory environment may involve various high risk types of work such as
- Work on large complex items of machinery
- Work on pressure system
- Work on high voltage electrical system
- Work in confined
- work on plant containing hazardous chemicals
- work at height and work on plant at extremes of temperature, to name but few.
And very often multiple hazards will exist at the same time and generate high and complex risk. Consequently,
maintenance work may often be designated as high risk and made subject to permit to work control.
In these cases, a PTW system must be carefully designed and implemented to ensure safety at all stages of the
maintenance work.
Various factors must be considered when such a system is being designed, developed and implemented.
- The system parameter must be clearly identified, so that there will be clear understanding of what the
permit system covers. The system must define the range of works falls under the PTW system and list
those works fall outside of the permit control.
o This may sometime subject to legal requirements. For example, confined space entry should
always be made subject to permit control as matter of course.
o In other instance the use of a permit system will be dependent on perceived risk on site – for
example hot work.
- Clear accountability: The definition of permit parameter must also identify who key personnel are and
what their specific responsibilities and authorities with regards to permit system.
o Persons with responsibility of authorizing the work under the permit system must be clearly
identified – that is called permit issuer,
o Personnel responsible for undertaking specific activities, such as risk assessment or
atmospheric monitoring, should have their responsibilities clearly allocated.
o And the persons who are responsible for monitoring the effective operation of the permit system
should also be defined.

45
- Effective selection, training and competence of personnel: all personnel associated with PTW
system must have necessary competency to undertake their assigned work and tasks. This implies –
o Training, knowledge, experience and other quality such as ability.
o Assessment of competence may be necessary.
o Training records, specific certification for key personnel may have to be obtained and recorded.
- The Recommendation / Control Measures: what the permit itself prescribes must be considered of
the permit system, this will vary depending on the types of work.
o Generally there would be arrangements designed into the system for the formal specifications of
key safety requirements before commencement of job.
o These safety requirements should be communicated to all concerned
o Auctioning of key controls should be verified
o System for hand over of control from authorizing manager to the person undertaking the
maintenance work.
o And there would be written do’s and don’t’s in the permits
- Cross check and verification: the verification of safety throughout the operation and the formal hand-
back of plant / equipment or areas would then follow. Formal acceptance of these areas would follow,
with the cancellation of the permit to prevent future work being carried out under old permissions.
- The Permit to work must clearly identify how the work should be coordinated and monitored. Personnel
with key responsibilities must be identified here, as well as the coordination and monitoring
arrangements being described in the system.
41-IA4-09 An organisation should carry out a risk assessment before developing a safe system of work.
(a) Outline the factors that should be considered when carrying out a risk assessment. (10)
(b) Give the meaning of the term ‘safe system of work’. (2)
(c) Outline the issues to be addressed to effectively implement a safe system of work. (8)
a) The factors to be considered when carrying out a risk assessment include
- The detail of the activity or task concerned and the equipment and materials involved;
- Any guidelines or information provided by the manufacturer;
- The number and type of persons to be involved in the activity;
- The hazards associated with the activity and the likelihood and severity of their associated risks;
- The adequacy of existing control measures;
- Accident history and previous experience;
- Legal requirements;
- The need to involve and consult workers and to use appropriate and familiar language to enhance
understanding;
- Monitoring the effects of the assessment once it has been introduced and arranging for periodic
reviews and finally ensuring the competency of the assessor.
Q11. Jul 2011
Q9. Jan 2010

46
b) The integration of people, equipment, materials and the environment to produce an acceptable level of
safety or a method of carrying out a task in which hazards have been identified and eliminated, or risks
reduced to an acceptable level is called “Safe System of Work”.
c) Issues that should be addressed to ensure the effective implementation of a safe system of work include –
- Its timing taking into consideration
- The need to avoid shift changes and holidays;
- The number of persons affected;
- The need to communicate with the workforce and to provide them with relevant information using
clear and unambiguous language;
- Arranging for the provision of the necessary training;
- Ensuring that managers and supervisors are made aware of and understand their responsibilities;
- Introducing procedures for securing feedback from the workers; and
- Making arrangements for the monitoring and periodic review of the system and to introduce any
changes found to be necessary
42-IA4-10 (a)Outline the site operator requirements for emergency planning and procedures within the International
Labour Organisation Convention C174 ‘Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents’ 1993. (6)
(b)As part of the on-site emergency planning process a large manufacturing site intends to provide
information to the external emergency services.
Outline the types of information that the site should consider providing to the ambulance service. (4)
a.
Under the ILO’s convention C174 on the subject of the Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents, the site
operator is required to:
- Identify major hazards and assess their potential outcomes;
- Prepare written site emergency plans and procedures;
- Draw up emergency medical procedures;
- Carry out periodic testing / mock drills and evaluation of the effectiveness of the emergency plans and
introduce any revisions to the plans shown by the evaluation to be necessary;
- Include reference in the plan to the protection of the public and the environment outside the site
following consultation with the authorities and communities concerned and
- Submit the emergency plans to the responsible authorities.
B,)Types of information such as
- The location of the site and its various access points;
- Details of the main hazards on site such as fire, explosion or toxic release;
- Details of any hazardous chemicals used and stored;
- The number of personnel on site both in daytime and at night;
- Plans showing the layout of the site;
- The location of any emergency control center;
- The identity and contact details of key personnel;
Q4. Jan 2011
Q3. Jul 2009

47
- Details of the establishment’s medical personnel and facilities;
- Details of any specific medical conditions of workers and particularly information relating to those known
to be vulnerable; and
- Any other information necessary to enable the ambulance service to carry out a risk assessment for its
own personnel.
43-IA4-11 The manufacturing process of a planned new chemical plant will involve toxic and flammable substances. The
plant is near to a residential area.
Outline the issues to be considered in the development of an emergency plan to minimise the
consequences of any major incident. (20)
The initial issues to be considered in the development of an emergency plan would be
- To consider the quantity of toxic and flammable substances involved,
- The possible causes of a major incident,
- The likely extent of the damage and the area of the plant and the surrounding area which is
vulnerable.
- Consideration will then have to be given to the availability of resources to deal with the incident
should it occur and what action would be taken to minimise its extent by for example shutting off
services and controlling spillage and pollution.
- There will need to be a clear allocation of responsibilities on site to deal with the incident, to
establish a control centre and to make arrangements for staff and equipment call out.
- A decision will have to be made on how the alarm will be raised on site and in the neighborhood
and this will require liaison with the community and particularly with representatives of the local
authority, the police and the emergency services since while the on site plan will be prepared by
the plant operator,
- A second off site plan, which may have to consider amongst other things the provision of
information to nearby residents and the possibility of their evacuation if an incident were to occur,
will be very much the responsibility of the local authority.
- The onsite plan will also need to address the arrangements for clean up and decontamination after
the event and for dealing with the media. It will of course be imperative for the plan once it has
been developed to be tested and assessed in a ‘mock incident’ involving both workers and
residents.
Q8 July 2010
44-IA4-12 A small company formulating a range of chemical products operates from a site on which it employs about 50
staff. The site poses a risk to employees, the neighboring community and the environment and the company
has been asked by the enforcement agency to provide details of its procedures for dealing with a range of
emergencies.
i. OUTLINE the types of emergency procedure that a site of this nature may need to put in place in order to
deal with incidents affecting the safety of site personnel.10
ii.Describe the arrangements that should be in place in order to demonstrate an effective major incident
procedure. 10

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