The document examines the main obstacles to international cooperation in combating transnational terrorism. It discusses four key obstacles: 1) differing strategic preferences and methods between states like the US and EU, which prioritize threats differently and prefer different coalition approaches; 2) opposition by some states to expanding multilateral cooperation, as seen in Russian and Turkish opposition to NATO operations; 3) challenges of intelligence gathering and sharing due to differing views on privacy and legal authorities; and 4) problems relating to human rights and ethics straining cooperation, as seen in US policies like Guantanamo Bay prison and interrogation techniques. The document analyzes each obstacle and argues that differences in interests between states on these issues reduce effectiveness in fighting transnational terrorism.

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What are the obstacles to international cooperation in combating the current
wave of transnational terrorism?
International cooperation has been placed at the forefront of the war against terror. As stated by
the former General-Secretary of Interpol, Ronald Noble: “You can’t fight terrorism from the
(EU) only, or the US, or with your allies [...] Al-Qaeda operate internationally, you have to fight
it worldwide.” (Noble 2007: 14). However, different actors have varying views on how the threat
should be dealt with. This essay examines the four main obstacles to international cooperation in
combatting the current wave of transnational terrorism and will analyse each one systematically.
Using the perspective of their effects on international cooperation, this essay will first, examine
the problems of differing strategies, second, the opposition by some states to attempts at
expanding multilateral cooperation, third, the problems of international intelligence gathering
and sharing, and fourth, the problems of human rights and ethics.
One of the most significant obstacles to international cooperation in relation to combating
transnational terrorism is the difference in preferences and methods of strategy, or “strategic
cultures” (Gartner and Cuthbertson 2005: 183), between each state. Two of the main combatants
of transnational terrorism, the EU and the USA, differ in both approach and practice. These
differences can result in tension between the actors and reduce the overall effectiveness of
cooperative policies.
One of these differences is the priority the actors place on combating transnational terrorism.
Groves writes “while terrorism has generally been America’s central fixation since 9/11…
Europe sees terrorism as only one of several important threats today” (Groves 2010: 140). An
obstacle arises as European states will often prefer negotiation and consensus building policies in

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the aim of creating a multilateral solution and response to threats (Groves 2010: 140).
Historically, Europe has had to deal with a wide range of threats which required cooperation
from all actors. The US, however, as stated in their 2006 National Security Strategy, prefers to
act with “coalitions of the willing [as these] may be be able to respond more quickly and
creatively” (Bush 2006). The US-led invasion of Iraq highlighted these different strategic
cultures as leading European nations, notably Germany and France, opposed the action yet the
US continued its planned invasion with a ‘coalition of the willing.’ The US acting without the
approval of these states raised tensions which strained international cooperation (The Guardian
2003).
The strategic decision taken by the US to lead the invasion in Afghanistan and remove the
Taliban from government with Operation Enduring Freedom while the European states, as part
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), were “bequeathed the task of nation-
building” (Aldrich 2004: 746) created problems in cooperation. The separation of roles causes
problems in cooperation as actors could view others as not sharing responsibility or not being
equally committed to combating transnational terrorism. Aldrich argues that “while this
arrangement may be pragmatic, such a stark separation of roles will quickly corrode transatlantic
solidarity” (Aldrich 2004: 746) This breakdown of transatlantic solidarity is likely to result in a
weakening of the transnational approach to combating transnational terrorism, as each actor will
be acting more independently than before and not as one strong and united force. This separation
of forces and goals in itself is an obstacle, as different states aiming for different goals with
different approaches are more likely to have strained relations and even less cooperation due to
their separate interests conflicting with one another.

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Similar to this problem is the issue of ‘national caveats’ which present another strategic obstacle
to cooperation.
National caveats are the limits placed by governments on their troops of where they are allowed
to go or what they are allowed to do while carrying out their missions. In 2009 half of the forces
in ISAF had some form of caveats (Morelli and Belkin 2009: 10). Renée de Nevers suggests that
these are problematic for two reasons: “they hurt operational effectiveness; and alliance members
do not share risk equally, which can cause friction.” (De Nevers 2007: 51) National caveats
illustrate the issue surrounding different strategic cultures. By some troops not being able to
follow the same orders as others, international cooperation on the ground becomes more
difficult. This fragments progress on the battlefield which can lead to further problems higher up
in the decision making process.
Strategic differences create one of the main obstacles which countries face in combating
transnational terrorism. The friction caused by these differences reduces the level of cooperation,
preventing the development of a strong and united force with clear procedures, goals and sharing
of responsibilities. This in turn can lead to further friction which continues to damage
cooperation in a cyclical nature.
Expanding multilateral cooperation further has also uncovered obstacles to international
cooperation. Countries outside the EU and US have also had a major role in combating
transnational terrorism however attempts at cooperation with countries who have not been
traditional allies of the West have in some cases created further obstacles. The bipolar approach
of the EU and US has been criticised. It has been suggested that a larger, more cooperative
policy that has resources, force and long-term commitment is needed to counter a transnational
threat. The ex-NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, stated at the 2004 Munich

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Security Conference “in this 21st century, we need multilateralism with teeth” (Scheffer 2004).
This growth in multilateralism has had some success; the number of countries contributing
troops to ISAF grew from 37 in 2007 to 48 at its peak in 2011. (NATO 2007 & 2011). As the
war on terror grew, countries which became associated with terrorism found themselves in the
spotlight and other nations questioned their capability to prevent terrorism from growing within
their own state. However, some states in the Middle East have begun to cooperate with Western
states in combating transnational terrorism. “The transformation was most dramatic among those
who suddenly found themselves directly under fire, including Saudi Arabia, Morocco,
Singapore, Indonesia and Jordan” (Cronin 2010: 844). Cronin suggests that once the
international community looked upon these countries and expected them to change with the
wave of counterterrorism that had spread across Western countries, the countries quickly
corrected some of their deficiencies. By focusing on Saudi Arabia, a relatively stable ally of the
West, it is clear that cooperation has improved even if only slightly. Saudi Arabia has enhanced
collaboration with the United States, for example on terrorist financing (Blanchard and Padros
2007: 22), but obstacles still remain. “Saudi Arabia ‘was a place where Al Qaeda raised money
directly from individuals and through charities,’ and indicates that ‘charities with significant
Saudi government sponsorship,’ such as the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, may have diverted
funding to Al Qaeda” (Blanchard and Padros 2007: 3) While cooperation has been accepted as
important by the Saudi Arabian government, obstacles in creating successful multilateral
cooperation still remain, as evident by the government sponsorship of groups linked to the
funding of terrorism.
While some international cooperation with the Middle East has had success, other attempts at
extending multilateralism have been less successful. In 2004 NATO planned to include Russia

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in Operation Active Endeavour for access into the Black Sea, however opposition came from
both Russia and Turkey. Russia was unwilling to cooperate as in return it wanted greater
decision making powers and also (along with Turkey) didn’t want NATO operating in an area
which they saw as within their spheres of influence (De Nevers 2007: 41). A similar case
occurred between the US and France when the French gave some opposition to the extension of
the FBI’s International Law Enforcement Academy in Bucharest. Opposition was due to the
French believing the US was extending its remit too far into European territory (Rees 2003: 56-
57). These cases present the argument that, although there is a multilateralist approach
developing, obstacles are created by one state trying to push its influence too far and encroaching
on the perceived jurisdiction or sphere of influence of another.
Having discussed the problems surrounding strategies and extending multilateralism, this essay
will now examine how the gathering and sharing of intelligence can also create obstacles to
international cooperation and combating transnational terrorism.
The gathering of intelligence can become an obstacle when states have differing positions over
what is an infringement of privacy and whether the information is legally and rightfully gathered.
Aldrich states: “The most serious challenge to confronting transatlantic intelligence cooperation
is identifying an appropriate fulcrum that allows us to continue to balance security and liberty”
(Aldrich 2004: 734). Finding the balance between security and liberty is a greater concern when
national organizations are operating in nations which are not their own. In 2006, 26 warrants
were issued in Italy for the arrest of CIA operatives who were working on Italian soil (Whitlock
2006). This case illustrates the differences in beliefs concerning the gathering and use of
intelligence. Although the US and Italy are both combating Islamist extremism, the warrants

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highlight the obstacle of combating transnational terrorism with individual states working in
foreign states without a clear legal framework.
Renée de Nevers finds that there are three factors which hinder greater cooperation in non-
military intelligence sharing: the problem of ensuring protection of sources when information is
dispersed, differences between the United States and many European allies over appropriate
domestic privacy standards and disagreements over legal constraints on intelligence (De Nevers
2007: 44). These three factors which hinder greater cooperation have tried to be addressed but
little significant framework has been created. The Berne Group is one of these solutions, which
all the 28 EU members are a part of. However, it does not have an overriding authority to control
each member and promote clearly the security agenda for all organizations. The importance of
these groups and forums is not underestimated, as Rees writes, “developing international
cooperation between internal security agencies is a necessary but a difficult task” (Rees 2011:
393). There has been progress to create institutions and strengthen pre-existing ones that have
transnational jurisdiction, such as Interpol and Europol, however these are obstructed by
“national security actors, such as the police, judiciary and intelligence services that have feared a
diminution in their own influence” (Rees 2011: 397). This reaction to greater international
cooperation has only heightened the obstacles to combating international terrorism.
Obstacles to international cooperation can also come from non-state actors. The gathering of air
travel data is a tool used by many intelligence agencies and the implementation of the No Fly
List by the Transportation Security Administration in the US is a method used to detect potential
terrorists and also restrict the transnationalization of terrorism (Transportation Security
Administration 2014). However, the gathering of intelligence regarding air travel can prove
difficult, “trying to persuade the United Airlines, British Airways and Air France to share

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commercially sensitive data about their customers was almost as difficult as national
intelligence-sharing” (Aldrich 2004: 743). This highlights the issue that non-state actors have an
important role in combating transnational terrorism but due to the increasing amount of actors
involved, the amount of problems relating to international cooperation also increases, as their are
more parties and their rights and priorities to balance.
Finding a balance between security and liberty, defining the rights of foreign intelligence and
security services, creating a network for national security services to share intelligence, and
having to work with non-state actors can all create obstacles to international cooperation when
combating transnational terrorism.
Sharing many of the same core issues as intelligence gathering, conduct in regard to human
rights and ethics when cooperating internationally can produce issues which may impede
international cooperation in combating transnational terrorism. Differences between the US and
other states in regard to human rights and ethics during the current wave of transnational
terrorism have caused problems both domestically in the US and on the interstate level. Groves
writes: “(perceived) dubious ethics of counterterrorism policies under Bush was a fundamental
endangering the long-term legitimacy of global counterterrorism efforts” (Groves 2010: 156).
The admission of the use of waterboarding by the US (BBC 2008), the living conditions in
Guantanamo Bay Prison (Leight et al 2011) and other human rights abuses such as at Abu
Ghraib Prison (Asser 2004) all put strains on international relations. Many states do not want to
be associated with these incidents nor be thought of as conducting similar actions. A former
Bush administration official, Matthew Waxman, recognises the importance of “promoting certain
rule-of-law principles and demonstrating the durability and legal consistency… of its
counterterrorism policies… to garner greater international cooperation” (Waxman 2011).

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Although Obama issued an executive order to close down Guantanamo Bay within a year
(Obama 2009), 5 years later the prison is still open. The continuing habit of United States foreign
policy of walking a tight-rope of international acceptability continues to put a strain on
international cooperation.
The tensions between American domestic policy and the desire of the American administration
to see itself as the protector of constitutional human rights and the rule of law and the difficulty
maintaining this stance while pursuing robust international relationships emphasises the
complexity of the task facing any nation when dealing with issues which are both domestic and
international. For America in particular, which desires to reinforce its position as ‘leader of the
free world’, this task becomes especially challenging.
The obstacles to international cooperation in combating the current wave of transnational
terrorism are deep and intertwined. Due to the nature of the conflict, problems which develop in
one area can spread to others. For example intelligence problems can easily develop into ethical
or strategical problems. After systematically analysing the four key obstacles to international
cooperation, the most recurrent theme which arises is that problems are a consequence of a
conflict of interests; whether this might be over civil liberties, strategies, solutions or other
factors; trying to find the balance between all these pressing demands on a transnational level
reveals many obstacles that reduce effectiveness in the effort to combat transnational terrorism.

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