This document summarizes a research paper that models the role of trust and commitment in predicting the effects of channel conflicts. The paper proposes that higher levels of trust and commitment between channel members make conflicts more likely to result in increased efficiency, while lower trust and commitment make conflicts more likely to reduce efficiency. The document provides background on channel conflicts, including causes and types. It also defines trust and commitment, which are posited as determining whether conflicts have positive or negative effects on channel performance.
this ppt explain retailing and wholesale functions in simple terms
Definition
Retailer
is one whose business firms sells mainly to the final consumers.
Functions of Retailers
They provide convenience;
Types of Retailers
Small
Department stores Variety Stores
Types of retailers
What is Wholesaling?
Wholesaling is a distribution channel function where one organization buys products from supplying firms with the primary intention of redistributing to other organizations (but, in general, not to the final consumer).
Functions of the Wholesaler
anticipating customer needs;
Types of Wholesalers
A. Merchant Wholesalers
Merchant wholesalers can be classified into two:
the general line merchant wholesaler who carry a general assortment of goods; and
the specialty line merchant wholesaler who carry only a limited number of lines.
Limited function wholesalers provide only some wholesaling functions, like order taking and processing.
They may be classified as follows:
1. drop shippers
2. truck distributors
3. mail-order wholesalers
4. cash-and-carry wholesalers
5. cooperatives
6. rack jobbers
Types of Wholesalers
Types of wholesalers
this ppt explain retailing and wholesale functions in simple terms
Definition
Retailer
is one whose business firms sells mainly to the final consumers.
Functions of Retailers
They provide convenience;
Types of Retailers
Small
Department stores Variety Stores
Types of retailers
What is Wholesaling?
Wholesaling is a distribution channel function where one organization buys products from supplying firms with the primary intention of redistributing to other organizations (but, in general, not to the final consumer).
Functions of the Wholesaler
anticipating customer needs;
Types of Wholesalers
A. Merchant Wholesalers
Merchant wholesalers can be classified into two:
the general line merchant wholesaler who carry a general assortment of goods; and
the specialty line merchant wholesaler who carry only a limited number of lines.
Limited function wholesalers provide only some wholesaling functions, like order taking and processing.
They may be classified as follows:
1. drop shippers
2. truck distributors
3. mail-order wholesalers
4. cash-and-carry wholesalers
5. cooperatives
6. rack jobbers
Types of Wholesalers
Types of wholesalers
Collaboration in Buyer-Seller Relationships as a New Approach to Competitive ...IOSR Journals
Although recent academic work on business relationships often discusses relationship quality as a major subject, particularly with regard to the phenomenon of seller stratification, there is still little empirical research on this important construct. In this paper, the authors provide a thorough conceptualization of relationship quality and its possible antecedents, i.e., bond relationship, Temporal, Social, and Structural bond, drawing on an empirical base of 219 buyers questionnaires, Structural equations modeling (SEM) is used to assess the simultaneous effects of the predictive variables. An empirical survey confirms the impact of the relational bond dimension on the satisfaction. The satisfaction has an effect on the customer trust witch influence his commitment. The findings are discussed and the authors provide managerial implications for decision-makers from both buyer and supplier organizations.
A growing literature in experimental economics examines the conditions under which cooperation can be sustained in social dilemma settings. In particular, several recent studies contrast cooperation levels in games in which the number of decision rounds is probabilistic to games in which the number of decision rounds is finite. We contribute to this literature by contrasting the evolution of cooperation in probabilistically and finitely repeated linear voluntary contribution public goods games (VCM). Consistent with past results, cooperation increases in MPCR, and in group size, holding MPCR constant. We also find, as the number of decision sequences increase, there is a pronounced decrease in cooperation in the final round of finite sequences compared to those with a probabilistic end round. We do not, however, find strong evidence that overall cooperation rates are affected by whether the number of decision rounds is finite or determined probabilistically.
Does labor–management partnership deprive union members ofac.docxjacksnathalie
Does labor–management partnership deprive union members of
activism toward their unions? Evidence from union members in Korea
Soon Sik Kwon*
Department of Business Administration, Changwon National University, Changwon,
Republic of Korea
This study aims to analyze whether partnership ideology really deprives union
members of the willingness and passion to act for their union, resulting in union
decline, and whether militant unionism, which includes adversarial ideology against
employers is more effective for igniting members’ activism for their unions rather than
labor–management partnership. The survey data were obtained from union members
working in Mechanical and Metal Manufacturers Complex, Changwon, Republic of
Korea. Judging from the overall results of the data analysis, Kelly’s (1996) claim that
moderate unionism based on partnership ideology would undermine members’
activism for their unions was not supported; on the contrary, partnership ideology had
positive effects on both members’ activism for their unions and decision-making
practices. The difference between partnership and militancy is that militancy had an
intensive effect on the narrow focus of union activities, but the impact of partnership
achieved a better balance between participation in union activities and in management
decision making.
Keywords: decision-making practices; labor–management partnership; union citizen-
ship behavior; union militancy; willingness to participate in union activities
Introduction
In prior researches concerning partnership, it has been very important to examine whether
partnership gives mutual gains to stakeholders like employers, labor unions and
employees. Criticism has been raised that such approaches, which are centered on
partnership outcome are separated from an understanding of their context, including the
corporate process and labor market conditions. Indeed, given the complexity of
partnership, it has been considered a myopic perspective to recognize partnership based
only on the outcome, but there is a need to understand more about the context, process and
drivers for partnership. Therefore, partnership has to be viewed as much more than a
quantitative labor–management outcome, and rather more broadly as an attempt to
reconfigure employment relations requiring more attention to internal behavioral
transformations and attitudinal improvements (Dietz 2004; Johnstone, Ackers and
Wilkinson 2009). Accordingly, this paper attempts to develop an understanding of
partnership-based approaches to employment relations that are more firmly grounded in
members’ attitude and behavior. This approach makes more of a contribution to
understanding the inner process of partnership, which is little known.
A lot of prior studies reflect case-based snapshots of partnership on the background of
such narrow, firm-level contexts that it becomes difficult to pick up generalized
propositions for partnership phenomena. For example, the ide ...
UNDERSTANDING ATTRIBUTIONS OFCORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILI.docxwillcoxjanay
UNDERSTANDING ATTRIBUTIONS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY
DONALD LANGE
Arizona State University
NATHAN T. WASHBURN
Thunderbird School of Global Management
Notwithstanding the significance to organizations of external reactions to bad behav-
ior, the corporate social responsibility literature tends to focus on the meaning of and
expectations for responsible behavior, rather than on the meaning of irresponsible
behavior. Here we develop a theoretical perspective that explicitly focuses on irre-
sponsibility and that particularly helps explain attributions of social irresponsibility
in the minds of the firm’s observers. In contrast to approaches in the corporate social
responsibility literature that tend to deemphasize the role of the individual perceiver
of firm behavior in favor of emphasizing such broader social structures as value
systems, institutions, and stakeholder relations, our focus is on how the social reality
of external expectations for social responsibility is rooted in the perceptions of the
beholder. We draw on attribution theory to describe how attributions of irresponsibil-
ity stem from the observer’s subjective assessments of effect undesirability, corporate
culpability, and affected party noncomplicity. We describe how those assessments
affect each other and how they are influenced by the observer’s perceptions of effect
and firm characteristics and by the observer’s social identification with the affected
party or the implicated corporation. We conclude by describing the important role of
frames on irresponsibility attributions.
Widespread external perceptions that a firm
has acted in a socially irresponsible manner
can have negative consequences for a firm,
since an organization’s success—indeed its sur-
vival—depends, in part, on satisfying normative
expectations from its environment (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Scott, 2008). When organizational
action seems controversial to observers and
constituents, the firm risks losing current and
potential members, as well as outside endorse-
ment and support, and it risks providing “am-
munition for adversaries” (Elsbach & Sutton,
1992: 712). An organization that is seen as a bad
actor in society can have a hard time attracting
customers, investors, and employees (Fombrun,
1996). Indeed, ample evidence from empirical
research shows that counternormative behavior
can lead to such consequences for the firm as
lawsuits, financial losses through settlements
and sales declines, increases in the cost of cap-
ital, market share deterioration, network partner
loss, or other costs associated with a negative
reputation (e.g., Baucus & Baucus, 1997; David-
son, Worrell, & Cheng, 1994; Haunschild, Sulli-
van, & Page, 2006; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008;
Strachan, Smith, & Beedles, 1983).
In spite of the demonstrated significance to
organizations of reactions to bad behavior, the
corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature
tends to focus on the meaning of and expecta-
tions for r ...
1
Interorganizational Diversity, Institutional Risk,
and the Formation of Multipartner Syndicates
Abstract: We examine how interorganizational diversity affects the formation of multipartner
banking syndicates that come together to finance some of the world’s largest infrastructure
projects. Previous studies have shown that diversity negatively affects partnership formation
because it increases the costs of cooperation among the partners and the probability of conflict
between them. We extend this research and argue that the negative relationship between
interorganizational diversity and partnership formation is moderated by the institutional context
in the country where the infrastructure project will be located. We compare 1,100 realized with
over 25,000 unrealized multipartner syndicates and examine the likelihood of their formation in
countries with different levels of institutional (specifically, political and social) risk. We show
that diverse syndicates are more likely to form when investing in high-risk countries than when
investing in low-risk countries. Our findings suggest that the country-level institutional
environment is an important consideration in the formation of interorganizational partnerships.
2
INTRODUCTION
Diverse organizations often come together to accomplish common goals. Corporate
organizations collaborate across industry lines and national borders. Increasingly, they work with
nongovernmental organizations and form public–private partnerships with government entities.
Large firms work together with small firms, experienced firms with less experienced ones, and
publicly traded firms with privately or state-owned firms. The vast literature on
interorganizational partnerships, which has analyzed cooperative agreements under a multitude
of settings, shows that firms value resource complementarity but also prefer to collaborate with
similar firms (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; e.g., Gulati, 1995; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008).
Differences between firms and, more broadly, interorganizational diversity—that is, “the
distribution of differences” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1200; emphasis added) between
organizations when more than two form a partnership—increase the costs of cooperation and
monitoring, and the probability of conflict between partners (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005; Gulati
& Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 1993). Given such costs, the formation of diverse interorganizational
partnerships, especially those involving a large number of partners, is somewhat surprising.
Yet, diversity also enhances access to complementary resources (Rothaermel & Boeker,
2008; Sampson, 2007) that are particularly valuable for managing environmental uncertainty
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). We argue in this paper
that diverse partnerships are more likely to form when firms invest in a high-risk environment.
The local institutional cont.
An Essay written for the final exam of the course Conflict, democracy, and facilitation at SLU university. The essay has two different part the first take into consideration the conflict from a theoretical prespective and the second analyzes some real cases with a focus on conflict around natural resources and indigenous peoples.
9 A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational Network Effectivenes.docxransayo
9 A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational Network Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of Four Community Mental Health Systems Keith G. Provan H. Brinton Milward This chapter presents the results of a comparative study of interorganizational networks, or systems, of mental health delivery in four U.S. cities, leading to a preliminary theory of network effectiveness. Extensive data were collected from surveys, interviews, documents, and observations. Network effectiveness was assessed by collecting and aggregating data on outcomes from samples of clients, their families, and their case managers at each site. Results of analyses of both quantitative and qualitative data collected at the individual, organizational, and network levels of analysis showed that network effectiveness could be explained by various structural and contextual factors, specifically, network integration, external control, system stability, and environmental resource munificence. Based on the findings, we develop testable propositions to guide theory development and future research on network effectiveness. The study of relations between organizations has been a major concern of organization theorists for at least the past 25 years. While most of the work in this area has focused on the determinants or predictors of interorganizational relations (see Oliver, 1990, for a review), as an understanding of the phenomenon has grown, the unit of analysis has gradually shifted from the dyad to the organization set, to the network. Especially in recent years, the study of organizational networks has proliferated. Much of this interest has been generated by an emerging recognition by academics that businesses, as well as organizations in the not-for-profit and public sectors, are increasingly turning to various forms of cooperative alliances as a way of enhancing competitiveness and effectiveness that would not be possible through the traditional governance mechanisms of market or hierarchy (Powell, 1990). While a good deal of what has been written about networks has been atheoretical, discussing the advantages of networks or examining issues of measurement and analysis, considerable theory-based research has also emerged (e.g., Cook, 1977; Burt, 1980; Granovetter, 1985; Jarillo, 1988; Williamson, 1991; Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992; Larson, 1992; Provan, 1993). In the organization theory literature, work on networks has been guided primarily by two theoretical perspectives: resource dependence, and related exchange perspectives, and transaction cost economics, with most recent work focusing on the latter approach. Each of these perspectives offers both complementary and contrasting views about the network form. For the most part, however, each perspective focuses essentially on the organizational antecedents and outcomes of network involvement, with little attention paid to the network as a whole, except for its governance and structure. This organizational view is understandable, sinc.
Business Essay | Essay on Business for Students and Children in English .... Business Essay Topics |Free Example | PrimeDissertations.com. Business studies essay.
Running Header ECONOMICS PAPER 1Question 4. Outline in.docxagnesdcarey33086
Running Header: ECONOMICS PAPER
1
Question 4. Outline in detail: The notion of free exchange. Discuss the types of protectionism used around the world to reinforce restriction of free-trade and what they denote. Name and describe at least 5 organizations that promote these concepts.
The Notion of Free Exchange
Free exchange refers to the rights allowed to an investor to transfer assets to another party without paying for any transaction fees during the exchange (Boyes, 2010). There are different types of protectionism employed around the world as a way of reinforcing free-trade for instance through tariffs. This is whereby governments raise the price of imports to make them less attractive to foreign customers (Langholtz, 2003). Subsidies as well as import quotas are also used. Such protectionism is put in place in order to protect local industries from foreign competition (Dunkley, 2004). A number of organizations promote these concepts for instance the World Trade Organization (Boyes, 2010).
Question 5 Explain the notion of (PPC) production possibilities curve. Include shapes shifts and operational points
Production Possibilities Curve (PPC)
Production Possibilities Curve or the PPC is a graphical representation of the various possibilities in alternative production facing a given economy (Dunkley, 2004). In other words, it is a graphical illustration of the total goods and services that can be made available in an economy at any given time, depending on the availability of resources (Boyes, 2010). If available resources are present and are fully employed, operational points of PPC can lie anywhere on the illustration other than inside or outside of it (Langholtz, 2003). Whenever the resources increase, the PPC shifts outward to the right indicating that more goods can be made available as compared to before (Dunkley, 2004).
Question 6. Describe in some detail. The difference in allocation of resource (4 hints questions) between capitalism; socialism and communism? Use any model to explain, Centralized vs decentralized allocations.
There exists a difference in allocation of resources between capitalism, communism and socialism. While Capitalism does not require government control in allocation of resources, Socialism relies on a public worker or owner for allocation of resources (Dunkley, 2004). This means that the worker owns the rights to resources (Langholtz, 2003). Communism is more political and allocation of resources is through people of power within the society (Boyes, 2010).
Centralized vs. Decentralized allocations
In centralized allocations, decisions regarding distribution of resources are made by people of a higher management (Dunkley, 2004). On the other hand decentralized allocations delegate decisions regarding allocation of resources to all levels of management (Langholtz, 2003).
Question 7. Describe the notions inverse vs positive relationship; scarcity; association as causation; fallacy of composition.
Collaboration in Buyer-Seller Relationships as a New Approach to Competitive ...IOSR Journals
Although recent academic work on business relationships often discusses relationship quality as a major subject, particularly with regard to the phenomenon of seller stratification, there is still little empirical research on this important construct. In this paper, the authors provide a thorough conceptualization of relationship quality and its possible antecedents, i.e., bond relationship, Temporal, Social, and Structural bond, drawing on an empirical base of 219 buyers questionnaires, Structural equations modeling (SEM) is used to assess the simultaneous effects of the predictive variables. An empirical survey confirms the impact of the relational bond dimension on the satisfaction. The satisfaction has an effect on the customer trust witch influence his commitment. The findings are discussed and the authors provide managerial implications for decision-makers from both buyer and supplier organizations.
A growing literature in experimental economics examines the conditions under which cooperation can be sustained in social dilemma settings. In particular, several recent studies contrast cooperation levels in games in which the number of decision rounds is probabilistic to games in which the number of decision rounds is finite. We contribute to this literature by contrasting the evolution of cooperation in probabilistically and finitely repeated linear voluntary contribution public goods games (VCM). Consistent with past results, cooperation increases in MPCR, and in group size, holding MPCR constant. We also find, as the number of decision sequences increase, there is a pronounced decrease in cooperation in the final round of finite sequences compared to those with a probabilistic end round. We do not, however, find strong evidence that overall cooperation rates are affected by whether the number of decision rounds is finite or determined probabilistically.
Does labor–management partnership deprive union members ofac.docxjacksnathalie
Does labor–management partnership deprive union members of
activism toward their unions? Evidence from union members in Korea
Soon Sik Kwon*
Department of Business Administration, Changwon National University, Changwon,
Republic of Korea
This study aims to analyze whether partnership ideology really deprives union
members of the willingness and passion to act for their union, resulting in union
decline, and whether militant unionism, which includes adversarial ideology against
employers is more effective for igniting members’ activism for their unions rather than
labor–management partnership. The survey data were obtained from union members
working in Mechanical and Metal Manufacturers Complex, Changwon, Republic of
Korea. Judging from the overall results of the data analysis, Kelly’s (1996) claim that
moderate unionism based on partnership ideology would undermine members’
activism for their unions was not supported; on the contrary, partnership ideology had
positive effects on both members’ activism for their unions and decision-making
practices. The difference between partnership and militancy is that militancy had an
intensive effect on the narrow focus of union activities, but the impact of partnership
achieved a better balance between participation in union activities and in management
decision making.
Keywords: decision-making practices; labor–management partnership; union citizen-
ship behavior; union militancy; willingness to participate in union activities
Introduction
In prior researches concerning partnership, it has been very important to examine whether
partnership gives mutual gains to stakeholders like employers, labor unions and
employees. Criticism has been raised that such approaches, which are centered on
partnership outcome are separated from an understanding of their context, including the
corporate process and labor market conditions. Indeed, given the complexity of
partnership, it has been considered a myopic perspective to recognize partnership based
only on the outcome, but there is a need to understand more about the context, process and
drivers for partnership. Therefore, partnership has to be viewed as much more than a
quantitative labor–management outcome, and rather more broadly as an attempt to
reconfigure employment relations requiring more attention to internal behavioral
transformations and attitudinal improvements (Dietz 2004; Johnstone, Ackers and
Wilkinson 2009). Accordingly, this paper attempts to develop an understanding of
partnership-based approaches to employment relations that are more firmly grounded in
members’ attitude and behavior. This approach makes more of a contribution to
understanding the inner process of partnership, which is little known.
A lot of prior studies reflect case-based snapshots of partnership on the background of
such narrow, firm-level contexts that it becomes difficult to pick up generalized
propositions for partnership phenomena. For example, the ide ...
UNDERSTANDING ATTRIBUTIONS OFCORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILI.docxwillcoxjanay
UNDERSTANDING ATTRIBUTIONS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY
DONALD LANGE
Arizona State University
NATHAN T. WASHBURN
Thunderbird School of Global Management
Notwithstanding the significance to organizations of external reactions to bad behav-
ior, the corporate social responsibility literature tends to focus on the meaning of and
expectations for responsible behavior, rather than on the meaning of irresponsible
behavior. Here we develop a theoretical perspective that explicitly focuses on irre-
sponsibility and that particularly helps explain attributions of social irresponsibility
in the minds of the firm’s observers. In contrast to approaches in the corporate social
responsibility literature that tend to deemphasize the role of the individual perceiver
of firm behavior in favor of emphasizing such broader social structures as value
systems, institutions, and stakeholder relations, our focus is on how the social reality
of external expectations for social responsibility is rooted in the perceptions of the
beholder. We draw on attribution theory to describe how attributions of irresponsibil-
ity stem from the observer’s subjective assessments of effect undesirability, corporate
culpability, and affected party noncomplicity. We describe how those assessments
affect each other and how they are influenced by the observer’s perceptions of effect
and firm characteristics and by the observer’s social identification with the affected
party or the implicated corporation. We conclude by describing the important role of
frames on irresponsibility attributions.
Widespread external perceptions that a firm
has acted in a socially irresponsible manner
can have negative consequences for a firm,
since an organization’s success—indeed its sur-
vival—depends, in part, on satisfying normative
expectations from its environment (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Scott, 2008). When organizational
action seems controversial to observers and
constituents, the firm risks losing current and
potential members, as well as outside endorse-
ment and support, and it risks providing “am-
munition for adversaries” (Elsbach & Sutton,
1992: 712). An organization that is seen as a bad
actor in society can have a hard time attracting
customers, investors, and employees (Fombrun,
1996). Indeed, ample evidence from empirical
research shows that counternormative behavior
can lead to such consequences for the firm as
lawsuits, financial losses through settlements
and sales declines, increases in the cost of cap-
ital, market share deterioration, network partner
loss, or other costs associated with a negative
reputation (e.g., Baucus & Baucus, 1997; David-
son, Worrell, & Cheng, 1994; Haunschild, Sulli-
van, & Page, 2006; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008;
Strachan, Smith, & Beedles, 1983).
In spite of the demonstrated significance to
organizations of reactions to bad behavior, the
corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature
tends to focus on the meaning of and expecta-
tions for r ...
1
Interorganizational Diversity, Institutional Risk,
and the Formation of Multipartner Syndicates
Abstract: We examine how interorganizational diversity affects the formation of multipartner
banking syndicates that come together to finance some of the world’s largest infrastructure
projects. Previous studies have shown that diversity negatively affects partnership formation
because it increases the costs of cooperation among the partners and the probability of conflict
between them. We extend this research and argue that the negative relationship between
interorganizational diversity and partnership formation is moderated by the institutional context
in the country where the infrastructure project will be located. We compare 1,100 realized with
over 25,000 unrealized multipartner syndicates and examine the likelihood of their formation in
countries with different levels of institutional (specifically, political and social) risk. We show
that diverse syndicates are more likely to form when investing in high-risk countries than when
investing in low-risk countries. Our findings suggest that the country-level institutional
environment is an important consideration in the formation of interorganizational partnerships.
2
INTRODUCTION
Diverse organizations often come together to accomplish common goals. Corporate
organizations collaborate across industry lines and national borders. Increasingly, they work with
nongovernmental organizations and form public–private partnerships with government entities.
Large firms work together with small firms, experienced firms with less experienced ones, and
publicly traded firms with privately or state-owned firms. The vast literature on
interorganizational partnerships, which has analyzed cooperative agreements under a multitude
of settings, shows that firms value resource complementarity but also prefer to collaborate with
similar firms (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; e.g., Gulati, 1995; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008).
Differences between firms and, more broadly, interorganizational diversity—that is, “the
distribution of differences” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1200; emphasis added) between
organizations when more than two form a partnership—increase the costs of cooperation and
monitoring, and the probability of conflict between partners (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005; Gulati
& Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 1993). Given such costs, the formation of diverse interorganizational
partnerships, especially those involving a large number of partners, is somewhat surprising.
Yet, diversity also enhances access to complementary resources (Rothaermel & Boeker,
2008; Sampson, 2007) that are particularly valuable for managing environmental uncertainty
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). We argue in this paper
that diverse partnerships are more likely to form when firms invest in a high-risk environment.
The local institutional cont.
An Essay written for the final exam of the course Conflict, democracy, and facilitation at SLU university. The essay has two different part the first take into consideration the conflict from a theoretical prespective and the second analyzes some real cases with a focus on conflict around natural resources and indigenous peoples.
9 A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational Network Effectivenes.docxransayo
9 A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational Network Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of Four Community Mental Health Systems Keith G. Provan H. Brinton Milward This chapter presents the results of a comparative study of interorganizational networks, or systems, of mental health delivery in four U.S. cities, leading to a preliminary theory of network effectiveness. Extensive data were collected from surveys, interviews, documents, and observations. Network effectiveness was assessed by collecting and aggregating data on outcomes from samples of clients, their families, and their case managers at each site. Results of analyses of both quantitative and qualitative data collected at the individual, organizational, and network levels of analysis showed that network effectiveness could be explained by various structural and contextual factors, specifically, network integration, external control, system stability, and environmental resource munificence. Based on the findings, we develop testable propositions to guide theory development and future research on network effectiveness. The study of relations between organizations has been a major concern of organization theorists for at least the past 25 years. While most of the work in this area has focused on the determinants or predictors of interorganizational relations (see Oliver, 1990, for a review), as an understanding of the phenomenon has grown, the unit of analysis has gradually shifted from the dyad to the organization set, to the network. Especially in recent years, the study of organizational networks has proliferated. Much of this interest has been generated by an emerging recognition by academics that businesses, as well as organizations in the not-for-profit and public sectors, are increasingly turning to various forms of cooperative alliances as a way of enhancing competitiveness and effectiveness that would not be possible through the traditional governance mechanisms of market or hierarchy (Powell, 1990). While a good deal of what has been written about networks has been atheoretical, discussing the advantages of networks or examining issues of measurement and analysis, considerable theory-based research has also emerged (e.g., Cook, 1977; Burt, 1980; Granovetter, 1985; Jarillo, 1988; Williamson, 1991; Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992; Larson, 1992; Provan, 1993). In the organization theory literature, work on networks has been guided primarily by two theoretical perspectives: resource dependence, and related exchange perspectives, and transaction cost economics, with most recent work focusing on the latter approach. Each of these perspectives offers both complementary and contrasting views about the network form. For the most part, however, each perspective focuses essentially on the organizational antecedents and outcomes of network involvement, with little attention paid to the network as a whole, except for its governance and structure. This organizational view is understandable, sinc.
Business Essay | Essay on Business for Students and Children in English .... Business Essay Topics |Free Example | PrimeDissertations.com. Business studies essay.
Running Header ECONOMICS PAPER 1Question 4. Outline in.docxagnesdcarey33086
Running Header: ECONOMICS PAPER
1
Question 4. Outline in detail: The notion of free exchange. Discuss the types of protectionism used around the world to reinforce restriction of free-trade and what they denote. Name and describe at least 5 organizations that promote these concepts.
The Notion of Free Exchange
Free exchange refers to the rights allowed to an investor to transfer assets to another party without paying for any transaction fees during the exchange (Boyes, 2010). There are different types of protectionism employed around the world as a way of reinforcing free-trade for instance through tariffs. This is whereby governments raise the price of imports to make them less attractive to foreign customers (Langholtz, 2003). Subsidies as well as import quotas are also used. Such protectionism is put in place in order to protect local industries from foreign competition (Dunkley, 2004). A number of organizations promote these concepts for instance the World Trade Organization (Boyes, 2010).
Question 5 Explain the notion of (PPC) production possibilities curve. Include shapes shifts and operational points
Production Possibilities Curve (PPC)
Production Possibilities Curve or the PPC is a graphical representation of the various possibilities in alternative production facing a given economy (Dunkley, 2004). In other words, it is a graphical illustration of the total goods and services that can be made available in an economy at any given time, depending on the availability of resources (Boyes, 2010). If available resources are present and are fully employed, operational points of PPC can lie anywhere on the illustration other than inside or outside of it (Langholtz, 2003). Whenever the resources increase, the PPC shifts outward to the right indicating that more goods can be made available as compared to before (Dunkley, 2004).
Question 6. Describe in some detail. The difference in allocation of resource (4 hints questions) between capitalism; socialism and communism? Use any model to explain, Centralized vs decentralized allocations.
There exists a difference in allocation of resources between capitalism, communism and socialism. While Capitalism does not require government control in allocation of resources, Socialism relies on a public worker or owner for allocation of resources (Dunkley, 2004). This means that the worker owns the rights to resources (Langholtz, 2003). Communism is more political and allocation of resources is through people of power within the society (Boyes, 2010).
Centralized vs. Decentralized allocations
In centralized allocations, decisions regarding distribution of resources are made by people of a higher management (Dunkley, 2004). On the other hand decentralized allocations delegate decisions regarding allocation of resources to all levels of management (Langholtz, 2003).
Question 7. Describe the notions inverse vs positive relationship; scarcity; association as causation; fallacy of composition.
Similar to Modelling the role of trust and commitment in predicting channel conflict effects (20)
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGuy Korland
Guy Korland, CEO and Co-founder of FalkorDB, will review two articles on the integration of language models with knowledge graphs.
1. Unifying Large Language Models and Knowledge Graphs: A Roadmap.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.08302
2. Microsoft Research's GraphRAG paper and a review paper on various uses of knowledge graphs:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/graphrag-unlocking-llm-discovery-on-narrative-private-data/
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Modelling the role of trust and commitment in predicting channel conflict effects
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www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online)
Vol.5, No.22, 2013
Modelling the Role of Trust and Commitment in Predicting
Channel Conflict Effects
Amangala.A.Emmanuel
M.Sc Student, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Enugu State, Nigeria
* E-mail of the corresponding author: olanariazi@gmail.com
Abstract
Marketing channels are social systems, with continuous interactions between different individuals and
organizations. As long as there are such interactions, conflicts are unavoidable. Conflict in channels are said to
have two possible effects – positive effects (increased channel efficiency) and negative effects (reduced channel
efficiency). In this paper, trust and commitment have been posited as determining whether conflicts would
produce positive effects or negative effects. I have proposed that as commitment and trust increase in the
channel, the more likely that when such conflicts occur, they would result in increased efficiency and as trust and
commitment reduce in the channel, the more likely that when such conflicts occur they would result in reduced
efficiency.
Keywords: Channel Conflict, Trust, Commitment
1. Introduction
Kotler and Keller (2009:450) define marketing channels as “sets of interdependent organizations involved in the
process of making a product or service available for use or consumption.” Channels of distribution are very
important aspects of every business’s operations. The importance of distribution channels can be easily
ascertained in the fact that early marketing ideas tended to revolve around distribution (Lusch, 2007:261). In
fact, early marketing was considered to be synonymous with distribution as shown by the American Marketing
Association’s (1948) and (1960) definitions of marketing which considers marketing to be “the performance of
business activities that directs the flow of goods and services from producers to consumers.” Distribution helps
to create place, time and possession utility (Lusch, 2007:262) by closing the separations of time, space, value,
possession and information and also the discrepancies of quantity and assortment.
Channels of distribution are generally regarded as the route the product or service takes from the manufacturer
to consumer or producer to user. It is worth noting that channels are made up of several organizations and
individuals who relate with one another, hence they are much more than just a collection of “movers” of
products, they collectively make up an interorganisational social system (Rosenbloom, 2004:110). In every
social institution there is relationship and interaction, and as long as there is interaction and relationship, there is
bound to be conflict and marketing channels are no different (Karadagli and Aluftekin, 2012:2212; Gaski,
1984:11). According to Stern and Gorman (1969) in Rosenbloom (2004:111), “in any social system, when a
component perceives the behaviour of another component to be impeding the attainment of its goals or the
effective performance of its instrumental behaviour patterns, an atmosphere of frustration prevails. A state of
conflict may, therefore, exist when two or more components of any given system of action become objects of each
other’s frustration.” Since marketing channels are made up of different business organizations, with each of
them pursuing its business interests and objectives, it is unthinkable that all their interests would be the same,
and as long as there are differences in objectives, they are bound to work at cross purposes sometimes, which
would eventually lead to conflict (Mohammed, Robert and Thomas, 2011:35; Kotler and Keller, 2009:470). As
stated earlier, the question is not if conflict would take place, rather the question is about what happens after the
conflict. Marketing channel conflicts are said to have either positive (constructive) or negative (destructive or
dysfunctional) effects (Kotler and Keller, 2009:471). It can be said that no conflict already has preordained
outcomes or effects i.e. positive or negative; rather it is a function of the existing relationship dynamics between
the channel members. While most studies on the area of conflict have looked at the causes of such conflicts, the
effects of conflicts, the power-conflict relationship, even looked at the conflict resolution mechanisms (Lusch
and Brown, 1982 amongst others), there is hardly any study to my knowledge that has been done on the variables
that can impact on resultant effect of such conflicts. There has been no model that tries to explain how the effects
of conflicts i.e. whether it ends up as negative or positive, can be decided by intervening variables. In every
relationship between individuals or organizations, the issue of trust and commitment is always bound to arise.
Hence, it is clear that trust and commitment have a role to play in the dynamics of every relationship. However,
no study or model has tried to explain the role played by the twin forces of trust and commitment in determining
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the effects of conflicts in channels. Therefore in this paper, I would try to develop a model that seeks to explain
the role played by trust and commitment in deciding the effect or results of conflict whether it would be positive
or negative and also, the trust and commitment outcomes of the effects of channel conflict.
2. Channel Conflict
“Channel conflict occurs when one channel member’s actions prevent another channel member from achieving
its goals” (Mohammed, Robert and Thomas, 2011:36). Gaski (1984:11) defines channel conflict as “the
perception on the part of a channel member that its goal attainment is being impeded by another with stress and
tension the result.” Stern and El-Ansary (1992) in Karadagli and Aluftekin (2012:2212) define channel conflict
as “a situation in which one channel member perceives another channel member(s) to be engaged in behaviour
that is preventing or impeding it from achieving its goals” Karadagli and Aluftekin (2012:2212) view channel
conflicts as the frequency and intensity of disagreements between channel members.
Pondy (1976) in Gaski (1984:11) classifies conflict into five stages: latent conflict - underlying sources of
conflict; perceived conflict – perception of conflict only, no yet felt; felt conflict – tension, anxiety, disaffection
in addition to the perception; manifest conflict – behaviour which blocks another’s goal achievement and conflict
aftermath – post-conflict conduct, either resolution or suppression. Theoretically speaking, this is a sequence that
moves from the perceptual to the real or manifest, and can be halted at any point before it becomes manifest.
This idea is supported by Gaski (1984:11) who suggests that the Pondy (1967) five stage sequence could be
approximated into just perceptual/attitudinal – behavioural conflict.
2.1 Types of channel conflict:
Three types of channel conflict have been identified in literature (see Kotler and Keller, 2009:417,). They are :(
1) vertical channel conflict i.e. conflict between different levels in the channel. Example, conflict between a
manufacturer and a retailer, (2) Horizontal channel conflict i.e. conflict between two channel members at the
same level of the channel, (3) Multichannel conflict i.e. conflict between two or more channels established by the
same manufacturer to sell to the same market.
2.2 Causes of conflict
Numerous authors and researchers have looked at, and pointed to many causes of channel conflict. However,
Rosenbloom (2004:113) identified seven categories of underlying causes of channel conflict. These are:
(i) Role incongruities: in every channel, there are roles assigned to members of the channel whether formally or
informally. These roles are sets of prescriptions defining what the behaviour of each member of the channel
should be. Whenever any member of the channel seems to deviate from the role assigned to them and either
encroach on another member’s role or worse, not play his role well, conflict is likely to occur.
(ii) Resource scarcities: a disagreement between channel members on how channel resources should be allocated
can be a cause of conflict in the channel.
(iii) Perceptual differences: a significant part of the conflict in marketing channels is a function of differences in
perception. Perception refers to the way stimuli is selected and interpreted by an individual. A lot of past
experiences and other factors like learning affect how an individual perceives stimuli. What one channel member
may consider as being very important may not be very important to another member and their respective actions
would reflect such divergence in perception. Example, a channel member may see a need for more advertising to
be done while another member may feel more emphasis should be placed on sales promotion. This is bound to
lead them in different parts thereby leading to conflict of purpose.
(iv) Expectational differences: as in every social setup, expectations of what other members of the social setup
would do are always there. In the same way, channel members have expectations of other channel members,
these expectations sometimes, are predictions on how the other member would behave. Based on these
expectations, sometimes inaccurate, the channel member takes actions which then provoke the very same
reaction albeit negative, that the other channel member was expecting. The negative effects of such a reaction
can cause conflict.
(v) Decision domain disagreements: this is in a way related to the issue of role incongruities and power. Channel
members have areas of decision making that are assigned to them or which they assign to themselves. Whenever
any channel member is perceived to be encroaching, or trying to make decisions that are supposed to be in the
ambit of another channel member, in some ways, trying to exercise undue influence or power over another
member’s decision domain, conflict is very likely to result. Even in situations where these domains have not
been spelt out, there can be conflict over who has the right to make what decisions.
(vi) Goal incompatibilities: channels are made of organizations that have their goals and objectives to pursue.
Too many times, these goals are incompatible and are likely to cause conflicts. A manufacturer may be interested
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in short term profit which would lead him to demand high prices, while the wholesaler is interested in sales
volume which means he needs to charge lower prices. This can very well bring them into a state of conflict.
(vii) Communication difficulties: communication can be said to be the foundation of every relationship. A break
down in communications has the capacity to destroy an otherwise good relationship. Misunderstandings between
channel members can easily arise due to breakdown in communication, and this can lead to conflict.
2.3 Channel conflict effects
The effect of channel conflict is usually measured in terms of its effects on channel performance or channel
efficiency (Rosenbloom, 2004:116). According to Rosenbloom (2004:116), channel efficiency is “the degree to
which the total investment in the various inputs necessary to achieve a given distribution objective can be
optimized in terms of outputs.” In simple terms, channel efficiency is measured as the rate at which, or the
degree to which the investments made in achieving set distribution objectives are actually paying off, without
need for the investment of more assets than was thought necessary, to achieving that same objective. A
manufacturer, who sets aside 80 million naira to achieve a set of distribution objectives, would not like to find
himself using up to 100 million to achieve those same set of objectives and for the same set of expected returns.
Channel conflicts are said to have three possible effects: negative effect (reduced channel efficiency), positive
effects (increased channel efficiency) and no effect (Kotler and Keller, 2009; Rosenbloom, 2004:116).
Negative effect (reduced efficiency): This happens to be the most commonly held belief about channel conflicts.
It is generally believed that channel conflict would always lead to reduced efficiency. As the conflict becomes
more intense, the efficiency of the channel is reduced. Once a state of conflict exists between two members, say
the manufacturer and a wholesaler, the wholesaler is more likely to start reducing the volume of the
manufacturer’s products carried previously, this would lead the manufacturer to start looking for additional
channels or intermediaries to carry the excess in order to meet up with his previous sales volume. This search
and involvement of additional intermediaries is likely to incur more costs for the manufacturer. Even the
wholesaler now has to start selling less of what he used to sell thereby reducing his own sales volume, or he will
even need to start negotiating with another wholesaler which in itself takes time and other resources. Both
members of the channel end up spending more to achieve their objectives.
No effect (efficiency is unchanged): In a case like this, the conflict has no effect on each party’s ability to meet
up their objectives. The investments made in reaching set objectives are not in any way affected by the conflict.
Rosenbloom (2004:117) suggests that this can be the case in channels where there is high level of dependency
and commitment.
Positive effect (increased efficiency): At the other end of what can be considered a continuum we have positive
effects of channel conflict. Conflict in the channel can actually produce channel efficiencies. Channel conflict
can force members out of a state of complacency, it can force channel members to begin to review areas of their
operations that may need adjustments. Channel conflict can force the members of the channel to reexamine some
of their policies and in the interest of the functioning of the channel, make changes. When channel members
come to the point where they begin to address some issues which without the conflict, they wouldn’t have
addressed, efficiency is increased in channel.
This paper would focus on the negative and positive effects because this researcher believes that it is not possible
for channel conflict to be without effect, the effect may be only slight, but it would definitely have an effect. A
non-effect situation is only theoretically possible but cannot happen in reality
3. Trust and Commitment
The relationships between channel members, like in every business-to-business relationship, require trust and
commitment for them to succeed. Unlike, dealings with final consumers, business to business dealings are
usually more long term in nature and therefore partners must always endeavour to put structures in place that
make for better relationships. In Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) key mediating variable (KMV) model of relationship
marketing, trust and commitment are considered the two key mediating variables that mediate between the
relationship between key antecedents of relationship progress or stability and the outcomes of such antecedents.
Trust and commitment are considered two notions that stimulate relational bonds and facilitate productive buyer
– supplier collaborations (Wallenberg et al, 2011:83). Commitment and trust are key to successful business – to
– business dealings because they encourage marketers to (i) work at preserving investments made in the
relationship by cooperating with exchange partners, (ii) to resist temptations to go for alternatives that may bring
short term benefits, but rather focus on the long – term benefits that staying and cooperating with existing
partners would bring (iii) take high risk decisions based on the knowledge that partners would not act in an
opportunistic manner (Morgan and Hunt,1994;22).
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3.1 Trust
Morgan and Hunt (1994:23) conceptualize trust “as existing when one party has confidence in an exchange
partner’s reliability and integrity” Moorman et al (1993:82) define trust as “a willingness to rely on an exchange
partner in whom one has confidence.” The key word that can be seen in both definitions is confidence. Trust is a
feeling or perception of one partner that the other partner will not do anything that would harm or impede his
progress, it is a feeling or perception that the other partner’s word can be relied upon, the other partner would
only do things that would bring profit to both of them. According to Moorman et al (1993:82) a willingness to
rely on that partner is a reflection of such confidence; however, Morgan and Hunt (1994) suggest that the
confidence in the other partner implicitly covers the willingness to rely on such a partner. Trust is viewed as
essential to all inter-organizational relationships and enables companies to focus on the long term benefits of the
relationship (Wallenberg et al, 2011:83). For business – to –business relationships like those of channel
relationships to succeed, partners must be able to take actions based on the knowledge that the other partners can
be relied on to do their own part, that promises made by partners can be relied on.
3.2 Commitment
Commitment is considered one of the essential parts of successful long term relationships (Wallenberg et al,
2011:83). Morgan and Hunt (1994:23) define commitment as “an exchange partner believing that an ongoing
relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum effort at maintaining it.” Grundlach et al
(1995:78) in Wallenberg et al (2011:83) define commitment as “an implicit or explicit pledge of relational
continuity between exchange partners.” Finally, Moorman et al (1992:316) define it as “an enduring desire to
maintain a desired relationship.” Grundlach et al’s (1995) definition, while highlighting the fact that commitment
is a conscious thing and not something that happens subconsciously, fails to give reason why such a “pledge” is
necessary or beneficial. The definitions of Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Moorman et al (1992) is closer in the
sense that they both not only point to the fact that commitment is a conscious thing and stems from a clear
desire, but also point to the fact that such desire is based on the importance attached to the relationship. That is, a
desire to continue in such a relationship is based on the fact that such a relationship is very important, and further
more conscious effort on the parts of both partners is required in order to maintain such a relationship.
Commitment implicit in these definitions, is a two way, reciprocative thing.
• High level of trust
• High level of commitment
CHANNEL
CONFLICT
• Low level of trust
• Low level of commitment
POSITIVE EFFECT
(INCREASED
CHANNEL
EFFICIENCY)
NEGATIVE EFFECT
(REDUCED
CHANNEL
EFFICIENCY)
Figure 1: Conceptual model of the role of trust and commitment in predicting the effects of channel conflicts.
4. Research framework
4.1 Trust and commitment
Trust is a necessity in long-term relationships. Partnerships that must last are partnerships that are based on trust.
Based on the definitions of Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Moorman et al (1992) it is obvious that partners desire
to maintain certain types of relationships and therefore, put in a lot of effort to sustain such relationships because
of what benefits they get from such relationships. According to Morgan and Hunt (1994:24) relationships that
would engender such desire and effort to maintain them are relationships built on trust, they are relationships
were both partners can take actions based on the knowledge that the other partner can be trusted, they can actions
based on the fact that they believe the other partner would not engage in opportunistic behaviour. Since there is
always an element of risk involved in every business dealing with another person or partner, trust helps to reduce
the risks associated with such exchanges hence organizations would be more committed to relationships that are
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based on trust. Trust is noted as a critical factor in fostering commitment among supply chain partners according
to Kwon and Suh (2004:1). Hence, trust is proposed as a determinant of relationship commitment.
P1: Trust is positively and significantly related to commitment.
4.2 Trust and channel efficiency
Channel conflict is based on the perception by one partner or channel member, that another channel member’s
actions and decisions are impeding the achievement of its own goals. The possibility of such conflict resulting in
negative results in the form of reduced channel efficiency or resulting in positive results in the form of increased
channel efficiency depends on the way the “offended” channel member views the other partner or “offending”
member. In a situation where the “offended” channel member views the other member with a high level of trust,
i.e. he believes that the other channel member would only take decisions that would be beneficial to all parties
and not just himself, the “offended” member may be willing to appraise the basis for such decisions and find that
it can easily work in his own favour. According to Rosenbloom (2004:118) the “offended” member may even
check and find that his own actions or inactions may have forced the hand of the other member and he would
therefore be willing to reappraise some of his own actions. On the basis of such reappraisal, positive changes can
be made which would lead to enhanced operations in the channel. As stated earlier, this can only happen, if the
“offended” member trusts the other member and is very confident that he would not engage in opportunistic
behaviour. Morgan and Hunt (1994:26) also suggest that when there is trust, partners would tend to treat
“offenses” as being functional i.e. they would see such disagreements as necessary to the normal functioning of
their relationship rather than something that should cause “bad blood” between them. They referred to such
things as “functional conflict.” This can also go the other way. In a channel relationship in which there is no
trust, basically every action taken by any partner would be looked at with suspicion by the other partner, which
would lead to a situation where even potentially beneficial actions, would be treated with suspicion and the
“offended” member would end up taking actions that hinder the accomplishment of channel goals. Kwon and
Suh (2004) also argue that lack of trust among supply chain partners often results in inefficient and ineffective
performance. Hence:
P2a: The higher the level of trust among channel members, the more likely that channel members would treat
“offences” with more levity thereby leading to increased channel efficiency i.e. the higher the level of
trust among channel members, the higher the level of channel efficiency that would result from channel
conflict.
P2b: The lower the level of trust among channel members, the more likely that channel members would treat
“offences” with more seriousness thereby leading to reduced channel efficiency i.e. the lower the level of
trust among channel members, the lower the level of channel efficiency that would result from channel
conflict.
4.3 Commitment and channel efficiency
The relationship between trust and commitment has already been established, and also trust and commitment –
not just one – but both of them must be present, to produce outcomes that promote efficiency, productivity and
effectiveness (Morgan and Hunt, 1994:22). Channel members would treat “offences” from channel partners to
whom they are committed with less aggressiveness than they would treat “offences” from channel partners to
whom they less committed. Because of a desire to maintain such a relationship which is so vital, channel
members are more likely to look for “soft landings” when such incidents occur so as to ensure the continued
existence of the relationship. However, where such commitment is not present, even minor issues can easily be
blown out of proportion by the partners. Hence based on the arguments presented above,
P3a: The higher the level of commitment among channel members, the more likely that channel “offences”
would be treated with more levity thereby leading to increased channel efficiency i.e. the higher the level
of commitment among channel members, the higher the level of channel efficiency that would result
from channel conflict.
P3b: The lower the level of commitment among channel members, the more likely that channel “offences”
would be treated with more seriousness thereby leading to reduced channel efficiency i.e. the lower the
level of commitment among channel members, the lower the level of channel efficiency that would result
from channel conflict.
5. Conclusion
The existence of conflicts in distribution channels is one of the key issues that points to the fact that channels are
not just economic systems or units that are designed to push products to consumers, but are also systems with
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behavioural issues that must be contended with by managers. Conflict in channels has been one of the key areas
of study in the field of distribution channel management and its effects on the performance of the channel as a
system cannot be ignored. The basic thrust of this paper is that the effect of channel conflict, be it negative or
positive, depends on the way in which such conflicts are handled. It is worth noting that this paper did not set out
to discuss channel conflict resolution techniques but rather the means by which individual channel members
react to and handle such incidents of conflicts. The basic idea is that if conflict is handled or managed properly,
it can actually lead to positive results but if it is handled or managed improperly, it can most likely lead to
negative results. However, what this paper really set out to show was that how well such conflicts are handled or
managed is mediated or is affected by the level of trust and commitment existing between the channel members.
In this paper therefore I have tried to show that trust and commitment can either mark the difference between
increased channel efficiency i.e. positive conflict effect or reduced channel efficiency i.e. negative effect. The
paper has tried to show that as trust and commitment increases between channel members, the more likely that
they would handle conflicts better and thereby result in increased channel efficiency. In this paper I have only
tried to model the role of trust and commitment but apart from the relationship between trust and commitment
which has been tested in previous studies (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Kwon and Suh, 2004), no empirical testing
of the model has been attempted. An empirical testing of this model would therefore be necessary to validate the
claims or propositions made.
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