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Dr. Marco Balduzzi
Mobile Telephony Threats in Asia
Black Hat Asia 2017, Singapore
Data Scientist
Pindrop
Dr. Payas Gupta
Sr. Threat Researcher
Trend Micro
Lion Gu
Sr. Threat Researcher
Trend Micro
Joint work with Prof. Debin Gao (SMU) and Prof. Mustaque Ahamad (GaTech)
2
Marco’s 9th
BH Anniversary :-)
3
Click to play recording [removed]
Wangiri Fraud, Japan
4
Fake Officials Fraud, China
5
This is your Telco calling, UAE
6
Police Scam, Singapore
7
BringBackOurCash, Nigeria
8
Why is Happening?
• Lack of users’
awareness
• Users publicly disclose
their mobile numbers
• Expose themselves and
the organization they
work for!
9
Current Defeat Strategies
10 10
• Telcos
• Crowd sourced
– FTC, fraud complaints
– 800notes open
datasets
• Proprietary
Missing Caller's Details
11
No Actual Timestamps
12
Perception v/s Reality
13
Not all Fraudulent Calls are Reported
• Compared both FTC and 800notes against each
other for a certain set of numbers
14
Delay in Reporting Fraudulent Calls
15
Any Solution?
17
Using SIP Trunks
192.168.1.10
Tel. Range -
88800 to 88899
IP-192.168.1.11
Tel. ext - 83345
IP-192.168.1.12
Tel. ext - 83351
IP-192.168.1.13
Tel. ext - 88346
Rules Destination no. Destination IP
Incoming call 88800 - 88899 192.168.1.10
Incoming call 83345 192.168.1.11
Incoming call 83351 192.168.1.12
Incoming call 88346 192.168.1.13
SwitchCall Manager/ PBX
Telephone
Exchange
Call Manager table Honeypot
Call
SIP Trunk
18
Using GSM/VoIP Gateways
19
Mobile Telephony Honeypot
20
Mobile Telephony Honeypot
21
Example of Call Recording
Example of SMS Recording
23
• 确认了哈,位置还留起的 之前在等qq消息,我刚才电话问
了,给我转款吧。建 行四川分行第五支行5240 9438 1020
0709,户名:王玲。
(I have confirmed. Reservation is still valid. I am waiting QQ
message, and I contact you by phone call. Please transfer money
to me. China Construction Bank Sichuan Provincial Branch Fifth
Sub-branch, account number: 5240 9438 1020 0709, account
name: Wang Ling)
23
24
How to make honeypot
numbers “appealing” to
fraudsters?
Seeding
Social network Mobile malware Abuse list
26
Simulating Social-Network Leaks
27
Mobile Malware Leak
• Honeypot numbers in
contact list
•~400 samples of 60
families
•Track 140 C&C leakages
• Taint Droid
• Network traffic
28
Active Engagement with Fraudsters
•2000+ reported (abuse)
numbers
•Engaged with SMS and
one-ring call
– I am fine with our
discussion. How do
we want to proceed?
29
General Results
30
Effect of Seeding
31
Social Networks
• Very effective
• Picked up by Xinhua
Quanmei [*]
• Daily news in the form
of spam -> 221
messages
[*] http://www.xhqm.cn/ 32
Malicious Apps
• 79 ADs from 106588302
• Self-promoting app [*]
– 0690123590110 (mal1)
1065502004955590110
(mal2) are spoofed
[*] http://wap.guanxi.me 33
Fraudsters’ Strategies
34
Blended Malicious Traffic
35
Concealed Caller Numbers
• 51% fraudsters: Use of SMS gateways and
VoIP services to hide identity
• Use of foreign sim-cards (mainly Thailand)
• Use of split-paid services to reduce cost on
international calls
36
Social Engineering
• Human = weakest point in chain
• Multi-hop attack, similar to BEC
• Lateral movements
37 37
Multi-step Attack
Pretend to
know the
victim
Ask for IM contact
Confirm IM
Send payment instructions
(paypal)
Confirm paypal
• Repeated over time
• Combination of Calls and SMS
38
The “Big Boss” Example
39
Google Business Listing
• List your business online
on Google
• Click here for recording
[removed].
40
Can you hear me?
• Subscribe you to
services when you say
‘YES’
• Click here for recording.
[removed]
41
Tax Collection Agency
Find you and call
you
Intimidation
Pay using tax
vouchers
42
Technical Support Scam
43
Use of intimidation
• Postal service
– Fee requested for a package in customs hold
• Telephony provider
– Contract suspended because bill not paid
44
How campaigns operate?
• Use of multiple calling
numbers to avoid easy
detection
45
• Common sources
– Multiple campaigns
ran by the same gang
Authentication Bypass
• Reuse of previously-terminated numbers
• Circumvent 2-factor auth!
[Tencent] Verification code 658339. Use it
to change the password of the QQ number
64******5. Leaking the verification code
has a risk. The QQ Security Center.
46
Defensive Strategies
1) Adopt reputation-based solutions
2) Protect your number
3) Don’t get social engineered
4) Look after your 2 auth
47 47
48
Questions?
@embyte
Thanks!
48

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