The document outlines the requirements for a midterm analytical essay on the movement towards human security, emphasizing the integration of course readings and objectives such as globalization's impact on security perceptions, key threats to human security, and the application of human security concepts. Students are instructed to present a structured essay, formatted without a cover page, adhering to a strict four-page limit while addressing a thesis that supports or refutes the midterm question. Additional guidance on essay structure, citation format, and considering multiple insecurities in security discussions is also provided.

1. Midterm Question
Is the movement towards human security a true paradigm shift?
In answering this question make sure to consider which of the
authors whom you have read in Weeks one to four of the course
support your view and which do not. *The sole use of attached
readings is required for the midterm*
Midterm Assignment – Instructions (Read Carefully)
In university courses, assignments (or assessments) are meant to
give students the opportunity to demonstrate what they have
been learning in the course – and give instructors evidence that
such learning is occurring within the classroom. Because of
these objectives, it is imperative to incorporate the specifics of
what you’ve been studying in the course into your writing
assignments. You accomplish this by answering the Midterm
question in the assessment via the course objectives and
readings from the course. The midterm will cover the following
objectives:
1. Describe the role of rapid globalization in changing
perceptions of security
2. Identify key threats to human security (food security,
personal security, environmental security)
3. Apply the concepts of human security
4. Compare and contrast traditional international relations
approaches to security with the doctrine of human security.
Additional Instructions
To answer the Midterm question you will write an analytical
essay. The analytical essay is a practical approach to solving a
problem. So think of this essay question as you would an
assignment from your boss: “I need you to take a look at this

2. problem and solve it for me using things from your IR toolkit
(what you have learned, or know). Present a well-written,
concise answer to me in four pages. I need it by tomorrow
morning.” This is how it happens in the real world, and this is
what we want to prepare you to do. To achieve this structure of
the essay please keep the following tips in mind:
1. Remember that the analytical essay is highly-structured. Each
paragraph should look like the others in terms of style and
substance. Writing to the limit of four pages is an art and
something you need to learn to do. So, don’t write fewer than
four pages and don’t write more. You may need to write over
just a little and then edit away the extra parts of the essay to
reach the concise four pages.
2. Review your submission and make sure that you have covered
the requirements of the assignment using only material from the
lessons and readings.
Format for the Essay:
1. Do not use a cover page. Instead, create a header with your
name, assignment name, and date. To do this in Word, go to
“insert” and then “header.” Do the same thing to insert a
‘footer’ and include page numbers. If you need help, use the
‘help’ function to learn more within Word.
2. Your submission should be four pages (no more, no less) and
look like this:
a. Introduction: Introduce your topic & include a thesis. To help
you set up your analytical essay include three reasons why you
agree or disagree with the midterm questions. By doing so, you
will set up the body of your paper. The introduction should be
½ page.
b. The Body: The body will focus on your three reasons that you
either agree or disagree with the midterm question. Each reason
should take up about 1 page and include support from the
readings and lessons.
c. Conclusion: The conclusion will wrap up your paper, and re-

3. state your three reasons. This should be about ½ page.
d. Reference List: Include a reference list in Turabian format.
This list will not count towards the four pages.
3. Use Turabian in-text citation with a reference list. Do not
include footnotes.
4. Make sure you have written your analytical essay in the third
person format
5. Use standard word settings for the assignment. Double-space,
12 pt. font
6. Make sure your submission is no more and no less than 4
pages
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Global Food Security: Challenges and Policies
Rosegrant, Mark W;Cline, Sarah A
Science; Dec 12, 2003; 302, 5652; ProQuest
pg. 1917
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Global Change, Peace & Security
formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change
ISSN: 1478-1158 (Print) 1478-1166 (Online) Journal homepage:
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Environmental security, geopolitics and the case of
Lake Urmia’s disappearance
Simon Dalby & Zahra Moussavi
To cite this article: Simon Dalby & Zahra Moussavi (2017)
Environmental security, geopolitics
and the case of Lake Urmia’s disappearance, Global Change,
Peace & Security, 29:1, 39-55, DOI:
10.1080/14781158.2016.1228623
To link to this article:
https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2016.1228623
Published online: 15 Sep 2016.
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6.1228623#tabModule
Environmental security, geopolitics and the case of Lake
Urmia’s disappearance
Simon Dalbya and Zahra Moussavib
aBalsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier
University, Waterloo, Canada; bFaculty of Geography,
University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
ABSTRACT
Geopolitics, climate change and environmental security operate
in
complicated and sometimes directly conflictual ways. Driven in
part by national policies of food self-sufficiency in response to

6. economic sanctions imposed on Iran by American and European
policies, the destruction of one of the world’s largest inland
lakes
raises questions about the interaction of multiple forms of
security, and in particular how securitizations by various actors
interact at a number of scales. Lake Urmia in North Western
Iran
has rapidly dwindled in the last decade, a result of
unsustainable
water extractions to irrigate growing agricultural production of
apples and other horticultural products. Clearly assumptions
that
security is additive across sectors and scales is not the case here
as elsewhere, but the Urmia Lake episode emphasizes that they
are in fact frequently operating at cross-purposes; national
security strategies may compromise other forms of security
quite
directly. Blaming climate change, and possibly the deliberate
use
of climate modification techniques for the lake’s demise adds a
key dimension to securitization discussions. This matters for
security studies more generally now because climate change is
increasingly being introduced as a macrosecuritization in
international politics.
KEYWORDS
Lake Urmia; environmental
security; Iran; sanctions;
geopolitics
Environmental security?
Protecting environments is now widely seen as key to
sustainable development. Indeed it
was the key theme in its original formulation three decades ago
in the deliberations that

7. led to the publication of Our Common Future.1 This report is
widely understood as a key
origin of the subsequent discussion of environmental security,
and how conflict, environ-
ment and policy ought to be linked. However while the
universalist aspirations of a
common future continue to resonate in policy-making
discussions, most recently in the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, the rapid pace
of environmental
change and the persistence of geopolitical rivalries make it clear
that practicalities in
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Simon Dalby [email protected]
1World Commission on Environment and Development, Our
Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY, 2017
VOL. 29, NO. 1, 39–55
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2016.1228623
mailto:[email protected]
http://www.tandfonline.com
many places are far from the hopes expressed in either the
original report or its recent
successors.2
Nonetheless environment and climate in particular is
increasingly being addressed as a
matter of security. President Obama’s crucial speech at the
Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on
19 June 2013 suggested that climate change was now the

8. overarching global security
issue, a matter that now transcended the importance of nuclear
weapons in international
politics:
With a global middle class consuming more energy every day,
this must now be an effort of all
nations, not just some. For the grim alternative affects all
nations – more severe storms, more
famine and floods, new waves of refugees, coastlines that
vanish, oceans that rise. This is the
future we must avert. This is the global threat of our time.
In late 2015 the Paris Agreements on climate change supposedly
elevated this crucial
environmental matter to top priority in international politics. As
numerous media critics of
the agreement have made clear, this is neither a binding
agreement, nor one that has a
realistic plan for adhering to the aspirational target of limiting
average global temperature
increase to 1.5°C. Part of the problem is of course the divided
political world, one in which
environmental matters are considered of less importance than
the ‘high politics’ of inter-
national rivalries. Likewise the term environment frequently
encompasses too much, and
while understood as a global problem, it lacks efficacy as a
policy framework because it
lacks connection to the specificities of local conditions.
When all this is considered in terms of security, things get even
more complicated. As a
term that gestures at a complicated series of political
discussions and a contested realm of
discourse, ‘environmental security’ is most useful.3

9. Environmental security is clearly a pol-
itical desideratum, but who tries to protect what form of
security where complicates the
use of the term so much that its utility as an analytical category
is usually seriously in
doubt. In many cases, development strategies that ignore long-
term environmental con-
sequences in favor of short-term rural production in the
agricultural sector continue apace
despite the rhetorical invocation of sustainable development.
National self-sufficiency in
produce to feed growing populations is frequently the priority,
and as this paper shows,
this can be aggravated by geopolitical rivalries that indirectly
cause the natural environ-
ment to suffer. The case of Urmia Lake in Iran, discussed in
detail in this paper, also
makes it clear that invoking climate change as a threat, without
taking the specifics of
local political ecology into consideration, can be seriously
misleading when attempting
to invoke some overarching notion of environmental security as
a policy aspiration.
Rhetorical flourishes and blaming external forces for domestic
policy failures are also a
persistent problem in thinking through the multiple entities and
policies under the label
environmental security. In some parts of the world, defense
institutions have simply not
engaged environment, or more recently, climate as a matter of
security at all.4 In the
United Nations, climate has been discussed as a matter of
security, but it has repeatedly
2United Nations General Assembly Transforming Our World:

10. the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (New York:
United
Nations A/70/L.1. 2015).
3Rita Floyd and Richard Matthews, eds., Environmental
Security (New York: Routledge, 2013).
4Michael Durant Thomas, ‘Climate Securitization in the
Australian Political–Military Establishment’, Global Change,
Peace &
Security 27, no. 1 (2015): 97–118.
40 S. DALBY AND Z. MOUSSAVI
come up against arguments that climate is about development,
not security.5 Elsewhere it
has been connected to multiple complicated transformations and
dangers, and increas-
ingly to alarming predictions from climate science that major
disruptions are on their
way unless substantial course corrections are made to energy
policy in particular.6
Climate change is now enmeshed in the environmental security
discussion in various
ways that complicate it considerably, not least when attributions
of causal roles to
climate change are made in international disputes, a matter that
suggests there may be
many good reasons for resisting the temptations to think of
climate in security terms.7
To tease out these difficulties with the notion of environmental
security, its recent
extensions in matters of climate change and the frequently

11. contradictory efforts that
result when different referent objects of security operate in
policy discussions, we look
first to some theoretical concerns with security, then to the
complicated situation in
Iran, under international sanctions of varying severity, and to
the case of Urmia Lake,
which has rapidly dried out in the last decade, and finally to
some theoretical reflections
on how the various scales and components of ‘security’ play in
this situation. The final con-
clusions are first that environmental security needs to be treated
with great caution in
policy deliberations, not least because the long-term
implications of failing to think it
through carefully, and act sensibly, are likely to be disastrous,
and second, to reiterate
the basic insight from critical security studies that who and
what is secured where and
how is rarely as simple as common rhetorical flourishes
invoking security as a political desi-
deratum suggest.
Multiple insecurities
The scholarly analysis of security has had numerous innovations
since the cold war that
emphasize not just the long-term provision of social stability as
the key function of
most forms of security, but complement this with an analysis of
how and when political
actors invoke notions of security and specify particular threats
as being serious enough
to require extraordinary measures.8 The analysis of these
securitizing moves focuses on
the link between rhetorical claims and policy outcomes, making

12. it clear that not all
claims generate policy effectively. This form of analysis does
focus attention on how it
is that claims of threat are related to invocations of particular
identities that are thus
deemed to be insecure. This heightens attention to endangered
entities and may lead
to a mobilization of national efforts in the face of a perceived
external threat. Given the
prime responsibility of states to protect their citizens from
danger, this formulation aims
to trump other policy priorities. In situations of international
tensions, these matters fre-
quently add to the difficulties of peaceful resolution of
difficulties by emphasizing particu-
lar priorities.
5Shirley Scott, ‘The Securitization of Climate Change in World
Politics: How Close Have We Come and Would Full Securitiza-
tion Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?’
RECIEL 21, no. 3 (2012): 220–30; Simon Dalby, ‘Climate
Change
and the Insecurity Frame’ in Reframing Climate Change:
Constructing Ecological Geopolitics, ed. Shannon O’Lear and
Simon
Dalby (London: Routledge, 2016), 83–99.
6John Barkdull and Paul G. Harris, ‘Climate-Induced Conflict
or Hospice Earth: The Increasing Importance of Eco-socialism’,
Global Change, Peace & Security 27, no. 2 (2015): 237–43.
7Angela Oels, ‘Resisting the Climate Security Discourse:
Restoring “the Political” in Climate Change Politics’ in
Reframing
Climate Change: Constructing Ecological Geopolitics, ed.
Shannon O’Lear and Simon Dalby (London: Routledge, 2016),

13. 188–202.
8K.M. Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007).
GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 41
It is also important to note that when these dynamics play out in
what the Copenhagen
school authors discuss in terms of five different sectors of a
state, there may be substantial
contradictions between policy responses.9 Threats to military,
social, political, economic
and environmental policies may not be congruent, and none of
these may line up well
with traditional notions of national security or the claims to
sovereignty that are key to
regimes’ claims to be legitimate governments within national
territory. The disjunction
between claims to energy security and climate security in the
case of US policy are
especially clear in contemporary discussions. The disconnection
between American pol-
icies to drill and dig fossil fuels enthusiastically on the national
territory to provide a par-
ticular form of energy security are completely at odds with
attempts to cut greenhouse gas
emissions, the key policy requirement if reducing the impact of
future global climate dis-
ruptions is to be accomplished.10 Thus the lack of congruity
between securitizing rhetorics
may lead to policy incoherence, even though the logic of
security supposedly trumps
other priorities by specifying safety and order as the

14. prerequisites for other socially desir-
able actions.
The initial Copenhagen framework for securitization analysis
related invocations of exis-
tential threat to a particular referent object, usually a particular
state, to the need to take
extraordinary measures to deal with the danger. But security
does not only work in terms
of simple political specifications of dangers to particular states
from mostly external
causes.11 In addition, complicated regional situations faced by
states need to be worked
into the analysis. Regional security complexes focus on groups
of proximate states
whose security situation is closely interconnected; the Indian
subcontinent being a case
in point where the conflicts between the states there occur
relatively independently of
either the Gulf to the west or the South East Asian situation to
the east. But such com-
plexes are also part of the overarching global geopolitical
situation where superpowers
sometimes penetrate the regional complex by making alliance
arrangements with some
of the powers in the region.12 This adds larger scale dynamics
to the local regional situ-
ation. In the Iranian case, both large-scale concerns with
nuclear weapon proliferation
and regional penetration in terms of American alliances with
Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
States and Israel are relevant.
Which threats are seen as most important relate to the particular
situation state policy-
makers see as a priority, and how local circumstances place

15. states within their particular
security constellation.13 At the global scale, issues such as
nuclear proliferation, or
perhaps now climate, are seen as overarching issues that must
be dealt with, and which
require mobilizations by many states in a larger cause, a matter
of ‘macrosecuritization’.
In the Cold War, the United States fairly successfully posited
the threats posed by com-
munism to the capitalist world order as a matter of
macrosecuritization. Partly this was
done too with Islamic terror as a macrosecuritization in the
subsequent ‘global war on
terror’. Now the question in terms of climate is whether it is to
be understood as a
9Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New
Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998).
10Jonna Nyman, ‘Rethinking Energy, Climate and Security: A
Critical Analysis of Energy Security in the US’, Journal of
Inter-
national Relations and Development (2015): 1–28. Advanced
online publication doi:10.1057/jird.2015.26.
11Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era
(Colchester,
ECPR Press, 2007; first ed. 1983).
12Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
13Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, ‘Macrosecuritisation and
Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation
Theory’, Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 253–76.
42 S. DALBY AND Z. MOUSSAVI

16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jird.2015.26
macrosecurity issue too, or if it will remain framed mostly as a
matter of external threats to
national security by the most powerful developed states that
have produced most of the
greenhouse gas emissions that are now causing climate
change.14
When all this comes to international confrontations, as with the
case of Iran’s fraught
relations with both some of its neighbors, and in particular with
the United States, the
complexities of policy and the contradictions between the
various sectors of security
are emphasized. The regional matters of rivalry in the Gulf are
complicated by the US con-
cerns with what it portrays as a macrosecurity issue of nuclear
proliferation. Given the very
different geographical premises for foreign policy in Tehran, it
might well be argued that
Iranian policy sees American involvement outside its own
region as a macrosecurity issue
needing attention by the global community, but this is not a
formulation that gains much
traction either in the region or further afield.15 Sorting out the
difficulties that result from
these competing macrosecuritizations is important for any
attempts to seriously confront
the dangers of environmental disruption at the largest of scales,
and in particular to
engage with the urgent need to tackle greenhouse gas emissions
and climate change.
Indeed it seems that in much of the climate change issue, the

17. problems of thinking
through social innovation and sensible policy are aggravated
rather than ameliorated
by multiple invocations of security. The case of fossil fuel
production and ‘energy security’
in the sense of reliable supplies under domestic control in
contrast to global climate policy
exemplify these tensions.
Security politics can in some senses be reduced to a matter of
choosing which disaster
to confront.16 But the more important point here is to note how
various invocations of
security work at cross-purposes, and potentially dangerously so
in this case in particular.
Ironically too in the Iranian case, environmental insecurities can
be blamed on external
threats, both climatological and political, and as this paper
discusses below, by claims
of a dangerous linkage between the two. The tensions between
political and environ-
mental sectors are also played out through a complicated series
of economic policies,
ones shaped but not determined by the pressure brought to bear
on Iranian political
economy by both United Nations and other sanctions regimes. If
environmental security,
and climate change in particular, is to become an effective
macrosecurization issue, then
these contradictions need careful attention. The Iranian case,
frequently ignored in more
high-profile discussions of putative climate wars in Sudan or
more recently Syria, illumi-
nates the difficulties of doing so.
Iran, sanctions and national self-sufficiency

18. As has been made clear recently in the pages of this journal, the
relations between the
United States and Iran have a long and fraught history going
back to the 1950s when
American activities were partly responsible for the coup that
brought the Shah to
power, and subsequently become especially antagonistic
following the revolution and
14Joshua S. Goldstein, ‘Climate Change as a Global Security
Issue’, Journal of Global Security Studies (2016). Advanced
access
online doi:10.1093/jogss/ogv010.
15Simon Dalby, ‘Critical Geopolitics and the Control of Arms
in the Twenty-First Century’, Contemporary Security Policy 32,
no. 1 (2011): 40–56.
16Simon Dalby, ‘Anthropocene Formations: Environmental
Security, Geopolitics and Disaster’, Theory, Culture and
Society
2015. Online First http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/early/recent
(August 2015).
GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 43
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogv010
http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/early/recent
hostage crisis in the late 1970s. Partly this is also as a result of
the geopolitical context of
the region which has interacted with internal politics within
each state; American percep-
tions of Iranian ambitions are connected to Iranian fears of

19. American attempts at regime
change and the removal of the revolutionary government, one
that it refused to recognize
in 1979 and with which it continues to deny normal diplomatic
relations.17 Both factors
clearly influence matters related to numerous forms of security,
and the substantial
policy initiatives as well as the rhetorical performances by
politicians. The American insis-
tence that Iran not acquire nuclear weapons, both as part of its
long-term counter prolifer-
ation efforts and its penetration into the regional security
complex, has until very recently,
persistently run up against Iranian efforts to extend their
nuclear capabilities as an attempt
to guarantee national security in the face of external threats and
sanctions.
In the larger regional complex, Israelis’ fears of the
implications of their losing their
nuclear weapons monopoly in the region also play a role in
Washington DC, where
nuclear deterrence is still seen as a crucial bulwark to the
existing arrangements of inter-
national order. Iranian efforts to use proxies in Lebanon and
elsewhere as a foreign policy
counter-balance to Israeli and American influence have
perpetuated claims of aggressive
expansionist aims on the part of what is supposedly a putative
regional Iranian-led Shia
geopolitical entity.
Mutual distrust has fed the confrontation, with the result that
Iran has been under
various sanction regimes for a long time.18 National pride in
technological accomplish-

20. ments, and an insistence that Iranian energy security be
understood as about more
than petroleum production, and hence involve nuclear
electricity generation, clouds the
issue of the regime’s intention regarding nuclear weapons. It
certainly appears that
while the regime may not aspire to make weapons any time
soon, the desire to have
the capability to do so, as a future possibility to provide
deterrent capability, has influ-
enced policy-making in at least substantial parts of the
government. The inflammatory
rhetoric of the Ahmadinejad Presidency (2005–13) aggravated
fears in Washington DC
concerning Iran’s intentions. Regardless, the international
opprobrium generated by the
prospect of a made in Tehran bomb has been the major point of
contention. Conversely,
Iranian irritation at the double standards in the current
international nuclear non-prolifer-
ation regime, where nuclear weapon states are held to different
standards from those
without the weapons, and a blind eye is turned to Israeli,
Pakistani and Indian arsenals,
17Reza Sanati, ‘Beyond the Domestic Picture: The Geopolitical
Factors That Have Formed Contemporary Iran–US Relations’,
Global Change, Peace & Security 26, no. 2 (2014): 125–40.
18Sanctions against Iran date back to the United States
executive order 12170, seizing Iranian property in the wake of
the
1979 revolution. Over the years, the United States has issued
more executive orders and imposed restrictions on trade
and transactions with Iran notably including Iran’s energy and
petrochemical sectors as well as nuclear technology (U.S.

21. Department of the Treasury, Resource Centre; Iran Sanctions,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Programs/pages/iran.aspx). International sanctions against Iran
began in 2006 when Iran was referred to the UN Security
Council following collapse in negotiations on Iranian nuclear
program. During 2006–2010, the Security Council passed 6
resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran, which mainly called
upon states to prevent the transfer of any material related to
Iran’s nuclear activities (United Nations Security Council,
Resolutions 1696 (31 July 2006), 1737 (27 December 2006),
1747
(24 March 2007), 1803 (3 March 2008), 1835 (27 September
2008), 1929 (9 June 2010), http://www.un.org/en/sc/
documents/resolutions/). Between 2007–2012, following the UN
resolutions, the EU imposed sanctions on Iran and
restricted trade with Iran, in particular in the energy sector and
related technologies. In 2012 the EU prohibited
import of crude oil and petrochemicals from Iran and export to
Iran of petrochemical equipment and technologies (Euro-
pean Commission, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments,
European Measures (sanction in force) (2015): 32–48,
http://eeas.
europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf).
44 S. DALBY AND Z. MOUSSAVI
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/pages/iran.aspx
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/pages/iran.aspx
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf

22. fueled determination to build nuclear facilities, which are seen
as Iran’s sovereign right in
the international system.
The upshot has been a series of international sanctions, and both
the symbolic and
practical isolation of the Iranian regime. Domestic policies
within Iran have been shaped
by this geopolitical context but also by complex factional
struggles tied into economic pol-
icies and political mobilizations to deal with trade constraints.
The punishing war that fol-
lowed Saddam Hussein’s attack on the revolutionary regime in
the 1980s led to a
mobilization of the Iranian state for the war effort and the
legacy of these innovations
has shaped the role of the state since. American reflagging
operations and naval patrols
in the Gulf to protect tanker traffic in the 1980s during the
Iraq–Iran war confronted
Iranian forces directly in the region.
Subsequently the American designation of Iran as part of the
Axis of Evil in the rhetoric
of the early stages of the global war on terror, and this, despite
tacit cooperation in the
removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, fed
escalation of the political rheto-
ric. Growing concerns about the capabilities and intentions of
the Iranian nuclear program
led to sanctions by the United States, and European states too.
American efforts to have
bilateral arrangements extended to multilateral ones through
attempts at restricting third-
party trade have partly constrained the Iranian economy.
However, growing ties with the

23. Far East in particular have partly circumvented the pressures a
more complete sanctions
regime might have had. In early 2016 the international sanctions
regime was partly
removed as Iran dismantled the contentious parts of its nuclear
program.
Nonetheless the knock on effects of financial sanctions in
particular had consequences
for larger economic activity and the inability of companies to
make international payments
have restricted trade in agricultural and industrial equipment as
well as food and medi-
cines. United Nations statements on the sanctions regime that
Iran has been subject to
are clear on the consequences:
The sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran have had
significant effects on the
general population, including an escalation in inflation, a rise in
commodities and energy
costs, an increase in the rate of unemployment and a shortage of
necessary items, including
medicine. … Even companies that have obtained the requisite
license to import food and
medicine are facing difficulties in finding third-country banks
to process the transactions.
Owing to payment problems, several medical companies have
stopped exporting medicines
to the Islamic Republic of Iran, leading to a reported shortage
of drugs used in the treatment of
various illnesses, including cancer, heart and respiratory
conditions, thalassemia and multiple
sclerosis. (United Nations, General Assembly, 2012)19
The external pressure has had domestic consequences, and the

24. Ahmadinejad adminis-
tration from 2005 to 2013 reacted by taking a number of steps,
including attempts to
more widely spread what oil wealth there is in Iran. Autarkic
policies that emphasize
self-sufficiency are hardly new in warfare, or in times of
international tension, but they
are a factor in Iranian politics that has been reinforced by the
international situation.
Self-sufficiency has been an important part of Five-Year
National Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Development Plans ever since the initial attempts to
rebuild the country after the war
with Iraq. These have mostly aimed at reducing trade
dependence, securing minimum
19United Nations, General Assembly, Situation of Human
Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Report of the Secretary-
General
(New York: United Nations A/67/327.2012), 15–16.
GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 45
basic needs of the Iranian people, maximizing the utilization of
factors of production to
increase agricultural production, and increasing the country’s
food security by relying
on production from domestic sources.20 Key among these
policies have been efforts to
increase agricultural production, in part to feed a growing …
Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community

25. Development
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Volume 3, Issue 1 / Fall 2012 143
Community food security via urban agriculture: Understanding
people,
place, economy, and accessibility from a food justice
perspective
Mahbubur R. Meenar a
Temple University
Brandon M. Hoover b
Ursinus College
Submitted 30 March 2012 / Revised 27 June and 11 August
2012 / Accepted 11 August 2012 /
Published online 28 November 2012
Citation: Meenar, M. R., & Hoover, B. M. (2012). Community
food security via urban agriculture: Understanding
people, place, economy, and accessibility from a food justice
perspective. Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and
Community Development, 3(1), 143–160.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5304/jafscd.2012.031.013
Copyright © 2012 by New Leaf Associates, Inc.
Abstract
This paper examines the role of urban agriculture

26. (UA) projects in relieving food insecurity in lower-
income neighborhoods of post-industrial U.S.
cities, using Philadelphia as a case study. Based on
food justice literature and mixed-methods such as
GIS, survey, field observations, and interviews, we
discuss how neighborhoods, nearby residents, and
the local food economy interact with UA projects.
Our findings suggest that, although UA projects
occupy a vital place in the fight against community
food insecurity in disadvantaged inner-city
neighborhoods, there are debates and concerns
associated with the movement. These concerns
include geographic, economic, and informational
accessibility of UA projects; social exclusion in the
movement; spatial mismatch between UA
participants and neighborhood socioeconomic and
racial profiles; distribution of fresh produce to
populations under poverty and hunger; and UA’s
economic contributions in underprivileged
neighborhoods. Finally, we outline future research
directions that are significant to understanding the
practice of UA.
Keywords
community food security, community gardens,
food access, food deserts, food justice, GIS,
Philadelphia, post-industrial cities, urban
agriculture
a Corresponding author: Mahbubur R. Meenar, Center for
Sustainable Communities and Department of Community and
Regional Planning, School of Environmental Design, Temple
University; 580 Meetinghouse Road; Ambler, Pennsylvania
19002 USA; +1-267-468-8314; [email protected]
b Brandon Hoover, Research Assistant, Center for Sustainable

27. Communities, Temple University.
Brandon Hoover is now at Ursinus College, Office of
Sustainability; 601 East Main Street; Collegeville, Pennsylvania
19426 USA; +1-610-409-3161; [email protected]
http://dx.doi.org/10.5304/jafscd.2012.031.013
mailto:[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]
Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community
Development
ISSN: 2152-0801 online
www.AgDevJournal.com
144 Volume 3, Issue 1 / Fall 2012
Introduction
Community food insecurity is among the most
pressing issues in many U.S. inner cities. By food
insecurity, we not only mean the presence of
hunger, but also the lack of physical and economic
access to safe and nutritious foods that meet the
dietary needs and cultural preferences of people of
all socio-economic and racial backgrounds. As a
response to these problems, and with the presence
of ample vacant land parcels, urban agriculture
(UA) has taken root in such cities. In addition, city
residents are becoming increasingly aware of the
environmental and social impacts associated with
the food they eat and the proximity of where it is
grown. The complexity of urban food systems,
such as the availability of local organic produce in
affluent neighborhoods and the apparent lack of
healthy food options in disadvantaged neighbor-

28. hoods, has given way to an increased interest in the
equity of the local food movement.
In this paper, we discuss two types of UA
activities: community gardens and urban farms. A
number of qualitative, and a limited number of
quantitative, studies have been done on the many
benefits of UA (Irazabal & Punja, 2009, pp. 9–10).
Using geospatial and/or statistical methods, some
researchers have analyzed the impacts of UA and
urban greening programs on neighborhood
property values (Been & Voicu, 2006), quality of
life (Tranel & Handlin, 2006), and crime (Kuo &
Sullivan, 2001). Other relevant quantitative studies
have discussed community food access and spatial
inequality (Hallett & McDermott, 2011; Hubley,
2011; Raja, Ma, & Yadav, 2008; Russell &
Heidkamp, 2011; Smoyer-Tomic et al., 2008) and
the potential and capacity of urban food produc-
tion (Kremer & DeLiberty, 2011; Metcalf &
Widener, 2011). On the other hand, many
researchers have studied community gardening as a
social process by using qualitative methods (Teig,
Amulya, Bardwell, Buchenau, Marshall, & Litt,
2009). A smaller group has used mixed-methods or
a qualitative GIS approach to combine these two
types of research (Corrigan, 2011; Knigge & Cope,
2006).
Our broader research objective was to use the
food justice literature and a mixed-methods
approach to examine the relationship between UA
and the urban social environment. The methods
included GIS analysis, survey, field observations,
and interviews. This research was done within the
context of Philadelphia, a post-industrial city with
over 45,000 vacant parcels and various community-

29. based foodcentric programs. Our primary research
question was whether or how UA can be consid-
ered as a viable solution to community food inse-
curity. This study also examined the following
questions: What are the socio-economic and racial
characteristics of active UA participants, and are
they consistent with the neighborhood demo-
graphics? What distribution networks exist to move
food to the neediest populations? Is UA socially
accessible to disadvantaged community residents?
What external and internal pressures do UA project
representatives have to deal with? To what extent
do UA projects make an impact on the local
economy?
Background
Alternative Food to Food Justice
The alternative food movement seeks to relink
food production and food consumption through
emphasizing a local foodshed that promotes
regional economies, sustainable growing practices,
and social justice (Allen, 1999; Starr, 2000). The
movement works in direct opposition to the cor-
porate food regime, which is a global food supply
system where a select few multinational corpora-
tions control the production and distribution of
food products (Allen, 2010). This regime operates
under, and also produces, unjust social practices,
such as low wages, poor working conditions,
hunger and starvation, and misdistribution of
resources (Allen, 2010).
Much of the research and practices associated
with the alternative food movement can be under-
stood from a food justice theory that is related to
environmental justice, race, history, and socioeco-

30. nomics. Food justice argues for a more democratic
process that distributes power more equitably, not
just to the hands of the purchaser (Alkon &
Agyeman, 2011). As a theory, food justice “opens
up linkages to a wider range of conceptual frame-
works drawn from the literature on democracy,
citizenship, social movements, and social and
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environmental justice” (Wekerle, 2004, p. 379). It
scrutinizes power, resource control, and lack of
participation within a food system, and problema-
tizes the hegemonic agro-food industry by calling
for alternative solutions such as local agriculture,
farmers’ markets, and community supported agri-
culture (CSA) (Allen, 2010; Macias, 2008). A food
justice framework assumes that basic human needs
are met through equal access and opportunity at
participation, without exploitation. Thus a socially
just food system is one that equitably shares power
so that people and communities can meet those
needs (Allen, 2008, 2010). Based on this under-
standing, food justice work engages racial, eco-
nomic, and political inequality associated with any
and all food systems (Alkon & Agyeman, 2011).
In practice, the alternative food movement,
working from a food justice background, plays out
as a creation of local food campaigns; a promotion

31. of food access and hunger relief; a concern for
sustainable food production and public health; a
focus on economic development based in a
regional food economy; and occasionally a concern
for race, ethnicity, class, and gender issues asso-
ciated with the power structure of food (Gottleib
& Joshi, 2010). An example of this movement is its
attempts to provide services to underserved popu-
lations. Many farmers’ markets and alternative food
outlets have begun to accept supplemental nutri-
tion assistance program (SNAP) benefits, and some
CSAs provide alternatives to the relatively high
financial commitment for membership in order to
create a more equitable member base (Gottleib &
Joshi, 2010).
A closer examination of the alternative food
movement from a food justice perspective demon-
strates that, while working to create greater democ-
racy, sustainability, and access, this movement may
unintentionally be creating its own inequality.
Although such campaigns promote the support of
local farmers in the economy, few movements
acknowledge that the “existing patterns of local
livelihood and exchange could be unequal or
unfair” (Hinrichs & Allen, 2008, p. 335). The
“selective patronage” of “buy local” campaigns, as
it is understood by Hinrichs and Allen (2008), may
aim to support an approved list of farms or farm-
ers’ markets and may not be equitable in their
support. Additionally, Born and Purcell (2006)
argue that, “there is nothing inherent about any
scale” (p. 195), suggesting that just because food is
local, that does not make it socially just. Such
structural problems are rarely addressed in local
campaigns.

32. UA and Food Justice
UA participants practice a bottom-up and multi-
actor approach to decision-making (Lang, 1999),
and gives power to women, minorities, and other
disadvantaged populations (Smit & Bailkey, 2006).
According to Anderson and Cook (1999), UA
supports a food system that is “decentralized,
environmentally-sound over a long time-frame,
supportive of collective rather than only individual
needs, effective in assuring equitable food access,
and created by democratic decision-making” (p.
141). However, UA needs to be more thoroughly
examined from a food justice perspective to under-
stand if it truly is making the food system more
democratic, secure, and socially and environmen-
tally just.
Much research has shown that poor urban
neighborhoods have insufficient and inconsistent
access to healthy foods, causing social, environ-
mental, and health concerns to neighborhood resi-
dents (Raja et al., 2008). In addition, U.S. urban
development patterns have contributed to spatial
inequalities that separated communities along racial
and class lines (Ball, Timperio, & Crawford, 2009).
These inequalities lead to what the literature under-
stands as food deserts: areas lacking easy access to
supermarkets or full-size grocery stores that sell a
wide range of healthy and fresh food. By growing
food in blighted neighborhoods, UA project par-
ticipants bring fresh and local food to food desert
areas, often with the added benefit of environ-
mental and community development goals (Block,
Chávez, Allen, & Ramirez, 2012).
Community-based UA has shown positive
effects in the surrounding neighborhoods, bene-

33. fiting the residents with healthy food access, food
equity, social interaction, natural human capital,
and learning opportunity (Macias, 2008). UA
projects may increase neighborhood property
values, act as a catalyst for neighborhood revitali-
zation and stabilization, create venues for commu-
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146 Volume 3, Issue 1 / Fall 2012
nity organizing and networking, offer opportunities
for recreation, exercise, and therapy (Been &
Voicu, 2006); improve social, physical, ecological,
and environmental conditions of a neighborhood
(Tranel & Handlin, 2006); and reduce neighbor-
hood crime (Kuo & Sullivan, 2001). Overall, local-
ized agriculture addresses the issues of food access
and food justice (Wekerle, 2004) and it also has
economic benefits. A study of Philadelphia-based
programs found that community garden partici-
pants reported an annual savings of USD700 per
family (Brown & Carter, 2003).
In the U.S., the idea of providing lower-
income and unemployed households with access to
urban vacant or underutilized land for the purpose
of growing food dates back to the 1890s (Lawson,
2004). This movement is particularly gaining
momentum now in many post-industrial cities that
have lost jobs, population, and other resources, and

34. have been affected by the recent housing crisis. UA
in these cities has become a symbol of local
reaction to two consequences of inner-city decline:
urban blight and food deserts. Since the beginning
of the 1970s, UA projects have been developed “as
a way to counteract inflation, civic unrest, aban-
doned properties, and to satisfy new environmental
ethics and open space needs” (Lawson, 2004, p.
163).
As a subversive movement, the practice of UA
generally increases social capital, civic involvement,
community efficacy, and empowerment
(Armstrong, 2000; Ferris, Norman, & Sempik,
2001; Gittelsohn & Sharma, 2009; Teig et al.,
2009). In addition, studies have identified public
participation as a crucial component of the food
security planning process (Jacobsen, Pruitt-Chapin,
& Rugeley, 2009; McCullum, Desjardins, Kraak,
Ladipo, & Costello, 2005; Vasquez, Lanza,
Hennessey-Lavery, Facente, Halpin, & Minkler,
2007). Urban farming can transform its participants
into urban ecological citizens who not only receive
agriculture and environmental education, but also
acquire the political and social skills necessary for
effective citizenship and community building
(Travaline & Hunold, 2010).
Under these assumptions, UA projects can
achieve justice at a myriad of levels — socially,
economically, and environmentally — although
UA sometimes faces similar criticisms as the local
food movement for not being socially just. Based
on food justice and food access literature, we have
identified the following components to discuss the
role of UA in community food security within the
context of a post-industrial city: socio-economic

35. characterization of UA project participants; geo-
graphic, economic, and informational access to
fresh and healthy food; hunger relief; social exclu-
sion; and food production, distribution, and eco-
nomic contribution.
Context
Philadelphia’s population decreased between the
1950s and 2010, when the census indicated it had
increased slightly. Our comparative analysis of land
use change in Philadelphia from 1990 to 2005
shows that residential, wooded, and agricultural
lands are diminishing, but parking areas and vacant
lands are growing. Following the trend of other
post-industrial cities, over that period Philadelphia
experienced a decrease in property values, jobs,
educational attainment, and community resources,
and an increase in vacant land, blight, concentrated
poverty, and racial segregation.
Many lower-income neighborhoods of this city
face significant food insecurity. According to a
national survey created for the Gallup-Healthways
Well-Being Index, Pennsylvania’s first congres-
sional district, which includes a major portion of
Philadelphia, was named the second hungriest in
the nation (Lubrano, 2011). Another national study
completed by The Reinvestment Fund (TRF) has
identified many low-access areas throughout the city
that are underserved by full-service supermarkets
(TRF, 2011).
Philadelphia’s local food landscape, on the
other hand, is celebrated on a national scale for
various programs, including a healthy corner store
initiative and Fresh Food Financing Initiative
(FFFI). The UA community in Philadelphia is an
extensive network of community gardens, farms,

36. and backyard or rooftop gardens. More than 700
food cupboards and soup kitchens are located in
the city (Greater Philadelphia Coalition Against
Hunger, 2011), some of which distribute fresh
produce through innovative programs. The UA
community, however, faces major challenges.
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Volume 3, Issue 1 / Fall 2012 147
Between 1996 and 2008, the number of food-
producing community and squatter gardens in the
city dropped from 501 to 226 for reasons such as
land tenure issues and lack of financial support
(Vitiello & Nairn, 2009). Figure 1 shows the con-
centration of vacant land parcels and community
gardens with respect to Philadelphia’s 18 planning
districts. There are more than 230 ecologically
defined neighborhoods in the city, and boundaries
of these neighborhoods are not universally
accepted. We decided to use planning district
boundaries in our maps.
Data and Methodology
We collected data for GIS analysis from various
sources. Demographic data were downloaded from
the U.S. Census Bureau (2009, 2010). Vacant land
parcels data were purchased by Temple Univer-
sity’s Center for Sustainable Communities (CSC)

37. from Philadelphia’s Office of Property Assessment
(OPA, 2010). Planning district boundary data was
collected from Philadelphia City Planning Com-
mission (2011). Land use data for the years 1990,
1995, 2000, and 2005 were purchased by CSC from
Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission
(DVRPC, 2009). Household-level survey data were
purchased by Temple University’s Metropolitan
Philadelphia Indicators Project from Public Health
Management Corporation (PHMC, 2010). The
survey, known as Community Health Data Base —
Southeastern Pennsylvania Household Health
Survey, is conducted every two years and provides
timely information on more than 13,000 residents
living in the five-county Philadelphia metro region;
Figure 1. Land Use and Vacant Land Trends in Philadelphia,
2010
Data sources: U.S. Census; City of Philadelphia; Philadelphia
Office of Property Assessment; and Philadelphia
Redevelopment Authority.
(a) (b)
(a) Location of vacant land parcels (N = 45,139) and urban
agriculture projects
(b) Number of vacant lots in Philadelphia’s planning districts.
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148 Volume 3, Issue 1 / Fall 2012
we narrowed the responses down to just those in
zip codes located within Philadelphia for the pur-
poses of this study. UA project location data were
collected from Pennsylvania Horticulture Society
(PHS, 2011), Philadelphia Orchard Project (POP,
2011), and Philadelphia Urban Food Network
(PUFN, 2011). We created primary GIS data, such
as locations of UA projects that participated in our
survey, food cupboards that receive produce
donations from those projects, and gardeners of
three UA projects in three neighborhoods.
We used the following GIS techniques: (1)
geocoding addresses, (2) joining PHMC data with
zip code boundaries and census data with census
tract boundaries, (3) mapping and interpreting
relationships between UA project locations and
vacant land parcels, race, population under poverty,
and population facing hunger, and (4) analyzing
network connectivity between gardens and their
active participants, and between gardens and food
cupboards. We used ESRI ArcGIS 10 software and
its Network Analyst extension.
In addition to GIS work, we developed a 36-
question online survey in Qualtrics and conducted
it for a two-week period, from February 21 to
March 7, 2011. The survey was distributed through
the listservs of PHS, POP, and PUFN. Overall, the
survey reached out to representatives of 120 UA
projects throughout the city. We received 46

39. responses (a 38 percent response rate) from indi-
viduals and nonprofit organizations who manage a
total of 81 community gardens and urban farms in
Philadelphia (N = 81). In addition, we conducted
20 semistructured interviews of the representatives
of community gardens, urban farms, and nonprofit
organizations. The interview process was done in
two stages: one during the summer of 2011 and the
other during the winter of 2012. Two-thirds of the
interviews took place at the locations of commu-
nity gardens, farms, or organizational offices. The
rest were done by telephone. Most of the inter-
viewees were selected from neighborhoods that
face higher rates of poverty and hunger. Finally, 35
field visits (to food cupboards, gardens, and farms)
and observations (of community events) were
made from spring to fall of 2011.
Findings and Discussions
The People: Characterization of Food
Producers and Produce Recipients
Of the 81 UA projects represented by respondents
to our survey, 30 are smaller than 2,000 sq. ft. (186
sq. meters), 16 are between 2,000 and 10,000 sq. ft.
(186 sq. m and 929 sq. m), and the remaining 35
range from 10,000 sq. ft to 2 acres (929 sq. m to
0.8 hectare). Altogether, the respondents reported
serving about 18,000 people in an average year.
They reported that many community gardens in
Philadelphia are initiated by the unemployed or
underemployed who want to grow their own food.
Included in this characterization are the “creative
class,” “hipsters,” immigrant and ethnic popula-
tion, and young people — mostly White — inter-
ested in a sustainable lifestyle. According to

40. respondents, although community gardeners are
mostly in their 30s or 40s, overall they represent a
wide range of age groups, from school-age children
to 85 year olds, with or without prior experiences
in gardening. The primary recipients of food pro-
duced through UA are lower- and middle-income
households. Schoolchildren are more likely to par-
ticipate in gardening, but less likely to be the pri-
mary recipients of produce. In contrast, house-
holds on government assistance and seniors are
more likely to be the main recipients, but less likely
to participate in production.
Twenty-five garden representatives mentioned
that they get fewer than 25 participants from their
own neighborhoods, eight gardens get 25–100, and
five gardens (primarily urban farms) get more than
100 participants from immediate neighborhoods.
From this data alone, we could not conclude that
Philadelphia’s UA projects are not drawing the
majority of their participants from their respective
neighborhoods. Low neighborhood participation
happens mostly in smaller gardens (the majority of
survey respondents), which also have an overall
lower number of active gardeners. In addition, our
follow-up GIS network analysis of three randomly
selected small to medium-size gardens in North,
West, and South Philadelphia revealed that most
active gardeners come from their immediate neigh-
borhoods. Figure 2 shows that most gardeners of a
South Philadelphia community garden live within a
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Volume 3, Issue 1 / Fall 2012 149
Figure 2. Locations of a South Philadelphia Community Garden
and its
Members
Data sources: Survey by authors; Delaware Valley Regional
Planning Commission (DVRPC).
Note: 2 miles = 3.2 km.
half-mile (0.8 km) walking
distance. The map is a
result of the shortest path
distance calculation
between this garden’s loca-
tion and its participants’
locations. Routes are dis-
played on top of five
network buffers, ranging
from 1 ⁄8 mile to 2 miles
(0.2 km to 3.2 km).
The UA projects
represented in this survey
are located in neighbor-
hoods of diverse race and
ethnic backgrounds, each
of them contributing
something unique to the
landscape. Figure 3 shows
the co-existence of higher
non-White population
density and the locations of
community gardens.
Although the primary racial

42. group in Philadelphia is
Black, it is mostly White population who are more
active in UA activities, sometimes in predominantly
Black neighborhoods. As shown in figure 3, the
average racial and ethnic compositions of active
gardeners were reported by survey respondents as
47 percent White, 36 percent Black, 12 percent
Hispanic, and 5 percent Asian. The composition of
White and Black races did not match proportion-
ately with census demographics (41 percent White
and 43 percent Black). We found the high percen-
tage of White gardeners in some predominantly
non-White neighborhoods a surprising trend, and
we have discussed it in another section (social
exclusion).
Accessibility — Geographic,
Economic, and Informational
The number of vacant land parcels in Philadelphia
increased almost 50 percent from 1999 to 2010
(Econsult Corporation & Penn Institute for Urban
Research, 2010). Over the past decade, the major
geographic concentration of these vacant parcels
remains almost the same. Philadelphia’s planning
districts with higher percentages of vacant lands
also have higher concentrations of poverty and
underrepresented populations. The UA community
tries to play an important role in the redevelop-
ment of many blighted neighborhoods. Acquiring,
leasing, preparing, and maintaining vacant lands for
gardening purposes, however, is a challenging task.
Respondents from several organizations trying to
start community gardens expressed frustration
about working with the city to gain access to

43. vacant property (see the quote in table 1(i)). This
makes gardens much less accessible for neighbor-
hoods with little social or political capital. In terms
of external difficulties, many garden respondents
faced unsupportive land use policies and redevel-
opment pressure. A few interviewees commented
that Philadelphia’s community gardens cannot be
utilized to their full potential and contribute to the
communities because of little or limited support
from the city.
Many areas within these neighborhoods do not
have easy access to healthy and fresh food. About
43 percent of the survey respondents believe their
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150 Volume 3, Issue 1 / Fall 2012
neighborhoods to be food deserts, broadly defined.
In contrast, a number of interviewee expressed
dislike for the term “food desert.” They com-
mented how confusing the term food desert has
become in literature, political circles, or neighbor-
hood conversations, and how many different
meanings the phrase conjures up. One interviewee
commented that food is available in all parts of the
city, but is not always of good quality or culturally
appropriate. Promoting healthy and fresh food is
also a challenging task (see the quote in table 1(ii)).
In general, community gardens are

44. economically accessible to neighborhood residents,
according to respondents. About 67 percent of
gardens do not require a membership fee, which
for the rest of the gardens vary from USD5 to
USD100 per season. Poor neighborhood residents,
however, face issues with informational access. The
majority of garden representatives surveyed use the
Internet and digital technologies to communicate
with their members (76 percent) and promote UA
activities (88 percent). Many lower-income and
elderly residents with limited or no access to the
Internet cannot be part of such outreach efforts.
Figure 4 shows locations of UA projects and the
pattern of Internet use throughout the city.
Fresh Produce as Hunger Relief
Many lower-income households practice
subsistence agriculture or participate in UA
activities, as they do not have easy access to healthy
and fresh food. A visual inspection of GIS maps
(figure 5) shows that there is a spatial connection
between higher concentrations of UA projects and
higher concentrations of people experiencing
hunger. A similar relationship exists between UA
projects and poverty concentration. Many UA
practitioners donate their harvests to hungry
people through religious institutions, food
cupboards, and shelters. Philadelphia’s major
Figure 3. Comparison of the Racial Profiles of City Residents
and Urban Agriculture Participants
Data sources: U.S. Census; City of Philadelphia; survey by
authors.

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hunger relief organizations (such as Philabundance
and Share) have specific programs that distribute
produce to populations in need. Additionally, as
part of the PHS City Harvest program, 33
cupboards receive donations of fresh, local
produce grown in 44 community gardens. In a
regular growing season, this program reaches out
to 1,000 lower-income families, and between 2006
and 2009 it distributed more than 64,000 pounds
of produce (PHS, 2011).
Typically, …
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Human Rights Quarterly 34 (2012) 88–112 © 2012 by The Johns
Hopkins University Press
Human Security: Undermining Human
Rights?
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann*
AbSTRAcT

46. This article warns that the human security discourse and agenda
could
inadvertently undermine the international human rights regime.
Insofar as
human security identifies new threats to well-being, new
victims of those
threats, new duties of states, or new mechanisms for dealing
with threats at
the inter-state level, it adds to the established human rights
regime. When
it simply rephrases human rights principles without identifying
new threats,
victims, duty-bearers, or mechanisms, however, at best it
complements
human rights and at worst it undermines them. A narrow view of
human
security is a valuable addition to the international normative
regime requir-
ing state and international action against severe threats to
human beings.
By contrast, an overly broad view of human security ignores the
human
rights regime; by subsuming human rights under human
security, it also
undermines the primacy of civil and political rights as a
strategic tool for
citizens to fight for their rights against their own states.
I. INTRodUcTIoN
This article warns that the human security discourse and agenda
has the
capacity to inadvertently undermine the international human
rights regime.
* Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann is Canada Research Chair in

47. International Human Rights at
Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, where she holds a joint
appointment in the Department
of Global Studies and the Balsillie School of International
Affairs. She is also a Fellow of
the Royal Society of Canada. In 2006 the Human Rights section
of the American Political
Science Association named Dr. Howard-Hassmann its first
Distinguished Scholar of Human
Rights. Among many other published works on human rights,
she is co-editor of the 2008
volume, The Age of Apology, and author of Reparations to
Africa (2008) and Can Globaliza-
tion Promote Human Rights? (2010). Her most recent article in
the Human Rights Quarterly
is “Mugabe’s Zimbabwe 2000–2009: Massive Human Rights
Violations and the Failure to
Protect,” (Nov. 2010).
2012 Human Security 89
It argues that insofar as human security identifies new threats to
well-being,
new victims of those threats, new duties of states, or new
mechanisms of
dealing with threats at the inter-state level, it adds to the
established human
rights regime. Insofar as it simply rephrases human rights
principles with-
out identifying new threats, victims, duty-bearers, or
mechanisms, at best
it complements human rights and at worst it could undermine
them. The
narrow view of human security, as defined below, is a valuable

48. addition to
the international normative regime requiring state and
international action
against severe threats to human beings. By contrast, the broader
view of
human security at best repeats, and possibly undermines, the
already extant
human rights regime, especially by converting state obligations
to respect
individuals’ inalienable human rights into policy decisions
regarding which
aspects of human security to protect under which circumstances.
The two
may be competing discourses, despite arguments by some
scholars that
they are not.1
II. HUMAN SEcURITY: THE coNcEpT
The term “human security” was introduced into international
discussion in
the 1990s as a response to new (or more generalized) “downside
risks” that
could affect everyone. The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)
defined human security as both “safety from such chronic
threats as hunger,
disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful
disruptions
in the patterns of daily life.”2 Although the actual term “human
security”
was first used by the UNDP in 1994, its origins can be traced to
earlier UN
commissions on the environment, development, and global
governance.3
The Clinton administration used the term in many foreign policy

49. speeches
in 1993 and 1994.4 Even earlier, the Helsinki Accords of 1975
linked state
security to individual human rights.5
The 1994 UNDP report focused on the risks of “Unchecked
population
growth, Disparities in economic opportunities, Excessive
international mi-
gration, Environmental degradation, Drug production and
trafficking, [and]
International terrorism.”6 Later, other risks such as the spread
of disease and
1. Shahrbanou TadjbakhSh & anuradha M. Chenoy, huMan
SeCuriTy: ConCepTS and iMpliCaTionS 12
(2007).
2. uniTed naTionS developMenT prograMMe [undp], huMan
developMenT reporT 1994, at 23
(1994) [hereinafter huMan developMenT reporT 1994].
3. See Gerd Oberleitner, Human Security: A Challenge to
International Law?, 11 global
governanCe 185, 185 (2005).
4. Emma Rothschild, What is Security?, daedaluS, Summer
1995, at 53, 55.
5. jaCk donnelly, univerSal huMan righTS: in Theory and
praCTiCe 249 (2d ed. 2003).
6. huMan developMenT reporT 1994, supra note 2, at 34.
Vol. 3490 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

50. instability in financial markets were added.7 The human
security agenda
focuses on “early warning and prevention” of all these downside
risks,8 to
which almost everyone, rich and poor, in the North or South, is
vulnerable.
Thus, the human security agenda identifies “new” threats to
human well-
being in the sense that the threats are actually new (climate
change), more
extreme than in previous decades (terrorism), or previously not
thought of
as a threat to human security (excessive migration).
The stress on “human” security was meant to be a counterweight
to the
view that the only form of security that mattered was state
security, defined
quite narrowly as “military defense of state interests and
territory.”9 The focus
of human security is “people,” as opposed to states. Human
security’s prin-
cipal goal is to extend the concept of security beyond national
security, as
one way to force states to pay more attention to the needs of
their citizens.
The choice of the term “security” is meant to persuade
governments that
citizens’ security is state security; if citizens are insecure, then
states are
insecure. Furthermore, the term implies that states can be
adversely affected
by the insecurity of citizens outside their own borders: for
example, by un-
controllable flows of illegal economic migrants. As a matter of
self-interest,

51. therefore, governments should participate in the protection of
citizens of
other states against standard threats to their security. Thus,
human security
can identify new victims of threats in the sense that it proposes
broadening
each state’s responsibilities to citizens of other states, not only
through the
mechanisms of international laws or courts to which states may
be party,
but also through other aspects of each state’s foreign and,
indeed, domestic
policies. For example, a state might decide to devote more
resources to
international efforts to ameliorate the threat of climate change
or terrorism,
or to liberalize its immigration laws.
The other innovation of the human security agenda is its
suggestion that
the international community has obligations to protect “people”
by inter-
vening to protect citizens’ security when their own states cannot
provide it.
Human security, in the view of one of its advocates, is a form of
“forward
defense” against common threats to humanity, utilizing new
diplomatic and
other tools.10 It identifies new duty-bearers to protect human
security and
suggests new mechanisms that they can use. Thus, the original
1994 hu-
man security agenda intersects with the later agenda of the
Responsibility to
Protect Doctrine (R2P)11 in an on-going attempt to legitimize
and regularize

52. 7. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, New Threats to Human Security in the
Era of Globalization, 4 j.
huM. dev. 167, 175–76 (2003).
8. Id. at 171.
9. Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,
inT’l SeCuriTy, Fall 2001, at
87, 87.
10. Paul Heinbecker, Human Security: The Hard Edge,
Canadian Mil. j., Spring 2000, at
11,13.
11. Lloyd Axworthy, Foreword to Trade, aid and SeCuriTy: an
agenda for peaCe and developMenT
xiii (Oli Brown et al. eds., 2007).
2012 Human Security 91
international intervention when states cannot, or will not,
protect their own
citizens. The R2P report, commissioned by the government of
Canada as one
of its human security initiatives, argues that the international
community is
justified in undertaking military intervention when states fail to
protect their
citizens from large scale loss of life that is a product of
deliberate state ac-
tion, state neglect, or inability to act; when there is a failed
state situation;
or when there is large-scale ethnic cleansing.12 In 2005 the UN

53. General
Assembly agreed in principle with these recommendations.13
Despite the fairly compact list of generalized threats in the 1994
UNDP
Report, there is substantial analytical disagreement about
precisely what
constitutes human insecurity. The narrower view focuses on
crisis situations
that require international remedies.14 In some instances, the
human security
agenda can transcend professional distinctions such as between
“humani-
tarian relief, development assistance, human rights advocacy
and conflict
resolution,”15 requiring new, coordinated mechanisms of
international coop-
eration or intervention to replace the piecemeal institutional
approach that
characterized international attempts to remedy large-scale crises
in the past.
This narrow approach stems in part from the human security
agenda
proposed and implemented by the then Liberal Foreign Minister
of Canada,
Lloyd Axworthy, in the late 1990s.16 In his view, human
security referred to
such matters as “[p]rotecting civilians, addressing the plight of
war-affected
children and the threat of terrorism and drugs, managing open
borders, and
combating infectious diseases.”17 Human security lost its
premier place in
Canadian foreign policy after Axworthy’s tenure as Foreign
Minister ended

54. in 2000, even under succeeding Liberal Ministers.18
Other attempts to define human security take a broader
approach than
did Axworthy. Convened in 2001 at the behest of Japan, the
Commission on
Human Security delivered its Report in 2003, arguing inter alia
that human
security included protection against extreme impoverishment,
provision of
basic education, and provision of health care and social
protection.19 This
12. inTernaTional CoMMiSSion on inTervenTion and STaTe
SovereignTy, The reSponSibiliTy To proTeCT
xi–xii (2001).
13. gareTh evanS, The reSponSibiliTy To proTeCT: ending
MaSS aTroCiTy CriMeS onCe and for all
3–4 (2008).
14. Nicholas Thomas & William T. Tow, The Utility of Human
Security: Sovereignty and
Humanitarian Intervention, 33 SeCuriTy dialogue 177, 178
(2002).
15. Peter Uvin, A Field of Overlaps and Interactions, 35
SeCuriTy dialogue 352, 352 (2004).
16. Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security and Global Governance:
Putting People First, 7 global
governanCe 19 (2001); Nik Hynek & David Bosold, A History
and Genealogy of the
Freedom-from-Fear Doctrine, 64 INT’L J. 735, 738 (2009).
17. Axworthy, supra note 16, at 19.

55. 18. Hynek & Bosold, supra note 16; Francis J. Furtado, Human
Security: Did it Live? Has
it Died? Does it Matter?, 63 inT’l j. 405, 418 (2008).
19. CoMMiSSion on huMan SeCuriTy, huMan SeCuriTy now
6–7 (2003).
Vol. 3492 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Japanese “security-development nexus”20 was partly a reaction
to the im-
poverishment caused by the Asian economic crisis of 1997 to
1999,21 which
resulted in a heightened sense of vulnerability in the Asian
region to world
economic events.22 Japan set up a UN Trust Fund for Human
Security in
1999, with a budget of $170 million by 2002.23 The Trust’s
geographical focus
was Southeast Asia and Africa, and its substantive focus was
development.24
The “Japanese” approach, ostensibly stressing development or
freedom from
want, is sometimes contrasted with the “Canadian” approach,
ostensibly
stressing freedom from fear.25 However, in 2006 Japan and
Mexico estab-
lished a Friends of Human Security network within the United
Nations.26 This
discussion forum for state and UN representatives leaned
towards a broad,
multidimensional view of human security, focusing on both
freedom from
want and freedom from fear.27

56. Some scholars advocate an even broader definition of human
security
than freedom from want and fear, referring to almost any aspect
of an indi-
vidual’s life that might make her insecure. Gary King and
Christopher J.L.
Murray, for example, redefine human security as “the number of
years of
future life spent outside a state of ‘generalized poverty.’”28
Gunhild Hoo-
gensen and Svein Vigeland Rottem include domestic violence as
an indicator
of human insecurity, while Mary Caprioli applies the language
of human
security to the entire range of women’s rights.29 Even more
nebulous is the
idea of human security as “social, psychological, political, and
economic
factors that promote and protect human well-being through
time.”30 Thus,
20. David Roberts, Human Security or Human Insecurity?
Moving the Debate Forward, 37
SeCuriTy dialogue 249 (2006).
21. CoMMiSSion on huMan SeCuriTy, supra note 19, at 8–9.
22. Amitav Acharya, Human Security: East Versus West, 56
inT’l j. 442, 448 (2001); Paul
Evans, A Concept Still on the Margins,but Evolving from Its
Asian Roots, 35 SeCuriTy
dialogue 363 (2004).
23. David Bosold & Sascha Werthes, Human Security in
Practice: Canadian and Japanese

57. Experiences, 1 inTernaTionale poliTik und geSellSChafT [inT’l
poliTiCS and SoC’y] 84, 95 (2005).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 94–95.
26. Gerd Oberleitner, Human Security, in enCyClopedia of
huMan righTS 486–87 (David P.
Forsythe ed., 2009).
27. Meeting Summary, UN Trust Fund for Human Security,
Third Meeting of Friends of Hu-
man Security—New York (2007), available at
http://ochaonline.un.org/OutreachandABHS/
Outreach/2007Activities/ThirdmeetingoftheFriendsofHumanSec
urity/tabid/2877/language/
en-US/Default.aspx.
28. Gary King & Christopher J.L. Murray, Rethinking Human
Security, 116 pol. SCi. Q. 585,
585 (2002).
29. Gunhild Hoogensen & Svein Vigeland Rottem, Gender
Identity and the Subject of
Security, 35 SeCuriTy dialogue 155, 167 (2004); Mary Caprioli,
Democracy and Human
Rights Versus Women’s Security: A Contradiction?, 35
SeCuriTy dialogue 411 (2004).
30. Jennifer Leaning, Psychological Well-Being over Time, 35
SeCuriTy dialogue 354, 354
(2004).
2012 Human Security 93

58. in the broader interpretations proposed by some scholars, human
security
now seems to refer to any possible need that any individual
might have,
including needs, such as provision of psychological security,
never before
defined as an obligation of either states or the international
system.
This broad view of human insecurity sometimes identifies new
threats to
individuals’ well-being and perhaps new victims of such threats,
depending
on each researcher’s view of what human security should
comprise. Moreover,
it implicitly proposes new duties on states to protect the victims
of violations
of well-being, both internally and within other states, and
implicitly suggests
that new mechanisms for protection are needed. However, it is
not clear
what these new duties are or what new mechanisms might be
used to realize
them. If the duty-bearer for human security is the international
community,
or some subset of it, then the new mechanisms the community
could use
to combat generalized poverty, domestic violence, or
psychological factors
that undermine human well-being are far from clearly
explained.
III. INTERNATIoNAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw coMpAREd
wITH
HUMAN SEcURITY

59. Human rights are rights that, in principle, all human beings are
entitled to,
merely by virtue of being biologically human. They are
individual rights, not
tied to any particular social status or to group, communal,
national, or any
other membership. Human rights do not have to be earned, nor
can they be
limited except by conformity to the rule of law, for example
when convicted
criminals are deprived of freedom of movement. Individual
human beings
can assert their human rights, while states and other entities are
obliged
to respect, protect, and fulfill them. To respect human rights
means not to
violate them; to protect them means to ensure that they are not
violated by
others; and to fulfill them means to implement positive
measures to ensure
that individuals enjoy their rights. Human rights are also
inalienable, mean-
ing that the state may not withdraw any individual’s human
rights except
under conditions prescribed by the rule of law or (for some
rights only) in
situations of national emergency.
The international human rights legal regime precedes the
discourse on
human security by over forty years. Human rights were
originally enshrined
in the UN International Bill of Rights, which consists of
the1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 International

60. Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1966 International
Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).31 Civil and
political rights
31. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec.
1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR]; International
Vol. 3494 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
include, for example, protection against torture, the right to a
fair trial, and
the right to vote.32 Economic, social, and cultural rights
include, for example,
the right to work, the right to form trade unions, and the rights
to education,
social security, an adequate standard of living, and the highest
attainable
standard of health.33 There are also so-called collective rights,
such as the
right to development.34 Many other more specific human rights
treaties, some
of which are mentioned below, have been agreed to since 1966.
Since the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights
was held
in Vienna in 1993, international law has recognized that all
human rights
are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated: it is
impossible to
enjoy one set of rights without enjoying the other sets. 35 This

61. principle thus
predates assumptions of inter-connectedness among solutions to
problems
of human insecurity.
Human rights were originally designed to protect the individual
against
the state.36 Gross human rights violations such as extra-judicial
execution,
arbitrary arrest, and torture are usually committed by the state,
although they
can also be committed by non-state entities such as armed rebel
militias.
Civil rights such as due process, a fair trial, and habeas corpus
are neces-
sary to protect citizens against these abuses, as are political
rights such as
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to vote.
The ubiquity
of the state makes a universal human rights standard necessary,
regardless
of the type of political regime.
Since the inception of the UDHR, however, human rights have
gradually
evolved to also protect individuals against non-state actors;37
all organs of
society are expected to protect human rights. An emerging
normative regime
obliges transnational corporations and international
organizations such as in-
ternational financial institutions (IFIs) to also respect human
rights.38 Moreover,
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.

62. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR], 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23
Mar. 1976); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16
Dec. 1966, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp.
No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR], 993 U.N.T.S 3 (entered
into force 3 Jan. 1976).
32. ICCPR, supra note 31, arts. 7, 14, 25.
33. ICESCR, supra note 31, arts. 6, 8, 10–12.
34. Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 Dec.
1986, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N.
Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
35. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted 25
June 1993, U.N. GAOR,
World Conf. on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993);
daniel j. whelan, indiviSible
huMan righTS: a hiSTory 1 (2010).
36. See MiCheline r. iShay, The hiSTory of huMan righTS
froM anCienT TiMeS To The globalizaTion
era 63–116 (2004); lynn hunT, invenTing huMan righTS (2007).
37. non-STaTe aCTorS in The huMan righTS univerSe (George
Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal
Arat & Peter Juviler eds., 2006).
38. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility and the
International Law of Human Rights:
The New Lex Mercatoria, in non-STaTe aCTorS and huMan

63. righTS 177 (Philip Alston
2012 Human Security 95
human rights obligations now extend to what was earlier
considered to be
the “private” societal and familial level. Society, the family,
and individuals
bear human rights obligations to the disabled, the aged, women,
children,
and increasingly to sexual minorities. Treaties such as the
Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW)
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) protect
women and
children against social actors and against abuse by family
members, as well
as against abuse by the state.39
Regarding the interplay between the international human rights
legal
regime and the discourse of human security, it is of utmost
importance to
recognize that respect for, protection of, and fulfillment of
human rights are
not policy choices. States may not pick and choose which rights
to protect,
whose rights to protect, or when to protect them. States that
have signed and
ratified the relevant human rights treaties are not permitted to
prioritize one
right, or set of rights, over another in the fulfillment of policy
objectives.40

64. Nor may states use real or perceived security threats as excuses
to pick
and choose which rights to respect, whether the threats are
traditional state
security threats such as military attack or new human security
threats such
as climate change. Although some human rights may be
suspended during
states of emergency, others—such as the protection against
torture41—may
not be derogated from regardless of the situation.
Furthermore, states must protect the rights of their individual
citizens.
They may not derogate from the rights of some individuals in
the name of
protection of the national people, or any subset thereof.
Individual citizens
possess the legal right to demand that their human rights be
enforced, whereas
ed., 2005); Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, John
Ruggie. Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility
and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Council, 4th Sess., Prov.
Agenda Item 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (2007); Mark Gibney,
Katarina Tomasěvski, &
Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Transnational State Responsibility for
Violations of Human Rights,
12 harv. huM. rTS. j. 267 (1999); Mark gibney, inTernaTional
huMan righTS law: reTurning
To univerSal prinCipleS (2008); david kinley, CiviliSing

65. globaliSaTion: huMan righTS and The
global eConoMy (2009); andrew ClaphaM, huMan righTS
obligaTionS of non-STaTe aCTorS
(2006).
39. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, adopted
18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 107th
plen. mtg., Supp. No.
46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW],
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered
into force 3 Sept. 1981); Convention on the Rights of the Child,
adopted 20 Nov. 1989,
G.A. Res 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st plen. mtg.,
Agenda Item 108, Supp. No.49,
at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force 2 Sept. 1990).
40. Gerd Oberleitner, Porcupines in Love: The Intricate
Convergence of Human Rights and
Human Security, 6 eur. huM. rTS. l. rev. 588, 596 (2005).
41. ICCPR, supra note 31, arts. 4, 7.
Vol. 3496 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
the individual has no standing in the human security
discussion.42 National
laws; regional treaties such as the European Convention for the
Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American
Convention on
Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights;43 and

66. international bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights
Committee
are all entities to which individuals can appeal violations of
their rights,
although their enforcement powers differ.
On the other hand, rarely can an individual appeal to a state to
protect
his human rights if he is not a citizen of that state. This leaves
stateless in-
dividuals unprotected, while migrants, whether legal or illegal,
frequently
have no recourse against violation of their human rights even if
they remain
citizens of a state where they no longer reside. Human
security’s broadening
of states’ responsibilities to include non-citizens, even if only
in principle
rather than practice, is thus a significant change from the
international hu-
man rights regime, with its insistence primarily on states’
responsibilities to
their own citizens.44
Defenders of the human security approach might argue that
although
the human rights legal regime is extensive, it has not had much,
if any, real
positive effect since 1945. Some scholars argue that there is no
evidence that
when a state signs a human rights treaty, its actual human rights
performance
improves.45 It seems that states sign treaties and take part in
the ritual of
UN human rights monitoring to gain international and internal
legitimacy,

67. rather than to improve their domestic human rights
performance. On the
other hand, some states are acculturated by international norms
to improve
their own human rights performance,46 and states that UN
monitoring bodies
criticize for poor protection of human rights after signing the
ICCPR and the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (CAT)47 improve their performance.48
Recent statistical
42. Rothschild, supra note 4, at 70–71.
43. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, art. 34, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,
Eur. T.S. No. 5 (entered
into force 3 Sept. 1953); American Convention on Human
Rights, signed 22 Nov. 1969,
art. 44, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979),
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into force 18 July 1978); African Charter
on Human and Peoples’
Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, art. 55, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/ Rev. 5, 1520 U.N.T.S.
217 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986).
44. Rothschild, supra note 4, at 83.
45. Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?,
36 j. peaCe reS. 95 (1999).
46. helen M. STaCy, huMan righTS for The 21ST CenTury:

68. SovereignTy, Civil SoCieTy, CulTure 124
(2009).
47. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., 93d plen.
mtg., Agenda Item 99, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1985) [hereinafter
CAT], 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987).
48. STaCy, supra note 46, at 130. ann Marie Clark,
inTernaTional SourCeS of huMan righTS Change
(2009).
2012 Human Security 97
work shows that on average, state ratification of human rights
treaties does
improve internal human rights performance.49
The human rights legal regime is also the underpinning for a
strong, in-
ternational civil society movement that has penetrated all areas
of the world
during the last three decades. The regime is a standard of
achievement upon
which citizens can rely in criticizing not only their own
governments, but
also non-state entities such as private corporations, and supra-
state interna-
tional organizations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary

69. Fund. Even when the human rights obligations of non-state and
supra-state
entities are not yet strongly enshrined in law, the normative
power of human
rights is compelling.50
On the other hand, the human rights regime does not make
strong de-
mands on the international system. Few international
mechanisms exist that
can actually check human rights abuses. The UN Security
Council (UNSC)
can pass resolutions regarding human rights abuses it deems to
adversely
affect international peace and security. The International
Criminal Court
(ICC) can convict individuals of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or
genocide, but only after they have already severely abused
human rights.
Various UN human rights committees dealing with civil and
political rights;
economic, social, and cultural rights; racial discrimination;
discrimination
against women; protection against torture; children’s rights; and
rights of …
International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) 2012
Managing Migration in Crisis Situations

70. MIGRANTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS:
AN EMERGING PROTECTION CHALLENGE
Venue: International Peace Institute, New York
Date: 9 October 2012
9:00am-1:00pm
BACKGROUND PAPER
1
Introduction
The recent political upheaval in North Africa, the food crisis in
the Horn of Africa, major natural
disasters such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake or the floods in
Pakistan in the same year, and other
events of similar magnitude have captured global attention and
entailed immense humanitarian
challenges. One important feature that these crises had in
common was the large-scale movement
of populations within and across borders. In effect, international
migration will always be a factor in
crises.

71. At the end of 2011, a total of more than 42 million people were
in a situation of forced displacement
as a result of sudden or protracted crises.
2
As such crises
3
- natural or man-made - emerge they
typically generate disorderly and predominantly forced
movements of people (either internally or
across borders), requiring a well-functioning humanitarian
response.
This workshop and paper focus on the situation of international
migrants when their destination
countries undergo crises. In other words, we will examine the
challenges facing non-nationals,
mainly migrant workers and their families, in a State that is
experiencing a crisis.
4
As a group of
persons affected by crisis, migrants have often been less visible
or neglected and may not be
accounted for in traditional humanitarian responses. Given the
growing number of migrants around

72. 1
This paper is based on two earlier background papers prepared
by IOM as part of its International Dialogue on Migration
2012 “Managing migration in crisis situations”: see
www.iom.int/idmcomplexcrises and
www.iom.int/idmmigrantsincrisis.
2
UNHCR Global Trends Report 2011. Worldwide, 42.5 million
people ended 2011 either as refugees (15.2 million),
internally displaced (26.4 million) or in the process of seeking
asylum (895,000).
3
For the purpose of this paper, the term “crisis” encompasses
slow- and sudden onset natural disasters as well as internal
and international armed conflict (e.g. war, civil war or unrest).
4
It is explicitly recognized that refugees and asylum seekers
may also be among vulnerable mobile populations in a crisis
situation and require specific protection, in line with
international law. A detailed discussion of the specific issues
facing
refugees and asylum seekers, however, is beyond the scope of
this paper.
http://www.swiftpage6.com/SpeClicks.aspx?X=2Y0V4WJPI4N
VPNG0000TXA
2

73. Date: 18 September 2012 www.iom.int/idmnewyork
the world – 214 million international migrants according to
latest estimates
5
– the consequences of
crises for migrant populations will likely be a significant
feature of future crises and need to be
factored into humanitarian response frameworks.
This background paper aims to enhance this understanding of
the migration context in times of
crises and to facilitate constructive, open and informal
discussions during the 2012 International
Dialogue on Migration
6
workshop taking place on 9 October in New York. First, this
paper explores
both migration management and humanitarian response
frameworks, as well as migrant-specific
vulnerabilities, including the characteristics of stranded
migrants. Second, the legal provisions
available and possible responses are explained, providing
background for the first session of the day

74. - “Protecting Migrants in Crisis Situations”. The third and final
section focuses on the subject of the
second session of the workshop, namely “Addressing Long
Term Consequences”, thereby focusing
on the linkage between migration, humanitarian, development
and security perspectives and
providing possible long-term responses.
1. Background
Migration management and humanitarian response frameworks
In times of crisis, affected populations by nature seek safety
elsewhere. As a result, migrants
experience numerous barriers to accessing basic services,
assistance, and protection. When
migrants’ host countries experience crises, migrant populations
often have few means to ensure
their own safety. In some cases migrants may be unable or
unwilling to leave the crisis area; in
others they may be unable to access humanitarian assistance,
while in others they may seek refuge
across borders in adjacent countries. Such population
movements have lasting implications for

75. societies, economies, development, the environment, security
and governance, and exacerbate risks
for already vulnerable populations, including migrants
themselves.
Last year’s events in North Africa
7
demonstrated the vulnerability of migrants when their host
countries experience crises: many migrants were unable to
escape the fighting and were trapped
inside Libya, where they were sometimes deliberately targeted
by the warring factions. Others were
stranded at the borders between Libya and neighbouring
countries in an attempt to seek safety.
Eventually, more than 800,000 migrant workers and their
families crossed the borders into
neighbouring countries and returned or were evacuated to their
countries of origin. The majority
were nationals of North-African, Sub-Saharan African and
South-Asian countries, but altogether
migrants of more than 120 nationalities fled the crisis in Libya.
Sub-Saharan Africans were one of the
largest groups of migrant workers in Libya: as a result of the
crisis, more than 200,000 returned to

76. 5
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UN DESA), Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008
Revision, http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1
6
The International Dialogue on Migration 2012 is IOM’s
principal forum for migration policy dialogue. It aims to
integrate
humanitarian and migration perspectives to improve
preparedness for managing population movements in the context
of
political crises, natural disasters and other emergencies. For
more information on the workshop organized by the
International Peace Institute and IOM in New York on 9
October 2012, see: www.iom.int/idmnewyork.
7
For more on the crisis in North Africa and its repercussions for
migrants and migration, see: IOM 2012 Returnees from
Libya: the bittersweet experience of coming home. Policy brief;
and IOM 2012 Migrants caught in crisis: The IOM
experience in Libya. Available at
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore.
http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1
3
Date: 18 September 2012 www.iom.int/idmnewyork
their home countries in just a few months time, giving rise to

77. critical challenges in an already fragile
region.
The international humanitarian system has produced well-
developed mechanisms to coordinate
international responses to crisis situations. The humanitarian
framework aims at providing a
comprehensive response to all affected by a crisis. Within these
responses there are long established
mechanisms to respond to refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs), with refugees clearly
under the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and an inter-agency collaborative approach toward IDPs.
However, these defined groups of crisis-
affected persons may not fully capture the varied conditions of
all those on the move in crisis
situations. International migrants in particular have often been
less visible or neglected and are
often not accounted for in traditional humanitarian responses.
In a world in which more and more people are on the move and
countries host large migrant
populations, an inclusive humanitarian response framework is

78. needed. Such frameworks need to
provide safety not only for displaced nationals but also for
migrants living in host countries (for
example as refugees, labour migrants, seasonal workers, etc.).
Humanitarian response frameworks
that do not proactively incorporate anticipation and management
of migration into their
preparedness planning therefore risk alienating migrants from
the aid they require in crisis. As such,
these systems should be strengthened and complemented with
other measures to assist and protect
migrants in crisis situations.
Migrant-specific vulnerabilities and challenges to their
protection in times of crisis
When a crisis strikes in a certain country, its population will
likely face considerable hardship and
distress. However, crisis situations also further exacerbate the
vulnerabilities that are specific to
migrants. When people are on the move they often experience
numerous barriers to accessing basic
services, protection, and assistance. How migrants’ human
rights are protected before a crisis will

79. directly affect their level of vulnerability and exposure to abuse
during a crisis. For example,
migrants who have become victim of illicit practices by
recruitment agencies may be unable to leave
or protect themselves if they owe debt to a recruiter.
The situation of stranded migrants in crises deserves particular
attention. Stranded migrants
8
are
typically exposed to severe vulnerabilities and need protection
and assistance, including
international migration assistance.
Some examples of situations that may occur during a crisis
affecting migrants – including stranded
migrants – and that may strongly exacerbate their specific
vulnerabilities include the following.
Migrants may face practical impediments to accessing support.
For example, language
barriers may complicate the ability to obtain relevant
information about assistance
available;
8
There is no globally accepted definition of the term “stranded
migrant”. The term describes situations in which a migrant

80. is unable to stay in the country of destination/transit, unable to
return to the home country, and unable to move to a third
country, and typically subject to severe vulnerability and
distress. Crises and emergencies represent one scenario among
many others which can lead to stranding.
4
Date: 18 September 2012 www.iom.int/idmnewyork
Migrants whose freedom of movement is already restricted –
e.g. domestic workers
whose passports had been taken away from them – may not be
able to access consular
assistance and seek support to evacuate, because they lack
social protection in their
host countries and/or their human rights were not adequately
protected before the
crisis;
Migrants may be unwilling to leave a potentially dangerous
situation, typically for fear of
losing assets or being unable to return to the country or place of
work after the crisis
subsides;
Migrants with no legal documents may cross an international
border to seek safety in a
country which is not their country of origin; and,
Irregular migrants may be excluded from humanitarian

81. assistance if they are not
registered by the country of origin or by the country of
destination. They may also not
turn for assistance to relevant authorities for fear of being
discovered.
These situations may combine and overlap and the same migrant
may experience several of the
above consequences during the course of a crisis. In addition,
migrant-specific vulnerabilities may
combine with other vulnerabilities related to gender, age, health
etc. Varying groups of migrants
(such as the elderly and children) experience crises differently,
depending on their own capacity to
seek safety, and the capacity of their country of origin to assist
them either while in the host country
or in transit.
2. Protecting Migrants in Crisis Situations (Session I)
Legal provisions for migrants in crises
There is no single legal framework that ensures comprehensive
protection of migrants in times of
crises. However, different branches of international law do
apply and contain a set of legal rules that

82. constrain, regulate, and channel State authority over migration,
including in emergency situations.
These branches include Human Rights Law, International
Labour Law, Criminal Law, Humanitarian
Law, Refugee Law, Nationality Law, and Law of the Sea. The
rules – which have been created
through State-to-State relations, negotiations and practice – are
enshrined in non-binding
instruments and multilateral and bilateral treaties, or have
become part of customary international
law. Relevant in this context is also the in 2011 adopted
International Labour Organization’s
Convention on Domestic Workers. Here, five specific
provisions are worth mentioning.
First, States bear the primary responsibility to protect and assist
crisis-affected persons residing on
their territory in a manner consistent with international
humanitarian and human rights law. Where
needed, States should allow humanitarian access to crisis-
affected persons such that humanitarian
assistance can be provided, including by other States whose
nationals have been affected, and by
other relevant actors. The duty to ensure protection and

83. assistance for migrants caught in crises
therefore rests with the State of destination, the State of transit
to which a migrant may have fled,
and the State of origin which has responsibilities for its
nationals even when abroad. However, in
crisis situations, States may experience insecurity and a
breakdown of national institutions, or other
States may cut diplomatic relations which can inhibit them from
providing the necessary and
adequate assistance and protection.
5
Date: 18 September 2012 www.iom.int/idmnewyork
Second, all migrants, irrespective of their status, are entitled to
the full protection of their human
rights by the mere virtue of their humanity. Migrants’ rights are
human rights. States have an
obligation to protect and provide rights to their citizens, but
also to non-nationals (with a certain
margin of appreciation, for instance restricting them in terms of

84. political activity such as the right to
vote and the right to stand for election). States are obligated to
create a fostering environment to
promote and facilitate the enjoyment of human – and therefore
migrants’ - rights.
Third, in cases of armed conflict, international humanitarian
law also applies to migrants: the most
relevant provisions include the principle of distinction between
civilians and combatants, the right of
migrants to leave the country in conflict, the prohibition of
forced transfers, and departure
arrangements.
9
Fourth, established protection frameworks for specific
categories of mobile individuals – such as
refugees / asylum seekers and trafficked persons
10
– must also be observed in times of crisis.
International and regional legal frameworks have established a
range of important categories (first
and foremost that of the refugee) to determine entitlements to
protection and assistance. The

85. complexity of modern crises and forced and mixed migration
situations, however, exposes displaced
individuals to a variety of crisis-related risks, vulnerabilities,
human rights violations and levels of
socio-economic deprivation not necessarily captured by existing
legal categories.
11
Lastly, although a non-binding document and not explicitly
identifying migrants or non-nationals,
‘the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ can be
understood to apply to them under their
broad definition of applying to “persons who have been forced
or obliged to flee or to leave their
homes or places of habitual residence.”
12
Although the Guiding Principles are non-binding, they can
provide useful guidance on how to deal specifically with
Internally Displaced Persons – including in
times of crisis – since they are based on International
Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and
Refugee Law.

86. Actions before and during a crisis
To ensure the protection of migrants in crisis situations, actions
are required “before”, “during” and
“after” a crisis. Migrants and migration therefore need to be
factored in pre-crisis preparedness,
emergency response, and post-crisis recovery, reconstruction
and transition.
As noted in the background section, a better integration of
migration management and
humanitarian approaches is necessary to adequately tackle the
immediate and mid- to long-term
9
See 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Protocols, in
particular the Fourth Geneva Convention Articles 35-46 and
Protocol I Part IV.
10
At international level, the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the 2000 United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and
its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children.
11
For example, see Koser, K. (2012) Protecting migrants in
complex crises. Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Policy Paper

87. 2012/2.
12
For provisions at the regional level, see the African Union
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons (“Kampala Convention”).
6
Date: 18 September 2012 www.iom.int/idmnewyork
consequences of migrants caught in crises. Some of the main
areas for policy responses and
cooperation before and during crises are outlined here.
13
Preparedness and contingency planning
Consideration of migrants, their needs and vulnerabilities must
be more systematically included in
preparedness efforts at national, regional and international
levels. This applies to both countries of
origin and destination, as well as to different types of crisis
such as natural disasters or pandemic
emergencies. Preparedness at a regional level would benefit
from the development of specific,

88. migrant-oriented early warning systems. A lack of information
about the size, location and
composition of a migrant population in a country can, however,
severely impede effective responses
in an emergency. Some countries with large numbers of
nationals abroad have set up emergency
funds to assist migrants caught in crises in their countries of
destination.
14
Admission and border management systems in crises
Countries need to be prepared for the potential influx of persons
fleeing crises from a nearby or
neighbouring country, including many who do not qualify for
refugee protection. Mechanisms, such
as temporary admission and protection, may be required to
prevent the stranding of a large number
of people at a border. Where they exist, regional agreements for
the movement of people can
facilitate the returns of affected individuals to their home
countries when appropriate.
Consular assistance

89. As the primary mechanisms through which countries of origin
protect their nationals in other
countries, the capacities of consular services to respond in
emergencies need to be strengthened.
One of their principal functions is the replacement of lost travel
documents and provision of laissez-
passer for migrants to be evacuated to their home countries.
15
Consulates need to maintain up-to-
date records on their nationals residing in a country and
disseminate information about the
assistance available to nationals when a crisis strikes. Further
measures can be training consular
officials, establishing specialised rapid response teams, and
enhancing capacity-building and
coordination among local authorities, international humanitarian
actors and diplomatic missions.
Where countries do not have the capacity to maintain a network
of consular services, collaborative
solutions between countries may be found. Also, consulates tend
to be located in capitals or major
cities, but should anticipate that emergency consular services
are often required in different parts of
the country or in border regions.

90. Protection and assistance in situ
During a crisis all migrants are entitled to non-discriminatory
access to aid, such as shelter, food and
water, and health care. National civil protection or disaster
response mechanisms should take into
account migrant populations and potential barriers they may
face in accessing assistance (for
13
Other interventions can be: Reduction of risks associated with
migration through pre-departure training and insurance
schemes; Health and psychosocial support to distressed
migrants; Protection and assistance of vulnerable migrant
groups
through referral mechanisms (e.g. victims of trafficking,
unaccompanied minors).
14
IOM Council Resolution No. 1229 of 5 December 2011
establishing the Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism is
one
example of the recognized need of States for more immediate
and reliable responses to the migration realities flowing
from modern-day crisis situations. To date, the Governments of
the Bahamas, Mauritius, Romania, South Africa, Turkey,
and the United States have generously contributed to the Fund
(status: 2 July 2012).
15

91. See 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations for more
detail.
7
Date: 18 September 2012 www.iom.int/idmnewyork
instance due to irregular status). At the international level, the
cluster system of the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee has developed strategies to reach out to
migrants and address their specific
needs.
Evacuation and international migration assistance
Humanitarian evacuation to home countries is sometimes the
only reliable protection mechanism
available for migrants caught in crises, and a way to avert more
severe humanitarian consequences.
A critical condition is that non-refoulement guarantees are
respected and individuals are not
returned to situations where they may face persecution, torture
or inhumane or degrading
treatment. When States do not have the capacity or resources to
evacuate their own nationals,

92. international assistance may be needed. A contentious issue is
the evacuation of non-national
relatives / dependants (such as spouses who hold a different
nationality). Evacuations can be large
operations at a global scale which require high degrees of
operational coordination between local
and international humanitarian agencies, border management
authorities, consular officials, military
bodies, and private and commercial transport companies.
3. Addressing Long Term Consequences (Session II)
Population movements prompted by crisis events have lasting
implications for societies, economies,
development, the environment, security and governance –
dimensions that extend far beyond the
scope of humanitarian systems and response.
16
Therefore, migration, humanitarian, development,
and security perspectives need to come together if the
challenges surrounding the situation of
migrants in crisis situations are to be addressed effectively.

93. In addition to facing vulnerabilities in times of crisis, migrants
are particular vulnerable in post-crisis
situations, the effect of which can be felt by themselves, their
families, and their communities long
after the crisis has subsided. In particular, where a crisis obliges
migrants to return to their countries
of origin, this can have severe impacts on the well-being of the
individual, the livelihoods of entire
families, and the development and security of the country of
origin. These migrant specific post-
conflict vulnerabilities therefore need to be considered in
migration management planning and
preparedness by countries of origin with large populations of
nationals living and working abroad:
for example, when a crisis forces a migrant to give up his or her
work in the country of destination,
the loss of income and livelihood often affects entire families,
who may have relied on remittances
as their source of income. Moreover, if returnee migrants are
unable to reintegrate in their origin
countries, they may seek to re-migrate but may be forced to opt
for irregular channels or the
services of people smugglers or even be at risk of human
trafficking.

94. It is important to underscore that once the initial emergency
phase has passed, or situations become
protracted, the migration consequences of the crisis may
change. Return to the place of origin is
traditionally considered the preferred option, but is sometimes
not possible.
16
Nothing in this paper intends in any way to supplant the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC) system or
responsibilities, but rather looks at bringing to bear migration
management approaches in addressing crises which affect
the movement of people.
8
Date: 18 September 2012 www.iom.int/idmnewyork
In 2011, the Sahel region experienced large-scale returns of
migrant workers from Libya who had
been living and working in Libya and supporting their families
back home through remittances.
According to government estimates, the total number of
returnees to the Sahel, including

95. unregistered cases, is approximately 420,000; 200,000 of which
are in the Niger, 150,000 in Chad,
30,000 in Mali and 40,000 in Mauritania.
17
Governments from Chad, Niger and South Sudan have
recently stressed that large-scale returns can overwhelm a
country’s capacity and resources to
receive and reintegrate their nationals who often face
unemployment, loss of assets, debt and
emotional hardship.
18
The case of the Sahel shows how a mass influx of migrant
returnees can negatively affect a region
which is already impoverished and facing economic and social
hardship, exacerbated by food
insecurity and regional instability. In the Sahel, most
governments invested considerable efforts in
receiving returning migrants and providing immediate shelter,
food, health care and onward
transportation to their home communities. Longer-term
reintegration, however, remains a challenge
given the constant developmental and security issues facing the

96. region. Furthermore, most
returnees had only low levels of education and originated from
the more underdeveloped parts of
the countries. To add to this, IOM estimates that, on average,
each returnee to the Sahel while in
Libya had supported over seven individuals in their home
country, illustrating the magnitude of the
impact when remittance streams suddenly dry up. In addition,
the traumatic circumstances of their
departure from Libya also meant that many returnees were
struggling with psychological distress
and the feeling of having “failed” their families who had been
relying on them. Other so-called
“returnees”, including many children, had in fact been born in
Libya and never been to the country
of their parents, creating barriers to social integration and
access to education.
19
Countries in other regions also faced the return of its nationals,
like Bangladesh. Bangladeshi
nationals made up approximately 20 per cent
20
of all migrants that fled Libya last year, and this case

97. provides an example of what measures can be taken in practice
to provide safe return and
reintegration. The Government of Bangladesh and IOM,
together with other partners, provided for
food, water and shelter, immediate medical assistance and
registration, and arranged the transport
of the returnees to their communities of origin. To ensure the
effective reintegration of the
Bangladeshi migrants, the Government, civil society,
international organizations and the private
sector worked together to support them. IOM led the
reintegration programme targeting more than
36,000 migrant workers, which included int.al. an outreach
campaign, a comprehensive database of
all returnees, a one-time cash hand-out for each returnee
supported by a World Bank loan, a call
center and Verification Center. The involvement of different
stakeholders was critical: for example,
after the crisis a Chinese company operating in Libya remitted
unpaid salaries for its Bangladeshi
workers directly to the Bangladesh Government’s Bureau of
Manpower, Employment and Training.
17

98. As at mid-December 2011. Source: UN Secretary-General
report to the Security Council of the assessment mission on the
impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region, 7 to 23
December 2011 (reference S/2012/42), page 6.
18
Stressed by the Representatives of Chad, Niger and South
Sudan during the International Dialogue on Migration in
Geneva, 23-24 September 2012.
19
For more detail see UN Secretary-General report to the
Security Council of the assessment mission on the impact of the
Libyan crisis on the Sahel region, 7 to 23 December 2011
(reference S/2012/42) and IOM 2012 Returnees from Libya: the
bittersweet experience of coming home. Policy brief.
20
IOM Country Office in Bangladesh:
http://www.iom.org.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
rticle&id=62. “Out
of the 646.000 [that have fled Libya last year], approximately
299.000 are third country nationals (TCNs) – with Bangladeshi
and Chadians making up 20 percent each of the total …
Environmental Policy and Law, 44/3 (2014) 325
0378-777X/14/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press
60 Environmental Liability Directive, Article 2, No. 3.
Specifically, species and
habitats stipulated in Article 4, No. 2 and Appendix I of the
Birds Directive, or in

99. Appendices II and IV of the Habitats Directive; as well as
natural habitats listed
in Appendix I of the Habitats Directive, and those breeding and
resting grounds
stipulated in Appendix IV of that Directive.
61 Ibid., Articles 1 and 2, Nos. 1–3, and Articles 4 and 5.
62 Ibid., Article 2, No. 1 lit a), clause 2. See also Knopp, L.
and Wiegleb, G. 2009.
Der Biodiversitätsschaden des Umweltschadensgesetzes, at 32.
Berlin/Heidelberg.
63 Cf. supra, note 23, Section 19, para. 1, clause 2;
Schumacher, J. § 19 Rd. no.
47–48; supra, note 28.
64 Schumacher, ibid.
65 ECJ, judgement of 10 January 2006 – C-98/03, NuR 2006, p.
166.
66 Supra, note 21, Article 6, para. 4.
67 BVerwG, judgement of 27 January 2000 – 4 C 2/99, NuR
2000, p. 448.
68 Supra, note 23, Section 15, para. 1, clause 1.
69 Ibid., Article 6, para. 4.
70 Ibid., Section 15, para. 2, clause 4.
71 BVerwG, judgement of 12 March 2008 – 9 A 3.06, NuR
2008, 633 Rd. no. 203.
72 Cf. Schumacher, J. In: Schumacher and Fischer-Hüftle,
supra, note 28, § 19
Rd. no. 44.
73 Supra, note 21, Article 6, para. 1 and supra, note 23, Section
32, para. 5, i.e.,
the Habitats Directive Management Plans.
74 Supra, note 23, Section 15, para. 2, clause 4.
75 Ibid., Section 15, Rd. no. 71 ff.
76 Supra, note 21, Article 6, para. 1.
77 Thum, R. 2006. “Chancen und Risiken von
Flächenbevorratung und Ökokonto:
Ein Praxistest”. Umwelt- und Planungsrecht 26(8): 289–296, at

100. 294.
78 Gellermann, M. 2010. § 15 BNatSchG. Landmann, R. v. and
Rohmer, G.
Umweltrecht, 57. Ergänzungslieferung, Rn. 22.
79 Koch, H.-J. and Krohn, S. (2008): “Das Naturschutzrecht im
Umweltgesetzbuch
im Auftrag der Föderalismusreform erfüllen”. Forum
Umweltgesetzbuch 7: 20.
German Federal Environment Agency; supra, note 77;
Gellermann, supra, note 78.
80 Administrative Court of Saarlouis, judgment of 29 January
2002, NVwZ-RR
2003, p. 265.
81 Supra, note 21, Article 4.
82 Lütkes, S., § 15 Rd. no. 71. In: Lütkes, S. and Ewer, W.
2011., supra, note 39.
83 Fischer-Hüftle, P. and Schumacher, A., § 15, Rd. nos. 72,
74. In: Schumacher
J. and Fischer-Hüftle, P., supra, note 28.
84 Administrative Court of Schleswig, judgement of 21
September 2006 – 12 A
162/00, NuR 2007, p. 278.
85 Supra, note 23, Section 15, para. 1, clause 1.
86 Ibid., Section 15, para. 1, Clause 3.
87 Ibid., Section 15, para. 6.
88 Ibid., Section 15, para. 2, Clause 3.
89 Cf. Ssymank, A. 1994. “Neue Anforderungen im
europäischen Naturschutz.
Das Schutzgebietssystem Natura 2000 und die ‘FFH-Richtlinie
der EU’”. In: Natur
und Landschaft 69(9): 395–406, 402–403.
90 As designated under Saxon Law on Spatial Planning,
Section 9, para. 1.
91 As designated in accordance with Section 7 of the Federal
Water Act.

101. 92 Saxon Nature Conservation Act, Section 10, para. 1.
93 Tucker, G.M., Underwood, E., Farmer, A., Scalera, R.,
Dickie, I.A.,
McConville, A.J. and van Vliet, W. 2013. Estimation of the
financing needs to
implement Target 2 of the EU Biodiversity Strategy. Report to
the European
Commission. London and Brussels: Institute for European
Environmental Policy.
Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/comm2006/
pdf/2020/Fin%20Target%202.pdf.
94 B e r l i n U n i v e r s i t y o f Te c h n o l o g y. [ U n d
a t e d ] Ü b e r p r ü f u n g u n d
Weiterentwicklung von Beurteilungskriterien für Natur und
Landschaft
innerhalb der Umweltrisikoeinschätzung des
Bundesverkehrswegeplanes für die
Verkehrsträger Straße und Schiene. R&D project 899 82 110
funded by German
Nature Conservation Agency. Bundesamt für Naturschutz FKZ
899 82 110, final
report.
95 Supra, note 15.
Climate Change Vulnerabilities
– Legal Status of the Displaced People –
by Awal Khan*
Bangladesh is a low-lying deltaic State, made up of
watersheds and flat land in South Asia with a large number
of rivers (seven major rivers and over 200 minor ones)
and many channels.1 Of these, 54 (including the Ganges,
Brahmaputra and Meghna) originate in India, which has
one of the largest river networks in the world.2 These rivers

102. and their branches define the geography of the country
and the lifestyle of its people. They are important for
agriculture, fisheries, irrigation, commercial and internal
transport, and other marine resources. Due to these benefits,
most of the communities live along the riverbanks and are
mainly dependent on the flood plains for their livelihoods.
As a result, they are very exposed to natural hazards such
as floods, cyclones and droughts.3
South Bangladesh has a very long coastline along the
Bay of Bengal. The country consists of low and flat land
except for the hilly regions in the north-east and south-
east.4 Most of its territory lies either very close to the sea
shores or to riverbanks. Bangladesh is more vulnerable to
climate change than other countries in South Asia because
Bangladesh
* Ph.D. candidate, School of Law, University of Western
Sydney, Australia.
of its regional connectivity through geo-physical and
hydrological features and its reliance on trade.5 Due to this
unique geographic position, Bangladesh is now regarded
as one of the most climate-vulnerable countries on earth.6
As residents of a disaster-prone area, the people
of Bangladesh are familiar with natural disaster and
calamities. They know how to survive regular floods,
cyclones or extreme cold or heat. They have grown used to
adapting with limited resources and capacity; however, the
climate change situation is a more recent phenomenon. Due
to the unpredictable and ever-growing impact of climate
change, their livelihoods are now under threat because
they do not know what to do or how to prepare themselves
against the adverse impacts of climate change.

103. The aim of this paper is to address this situation and
to examine the impact of climate change on population
displacement from and within Bangladesh. As legal
recognition of displaced people is not available under the
existing climate-change legal regime, this paper outlines
the on-going argument and controversy with regard to
climate-change displacement to determine the status of the
displaced people under both international and Bangladeshi
law. In addition, this paper suggests that there is a logical
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justification in bringing the rights of climate-change-
displaced people within the Bangladeshi legal framework.
The Observed Climate-Change Scenario in
Bangladesh
Climate change is a continuing threat to Bangladesh and
it has already affected most parts of the country severely.
The Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates that South Asia
is the most vulnerable region of the world to the impacts
of climate change7 and the international community
ranks Bangladesh high on the list of most vulnerable
countries.8 Bangladesh is more vulnerable because of its
weak economy, low adaptive capacity, corrupt politics
and various social hindrances. Moreover, the geographical
position of Bangladesh places it in a difficult position to
combat climate change. Two-thirds of the country is less
than 5 m above sea level and in an average year around one

104. quarter of the country is usually flooded. The Bangladesh
Delta is most vulnerable to sudden storm surges. Instances
have been observed where up to two-thirds of the land
mass was inundated with water after extreme weather
phenomena.9
The situation of Bangladesh is also extreme because of
its small territory and large population.10 Bangladesh will
not be able to cope with the predicted loss of habitable
territory resulting from climate change11 because the
unaffected territory will not be able to absorb all of the
displaced population.12 The present trend of displacement
indicates that most will probably be internal, rather than
cross-border or external, in nature.13 International and
regional security would be threatened if a large number of
people from Bangladesh were displaced.14
Bangladesh has a sub-tropical monsoon climate with six
seasonal variations in rainfall, humidity and heat.15 Impacts
of climate change are evident in Bangladesh in the form
of extreme temperature; unpredictable rainfall; sudden
and increased numbers of intensified floods, cyclones
and droughts; and the prevalence of rough weather in the
Bay.16 Frequent weather variations have been observed in
recent times.
Bangladesh ex p erien ced th e lo w est recorded
temperature in its history (3°C in three northern districts)
during January 2013.17 On the other hand, extreme high
temperatures (42.08°C in Jessore, a southern district) have
been recorded over 14 years. On 27 April 2009, a record
number of patients were admitted to the International
Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh
(icddr,b) due to illness caused by extreme heat.18
On 28 July 2009, the heaviest rainfall in 60 years was

105. recorded in Dhaka – 333 mm (290 mm in six hours, a record
for the capital).19 A total of 408 mm rainfall in Chittagong
(measured on 11 June up to 21.00, the heaviest in 25 years)
resulted in a landslide killing at least 124 people.20 On
the other hand, there was 21 percent less rain during the
monsoon period (June–August) in 2009 and the northern
districts suffered from drought.21 Droughts were reported
even in the coastal zone.22
A number of severe floods have hit Bangladesh in the
last decade: “recurring floods occurred in 2002, 2003, 2004,
and twice in 2007 (July–August and September). Flash
flooding in the hilly terrain of the eastern and north eastern
part of Bangladesh has been increasing and also occurring
a few days earlier in recent years than 40–50 years ago”.23
Similarly, the number of cyclones developing into landfall
and storm surges has also increased substantially: for
example, Super Cyclone Sidr, on 15 November 2007;
Cyclone Nargis, on 2 May 2008 (which hit Myanmar and
affected Bangladesh as well); Cyclone Rashmi, on 27
October 2008; and Cyclone Aila, on 26 May 2009.24
The insecurity surrounding cyclones – the lack of
advance warning and the uncertainty in forecasting of the
timing and vulnerability to climate changes – is already
being experienced by Bangladeshi people, and it is
extremely frightening. Changes in rainfall patterns and in
the frequency and severity of tropical cyclones and storm
surges are likely to happen quickly.25 Other changes such as
sea-level rise may occur after 20 years or possibly longer.26
This variation in climate will impact the lifestyle of the
people of Bangladesh. Displaced people face more serious
challenges than other climate-change victims.
Climate-Change Vulnerability in

106. Bangladesh
According to a recent climate vulnerability rating,
Bangladesh ranks 12th out of 166 countries.27 Another
measure, the Global Climate Risk Index 2009, recognised
Bangladesh as the most vulnerable country for extreme
weather events.28 A number of hydro-geological and socio-
economic factors are responsible for the high vulnerability
of Bangladesh due to climate change, such as its sea-
proximate geographical location, flat deltaic topography
with very low elevation, extreme climate variability (the
monsoon, source of acute water distribution over space and
time), high population density, poverty and the fact that its
agriculture-based economy is highly dependent on rainfall
and temperature.29
It has been predicted that increased temperatures,
monsoons, rain, riverbank erosion, more intense cyclones
and more severe droughts will be observed over the next
century.30 The primary impact of this on the livelihoods
of the people will occur through factors such as food
production,31 water supplies, health, home and income.32 By
the middle of the 21st century, there will be water scarcity
to the point where there is likely to be insufficient water
in low rainfall periods.33
Moreover, “the coastal zone of Bangladesh hosts over 35
million people who are exposed to cyclones, storm surges,
rough seas, salinity intrusion and permanent inundation due
to the sea level rising”.34 Bangladesh needs to prepare for
these large numbers of people who are likely to be displaced
due to climate change. There are 72 offshore islands with
an area of 4,200 km2 where over three million people are
extremely vulnerable.35 A joint report by the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

107. (IDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) stated
that, in 2008, at least 36 million people in Bangladesh were
displaced by sudden-onset natural disasters, including 20
million displaced as a result of climate-related events.36
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Recent satellite images show that an island known as
New Moore Island or South Talpotti (uninhabited disputed
territory of Bangladesh) has disappeared due to sea-level
rise.37 It is predicted that other small islands in the Bay of
Bengal may disappear like South Talpotti in the coming
decades.38
Sea-level rise is also anticipated to worsen and
subsume up to 30 percent of Bangladesh’s coastal land
by 2080.39 Even a rise of one metre may submerge
17.5 percent of all the land in Bangladesh.40 If this happens,
then many places in Bangladesh will disappear and large
numbers of people will migrate. Already many people have
migrated to the urban slums from the coastal areas due to
repeated cyclones, storm surges, and riverbank erosion.41
During the last five years, about 135,632 families have
become homeless due to riverbank erosion on 12 rivers
in Bangladesh.42 Three-quarters of the population live in
rural areas which are environmentally vulnerable and half
of rural households are landless.43 Preliminary estimates
indicate that around 26 million people in Bangladesh are
under threat of sea-level rise.44 A major disruption could
result in low-lying, shoreline areas becoming submerged.45
An example of this occurred in 1995, when half of Bhola
Island became permanently flooded, leaving 500,000

108. people homeless, who have been described as some of the
world’s first climate-change-displaced people.46 Cyclone
Sidr affected 30 districts out of 64, impacting nearly 8.7
million people in 2007; among them, 650,000 people were
displaced and 3,447 killed.47 In April 2009, Cyclone Bijli
displaced around 200,000 people.48
The country was hit twice in 2009. In May, Cyclone
Aila smashed the coastal area and nearly 4.82 million
people were affected.49 Then according to the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) 16,651 families
were displaced from only two upazilla (sub-districts)
in November 2009 as a direct consequence of Cyclone
Sidr.50 On average, those events resulted in displacement of
2 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively, of the total
population of the country, and this representing 6.5 percent
of the coastal population.51
It has been further predicted that a one metre sea-level
rise will lead to 14.8 million people becoming landless.
Over 29,000 km2 of Bangladesh’s land will be lost and
40 million of its people displaced.52 In the transnational
Ganges-Brahmaputra delta, half a million people are
displaced regularly as a result of flooding.53 The Lohachara
Island in the Ganges delta (close to Bangladesh), where
10,000 people used to live,54 has been totally submerged.
However, it is impossible to distinguish the numbers of
people moving due to soil degradation in the Sahel or a
rise in sea level in Bangladesh from those making the same
journey for other reasons.55
Regardless of the exact estimate, it has been
recognised that climate-change-related displacement
is now a burning issue for Bangladesh. Frequent
devastation by natural disasters has been one of the
major reasons for poverty.56 So it is a pressing concern

109. for Bangladesh to protect its citizens from the severe
impacts of climate change.
Who Are Climate-change-displaced People?
The traditional climate-change literature argues that
climate-induced migration occurs due to fear57 and it is
depicted as a manifestation of the severe vulnerability of
those people affected by the climate.58 There are four main
climate-change-related displacement scenarios:59 weather-
related disasters, such as hurricanes and flooding; gradual
environmental deterioration and slow-onset disasters (such
as desertification, sinking of coastal zones and possible total
submersion of low-lying island States); increased disaster
risks resulting in relocation of people from high-risk zones
and social upheaval; and violence attributable to climate-
change-related factors.
In its First Assessment Report, the IPCC indicated that
the most severe effects of climate change may be those
resulting in human migration.60 It documented a strong
link between these phenomena. In Bangladesh, as in many
other countries, they have also been linked to severe and
immediate threats to human rights and environmental
security.61 The Report called for specific situation-
necessitated treatment for climate-change-displaced
people. Academic literature also highlights these points.
Despite national and international controversy on the legal
identity of the climate-change-displaced people, it has
been observed that “neither the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),62 nor its Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change63 (Kyoto Protocol) includes any provisions
concerning specific assistance or protection for those who
will be directly affected by the effects of climate change”.64
In the same way, climate-change-displacement issues are

110. acknowledged only in academic discussions in Bangladesh.
The government of Bangladesh does not legally recognise
a category of climate-change-displaced people.
This paper intends to clarify their position. There are
many arguments and criticisms regarding the formal and
legal identification of, and the suitable terminology to
define, climate-change-displaced people. Various literary
and academic discussions define a climate-change refugee
as an individual who is forced to flee his or her home as
the result of sudden or gradual environmental disruption/
change and who is, as a result, temporarily or permanently
displaced across a national boundary as a consequence
of climate change.65 Due to the lack of an official or
widely accepted definition, however, the meaning of these
words often remains unclear.66 Sometime these people
are referred to as “environmental refugees”, “climate
refugees” or “environmental migrants”.67 However, the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
international agencies generally agree that these terms
should be avoided because they are misleading and could
theoretically undermine the international legal regime for
the protection of refugees.68
UNHCR has stated its clear position regarding the
identification and legal position of displaced people.
UNHCR has argued that the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)69 is applicable
in some cross-border displacement scenarios. UNHCR
has serious reservations with respect to the terminology
and notion of environmental refugees or climate refugees.
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111. 0378-777X/14/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press
These terms have no basis in international refugee law.
Furthermore, the majority of those who are commonly
described as environmental refugees do not cross an
international border. Hence, use of this terminology could
potentially undermine the international legal regime for the
protection of refugees and create confusion regarding the
link between climate change, environmental degradation
and migration. While environmental factors can contribute
to prompting cross-border movements, they are not
grounds, in and of themselves, for granting refugee status
under international refugee law.70
Reference to them as “environmental refugees” or
“climate refugees” would be contrary to the Refugee
Convention,71 where the displaced climate-affected
people remain within the borders of their own territory.72
However, there are situations in which environmentally
displaced persons are legitimately “refugees”. It is argued
that if there are grounds for treating such a person as
a refugee under the Refugee Convention, then he or
she might be protected even if the force compelling
displacement is environmental. For example, where
victims of natural disasters flee from their homeland
because their government has consciously withheld or
obstructed assistance in order to punish or marginalise
them, they would appear to be legitimately considered
refugees in the traditional sense of the term.73
The UNHCR has taken a strict position in relation to
including people under the Refugee Convention who have
been displaced across borders as a result of long-term
climate change or sudden natural disasters.74
The term “refugee” narrowly describes a sub-class of

112. the world’s forced migrants and it is often misunderstood
to apply to those who have moved or are anticipated to
move for environmental or climate reasons.75 The reasons
that displaced people are generally outside the definition
of refugee in the Refugee Convention is because they are
not normally being prosecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality or membership of a particular racial or political
group.76 As noted, however, in some circumstances,
displaced people could arguably fall within the definition of
refugee as in the case of prosecution through environmental
harm.77 Even then, although the refugee terminology is
used for them, they are, in fact, more correctly recognised
as climate-change-displaced persons.78
Moreover, due to the combined impacts of conflict,
the environment and economic pressures, the scenario
to define climate-change-displaced people is becoming
increasingly complicated.79 Indeed, the scope of climate-
change-induced displacements is still very much debated
because an individual’s decision to move is often induced
by various factors.80
The concepts of “environmental migrant” and “climate-
change-induced migrant” correlate with each other such
that they are sometimes combined under the term “climate
migrant”. Under the IOM definition, “environmental
migrants” are those who, “for compelling reasons of sudden
or progressive changes in the environment that adversely
affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave
their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily
or permanently, and who move either within their country
or abroad”.81 A person who is initially forced to migrate due
to environmental effects is defined as an environmentally
displaced person.82 But the force of the environmental
change displacing them does not necessarily mean that they

113. have no other options but to leave that place. These people
are motivated to move because of choice and environmental
factors (for example, natural disasters, slow-onset land
degradation, and sea-level rise).83 This type of migration
can also be viewed as a coping strategy against climate
change, and people can take time to choose this strategy
and to consider social and other factors. This definition
adopts a realistic approach, as it generally includes people
displaced by climatic events as well as by climatic change,84
people moving temporarily or permanently, people forced
to move, and those choosing to do so.85
The first overarching definition of “environmental
refugee” was used by Essam El-Hinnawi of the United
Nations Environment Programme in 1985, when he stated
environmental refugees are those people who have been
forced to leave their traditional place of living temporarily
or permanently, because of a marked environmental
disruption leaving that place unable to support human life.86
The concept of “environmental refugee” has been
expansively and loosely used, and it has attracted wide
interest.87 The definitions of that phrase usually encompass
victims of climate change. Generally, environmental
migrants move voluntarily because the situation of any
gradual and natural degradation in an area may lead people
to decide to seek a better and more convenient place to
live. On the other hand, extreme or sudden environmental
disasters could force people to leave their homes. Here, they
have no alternative but to abandon their home and property.
Thus the vulnerability and sufferings of environmental
migrants and climate-change-displaced people are quite
different. International and national obligations with
respect to enforcing the human rights of these two groups
obviously vary due to their particular aspects and the
nature of their vulnerabilities. These terms are used herein

114. to refer to those who are only moving because of global
climate change, as opposed to any other changes in the
environment.88
The term environmental refugee is widely used and
climate-change refugee is more specific. But it is clear
from the report of UNHCR, as discussed previously, that
using the term refugee is misleading and contrary to the
Refugee Convention. Thus this article prefers to use the
term “climate-change-displaced persons”.
However, there is still a problem of distinguishing
them on the basis of their movement. They are referred
to as “internally displaced persons” when they have been
forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places
of habitual residence due to natural or human-made
disasters, but have not crossed an international State
border.89 This definition includes only those who are
forcibly displaced within their national territory due to
the adverse effect of climate change; it remains debatable
whether, when they cross international borders, they would
be defined as “climate refugees”. As the IOM has noted,
“Environmentally-induced migration is therefore best
understood as a continuum, ranging from clear cases of
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forced movement to clear cases of voluntary movement,
with a large grey zone in between”.90
If these sorts of people are treated as refugees and fall
within the definition of the Refugee Convention, they will

115. be protected under the mandate of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees. However, anyone
who crosses borders solely because of environmental
degradation in their nation of origin is not accorded this
protection.91 There is no developed legal protection of
climate migrants under national legal systems. It is also
well known that, due to resource constraints and political
reasons, developing countries such as Bangladesh are not
interested in providing special legal protection to climate-
change-displaced people.
It can be argued that human displacement due to
climate change is a result of human-made conditions;
the poor and displaced people are not responsible for
these conditions, but ultimately they become the victims.
The governments thus have to bear the responsibility for
such people’s legal identity and protection. This article
recommends calling them “climate-change-displaced
people” – a concept that is less debated and would be
well accepted. Given that their rights and identity are very
controversial in the international arena, it may be better to
determine their status through national legal mechanisms
rather than internationally.
Climate-change-displaced People in
Bangladesh
The climate-change-displacement scenario in
Bangladesh is quite complex. Large numbers of people
are already displaced and will be displaced in the future
due to climate change.92 It is happening in Bangladesh
due to the intensification of both sudden and slow-onset
natural disasters, the adverse consequences of increased
warming and climate variability for livelihoods including
impacts on health, water, food and housing.93 Unexpected
environmental events and regular environmental change

116. can affect population displacement in various ways.94
But large-scale human movement usually happens due
to floods, cyclones and riverbank erosion. In these cases,
people usually return to their place of origin when the
natural disaster is over. But in cases involving coastal
erosion, sea-level rise, salt-water intrusion, changing
rainfall patterns and drought, a more permanent form of
migration may be necessary.95
Owing to strict border protections, human movement
in Bangladesh due to climate-change impacts is mainly
internal – visible in the migration from rural to urban
areas – although there are also incidents where people are
displaced across the …
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America’s economic, military, and ideological power is the
taproot of its international
influence and the ultimate guarantor of its security. Anyone
who thinks the United States
should try to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs), promote human
rights, advance the cause of democracy, or defend a particular
ally must start by
acknowledging that America’s ability to do any of these things
depends first and foremost
upon its power.
Yet America’s position of primacy also fosters fear and
resistance when its power is misused.
Because the United States is so strong and its impact on others

117. so pervasive, it inevitably
attracts suspicion from other states and finds it difficult to elicit
their full and enthusiastic
cooperation. Moreover, because the United States is wrestling
with so many issues in so
many places, it is prone to being manipulated or hoodwinked by
states who wish to use
American power to advance their own interests. Given these
constraints, how can the United
States maximize the benefits that primacy brings and minimize
the resistance that its power
sometimes provokes?
FORUM
In the National Interest
A grand new strategy for American foreign policy.
FEBRUARY 1, 2005
STEPHEN M. WALT
http://bostonreview.net/forum
http://bostonreview.net/stephen-m-walt
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Trying to increase the American lead might not be worth the
effort (if only because the
United States is already far ahead), but allowing other states to
catch up would mean
relinquishing the advantages that primacy now provides. For
this reason alone, the central

118. aim of American grand strategy in foreign policy should be to
preserve its current position
for as long as possible. Several obvious implications follow.
First, American leaders should
take care not to squander the nation’s power unnecessarily (by
fighting unnecessary wars, for
example) or mismanage its economy in ways that undermine its
long-term vitality. Second,
the United States should avoid giving other states additional
incentives to build up their own
power—either by acquiring new capabilities of their own or by
joining forces with others—
and should encourage them to rely on America’s help when
security problems arise in their
own regions. In other words, we want to discourage balancing
against the United States, and
encourage regional balancing with us.
What grand strategy is most likely to achieve these results? One
option is global hegemony,
in which the United States tries to run the world more or less on
its own. In this strategy, the
United States sets the agenda for world politics and uses its
power to make sure its
preferences are followed. Specifically, the United States decides
what military forces and
weapons other states are allowed to possess and makes it clear
that liberal democracy is the
only form of government that the United States deems
acceptable and is prepared to support.
Accordingly, American power will be used to hasten the spread
of democratic rule, to deny
WMDs to potential enemies, and to ensure that no countries are
able to mount an effective
challenge to America’s position.

119. This image of global dominance is undeniably appealing to
some Americans, but the history
of the past few years also demonstrates how infeasible it is.
President George W. Bush has
embraced many of the policies sketched above, but the rest of
the world has not reacted
positively. The Bush administration has been scornful of
existing institutions and dismissive
of other states’ opinions, emphasizing instead the unilateral use
of American power to
“promote liberty” and preempt potential threats. The result?
America’s global standing has
plummeted, and with it the ability to attract active support from
many of its traditional allies.
Instead, many of these states have been distancing themselves
from America’s foreign-policy
agenda and looking for ways to constrain its power. So-called
rogue states such as Iran and
North Korea have become more resistant to American pressure
and more interested in
acquiring the ability to deter American military action. Efforts
to “promote liberty” at the
point of a gun have arguably strengthened the hands of
authoritarian rulers in the Middle
East, Central Asia, Russia, and elsewhere. The strategy of
preventive war and the goal of
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regional transformation led the United States into a costly
quagmire in Iraq, demonstrating
once again the impossibility of empire in an era in which

120. nationalism is a profound social
force. President Bush’s overall approach to foreign policy
demonstrates why global
hegemony is beyond our reach, and even some supporters of this
strategy have begun to
recognize that fact.
A second option is selective engagement. In this strategy, the
United States keeps large
military forces deployed in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East
(including the Persian Gulf) in
the context of bilateral or multilateral alliances and for the
purpose of dampening security
competition in these regions. Selective engagement, like global
hegemony, emphasizes the
need to control the spread of WMDs, but it does not prescribe a
policy of preventive war or
call for idealistic crusades to spread democracy or other
American values.
Selective engagement corresponds closely to the strategies
followed by Presidents George
H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton, and their performance shows
that American primacy
need not provoke widespread global resistance. American power
was committed in Europe,
Asia, and the Middle East, but largely for defensive purposes.
The use of military power was
restrained and reluctant, and conducted largely through
multilateral institutions. The United
States did use force on occasion—in the 1991 Gulf War, the
Bosnian settlement, and the
Kosovo war—but it did not part company with its allies and was
careful to acknowledge their
concerns even as it pressured them to follow its lead. Although
other states were concerned

121. about the asymmetry of power and annoyed when American
officials praised their own
indispensability too loudly, opposition was muted.
The chief problem with selective engagement was that it was
not selective enough. With
Europe reliably democratic and the Soviet Union gone, there
was less and less reason for the
United States to keep tens of thousands of its own troops tied
down in Europe. In the Persian
Gulf, the United States moved away from its traditional
balance-of-power policy and adopted
a policy of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran, thereby fueling
the rise of al Qaeda.
Unconditional backing for Israel, uncritical support for
traditional Arab monarchies, and the
failure to achieve a final peace settlement between Israel and
the Palestinians also
contributed to growing anti-Americanism. And by declaring
itself to be the “indispensable
nation,” the United States ended up taking responsibility for a
vast array of global problems.
Attempting to deal with all of them was too difficult and
expensive, but failing to do so cast
doubt on American credibility and leadership.
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The final option is offshore balancing, which has been
America’s traditional grand strategy.
In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only
when there are direct threats

122. to vital American interests. Offshore balancing assumes that
only a few areas of the globe are
of strategic importance to the United States (that is, worth
fighting and dying for).
Specifically, the vital areas are the regions where there are
substantial concentrations of
power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe,
industrialized Asia, and the Persian
Gulf. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United
States does not need to control
these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not
fall under the control of a
hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-
called peer competitor. To
prevent rival great powers from doing this, offshore balancing
prefers to rely primarily on
local actors to uphold the regional balance of power. Under this
strategy, the United States
would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers
are unable to uphold the
balance of power on their own.
Most importantly, offshore balancing is not isolationist. The
United States would still be
actively engaged around the world, through multilateral
institutions such as the United
Nations and the WTO and through close ties with specific
regional allies. But it would no
longer keep large numbers of troops overseas solely for the
purpose of “maintaining
stability,” and it would not try to use American military power
to impose democracy on other
countries or disarm potential proliferators. Offshore balancing
does not preclude using
power for humanitarian ends—to halt or prevent genocide or
mass murder—but the United

123. States would do so only when it was confident it could prevent
these horrors at an acceptable
cost. (By limiting military commitments overseas, however, an
offshore-balancing strategy
would make it easier for the United States to intervene in cases
of mass murder or genocide.)
The United States would still be prepared to use force when it
was directly threatened—as it
was when the Taliban allowed al Qaeda a safe haven in
Afghanistan—and would be prepared
to help other governments deal with terrorists that also threaten
the United States. Over
time, a strategy of offshore balancing would make it less likely
that the United States would
face the hatred of radicals like bin Laden, and would thus make
it less likely that the United
States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is
not welcome.
Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of
American primacy. It husbands
the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear
that this power provokes. By
setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional
allies, it reduces the danger of
being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other
states to do more for us.
Equally important, it takes advantage of America’s favorable
geopolitical position and
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124. exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about
each other than about the
United States. But it is not a passive strategy and does not
preclude using the full range of
America’s power to advance its core interests.
What are the other steps the United States could take to
implement this strategy most
effectively? The rest of the world knows that the United States
is the most powerful country
on earth, and other states are understandably sensitive to the
ways it uses its power. If
Americans want their power to attract others instead of
repelling them, they must take care
to use it judiciously. Americans should worry when generally
pro-American publications like
The Economist describe the United States as “too easily excited;
too easily distracted, too
fond of throwing its weight around,” or when knowledgeable
but moderate foreign observers
describe the United States as a “rogue superpower” or “trigger-
happy sheriff.”
Two specific recommendations follow. First, the United States
should use military force with
forbearance, asking questions first and shooting later.
America’s power allows it to take a
deliberate approach to many international dangers, and the
world’s most powerful country
should never appear either overly eager to use force or
indifferent to the human
consequences of its actions. In general, Americans should heed
President Woodrow Wilson’s
wise advice to “exercise the self-restraint of a truly great
nation, which realizes its own power
and scorns to misuse it.”

125. In particular, the United States would do well to abandon the
doctrine of “preemption”
contained in the 2002 National Security Strategy, a policy that
alarmed the rest of the world
without conferring any concrete advantages on the United
States. This new doctrine was not
in fact a policy of “preemption” (that is, a first strike intended
to forestall an imminent
attack). Rather, the new doctrine sought to justify a policy of
“preventive war” (that is, a war
fought to forestall a shift in the balance of power, independent
of whether the opponent was
planning to attack). “Preemption” is a legitimate act in
international law (provided there is a
well-founded fear of imminent attack), but preventive war is
not.
Supporters of this new doctrine argued that preventive war
might be needed to keep “rogue
states” from obtaining WMDs, based on the fear that such
regimes would give them to anti-
American terrorists and thus expose the United States to the
threat of surprise attack. Yet the
danger that rogue regimes will give WMDs away is extremely
remote. After incurring all the
costs and risks of obtaining these weapons, would any leader
simply give them to terrorists
when that leader could not control how the terrorists might use
the weapons or whether the
transfer itself would be detected? Indeed, a rogue state with
WMDs would need to worry that
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126. bostonreview.net/walt-national-interest 6/22
the United States would retaliate if it merely suspected that the
state had transferred
weapons to a terrorist group. For this reason, among others,
newly WMD-capable states will
go to great lengths to make sure their arsenals do not find their
way into terrorists’ hands. No
foreign government is going to give up the weapons they need
for deterrence and allow them
to be used in ways that would place their own survival at risk.
The invasion and occupation of Iraq offers abundant evidence of
the inherent unworkability
of a policy of preventive war. The failure to find any Iraqi
WMDs demonstrates the dangers
of going to war merely on the basis of suspicions, especially
when leaders who want to go to
war are able to distort the intelligence process into giving them
the “answers” they want.
Furthermore, when you invade a foreign country in order to
disarm and oust a hostile
regime, you end up owning the entire society and must therefore
deal with all its internal
problems. As the United States has discovered in Iraq, trying to
occupy and rebuild a hostile
society is costly. For these reasons, preventive war will rarely
(if ever) be a viable policy
option.
Equally important, making preventive war the centerpiece of
U.S. national security policy did
considerable damage to America’s international image. All
nations retain the option of using
force if their vital interests or survival is threatened, and

127. America’s enemies are well aware
that the United States might use force first if its own security
were at risk. But putting
preventive war at the heart of its national security policy made
the world’s most powerful
country seem eager to use force—at times and places of its own
choosing—whether a genuine
threat of attack was actually present or not. Not surprisingly,
this policy was alarming to
most countries: no state could be entirely sure that it would not
end up in America’s
crosshairs, or be confident that its interests would not be
adversely affected by a unilateral
American decision for war. It also set a dangerous precedent: if
preventive war made sense
for the United States, then it could be equally legitimate for
China, India, Pakistan, Syria,
Russia, or any other country that concluded that it could
improve its strategic position by
using force against a weaker adversary. In short, adopting a
declaratory policy that
emphasized preemption damaged America’s global image
without enhancing its security, and
repudiating this policy is an obvious first step in rebuilding
America’s reputation.
Second, instead of emphasizing “preemption,” the United States
should strive to reassure its
allies that it will use force with wisdom and restraint. In
particular, the United States can
reduce the fear created by its overawing power by giving other
states a voice in the
circumstances in which it will use force. Although exceptions
may arise from time to time,

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the United States should be willing to use a de facto “buddy
system” to regulate the large-
scale use of its military power, whether by NATO, the UN
Security Council, or other
international institutions. The point is not to cede control over
American foreign policy to
foreign powers or to an international institution like the United
Nations; the point is to use
other states or existing institutions to reassure others about the
ways the United States will
use its power. Conservative critics of the UN and other
multilateral institutions have
mistakenly focused on the rather modest restrictions that these
organizations might impose
on the United States, and they have ignored the role these
institutions could play in
legitimizing American policy and reducing the risk of an anti-
American backlash.
For the foreseeable future, the United States must think of this
sort of “reassurance” as a
continuous policy problem. During the Cold War, the United
States took many steps—
including military exercises, visits by important officials, and
public declarations—to remind
allies (and adversaries) that its commitments were credible. And
it didn’t just do these things
once and consider the job over; rather, it reaffirmed these
signals of commitment more or
less constantly. Now that the Cold War is over and the United
States is largely unchecked,

129. American leaders have to make a similar effort to convince
other states of their good will,
good judgment, and sense of restraint. American leaders cannot
simply assert these values
once or twice and then act as they please—which is what the
Bush administration has done.
Rather, reassuring gestures have to be repeated, and reassuring
statements have to be
reiterated. And the more consistent the words and deeds are, the
more effective such pledges
will be.
The benefits of self-restraint can be demonstrated by
considering how much the United
States would have gained had it followed this approach toward
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Had
the Bush administration rejected preventive war in Iraq in
March 2003 and chosen instead
to continue the UN-mandated inspections process that was then
underway, it would have
scored a resounding diplomatic victory. The Bush team could
have claimed—correctly—that
the threat of U.S. military action had forced Saddam Hussein to
resume inspections under
new and more intrusive procedures. The UN inspectors would
have determined that Iraq
didn’t have WMDs after all. There was no reason for the Bush
team to rush to war because
Iraq’s decaying military capabilities were already contained and
Saddam was incapable of
aggressive action so long as the inspectors were on Iraqi soil. If
Saddam had balked after a
few months, international support for his ouster would have
been much easier to obtain, and
in the meantime the United States would have shown the world
that it preferred to use force

130. only as a last resort. This course would have kept Iraq isolated,
kept the rest of the world on
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America’s side, undermined Osama bin Laden’s claims that the
United States sought to
dominate the Islamic world, and incidentally allowed the United
States to focus its energies
and attention on defeating al Qaeda. Even more important, this
policy of self-restraint would
have made the war avoidable, thereby saving thousands of lives
and billions of dollars and
keeping the United States out of the quagmire in which it is now
engulfed. The Bush team
had all these benefits in their hands, and it squandered them by
rushing headlong into war.
Instead of demonstrating that America’s primacy would be
guided by wisdom and restraint,
the Bush team gave the rest of the world ample reason to worry
about the preponderance of
power in Washington’s hands. Repairing the damage is likely to
take years.
As the world’s premier power, the United States has a vital
interest in discouraging other
states (or political movements) from joining forces against it.
Accordingly, it should resist the
widespread tendency to see potential enemies as monolithic, and
it should eschew policies
that force different adversaries to overlook their differences and
make common cause against

131. the United States. To lump North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and
other states together as a set
of “rogue states,” or to announce a global crusade against any
political groups that employ
“terrorist” methods, is to ignore the critical differences among
these various parties, which
blinds us to the possibility of improving relations with some of
them and encourages them to
cooperate with each other more actively. Even worse, to label
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an
“axis of evil,” as President Bush did in his 2002 State of the
Union speech, made it less likely
that these regimes would moderate their anti-American policies
and made key allies question
America’s judgment. At a broader level, anticipating a looming
“clash of civilizations”
between the West and Islam or between the United States and
China could easily lead the
United States to act in ways that will aggravate existing
differences and turn a valuable
warning into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD programs reveals, the
United States will do much
better if it pursues a strategy of “divide and conquer.” The
Clinton and Bush administrations
persuaded Libya to change course by using carrots and sticks
specifically tailored to Libya’s
particular aims, circumstances, and vulnerabilities. Indeed, the
Libyan example provides a
model for dealing with the most difficult and recalcitrant
regimes, including Iran and North
Korea. Viewing these states as a single problem—even if only
for rhetorical purposes—
interferes with the adroit and effective use of American power
and should therefore be

132. avoided, unless hostile states are really in cahoots. Even then,
policymakers should look for
ways to drive wedges between them instead of acting in ways
that give them little choice but
to cooperate with each other.
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The United States has many instruments of influence at its
disposal, and other states (and
movements) all have unique interests, goals, assets, and
vulnerabilities. Instead of launching
crusades against undifferentiated and abstract enemies (such as
“international terrorism”),
the United States should focus on the concrete foes that threaten
key interests and then
devise particular approaches to each one. Unless the United
States has clear and compelling
evidence that foreign states or terrorist groups are actively
aiding each other, the proper
strategy is to exacerbate and exploit the differences between
them.
American power is most effective when it is seen as legitimate,
and when other societies
believe it is being used to serve their interests as well as
America’s. On the other side,
America’s enemies will try to rally support by portraying the
United States as a morally
dubious society that pursues dangerous and immoral policies
abroad.

133. Therefore, in addition to waging the familiar forms of
geopolitical competition, the United
States must do more to defend the legitimacy of its position and
its policies. This process
must begin by recognizing how the United States looks to others
and then proceed to devise
clear, specific, and sustained initiatives for shaping these
perceptions. The United States
cannot expect to win over every heart and every mind, of
course, because conflicts of interest
will always arise and sometimes the pursuit of the national
interest will offend or anger
others. But the United States can surely do better than it has
done of late, both by adopting
more sensible policy positions and by explaining them to others
with greater care and
respect. America will not be universally loved or admired, but it
should get credit for the
good it does do, and it should not be blamed for misfortunes or
evils that are not its fault.
Unfortunately, American efforts at public diplomacy remain
half-hearted and ineffective. A
recent Council on Foreign Relations task force concluded that
“public diplomacy is all too
often relegated to the margins of the policy process, making it
effectively impotent.” As a
result, the task force discovered, “anti-Americanism is on the
rise throughout the world.” Or,
as the former ambassador to the United Nations Richard
Holbrooke put it, “How can a man
in a cave [Osama bin Laden] out-communicate the world’s
leading communications society?”
The report of the 9/11 Commission offers a partial answer: al
Qaeda and other anti-American
groups take the struggle for legitimacy seriously. They know

134. they are in a war for hearts and
minds around the world, and they work hard at developing and
disseminating a message that
will place America in the worst possible light. In the
commission’s words, “Bin Laden’s
message . . . has attracted active support from thousands of
disaffected young Muslims and
resonates powerfully with a far larger number who do not
actively support his methods.” As a
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result, the commission calls for the United States to “engage the
struggle of ideas” and
recommends increased funding and attention for media
outreach, broadcasting,
scholarships, and cultural exchange.
In particular, the commission emphasizes the need for an
improved capacity to communicate
effectively in the Arab and Islamic world. The hatred that
provoked the 9/11 attacks is partly
a reaction to American policy in the region, but it is also fueled
by myths and misperceptions
promoted by anti-American groups and governments. To
overcome them, the United States
should launch a broad-based and sustained public-information
campaign, using every
instrument and channel at its disposal. In addition to preparing
diplomats to engage on a
regular basis with local media outlets such as al Jazeera, the
United States must increase its

135. own Arabic-language broadcasting and develop sophisticated
and appealing Arabic Web sites
to reach the growing population of Internet-savvy Arab youth. A
major effort to train fluent
Arabic speakers is also essential so that we can engage Arabic
and Islamic news agencies on
an equal footing.
The good news is that the United States possesses formidable
assets in this sort of ideational
competition. Not only is English increasingly the lingua franca
of science, diplomacy, and
international business, but the American university system
remains a potent mechanism for
socializing foreign elites. Students studying in the United States
become familiar with
national mores while simultaneously absorbing mainstream
American views on politics and
economics. To be sure, not all of them will have positive
experiences or end up adopting
favorable attitudes toward the United States, but most of them
will. It is crucial that the
United States not let its post-9/11 concern for domestic security
interfere with the continued
flow of foreign students to our best colleges and universities.
It should be noted that any public diplomacy effort, to be
effective, needs a good product to
sell. Defending the legitimacy of American primacy is not
primarily a question of “spin,” or
propaganda, or even cultural exchange. If American foreign
policy is insensitive to the
interests of others, and if it makes global problems worse rather
than better, no amount of
“public diplomacy” is going to convince the rest of the world
that the United States is really

136. acting in the best interests of mankind.
Just imagine how the United States might appear had it behaved
just a bit differently over
the past few years. Suppose the Bush administration had said
that it was not going to submit
the Kyoto Protocol for ratification (an announcement that would
have surprised no one) but
had immediately added that it recognized the dangers posed by
global warming and was
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therefore ready to place on the table a new and fair-minded
proposal that showed a
sensitivity to the concerns of others as well as appropriate
attention to its own particular
interests. Suppose the United States had signed the landmines
convention, pressed hard for a
small-arms treaty, and not blocked the improved verification
protocol for the biological-
weapons convention. Suppose President Clinton had taken
strong action to prevent the
Rwandan genocide and that President Bush had actually
delivered on his pledge to …
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137. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
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Current Trends in Agroterrorism (Antilivestock,
Anticrop, and Antisoil Bioagricultural Terrorism)
and Their Potential Impact on Food Security
Joseph W. Foxell Jr
To cite this article: Joseph W. Foxell Jr (2001) Current Trends
in Agroterrorism (Antilivestock,
Anticrop, and Antisoil Bioagricultural Terrorism) and Their
Potential Impact on Food Security,
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24:2, 107-129, DOI:
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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24:107–129, 2001
Copyright © 2001 Taylor & Francis
1057-610X/01 $12.00 + .00
Current Trends in Agroterrorism (Antilivestock,
Anticrop, and Antisoil Bioagricultural Terrorism)
and Their Potential Impact on Food Security
JOSEPH W. FOXELL, JR.
College of Staten Island
New York, NY, USA
The relatively indirect and indiscriminate nature of an
agroterror attack meshes
perfectly with the perceived shift in terrorism goals, which have
ostensibly veered
away from attempting to achieve specific political results and

139. instead increasingly
seek the destruction of “enemy” societies. This article presents
the case specifically
that access to agroterroritst weapons, the vulnerability of the
agricultural infra-
structure, the lack of reporting requirements for outbreaks of
plant diseases, and a
general shift in the motives of terrorists and the purpose of
terrorist acts, all com-
bine to make agroterrorism an increasingly likely threat.
Agroterror’s Threat to the Security of the Food Supply
One threat that terrorism currently presents, and that has been
seriously underrated until
only very recently, is the potential for agroterrorism (i.e.,
attacks on a society’s agri-
cultural infrastructure). Such attacks could be accomplished by
concentrated viral, ento-
mophilous (spread by pollinating insects), botanical, or
bacteriological germ warfare–
style assaults against U.S. poultry, livestock, agricultural
produce, animal feed, and cereal
grain crops. This has happened once before in U.S. history—but
on a very mundane level.
During World War I, Imperial Germany undertook a covert
program of bioagricultural
warfare, using anthrax and glanders, directed against horses and
mules being shipped
overseas from America to British and French armies. The
program was operated in the
United States from 1915 to 1917 by Anton Dilger, an American-
born graduate of Johns
Hopkins Medical School. Dilger had brought cultures of these
two animal diseases
with him on a return trip from Berlin, and grew them in an

140. improvised bacteriology
laboratory in his suburban Washington, D.C. dwelling. He then
carried out a series of
agroterrorist attacks in Baltimore against shipments of draft
animals heading for U.S. allies
in Europe. The animal victims were pricked with contaminated
needles to start a round of
infection that then spread through the herd via natural means
(e.g., fecal matter, coughing,
or na sal disc harges). M ore than 3,500 horses w e re infec te
d a nd re nde red
Received 30 March 2000; accepted 7 July 2000.
Address correspondence to Joseph W. Foxell, Jr., Ph.D., 41
Tanner Drive, Princeton, NJ
08540-9488, USA. E-mail: [email protected]
108 J. W. Foxell, Jr.
useless for wartime service. Other German agents used similar
agroterrorist techniques
to introduce anthrax and glanders into French cavalry horses,
Romanian sheep, and Argen-
tinean livestock earmarked for use by Allied forces. A modern
day agroterrorist might just
as easily use fumonosin, a mycotoxin (poisonous substance
produced by fungi or molds
on agricultural crops)1 that causes liver and brain damage in
horses, or a wide range of
lesser known pathogens (infectious or toxin-forming
microorganisms causing disease).
In light of the ease with which Dilger’s scheme was

141. accomplished, as well as sun-
dry other theoretical and practical examples, an exponential
growth in terrorism’s poten-
tial for mass-scale, economically motivated violence may soon
occur, as terror groups of
all stripes come within striking distance of obtaining some form
of agroterrorism capa-
bility that will threaten U.S. food security. For purposes of this
work, food security
means the ready availability of nutritious, adequate, and safe
food, without having to
resort to emergency food supplies, scavenging, stealing, or
other desperate strategies.
Agroterrorism is defined as the intentional introduction of
animal or plant pests or the
cultivation or production of pathogenic bacteria, fungi,
parasites, protozoans, viruses, or
their toxic products for the purposes of causing poultry,
livestock, crop, soil, or human
disease, poisoning, or death. This could occur through
introducing pests intended to kill
food crops, spreading a virulent disease among confined
feedlots where animals are
given high protein rations to prepare them for slaughter,
poisoning civil or agricultural
water sources or food supplies, or using food-borne pathogens
to cause human disease.
Food-borne pathogens are microorganisms that cause illness
through the ingestion of
food. The most frequently occurring are: salmonella,
staphylococcus aureus, campylobacter
jejuni, yersinia enerocolitica, listeria monocytogenes, vibrio
cholerae non-01, vibrio para-
hemolyticus, bacillus cereus, escherichia coli—
enteropathenogenic, and shigella. These
pathogens are most often found in contaminated meat, poultry,

142. shell eggs, dairy prod-
ucts, and seafood.
Access to Weapons
Worryingly, exposure might increase after the first few
agroterrorist incidents, as copy-
cats discover that agricultural terrorism entails minimal startup
effort and is relatively
simple to carry out. Source materials for agroterrorism are easy
to come by as a wide
range of plant and animal infective agents occur naturally on
farms or in the wild. In
addition, because many animal pathogens are contagious, very
little agent is needed to
infect large numbers of livestock. The close feeding and
watering conditions characteris-
tic of modern farms would help spread the illness via physical
contact, fecal shedding,
offal (blood, bone, feathers, or fat), or water or feeding trough
contamination. Agroterrorism
is attractive to enemies of the U.S. because agricultural agents
are easier to prepare than
biological weapons. Making them can be as simple as storing
wetted vegetable matter in
a dark place—a technique used to produce emergency medicinal
supplies of Clostridium
botulinum.
Potential Effects
Norman Schaad of the USDA Agricultural Research Service’s
Foreign Disease/Weed
Science Research Unit at Fort Detrick, Maryland states that
“plant pathogens are much
easier to use than other weapons of mass destruction, and they

143. would cause more dam-
age to the food supply and the economy.”2 Paul Rogers, a
British agroterrorism expert,
argues that the victims of such an attack “could well experience
famine that would be at
Current Trends in Agroterrorism 109
least as costly, in human terms, as an anthrax attack on a city.”3
In situations of long-
term impact (i.e., induced food scarcity) where nutritional
levels had already severely
declined, the population would become increasingly susceptible
to outbreaks of un-
related diseases, as their immune systems’ resistances were
correspondingly lowered.
Worse, the directions for finding or culturing these pathogens
have been—and are still
being—published on the Internet, potentially allowing even the
tiniest, most obscure
group to mount an economically devastating agroterrorist
assault against this country’s
national infrastructure for food security. According to Dr.
Glenn McGee, a biologist
as well as a computer security expert, insecurities in the
Internet itself allow the possi-
bility of “viral hacking,” wherein would-be agroterrorists no
longer need “to find a tiny
sample of smallpox [or bioagricultural pathogens on the open,
gray, or black markets],
when, as hackers, they can synthesize it from scratch on a
$1,000 iMac connected to a
$10,000 gene synthesizer.”4 Dr. McGee argues that “if viruses
can be manipulated and

144. created by genetic engineering technology, their genetic codes
can also be e-mailed
around the world, as well as built from innocuous lab materials
using the same tech-
nology.”5
Equally worrisome is the fact that the physical resources (i.e.,
laboratory facilities,
calibrated condensing vessels, pre-set gauges, specialty
apparatuses, freeze dryers, mill-
ing machines, centrifuges, micro-fine air filters, and
fermentation tanks) needed for manu-
facturing such bioagricultural weapons agents are readily
available to almost everyone
in the scientific, pharmaceutical, and agribusiness communities.
Worse, large amounts
of many types of antilivestock, anticrop, and antisoil
bioagricultural agents can be made
in high-school science laboratories, often within a period of
hours or days. Even an
abandoned brewery or dairy will do. Former Central
Intelligence Agency director Will-
iam Webster has assessed this risk in the following way: “The
equipment, materials, and
expertise needed to produce genetically altered bioagricultural
agents all have legitimate
uses in the botanical, pharmaceutical, and medical industries.
With currently available
technology, these biological-warfare agents can be produced at
such a rate that stock-
piles are no longer necessary. Actually, any nation with a
modestly developed pharma-
ceutical or agribusiness industry can produce these agents, if it
chooses.”6
The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency

145. now assess the
threat of a biological-agent agroterrorist attack on American
farms that feed American
cities as a palpable and hypothetical danger and no longer
merely a remote possibility.
Counterterrorism experts are increasingly echoing the warning
of Richard K. Betts, who,
in a 1998 article in Foreign Affairs, suggested that, “the
primary risk is not that enemies
might lob some nuclear or chemical weapons at U.S. armored
battalions or ships, awful
as that might be. Rather, it is that they might attempt to punish
the United States by
triggering catastrophes in American cities.”7 A 2000 General
Accounting Office audit
concluded that the United States is ill prepared to cope with
terrorism affecting its urban
areas.8 One way to accomplish such a scheme is to deprive
urban residents of ample,
safe food supplies. This is much more likely than an all-out
weapons-of-mass-destruc-
tion attack. Even a bungled agroterrorist livestock disease-based
stratagem that affected
only a handful of farm animals—a probable outcome if the
perpetrators were unfamiliar
with agricultural pathogens or modern farming practices—
would produce a transient
climate of fear and panic among food buyers. A foreign-enemy-
agent terrorist attack on
U.S. urban food supplies is not the only danger. Domestic
environmental terror groups
might deploy agricultural pathogens to prevent further acreage
from being planted with
genetically modified crops, fertilizers, or farm animals or to
force changes in what they
perceive as “inhumane” animal care and slaughter policies and

146. practices.
110 J. W. Foxell, Jr.
U.S. Vulnerabilities to Agroterrorism
Agriculture is vulnerable to unanticipated terrorist assault. The
possibility of an agroterrorist
attack on America’s farmlands—when acknowledged at all—has
been depicted as a re-
mote threat, in part due to the nation’s seemingly unending
agricultural bounty that
constitutes the world’s largest granary and larder. We routinely
take such munificence
for granted—often to the point of forgetting that American
farms’ capability to provide
the citizens of this country with wholesome, nutritious,
affordable food constitutes a
substantial portion of the nation’s strength and prosperity.
Hence, the U.S. agricultural
infrastructure is relatively unprotected, particularly when
compared to other industrial or
economic capacities. The Administrator of the Department of
Agriculture’s (USDA) Agricul-
tural Research Service, Floyd Horn, believes that we lack the
technology to adequately
defend our food supply if bioagricultural weapons agents
attacked it. “There is tremen-
dous potential for surprise here and it is entirely possible that a
biological event could
occur without U.S. knowing it because we do not really have the
tools in place to detect
it.”9 Indeed, in the United States today, there is no legal
requirement for reporting emerging

147. plant diseases, as there is for new human diseases. Thus,
America’s grain and cereal
food supply poses an attractive, seemingly unguarded, “soft”
target to agroterrorists be-
cause of the very low level of awareness of these dangers
prevalent until now among
defense planners, intelligence analysts, and even
counterterrorism experts.
Food security experts estimate that the average U.S. city has a
five-day supply of
fresh meat, fruit, and vegetables. These supplies could be
extended to between three and
five weeks’ worth of rations if edibility, rather than freshness,
were used as the criterion.
The five-week figure represents acceptance of a serious amount
of spoilage. This risk is
made more acute as many urban supermarkets no longer rely on
large in-store invento-
ries, but instead depend on just-in-time deliveries. Our society’s
exposure is increased
by the fact that, on average, food supplies must travel more than
1,300 miles from the
farm where they are grown to the “typical” urban resident’s
dinner table. If metropolitan
food supplies were interrupted by a widely publicized act of
agroterrorism, supermarket
produce stands, meat counters, and canned goods sections would
quickly be stripped to
bare shelves as consumers indulged in panic buying and
hoarding. The situation would
be exacerbated if a terrorist-caused food supply outage were to
occur during a peak
holiday period. Moreover, U.S. troops are now totally dependent
on civilian-source food
supplies, adding a military preparedness risk issue to these

148. concerns.
Ten factors involving the qualitative and quantitative natures of
U.S. agriculture
contribute to our nation’s vulnerability in this area. First, the
livestock industry is con-
centrated in just a few essential geographic sectors: cattle
feeding in western Kansas;
hogs in North Carolina, Nebraska, and Iowa; and poultry in
Virginia, Georgia, Arkan-
sas, Pennsylvania, and Maryland’s Eastern Shore district. This
consolidation makes it
potentially easy for agroterrorists, using only a small number of
infected animals, to
spread agricultural diseases throughout the heartland of
America’s farm industry. Thus,
an agroterror attack against a knowledgeably chosen, small but
critical, geographic area
could effectively wipe out production and sales of a large
percentage of the specific
animal type raised there. For example, over 70% of U.S. beef
cattle is currently pro-
duced within the locus of a 200-mile circle. Pork production is
very centralized as well
(75% of America’s 60 million hogs are in the Midwest), and
dairy production is becom-
ing more so.10 Compare the above clusters to the much larger
“Corn Belt” that ranges
from Iowa, Indiana, most of Illinois, and parts of Kansas to
Missouri, Nebraska, South
Dakota, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Furthermore, U.S.
durum wheat production
Current Trends in Agroterrorism 111

149. extends in a wide arc from North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Minnesota to Montana,
California, and Arizona. Durum wheat is the source of semolina,
an essential component
of many pasta items, including macaroni and spaghetti.
Although vulnerable, these vital
corn and wheat farming areas, because of their geographical
dispersion, form segmented
tracts that would be much harder to destroy by an agroterrorist
stratagem than contigu-
ous-area or single region–centered farm production or livestock
feeding operations.
Second, the U.S. food business is moving in the direction of
centralized ownership
and larger individual farms. For example, in 2002, the pork
industry will become so
concentrated that the top forty producers will control 90% of
production. Even now,
36% of all pork produce derives from these forty conglomerates.
By 2010, our domestic
beef industry will become organizationally aggregated to the
degree that the thirty lead-
ing cattle feeding corporations will generate 50% of all beef
products. Even ancillary
businesses are being consolidated—for example, in the
agrochemical industry, eight com-
panies control 80% of the market.11 The recent merger of
Novartis’s and AstraZeneca’s
agrochemical divisions to create the market-share giant
Syngenta accelerates this trend.
Syngenta made $7.9 billion in agricultural sales in 1998. The
four next biggest sellers
were Aventis ($5.4 billion); DuPont ($4.6 billion); Monsanto
($4.3 billion); and Dow

150. AgroSciences ($2.4 billion). Such consolidation within the
various levels of U.S. agri-
business makes it potentially easy for agroterrorists to
compromise key sectors of America’s
farm supply–provisioning infrastructure. The ongoing
amalgamation of the American
food industry, wherein a few producers enjoy a continually
enlarging, already large
market share, allows a situation in which minuscule amounts of
antisoil, anticrop, or
antilivestock pathogens could ultimately generate a
multimillion-dollar agricultural epi-
demic—possibly perpetrated by a single individual or small cell
of terrorists.
Third, because of intensive proximity husbandry practices that
have reduced the
free range movement of farm animals on many of the largest
farms, the American poul-
try and livestock industries have become much more vulnerable
to the spread of both
indigenous and foreign-originating infectious diseases. A
typical poultry farm has be-
tween 250,000 and 2,000,000 birds. Dairy herds often contain
ten thousand cows. High
animal-per-acre ratios (often exceeding 2,000 animals per
feeding lot), overcrowded feeding
and watering troughs, reliance on steroids to increase the
percentage of edible meat per
animal, and densely packed confinement pens collectively
generate significant sanitary
hazards and high stress levels within many portions of beef
cattle herds. The General
Accounting Office estimates that there are 450,000 such
“concentrated animal feeding
operations” (CAFOs) nationwide. A CAFO is a facility where

151. large numbers of live-
stock are confined, fed, raised, or fattened for slaughter. CAFOs
include dairy and beef
cattle feedlots, hog production facilities, and closed poultry
houses. This trend toward
increased concentration has produced lowered resistance levels
to infectious diseases
among many functionally warehoused farm animal populations.
There has also been an
over-reliance on antibiotics (synthetic or microorganism-
produced substances that inhibit
the growth of, or destroy bacteria) to control outbreaks of
sickness among poultry, swine,
and cattle. Antibiotics have been used at the subtherapeutic
level as a constituent of
animal feed since the 1950s. Their use has resulted in the
proliferation of antibiotic-
resistant infections in cows, chickens, and pigs, as well as
human consumers of these
animals’ meat. Wide-scale use of antibiotics has also created
conditions wherein farm
animals have been bred for the ability to gain weight or give
milk, not disease resis-
tance. The use of bovine somatotropin (a growth hormone that
causes cows to increase
the efficiency of milk production) has added to these concerns.
Moreover, many animals
are frequently moved to different regions of the country to take
advantage of warmer
112 J. W. Foxell, Jr.
climates and longer growing seasons. This increases the risks of
agroterrorist-induced

152. disease spreading simultaneously in disparate, far-flung
geographic zones.
Fourth, the increased level of international air travel, which has
drastically reduced
the isolation that had previously protected American poultry,
livestock, and field crops
from foreign illnesses and pests, has exacerbated our country’s
vulnerability to either
accidental or deliberate infestation or infection. In the event of
an unclaimed agro-
terrorist attack on America’s farmland and agricultural
produce—even when the vector
is a foreign-originating disease or pest that has never been
recorded here before—the
fact that international travel could account for the incidence
provides an alternative
explanation that creates doubt in many minds that a terrorist act
has occurred.
Fifth, an increasing reliance on pesticides and herbicides to
control crop pests such
as insects and weeds has established a precursor state, wherein
pesticide-immune and
herbicide-resistant antagonists could decimate arable crop
staples. This in turn provides
opportunities to agroterrorists seeking weak-link vulnerabilities
within the framework of
an opponent’s agricultural infrastructure. Aggressive “super
diseases,” out-of-sector crop
pests, and non-native organisms and weeds could be
deliberately introduced by terrorists
with devastating effect.12
Sixth, a lack of crop diversity renders U.S. farmlands especially
vulnerable to “cropicide”

153. agroterrorist attack. This dearth of variety has resulted from the
American farmer’s widespread
practice of growing only one or two types of major food crops,
as opposed to diversi-
fied farming, where different food crops are mixed and rotated
to reduce pest damage
and keep the soil fertile. The lack of diversity, wherein single
crops are grown over
thousands of acres (agricultural scientists call these
monocultures ), renders the entire
crop susceptible to a single pathological organism. This
provides would-be agroterrorists
with a much easier task in selecting across-the-board effective
crop pathogens when
concocting their schemes. A terrorist could, therefore, exploit
this vulnerability by in-
sinuating two or more of these blights, fungi, or pests into
breadbasket growing areas
that, under soil and climate conditions favorable to the spread
of such intruders, would
lead to the genesis of a region-wide pandemic.13 This is a
worldwide problem. Filipino
farmers, for example, once grew thousands of kinds of rice.
Today, only two varieties
account for 98% of rice grown in the Philippines.
Seventh, this lack of diversity is compounded by the fact that
80% of the nation’s
seed derives from one locale, the Idaho valley, due to the
exceptionally dry climate in
that region.
Eighth, a notable percentage of imported hybrid seeds used for
crop production in the
United States comes from just four countries: Mexico, Chile,
Iran, and China. Worryingly,

154. the latter two countries are suspected of having covert
bioagricultural weapons develop-
ment programs. Reliance on so few sources for the purchase of
imported seed begets the
possibility that agroterrorists could silently insinuate diseased
seed into the filled orders
shipped to the United States. Such a tactic would go unnoticed
unless a tip-off alerted
authorities, because, according to plant seed experts, the United
States is “very lax” in seed-
control inspections. These critics allege that the United States
lacks the manpower and the
motivation to do anything more than visually inspect imported
seed-shipping containers
for the presence of insects or insect nests. They may be right.
This occurs despite the legal
requirements imposed by the Federal Seed Act that prohibits the
importation of adulterated
or misbranded seeds and the Federal Noxious Weed Act that
authorizes the USDA’s
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to prevent
the importation of noxious
weed seeds. The economic costs of ignoring our vulnerability
can be exorbitant. In the
1980s, an accidental epidemic of watermelon fruit blotch ruined
nearly one third of that
Current Trends in Agroterrorism 113
crop in three Southern states: Georgia, Florida, and South
Carolina. The germ plasm
for the seed that was sown in this region had been imported
from Iran in the 1970s.14

155. Banning the importation of foreign seed cannot purchase
security against agroterrorism,
however. Indeed, ending the use of imported seed could
ultimately jeopardize U.S. plant
crop yields, because such a step would decrease the genetic
diversity of U.S. crops.
Ninth, the soil itself is an ignored, and hence inadequately
protected, resource. This
is unfortunate, as it can take centuries to grow an inch of
topsoil. In the United States,
there are over 70,000 kinds of soil recognized by the National
Resources Conservation
Service. Modern farming methods have accelerated the loss of
topsoil, which has
increased over the last four decades. Perhaps as much as half of
the nation’s topsoil
blanket that existed 50 years ago has been lost due to runoff
(i.e., sheet, rill, or gully
erosion), intensive heavy equipment usage, and winds.
Agroterrorist schemes that threaten
topsoil viability—most likely through use of a long-acting soil
sterilant—pose long-term
dangers to America’s farmland productivity.
Tenth, a variety of pathogenic or market-value inhibiting agents
that are foreign to
U.S. farm animals and crops—and hence could spread rapidly in
the absence of natural
immunities or predators—are readily obtainable from a
multitude of overseas sources.
American agriculture and livestock are believed to be highly
vulnerable to many of
these agents.
When considered collectively, the above ten factors constitute a

156. significant national
security vulnerability that could produce a situation similar to
the “gas crisis” of 1973 that
generated unanticipated shortages, astronomical price increases,
long lines of agitated
customers, panic buying, and hoarding. Such behavior would
force the U.S. government
to impose rationing if it were to continue for a protracted
period. Today, what had
originally been a concern that the former U.S.S.R. would use
antilivestock, anticrop, and
antisoil bioagricultural weapons in a strategic economic assault
on U.S. farmlands dur-
ing the Cold War has been transformed into fears that a new
breed of terrorists or foreign
state enemies might carry out silent attacks on the nation’s
domestically produced food
supply. For instance, terror surrogates could initiate this type of
campaign as part of a
rogue state-backed terror offensive to weaken U.S. Department
of State policy support
for Washington’s allies in the Middle East, East Asia, or the
Balkans. Alternatively, they
might aim to force the United States to back off from a
confrontation during a time of
international tensions. According to statements by Col. Qiao
Liang, a senior strategist for
China’s People’s Liberation Army/Air Force (PLAAF), the best
way to fight a war against
the United States is to use terror surrogates to attack the urban
infrastructures of key
allies providing significant support—overflight permissions,
crucial votes in international
forums like NATO or the United Nations, or troop deployment
logistical assistance—to
American military operations. According to Col. Qiao, “once

157. that country feels the pain,
it will no longer let the United States conduct war on its
territory.”15 One of the most
effective ways for a rogue nation to follow Col. Qiao’s advice
would be to “starve” a U.S.
ally’s city dwellers through an agroterrorist “offensive.” What
type of targets might these
agroterrorists strike? Most probably high value, heavy demand
items such as fresh meats,
flour, vegetable oils, roasted coffee, refined sugar, milk, cheese,
wine, breakfast cereals,
fresh and dried fruits and vegetables, eggs, and nuts.
The Potential Economic Impact of Agroterrorism
With the exception of stratagems intended to poison food
consumers, agroterrorism is,
in focus, primarily mass disruptive (i.e., purposed to destroy a
vital national infrastructure
114 J. W. Foxell, Jr.
by rendering seeds sterile, soil inhospitable, or spreading
serious, communicable diseases
among crops, poultry, and livestock), rather than mass casualty
(viz., intended to kill large
numbers of humans). If biological weapons, which are becoming
more available not only
to rogue states but also to clandestine, non-state, terror
organizations, are the “poor …
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158. Review (2013) 22(2): 162–173.
162 Volume 22, Issue 2, June 2013H
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term can mean various things to different people
(Maxwell & Smith, 1992).
BACKGROUND
The concept of ‘food security’ originated from
international discussions during the mid-1970s
global food crisis. The initial focus of attention was
primarily on food supply problems; of assuring the
availability and to some degree the price stability
of basic foodstuffs at the international and national
level (Overseas Development Institute, 1997).
This initial focus on food supply volume and sta-
bility is refl ected in the 1974 World Food Summit
defi nition: ‘availability at all times of adequate world
food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady

159. expansion of food consumption and to offset fl uctuations
in production and prices’ (United Nations, 1975). In
1983 the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) expanded its concept to
include securing access by vulnerable people to
available supplies, implying that attention should
be balanced between the demand and supply side
of the food security equation: ‘ensuring that all peo-
ple at all times have both physical and economic access to
the basic food that they need’ (Food and Agriculture
Organisation, 1983). This defi nition was revised
in 1996 at the World Food Summit to include the
individual and household level in addition to the
regional and national level: ‘food security exists when
all people, at all times, have physical and economic access
The responsibilisation of food security: What is the
problem represented to be?
AMBER BASTIAN AND JOHN COVENEY
Public Health, School of Medicine, Flinders University,
Adelaide, SA, Australia
Abstract: Food security is an evolving concept with various defi
nitions and associated meanings. The way food
security is understood by policy-makers impacts on how it gets
addressed in public policy. This research uses an interpretive
approach to uncover how food security is represented by

160. stakeholders. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with
24
stakeholders in South Australia between June and September
2010. The fi ndings reveal four dominant representations for
food security that locate responsibility for the issue across
different stakeholders, namely individuals, governments, com-
munities and private enterprise. These representations hold
different underlying assumptions about the role of government
in addressing the issue; the neo-liberal perspective supports a
reduced role for government whereas the social determinants
of health perspective calls for greater government intervention.
Food security activists may need a greater awareness of how
they represent the issue in order to change public policy action
in this area. The approach taken in this research is relevant
to other public policy problems and contexts.
Keywords: food security, public health, policy, Australia,
sociology, qualitative research, Carol Bacchi
F
ood security’ is a concept that has grown
in recent years. It has received increased
attention following recent food price spikes in
2007–2008 (Bello & Baviera, 2009; MacMillan &
Dowler, 2011). Food security has become a motif
to circumscribe food defi cits, for example: to
describe the characteristics of individuals, families,
and communities (Biggerstaff, Morris, & Nichols-

161. Casebolt, 2002; Nolan, Williams, Rikard-Bell, &
Mohsin, 2006); to explain the impact of location
and transport to food outlets on food availability
(Coveney & O’Dwyer, 2009; Daniel, Kestens, &
Paquet, 2009); to critique global factors affecting
food production (Magdoff & Tokar, 2009; Piesse
& Thirtle, 2009); and to catastrophise the impact
of resources like land, water, and energy on future
food supplies (Khan & Hanjra, 2009; Koning
et al., 2008). In short, food security has become
a term heralding food crisis at the individual,
community and national levels. Most commonly
food security has been used by governments,
non government organisations and academics to
describe, monitor, analyse and intervene in a food
system that has not met the needs of the world’s
population for suffi cient food that is culturally
appropriate, affordable, accessible and nutritious

162. (MacMillan & Dowler, 2011). Its widespread
use has led to a variety of meanings and there
are around 200 defi nitions in published writings
for the term food security, highlighting how the
‘
The responsibilisation of food security
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to suffi cient, safe, nutritious food to meet their dietary

163. needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’
(Food and Agriculture Organisation, 1996). This
defi nition highlights four main dimensions of food
security: physical availability of food; economic
and physical access to food; individual utilisation
of food; and stability of these factors over time.
The 2009 World Food Summit reiterated this
defi nition with the additional emphasis on the
nutritional dimension as an integral concept of
food security (Food and Agriculture Organisation,
2009). These evolving defi nitions of food security
illustrate how the concept has moved from a con-
cern for being able to feed the world’s population
appropriately into a focus on maintaining reserves
and then later to concern for individual household
food security (Shaw, 2007). The climate change
aspect has made a more recent emergence into
food security discourse (Food and Agriculture
Organisation, 2009; MacMillan & Dowler, 2011).

164. The emphasis on various aspects of food security
illustrates how the issue is represented in different
ways depending on the context.
This paper explores how food security is
understood by stakeholders within an Australian
jurisdiction. Importantly, the paper examines
how food security is discussed and deployed
through various representations and for particu-
lar purposes. Representations can direct attention
towards certain elements while simultaneously
diverting attention away from others (known
as issue framing); that which is highlighted or
excluded is often what the framing group val-
ues (Yanow, 2000). Bacchi in her ‘What’s the
problem represented to be?’ approach to policy
analysis is interested in understanding how the
problematisation of policy issues can both con-
struct and constrict social vision (Bacchi, 1999,

165. 2009). This approach proposes that different
groups attribute different values and beliefs to the
same issue and these differences in seeing, under-
standing and doing are based on different prior
experiences (Yanow, 2000). Work informed by
Bacchi’s approach insists that problems do not
exist independently, but are rather the product
of imposing certain frames of reference on real-
ity (Bastian, 2011; Begley & Coveney, 2010;
Burr, 2003; Grey, 2004). Taking this approach
each proposed solution to a problem has built
into it a particular way in which the problem is
represented (Bacchi, 2009).
The present study took place in South Australia
where 7% of the population has been estimated
to be suffering from food insecurity (Foley et al.,
2010). The question used to measure food insecu-
rity, ‘in the last 12 months, were there any times

166. that the food you have bought just didn’t last, and
you didn’t have money to get more?’ captures the
economic element of food insecurity but does not
consider the other elements that may impact on it.
This question was asked in the South Australian
surveillance and monitoring system between
July 2002–December 2007. As this survey only
includes people with a telephone number listed
in the electronic white pages it may under-repre-
sent the prevalence of food insecurity as vulner-
able individuals without permanent housing and/
or without the resources for a telephone line are
not captured. While food security has been rec-
ognised as an important public health issue there
remains a gap in local policy action to address it.
This research aims to examine how food security
stakeholders in South Australia view the issue. In
doing so it highlights the various beliefs stakehold-

167. ers attach to food security and theorises how val-
ues may impact on how the issue gets addressed.
Furthermore it attempts to uncover how stake-
holders proposed policy solutions frame the issue
and highlights the resulting effects.
METHOD
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with
24 stakeholders currently involved in food secu-
rity, or with the potential to improve food security,
within South Australia between June–September
2010. Table 1 shows the types of stakeholders
interviewed and their various roles. For good qual-
ity, qualitative research sample randomness and
representativeness are of less concern than rele-
vance to ensure the sample can provide the type of
knowledge necessary to understand structures and
processes of the local context (Popay, Rogers, &
Williams, 1998). Based on this principle, snowball

168. sampling was used and recruitment of participants
was concluded once no new stakeholders emerged.
Ethics approval was sought and obtained from
the Flinders University Social and Behaviour
Research Ethics Committee. A discussion paper
Amber Bastian and John Coveney
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based on Rychetnik, Webb, Story and Katz’s

169. (2003) Food Security Options Paper was developed
specifi cally for this research and sent to participants
prior to interview. Five themes were explored
during interviews: food security defi nition; expe-
rience of food security in South Australia; deter-
minants of food security; potential solutions to
improve food security; and key stakeholders for
food security in South Australia. Voice recordings
of interviews were transcribed verbatim to allow
for a detailed analysis (Patton, 2002). Interview
transcripts were rechecked against voice record-
ings by the principal researcher to ensure accuracy.
Participants were e-mailed their interview tran-
scripts and offered the opportunity to make any
amendments, a step that helped to further enhance
validity of the research method (Perry, 1998).
Prior to analysis audio fi les were listened to
and interview transcripts were read and re-read

170. to allow for immersion in the data, a method
employed to enhance analysis (Green et al., 2007).
Following this immersion, emerging concepts on
food security from each participant were physi-
cally cut from transcripts, collated and openly
coded into emerging categories. Analysis of data
took two approaches which were later compared
and contrasted. First the range of proposed solu-
tions by stakeholders was examined against fi ve
questions adapted from Bacchi’s framework of
analysis (Bacchi, 1999, 2009) and second, these
questions were applied to each individual inter-
view transcript to uncover any tensions. Bacchi’s
original framework was adapted to avoid rep-
etition and better meet the needs of analysing
interview data as opposed to policy,
which is how Bacchi most commonly
uses her framework.

171. The following questions were used in
analysis:
1. What is the problem represented to
be through the solutions proposed by
stakeholders?
2. What presumptions or assumptions
underlie representations of the problem?
3. What is left unproblematic by rep-
resentations? Where are the silences?
How can the problem be thought
about differently?
4. What effects are produced by rep-
resentations of the problem? What are the
unintended consequences of representations?
Who benefi ts from the representations?
5. Where are the various problem representations
being produced and reproduced? Adapted from
(Bacchi, 1999, 2009; Murray & Powell, 2009).
FINDINGS
Dominant problem representations
offered by stakeholders
Bacchi proposes policy solutions have built into
them a particular representation of what the
problem is. Furthermore, postulated solutions to
policy problems reveal underlying assumptions,

172. values and beliefs of policymakers (Bacchi, 2009).
In examining various proposed solutions and
problem representations offered by stakeholders,
four themes emerged around who stakeholders
framed as being responsible for improving the
issue. The two most common themes were that
of individual responsibility and government inter-
vention, followed by community action and lastly
corporate social responsibility of private industry.
Table 2 provides an overview of the types of
solutions proposed and who these solutions frame
as being responsible for improving food security.
Presumptions and assumptions underlying
problem representations
Bacchi highlights how examination of language
used and meanings attached to key concepts
reveal underlying assumptions (knowledge) and
values attached to particular policy issues (Bacchi,
2009). Examination of interview transcripts

173. TABLE 1: RESEARCH RESPONDENTS
Type of
stakeholder
Roles Number
Public servants Food transport, food processing,
public health and social policy
7
Directors/
employees of
non government
organisations
Income support, social and
community support, food provision,
public health, alternative food
production and retailing
7
Professionals Nutrition and health, social work
and urban planning
3
Private enterprise Food retailing and farming 2
Local government Community development, strategic
planning, food and health
5

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the broader social structural elements of food
security unproblematic and, through the use of
the word ‘ability’, frames the issue as one of indi-
vidual skills, knowledge and resources.
A number of participants reframed the issue of

175. food security by providing alternative defi nitions.
One reframed the issue as relating to the total pro-
duction of food globally versus population needs.
This defi nition draws attention to the agricul-
tural industry and the import/export market. The
recent Australian Federal Government’s Food
Plan issues paper emphasises and promotes greater
international free trade to ensure future food secu-
rity. The paper frames the solution to food secu-
rity as being increased production within Australia
above population requirements in order to capital-
ise on export markets (Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry, 2011). Similarly, the main
focus of the Prime Minister’s Science Engineering
revealed how stakeholders drew attention to
various aspects of food security through their use
of certain terms or language when defi ning the
issue. A majority of stakeholders agreed with the

176. defi nition of food security provided in the dis-
cussion paper. This defi nition refers to ‘the ability
of individuals, households and communities to acquire
appropriate and nutritious food on a regular and
reliable basis, and using socially acceptable means’.
The wording of this defi nition places responsibil-
ity onto individuals, families and communities to
acquire food. Furthermore by stating that ‘food
security is determined by both food supply and
people’s ability to access and use food’ account-
ability is again placed onto individuals and their
personal skills or resources to be able to access
and use food rather than their facilitating circum-
stances. While this defi nition acknowledges food
supply as a determinant, to a large extent it leaves
TABLE 2: DOMINANT PROBLEM REPRESENTATIONS
OFFERED BY STAKEHOLDERS
Responsibility
for food security
Frequency of
representation
Examples of proposed solutions

177. Individuals 35 Improve knowledge and skills on various topics:
fi nancial literacy and
budgeting; shopping and cooking; label reading; home and
community
gardening; awareness of environmental impacts of food
production
Change consumer demand
Communal shopping, food swapping and gardening
Government 67 Urban planning policy to address location and
type of retail outlets
Land use policy to protect arable agricultural land
Invest in public transport infrastructure to improve mobility and
access to food
retail outlets
Improve public housing infrastructure to ensure adequate
cooking and
storage facilities
Set targets for industry to improve food composition of home
name brands
Create and implement pricing policies such as subsidisation of
healthy foods
and taxation of unhealthy foods
Change social policy to ensure income is in line with current
costs of living
Subsidise food transport costs
Research and development for the agriculture sector
Provision of training on sustainable farming practices
Increase workforce capacity
Develop joined up food policies and frameworks
Community 16 Develop alternative food supply systems such as:
community-supported
agriculture; community gardening; local farmers’ markets; food
co-ops;

178. food swaps Coordinate food purchasing systems for remote
Indigenous
community stores Train and employ community members in
remote
Indigenous stores
Private enterprise 5 Farmers to incorporate more sustainable
production methods
Food manufacturers to create more healthy products
Food retailers to increase proportion of locally-produced food
in stores
Food retailers to implement in-store pricing policies to reduce
cost of healthy
food and increase cost of unhealthy foods
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179. SR
of ideas, practices and approaches that are asso-
ciated with a preference for small government
and greater reliance on market mechanisms
to determine economic outcomes (Beeson &
Firth, 1998). Neo-liberals assert good govern-
ment is synonymous with securing conditions
for economic growth, which provides required
resources for education, health and welfare.
Similarly economic security is dependent on
the effi ciency of these services (Beeson & Firth,
1998). Due to this belief, economic policy takes
precedence over all other forms of public policy.
By framing individuals as being responsible to
change their own circumstances to improve their
individual food security the role of government
is minimised within the neo-liberal perspective.

180. The two stakeholders working in food produc-
tion and retail industries tended to support free
market economies by framing the issue as inad-
equate production or distribution of food. This
is consistent with how the issue is framed in the
food plan issues paper (Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry, 2011) and the Australian
food security in a changing world report (PMSEIC,
2010). Through this representation the power to
improve food security is placed in the hands of
industry and the role for government is minimised.
A social determinants of health perspective
A converse perspective is offered through a focus
on the social determinants of health and govern-
ments’ role to intervene to ensure its citizens are
afforded equal opportunities and access to health
care and education. The provision of income
and housing is considered the responsibility
of government, which is a move back towards

181. a role for ‘big government’ or greater govern-
ment intervention in free market economies.
The recent World Health Organisation commis-
ion on the social determinants of health (WHO,
2008) highlights how health inequalities within
and between countries are caused by an unequal
distribution of power, income, goods and access
to services as a result of poor social policies and
programmes. While the report acknowledges
economic growth of a country is undoubtedly
important, as it provides required resources to
invest in the improvement of the lives of the
population, it highlights how this growth alone
and Innovation Council working group’s report
Australian Food Security in a changing world is on
increasing food production via increased research
and development and building capacity in the
food sector (PMSEIC, 2010).

182. Another stakeholder reframed the issue as
relating to adequate local production of food (so
that there is no dependence on imports) through
use of the term ‘food self-suffi ciency’ and in
doing so drew attention to local agriculture. A
third reframed the issue as ‘food sovereignty’
and people’s right to control their food supply.
Use of the term ‘people’s right’ brings a social
justice aspect to the issue.
These various ways of framing food security
are supported by underlying assumptions that
lead to thinking about the issue in a particular
way. The focus on changing individuals’ behav-
iour and enhancing the agricultural industry
are supported by an underlying assumption of
reduced government intervention and increased
economic rationality thus taking a neo-liberal
perspective. Conversely, an increased role for

183. government to address the social determinants of
health is seen through the focus of creating sup-
portive social and structural conditions through
discourses such as addressing personal fi nances
and food prices. These two perspectives are
explored in more detail below.
A neo-liberal perspective
Framing of the issue as one of individual respon-
sibility, by focussing on people’s ability to access
food, along with framing of the issue as one of
inadequate food production, by focussing on
increasing yield, both assert a neo-liberal per-
spective. Neo-liberalists support a free-market
economy and a reduced role for government,
along with a protection of individual freedoms.
They believe that conditions provided by free
markets are likely to prove most propitious for
the development of the economy and indeed
for society as a whole (Barry, Osborne, & Rose,

184. 1996; Hindess, 1998). In supporting free markets
governments move away from a regulation role
and instead there is a separation of government
from society; there is a public and private sec-
tor. As opposed to interventionist policy tools of
big government, neo-liberalism presents a range
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185. fi nances as an individual skills and behaviour
issue with the problem being represented as an
individual’s lack of budgeting skills compounded
by lack of knowledge of how to shop economi-
cally, their lack of cooking skills to prepare cheap
healthy meals and lack of gardening skills to
grown their own food. As one participant com-
mented; ‘some people will survive better on the same
amount of money’ (Public Servant, family and
community sector). Competing priorities such
as drug, alcohol and gambling addictions were
raised as reasons why people were not able to
purchase healthy food within their budget. The
tensions between these two representations result
in very different effects. The social policy repre-
sentation places responsibility onto government
to create social policy change. Alternatively the
individual knowledge, skills and behaviour repre-
sentation places accountability onto individuals.

186. While there may still be a role for government
action in this representation through the provi-
sion of funding for community-centred educa-
tion programmes, the ultimate responsibility is
for the individual to acquire the required knowl-
edge and skills to cope with their circumstances.
Unintended consequences of the individual
responsibility representation may be associated
stigma for individuals experiencing food inse-
curity. Placing responsibility onto individuals to
overcome their life circumstances in order to
improve their food security induces a level of
blame for individuals currently experiencing food
insecurity and frames them as having failed to
modify their behaviours to ensure food security.
In addition, by highlighting that some individu-
als choose to spend money on competing priori-
ties such as drug, alcohol and gambling addictions

187. rather than purchasing healthy foods, infers these
individuals are being socially ‘deviant’. Deviance
can be defi ned as not conforming to a set of social
norms and is behaviour that is subjected to correc-
tion or treatment (Scambler, 2003). In their dis-
course analysis Madden and Chamberlain (2004)
highlight the ‘moral’ individual is one who con-
sumes healthy foods and looks after their weight
while the ‘immoral’ individual eats ‘bad’ foods.
By representing the issue as a problem of indi-
vidual behaviour and lack of knowledge on how
to appropriately budget fi nances or eat healthily
without appropriate social policies brings little
benefi t to improving the unequal distribution of
goods and services. Under this perspective poor
and unequal living conditions, including unequal
access to food, are the consequence of inadequate
social policies and programmes and unfair eco-

188. nomic arrangements. In order to improve equal
access to goods and services an increased role
for government is proposed through creating a
strong public sector that is committed, capable
and adequately fi nanced. In order to achieve
this, strengthened government and governance
is required along with increased private sector
accountability (Marmot, Friel, Bell, Houweling,
& Taylor, 2008; WHO, 2008). This increased
role for government was found through stake-
holder discourse on addressing the social struc-
tural elements of food security such as individual
fi nancial resources versus cost of food, adequate
cooking and food preparation facilities and
greater regulation of the food industry in order
to change how food is produced and sold.
Silences, benefi ts and effects produced by
the various problem representations
Aspects of a particular problem may be left uncon-

189. sidered in proposed policy solutions or silenced
by the way the issue is represented. Furthermore,
some groups or individuals may benefi t or
become disadvantaged by various representations.
This section examines the four dominant prob-
lem representations in greater detail to illustrate
how these competing representations, and their
different underlying assumptions, benefi t differ-
ent social actors and produce different effects for
stakeholders and those at risk of food insecurity.
The problem represented as individual
responsibility compared to government
responsibility
The most commonly mentioned determinant by
stakeholders was lack of personal fi nances of indi-
viduals to spend on purchasing food. However,
the way this determinant was represented, the
proposed solutions varied. Some stakeholders
framed this issue as a social policy problem with
the underlying assumption that welfare payments

190. have not increased in line with increased costs
of living. Other stakeholders framed personal
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this problem representation there is the underlying
assumption by stakeholders that government
should intervene to meet the needs of the most

191. vulnerable in society. This creates the subject posi-
tion for government to be more paternalistic by
intervening through approaches such as laws, regu-
lations, enforceable policies and fi scal instruments.
The problem represented as the community’s
responsibility
A number of proposed strategies, including those
looking at alternative food supply systems such as
community-supported agriculture, community
gardening, local farmers’ markets, food co-ops
and food swaps, highlight the role for community
action. By framing solutions as community action
initiatives the effect is to position individuals as
needing to create their own systems and solutions
to improve food security and in doing so either
consciously or unconsciously diverts some of the
responsibility and accountability away from gov-
ernment and industry. The representation provides
an alternative system of power and infl uence that

192. can interact to improve food security, a system
whereby the ‘lay voice’ can be valued and heard
and individuals are less reliant on government
to make changes. On the surface, by placing the
accountability and responsibility onto communi-
ties it removes the risk of stigmatising individuals as
it calls for collective rather than individual action.
However, upon closer examination, once these
alternative food systems and community action
initiatives are created, ultimate responsibility still
rests with the individual to participate and engage
in them; therefore there is still an element of indi-
vidual responsibility and potential for blame.
Community organisations may benefi t from
this representation …
Local/Global Encounters
Modernity, Exclusion and Resistance: Water and
indigenous struggles in Peru

193. JUANA VERA DELGADO
AND MARGREET
ZWARTEVEEN
ABSTRACT Juana Vera Delgado and Margreet Zwarteveen
present
the social and political struggles around water of peasant
indigenous
people from an Andean community in Peru. They look at how
the
community attempts to access, control and claim legitimacy for
their
rights to water when faced with a large and modern irrigation
project. The community’s struggle for legitimate existence
based
on access to land and water is deeply rooted in local cultural
and
customary norms and practices. The struggle illustrates how the
contestation and counter-discourses of marginalized people are
part of the ‘alternatives to modernity’ that are emerging with
the globalizing water world.
KEYWORDS contestation; community; watershed; Majes
irrigation
project; modernity; tradition
Struggles to obtain water
yWho are wey? Are we perhaps the stepchildren [of the
government]? Because when some-
thing happens with the Majes canal they immediately come
running to repair it, but when
something happens with our own Coporaque canal nobody
comes to our assistance and we
have to deal with it on our own y (Opinion of a Coporaquen$ o,

194. expressed ina meeting between
water users of the communityof Coporque and the official water
authorities, October 2006).
When this Coporaquen$ o refers to himself and his neighbours
as ‘stepchildren’, he not
onlyexpressedademand forgovernmentalattentiontoaveryspecific
maintenancepro-
blem of the Coporaque canal but also drew attention to the bias
of state interventions
in the area. As such, his question provides a clear indication of
the asymmetrical rela-
tionship.There are those whoare considered the‘lawful
beneficiaries’ (citizens) whobe-
long to and are included in the logic of the national project of
development and
modernization.Thenthere are the‘others’who fall outside of this
logic. Rather than just
acall for inclusion, however, the questionalsoentailedademand
forchanging the terms
of inclusion, and for changing the nature and direction of the
national project of
development.
Coporaque is one of the 16 Andean communities of the
ColcaValley, located on the
right bankof the Colca river (3,600 m.o.s.l), called the
watershed of Colca-Majes-Siguas1
Development, 2008, 51, (114–120)
r 2008 Society for International Development 1011-6370/08
www.sidint.org/development
Development (2008) 51, 114–120.
doi:10.1057/palgrave.development.1100467

195. (CMS). In contrast to neighbouring communities,
Coporaque is the only community that has suc-
ceeded in bringing water from the Colca river to
its lands. Although initially part of an attempt of
four communities (Coporaque, Ichupampa, Lari
and Madrigal, situated on the right bank of the
CMS), only people from Coporaque succeeded in
accessing the water. At the start of the project (in
the 1980s), the leaders of the four communities
joined their efforts in an attempt to convince the
politicians and the planners that a new multi-
communal irrigation project was needed to solve
their problems of water shortage. In fact, not only
these four communities, but all 16 villages of the
valley faced problems with acquiring enough
water to irrigate their 10,500 ha of irrigable land.
Most of this land had been irrigated since time im-
memorial, as the still-present ancient terraces2
built in the Collaguas and Cabanas cultures testi-
fy. However, less water is available nowadays and
only around 40 percent of these lands could still
be cultivated in 2007. The water problem was
especially severe in Coporaque and Lari, where
farmers could only irrigate their crops once every
70 or 90 days.
The leaders of the four communities asked for
approval and funds for their project from the
central government as well as permission from
the official water authority to construct an in-
take-canal and make use of those waters of the
Colca River that remained after the upstream

196. deviation by the Majes Irrigation Project (MIP) in
1983. To reduce costs, they promised that most of
the wage labour needed for construction would
be contributed by the local community through
theircustomarycollective work, faenas. Obtaining
the approval from the government was hard, but
obtaining the funds to initiate the project proved
even more difficult. The leaders had to travel
frequently to Lima (a trip that took three days of
travel) to receive money that was used up in the
pre-feasibility study costs. Even after some years,
the money to begin the construction was not
released, to the despair of the leaders who felt that
the government was not there for them. Only the
Coporaquen$ os had enough stamina to persist and
finally succeeded. They built eight kilometres
of canal (280 l/sec) and 0.5 km of tunnel. In
November 2007, the last section of the canal was
still being constructed.
Constructing the canal and the tunnel was a
huge effort for the people of Coporaque, not only
in terms of labour and time investments (more
than 20 years) but also interms of continuous po-
litical battles with the governmental apparatus,
against corruption and favouritism including
the local Mayor misusing the project’s funds. As a
consequence, the structures of the canal were
weakand the Coporaquen$ os have to repair it three
or four times in ayear.
The enormous efforts and troubles of the Copor-
aquen$ os to gain minimal support from the
government contrast starkly with the enormous
amounts of money and energy that the govern-

197. ment spent every year on the MIP.
The Majes Irrigation Project (MIP)
The Majes Irrigation Project is a large-scale irriga-
tion system that aimed in its first stage to turn
22,000 ha of arid lands of the Majes desert (Pam-
pas de Majes, 1,300 m.o.s.l.) into a highly modern
and profitable agriculture oriented towards grow-
ing commercial export crops. The MIP was first
envisioned and designed as earlyas the beginning
of the 1940s. It was considered, together with
other large-scale irrigation projects alongside the
coast of Peru, as a key element of the moderniza-
tion of the Arequipa region in Peru. The large-
scale surface irrigation systems were a mark of
that era’s development investments worldwide.
The ‘green revolution’ led to top-down, standar-
dized and ‘integrated’ projects that aimed to
modernize agriculture through improved high-
yieldingseeds and modernwatercontrol methods.
It also included the resettlement of people,
development of roads, generation of electricity
and reform of land tenure systems. Such projects
were carried out by centrally financed bureau-
cratic institutions, highly dependent on interna-
tional funds. Rural people were seen as
beneficiaries, dependent for their welfare and
development on the standardized package of in-
puts and training provided by the government
(Vermillion, 2000; Zwarteveen, 2006). The MIP
was a prototype example of such a project.
Vera Delgado and Zwarteveen: Water and Indigenous Struggles
in Peru

198. 115
In 1971, the leftist Peruvian president Velazco
Alvarado started the construction of the MIP. It
was completed in eleven years. The MIP consists
of a very sophisticated network of reservoirs, tun-
nels, aqueducts and canals (Figure1). The first re-
servoir, Condoroma, has a storing capacity of
285 MCM (million cubic meters) of water, which is
released into the Colca River, and stored in a sec-
ond reservoir-intake, situated in Tuti (one of the
first villages of the Colca Valley), 70 km down-
stream. This second reservoir captures 276 MCM
water from the upper-intermediate part of the
watershed. At this point all the water, 523 MCM
or10^13 m3/sec, is deviated to the Pampas of Ma-
jes, through 88 km of tunnels (conduction capa-
city of 34 m3/sec) and 12 km of open canal. All
these flows of water (15 m3/sec) are again released
into the Siguas’river, and almost 30 km downriver
the water is captured by the intake of Tipay, and
from here water is conducted to the ‘Pampas’ of
Majes.
The Peruvian government invested US$ 1,320
million in MIP. Of this,980 million were lost a‘fon-
do perdido’of the external debt. A comparison of
the government investments in the Pampas de
Majes irrigation infrastructures with those in
the Colca Valley shows how Peruvian policies
favoureda specific type of developmenttopromote
modernity and the ‘modern farmer’. In the first
stage of MIP, 22,000 ha were expected to be con-

199. verted to irrigated production (though only
15,000 ha have been to date).The government has
Figure 1:
Development 51(1): Local/Global Encounters
116
invested around US$ 60,000 ha to turn arid and
unproductive land into fertile agricultural soils.
For each farmer (2,587 farmers received land in
the area), the government invested US$ 510,243.
In the same period, the government invested
only US$ 1.85 million in the improvement and
rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure in the
Colca Valley (ATDR, 2006). This amounts to US$
176,00/ha or US$ 312 per farmer (there are 5,923
farmers in the ColcaValley).
In this model of modernity, there is no discur-
sive or political space for inhabitants of the
Colca Valley. Their existing ways of farming and
irrigating or their rights to the waters of the
Colca River are not acknowledged. The MIP uses
water from the upper part of the watershed
(4,158 m.a.s.l.), negativelyaffecting the availability
of the water for the inhabitants of the ColcaValley.
MIP in many ways threatened (and continues to
threaten) the livelihood security of these inhabi-
tants. For instance, one of the downstream effects
of deviating the complete flow of the river’s water
inTuti is that the river regularly runs dry for more

200. than 300 km, only 70 km downstream of the first
dam, the Presa Condorama (see figure 1). The risk
is that the area turns into a closed watershed.
There is alsoaworrying decline inthe fishpopula-
tion. Fish, an important source of food in the
valley, have been negatively affected by MIP.
Another major effect of the diversion of the Colca
River’s waters is that many fountains and springs
onthe left bankof the river have dried up. Because
the water is now diverted through tunnels, there
is no longer any subterranean seepage to feed
fountains and springs. The farmers who relied on
these water sources for their crops have com-
plained to the government and demanded the
return of their water. They even threatened to
damage the canal unless the government paid
attention to their demands. After almost ten years
of rolling protests and activism, which also
engaged NGOs, the government gave permission
to construct off-takes from the canal in order to
re-allocate some of the water to the eight villages
on the left bank. The water is still not enough to
meet the water needs of these villages. Some of
them, like Pinchollo village, were compelled to
build and open a valve illegally to replace water
from the MIP canal in 2005. As they had no per-
mission from the water authorities the villages
were fined.
How is it possible that the 6,000 families living
in the Colca Valley were completely overlooked
during the diagnosis, design and construction
process of the MIP? Ignoring the peasants of the
ColcaValley is typical of many irrigation moderni-
zation efforts, which is based not only on the

201. scientific control of water but also the disciplining
of human behaviour. Irrigation engineers see
existing customs of indigenous farmers as back-
ward and running counter to their civilizing
project (Gilmartin, 1994: 1136; Bolding et al.,
1995). To build their dreams of modernity and
civilization, engineers aimed to eliminate as
muchas possible unwanted interferences by‘local
communities’, largely through technical means.
Modernity and civilization would come about
through the ‘liberation of Man from Nature’. The
new irrigation system were embedded in a con-
cept of modernity that is individualist and profit
maximizing. The proper, scientific, functioning of
the irrigation system not only required a modern
farmer but also actively helped produce such indi-
viduals. The layout and size of irrigated plots, the
prescribed cropping patterns and all agricultural
support and credit services were geared towards
a‘modern’ farmer. The people eligible to settle on
the newly irrigated land were selected to match
most closely the ideal type (Zwarteveen, 2006),
the so-called‘lettered’people (de la Cadena, 2004)
who belong to a privileged culture. This way of
thinking continuously marginalized the ‘others’,
the indigenous peasants who do not fit into the
logic of a modernization project, even as benefi-
ciaries.
Modern dreams vs indigenous
knowledge and culture
MIPis embedded ina huge techno-scientific appa-
ratus of modern development with AUTODEMA
(Autoridad AutoŁ noma de Majes), the administra-
tive authority in charge of managing the system.

202. AUTODEMA supervised the maintenance of the
major infrastructural work, and were responsible
for the efficient management and control of water
Vera Delgado and Zwarteveen: Water and Indigenous Struggles
in Peru
117
according to the designed irrigation module.
They were in charge of organizing the allocation
of newly irrigable lands and the promotion of
market-oriented agriculture based on the ‘green
revolution’ model. Interestingly, AUTODEMA was
simultaneously given the tasks of implementer
and of judge, since they were also asked to evalu-
ate the environmental and social effect of the MIP
in Colca and Siguas.3
AUTODEMA is financed from the public budget.
The Peruvian government spends annually US$
33 (8 million for infrastructure insurance,22 mil-
lion for staff of AUTODEMA). This amount is in
marked contrast to the negligible public expendi-
ture on most Andean irrigation systems, the costs
of which are mainly borne by the local water
users. These local water systems are undertaken
through the collective work of ‘faenas’, with
ancestral ceremonies and water ‘rituals’, like the
‘Harqa Haspiy’ and the ‘Mallku Chaskiy’ feast
(cleaning of the canal and reception of the water
spirit or sentient water entity). These activities
contribute to the activities of a series of social
networks based on reciprocal relationships, the

203. enforcement of familiar ties and the construction
of communal and water actors and authorities,
where women have a prominent role (Vera,2004).
The most visible traditional water authorities
are the ‘regidor of Urinsaya’ and the ‘regidor of
Hanansaya’ (the water mayors). Changing an-
nually, these regidores are incharge of distributing
water year and organizing the water feast, which
entails: the collective cleaning of the irrigation
infrastructure or Yarqa Haspiy, the reception of
the Mallku (Valderrama and Escalante,1988;Vera
and Zwarteveen, 2007). The organization of the
collective work for the cleaning of the canals and
reservoirs is done together with the authorities of
the ComisioŁ n de Regantes. Almost all these works
and ceremonies occur in four days in August
when Coporaquen$ os combine intensive physical
labour, pilgrimage, spiritual worship and gift giv-
ing to the fountains and springs from where the
Mallku emerges, as well as to the mother earth
(Pacha Mama) and Apus (the snow mountains).
The importance of water in local traditions
and community organization had already been
observed by the first Spanish chroniclers who
arrived in Peru (Bouysse, 1987:13; CarrioŁ n, 2005:
31) in the 16th and 17th centuries. Colonial at-
tempts to annihilate this waterculture or ‘diabolic
practices’, as they used to be called, have been
without success. Manyauthors, like Gelles (2002),
Yauri (2006), and Rostworowski (2000) describe
how traditional water rituals and ceremonies
were present 500 years ago, in spite of manyother
changes associated with the trans-cultural colo-

204. nization process. These traditional water systems
continue to be associated with the so-called back-
wardness and superstitions ‘indios’, ‘serranos
(Andeans)’ ‘cholos’ or ‘indigenous’ (de la Cadena,
2007). Indigenous water systems have been and
continue to be labelled as ‘anomalous’,‘abnormal’
and even‘unnatural’by thosewhopropagate mod-
ern ‘universal’ models of water management.
Existing ways of managing and using water in
many Andean communities are not seen and
judged on their own merits and terms but are
evaluated against the universal and ideal model
(Escobar,1995; Boelens and Zwarteveen,2005).
Placed as the other
Such a stigma of anomaly and abnormality of
the Andean region explains why the people in the
Colca Valley were not considered when the MIP
was designed and implemented. In order to devel-
op a ‘modern’ agriculture in the Colca Valley
indigenous peoples were not considered by the
design engineers. The labelling of the Colca pea-
sants as ‘backward’, ‘illiterate’, ‘poor’ and of their
agriculture as ‘inaccessible to markets’ justified
their exclusion from the irrigation modernization
project.
As soon as MIPstarted the diagnostic stage, the
engineers changed the native name of Hatun
Mayu (big river in English) to that of the Colca
River. ‘Development has [..] been fundamentally
about mapping and making, about the special
reach of power and the control and management
of other peoples, territories, environments, and
places’ (Crush, 1995). The developmentalist

205. and modernist discourse and their spatial images
and metaphors have always been used to define
what development is and does (Slater, 1993) in
order to justify intervention (Mitchell, 1995) but
Development 51(1): Local/Global Encounters
118
in the MIP case, it was used to justify non-inter-
vention.
Conclusion
Escobar (2007) suggests acritical interpretationof
modernity from the perspective of coloniality,
allows a better understanding of the marginaliza-
tion of the cultures and knowledges of subaltern
groups by hegemonic discourses. He suggests a
radical and visionary project of redefining and
reconstructing the local and regional worlds
from the perspectives of cultural, economic and
ecological differences. This vision is based on the
readingof the discourses and practices of commu-
nities as alternatives to modernity. When seen
from this perspective, indigenous peoples in
maintaining their own water culture are resisting
politically and religiously the hegemonic dis-
courses of development and modernization
(Escobar, 2007) propagated through the MIP.
By choosing not to join these discourses and
practices of modernity, Andean communities also
invited their own marginalization from main-

206. stream processes of development. In Peru (like in
Ecuador), this created a clear spatial divide be-
tween the coastal region, where white and criollo
people lived and associated with development,
and the Andean region, which was related with
tradition and backwardness and where Indians
and Mestizos lived. Marginalizing the people and
their cultural practices, they have also margina-
lized the geographical place.
The people from the ColcaValley pursue a dual
strategy to obtain legitimacy as citizens and
water-right holders. On the one hand, they
actively affirm their own culture, language and
traditions to demonstrate their own ‘otherness’.
On the other, they pragmaticallyand strategically
appropriate and borrow elements of these
same hegemonic discourses and insert those into
their own modes of thinking and doing to
construct a dynamic alternative to modernity
and development.
Notes
1 The Colca-Majes-SiguasWatershed is situatedalongside the
occidental Andes and part of the coastal regionof Are-
quipa in Peru, between 800 and 4,850 m.o.s.l., and its
maintributaryof water is the Colca’s river.This region is con-
sidered a dry and dessert area, although the precipitations in the
upper part can reach on average to 629.8 mm/
year (series of 20 years of SENAMI, Spanish name, Servicio
Nacional de InformacioŁ n MeteoroloŁ gica). In the inter-
mediate part of the watershed, rain can reach on average to
482.6 mm/year (series of the last ten years), and in
the lower part (Majes and Siguas), it does not rain at all.

207. 2 The ColcaValley’s terraces, together with the‘Condor’s
cross’, are actually one of the main attractions for the hun-
dreds of tourists who visit this place every day.
3 Because of the over-utilization of water, two times (1^1.2
l/sec) that of the designed irrigation module (0.5^0.6 l/
sec), and the highuse of agro-chemical inputs, most of the
fertile and high productive lands of Siguas’Valley (eight
villages) have been salinized and buried by sand.
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ATDR (2006) ‘InversioŁ n Pu¤ blica en las infraestructuras de
Riego delValle del Cocla’, Informe teŁ cnico, AdministracioŁ n
TeŁ cnica del Distrito de Riego Colca-Majes.
Boelens, Rutgerd and Margreet Zwarteveen (2005) ‘Anomalous
Water Rights and the Politics of Normalization.
Collective Water Control and Privatization Policies in the
Andean Region’, in Dik Roth, Rutgerd Boelens
and Margreet Zwarteveen (eds.) Liquid Relations. Contested
Water Rights and Legal Complexity pp. 97^123,
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Bolding, Alex, Meter M. Mollinga and Kees van Straaten (1995)
‘Modules for Modernisation: Colonial irrigation in
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Peru¤ , Lima, Peru¤ : Instituto Nacional de Cultura.

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dela Cadena, Marisol (2004) Ind|¤genas mestizos. Rasa y
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Rostworowski, Mar|¤a (2000) Estructuras Andinas del Poder.
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Enframingof DevelopmentTheory’,Transactions of Institute
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Valderrama, Ricardo and Carmen Escalante (1988) ‘Del Tata
Mallku a la Mama Pacha’, Riego, sociedad y ritos en los
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Desarrollo, DESCO. p.243.
Vera, D.Juana (2004) ‘CuaŁ nto maŁ s doy, maŁ s soy.’
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ciones de riegotradicionales en los Andes del sur peruano, in
Francisco Pen$ a (ed.) Los Pueblos Ind|¤genas and el Agua:
desaf|¤os del siglo XXI, San Luis Potos|¤, Mexico: Colegio de
San Lu|¤s,WALIR, SEMARNAT, IMTA.
Vera, D.Juanaand Margreet Zwarteveen (2007) ‘The Public and
Private Domain of the Everyday Politics of Water:The
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InternationalJournal of Feminist Politics 9(4):503^11.
Vermilion, Douglas (2000) ‘Old and New Paradigms
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210. Yauri, M.Marcos (2006) ‘Laberintos de la memoria.
ReinterpretacioŁ n de relatos orales y mitos andinos’, Lima
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del PedagoŁ gico San Marcos, Instituto de Ciencias y
Humanidades, AFINED. p.181.
Zwarteveen, Margreet Z. (2006) ‘Wedlock or Deadlock?
Feminists’Attempts to Engage Irrigation Engineers’, PhD
thesis.Wageningen:Wageningen University.
Development 51(1): Local/Global Encounters
120
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
Spring/Summer 2012 • volume xviii, issue 11
115
Copyright © 2012 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs
Alison Brysk is Mellichamp Professor of Global Governance in
the Global and International Studies
Program at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She has
authored or edited eight books on inter-
national human rights, most recently From Human Trafficking

211. to Human Rights: Reframing Contemporary
Slavery (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). Natasha
Bennett is a PhD candidate in the Deparment
of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara.
Voice in the Village:
Indigenous Peoples Contest
The close of the twentieth century saw the unexpected rise of an
indigenous
peoples’ rights movement in Latin America and worldwide,
contesting 500
years of oppression and the emerging challenges of
globalization. By the turn
of the millennium, indigenous rights campaigns had gained a
voice in local,
national, and international political arenas. Yet the legacies of
oppression and the
pressures of globalization continue, and inclusion has translated
only partially
into empowerment. Now we must ask when and how indigenous
peoples gain
influence over the development processes that threaten their
lands, cultures,
and livelihoods.
Bolivia provides a good case study in indigenous empowerment,
since it
is an indigenous majority country whose marginalized
population has been
struggling for rights in waves since the 1952 Revolution. In the
1990s, Bolivia’s
indigenous peoples made vast strides in legal recognition,
political representa-
tion, and local autonomy, and began to contest globalization
projects such as

212. internationally sponsored dams and roads. But recently,
development crises,
internal political divisions, and lack of leverage in key
transnational venues
have limited the gains achieved by indigenous communities
throughout the
Alison Brysk
Professor
University of California, Santa Barbara
Natasha Bennett
PhD Candidate
University of California, Santa Barbara
Globalization in Bolivia
the brown journal of world affairs
Alison Brysk and Natasha Bennett
116
continent. Thus, the outcome of current indigenous struggles in
Bolivia can
help us to assess the prospects, potential, and limitations of the
critical move
from inclusion to empowerment in the era of twenty-first
century globalization.
After examining an overview of trends in indigenous rights
struggles, we will
focus on the Bolivian experience.
froM tribal Village to global Village: the big piCture

213. After centuries of chronic marginalization, indigenous peoples
found their voice
in the era of globalization. The key to their mobilization was
the transnational
formation of a pan-indigenous identity, coalitions with global
civil society,
and a series of appeals to international institutions and
grassroots supporters
above and below blocked state institutions. As Latin America
democratized in
the second half of the twentieth century, some governments
became receptive
to contestation. But the 1990s were also the peak of
neoliberalism, in which
globalization was a double-edged sword for indigenous peoples.
At the same
time that globalization challenged indigenous livelihoods and
cultures, it also
provided new tools for political mobilization and self-defense.
The threats and challenges of globalization included the
expansion of
state power, economic development, and cultural domination.
Throughout the
Amazon Basin, in Colombia, and in the Sandinista conflict with
Nicaragua’s
Miskitos ethnic group, indigenous peoples have been displaced
and persecuted
by the militarization of national borders and manipulation by
rebel groups. In
some areas, this security crisis overlaps with cultural nation
building that seeks
forced assimilation through the suppression of native languages,
religions, and
family life.

214. In Latin America, North America, and Asia alike, tribal groups
are threat-
ened by several dynamics of economic development:
construction of infrastruc-
ture such as dams and roads by international agencies, resource
extraction by
transnational corporations, loss of collective lands to
privatization, and incursions
by impoverished neighbors displaced by national development
and globalization.
In the latter scenario, tribal peoples are often vulnerable to
physical abuse by
police, military, and paramilitary forces enforcing national
development plans,
protecting transnational projects, or simply executing the orders
of local elites.
Mexico’s Zapatista uprising reflects this pattern acutely: it was
mounted on the
day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took
effect in 1994
in response to the associated privatization of historical
collective land rights for
tribal communities.
Voice in the Village
Spring/Summer 2012 • volume xviii, issue 11
117
VoiCe in the Village
In response to these challenges, indigenous peoples have

215. mobilized for their
rights and achieved an unexpected impact, especially in Latin
America.
Following protests, indigenous groups have been granted
significant land rights
in Ecuador and Brazil, water rights in Bolivia, and zones of
local autonomy in
parts of Mexico, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. Constitutions have
been changed to
reflect multicultural national identities and to grant indigenous
peoples the
right to participate in government in several countries, notably
in Bolivia and
Brazil. Accordingly, bilingual education programs, health
policies, and local
development schemes have been enhanced in Mexico, Costa
Rica, and most
Andean countries. Tribal groups have been granted special
political participation
rights in Colombia’s legislature, and indigenous leaders have
come to national
political power in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Numerous Latin
American
governments have given tribal communities improved standing
to approve
international development and forestry projects, in part due to
the increased
accountability to indigenous stakeholders required by the World
Bank and the
regional Inter-American Development Bank. Although the social
conditions of
indigenous people in Latin America remain poor and unequal to
the dominant
population, indigenous groups have made tremendous gains in
access to power
to contest those conditions.

216. But at the same time, globalization has also deepened the
contradictions
of the neoliberal multicultural state. While some indigenous
peoples remain
second-class citizens, others have moved up to first-class status
in second-class
states—states that are at the mercy of global forces and cannot
fully protect any
of their citizens. As a local indigenous leader in a Mexican
autonomous zone told
me, “We don’t want self-determination in order to administer
impoverishment.”1
froM inClusion to eMpoWerMent?
Recent indigenous political action in Latin America has
sustained recognition
and political access that is used to contest development
projects. However,
indigenous voices meet with mixed reactions from populist
governments that,
though pledged to represent rising indigenous populations, are
pressured by
development crises. Indigenous ties to land and environment
create further
conundrums. We will examine the regional trend, and then turn
to how this
dynamic has played out in Bolivia.
During the past year, Latin American governments have
expanded the
the brown journal of world affairs

217. Alison Brysk and Natasha Bennett
118
political and cultural recognition and rights of indigenous
peoples throughout
the region. In Colombia, indigenous languages may now be used
for official
purposes, and the government will provide translation services
to help people
access justice. In Brazil, the government ministry for Indian
affairs has set up
a new agency for indigenous women and a gender action plan to
address dis-
crimination. In Chile, outgoing President Michelle Bachelet
acknowledged and
apologized for Chile’s historical mistreatment of indigenous
peoples.2
But indigenous land rights present a more complicated picture
and begin to
touch on development conflicts. While the populist Chavez
regime in Venezuela
redistributed about 15,000 hectares of land to Yukpa Indians in
2011, debates
still rage over whether certain local development projects will
be cancelled as a
result.3 Chilean Mapuche have
been fighting since the conclu-
sion of the Pinochet regime for
ancestral lands seized under the
dictatorship and against the application of anti-terror laws to
criminalize land

218. occupations. In 2010, 34 indigenous detainees staged a 66-day
hunger strike
against the controversial anti-terror law.4 As a result, the
president proposed
legislation that would forbid civilians and minors from being
tried in military
courts and announced a $4 billion package of economic and
social measures to
improve socioeconomic opportunities and quality of life for
Mapuche in their
home territory.5
Elsewhere, indigenous movements have mobilized to protest
environmen-
tally destructive globalization and development projects, the
most complicated
scenario of all. Since 2009, Peruvian Indian organizations have
staged road-
blocks to protest free trade agreements, deforestation, and the
privatization of
lands, leading to violent clashes with police.6 In Brazil, the
same government
that easily expanded indigenous anti-discrimination programs is
at the same
time pushing through a controversial dam project that activists
claim would
flood Indian lands (despite an unresolved case contesting this
move at the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission). Hundreds of indigenous
protestors
have occupied the construction site of the Belo Monte Dam. The
Brazilian
government defends Belo Monte as necessary to ensure that the
country has
sufficient electricity and denies that indigenous lands will be
flooded.7 Under

219. Ecuador’s sympathetic populist government, which includes an
indigenous
government agency and indigenous political parties that have
seats in Congress,
destructive oil production and mining continue in indigenous
lands, and have
been met by massive protest. According to the Confederation of
Indigenous
Indigenous movements have mobilized
to protest environmentally destructive
globalization and development projects.
Voice in the Village
Spring/Summer 2012 • volume xviii, issue 11
119
Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), there are currently 189
people accused
of sabotage and terrorism by the Ecuadorian government for
exercising their
right to protest the privatization of natural resources. Amnesty
International
issued a statement denouncing their imprisonment as an attempt
to silence
opposition to government policies.8 CONAIE actively
mobilized support for a
community referendum to prevent mining in the Amazon, but
the government
has attempted to deem the referendum illegal.
the rise of the indigenous VoiCe in boliVia

220. The year 2005 saw a historic moment for Bolivia’s indigenous
majority with the
overwhelming electoral victory of Latin America’s first
indigenous president,
Evo Morales. At a ceremonial inauguration held at the holy pre-
Incan site of
Tiwanaku, Morales announced that his election began a “new
year for the original
peoples of the world, in which we seek equality and justice.”9
Indeed, Morales’s
presidential election marks the culmination of a series of social
movements,
which, since 1952, have sought to reverse the privatization of
national resources,
combat U.S. foreign policy concerning coca production, and
claim rights for
indigenous peoples.
The story begins with one of the few true social revolutions in
Latin
America. In the 1952 Bolivian revolution, organized miner
unions and peasant
coalitions overthrew Bolivia’s oppressive and politically
unstable oligarchy. The
National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) pursued class-based
initiatives that
challenged political party elites and represented the interests of
organized labor.10
While the MNR government made important political strides for
Bolivia’s work-
ing class, including the implementation of universal suffrage
and an extensive
redistributive agrarian reform, it also folded cultural rights and
questions of eth-
nic identity into broader class-based initiatives.11 It was not

221. until the late 1960s
that social movements took up indigenous concerns. The
Katarista movement
of the 1970s was mostly comprised of urban Aymara
intellectuals attempting
to reformulate Bolivia’s historical narratives and mainstream
“Indianness” as a
political identity. The movement initially proposed that a
plurinational Bolivian
state (a state that officially and socially legitimates its diverse
social groups) would
allow indigenous populations to effectively claim citizenship
rights.12 The 1990s
brought an interesting array of multicultural policies to the
political scene. The
1993 Law of Constitutional Reform recognized indigenous
rights.13 One year
later, the 1994 Law of Popular Participation decentralized
political processes,
granting regional and municipal governments more political
autonomy. Yet,
the brown journal of world affairs
Alison Brysk and Natasha Bennett
120
while the law was designed to provide opportunities for
indigenous representa-
tion and governance, many have argued that the law granted
greater weight to
local elites, decentralizing social exclusion.14

222. Meanwhile, as Bolivia returned to civilian rule after a series of
military
dictatorships, the state embraced the neoliberal era, quickly
adopting United
States–prescribed structural adjustment policies intended to
decentralize state
power and privatize national resources. Bolivia is well known
for its 2000
Water War, in which citizens of Cochabamba successfully
reversed neoliberal
water privatization efforts that followed the World Bank’s loan
provisions.
Throughout the early 2000s, parallel peasant demonstrations
erupted among
indigenous groups in Bolivia’s highlands and in Cochabamba’s
valley. Indigenous
demonstrators made appeals for national control over water,
natural resources,
biodiversity, land reform, and labor rights.15 The coca-grower’s
union, headed
by Evo Morales, also used cultural claims to protect the sanctity
of the coca
leaf—and employment associated with coca growing—in
response to the U.S.
coca eradication efforts. In what became known as the Gas
Wars, a similar wave
of protests against the privatization of the country’s
hydrocarbon reserves first
ousted former dictator (and democratically elected president)
Goni Sánchez de
Lozada in 2003 and then his successor, Carlos Mesa, in 2005.
In the historic election that followed, Evo Morales was
popularly elected
to the presidency and immediately responded to demands for a
new constitu-

223. tion that more accurately represented the country’s indigenous
majority. The
constitution of the new Plurinational State of Bolivia delineates
a comprehensive
set of rights, based on expanded notions of human rights and
cultural citizen-
ship. In effect, the new national law uses human rights and
indigenous values as
foundations for a new breed of inclusive political
representation. Among other
policies, the constitution legally recognizes all indigenous
languages as official
state languages, and includes provisions for indigenous
autonomy in rural areas.
“We are all tipnis:” broadening indigenous rights in terMs of
enVironMental JustiCe
As elsewhere in Latin America, development dilemmas and
environmental
debates have tested Bolivia’s new democratic government’s
commitment to
indigenous rights. In Bolivia, the social movements that put Evo
Morales and
his MAS (Movement Toward Socialism) government into power
have assumed a
new political role, holding Morales accountable for his
promises. Within the last
year, these social movements have formed in opposition to two
major policies.
Voice in the Village
Spring/Summer 2012 • volume xviii, issue 11

224. 121
The first wave of indigenous rights protests is reminiscent of
the Gas Wars
of the early 2000s. Tens of thousands of people took to the
streets in Decem-
ber 2010, setting up roadblocks to protest the government’s
decision to repeal
subsidies of the country’s nationalized hydrocarbons. The
government defended
its position that the repeal of subsidies was necessary to protect
the economy
and to redirect social spending. Ultimately, this series of
protests forced the
government to reinstitute the subsidies, attesting to the
continued strength of
Bolivia’s social movements, which relentlessly seek
governmental accountability.
The second mass protest, in which indigenous marchers
contested a high-
way development project, speaks more directly to the
difficulties indigenous
peoples have experienced in
the face of economic devel-
opment as their ways of life
clash with industrialization
agendas. Economic policy
under the Morales adminis-
tration, largely spearheaded by Vice President Álvaro García
Linera, emphasizes
the development of the country’s domestic markets, internal
production, and
industrialization through policies such as the nationalization of
Bolivia’s hydro-

225. carbons and infrastructure projects. The Morales administration
has argued that
a road traversing the Bolivian tropics would provide a necessary
avenue for the
transportation of goods and services through the country. In
early 2011, the
Bolivian ministry approved negotiations for loans from the
Brazilian government,
propelling a project to connect the region of Beni to
Cochabamba through the
protected Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park
(TIPNIS).
Indigenous populations who live in and depend on the TIPNIS
park protested
that the project would be destructive to the environment and
that it threatened
indigenous autonomy. In response, they coordinated a march to
the capital city
with the hopes of halting the project.
The TIPNIS indigenous territory and national park is home to
some of
the world’s most concentrated biodiversity. Aside from its
extensive variety of
plants and animals, it also includes different ecosystems that
range from rain
forests and swamps to dry plains. Anthropologists and
ecologists argued that the
construction of the highway would have serious environmental
consequences
that would harm biodiversity, and that it would affect the
aquifers that currently
provide an important source of drinking water.16 However, for
the indigenous
populations, the TIPNIS park represents more than simply
irreplaceable biodi-

226. versity; it also carries divine importance as part of Mother
Earth. Socially, the
For the indigenous populations, the
TIPNIS park represents more than simple
irreplaceable biodiversity; it also carries
divine importance as part of Mother Earth.
the brown journal of world affairs
Alison Brysk and Natasha Bennett
122
TIPNIS area is home to lowland indigenous groups who have
maintained a
direct precolonial heritage and have claimed ancestral rights to
the land. These
Amazonian indigenous populations sustain a livelihood that is
deeply com-
mitted to striking a balance with nature. They understand their
life in terms
of reciprocal exchanges with Mother Nature and govern their
own institutions
and customs within a self-identified collective.
The TIPNIS march represents the eighth indigenous march to
the capital
in defense of “indigenous dignity, life, and land.”17 The 1990
March for Ter-
ritory and for Dignity sought to establish indigenous autonomy
and territory,
and marked the emergence of an indigenous mobilization for
Bolivia’s lowland

227. Amazonian communities.18 In a symbolic fashion, the march
married ecological
concerns to indigenous identity and resulted in a relatively
successful protection
of indigenous land grants.19 In the 2011 TIPNIS march,
approximately 1,000
indigenous people from the lowlands took part in a two-month,
250-mile trek
to the presidential palace in La Paz. Their primary objective
was simple: to speak
directly to President Morales and demand that he prevent the
construction
of the proposed highway. By the end of the march, they had
broadened their
demands and support base.
The 2011 march began in mid-August among TIPNIS residents.
By the
end of the month, they had attracted a wide range of popular
support from the
country’s larger Aymara and Quechua indigenous groups.
Support from the
Bolivian Confederation of Indigenous Peoples, a coalition of
indigenous groups
and the main indigenous rep-
resentative body, managed the
marchers’ negotiation efforts
and helped the movement
articulate 16 demands. Most
notably, these included a com-
prehensive framework for the protection of the TIPNIS and
other national parks;
effective respect for indigenous autonomy; recognition of the
indigenous right

228. to be consulted in development projects; appeals for public
education, housing,
and health services; and even implementation and financing for
an independent
indigenous television station. While the TIPNIS march had one
primary and
clear objective—blocking the construction of the highway—the
movement
encompassed an array of provisions that sought to broaden
indigenous rights
more generally.
However, unlike previous marches, the 2011 TIPNIS march met
some
local resistance and violent police repression. Colonists, a term
for indigenous
For the marchers and their supporters,
protecting TIPNIS became not only
a matter of ecological protection,
but also a case for indigenous rights.
Voice in the Village
Spring/Summer 2012 • volume xviii, issue 11
123
migrants and small agricultural producers who have illegally
settled in the
TIPNIS area to grow coca, successfully sustained roadblocks
that impeded the
marchers’ progress for over a week. There were suspicions that
a violent conflict

229. would erupt once the TIPNIS marchers reached the colonists’
blockade.20 To
avoid violence, local police intervened, providing a buffer
between the march-
ers and colonists. In response, the marchers demanded that
Bolivian Foreign
Minister David Choquehuanca accompany them through the
police line, which
he did.21 However, the next day local police descended on the
indigenous protes-
tors’ campsites with tear gas and truncheons, detaining
hundreds. Following the
incident, the national government released a statement declaring
that it did not
order the police to disrupt the march. Shortly after the
government’s statement,
Defense Minister Cecilia Chacon issued a statement of her own
to accompany
her resignation, in which she condemned the government’s
actions. The next
day, Interior Minister Sacha Lorenti also resigned following a
press conference
in which he claimed that the police were deployed to buffer
potential conflicts
between TIPNIS marchers and the colonists.22 In a brief video
interview, the
president of the Confederation for Indigenous Women in Bolivia
highlighted the
anger of indigenous populations at the government violence: “It
is a criminal act
what the president of this plurinational state has done to us […]
I not only call
upon Bolivia, but upon all of Latin America and the World
because the TIPNIS
is the jungle’s lung that breathes for Bolivia, Latin America,
and the world.”23

230. Once the marchers successfully completed their journey and
arrived in La
Paz, Evo Morales finally signed a law that banned the
construction of the high-
way through any portion of the TIPNIS area. Titled the Ley
Corta, it officially
classifies the TIPNIS park as “untouchable” for development
projects, seemingly
meeting the indigenous protestors’ demands. However, debates
over the specific
meaning of the term untouchable continue to stall the law’s
implementation, and
there has been no serious discussion regarding the movement’s
other demands.
The symbolic nature of indigenous claims carried appeals to
transnational
communities and national identity similar to previous marches,
yet revealed
much deeper political frustrations with the national government.
The march’s
slogan, “We are all TIPNIS,” denotes a symbolic commitment
that equates
rights of nature with human rights, more generally. For the
marchers and their
supporters, protecting the TIPNIS became not only a matter of
ecological
protection, but also a case for indigenous rights. Furthermore, it
carried strong
messages regarding the universal right to life and the nature of
national identity;
and it was regarded as an indispensable fundamental exercise of
political and
civil rights. Ultimately, the TIPNIS march highlights the
continued nature of

231. the brown journal of world affairs
Alison Brysk and Natasha Bennett
124
fragile social and political relations even in light of national
legal reform.
deepening ContradiCtions
While Morales’s opposition claimed that the president’s defense
of the road
project connecting Beni to Cochabamba (the country’s major
coca producing
region) signaled a commitment to cocaine interests, those
sympathetic to the
TIPNIS march defended the protestors by pointing to inherent
contradictions
in the Morales administration’s environmental and social
policies. Scholars of
Bolivia have noted that Morales’s MAS government juggles
different political
aims. Bolivian political scientist Roberto Laserna suggests that
there are
three tendencies present in the reform of the Bolivian state.24
The first is an
“indigenist” tendency designed to incorporate indigenous
political actors and
fulfill the collective rights of indigenous peoples. The second
refers to what
he calls a socialist tendency that places an emphasis on the
broader role of the

232. state in nationalist development and infrastructure projects. The
third, popular
democracy, refers to a breed of government that Morales calls
“a government
of social movements.”25 The TIPNIS conflict provides an
example of how these
three tendencies collide, presenting a dilemma for consistent
and responsible
social and economic reform.
The most notable contradiction is the government’s emphasis on
envi-
ronmental protection. Recently, Bolivia has assumed an active
role in global
environmental politics. In 2010, Bolivia hosted the World
People’s Conference
on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, a
conference attended by
environmental justice and indigenous rights groups from
approximately 150
countries. Following the discussions of the conference, Bolivia
passed a piece of
radical conservation legislation that officially grants nature the
same and equal
rights to humans. The Law of Mother Earth regards humans as
equal entities
within a natural world.26 However, much like the controversy
concerning the
“untouchability” of the TIPNIS park, the law is not expected to
halt all industrial
development as many hoped, but rather introduces confusing
questions about
the practical and legal implications of such ecological
conservation efforts.
In the weeks following Morales’s signing of the law banning

233. development
in the TIPNIS, the Consejo Indígena del Sur (Indigenous
Council of the South,
CONISUR), alongside coca growers and residents of
Cochabamba, organized
a countermarch to La Paz defending the highway project and
seeking to reverse
the Ley Corta and propel the highway construction plan back
into action. The
responses to this countermarch have been wide ranging: Vice
President García
Voice in the Village
Spring/Summer 2012 • volume xviii, issue 11
125
Linera has proposed that the issue be decided through a
referendum of TIPNIS
residents; Evo Morales maintains the position that the road is
fundamentally
necessary for the country’s development, yet he has publicly
announced that the
responsibility falls upon the Bolivian Confederation of
Indigenous Peoples to
discuss the issue with CONISUR and the other pro-highway
marchers to reach
an agreement; and government lawmakers have reopened the
TIPNIS highway
project debate, threatening the highway ban altogether.27
Motivated by fears that the law will be repealed as a result of
this debate,

234. indigenous actors have taken their struggle from the streets to
the legislative
assembly. In order to ensure that the highway ban stays in
place, indigenous
leaders in the legislative assembly have formed the first
indigenous caucus, ef-
fectively blocking the MAS party’s efficiency and ultimately
threatening the
MAS majority in the lower house.28 The long-term
consequences of this caucus
formation are unknown, but for now it clearly illustrates what
the vice president
has admittedly called fractured “government–indigenous
relations.”29
The Morales administration finds itself caught up in a
whirlwind of seem-
ingly contradictory initiatives symptomatic of twenty-first
century indigenous
rights struggles in Latin America. It attempts to: (a) solidify
social inclusion
while respecting indigenous autonomy; (b) conserve Mother
Earth while making
strides to foster economic development; and (c) navigate
between competing
national and transnational business interests while complying
with constituent
demands. Indigenous proclamations that Morales has failed to
live up to his
promises of protecting indigenous rights and environmental
justice speak to these
tensions and contradictions in a politically …

235. CONTENTS
Editorial
Georg Frerks & Human security: a launching pad for debate and
Kees Homan policy? 1
Articles
Georg Frerks Human security as a discourse and counter-
discourse 8
Peter Hough Global steps towards human security 15
Berma Klein Why human? The interlinkages between security,
Goldewijk rights and development 24
Martijn Dekker & Human security from below in a Hobbesian
Mient Jan Faber environment 37
Joost van Puijenbroek Human security from below, a case study
from
the Ituri district, Democratic Republic of Congo 45
Jan Gruiters Human security and development: an ambivalent
relationship 54
Gerd Oberleitner The OSCE and human security 64
Kees Homan The military and human security 73
Victor-Yves Ghebali The 2007 Madrid Ministerial Council
Meeting:

236. A mixed bag of non-decisions and a discrete set 82
of measures
Summaries 100
Contributors 104
Human security: a launching pad for debate and
policy?
Georg Frerks and Kees Homan (guest editors)1
Introduction
The Helsinki Monitor has changed its name in Security and
Human Rights and the
editorial board has decided to devote the first issue under the
new name to the
theme of ‘human security’. The name of Helsinki Monitor refers
to The Final Act
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also
known as the
Helsinki Accords, the Helsinki Declaration or the Helsinki
Process. The
conference was held in Helsinki in 1975 and attended by the
United States,
Canada, the Soviet Union and nearly all European countries.
The Final Act was
signed by 35 countries and not only confirmed the post-World

237. War II borders in
Europe, but also provided for the first time a formal basis for
the human rights
agenda in the political discourse with the Soviet Union, leading
to what became
highly effective Helsinki Watch or Monitoring Committees both
in the Soviet
Union itself and internationally. The Helsinki Process was later
transformed into a
permanent organisation, the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).
The particular geo-political context of those days has obviously
changed
enormously due to the demise of the Soviet Union and the
associated
disappearance of the bi-polar superpower system. So has the
nature of the security
problématique that we are witnessing today, with its increasing
emphasis on
intrastate conflicts. Though these momentous transitions created
a series of
conflicts in the Balkans and Eastern Europe some of which are
still in existence
today, most attention is now paid to conflicts in the developing
world. These
require a rather different explanatory framework than the ones
that were prevalent
during the Cold War epoch. Concurrently, the OSCE has
evolved into a wide-
ranging organisation having 56 members at present (although
officially they are
stilled called ‘participating States’). It deals with politico-
military matters,
economic and environmental issues and the ‘human dimension’,

238. including human
rights and democratisation. The new title of the journal Security
and Human
Rights continues to reflect the core elements of the Helsinki
Accords, but is no
longer exclusively linked to that historical process and epoch
and therefore invites
a broader treatment of issues geographically and thematically,
something that was
already apparent in the Helsinki Monitor as well.
1 Georg Frerks is Professor of Conflict Prevention and Conflict
Management at Utrecht
University, Utrecht and Professor of Disaster Studies at
Wageningen University,
Wageningen, The Netherlands.
Major General (ret.) Kees Homan is a senior research fellow at
the ‘Clingendael’ Institute in
The Hague, The Netherlands and editor of Security and Human
Rights.
Georg Frerks and Kees Homan
Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 1
2
The choice of the theme ‘human security’ for the first special
issue seems to be a
very opportune one in this connection, as it enables a broad

239. discussion on what
constitutes security, what new developments do emerge in the
security discourse,
and what this implies for policy practice? Obviously, such
fundamental questions
merit a much deeper debate than the one we can reasonably
offer in a special
journal issue of limited scope and length. As guest editors of
this special issue we
do not pretend even to have more than scratched the surface of
the ongoing human
security debates and policies of the last fifteen years. In
preparing for this special
issue we decided to invite contributions highlighting a selected
number of aspects.
In the first place we deemed it fit to introduce the notion of
human security
by briefly explaining how it came into existence and evolved
over the years.
Three articles in this volume deal with this aspect.
The human security concept and discourse
In the first article of this special issue Georg Frerks deals with
human security as a
‘discourse and counter-discourse’. He first discusses the
broader shifts from
interstate to intrastate wars and remarks that current conflicts
are increasingly
caused by the own society and polity rather than by an
international confrontation
between states. He argues that the notion of human security
introduced in the
Human Development Report 1994 has come to reflect the
various changes this
implies. He traces the development of the human security

240. concept and discourse
by highlighting a number of landmark documents and
commissions that further
helped disseminate the idea in the international arena. He
submits that the human
security debate comprises in fact an ‘alternative security
discourse’ or ‘counter-
discourse’ compared to earlier views that were more state-
centred or had a
military-strategic focus. Frerks states that the human security
discourse has
brought a number of definite benefits. It underlined the
comprehensive nature of
current conflict, linked several security components mutually,
and forged a new
balance between state and people-centred security. It has also
connected security
to development issues and placed human rights at centre stage.
Finally, it involved
a wider group of actors at different societal levels. Frerks
mentions as a
disadvantage the existence of multiple definitions and the risk
to consider nearly
everything as a security risk, something he links conceptually to
the
‘securitisation’ debate of the Copenhagen School. In order to
avoid the
counterproductive consequences of such a tendency, he
recommends that human
security keeps to the middle-ground between the state-centred
security discourse
and the danger of ‘over-securitisation’.
In the second article Peter Hough discusses the role of the state
and of supra-
national structures and processes in promoting human security.

241. Departing from a
broad analysis of different political theories and historical
approaches attempting
to overcome state weakness in the realm of conflict, he argues
that at present
neither the state nor a partially globalised world order can be
expected to
guarantee human security fully. He discusses a number of
particular recent trends
in global governance that may offer hope for further
improvement. Whereas
Human security: a launching pad for debate and policy?
Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 1
3
earlier ideas of political integration and federalism were too
drastic for most
sovereign states, more pragmatic, ‘utilitarianist’ approaches
towards global
governance have been emerging. He mentions several examples,
including the
European Union’s (EU) notion of ‘subsidiarity’. Hough also
notes that morality,
ethics and social co-responsibility play an important role in the
political world and
that ‘universal values’ may well provide a way of maximising
human security.
Governments will certainly have to adjust to the force of global

242. spill-over, but will
hardly ever choose on their own what is best for their citizens,
especially when
that harms their own state interests. States, moreover, tend to
prioritise only their
own citizens, excluding all others. Hence, Hough concludes that
despite some
positive tendencies at the global level, direct interest-driven
action by those
affected remains needed to overcome the ‘national interest’
barrier inherent in
state action.
In the third article, Berma Klein Goldewijk observes that the
adjective
‘human’ connects current security, rights and development
discourses and she
questions what ‘human’ really implies here. She argues that the
human dimension
identifies, modifies and frames the three notions of rights,
development and
security both individually and jointly. She explores three
specific dimensions. The
first one refers to the inter-linkage between rights, development
and security. She
notes in the human security debate the presence of a
universalism akin to most
human rights discourses, but simultaneously warns against a
potential risk of
essentialism that would deny the pluralistic nature of human
life. Like Frerks, she
observes the vagueness of the human security discourse and also
points at the
diversity of the issues at stake that is seriously compounding
prioritisation in
practice. The second dimension relates to the normative

243. reasoning in the
international public sphere, an aspect Hough was also alluding
to. Klein
Goldewijk discusses here the prevailing trends in
humanitarianism, humanitarian
law and humanitarian intervention, while outlining some of
their inherent
contradictions. She mentions the relevance of both the standards
of justice and
humanity. Human security as a normative concept could help
unify global policies
and agency mandates across different state and non-state actors.
Her third
dimension concerns the gap between policy and operation,
between rhetoric and
implementation. She argues that the rubric of ‘human’ still
connotes largely to that
of national citizen, relegating non-citizens to a position of ‘non-
humans’. Klein
Goldewijk concludes that the human dimension has brought a
stronger sense of
correlation, coherence and shared purpose in response to the
combined and
complex issues of violent conflict and persistent poverty.
Security-from-below
A second set of articles focuses on everyday realities of human
security and the
notion of security-from-below. The first one by Martijn Dekker
and Mient Jan
Faber positions human security in a Hobbesian environment of
state collapse,
where people and communities have to fend for themselves. In
this connection,
the authors distinguish three levels of human security: self-
protection, horizontal

244. Georg Frerks and Kees Homan
Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 1
4
protection and vertical protection. The first level refers to the
population’s own
religious, ethnic or other identity networks providing self-
organised, localised
security zones. The second relies on lifelines connected to
outside civil society and
other non-state actors, while the latter relates to security from
above, such as that
provided by the UN or external interventionists. The authors
note, however, that
external interventions or related attempts at pacification are
frequently difficult, if
not sometimes nearly impossible. Many intervening actors in
conflict situations
have inadvertently become part of the problem and then a
winning hearts and
minds strategy will not suffice anymore, as interaction is a two-
way street.
Nevertheless, Dekker and Faber give examples where external
and local parties
have been able to connect and collaborate in providing localised
forms of self-
protection and thus create a semblance of order.
In a second article on security-from-below Joost van

245. Puijenbroek presents a
case study from the Ituri district in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. He
describes the background of the conflict as well as the peace
process and the
intervention of the Mission d’Observation des Nations Unies au
Congo (MONUC).
Yet, in most parts of the district the public administration
remains fragile, if not
completely absent, and the state fails to deliver whatever social
service necessary
to its population. In fact, the ‘reformed’ Congolese army and
the national police
are the main source of instability at the moment, with large-
scale harassment of
the population, illegal arrests, torture and looting of properties
taking place. Van
Puijenbroek describes how a network of NGOs in Ituri started
local peace
initiatives (ILPs and nyumba kumi) that carried out a variety of
tasks in the field of
protection and local conflict resolution. This NGO network
further organised
security meetings and set up security committees at the different
administrative
levels of the district. These activities have contributed to
increased security at the
local level and filled the gap left by an extremely fragile or
absent state. The
establishment of a relationship between security agencies and
the population has
rendered the behavior of the security actors less extreme,
volatile and brutal. Yet
there have also been considerable bottlenecks due to limited
capacities, ethnic
mistrust and lack of resources. Links with the government, the

246. MONUC as well as
militias have been lacking or proven difficult. Without a
connection to the state
level, community security programs only have a limited impact.
However, when
such connections are in place, a community security system
cannot only play a
pivotal role locally, but also contribute to discussions about
security sector reform
and monitor behavioral changes of the army and police.
Security and development
Thirdly, we felt that security and peace should be linked more
explicitly to
development concerns. This reflects the insight that a lack of
development —
economic, social, political and institutional — may lay at the
basis of insecurity
and that properly designed development interventions may help
address this.
There are, on the other hand, also several publications arguing
that Western, ill-
designed development policies and the biased, ill-distribution of
its benefits have
Human security: a launching pad for debate and policy?
Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 1
5

247. enhanced local conflict.
Jan Gruiters discusses this ‘ambivalent relationship’ between
the two
notions. He argues that there is no broadly accepted, context-
specific theory on
how security and development are related and, therefore, we
witness ‘meandering’
strategies in policy practice. Taking human dignity and human
rights as the
normative foundation, Gruiters places a ‘person-centred’
approach to security and
development opposite the state-centred views on security and
linear theories of
state-led modernisation that dominated the second half of the
twentieth century.
He mentions different reports and initiatives promoting this
person-centred
approach and underlines the emerging independent role of civil
society and
community-based organisations in matters pertaining to
freedom, development and
peace. After 9/11, however, he discerns a counter-tendency of
state-centred
homeland security where development aid is dispensed in
service of security
concerns. The question of whose security and whose
development is at stake is the
litmus test for morally pure and politically effective policy with
non-ambivalent
objectives and strategies based on either state security or human
security interests.
Western ideological assumptions and experiences often seem to
determine the
perception of causal links between security and development,
but these are much

248. more complex in reality, as Gruiters demonstrates in his article.
Practical experiences as well as research data show that the
connection
between them requires a context-specific, and not a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach.
The present political ambivalence around security and
development, which
invokes the interests of homeland or national security at one
moment and human
security the next, is not only morally questionable, it also leads
inevitably to
indeterminate strategies that lack clear-cut priorities and the
means suitable for
achieving them. Gruiters concludes that security and
development must find their
normative foundation in human dignity. That implies that
people and the
communities of which they are a part, and not the state, should
be the fundamental
premise when considering security and development.
Institutional security settings
Fourthly, we liked to address how human security is
implemented in broader
institutional security settings. To this end we invited two
articles focusing on the
role of human security in the OSCE and, more broadly, within
the military.
The first article in this section is by Gerd Oberleitner. He
analyses the
consequences of the emergence of human security for the
OSCE. He asks whether
the organisation should engage more seriously with the concept
than it has done so

249. far. After describing the history of the concept, he argues that
very term ‘human
security’ was seldom used within the organisation, and hardly
could be seen as a
guiding principle for the OSCE’s work. Even though the
OSCE’s view on security is
comprehensive, Oberleitner argues that it has gradually become
fragmented rather
than integrated, and surely does not command the same appeal
as the human
security discourse. On the other hand, the OSCE’s security is
cooperative and
combines bottom-up, empowering activities with top-down
initiatives and hence
Georg Frerks and Kees Homan
Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 1
6
corresponds to important aspects of human security. Similarly,
the subjects the
OSCE is dealing with in its practical work, and its institutional
structure as a
multilateral, trans-regional network including civil society
actors, do reflect the
human security agenda. Reviewing the evidence, Oberleitner
asserts that a more
explicit orientation on human security may well have a value
added for the OSCE.
It would allow the OSCE to re-examine the validity of having

250. three separate
security dimensions that are likely to be balanced against each
other. Thinking
along the lines of human security may further bring the OSCE
back into the
innovative approach it once applied to fostering security,
though it certainly will
not be able resolve the organisation’s present crisis. Oberleitner
concludes that in
order to advance the OSCE’s original purpose to not only
provide stability in the
region but also effectively make people more secure in their
everyday lives,
human security may well be a more effective vision than
OSCE’s present thinking
in three boxes.
The last article in the volume is written by Kees Homan and
deals with
human security and the military. He surveys the potential roles
for the military in
the field of human security in the context of the emerging, but
contested concept
of the ’responsibility to protect’. Based on Holt, Homan
outlines six distinct forms
of protection the military is able to provide. He argues that the
military, including
the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), so far lack a
systematic
framework for the protection of civilian populations, though the
NATO manual on
peace support operations includes a section on the protection of
humanitarian
operations and of human rights, and on safe areas. Homan
elaborates on the yet
un-official Human Security Doctrine that the EU is working on.
The doctrine

251. comprises seven principles for operations in situations of severe
insecurity, a
human security response force of 15,000 personnel, and a legal
framework.
Homan discusses a number of obstacles that compound an
effective military
human security response. One relates to the various problematic
aspects of civil-
military cooperation. Though military actors have worked with
other agencies in
the field, they so far have not developed a joint understanding
of what civilian
protection means or requires. Homan concludes that human
security
considerations should be made a part of all military activity, but
most urgently at
the operational level, through training, a change of military
culture, accountability
and stringent enforcement. As protection operations are
different from both the
traditional operational concepts for waging war and UN
peacekeeping operations,
steps should be taken to develop a universal human security
doctrine.
Conclusion
The articles brought together in this special issue highlight a
number of important
insights. Without exception, they underline the importance and
usefulness of
human security both at the conceptual-discursive level and in
the domain of
operational implementation in the field.
The human security discourse provided a fundamental change
in the
prevailing thinking about security, if not a full alternative or

252. counter-discourse to
Human security: a launching pad for debate and policy?
Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 1
7
the hitherto hegemonic state-centred and military-driven view.
Nearly all authors
paid attention the epistemological, theoretical or normative
antecedents of human
security or embed it into larger trends and developments,
notably in the field of
political integration, human rights, humanitarian intervention
and human
development. It also was placed in the perspective of current
countertendencies,
including the War on Terror, homeland security and over-
securitisation. This
invited a further reflection about what basically constitutes the
humanum and
whose security and whose development we need to prioritise as
policy-makers and
practitioners?
Nearly all authors recognised limitations and weaknesses of the
human
security notion and approach, but many of these were
characteristically perceived
as strong points when looked at from a different angle.

253. Examples include
paradoxes like being broad or vague; being inclusive or
unwieldy; being appealing
or rhetoric, etc. Based on a shared awareness of the
inadequacies of state-centred
security approaches, the authors felt that ‘pragmatic’, ‘middle-
ground’ and
‘utiliarianist’ approaches to human security provided the best
chance of realising
its potential. It was shown that security-from-below is already
an every-day reality
and has much to offer to populations in fragile or collapsed
states. It has been
adopted by a variety of civil society and other non-state actors
providing
protection to populations at risk. It was also argued that the
international policy
and intervention domain has much to gain from a more explicit
focus on human
security. This applied to bilateral and multilateral donors, the
OSCE, NATO and
military alike.
With Berma Klein Goldewijk we like to argue in conclusion that
the human
security concept identifies, modifies and frames the three
notions of rights,
development and security both individually and jointly. Despite
its shortcomings,
the human security approach is needed as a counter-discourse,
as a complement
and as a normative standard for those attempting to achieve
peace for people and
communities affected by conflict.

254. The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 4,
201440
Understanding Environmental Security
and Its Causal Factors with Reference to
Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
This paper explores the causal factors related to environment
and security. An attempt
has been made to identify the sources of environmental
degradation in Bangladesh in
general and Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in particular. Homer-
Dixon study on
environment and security has put forward three causal factors of
environmental
degradation (increasing population growth, unequal distribution
of lands and
environmental changes), and it was successfully experimented
by Alam in the case of
Bangladesh. But the theory of Homer-Dixon (supply-induced
scarcity, demand-induced
scarcity and structural-induced scarcity) has proved to be
insufficient in analyzing the
causal factors of environmental degradation in the case of CHT.
The empirical scrutiny
shows that the non-market variables (religion, regime and
nationalism) are the major
causal factors of environmental degradation and conflicts in
CHT.

255. © 2014 IUP. All Rights Reserved.
Arun Kumar Nayak*
* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science,
Government Degree College, Santir Bazar, Tripura,
India. E-mail: [email protected]
Introduction
There have been debates on the environmental security—
relatively a new term in the
lexicon of both global environmental politics and international
studies—especially
since the end of the Cold War. Analysts differ on the causal
relations between
environmental degradation and serious conflicts, and indeed the
whole notion of
environmental security is contested. However, the dominant
approach to this link
between the environment and security has become a new
strategic resource, and
environmental degradation has become a non-military threat to
national and
international peace and security. The whole issue of
environmental security is
therefore counted as a vehicle for enabling us to identify and
understand new kinds
of threats and instabilities and for thinking about security in
more than military terms.1
There is scholarly literature on the subject of environmental
degradation and
security issues explaining the generation of conflicts within and
between the states.
However, there were disagreements among themselves while
explaining the causal

256. relations. In this context, this study tries to understand the
whole discourse of
research on environmental security and aims at identifying the
causal relations
1 Lorraine Elliott (1998), “What is Environmental Security?: A
Conceptual Overview”, in Alan Dupont (Ed.),
The Environment and Security: What are the Linkages?, pp. 7-
22, Strategic and Defense Studies Centre,
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian
National University, Canberra.
41Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors
with Reference to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
between environmental degradation and violent conflicts of
Bangladesh in general
and Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in particular.2
Environmental Degradation and National Security
There have been debates on environmental degradation and
national security both
nationally and internationally, especially since the 1980s. It was
largely due to acute
environmental pressure triggered by increasing population,
greater consumption of
resources, pressure on agricultural lands, heavy
industrialization, large-scale
deforestation, pollution, mining and climate change, etc.3
The traditional concept of national security has dominated the
international system
during the Cold War. It was viewed as a successful pursuit of
interstate power

257. competition. But environmental security represents a significant
departure from this
approach to national security. The term ‘security’ was defined
excessively based on
narrow understandings; however, it gradually began to change
in the 1990s.
Environmental degradation as national security was recognized
by the officials of the
US. It was the Bush administration which acknowledged
environmental security as
part of overall US security. Later, the Clinton administration
integrated environmental
security with its national security policy by following the
concept of national security
in its 1994 national security document. It mentioned that the
decreasing renewable
resources are posing a risk by destabilizing regional stability
and in due course
blocking economic growth around the world. Therefore, it
emphasizes on
partnerships between governments and non-governmental
organizations to mitigate
the emerging environmental challenges.4 The UNDP also urged
that environmental
security should be part of a comprehensive approach to security
and explained that
one should move away from a narrow military and defensive
meaning of security
and give highest importance to environmental security. It is a
huge problem
accelerated by human activity causing concerns for both the
planetary ecosystem and
the future generations. People, states, and economies cannot be
secure unless the
ecosystem is secure. The increasing rate of environmental
degradation has become

258. the source of economic disruption, social tension and political
antagonism.5
2 Lester Brown (1977), Redefining National Security,
Worldwatch Paper, No. 14, Washington DC; Johan
Galtung (1982), Environment, Development and Military
Activity: Towards Alternative Security Doctrines,
Norwegian University Press, Oslo, Norway; Richard H Ullman
(1983), “Redefining Security”, International
Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 129-153; Carsten F Ronnfeldt
(1997), “Three Generations of Environment
and Security Research”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No.
4, pp. 473-482; Wenche Hague and
Tanja Ellingsen (1998), “Beyond Environmental Scarcity:
Causal Pathways to Conflict”, Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 299-317; Manus I Midlarsky
(1998), “Democracy and the Environment: An
Empirical Assessment”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No.
3, pp. 341-361; and Charles-Philippe
David and Jean Francois Gagne (2006-2007), “Natural
Resources: A Source of Conflict?”, Canadian
Institute of International Affairs, Vol. LXII, No. 1, Winter, pp.
5-17.
3 Graeme Hugo (1996), “Environmental Concerns and
International Migrations”, International Migration
Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 113.
4 Gareth Porter (1995), “Environmental Security as National
Security Issue”, Current History, Vol. 94,
No. 952, May, pp. 221-222.
5 Elliott (1998), op. cit., pp. 19-21.

259. The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 4,
201442
The incorporation of environmental degradation into the
security area of state
raises a question: Does each and every environmental
degradation have an impact
on environmental security? The answer is no. All categories of
environmental
degradation do not come under the scope of environmental
security. The
understanding of environmental security addresses two distinct
issues: the
environmental factors behind potentially violent conflicts, and
the impact of global
environmental degradation on the wellbeing of societies and
economies.
Environmental degradation is considered as a security issue
when it causes violent
conflicts and it appears to be consistent with the traditional
definition of national
security. The first issue of environmental security primarily
refers to any threat to the
wellbeing of societies, either from an external force or by the
public policies. The
second refers to the serious degradation of natural resources
(freshwater, soils,
forests, fishery resources and biological diversity) and vital life
support systems (the
ozone layer, climate system, oceans and atmosphere)
accelerated by global economic
activities.6
The understanding of environmental degradation and its linkage
with conflicts
therefore needs to make a clear distinction between renewable

260. and nonrenewable
resources. Renewable resources include freshwater, air, soils,
forests, atmosphere
and biological diversity which are integrated into the
ecosystem, and ensure their
replacement and preservation. Minerals and fossil fuels are
known as nonrenewable
resources and their exhaustion would cause depletion not
degradation. The
renewable resources are not easily substituted and in some
cases, they are not
substitutable, at all. The conflicts caused due to the depletion of
nonrenewable
resources are not categorized under the framework of
environmental security. Only
those conflicts that arise due to degradation of renewable
resources are considered
as environmental security.7
The environmental insecurity caused by environmental
degradation has multiple
implications. Most important among them is the cross-border
migration of the people,
and most of the victims in these cases are the ethnic
communities. As a result, conflicts
between migrants and the host communities are obvious. Such
cases are more
noticeable in developing countries compared to the developed
countries.8 Migration
has both positive and negative impacts. Positive contribution
could be the positive
changes in the economy of the host countries. On the other
hand, negative
consequences include arms trafficking, drug smuggling, and
trafficking of women
and children, over which many host governments have little

261. control. These security
concerns are magnified when a host country fails to provide
sufficient assistance to
the large-scale migrants. Thus, host states perceive protracted
refugee situations as
6 Porter (1995), op. cit., pp. 218-221.
7 Narotam Gaan (2001), “Rethinking Security: The Environment
Approach”, International Studies,
Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 308-309.
8 Myron Weiner (1992-93), “Security, Stability and Migration”,
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3,
pp. 91-126.
43Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors
with Reference to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
posing direct and indirect threat to their national security and
regime survival.
However, not all refugees are seen as a threat. In this sense, the
importance of ethnic
and religious affinity cannot be overstated. If the host
community perceives the
incoming refugee as ‘one of us’, then positive and generous
conception of distributive
justice applies. Conversely, if refugees are seen as members of
an ‘out group’, they
are likely to receive hostile reception. In these cases, it becomes
a threat to the
balanced multiethnic societies and destabilizes the political
balance of power.9

262. Research on Environment and Security
It is in the 1970s and the early 1980s that the theories of
relative deprivation and
of resource mobilization featured prominently in research on
conflict causation. There
are certain factors which triggered the research community to
look into the area to
be researched. First, the introduction of the concept ‘sustainable
development’ by
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
in 1980 along with
the Brundtland Commission Report of 1987 raised awareness on
environmental
degradation across the world. Secondly, the end of the Cold War
during the 1990s
ensured the search for a new security paradigm, and thus many
writings and debates
were opened up to link environmental degradation and conflicts
which cause national
security threats.10
Ronnfeldt has brilliantly conceptualized the discourse of
research on environment
and security and classified them into three generations.11 The
first generation of
researchers were very much critical of the traditional notion of
security, and they
actively debated to broaden the concept of state security in
general and incorporate
the environmental concerns into the security concerns in
particular.12 Among them,
Ullman13 excellently criticized and claimed that the American-
defined national security
is excessively military in nature. He argues that more
concentration on perceived
military threats leads to militarization of international relations

263. and increases global
insecurity. National insecurity does not come always from
beyond the borders of one’s
own country, but it often arises within it. The actions and
events (natural disasters,
epidemics, catastrophic floods, drought, famine, climate change,
etc.) also threaten
drastically and degrade the quality of life of the populace of the
state. The increasing
population growth and its demand for both renewable (forests,
fish stocks,
freshwater, air, soils, atmosphere and biological, etc.) and
nonrenewable resources
(Minerals and fossil fuels) also poses a great threat to all states,
irrespective of
their size.14
9 Gil Loescher and James Milner (2005), Protracted Refugee
Situations: Domestic and International Security
Implications, ADELPHI Paper, 375, pp. 32-34, July, USA and
Canada.
10 Hague and Ellingsen (1998), op. cit., pp. 229-230.
11 Ronnfeldt (1997), op. cit., pp. 473-482.
12 Lester (1977), op. cit.; Galtung (1982), op. cit.; and Ullman
(1983), op. cit.
13 Ullman (1983), op. cit.
14 Ullman (1983), op. cit., pp. 129-153.
The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 4,
201444
Although the first generation of research conceptually linked
the causal relations

264. with environmental degradation and conflicts, criticisms were
made in the early 1990s
on the ground that it only linked conceptually without any
empirical evidence.
Therefore, the second generation of research took many case
studies for empirical
verification in the 1990s. Among them, the work of Homer-
Dixon15 has brilliantly
testified the aforesaid causal relations by taking a number of
empirical case studies.
He finds that many parts of the developing countries are already
facing environmental
scarcities, causing violent conflicts, which are possibly the
early signs of rise of violence
in the coming decades and that would be sub-national,
persistent and diffuse. He
ascertained three main causes of environmental scarcities: (i)
environmental changes,
(ii) population growth, and (iii) unequal distribution of
resources. First refers to
human-induced decline both in terms of quantity and quality of
renewable resources
that degrade at a faster rate than are renewed by the natural
processes. Second,
the per capita availability of resources is being reduced day by
day owing to increase
in the population growth. Third, unequal resource distribution
due to disproportionate
concentration of resources in the society is empowering a few
people to access bigger
slice of resources.16
However, this generation is also not free from criticisms. In
spite of a number of
empirical studies undertaken, the approach or the model
received severe criticisms

265. from the third generation in the mid-1990s. Hague and
Ellingsen17 argue that the
Dixon model has some parallels in economic theories of the
market, which can be
composed into three dimensions: (i) supply-induced scarcity,
(ii) demand-induced
scarcity, and (iii) structural scarcity. It has given absolute
importance to economic
variables and ignored other variables (political and economic
factors, type of regime,
form of government, economic development, etc.) while linking
the causal relations
between environmental degradation and conflicts.18
Complementing the above criticism, David and Gagne19 claim
that there is a
negative relationship between non-democratic regime and
environmental protection.
Political violence is common in semi-democratic and non-
democratic regimes.
Enjoyment of limited civil liberties and neglected mediating
mechanisms create a
window of opportunities for various opposition forces to
mobilize and organize
against the regime. The lack of diversity in political
representation in government
institutions produces numerous opposition groups and wins
domestic and foreign
political support to accelerate their agitations and it sometimes
disrupts the delivery
of public services and the state faces difficulties to govern,
which in turn heightens
15 Thomas F Homer-Dixon (1994), “Environmental Scarcities
and Violent Conflict”, International Security,
Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 5-40.

266. 16 Homer-Dixon (1994), op. cit.
17 Hague and Ellingsen (1998), op. cit.
18 Ibid., pp. 229-234; Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998), “Armed
Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the
Literature”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 381-
396.
19 Charles-Philippe and Jean Francois (2006-2007), op. cit., pp.
12-16.
45Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors
with Reference to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
the risk of civil war and insurgency. In response to it, state
militarizes the region to
suppress the movement and it becomes the only tool of political
communication.20
On the other hand, Midlarsky21 claims that there is a positive
relationship between
democratic regime and the protection of environment, which
respects individual rights
in contrast to authoritarian states. The environmentalists freely
market their ideas
and implement them in environmental legislation. Democratic
governments are more
responsive and accountable to public opinion and are more
cooperative with the
international environmental agencies to mitigate the
environmental degradation.
However, many times, democratic governments even face
difficulties in protecting their
environment. Sometimes, Multinational Corporations (MNCs)

267. control the nuts and
bolts of daily democratic governance, which is very different
from the ideal. Secondly,
the absence of inclusive economic growth and the existence of
income inequality in
the society causes barriers to environment protection.22
The discussion on these three generations of research and their
methods and
approaches has indeed given broader insights and has inculcated
a big picture in
the minds of the researchers to explore other dynamics of
linkage between
environmental degradation and conflicts. Following the methods
and approaches of
third generation, here, an initiative has been made to explain
various causes of
environmental degradation in Bangladesh in general and
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)
in particular.23
Natural Resources of Bangladesh
The study of Alam24 on Bangladesh has shown that the country
is facing acute scarcity
of natural resources due to (i) environmental changes, (ii)
extreme population
pressure, and (iii) unequal distribution of resources. It is the
most important and
constantly changing factor in the ecological equation affecting
the demand on the
natural resources of Bangladesh. The absence of hope for
survival in other parts
of their own country leaves them with no other option but to
migrate to India in
20 David Charles-Philippe and Gange Jean Francois (2006-

268. 2007), “Natural Resources: A Source of Conflict?”,
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. LXII, No. 1,
Winter, pp. 12-16.
21 Midlarsky (1998), op. cit.
22 Midlarsky (1998), op. cit., pp. 341-347.
23 Yuri V Gankovsky (1974), “The Social Structure of Society
in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh”, Asian
Survey, Vol. 14, No. 3, March, pp. 220-230; Willem Van
Schendel (1992), “The Invention of ‘Jummas’:
State Formation and Ethnicity in Southeastern Bangladesh”,
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 95-
97; Ajay Darshan Behera (1996), “Insurgency in the Bangladesh
Hills: Search for Autonomy”, Strategic
Analysis, Vol. XIX, No. 9, pp. 985-986; Rahman Safiduqur
Khan (2003), “Indigenous Peoples in
Bangladesh: Land Rights and Land Use in the Context of
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)”, Master Thesis,
pp. 9-15, Faculty of Law, Lund University, Sweden, May 16,
available at http://www.jur.lu.se/Internet/
english/essay/Masterth.nsf/0/9E1E3437C900AFB0C1256D5D00
40DDFF/$File/xsmall.pdf?
OpenElement. Retrieved on 12/05/2007.
24 Sarfaraz Alam (2003), “Environmental Induced Migration
from Bangladesh to India”, Strategic Analysis,
Vol. 27, No. 3, July-September, pp. 422-438.
The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 4,
201446
large numbers and it has become a major source of tension
between the two

269. countries.25
He argues that Bangladesh being an agricultural country, land is
the most
important natural resource for livelihood. However, the extreme
population growth
in the country has reduced the man-land ratio to a great extent,
which is
unfavorable for sustainable food production. According to the
2001 Census, the
population of Bangladesh has reached 129.2 million from 42.16
million in 1951.
And the density of population too has increased from 285 to 975
persons per sq.
km, which reduced the man-land per capita ratio at 0.15 acre,
and it became a
factor responsible for acute scarcity of land resources in the
country. Besides
population growth, unequal distribution of land too is an
important factor for land
scarcity in the country. According to the National Agricultural
Census undertaken
in 1996, 24.14% of farmers (who are rich) own 56.89% and
operate on 58.81%
of the land. On the other hand, landless and small farmers (each
owning up to 1.49
acres of land) constitute 64% of total households of the country,
but own only 26.24%
and operate on 23.3% of the land. Land scarcity is further
accentuated by severe
environmental changes ravaged by large-scale natural disasters
such as riverbank
erosion, cyclones accompanied by storm surges, floods and
droughts in the country.
Bangladesh lies within the combined delta of three major rivers:
the Ganges, the

270. Brahmaputra-Jamuna and the Meghna. The low deltaic terrain,
extreme rainfall in
the nearby hills, and high flows from these large catchments
mean that over 20%
of Bangladesh is inundated in a ‘normal’ flood year. It exceeds
36% during severe
floods, which is nearly 60% of the net cultivable areas.26
Chittagong Hill Tracts
It seems true from the above study that Bangladesh is facing
acute environmental
crunch triggered by population growth, unequal distribution of
land and environmental
changes. However, the study has some limitations; it is purely
based on the statistical
data and economic theories of demand-supply relationship. It is
well known that
statistical data always does not show the reality and this study
shows that in the case
of CHT, non-market economic variables (religion, regime and
nationalism) play a
greater role in changing the environment.
It is true that population has been increasing in CHT and the
rate of degradation
of renewable resources both in quantity and quality is faster
than it is renewed by
the natural processes (demand-induced scarcity). But the trend
of decreasing
indigenous people (tribals) and increasing Bengali population in
the CHT is justifying
other factors of population growth. In 1872, the tribals
constituted 98%, whereas
the Bengalis constituted 2%. In 1901, the tribals constituted
93%, while the Bengalis
increased to 7%. In 1951, the Bengali population in CHT rose to

271. 9%, 41% in 1981
25 Alam (2003), op. cit.
26 Ibid.
47Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors
with Reference to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
and 49% in 1991. It is a fact that economic migrants from the
plains of Bangladesh
have been coming to CHT for many years. However, tribals in
CHT, who constituted
91% in 1951, were suddenly reduced to 59% in 1981. Such
drastic demographic
changes within three decades were no doubt influenced by other
factors. The study
shows that the major reasons are the introduction of drastic
political and
administrative reforms in Bangladesh, combined with ethno-
cultural factors, besides
other factors like religion, regime and nationalism.27
Bangladesh is known for its least ethnic diversity in South Asia,
where Bengalis
constitute 98% of the total population and the rest 2%
comprises 12 distinct ethnic
groups. The former are largely concentraed in the plains and
the latter generally
live in the hilly tracts known as Chittagong Hill Tracts. This
area constitutes about
10% of the total territory of the country, covered with dense
forests and plenty of
natural resources, which is subdivided into three districts
(Khagracherri, Bandarban

272. and Rangamati) for its administrative convenience. The people
of this region belong
to the Sino-Tibetan descent group and closely resemble the
people of northeast India,
Myanmar and Thailand and are distinct from the people of the
plains of Bangladesh.
The people of CHT practice Buddhism and, on the other hand,
the rest of the
population of the country (Bengalis) follow Islam. However,
they have their rich
cultural heritage irrespective of their diversified language and
religion.28
Agriculture is the prime source of livelihood for the hill people
and hence land
is the prime resource for them. Their traditional agricultural
economy represented
a reasonably harmonious adjustment to environmental and
social conditions and
it consists of five predominant subsistence activities: rice
cultivation, animal
husbandry, fruit cultivation, horticulture, timber and bamboo
extraction for household
consumption. The economic activities of the CHT can be
divided into three classes:
(1) big land-owners, (2) peasant (flatland) producers, and (3)
landless cultivators,
who practice slash-and-burn or shifting cultivation locally
known as jhum cultivation.
However, land suitable for rice cultivation is 100,000 acre
which is only 3% of
the total land of the CHT. Thus practicing jhum cultivation is
inevitable for the hill
people.29
27 Behera (1996), op. cit., p. 998; Raja Devashish Roy (1997),

273. “The Population Programme of 1980s and
the Land Rights of the Indigenous People of Chittagong Hill
Tracts”, in Subir Bhaumik, Meghana
Guhathakurta and Sabyasachi Basu Ray Choudhury (Eds.),
Living on the Edge: Essays on Chittagong Hill
Tracts, pp. 167-208, South Asia Forum for Human Rights,
Kathamandu; and Arun Kumar Nayak (2005),
“Environmental Induced Conflicts in Bangladesh”, South Asia
Politics, Vol. 4, No. 8, December, p. 40.
28 Philip Gain (1998), Bangladesh Land Forests and Forest
People, Society for Environment and Human
Development (SEHD), Dhaka; Philip Gain (2000), “Life Nature
at Risk”, in Philip Gain (Ed.), The Chittagong
Hill Tracts: Life and Nature at Risk, Society for Environment
and Human Development (SEHD), Dhaka;
Philip Gain (2001), “Land Use Policies in Chittagong Hill
Tracts”, Earth Touch, June, pp. 20-28; Philip
Gain (2002), The Last Forests of Bangladesh, Society for
Environment and Human Development (SEHD),
Dhaka; Gankovsky (1974), op. cit.; Schendel (1992), op. cit.;
Behera (1996), op. cit.; and Khan (2003),
op. cit.
29 Gain (2000), op. cit., pp. 13-15.
The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 4,
201448
During the British rule, the region of CHT was administered
under the CHT
Regulation Act of 1900, which declared the region as an
excluded area.30 Under
this regulation, CHT was given regional autonomy and the

274. tribals were enjoying a
variety of rights over the land.31 The Government of India Act
1935 too mentioned
it as a ‘totally excluded area’ and outsiders were prohibited
from entering the region
and interfere with them.32 However, they lost their ‘autonomy’
and their status of
‘excluded’ area soon after the independence of Pakistan (earlier
Bangladesh was
part of Pakistan, known as East Pakistan). The region was
administered directly by
the Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Government of
Pakistan. Although the
constitution of 1956 and 1962 of Government of Pakistan
maintained CHT as
excluded area, later the constitutional amendment in 1963
abrogated the CHT
Regulation of 1900 to exploit the natural resources of the region
and started to
acquire land in the name of public purpose by introducing the
CHT (Land Acquisition)
Regulation, 1958 (Government of East Pakistan, 1958).
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan introduced a number of
developmental projects
in the CHT which caused large-scale environmental degradation
and loss of livelihood
to the tribals. The first large-scale development project was the
Pakistan’s National
Pride ‘Karnaphuli Paper Mills’, which started its production in
1953, which was given
99 years to extract raw materials (bamboo and softwood) from
the forest areas. The
Karnaphuli Rayon Mill and Kaptai Hydroelectric Project were
constructed in 1963 and
1966, respectively.33 The Kaptai Dam submerged 54,000 acres

275. of cultivable land, and
about 100,000 people lost their homes. Massive environmental
degradation caused
by such projects brought far-reaching effects on sustainable
economy, life style, and
severe livelihood crisis among the tribals. It is estimated that
approximately 40,000
tribals were forced to cross the border and become refugees in
the northeastern
states of India due to the construction of Kaptai Dam alone.34
Apart from land
acquisitions, encouragement of commercial plantations (rubber
and teak) in CHT by
the government further aggravated the situation. Rubber
plantations began in CHT
in 1959 on an experimental basis and within a decade the
government took over
30 Roy (1998), op. cit., pp. 56-79.
31 Schendel (1992), op. cit., pp. 110-115; and Swapna
Bhattacharya (2001), “The Refugee Generating
Chittagong Hill Tracts: Past, Present and Future”, in Sanjoy K
Roy (Ed.), Refugee and Human Rights: Social
and Political Dynamics of Refugee Problem in Eastern and
Northeastern India, p. 325, Rawat Publications,
Jaipur and New Delhi.
32 Behera (1996), op. cit., p. 987.
33 Nafis Ahmad (1950), “Industrial Development in East
Bengal (East Pakistan)”, Economic Geography,
Vol. 26, No. 3, July, pp. 183-195; and Gain (2000), op. cit., pp.
30-36.
34 David E Sopher (1963), “Population Dislocation in …

276. HUMAN SECURITY
MARY KALDOR
Professor of Global Governance, London School of Economics
and Political Science1
E-mail: [email protected]
The essay poses the question whether the so-called Arab spring
offers the potential to complete the
1989 revolutions. It first discusses what was hoped to be
achieved in 1989, and it then argues that the
post-1989 arrangements failed to prevent new security
challenges from emerging. The Islamist
threat came to play the role that the Communist threat had
played to the West or the Western threat
had played to the East. The essay then turns to the question on
what needs to happen if current events
are to lead to something better. It argues that there is a need to
overcome the legacies of the past and
adapt institutions to the global present. The world must move
away from nationalist and bloc think-
ing towards a concept of human security – a concept which
came out of the Helsinki Agreements in
1975. The case of the recent intervention in Libya illustrates the
need for a human security approach

277. in practice.
Keywords: Arab spring, Cold War, Helsinki Agreements, human
security
JEL-codes: F52, F55
INTRODUCTION
It is a special honour to receive an honorary doctoral degree
here in Budapest.
This is not only because of my family connections. It is also
because my formative
political and intellectual experience was here in Hungary in the
1980s. It was here,
as well as in other Central European countries, that I learned the
concept of civil
society – an idea that had become dormant in the West. And it
was through my
1588-9726/$20.00 © 2011 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
Society and Economy 33 (2011) 3, pp. 441–448
DOI: 10.1556/SocEc.33.2011.3.1
1 The author received an honorary doctoral degree from
Corvinus University of Budapest on
April 18, 2011. This essay is based on the lecture delivered by
the author on the occasion.

278. discussions with young people and with opposition intellectuals
that I absorbed
the significance of the coming together of peace and human
rights – something I
now describe as human security.
This is another turbulent moment in world history when the
people power that
was experienced here in 1989 is sweeping across the Middle
East. So the question
I would like to ask in this short lecture is whether the so-called
Arab spring offers
the potential to complete the 1989 revolutions, to fulfil the
aspirations of those
who longed for democracy and an end to political violence. The
regimes in the
Middle East are capitalist and authoritarian, sometimes masked
by a sham demo-
cratic process. They are not so very different from many post-
Communist re-
gimes. So what do these revolutions betoken for the future of
this type of regime
and for the world? I will start by talking about what we hoped
to achieve in 1989

279. and then what went wrong. I will then ask what needs to happen
if current events
are to lead to something better.
ASPIRATIONS IN 1989
I would like to begin by telling you my Sarajevo story. A
fisherman fishes a mer-
maid. She says she will give him three wishes if he throws her
back into the sea. So
he wishes to be young and handsome, he wishes to have a
beautiful wife and he
wishes to be very important. He throws the mermaid back into
the sea and he
wakes up in a grand ornate room. He looks in the mirror and he
is young and hand-
some. A beautiful woman comes into the room and she says
‘Wake up Ferdinand!
We have to go to Sarajevo today!’ I told this story when I went
to Sarajevo in 1991
just before the war there began. During the 1980s I had three
wishes. I wished for
democracy in Eastern Europe. I wished to get rid of cruise
missiles. And I wished
for the Cold War to end. And all my wishes came true and one

280. day a Yugoslav
friend rang up and said ‘Wake up Mary! There’s nationalism
and crime and ethnic
cleansing! You have to go to Sarajevo today!’ That’s what
happened after 1989.
So what should we wish for now?
Actually one could argue that the Cold War ended 14 years
before the revolu-
tions in Central and Eastern Europe when the Helsinki
Agreement was signed in
1975. It was that agreement that first brought peace and human
rights together. As
many of you will know, the Helsinki agreement comprised three
baskets. The first
was the security or peace basket; it was an agreement about the
territorial status
quo in Europe and about the non use of force on the European
continent. The sec-
ond basket was about economic and scientific cooperation. And
the third basket
was about respect for human rights. Both the democratic
opposition in Central Eu-
rope and the peace movement in Western Europe could be
viewed as offspring of

281. Society and Economy 33 (2011)
442 MARY KALDOR
that agreement. For the former, the Helsinki agreement provided
a legal instru-
ment to publicise their situation and the reduced international
tension offered a
small but significant political opening. The growth of the peace
movement in
Western Europe in the early 1980s was a reaction to the
proposed new generation
of nuclear weapons, which raised fears of a return to pre-
Helsinki hostility and
military confrontation. Through the mass mobilisation of that
period and through
growing dialogue and communication across the East–West
divide, many of us
came to understand and assimilate what the indivisibility of
peace and human
rights really meant. Some like me in the peace movement came
to realise that de-
mocracy in Central and Eastern Europe was the way to end the
Cold War and the

282. arms race. And many (though not all) in the East European
opposition came to un-
derstand that reducing the conflict between East and West
created space for civil
society. We opposed the Cold War not simply because we were
afraid of another
world war but because the existence of enemies and mutual
threats sustained a war
mentality that provided a justification for suppressing freedom.
The end of the Cold War was a huge achievement. It meant an
end to the Com-
munist regimes and to the kind of binary black–white thinking
that inhibited polit-
ical creativity and social change in the West as well. And yet
many are disap-
pointed. The holding of elections did not necessarily bring
democracy in the sense
that ordinary people could influence the decisions that affect
their lives. The intro-
duction of markets increased wealth for a few but also led to
new inequalities and
social injustices. The re-emergence of nationalist and
xenophobic ideologies, the

283. spread of transnational crime, and the growing privatisation of
violence exploded
in some regions like the Balkans or Central Asia. Moreover, this
combination of
weak but authoritarian states, social and economic injustice, and
new or renewed
exclusivist political currents were not just a post-Communist
phenomenon. They
affected the West as well as other parts of the world.
So what went wrong? Part of what went wrong was our failure
to dismantle the
legacies of the past and, in particular to transform the thinking
and the institutions
associated with the Cold War. To be sure, military budgets were
cut but this was
not the same as disarmament and demobilisation. Soldiers who
were unpaid sold
their services and their weapons in a newly expanded market in
violence contrib-
uting to the toxic mixture of crime and insecurity in Africa, the
Balkans or Af-
ghanistan. Intelligence and internal security services were less
affected and con-
tinued to exist. And in the United States, the research and

284. development budget
was protected and this laid the basis for new military
technologies in the 21st cen-
tury. The Warsaw Pact was dismantled and a new institution,
the Organisation of
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was established on
the basis of the
Helsinki Agreement. But NATO was not dismantled; indeed it
expanded
eastwards. And in post-Soviet space a new organisation, the
Commonwealth of
Society and Economy 33 (2011)
HUMAN SECURITY 443
Independent States (CIS) was created. This proliferation of
security organisations
with different philosophies prevented each other from providing
security.
To some extent, security thinking did change as a consequence
of the end of the
Cold War. A new humanitarian discourse characterised the
OSCE as well as or-
ganisations like the European Union (EU) and the United

285. Nations (UN). But that
discourse competed with deeply embedded geopolitical
mentalities. New na-
tionalisms constructed new ‘we-them’ dichotomies. And the
terrorist attacks on
New York on September 11 2001 led to a new ‘War on Terror’
that bore many of
the hallmarks of the Cold War. The Islamist threat came to play
the role that the
Communist threat had played to the West or the Western threat
had played to the
East. The War on Terror led to the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. It provided new
justifications for increasing military budgets again, a new lease
of life for intelli-
gence services, and new arguments for cracking down on civil
liberties. In the
Middle East, for example, where authoritarian regimes have
lasted longest, the ar-
gument that Islam is unsuited to democracy and that any
political space would be
filled by political Islam was used to defend the West’s
continued support for those
regimes.

286. But what happened can not only be explained in terms of the
legacies of the
past. We also have to understand what went wrong in terms of
the present and, in
particular, our failure to adapt to the phenomenon that we
ourselves created that
we call globalisation. Globalisation is an all encompassing term
with many differ-
ent meanings. When I use the term I am referring to growing
interconnectedness
as a result of the revolution in information and communications
technologies and
air travel. I am also referring to the growth of a global market
and the dominance
of a fundamentalist belief in deregulation and privatisation. And
in addition I am
referring to the erosion of the nation-state and the fact that
fewer and fewer deci-
sions that affect our lives are taken at the level of the nation-
state. Democracy is
being effectively hollowed out at the very moment that people
are demanding
more and more democracy. Terms like transition, convergence
criteria, or struc-

287. tural adjustment offered a standard set of recipes to be adopted
by all parties so
that decisions about the allocation of resources are no longer
taken in national
capitals. Market reform often meant the dismantling of social
safety nets. It was
the global market and not popular votes that, for example, has
thrown out govern-
ments in Ireland and Portugal. The consequence is that
democratic choices are
largely reduced to the manipulation of the media. Appeals to
nationalist and xeno-
phobic prejudices are often ways to define political difference
in a context where
meaningful policy differences are less and less possible. At the
same time, the
weakness of global institutions permitted an unregulated global
market to plant
the seeds of asset bubbles and financial crisis.
Society and Economy 33 (2011)
444 MARY KALDOR

288. Europe should have offered an alternative way out of this
paradox. It is poten-
tially a mechanism for solving the global democratic deficit.
For Central Euro-
pean countries, certainly, membership in the European Union
mitigated some of
the consequences of the combination of past legacies and the
global present. But
Europe is an unfinished project. It widened but did not deepen.
It acquired more
members, a common currency, and a common visa policy, but
did not fundamen-
tally democratise its institutions. It was used as a scapegoat by
national politi-
cians. And in the competition between national and European
rhetoric, the former
seems to be winning out, making Europe unfit to cope with the
economic crisis
and unable to offer an alternative to the War on Terror. Indeed,
there is a real risk
that the whole project will unravel.
So does the new wave of people power offer us the possibility
for completing
the hopes and aspirations of `1989? Does it provide an

289. opportunity to end the War
on Terror and the new divide between the so-called “West-
secular semi-demo-
cratic capitalist regimes” and Islamism, the political Islamist
ideology? Could it
democratise today’s authoritarian regime and bring social
justice as well? What
do we learn from what went wrong after 1989 that could make
things right now?
HUMAN SECURITY AND ITS DIMENSIONS
In what follows I emphasise the security dimension – the need
to overcome the
legacies of the past and adapt our institutions to the global
present. There is a need
to move away from nationalist and bloc thinking that permeates
our institutions
towards a concept of human security – the concept that
expresses what came out
of the Helsinki agreement. This means not only changing our
thinking but dis-
mantling the security institutions of the past that sustain current
authoritarian re-
gimes and creating new institutions that are better adapted to a
globalised situa-

290. tion. Of course we need security institutions but they have to be
very different –
this is why I propose to apply the concept of human security.
Human security has three dimensions.
First of all, human security is about the security of individuals
and the commu-
nities in which they live. This is the third basket of Helsinki –
the human dimen-
sion. By emphasising the security of individuals rather than
states, human security
implies a commitment to human rights but it does not deny the
importance of the
more traditional state centred threats. Indeed, the threat, for
example, of an attack
by an enemy state can also be described as a humanitarian
threat.
Second, human security is about the interrelationship between
freedom from
fear and freedom from want and about physical as well as
material insecurity. This
is the second basket of Helsinki; the emphasis on economic,
scientific and cultural
Society and Economy 33 (2011)

291. HUMAN SECURITY 445
co-operation. It means that human rights do not just cover
political and civil rights
but economic and social and cultural rights too.
Thirdly, human security implies an extension of rule-governed
security as op-
posed to war-based security. It implies that relations between
states are governed
by a law paradigm rather than a war paradigm. It is about the
non-use of force in
relations between states and the extension of law-governed
security to the whole
Euro-Atlantic area – the first basket of Helsinki. Or to put it
another way, it is
about the blurring of the internal and the external. We are used
to thinking of inter-
nal security as the domain of law and policing and external
security as war and di-
plomacy. A human security approach implies that something
like what we take for
granted internally has to apply externally as well.

292. The term ‘human security’ has been widely used and it has been
criticised for
meaning whatever anyone wants it to mean. For some, the term
is too ‘soft’. It
treats economic and social development as security issues and
neglects the real
dangers people face in the context of political and criminal
violence. If we tie the
term to the Helsinki baskets, then it has to have a hard
dimension. It has to be
about protecting people from foreign military aggression,
genocide, ethnic
cleansing, sectarian warfare, terrorism, violent crime, or other
human rights viola-
tions as well as from extreme poverty or disease.
For others, the problem is the opposite. It is a way the great
powers legitimate
the use of military force. NATO justified the war over Kosovo
in 1999 in terms of
humanitarian intervention and the Russian foreign minister,
Sergei Lavrov, used
the term ‘human security’ to justify the invasion of Georgia in
August 2008. Nei-
ther the Kosovo war nor the Georgian war can be described as

293. human security.
Whatever the goals, the means did not conform to human
security.
In other words, human security is a means as well as a goal. It
may involve the
use of force and thus can be regarded as a hard security policy
but the use of force
has to be directed towards protection rather than fighting or
revenge. It means us-
ing the military in a different way, more like policing than war
fighting. To put hu-
man security into practice we need something like global
emergency forces – po-
lice, health services, fire fighters, etc. These forces would also
include the military
but the aim would be to dampen down violence and to protect
civilians not to fight
enemies.
Let me give two examples. One is about how thinking could
change our ac-
tions. The attack on New York on September 11 2001 was
treated as an attack by a
foreign enemy on the United States; it was compared to Pearl
Harbor in 1941 and

294. justified what was described as pre-emptive defence against
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Suppose it had been described as a ‘crime against humanity?’
That would have re-
quired a global police effort to capture the perpetrators and
bring them to justice
instead.
Society and Economy 33 (2011)
446 MARY KALDOR
The second example is the current intervention in Libya and is
about how we
need institutions to implement human security. Like Kosovo,
the goal of the inter-
vention in Libya is to protect civilians – a human security goal.
But the means are
the classic instruments of war – air strikes. It is very difficult to
protect civilians
from the air. The danger of air strikes is that people get killed,
mainly soldiers but
also the very people you are supposed to protect; already rebels
and some civilians

295. have been killed by mistake. Air strikes are also very
polarising, increasing the co-
hesion of Gadhafi supporters behind an anti-imperialist rhetoric.
At best they will
help the rebels win but leaving a legacy of bitter division. At
worst the stalemate
between the rebels and Gadhafi will degenerate into the kind of
new war that we
have witnessed in Africa, Iraq or Afghanistan.
From a human security perspective, the appropriate course of
action would
have been to protect civilians throughout Libya and guarantee
their right to peace-
ful protest. In the end, the prospects for democracy depend on
the extent to which
the rebels can mobilise politically; thus the aim of any human
security approach is
to dampen down violence and not support one side or another
militarily. The first
task should have been to declare Benghazi and the liberated
areas a UN Protected
Area or safe haven. Human security forces including both
military and civilians
would have had to be deployed to help protect the liberated

296. areas, provide human-
itarian and reconstruction assistance and support for a
democratic political pro-
cess so that the liberated areas could provide poles of attraction
for other parts of
the country. These forces would defend the protected areas
robustly; they would
not attack Gadhafi forces but where, given the opportunity, they
would try to ar-
rest those indicted by the International Criminal Court. They
would, of course,
have needed air protection and indeed what has happened
already helps to provide
conditions for a safe haven. But this is different from relying on
military attacks
from the air alone. Of course, this did not happen since the
world has not yet con-
structed human security capabilities.
But security forces have to be accountable to democratic
institutions. So as
well as dealing with the legacies of the Cold War, we have to
address the global
present and we have to institutionalise greater access to
decision-making for ordi-

297. nary people at both European and global levels. We need, for
example, an elected
President of Europe. We also need new types of taxes at a
European level – a car-
bon tax, for example, or a tax on speculation so that European
institutions are in-
dependently funded and are able to respond to crisis and social
injustice across
Europe. We need to think about how the newly emerging
democracies of North
Africa and the Middle East could be linked to Europe and what
kind of
redistributive economic and social policies at European and
global levels can help
to meet popular aspirations. And of course, we need to think
about sustainability,
how these European and global institutions can respond to the
combined chal-
Society and Economy 33 (2011)
HUMAN SECURITY 447
lenges of climate change, economic and technological
transformation as well as

298. the power shifts from Europe to Asia and Latin America.
CONCLUSIONS
In the 1980s, it was through dialogue and communication that
we developed new
ideas about how to see the world. Our big ideas, I have
suggested, were about civil
society and human security. Can the new people’s movements in
Europe and the
Middle East come together and formulate a new way of thinking
which could help
to make today’s wishes come true? The revolutions in the
Middle East have dis-
proved the assumption of Arab exceptionalism. The people on
the streets of the
Middle East are asking for dignity and freedom; extremist
Islamist currents have
been marginalised. As in 1989, they are showing that the power
of voice and con-
science has the potential to provide the kind of stability that
weapons and money
have failed to provide. So can this moment reinvigorate the
momentum towards
human security and the democratisation of the European and

299. global projects? If
my analysis is correct, this is what is needed to bring about the
kind of democracy
that we hoped for in 1989 and to which young people in Europe
and the Middle
East still aspire.
Society and Economy 33 (2011)
448 MARY KALDOR
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Review of International Studies (2001), 27, 441–450 Copyright
© British International Studies Association
441
Environmental security and international
relations: the case for enclosure
H U G H DY E R
Abstract. The environment is now an established area of
theoretical and empirical work in
the field of International Relations, but the central question
remains whether existing
institutional structures, intellectual and political, are being in

300. some respect transformed by
this development. This review article examines the concept of
environmental security as a
reflection of the centrality of the environmental challenge. This
relatively novel perspective on
a defining feature of the field tests the domain of discourse and
inquiry, and thus has
implications for the study of international relations, perhaps to
the extent of justifying the
enclosure of its key concepts within the environmental
perspective.
The influence on international relations of the environmental
issue area has been
both practical and theoretical; that is to say, it has challenged
the behaviour and
relative significance of the various political actors, but has also
(or as a consequence)
challenged the discipline of International Relations. What might
have appeared to be
a flash in the policy pan some decades ago is now enshrined in
the institutional
structures of theoretical and practical work in the field, though
a question in both
respects is whether the institutional structures are in fact up to
the challenge, or
whether they are being in some respect transformed by it. This
review article looks at
the concept of environmental security as a reflection of the
centrality of the environ-
mental challenge to International Relations: security, a defining
feature of the field,
is thus wedded to a relatively new and different set of concerns,
and hence poten-
tially undermined as a grounding referent. Of course, in this
latter respect, the

301. environment is one of a number of alternative perspectives on
the concept of
security (identity, society, technology, and so on) all of which
put a twist in the tale
of a post-Cold War world of peace dividends and institution-
building. However, the
relative novelty and ubiquity of environmental concern makes it
worth looking at
the literature of the last decade or so which has specifically
connected this aspect of
world affairs to the notion of security, and hence raised
questions of disciplinary (as
well as political) importance. The article will consider what
counts as, in turn, a
‘security’ issue, an ‘environmental’ issue, and an ‘international’
issue, before drawing
some conclusions about the prospect of an ‘enclosure’ of the
discipline by an
environmental security concept.
Is everything a security issue?
The answer to this question perhaps depends on how nervous
you are, but it is fair
to ask whether including environmental problems under the
rubric of security issues
is stretching the meaning of the security concept beyond useful
recognition. While
the notion of ‘social security’ is not alien, it has seldom been
confused with the high
politics of inter-state diplomacy. Certainly, including the whole
range of social
welfare issues within the domain of security concerns would not

302. be helpful to
military planners, even if the expansion of their budget was a
temptation. Those
outside the ‘security community’ would likewise be troubled by
such a prospect,
since the military approach to human well-being typically has a
‘no pain, no gain’
flavour to it. Yet both insiders and outsiders in this respect
might agree that there are
some things worth securing; the difficulties arise from
uncertainty about just what
those objects of security are in the post-Cold War world, and
what means the ends
justify.
To set the scene, the contrast between traditional and more
recent critical
perspectives on security should be noted. The point of reference
for ‘security’ is in
this context already uncertain, in part because of a traditional
preoccupation with
politico-military notions of security as between states. Here we
see the cycle of
offensive and defensive postures because security is necessarily
relational, or inter-
dependent, leading to the essentially tragic ‘security dilemma’1
arising from state
attempts to secure the ‘territoriality’ or ‘impermeability’ on
which their ‘sovereignty’
and ‘independence’ rests.2 Mutual fear and suspicion compels
states to seek ever
more security, ‘an effort which proves self-defeating because
complete security
remains ultimately unobtainable’.3
This traditional notion of national security is readily unseated

303. whenever ‘the
image of the state as a referent object for security fades’ 4
because a novel source of
insecurity, such as global environmental change, is not
recognizable. Certainly,
‘territoriality’ and ‘impermeability’ go out of the window in the
context of trans-
boundary environmental change. Yet, shifting the point of
reference for security
away from the state leaves open the question of which referent
might be used,
including the environment. While security would normally be
conceived of as a
human political or psychological requirement, it is not
impossible to contemplate
moving from an anthropocentric (human-centred) to an
ecocentric (environment-
centred) perspective in which the global environment becomes
the object referent of
security. What seems clear is that some referent or locus of
security is needed, unless
one subscribes to a notion of natural harmony such that security
is not an issue. The
nation-state, of course, has traditionally been this referent and
locus in the context
of conflictual international relations, but those associated with
‘Critical Security
Studies’ argue convincingly that the state is in fact a chief
source of insecurity, and
yet still link security with emancipation and autonomy5—these
latter being typically
provided (for humans) by the state. So the question remains as
to whether we have
442 Hugh Dyer

304. 1 See, for example, H. Butterfield, History and Human
Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp. 19–20;
A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 3–24;
R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1976), p. 66.
2 J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 76
3 Ibid., p. 231.
4 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear, 2nd edn. (Hemel
Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991),
p. 103.
5 K. Booth, ‘Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory
and Practice’, International Affairs, 67:3
(1991); K. Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of
International Studies, 17:4 (1991).
a better chance of finding emancipation and autonomy in an
environmental
perspective on global politics.
The trouble is, we must thus conflate environmental and
security concepts, poten-
tially doing violence to both. At this stage in the discussion, the
concern is whether
including environmental issues overburdens the discrete area of
security studies just
when it is struggling with self-definition. In this respect there
are entirely practical
reasons for excluding epiphenomena in the search for

305. conceptual clarity. However, a
fullsome conception of security must surely encompass
whatever presents us with an
apparent sense of insecurity, as environmental change clearly
does. A NATO
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS)-
sponsored pilot study on
‘Environment and Security in an International Context’ notes in
its background
statement that with both large-scale and localized environmental
problems ‘the
security dimension is clear’ and a ‘complete definition of
security would include
these components’.6 We are hence obliged to include
environmental concerns in our
perspective on security.
On the other hand, Deudney argues that organized violence, the
traditional threat
and source of insecurity, is not analytically comparable to
environmental threats.7
Pirages suggests re-examining ‘the meaning of security’.8
Walker does this by
challenging the historically determined discourse on
sovereignty, where sovereign
states displace any other potential political community (such as
an ecologically-
determined one) and security is linked unproblematically to the
state. He notes that
‘the absence of sustained debate about the meaning of security
is rather odd’ and
that attempts ‘to articulate alternative accounts of structural
violence, common or
global security, and so on, necessarily challenge accounts of
what passes for

306. common sense’.9 Elsewhere, more recently, Litfin has examined
sovereignty in the
ecological context—an uncomfortable fit to be sure, given the
contrast between
political and geographical maps of the world.10 There’s the rub:
is it unreasonable to
consider sovereignty in relation to security? Does this open a
can of worms, and
permit bringing in awkward counterfactuals such as
environmental change? Can we
not consider the ecological sources of conflict in relation to our
concerns with
security, or is this simply ‘salami tactics’, gradually eroding the
clarity and coherence
of the old and favoured concept of security?
Is everything an environmental issue?
Having asked what counts as a security issue, and considered
the possibility that
environmental issues might be included, or even definitional,
we may now consider
the converse: what counts as ‘environmental’? Scarcity of
resources has always been
Environmental security and international relations 443
6 See the NATO/CCMS web site at
http://www.nato.int/ccms/pilot.htm
7 Deudney, ‘The Case Against’; D. Deudney, ‘Environmental
Security: Muddled Thinking’, Bulletin of
The Atomic Scientists, 47: 3 (April 1991), pp. 22–8.
8 D. Pirages, ‘Environmental Security and Social Evolution’,
International Studies Notes, 16:1 (1991),

307. p. 8.
9 R.B.J. Walker, ‘Security, Sovereignty and the Challenge of
World Politics’, Alternatives, 15:1 (1990),
p. 8.
10 K. Litfin, ‘Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics’, Mershon
International Studies Review, 41(1997), pp.
167–204; K. Litfin, The Greening of Sovereignty in World
Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
a potential source of violent conflict, but should we then
conceive of this in
‘environmental’ terms just because the scarcity involves a
‘natural’ resource such as
water, for example: are ‘Water Wars’11 about failures in
environmental management,
or really just about the potential for armed violence
(incidentally sparked-off by
distribution and consumption patterns)? Is a wedding of
environment and security
issues ill-conceived, from an environmental perspective? This
has the makings of a
paradigm dispute, and certainly there is something of this in the
academic debate.12
Perhaps some issues are not made more easily comprehensible
by forcing their
enclosure in an environmental perspective (even if the
connections are apparent),
and it may equally be a disservice to environmental politics and
scholarship to force
upon them an unwanted security discourse. Yet enforcement is
not necessarily the

308. pertinent dynamic, since there may already be strong affinities
where environmental
issues are seeking enhanced status, and security issues are
seeking a new home,
and both are anyway being viewed through the lens of a recent
‘critical turn’ in
International Relations theory which opens the way for new
alternatives. This
consequently involves a heady mixture of empirical and
theoretical change, which
does not enhance clarity. Environmental security necessarily
invokes a critical
perspective because of the diffused characteristics of the source
of insecurity in this
case, but it is often treated in terms of the political actor which
suffers the insecurity
and can thus create demand for responses from traditional
authority structures
which are thought to be efficacious in providing security (for
example, states). The
United States now (since 1993) has a Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for
Environmental Security, and its security agencies (including the
CIA, State
Department, and so on) are now involved in environmental
issues to the extent that
the Defence Intelligence Agency has studied the spread of water
hyacinth plants in
Lake Victoria13—the unlikely image of cloak and dagger
botany leaps to mind,
though in an era of increasing concern with biotechnological
risks this may not be
so far-fetched. The issue here is whether environmental
perspectives on global
politics are aided by such affiliations.14

309. Among academics there is consequently some debate about the
environmental
consequences of de-linking security from traditional agendas
and political forms.15
Still, the case for linking environment and security can be
made. Norman Myers
argues ‘that nobody can feel finally secure as long as others are
persistently
444 Hugh Dyer
11 J. Bulloch and A. Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflict in
the Middle East (London: Victor
Gollancz, 1993); P. Gleick, ‘Water and Conflict: Fresh Water
Resources and International Security’,
International Security, 18:1 (1993); M. Lowi, ‘Transboundary
Resource Disputes and Their
Resolution’, in D. Deudney and R. Matthew (eds.), Contested
Ground: Security and Conflict in the
New Environmental Politics (New York, NY: SUNY Press,
1998).
12 See the writings of Homer-Dixon, and his critics on the point
of method, and the argument by
Deudney against linking environment and security, as well as
Barnett’s recent contribution to this
journal which suggests such a link is merely a legitimation of
the ‘Northern’ stat-centric security elite
status quo. T. Homer-Dixon, ‘On the Threshold: Environmental
Changes as Causes of Acute
Conflict’, International Security, 16:2 (1991), pp. 76–116; T.
Homer-Dixon and M. Levy,
‘Environment and Security, Correspondence’, International
Security, 20: 3 (1995), pp. 189–98;
M. Levy, ‘Is the Environment a National Security Issue?’,

310. International Security, 20:2 (1995),
pp. 35–62; D. Deudney, ‘The Case Against Linking
Environmental Degradation and National
Security’, Millennium, 19:3 (1990), pp. 461ff; J. Barnett,
‘Destablilizing the Environment-Conflict
Thesis’, Review of International Studies, 26:2 (2000), pp. 271–
88.
13 International Herald Tribune, 10 October 1995.
14 K. Conca, ‘The Environment-Security Trap’, Dissent,
(Summer 1998), pp. 40–45.
15 Deudney, ‘The Case Against’; D. Deudney, ‘Muddled
Thinking’; K. Conca, ‘The Environment-
Security Trap’.
insecure’16 and presents a case for pursuing ‘ultimate security’
(environmental
security). This restates the traditional security dilemma, and it
seems facile to posit a
‘final’ or absolute security, and yet if critical perspectives on
the state suggest that
the global environment is a better bet as a referent for political
organization of all
kinds, then it should also shoulder the conceptual burden of
security.
If security is a legitimate perspective on the threat of
environmental degradation,
then environmental security could easily be an alternative
account of security—it
challenges ‘common sense’, at least in so far as it distances
itself from the traditional
state-centric security agenda. The difficulty is precisely that

311. this distance is not
always clear, as some treatments of environmental security tend
merely to add the
environment to the existing list of security concerns by
examining environmental
aspects of military activity, and more recently identified threats
to the state such as
migration. This may not adequately reflect the environmental
context of security,
and we may want to know what benefit to the environmental
cause might accrue
from its ‘securitisation’. Will this not put a ‘fragile
environment’ into the hands of
‘powerful security forces’? This raises a question about what,
exactly, is being
secured, and against what threat: existence,17 life, ideals,
beliefs, territorial integrity,
and well-being18 against war, revolution, civil strife,19 and
non-military threats.20
What is being secured, and against what threat, of course
depends on the conception
of security employed. In the International Relations tradition,
security concerns
territorial nation-states and their citizen populations and the
threats they pose to
one another. The limited nature of this conception having been
recognized, the
redefinition of security is the topic of a broad literature, which
has become increas-
ingly specific in its attention to environmental security,21 and
supported by a
Environmental security and international relations 445
16 N. Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of

312. Political Stability (New York: W.W. Norton,
1993), p. 16.
17 I. Rowlands, ‘Environmental Issues in World Politics’, in N.
Rengger and J. Baylis (eds.), Dilemmas of
World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992),
p. 299; See also I. Rowlands, ‘The Security Challenges of
Global Environmental Change’, Washington
Quarterly 14:1(1991), pp. 99–114.
18 Pirages, ‘Environmental Security’, p. 8.
19 Ibid., p. 8.
20 Rowlands, ‘Environmental Issues’, p. 299.
21 For a usefully organized and extensive bibliography, see the
Woodrow Wilson Centre Environmental
Change and Security Project’s ‘Bibliographical Guide to the
Literature’ on their web site at
http://ecsp.si.edu/ecsplib.nsf/. There is a wide and growing
literature addressing environmental
security, a sample of which is indicated here to give a sense of
its development from the redefinition
of security to the more specific (often critical) environmental
focus over the last decade or so:
L. Brown, Redefining National Security,Worldwatch Institute
Paper no. 14, (Washington, DC:
Worldwatch Institute, 1977); R. Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’,
International Security, 8:1(1983),
pp. 129–53; J. Mathews, ‘Redefining Security’, Foreign Affairs,
68:2 (1989), pp. 162–77; N. Myers,
‘Environment and Security’, Foreign Policy, 74 (1989), pp. 23–
41; N. Brown, ‘Climate, Ecology and
International Security’, Survival, 31:6 (1989), pp. 519–32; P.
Gleick, ‘Environment and Security: The
Clear Connections’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 47:3 (April

313. 1991), pp. 17–21; S. Dalby, ‘Security,
Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security
Discourse’, Alternatives, 17:1 (1992),
pp. 95–134; J. Kakonen (ed.), Green Security or Militarized
Environment (Brookfield: Dartmouth
Publishing, 1994); J. Vogler, ‘Security and Global
Environmental Change’, Conflict Processes, 1:2
(1993), pp. 1–13; R. Matthew, ‘Environmental Security and
Conflict: An Overview of the Current
Debate’, National Security Studies Quarterly, 1:2 (1995); M.
Renner, Fighting for Survival:
Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of
Insecurity (New York: W. W. Norton,
1996); D. Deudney and R. Matthew (eds.), Contested Ground:
Security and Conflict in the New
Environmental Politics (New York: SUNY Press, 1998); K.
Conca, ‘The Environment-Security Trap’;
See also such specialist publications as the Environmental
Security Network Newsletter and the new
journal, Environment and Security.
developing literature which treating security from an explicitly
critical perspective.22
It is not surprising that the difficulty remains of how security
can be conceived in
any way that does not involve some political or moral agent,
whether identity group
or state or other polity or actor, which is concerned to secure its
interests against
threats from others. The environment itself does not have
political or moral standing
independently of the interests that political actors invest in it
(pace the various

314. ecocentric arguments for ‘intrinsic value’ 23 ). In part this is
what makes the environ-
ment a special case of security: while states or peoples may feel
their security is
threatened by environmental change, the environment is not in
the role of a
threatening ‘other’; indeed it is the environment itself which is
threatened by human
activities, and thus by extension, states. It is this latter feature
which makes it
possible for states and other actors to view one another as
threatening to ‘their’ own
(‘national’) environment, although the global dimension of
environmental issues
such as climate change makes this territorial perspective on the
environment un-
sustainable. An environmental perspective on security might
better reflect human
concern about environmental change, the insecurity that it
engenders, and the
prospects for coping with it. In this sense, a full account of the
complexity and
centrality of environmental issues in the twenty-first century
cannot distance itself
from the security considerations it necessarily invokes.
Is everything an international issue?
In the age of globalization (with all its various manifestations
and interpretations)
we can reasonably ask if everything needs to be included in the
field of International
Relations, or whether we can’t maintain some discrete area of
investigation and
some modest claim to special knowledge of, say, inter-state
relations, war and peace,

315. and sundry other topics which seem all too relevant at the close
of the twentieth
century. Clearly there are matters specifically of concern to
national populations and
governments, even in respect of global environmental change—
local characteristics
of adaptability and resilience, and local variations in
environmental impacts, means
that not everything is the same everywhere; there are national
perspectives and
responses, and there is not always international ‘spill-over’
when environmental
problems arise. Yet environmental concern amongst peoples
everywhere has given
rise to some shared perspectives, and scientific knowledge and
information about
environmental change does not trouble itself much with national
boundaries. It is,
perhaps, the local-global dimension of environmental change
that presents the
greatest challenge to state-centric International Relations, since
the degree to which
environmental issues dominate the ‘international agenda’
(including transnational
societal agenda) suggests that the feast has moved. Where once
the great issues of
446 Hugh Dyer
22 R. Wyn Jones, ‘’Message in a Bottle?’ Theory and Praxis in
Critical Security Studies’, Contemporary
Security Policy, 16:3 (1995); K. Booth, ‘Security in Anarchy’,
and ‘Security and Emancipation’;
S. Dalby, ‘Security, Modernity, Ecology’; R. Lipschutz, On
Security (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995); K. Krause and M. Williams (eds.), Critical

316. Security Studies: Concepts and Cases
(Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press, 1997).
23 See R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory:
Towards an Ecocentric Approach (London:
UCL Press, 1992) and R. Goodin, Green Political Theory
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
world affairs could only be conceived of and addressed through
the mechanisms of
inter-state relations, these mechanisms now appear to be playing
‘catch-up’ to
globalized political practices. Thus, while not everything is
necessarily an ‘inter-
national’ issue, that in itself has little or no bearing on relative
importance.
The prospects for a thorough conceptual redefinition of
security, for taking a new
concept of environmental security seriously, depends in part on
whether there is
room among the underlying assumptions of the discipline’s
theoretical frameworks
for a genuinely global perspective. The case in point is global
environmental change,
which has been adopted as a social value in advance of any state
identifying it as a
matter of national interest.24 Even where a politico-military
focus is intended, public
attitudes tend to force open the discussion to include
environmental issues.25
National interest could account well enough for the failure to
establish perfect

317. international cooperation on environmental issues (such as the
slow progress in
agreeing emission reductions), but it could not easily account
for the significant
cooperation that has occurred (even if through state-oriented
international organiz-
ations), nor for the increasing significance of environmental
change on the inter-
national agenda, without admitting at least a shift in values that
has prompted a
more ‘enlightened self-interest’. Importantly, this version of
self-interest does not
rightaway invoke a military stance, and the distinction has been
noted between those
environmental concerns which require non-military responses
and the rather limited
number that might be addressed by a military response of some
kind.26
National interests are likely to vary greatly in the environmental
context—security
in this sense is related to environmental impacts, which are
uneven—and responses
must typically be collective in order to have the desired
environmental effect, and
while it is hard to say precisely what influence cultural
constructions of the environ-
ment may have on conflict and cooperation, it is clear that there
are differences, and
this in itself suggests potential difficulties in communication.
Variations in world-
views (understood as cultural biases) may provide the most
convincing explanations
of risk perception.27 So, the risks of global environmental
change may be perceived
in the light of particular cultural priorities or life-styles, rather

318. than merely in terms
of actual environmental degradation—indeed, what is
acknowledged as a problem
of environmental degradation can depend on the priorities
attached to certain
aspects of the environment. Importantly, this is also true of
perceptions of national
security.28 As Rosenau argues, the dynamics of global
environmental change and
global social change are only examined separately for reasons
of analytic con-
Environmental security and international relations 447
24 R. Dunlap, G. Gallup and A. Gallup, The Health of the
Planet Survey: A Preliminary Report on
Attitudes on the Environment and Economic Growth measured
by Surveys of Citizens in 22 Nations to
Date, survey conducted in 1992 (Princeton, NJ: The George
Gallup International Institute, 1993);
L. Harris and Associates, Public and Leadership Attitudes to the
Environment: A Report of a Survey in
16 Countries, conducted for the United Nations Environment
Programme (New York, NY: Harris
and Associates, 1989).
25 R. Smoke (ed.), Perceptions of Security: Public Opinion and
Expert Assessments in Europe’s New
Democracies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996),
p. 22.
26 Woodrow Wilson Centre Environmental Change and Security
Project, ‘Critical Review of Various
Conceptions of Environment and Security’, on the web site at
http://ecsp.si.edu/ecsplib.nsf/

319. 27 A. Wildavsky and K. Dake, ‘Theories of Risk Perception:
Who Fears What and Why?’, Daedalus,
119:4 (1990).
28 P. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security:
Norms and Identity in World Politics (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Smoke, Perceptions of
Security.
venience, so profound is their interaction.29 Consequently, the
meaning of global
environmental change is not given by a potentially universal
scientific or political
consensus, but by the complex product of political cultures,
ideologies, world views,
and life ways.30 Thus, with any increase in the salience of
environmental security in
relation to traditional politico-military security, the behaviour
(and relative import-
ance) of political actors will be judged by different criteria.
Attempts to ameliorate
defection from political consensus by bolstering the
institututions of global govern-
ance will only underline the tension between existing
international structures and the
more various political forces created by environmental change.
The point here is thus
not whether ‘the environment’ fits into conventional categories
of ‘the international’,
but rather that ‘the international’ is stretched out of shape by
the implications of
environmental change.
Environmental security could not take the same form

320. everywhere, nor guarantee
that a global norm concerning the environment will be
established—although there
is ‘a rising prospect that a new norm of international society
will develop from an
increasing concern over ecological issues’.31 However, the
notion of environmental
security opens up the possibility that such a central problem in
international
relations may create the conditions for transforming
International Relations as a
discipline. Buzan suggests that environmental security is linked
to other focal points
within the security problematique—military, political, economic
and …