MAYORAL FISCAL
 PERFORMANCE AND
REELECTION SUCCESS

   C. Alexandre A . Rocha
 Prof. James E. Kee, Advisor
Objective
• To determine if there is a relationship
  between the fiscal performance of Brazilian
  municipalities and the reelection chances of
  their mayors.




                                                 2
Theoretical Literature
• Elections as reasonably efficient
  instruments of choosing the best
  representatives (Wittman, 1989).
• Asymmetric information can generate
  moral hazard and adverse selection (Le
  Borne e Lockwood, 2002).
• Higher the percentage of non-informed
  voters, lower the efficiency of the electoral
  process (Baron, 1994).
                                                  3
Empirical Literature
• Reelection for legislatives offices (Hall and
  van Houweling, 1995; Kiewiet and Zeng,
  1993) and for the Presidency of the U.S.
  (Peltzman, 1992; Cuzán and Bundrick , 2000).
• In Brazil, Leoni, Perereira and Rennó (2001)
  analyses the elections for legislatives offices,
  and Mendes (2004) explores the relationship
  between the candidature and reelection
  probabilities, and how well the incumbent
  mayors publicized their efforts and how well
  they performed as public managers.
                                                     4
Characteristics of Phenomena
• Big numbers of potential observations (5,561
  municipalities).
• Elections happen at the same time.
• Constitutional amendment allowing reelections
  approved in 1997: all mayors elected in 1996
  knew, since the beginning of their term (1997-
  2000), they could be reelected once.
• There is a two year lag between municipal
  elections and the state and federal elections.
                                               5
Incumbent Mayor’s Options
1. Abandoning politics.
2. Running for town councilor.
3. Being up for reelection.
4. Remaining two years without mandate and
  then running for an office in the federal or
  state government.


                                                 6
Decision of Running for Reelection

1. Chance of being reelected.
2. Cost of the electoral campaign.
3. How well the mayoral office is valued by
   the incumbent mayor.




                                              7
Model


REEL* = α ' z i + η i
    i                   if   CANDi = 1
REELi = 1 if       REEL* > 0 and
                       i                 0 otherwise




                                                   8
Types of Variables Used
• Fiscal performance between 1997 and 1998 (fiscal
  performances per se, tax revenues, current revenues,
  current transfers received, and current expenses).
• Personal characteristics (being a candidate and electoral
  performance in the election of 1996).
• Local characteristics (Human Development Index, GINI
  coefficient, urban population, local population compared
  to the state one, population density and growth,
  percentage of mayors reelected in municipalities
  belonging to the same micro region, being a capital,
  belonging to a metropolitan area, belonging to the North,
  North-East, Center-West, South or Southeast regions,
  being new and being divided).
                                                        9
Model Handicaps
•   Campaign expenditures.
•   Age.
•   Level of education.
•   Cross-section.




                              10
Matrix of Candidature and Reelection (*)
                         Non-Reelected        Reelected        Total
                                   31.4%          _              31.4%
Non-Candidate
Candidate                          28.2%          40.4%          68.6%

Total                              59.6%          40.4%        100.0%


        (*) Mayors older than 70 years were excluded whenever there
        were data about age .


                                                                      11
Effective Sample
Only 2,333 fulfilled the required prerequisites:
• Their mayors were less than 70 years old.
• Their fiscal accounts were available to
   general public.
• Their mayors actually tried to be reelected
   in the election of 2000.


                                              12
Estimation
   Non Significative         Significative
Fiscal Performance.     Current Expenses,
Tax Revenue.            Transfers and Revenues.
GINI Coefficient.       N, NE, CW and S.
Municipality Divided.   Micro region.
Metropolitan Area.      Population Density.
Population Growth.      Percentage of State
                        Population. (–)
                        Urban Area. (–)
                        Capital.
                        New Municipality.
                        Performance in the 1996
                        Election.
                        HDI.                    13
Conclusions
• The fiscal federalism model adopted by
  Brazil promotes further increases of local
  expenses.
• Electoral process in the North and Northeast
  regions than in the Southeast.




                                             14
Topics for Further Investigation
• Comparison between big and small cities
  (however, only 220 municipalities have
  more than 100.000 inhabitants).
• Effect of the Fiscal Responsibility Law
  (Complementary Law n. 101, of 2000).
• Identification of other feasible explanatory
  variables.

                                                 15

Mayoral Fiscal Performance and Reelection Success

  • 1.
    MAYORAL FISCAL PERFORMANCEAND REELECTION SUCCESS C. Alexandre A . Rocha Prof. James E. Kee, Advisor
  • 2.
    Objective • To determineif there is a relationship between the fiscal performance of Brazilian municipalities and the reelection chances of their mayors. 2
  • 3.
    Theoretical Literature • Electionsas reasonably efficient instruments of choosing the best representatives (Wittman, 1989). • Asymmetric information can generate moral hazard and adverse selection (Le Borne e Lockwood, 2002). • Higher the percentage of non-informed voters, lower the efficiency of the electoral process (Baron, 1994). 3
  • 4.
    Empirical Literature • Reelectionfor legislatives offices (Hall and van Houweling, 1995; Kiewiet and Zeng, 1993) and for the Presidency of the U.S. (Peltzman, 1992; Cuzán and Bundrick , 2000). • In Brazil, Leoni, Perereira and Rennó (2001) analyses the elections for legislatives offices, and Mendes (2004) explores the relationship between the candidature and reelection probabilities, and how well the incumbent mayors publicized their efforts and how well they performed as public managers. 4
  • 5.
    Characteristics of Phenomena •Big numbers of potential observations (5,561 municipalities). • Elections happen at the same time. • Constitutional amendment allowing reelections approved in 1997: all mayors elected in 1996 knew, since the beginning of their term (1997- 2000), they could be reelected once. • There is a two year lag between municipal elections and the state and federal elections. 5
  • 6.
    Incumbent Mayor’s Options 1.Abandoning politics. 2. Running for town councilor. 3. Being up for reelection. 4. Remaining two years without mandate and then running for an office in the federal or state government. 6
  • 7.
    Decision of Runningfor Reelection 1. Chance of being reelected. 2. Cost of the electoral campaign. 3. How well the mayoral office is valued by the incumbent mayor. 7
  • 8.
    Model REEL* = α' z i + η i i if CANDi = 1 REELi = 1 if REEL* > 0 and i 0 otherwise 8
  • 9.
    Types of VariablesUsed • Fiscal performance between 1997 and 1998 (fiscal performances per se, tax revenues, current revenues, current transfers received, and current expenses). • Personal characteristics (being a candidate and electoral performance in the election of 1996). • Local characteristics (Human Development Index, GINI coefficient, urban population, local population compared to the state one, population density and growth, percentage of mayors reelected in municipalities belonging to the same micro region, being a capital, belonging to a metropolitan area, belonging to the North, North-East, Center-West, South or Southeast regions, being new and being divided). 9
  • 10.
    Model Handicaps • Campaign expenditures. • Age. • Level of education. • Cross-section. 10
  • 11.
    Matrix of Candidatureand Reelection (*) Non-Reelected Reelected Total 31.4% _ 31.4% Non-Candidate Candidate 28.2% 40.4% 68.6% Total 59.6% 40.4% 100.0% (*) Mayors older than 70 years were excluded whenever there were data about age . 11
  • 12.
    Effective Sample Only 2,333fulfilled the required prerequisites: • Their mayors were less than 70 years old. • Their fiscal accounts were available to general public. • Their mayors actually tried to be reelected in the election of 2000. 12
  • 13.
    Estimation Non Significative Significative Fiscal Performance. Current Expenses, Tax Revenue. Transfers and Revenues. GINI Coefficient. N, NE, CW and S. Municipality Divided. Micro region. Metropolitan Area. Population Density. Population Growth. Percentage of State Population. (–) Urban Area. (–) Capital. New Municipality. Performance in the 1996 Election. HDI. 13
  • 14.
    Conclusions • The fiscalfederalism model adopted by Brazil promotes further increases of local expenses. • Electoral process in the North and Northeast regions than in the Southeast. 14
  • 15.
    Topics for FurtherInvestigation • Comparison between big and small cities (however, only 220 municipalities have more than 100.000 inhabitants). • Effect of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (Complementary Law n. 101, of 2000). • Identification of other feasible explanatory variables. 15