This paper examines the relationship between local economic conditions and voting patterns in the 2012 Belgian municipal elections. It tests several hypotheses based on economic voting theory, which posits that voters reward or punish incumbents based on the state of the economy. The paper uses survey data from voters and analyzes the relationship between incumbency voting and the local unemployment rate while controlling for other individual and municipal factors. The results support the hypotheses, finding that voters were more likely to vote for incumbents when unemployment decreased and less likely when it increased. Higher educated voters showed a stronger relationship between voting and economic indicators.

1. Punishing Local Incumbents for the
Local Economy
Economic Voting in the 2012 Belgian
Municipal Elections
2016
Ruth Dassonneville
Michael S. Lewis-Beck
Ellen Claes

2. Objective
• This paper sheds light on the link between
local economic conditions and the individual
vote choice in local municipal elections in
Belgium.

3. •Theory:
•The paper uses Economic Voter Theory as
its base for analysis.
•It states that voters rewards/ punishes the
incumbent based on condition of economy.

4. Hypothesis
• Hypothesis 1: The better the state of the economy in
a municipality, the more likely a voter is to vote for
the local incumbent.
• Hypothesis 2: The more incumbents invest in local
economy, the more likely a voter is to vote for the
incumbent.
• Hypothesis 3: The better the state of the economy in
a municipality, the more likely a voter is to vote for
the list of the incumbent mayor.
• Hypothesis 4: The more incumbents invest in local
economy, the more likely a voter is to vote for the
list of the incumbent mayor.
• Hypothesis 5: Higher levels of political sophistication
strengthen the local economic vote.

5. DATA
• Data from the PartiRep exit poll 2012.
• The exit poll format implies that voters were
interviewed immediately after leaving the
polling station.
• To conduct a nationally representative survey
in the context of municipal elections, the
sample design consisted of a three-step
procedure:

6. Method of Survey
• First, 40 of the 589 municipalities in Belgium
were randomly selected within regionally based
socio-economic clusters.
• Then, polling stations were randomly selected in
each of the municipalities in the sample, and the
number of stations covered in a municipality was
in proportion to its number of inhabitants.
• Finally, interviewers had to invite each fifth voter
leaving the polling station to participate in the
exit poll survey.

7. Methodology
• The methodology used in this paper is
multilevel regression analysis.
• Dependent variable : Incumbency voting
• 1 : If a respondent reported to have voted for
one of the parties of the incumbent local
coalition.
• 0 : Otherwise.
• Multinomial modelling techniques not used,
because of data and interpretation limitations.

8. • Independent variable:
• Unemployment as the indicator of how the local economy
is performing.
• Change in unemployment rates between 2010 and 2011.
• Two most important municipal taxes: Local income tax and
Local property tax
• Controls:
• Individual level:
• Traditional socio-demographics such as respondent age,
gender and whether or not they have a higher education
degree.
• Voter language group – French or Dutch
• Voter self-placement on a 0-to-10 left-right scale: measure
of ideology.
• No. of years respondent is living in that municipality.

9. Municipal Level controls:
• Number of terms incumbent party mayor is in office.
•Effective number of parties.
• Combined vote share that incumbent parties
obtained in 2006.

10. Results
• Table 1: Intercept only model, which allows us
to assess the total amount of variance at the
level of municipalities.
 Model 1: Add the individual- and municipal-
level control variables and we include the
indicator for changes in unemployment rates
between 2010 and 2011.

11. • The estimated effect of changes in
unemployment rates on voting for an
incumbent party is, furthermore, substantively
significant, as is evident from the simulated
predicted probabilities in Figure 1.

13. • Model 2 and Model 3, assess the impact of local
tax rates on the probability that respondents
choose an incumbent list.

16. • Table 2 : Results of a series of multilevel
logistic analyses examining the determinants
of a vote for the list of the incumbent mayor.
• Similarly 3 different models were constructed
for it.

20. • Table 3 : Results of analyses investigating
individual-level heterogeneity in the economic
vote.
• Focus on the impact of political sophistication
and to the main models that were presented in
Table 1 interaction terms between education
(having a college degree) and indicators of the
state of the economy.

22. • The results hence suggest that the general
relation observed, that local incumbents are
punished for worsening unemployment rates
and rewarded for improving unemployment
rates, is strengthened for voters with a college
degree.
• Findings suggest that holding accountable
local incumbents for the state of the local
economy is a cognitively demanding task, that
higher educated voters appear more capable
of.

24. Thank You