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Knowing Your Enemy
What Makes A Trojan Financial?
Your speakers today
Nick Bilogorskiy
@belogor
Director of Security Research
Shel Sharma
Product Marketing Director
Agenda
o What makes a Trojan Financial
o Financial Trojans countdown
o Wrap-up and Q&A
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What makes a Trojan Financial
o What they try to get:
o Direct collection theft of credit cards
o Collect of credentials for online fraud
o Fake bank communication
o Direct control over bank transfer system
o How sophisticated they are:
o Man-in-the browser: webinjects
o Evasion, armoring, anti-analysis
o Configuration file for targets
o Encrypted Command-and-Control and DGA
Shylock
Aka Caphaw
Enemy #8
Shylock Trojan
o First seen: 2011
o Target: European banks, especially UK
o Distribution: Blackhole, Cool, Magnitude,
Nuclear, and Styx Exploit Kits, spam,
malvertising via Youtube ads, Skype.
o Value Stolen: several million dollars
o Infected Users: 60,000 (Symantec)
o Actors: in Russia or Eastern Europe
Shylock features
o Steals financial info via man-in-the-browser
o Injects itself in svchost and explorer, uses bootkit
o VNC module to control user machine
o Spreads through skype
Bebloh
Aka URLzone
enemy#7
Bebloh Trojan
o First seen: 2009
o Target: Western Europe banks (most in Germany)
o Distribution: LuckySploit Kit, Spam mails
o Value Stolen: $7.3 Million dollars annually (just one gang)
o Infected Users: less than 30,000 (Source: Symantec)
Bebloh: PDF exploit
Bebloh Features
o Forces use of Internet Explorer
o Disables use of a proxy
o Monitors access of certain online banking sites
o AV Evasion
o Encrypted config file
Bebloh Trojan
o C&C comm
o Decrypted
Config
file
Bebloh: AV evasion
Vawtrak
Aka Snifula, Neverquest, Papras
enemy #6
Vawtrak Trojan
o First seen: August 2013
o Target: North American banks
o Distribution: Angler Kit, Kuluoz spam,
Chanitor downloader
o Value Stolen: $24 Million dollars (RT)
o Infected Users: about 100,000
o Actors: Russian Neverquest Vawtrak crew,
vorVzakone – Oleg Tolstykh (phishlabs)
Vawtrak Trojan
AVG
Vawtrak features
o Vawtrak CNC process is complex and well-hidden. The
update servers are hosted on the Tor hidden Web services,
and communication is done over SSL. Communication is
done only while the user is browsing the Internet (i.e. while
a browser produces a network traffic).
o The command and control center of the attack is located
in Russia
o Furthermore, Vawtrak uses steganography by hiding the
update lists inside favicons 4 kB favicon image files, carrying
data in the least significant bits!
Dridex
Aka Cridex, Bugat
enemy #5
Dridex Trojan
o First seen: Nov 2014
o Target: North American and European Banks
o Distribution: Spam mails with Word Documents
o Infected Users: about 29,000 (Symantec)
Dridex features
o Some version use p2p over http for carrying out botnet
communication
o Uses web injects to carry out man-in-browser attack
o Uses VNC
o Can act as RAT tool unlike other banking Trojan
o Uses XML based config file
Dyre
Aka Dyreza
enemy #4
Dyre Trojan
o First seen: 2014
o Target: North American Corporate Banks
o Distribution: Spam mails, by Upatre and Cutwail botnets, RIG
exploit kit.
o Value Stolen: over $1 million dollars (IBM)
o Infected Users: 90,000+ (Symantec)
o Actors: Eastern Europe
Dyre Wolf gang (FBI)
Dyre Trojan
www.blueliv.com
Blueliv.com
Dyre features
o Uses man-in-the-browser attack
o Browser Snapshot, can take pictures and grab credentials.
o Adds extra text fields required for accessing the account
o Uses SSL, DGA algorithm, 1000 domains each day for CNC
o THE PHONE CALL –ADVANCED SOCIAL ENGINEERING
o To hide its backend infrastructure, Dyre deploys a set of proxy
servers that act as C2 servers.
SpyEye
Enemy #3
SpyEye
o First seen: 2009
o Target: Mostly US
o Distribution: sold as a toolkit ranging from $500 to $8,500 depending on the
plugin. Most bot arrives through spam mails.
o Value Stolen: tens of millions of dollars (infosecurity-magazine.com)
o Infected Users: 1.4 million (FBI)
o Actor: Aleksander Panin a.k.a
Gribodemon or Harderman,
arrested in June 2013
SpyEye
SpyEye features
o Uses man-in-the-browser attack
o Configuration file is saved in encrypted format.
o Browser Snapshot, can take pictures and grab credentials.
o Only activates when the user is browsing the bank’s website
o Updates itself
o Injects into explorer.exe
Source: http://www.xylibox.com/
Zeus
Enemy #2
32
ZEUS What is it
o First seen: 2007
o Target: All financial
institutions
o Distribution: drive by
downloads, spam
o Value Stolen: $100 Million
dollars (FBI)
o Infected Users: 4 Million+
o Actors: Russian Evgeniy
Bogachev
ZEUS Actors
Evgeniy Bogachev, 30, of
Anapa, Russia.
nickname “Slavik”
Gameover Zeus ringleader
Hamza Bendelladj, 24, Algerian
nickname “Bx1”
Botmaster
Arrested and extradited in 2013
o Steganography
o Rootkit
o Anti-Debugging
o Digital signatures
o Modular. Flexible. Persistent.
ZEUS Advanced tricks
Carbanak
Aka Anunak
enemy #1
Carbanak Trojan
o First seen: February 2015
o Target: Russia, followed by the United States, Germany,
China and Ukraine
o Distribution: targeted phishing emails
o Value Stolen: $1 Billion dollars
o Infected Users: only a thousand private customers
o Actors: China or Russia
Carbanak Trojan
Carbanak features
o APT TTP. A backdoor based on the Carberp malicious code.
o Evasion – anti-VM, sleeping, anti-debugging
o moved laterally to infiltrate administrator machines and
observed cash transfer patterns
o Steals from banks directly, not from users
o ATMs were instructed to dispense cash for money mules
o Manipulating account balances
Trojans map
Vawtrak Dyre
Carbanak
USA
UK
Germany
Russia
China
SpyEye
Bebloh
Shylock
Conclusions
o Continued activity targeting
individuals using more sophisticated
Trojans,
o Increased ransomware with blackmail
tactics for extortion,
o Increased campaigns and malware
targeting banks and clearing houses
themselves
Q and A
Previous
MMW slides on
www.slideshare.net/
Cyphort/
Thank You!
Twitter: @belogor
Malware's Most Wanted: Financial Trojans

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Malware's Most Wanted: Financial Trojans

  • 1.
  • 2. Knowing Your Enemy What Makes A Trojan Financial?
  • 3. Your speakers today Nick Bilogorskiy @belogor Director of Security Research Shel Sharma Product Marketing Director
  • 4. Agenda o What makes a Trojan Financial o Financial Trojans countdown o Wrap-up and Q&A CyphortLabsT-shirt
  • 5. Threat Monitoring & Research team ________ 24X7 monitoring for malware events ________ Assist customers with their Forensics and Incident Response We enhance malware detection accuracy ________ False positives/negatives ________ Deep-dive research We work with the security ecosystem ________ Contribute to and learn from malware KB ________ Best of 3rd Party threat data
  • 6. What makes a Trojan Financial o What they try to get: o Direct collection theft of credit cards o Collect of credentials for online fraud o Fake bank communication o Direct control over bank transfer system o How sophisticated they are: o Man-in-the browser: webinjects o Evasion, armoring, anti-analysis o Configuration file for targets o Encrypted Command-and-Control and DGA
  • 8. Shylock Trojan o First seen: 2011 o Target: European banks, especially UK o Distribution: Blackhole, Cool, Magnitude, Nuclear, and Styx Exploit Kits, spam, malvertising via Youtube ads, Skype. o Value Stolen: several million dollars o Infected Users: 60,000 (Symantec) o Actors: in Russia or Eastern Europe
  • 9. Shylock features o Steals financial info via man-in-the-browser o Injects itself in svchost and explorer, uses bootkit o VNC module to control user machine o Spreads through skype
  • 11. Bebloh Trojan o First seen: 2009 o Target: Western Europe banks (most in Germany) o Distribution: LuckySploit Kit, Spam mails o Value Stolen: $7.3 Million dollars annually (just one gang) o Infected Users: less than 30,000 (Source: Symantec)
  • 13. Bebloh Features o Forces use of Internet Explorer o Disables use of a proxy o Monitors access of certain online banking sites o AV Evasion o Encrypted config file
  • 14. Bebloh Trojan o C&C comm o Decrypted Config file
  • 17. Vawtrak Trojan o First seen: August 2013 o Target: North American banks o Distribution: Angler Kit, Kuluoz spam, Chanitor downloader o Value Stolen: $24 Million dollars (RT) o Infected Users: about 100,000 o Actors: Russian Neverquest Vawtrak crew, vorVzakone – Oleg Tolstykh (phishlabs)
  • 19. Vawtrak features o Vawtrak CNC process is complex and well-hidden. The update servers are hosted on the Tor hidden Web services, and communication is done over SSL. Communication is done only while the user is browsing the Internet (i.e. while a browser produces a network traffic). o The command and control center of the attack is located in Russia o Furthermore, Vawtrak uses steganography by hiding the update lists inside favicons 4 kB favicon image files, carrying data in the least significant bits!
  • 21. Dridex Trojan o First seen: Nov 2014 o Target: North American and European Banks o Distribution: Spam mails with Word Documents o Infected Users: about 29,000 (Symantec)
  • 22. Dridex features o Some version use p2p over http for carrying out botnet communication o Uses web injects to carry out man-in-browser attack o Uses VNC o Can act as RAT tool unlike other banking Trojan o Uses XML based config file
  • 24. Dyre Trojan o First seen: 2014 o Target: North American Corporate Banks o Distribution: Spam mails, by Upatre and Cutwail botnets, RIG exploit kit. o Value Stolen: over $1 million dollars (IBM) o Infected Users: 90,000+ (Symantec) o Actors: Eastern Europe Dyre Wolf gang (FBI)
  • 26. Dyre features o Uses man-in-the-browser attack o Browser Snapshot, can take pictures and grab credentials. o Adds extra text fields required for accessing the account o Uses SSL, DGA algorithm, 1000 domains each day for CNC o THE PHONE CALL –ADVANCED SOCIAL ENGINEERING o To hide its backend infrastructure, Dyre deploys a set of proxy servers that act as C2 servers.
  • 28. SpyEye o First seen: 2009 o Target: Mostly US o Distribution: sold as a toolkit ranging from $500 to $8,500 depending on the plugin. Most bot arrives through spam mails. o Value Stolen: tens of millions of dollars (infosecurity-magazine.com) o Infected Users: 1.4 million (FBI) o Actor: Aleksander Panin a.k.a Gribodemon or Harderman, arrested in June 2013
  • 30. SpyEye features o Uses man-in-the-browser attack o Configuration file is saved in encrypted format. o Browser Snapshot, can take pictures and grab credentials. o Only activates when the user is browsing the bank’s website o Updates itself o Injects into explorer.exe Source: http://www.xylibox.com/
  • 32. 32 ZEUS What is it o First seen: 2007 o Target: All financial institutions o Distribution: drive by downloads, spam o Value Stolen: $100 Million dollars (FBI) o Infected Users: 4 Million+ o Actors: Russian Evgeniy Bogachev
  • 33. ZEUS Actors Evgeniy Bogachev, 30, of Anapa, Russia. nickname “Slavik” Gameover Zeus ringleader Hamza Bendelladj, 24, Algerian nickname “Bx1” Botmaster Arrested and extradited in 2013
  • 34. o Steganography o Rootkit o Anti-Debugging o Digital signatures o Modular. Flexible. Persistent. ZEUS Advanced tricks
  • 36. Carbanak Trojan o First seen: February 2015 o Target: Russia, followed by the United States, Germany, China and Ukraine o Distribution: targeted phishing emails o Value Stolen: $1 Billion dollars o Infected Users: only a thousand private customers o Actors: China or Russia
  • 38. Carbanak features o APT TTP. A backdoor based on the Carberp malicious code. o Evasion – anti-VM, sleeping, anti-debugging o moved laterally to infiltrate administrator machines and observed cash transfer patterns o Steals from banks directly, not from users o ATMs were instructed to dispense cash for money mules o Manipulating account balances
  • 40. Conclusions o Continued activity targeting individuals using more sophisticated Trojans, o Increased ransomware with blackmail tactics for extortion, o Increased campaigns and malware targeting banks and clearing houses themselves
  • 41. Q and A Previous MMW slides on www.slideshare.net/ Cyphort/

Editor's Notes

  1. Attack occurred in 2013 and 2014 but was discovered in 2015  this hack began like any other. The cybercriminals sent their victims infected emails — a news clip or message that appeared to come from a colleague — as bait. When the bank employees clicked on the email, they inadvertently downloaded malicious code. That allowed the hackers to crawl across a bank’s network until they found employees who administered the cash transfer systems or remotely connected A.T.M.s. Then, Kaspersky’s investigators said, the thieves installed a “RAT”— remote access tool — that could capture video and screenshots of the employees’ computers.