The document discusses the impact of digital technologies and the internet on businesses and society. It argues that [1] new technologies have lowered barriers to entry and allowed new competitors to easily enter previously stable industries, [2] businesses must reinvent their strategies, operations, and organizational structures to focus on customers and revenue generation rather than just costs, and [3] society will experience changes to work, education, and leisure as digital technologies continue to converge and become ubiquitous.
Business faces a watershed. The 80’s and 90’s mandate to compete by operational efficiency amongst high technology users timed-out around 1995. Technology was a rising tide that lifted all ships - not just one or two - conferring zero net competitive advantage - forcing industry to find efficiencies only at the margin. The ‘revolution’ merely automated number-crunching, or repetitive tasks and gave no assistance with running a complex business or producing distinct, quality products. It took the half-life of any good idea, just to get it to market. By that time, someone else had had the idea too and a new set of competitive criteria obtained. Industries in overcapacity offered indistinct products. In any situation a revolution was going to occur, given the above model. But the way the revolution was headed was in the direction of size (increased concentration). Indeed many companies positioned themselves in expectance of exactly this - the merger activity of the late 1990s and the dash for incorporation by previously mutually funded companies. (These processes are ongoing - QED Natwest….) But industry has been caught with a double-whammy. What happened?
The two ‘whammies’ were: 1) that industry still had to solve the problems in the market (i.e. overcapacity / product differentiation). 2) the rules about technology use had changed: - Not a distinguishing factor amongst competing companies, just a cost of entry - A number of companies had capitalised on the key problems of the past revolution - ‘Client/Server’ - and had packaged up the technical architectures into shrink-wrapped ‘middleware’ layers that could then be deployed at lesser cost to new entrants. - These technical architectures promised great flexibility due to open nature of standards (CORBA, COM). Companies could literally employ any type of machine (brand-independence) anywhere (location independence) at any time (process independence). - The internet was promoted heavily in the United States and proved to be a cheap, virtual Wide Area Network (WAN) for companies (existing companies tied to expensive proprietary networks). Coincidentally, the internet offered a huge repository of knowledge (again, companies had invested hugely in proprietary knowledge-bases) and of virtual real-estate (worldwide shop-front). - Numerous ‘smart’ devices were entering the market that could - or had the potential to - talk over these open architectures, using the internet as the main network. The PC is only one such device; mobile phones (now WAP), another; Laptops; hand-held computers and now Digital TV. Well, “so what”, you may say.
I hope the preceding few slides now makes sense of some of the ‘hype’ you will have heard about eCom. Here are some of my favourite sound bites.
This may sound like repetition of former slides, except this is the real list derived for me by David Evans, former CIO of AON. I was keen to start with strategy (as opposed to technology) to dispel the idea either that Electronic Commerce is just the next fad, or just a solution looking for a problem. We face a tough, strategic dilemma (from legacy of 1980’s / 90’s). No consultant should approach eCom any other way ‘round (here’s an answer, what’s your problem?). eCom is 80% about the resolution to business problems, 20% about the use of technology for technology’s sake (conservative). Hopefully I have convinced you of this. Indeed, I have advised a small client company once to avoid an eCom offering being pushed at them by the US parent, precisely because of the ‘lack of problem’ it was deemed to address (at least in the UK at the time - Dec 1998). ‘ Stick to the knitting’ may well be an answer. It should almost certainly form part of the overall answer because of this 80-20 rule. If your existing physical distribution has efficiencies - it is not sensible to abandon these in the belief that in doing-so, one is partaking in the eCom revolution and therefore doing ‘the right thing’. US companies got caught out with this. We can learn from their mistakes.
Not an exhaustive list, but a truism. Notice again, I have not said ‘launch wholeheartedly into eCom’ but rather ‘pick and choose what you want to put over. (Use it as a new channel, not as your only one). Some good US examples where moving totally to web was inappropriate and had then to be counter-balanced by retention of ‘useful legacy’. For example: Charles Schwabb. We will see later how important it is also to vary the proposition on the web, from what you distribute over existing channels - again to avoid cannibalisation. I am not being flippant with my last line. The last twelve months have seen some big heads roll - purportedly for ‘failure’ to address market position: Andersen Consulting (George Shaheen) Compaq (Eckhard Pfieffer) Natwest (Derek Wanless) Sainsburies - Dino Adriano (replaced by Sir Peter Davis from Pru) Baan - CEO left at beginning of January after ‘disastrous’ results Proportion of executives on company boards for less than five years has risen from 14% in 1997 to 17% in 1999. (Hay Group).