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lecture 7A

This document is a lecture on how health information technology (HIT) can impact patient safety culture. It discusses applying quality improvement tools to analyze HIT errors. It highlights the success of efforts led by Dr. Peter Pronovost to reduce central line bloodstream infections through standardization, independent checks, and learning from defects. Checklists, data collection, and adopting practices from high-reliability industries like aviation and Toyota have helped significantly reduce infection rates.

HIT
These logos represent agencies and associations involved in HIT in 2010.
8

National Health Care Quality
2009 National Healthcare Disparities Report. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD.
2009 National Healthcare Quality Report. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD.
Courtesy HHS AHRQ Archive: http://archive.ahrq.gov/
9

BSI Checklist
• Wash your hands.
• Clean your skin with Chlorhexidine.
• Avoid placing catheters in the groin.
• Use full barrier precautions.
• Ask every day if you still need the catheter.
10

Science of Safety: Independent
Checks
12

Science of Safety: Learn from
Every Defect
15

HIT’s Impact on a Patient Safety Culture
Summary — Lecture a
• Despite massive efforts, quality and safety
have not significantly improved.
• It takes teamwork and cooperation.
• National efforts to improve central line BSI
rates have been hugely successful.
• Standardization, independent checks, and
learning from every defect are keys to
success.
22

HIT’s Impact on a Patient Safety Culture
References — Lecture a — 2
Images
Slide 4: Dr. Peter Pronovost [Online image]. The photo was taken during filming for
Program One — "Silent Killer" at Johns Hopkins University's Hospital and Children's
Center for the RAM Campaign. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from
http://www.ramcampaign.org/pages/campaign_photos.htm
Slide 6: Earthrise Over the Lunar Horizon [Online image].(NASA photo ID AS11-44-6552).
Retrieved May 25, 2016, from
http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/apollo11.html
Slide 7: Planet Earth from the Moon [Online image]. (NASA photo ID AS11-36-5355).
Retrieved May 25, 2016, from
http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/apollo11.html
Slide 8: A Collage of Association Logos for Agencies Involved in HIT. Image Sources,
retrieved March 2012: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
http://www.ahrq.gov/; VA National Center for Patient Safety.
http://www.patientsafety.va.gov/ World Health Organization. www.who.int; Joint
Commission. http://www.jointcommission.org/; American Medical Association.
http://www.ama-assn.org/; Institute for Safe Medication Practices.
http://www.ismp.org; Consumers Advancing Patient Safety.
http://www.patientsafety.org; ECRI Institute. https://www.ecri.org; National Patient
Safety Foundation. http://www.npsf.org; National Center for Nursing Quality.
http://www.nursingworld.org/ncnq
24

HIT’s Impact on a Patient Safety Culture
References — Lecture a — 3
Images
Slide 9: 2009 National Healthcare Disparities Reports and National Healthcare Quality
Report. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. Retrieved May
27, 2016 from: http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhdr09/index.html and
http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhqr09/index.html
Slide 11: A Clinician Prepares a Syringe While a Patient Looks On. American Health
Information Management Association (AHIMA).
Slide 12: A Three-Point Seat Belt in a Lincoln Town Car [Online image]. Creative
Commons: Gerdbrendel. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Seatbelt.jpg
Slide 13: David H. Berger, M.D., MEDVAMC Operative Care Line Executive (Left)
Prepares for Surgery with an Anesthesia Resident and Grace Campos, R. N.,
Operating Room Nurse.
Slide 14: Nurse [Online image]. Educational Resources — National Organization on Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome (NOFAS). Centers for Disease Control. Retrieved May 25, 2016,
from http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/training.html
25

HIT’s Impact on a Patient Safety Culture
References — Lecture a — 4
Images
Slide 15: Doctors Ronald Post (Left) and John Smear (Center) and Physician’s Assistant
Debra Blackshire Perform Laparoscopic Stomach Surgery [Online image]. Department of
Defense. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.defense.gov/Media/Photo-
Gallery?igphoto=2001242690
Slide 16: Blood Infection Checklist at Johns Hopkins. Available
from:http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org
Slide 17: Swan-Ganz-Heparin Coated Catheter. FDA.
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/default.htm
Slide 18: Safety Score Card. The BSI Report Card – Dr. Peter Pronovost. Johns Hopkins
Hospital.
Slide 19: Overview of STOP-BSI Program. Peter Pronovost, MD, PhD. Johns Hopkins
Hospital.
Slide 20: The Model. Johns Hopkins Hospital. http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org
Slide 21: Dr. Peter Pronovost [Online image]. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from
http://www.ramcampaign.org/pages/images/Dr_Pronovost_large.jpg
26

lecture 7A

1.
Quality Improvement HIT’s Impacton a Patient Safety Culture Lecture a This material (Comp 12 Unit 7) was developed by Johns Hopkins University, funded by the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology under Award Number IU24OC000013. This material was updated in 2016 by Johns Hopkins University under Award Number 90WT0005. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/.
2.
HIT’s Impact ona Patient Safety Culture Learning Objective — Lecture a • Apply QI tools to the analysis of HIT errors. 2
3.
Dr. Peter Pronovost— 1 3
4.
Dr. Peter Pronovost— 2 4
5.
Key Topics 7.01 Figure. 5
6.
Apollo Mission —1 6
7.
Apollo Mission —2 7
8.
HIT These logos representagencies and associations involved in HIT in 2010. 8
9.
National Health CareQuality 2009 National Healthcare Disparities Report. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. 2009 National Healthcare Quality Report. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. Courtesy HHS AHRQ Archive: http://archive.ahrq.gov/ 9
10.
BSI Checklist • Washyour hands. • Clean your skin with Chlorhexidine. • Avoid placing catheters in the groin. • Use full barrier precautions. • Ask every day if you still need the catheter. 10
11.
Science of Safety:Standardize Care 11
12.
Science of Safety:Independent Checks 12
13.
Science of Safety 13
14.
At Hopkins 14
15.
Science of Safety:Learn from Every Defect 15
16.
Checklist 16
17.
Rates 17
18.
The BSI Story 18
19.
Michigan 19
20.
The Model 20
21.
Toyota 21
22.
HIT’s Impact ona Patient Safety Culture Summary — Lecture a • Despite massive efforts, quality and safety have not significantly improved. • It takes teamwork and cooperation. • National efforts to improve central line BSI rates have been hugely successful. • Standardization, independent checks, and learning from every defect are keys to success. 22
23.
HIT’s Impact ona Patient Safety Culture References — Lecture a — 1 References Klein, S., & McCarthy, D. (2010 April/May). A conversation with Peter Pronovost about patient safety. Quality Matters. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/Quality-Matters/2010/April-May- 2010/Q--A.aspx Pronovost, P. (2010 October). Speech presented at the Legg Mason Capital Management Thought Leader Forum. Ross, B. (2010 January 29). Toyota CEO apologizes to his customers: ‘I am deeply sorry.’” ABC News. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/toyota-ceo-apologizes-deeply/story?id=9700622 Charts, Tables, Figures 7.01 Figure: Key Topics. Courtesy Dr. Anna Maria Izquierdo-Porrera. Images Slide 3: Dr. Peter Pronovost Listens to a Patient’s Heart [Online image]. The photo was taken during filming for Program One — "Silent Killer" at Johns Hopkins University's Hospital and Children's Center for the RAM Campaign. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.ramcampaign.org/pages/campaign_photos.htm 23
24.
HIT’s Impact ona Patient Safety Culture References — Lecture a — 2 Images Slide 4: Dr. Peter Pronovost [Online image]. The photo was taken during filming for Program One — "Silent Killer" at Johns Hopkins University's Hospital and Children's Center for the RAM Campaign. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.ramcampaign.org/pages/campaign_photos.htm Slide 6: Earthrise Over the Lunar Horizon [Online image].(NASA photo ID AS11-44-6552). Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/apollo11.html Slide 7: Planet Earth from the Moon [Online image]. (NASA photo ID AS11-36-5355). Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/apollo11.html Slide 8: A Collage of Association Logos for Agencies Involved in HIT. Image Sources, retrieved March 2012: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. http://www.ahrq.gov/; VA National Center for Patient Safety. http://www.patientsafety.va.gov/ World Health Organization. www.who.int; Joint Commission. http://www.jointcommission.org/; American Medical Association. http://www.ama-assn.org/; Institute for Safe Medication Practices. http://www.ismp.org; Consumers Advancing Patient Safety. http://www.patientsafety.org; ECRI Institute. https://www.ecri.org; National Patient Safety Foundation. http://www.npsf.org; National Center for Nursing Quality. http://www.nursingworld.org/ncnq 24
25.
HIT’s Impact ona Patient Safety Culture References — Lecture a — 3 Images Slide 9: 2009 National Healthcare Disparities Reports and National Healthcare Quality Report. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. Retrieved May 27, 2016 from: http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhdr09/index.html and http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhqr09/index.html Slide 11: A Clinician Prepares a Syringe While a Patient Looks On. American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA). Slide 12: A Three-Point Seat Belt in a Lincoln Town Car [Online image]. Creative Commons: Gerdbrendel. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Seatbelt.jpg Slide 13: David H. Berger, M.D., MEDVAMC Operative Care Line Executive (Left) Prepares for Surgery with an Anesthesia Resident and Grace Campos, R. N., Operating Room Nurse. Slide 14: Nurse [Online image]. Educational Resources — National Organization on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (NOFAS). Centers for Disease Control. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/training.html 25
26.
HIT’s Impact ona Patient Safety Culture References — Lecture a — 4 Images Slide 15: Doctors Ronald Post (Left) and John Smear (Center) and Physician’s Assistant Debra Blackshire Perform Laparoscopic Stomach Surgery [Online image]. Department of Defense. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.defense.gov/Media/Photo- Gallery?igphoto=2001242690 Slide 16: Blood Infection Checklist at Johns Hopkins. Available from:http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org Slide 17: Swan-Ganz-Heparin Coated Catheter. FDA. https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/default.htm Slide 18: Safety Score Card. The BSI Report Card – Dr. Peter Pronovost. Johns Hopkins Hospital. Slide 19: Overview of STOP-BSI Program. Peter Pronovost, MD, PhD. Johns Hopkins Hospital. Slide 20: The Model. Johns Hopkins Hospital. http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org Slide 21: Dr. Peter Pronovost [Online image]. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.ramcampaign.org/pages/images/Dr_Pronovost_large.jpg 26
27.
Quality Improvement HIT’s Impacton a Patient Safety Culture Lecture a This material (Comp 12 Unit 7) was developed by Johns Hopkins University, funded by the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology under Award Number IU24OC000013. This material was updated by Johns Hopkins University under Award Number 90WT0005. 27

Editor's Notes

#2 Welcome to HIT’s Impact on a Patient Safety Culture. This is Lecture a. In this lecture, we will take a deeper dive into the concept of a patient safety culture and the ways in which HIT can support and enhance this culture. In this segment, Dr. Peter Pronovost will share his very successful bloodstream infection story. The principles underlying the success of this initiative are universal and illustrate how you, as a future HIT professional, can help to infect a patient safety culture. This is a recording from a live presentation on October 27, 2010, at the Legg Mason Capital Management Thought Leader Forum.
#3 The objective for this lecture of HIT’s Impact on a Patient Safety Culture is to: Apply QI tools to the analysis of HIT errors.
#4 Thank you everybody! You know, when I got that Genius Award, my daughter’s teacher brought in the newspaper article and said, “Oh look, class, Emma’s daddy got the Genius Award.” And my daughter, as only a kid can say, said “What are you talking about? My daddy’s not a genius. I put peanut butter on his nose, and our big yellow lab licks it off his face! What genius would do that?”
#5 One of the themes you are going to hear me talk about this morning is humbleness. And it’s a commodity that is, I think, too rare in our organization. But frankly, without it, you can’t get started, and you certainly can’t progress on this journey, so let’s keep that in mind.
#6 What I want to do in our time together is really three key things. One is I want to delve into, briefly, the story of the checklist so that you understand this really phenomenal success story — but it’s not as simple as the media build it out to be. Second is to understand this thing of culture and what we mean by that, and third, and perhaps most of our time, talking about what you can do to prevent projects from failing. Because if we look at our success in the implementation of quality and safety products, not just here but frankly around the globe, we have a batting average of around 10 percent. Most of them fail, and we need to dig into why that is, and perhaps you may be surprised at some of those reasons.
#7 Let me begin with this remembering. Some of you may remember that first Apollo mission that circumnavigated the globe. Well, one of the astronauts on that mission, Rusty Schweickart, when he was flying over the Middle East, asked what it was like to fly over the Middle East from outer space.
#8 And his words, I think, were so telling. He said, “There are no lines from outer space — we invent them. They are figments of our imagination. And yet, on Earth, we kill people over those lines.”
#9 And I think about our efforts in this country to improve safety over the last decade. I see efforts that have been competitive more than cooperative. We have about thirty different agencies doing work, and none of them talk to each other. I see efforts that have been independent rather than interdependent — even within our own hospitals — we have silos who are working and duplicating efforts, and were not leveraging it. Most importantly, we have efforts that have been focused on what we do — the efforts rather than results we achieve.
#10 Some of you may have read that National Health Care Quality Report, which is the scorecard, if you will, for how were doing on quality and safety in this country, that was released by AHRQ about two months ago. The bottom line is that over the last decade we are doing a lot — we’re doing a lot of “rah-rah” sessions — we may be using evidence-based medicine more — but the empiric evidence that patients are dying less or that outcomes have actually improved is virtually non-existent. Some of that is because we don’t have good measures; a lot of it is because we actually haven’t improved outcomes, and we need to rethink why that is.
#11 Now, one different and remarkable success story is with central-line infection, so let’s begin with that story a little bit to understand what happened. The Johns Hopkins Hospital, and Judy well knows this, back in the early 2000, 2001, had amongst the highest blood stream infection rates in the country. We had a rate, which my own belief now is that we should have been shut down if we had that rate now, of somewhere around 11 per thousand catheter days. It was exceedingly high. And at the time, all of our docs said, “Hey, we treat sick patients; that’s the way it is. These infections are inevitable. There is nothing we can do about it. We’re trying hard.” But we questioned that. We said, “Well are we really doing the best we could?” And we went to the Center for Disease Control, who had a guideline on this, a guideline, which is, as you know, the normal way medicine summarizes evidence, that was two hundred pages long and had a hundred or so recommendations to use. Now, any of you who are clinical will know you are not doing a hundred things when you are a busy doctor or nurse or pharmacist on the wards. So we had the, perhaps ludicrous, idea of taking that guideline and culling out from it a checklist. A list of five items that are unambiguous, that are actually do-able, and that are probably the most important things. Now, admittedly, we shot from the hip in picking what was most important. But we got some clinicians who are trained in clinical research to look at the evidence and we ended up with five simple things: Wash your hands, Clean your skin with Chlorhexidine, Avoid placing catheters in the groin, Use full barrier precautions, and Ask every day if you still need the catheter. Now, when we looked, we saw that our docs were doing those things 30 percent of the time — 30 percent of the time — unbelievable! And so we got into a heated argument where our docs said, ”Peter, these rates are what they are going to be — we have sick people.” I said, “Ok, let’s not argue about how low the rates can go — but let’s make sure that every patient gets these five evidence-based things because we all agree that we ought to be doing these — and let’s just see what happens.” So they said, “Ok, great.”
#12 So we dug into it as applying the science of safety — and one of the principles of the science of safety is standardizing care. And when we looked at why we weren’t doing it, we initially fell into the traditional bad doc, bad nurse — if we whip our docs harder, they will start doing it. But what we found was that our docs had to go to eight different places to get the equipment needed to comply with that checklist. So caps were in one place, masks were in another, gowns were in another. It was no wonder why they didn’t comply because, like many of you, our docs were busy. And if they had to walk down the hall to get equipment; that was five minutes that they wouldn’t spend with another patient. In their minds, and perhaps logically, for a utilitarian approach, they said, “It’s not worth it! If I’m going to take away from another patient, I’m just going to go without the supplies.” But we should never have put them in that position. We said, “Ok, let’s get a line cart. We’ll take eight steps down to one.” We tried it in the SICU and WICU, as many of you know, and that took compliance from 30 percent up to 70-75 percent. Good — but not good enough. Our rates came down from somewhere around 11 to maybe five or so. We said, “Ok, that’s great — but docs still aren’t doing it all the time.”
#13 Let’s apply the second principle of the science of safety, which is independent checks. So we pulled the doctors and nurses together and said, “Nurses, I would like you to assist with the doctors placing a catheter and ensure that they comply with these five steps on this checklist.” Some of our WICU and SICU nurses are here … you would have thought that I caused World War Three with that. Now, this was just a few years ago, but the culture just didn’t allow questioning physicians. And the responses from the doctors and nurses — were so interesting — which is this culture nugget.
#14 The nurses said, “Hey, it’s not my job to police the docs, and if I do, I’m going to get my head bit off. Fascinating — the view of their scope of their authority was perhaps, I feel, comfortable advocating for psycho-social issues, but not evidence-based practice or safety and likely a really real and strong history of it not being safe to speak up because getting your head bit off is probably a daily occurrence in many of our areas. The docs, on the other hand, were equally interesting. They pulled me aside and said, “Peter, there is no way you can have a nurse question me in public — it makes me look like I don’t know something, right?” And what was driving it was this myth that they have to be perfect. They didn’t debate the evidence; they didn’t debate should we do this; what they debated was — is it ok for someone to question me — for me to not be perfect. So fascinating psychology.
#15 I pulled everyone together and I said, “Is it tenable that we harm patients at Johns Hopkins” — and everyone said, “No.” Without going into the psychological literature, there’s very good evidence that having people publically commit to a goal dramatically increases adherence to it. I then said, “And do you agree that the items on this checklist are sound and that every patient ought to get them” — and they said, “Yes.” That remarkably, I mean it almost sounds like fairy dust, and indeed many of the visitors who came to our hospital would walk around the WICU or SICU and say, “This culture seems like you sprinkled fairy dust, Peter — people are working together — is it really real?” And I said, “Yes, go watch it.” The interaction isn’t confrontational. I think it’s because we changed the focus on whether I’m right or you’re right to the aligning as the patient as the North Star. We finally realized that, rather than battling each other, we’re actually on the same team. And this idea of battling is far too common. Then I said, “If we agree on that, how could we possibly — possibly — allow a patient not to get it because of either ego or afraid of speaking up?” So nurses, I need you to speak up — your patients need you to speak up — as a patient advocate, you have to speak up. And, doctors, we have permission to make mistakes. I’m going to forget, you’re going to forget, we have permission to not remember to wash our hands. But we don’t have permission to needlessly put patients at risk, so if we forget it, it’s ok, but if the nurse sees you or whoever that checks sees you, then you have to go back and fix it because we can’t put patients needlessly at risk.
#16 Some of you may have known that I was doing anesthesia a while ago, and I thought one of the patients had a pneumonia. And so I wanted to get a chest X-ray. It caused an uproar amongst the surgeon who was doing the case, who said, “You know this is nuts. The patient doesn’t have a pneumonia. What are you thinking?” And I said, “Yeah, I’m an intensivist. I’ve diagnosed pneumonia many times a week. I know what pneumonia is, and I think they have it.” And then went on to say, “This is just you anesthesiologists wanting to go home early. You’re making me late for clinic.” And this is all in front of the patient — completely inappropriate. And so, afterwards, we had a discussion about it afterwards, to his credit, the surgeon apologized to me, but his framing of it was so telling. What he said to me was, “You know, Peter, I didn’t mean to offend you (I had said “your remarks are completely offensive and inappropriate”), but in the heat of battle, you have to exaggerate.” And I said, “Wow, that’s a fascinating world view because I never thought we were battling. I actually thought we were on the same team.” And it’s remarkable, I think so much of our conflicts, we actually forget that we are on that same team.
#17 Ok, so compliance now — the nurses are questioning docs — we’re up to about 95 percent compliance with the checklist, and our rates come down to maybe 2 ½ or 3 — just remarkable, remarkable success. Doctors still say there’s no way we can get any lower. I said, “I’m not sure about that — let’s apply the third principle of the science of safety, which is learn from every defect.” So we said, “Let’s start investigating each of these infections that we have to see if we can understand why.” Now, that approach does two things: perhaps most importantly, it changes the mental model from these are inevitable to these are preventable, right? Because once we start labeling them as defects, people dig into it and say, “Ok, well, they shouldn’t happen, let’s look into it and why.” And secondly, you find out what went wrong. What did we find out? Well, when we dug into this, we found that (and Deb Hobson helped lead a lot of these investigations) many of the infections, indeed half, weren’t from lines that we had placed in the ICU, they were from lines that were placed in the operating room. We knew that because the infection developed very quickly, within two days in the ICU, and they didn’t get a new catheter placed. But we hadn’t, at the time, taken the intervention to the operating rooms, so now we had some evidence. We went to the anesthesia leaders and said, “Hey, you need to start using this approach in the operating room;, we have pretty good data that half of the infections that we have are from the catheters that you’re placing.”
#18 We then — rates came down to maybe 2, 1.8 — we kept digging in further, and what did we find? And again, this is really our nursing leaders found that the few infections that we had now had nothing to do with the checklist, which is for placing the catheter, it had to do with how we maintained the catheter, because the infections didn’t happen within the first five days — what you would expect if its due to insertion, it happened after people had catheters for 10 days, two weeks, three weeks sometimes — in other words, not likely to do with our checklist, but, when we audited our catheter maintenance practices, what we found and — surprisingly, we had it standardized so there was wide variation and knowledge about what we do for catheter maintenance — there was wide variation in practice. It’s hard, many of the catheters are falling off; the dressings don’t stick. So we, again mostly collaborating with Nursing, got new dressings that actually stay on an IJ much better. Dick, Deb Hobson, and others developed in-services to audit our catheter maintenance so that each day we would look to see: Are the dressings intact, and we retrained the nursing staff to make sure they do it and with that, we virtually eliminated these infections.
#19 When I say that, let me just frame this performance to you, because it’s truly breathtaking, this mindset of switching inevitable to preventable. What we found was that the cardiac SICU, which the average patient has three or so catheters, had gone over a year — I think it went to like 72 weeks without an infection. The SICU (Deb, you can correct me), I think at a time went 85 weeks; the WICU was up to 88 or so weeks — unheard of performance! Now, is that really eliminating them because, after 85 weeks, you get an infection? Well. the reality is — I don’t know — but my gut is that if you can go over a year without an infection, I suspect that the one we have is we probably got sloppy. I don’t know that for sure — maybe the patient was that sick, and they were destined to get it because there are certainly patients at high risk. But that performance was just deemed unheard of!
#20 Now, that effort and then the subsequent effort, where some of you may be aware of, we took this program and put it in the whole state of Michigan, and, remarkably, got the same results as Michigan — essentially eliminated infection in over a hundred ICUs. I was petrified to think of scaling up a safety program that could be scaled up and made that simple to implement in hospitals that we have absolutely no relationship with. But the reality is that it worked, and we published that in the New England Journal. We then went on to do the same thing in Rhode Island; that will be published shortly. Every hospital in the state eliminated. We’re now, which is near killing me, putting it into every state in the country. We’ve launched about 38 states, and I think 44 have signed up. Within six months, Hawaii eliminated these infections, about 75 percent of the hospitals in Ohio have signed up, eliminated these infections. Half the hospitals in New Jersey signed up, eliminated these infections. Half the hospitals in Georgia signed up, eliminated the infections. It’s remarkable that this model works!
#21 So what is this model? Well, I wish I could tell you I understand it really deeply — what happened — but I know it’s not just the checklist that the press says it is. And the reason I know that is that, when we went to go to take this out to other hospitals, I hear some very common things; I hear, “Oh, we’re using the checklist,” and I say, “Great, yeah, but the public really cares about your infection rates — I don’t really care about the checklist — what are they?” And, uniformly, the answer is either we don’t know or our rates are high. But most importantly, it’s the responses I get when I talk to nurses — and I think that this is perhaps the most indicting statement of our medical culture. In every hospital I’ve been at, quite frankly except ours, and we’ll talk about that in a second, when I ask the nurses in that hospital, ”If you were to see a doctor, especially a senior doctor, putting in a catheter and not complying with the checklist, would you speak up, and do you think the doctor would comply?” And literally in every hospital in this country, I’m laughed at as if I’m nuts. The nurses say, “Are you crazy, Peter? There is no way we have that culture to support it.” Now, I want you to think back for a second — just take a step back. Nobody debates the evidence and the use of this darn thing, I mean, saved probably 20,000 lives this year. Thirty one thousand people die from central-line associated blood stream infections. It’s a high, high mortality of all of our central-line infections. And we tolerate a culture where we wantonly allow failure to comply with evidence-based standards because of, frankly, ego. I don’t know any other industry — ANY other industry — where we would tolerate 31,000 deaths a year when you have a solution — because of this cultural barrier. To me, it’s unconscionable — a leadership failure in our American medical system to not create that kind of culture.
#22 So what is this model? Well, I wish I could tell you I understand it really deeply — what happened — but I know it’s not just the checklist that the press says it is. And the reason I know that is that, when we went to go to take this out to other hospitals, I hear some very common things; I hear, “Oh, we’re using the checklist,” and I say, “Great, yeah, but the public really cares about your infection rates — I don’t really care about the checklist — what are they?” And, uniformly, the answer is either we don’t know or our rates are high. But most importantly, it’s the responses I get when I talk to nurses — and I think that this is perhaps the most indicting statement of our medical culture. In every hospital I’ve been at, quite frankly except ours, and we’ll talk about that in a second, when I ask the nurses in that hospital, ”If you were to see a doctor, especially a senior doctor, putting in a catheter and not complying with the checklist, would you speak up, and do you think the doctor would comply?” And literally in every hospital in this country, I’m laughed at as if I’m nuts. The nurses say, “Are you crazy, Peter? There is no way we have that culture to support it.” Now, I want you to think back for a second — just take a step back. Nobody debates the evidence and the use of this darn thing, I mean, saved probably 20,000 lives this year. Thirty one thousand people die from central-line associated blood stream infections. It’s a high, high mortality of all of our central-line infections. And we tolerate a culture where we wantonly allow failure to comply with evidence-based standards because of, frankly, ego. I don’t know any other industry — ANY other industry — where we would tolerate 31,000 deaths a year when you have a solution — because of this cultural barrier. To me, it’s unconscionable — a leadership failure in our American medical system to not create that kind of culture.
#23 This concludes Lecture a of HIT’s Impact on a Patient Safety Culture. In summary, despite massive efforts, health care quality and safety have not significantly improved. It takes teamwork and cooperation to achieve lasting improvement. There have been pockets of success, most notably with respect to national efforts to improve central-line blood stream infection rates. Keys to success in that initiative have been three of the science of safety principles: standardization, independent checks, and learning from every defect.
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lecture 7A

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lecture 7A

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