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Lattice based signatures
Zhenfei Zhang
zzhang@onboardsecurity.com
April 27, 2018
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 1 / 29
Our company
Previously known as NTRU Cryptosystem Inc., . . .
. . . then Security Innovation, . . .
Three focus area:
Lattice based cryptographic research;
V2X security;
Editor of IEEE 1609.2 WAVE standard
Trusted Computing and TPMs;
Chair for TCG software stack working group and Virtualized Platform
working group
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 2 / 29
Why lattice
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 3 / 29
Why lattice
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 3 / 29
Why lattice
Lattice leads to the knowledge of everything!
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 3 / 29
Why lattice
Lattice leads to the knowledge of everything!
(WRONG!)
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 3 / 29
Why lattice
the real reason
1994, Shor’s algorithm, break RSA and ECC with quantum
computers;
2015, NSA announcement: prepare for the quantum apocalypse;
2017, NIST call for competition/standardization;
2030(?), predicted general purpose quantum computers;
bonus points
Good understanding of underlying hard problem;
Fast, parallelable, hardware friendly;
Numerous applications: FHE, ABE, MMap, obfuscation, . . .
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 4 / 29
Why lattice
the real reason
2030(?), predicted general purpose quantum computers;
Data vaulting attack
A.k.a., harvest-then-decrypt attack
Data need to be secret for, say, 30 years;
Quantum computer arrives in, say, 15 years;
Perhaps the most practical attack in cryptography!
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 5 / 29
Figure source: https://nsa.gov1.info/utah-data-center/
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 6 / 29
Figure source: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-
cryptography/post-quantum-cryptography-standardization
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 7 / 29
Source: https://csrc.nist.gov/Presentations/2018/PQ-Crypto-A-New-
Proposed-Framework
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 8 / 29
This talk
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 9 / 29
This talk
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 10 / 29
Figure source: Wendy Cordero’s High School Math Site
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 11 / 29
Lattice
Definition of a Lattice
All the integral combinations of d ≤ n linearly independent vectors
over R
L = Z b1 + · · · + Z bd = {λ1b1 + · · · + λd bd : λi ∈ Z}
d dimension.
B = (b1, . . . , bd ) is a basis.
An example
B =
5 1
2
√
3
3
5
√
2 1
d = 2 ≤ n = 3
In this talk, full rank integer Basis: B ∈ Zn,n.
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 12 / 29
Example
A lattice L
B =
8 5
5 16
All lattice crypto talks start with an image of a dim-2 lattice
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
Example
A lattice L
UB =
1 0
−1 1
8 5
5 16
=
8 5
−3 11
An infinity of basis
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
Example
A lattice L
UB =
1 0
1 1
8 5
5 16
=
8 5
13 21
An infinity of basis
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
Example
A lattice L
UB =
3 1
2 1
8 5
5 16
=
29 31
21 26
An infinity of basis
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
Example
The Shortest Vector and The First Minima
v = 8 5 , with λ1 = 82 + 52 = 9.434
The Shortest Vector
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
Example
The Determinant
det L = det (BBT ) = 103
The Fundamental Parallelepiped
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
NTRU lattice
NTRU ring
Originally: Zq[x]/(xN − 1), q a power of 2, N a prime;
Alternative 1: Zq[x]/(xN − x − 1), q a prime;
Alternative 2: Zq[x]/(xN + 1), q a prime, N a power of 2
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 14 / 29
NTRU lattice
NTRU ring
Originally: Zq[x]/(xN − 1), q a power of 2, N a prime;
Alternative 1: Zq[x]/(xN − x − 1), q a prime;
Alternative 2: Zq[x]/(xN + 1), q a prime, N a power of 2
Ring multiplications: h(x) = f (x) · g(x)
Compute h (x) = f (x) × g(x) over Z[x]
Reduce h (x) mod (xN − 1) mod q
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 14 / 29
NTRU lattice
NTRU ring
Originally: Zq[x]/(xN − 1), q a power of 2, N a prime;
Alternative 1: Zq[x]/(xN − x − 1), q a prime;
Alternative 2: Zq[x]/(xN + 1), q a prime, N a power of 2
Ring multiplications: h(x) = f (x) · g(x), alternatively
h0, . . . , hN−1 = f0, . . . , fN−1 ×







g0 g1 g2 . . . gN−1
gN−1 g0 g1 . . . gN−2
gN−2 gN−1 g0 . . . gN−3
...
...
...
...
...
g1 g2 g3 . . . g0







mod q
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 14 / 29
NTRU lattice
NTRU assumption
Decisional: given two small ring elements f and g; it is hard to
distinguish h = f /g from a uniformly random ring element;
Computational: given h, find f and g.
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 15 / 29
NTRU lattice
NTRU assumption
Decisional: given two small ring elements f and g; it is hard to
distinguish h = f /g from a uniformly random ring element;
Computational: given h, find f and g.
NTRU lattice
qIN 0
H IN
..=














q 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 q . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . q 0 0 . . . 0
h0 h1 . . . hN−1 1 0 . . . 0
hN−1 h0 . . . hN−2 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
h1 h2 . . . h0 0 0 . . . 1














Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 15 / 29
NTRU lattice
NTRU assumption
Decisional: given two small ring elements f and g; it is hard to
distinguish h = f /g from a uniformly random ring element;
Computational: given h, find f and g.
NTRU lattice L =
qIN 0
H IN
g, f (and its cyclic rotations) are unique shortest vectors in L;
Decisional problem: decide if L has unique shortest vectors;
Computational problem: find those vectors.
Both are hard for random lattices.
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 15 / 29
NTRU lattice
The real NTRU assumption
NTRU lattice behaves the same as random lattices.
NTRU lattice L =
qIN 0
H IN
g, f (and its cyclic rotations) are unique shortest vectors in L;
Decisional problem: decide if L has unique shortest vectors;
Computational problem: find those vectors.
Both are hard for random lattices.
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 15 / 29
NTRU lattice vs random lattice
256 0
172 1
256 0
17 1
(g, f ) = (1, 3) v = (17, 1)
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 16 / 29
Lattice signatures
GGHSign hash-then-sign generic lattice
NTRUSign hash-then-sign NTRU lattice
Fiat Shamir with abort FS, Rejection sampling generic lattice
GPV hash-then-sign generic lattice
BLISS FS, Rejection sampling NTRU lattice
Dilithium FS, Rejection sampling generic lattice
Falcon hash-then-sign NTRU lattice
pqNTRUSign HTS, Rejection sampling NTRU lattice
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 17 / 29
GGHSign
Signing key: a good basis B
Verification key a bad basis H
Sign
Hash message to a vector v
Use B to find the closest vector c (Babai’s algorithm)
Verification
Check Dist(v − c) is small
NTRUSign
Good basis: (g,f)
Bad basis: h
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 18 / 29
Transcript security
Breaks GGHSign, NTRUSign;
Each signature is a vector close
to the lattice (info leakage);
Recover enough of distance
vectors (blue dots) gives away a
good basis of the lattice;
Seal the leakage with rejection
sampling.
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 19 / 29
GPV sampler: a randomized Babai function
The idea
A trapdoored lattice L, i.e.
L⊥
A := {v : Av = 0 mod q}, Lh := {(u, v) : uh = v mod q}
A trapdoor S, or (g, f ), and a smooth parameter ηε(L)
A target lattice point v
Outputs another vector s, s.t.
s is uniform over L
dist(s, v) Gaussian over Zn
Bottle neck: trapdoor generation
Bonsai Tree, Gadget matrix, . . .
Falcon = GPV + NTRUSign + more ticks
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 20 / 29
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 21 / 29
Falcon
Public key security: recover f and g from h;
Forgery: as hard as finding a preimage for GPV without secret key
Transcript security: output is already Gaussian
independent from secret basis; no need for rejection sampling.
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 22 / 29
Modular Lattice Signatures
The core idea
Given a lattice L with a trapdoor T, a message m, find a vector v
v ∈ L
v ≡ hash(m) mod p
Can be instantiated via any trapdoored lattice
SIS, R-SIS, R-LWE, etc
pqNTRUSign is an efficient instantiation using NTRU lattice
Efficient trapdoor f , g.
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 23 / 29
pqNTRUSign
Sign (f , g, h = g/f , p = 3, R, m)
Hash message into a “mod p” vector vp, up = hash(m|h)
Repeat with rejection sampling:
Sample v0 from certain distribution; compute v1 = p × v0 + vp
Find a random lattice vector v1, u1 = v1 · I, h
“v-side” meets the congruent condition.
Micro-adjust “u-side” using trapdoor f and g
Compute a = (u1 − up) · g−1
mod p
Compute v2, u2 = a · p × f , g
Compute v, u = v1, u1 + v2, u2
Output v as signature
Remark
v = v1 + v2 = (p × v0 + vp) + p × a · f = p × (v0 + a · f ) + vp
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 24 / 29
pqNTRUSign
Verify (h, p = 3, R, m, v)
Hash message into a “mod p” vector vp, up = hash(m|h)
Reconstruct the lattice vector v, u = v · I, h
Check vp, up = hash(m|h)
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 25 / 29
pqNTRUSign
Public key security: recover f and g from h;
Forgery: as hard as solving an approx.-SVP in an intersected lattice;
Transcript security - achieved via rejection sampling.
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 26 / 29
Rejection Sampling
Consider b ..= v0 + a · f
“large” v0 drawn from uniform or Gaussian;
“small” a drawn from sparse trinary/binary;
sparse trinary/binary f is the secret.
RS on b
b follows certain publicly known distribution independent from f ;
for two secret keys f1, f2 and a signature b, one is not able to tell
which key signs b - witness indistinguishability.
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 27 / 29
Rejection Sampling
Rejection sampling on Uniform
Sample v0 uniformly from [−q
2 , q
2 ]N
Accept b when b is in [−q
2 + B, q
2 − B]N
Before rejection
	0.0005
	0.0006
	0.0007
	0.0008
	0.0009
	0.001
	0.0011
-600 -400 -200 	0 	200 	400 	600
"notuniforminq"
1/1031.0
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 28 / 29
Rejection Sampling
Rejection sampling on Uniform
Sample v0 uniformly from [−q
2 , q
2 ]N
Accept b when b is in [−q
2 + B, q
2 − B]N
After rejection
	0
	0.0002
	0.0004
	0.0006
	0.0008
	0.001
	0.0012
-600 -400 -200 	0 	200 	400 	600
"uniforminq"
1/1021.0
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 28 / 29
Rejection Sampling
Rejection sampling on Gaussian
Sample v0 from discrete Gaussian χN
σ
Accept b when b is Gaussian
Before/after rejection
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 28 / 29
Thanks!
to study the underlying principle to acquire knowledge (idiom);
pursuing knowledge to the end.
Figure source: Google Image & www.hsjushi.com
Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 29 / 29

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Lattice-based Signatures

  • 1. Lattice based signatures Zhenfei Zhang zzhang@onboardsecurity.com April 27, 2018 Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 1 / 29
  • 2. Our company Previously known as NTRU Cryptosystem Inc., . . . . . . then Security Innovation, . . . Three focus area: Lattice based cryptographic research; V2X security; Editor of IEEE 1609.2 WAVE standard Trusted Computing and TPMs; Chair for TCG software stack working group and Virtualized Platform working group Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 2 / 29
  • 3. Why lattice Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 3 / 29
  • 4. Why lattice Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 3 / 29
  • 5. Why lattice Lattice leads to the knowledge of everything! Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 3 / 29
  • 6. Why lattice Lattice leads to the knowledge of everything! (WRONG!) Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 3 / 29
  • 7. Why lattice the real reason 1994, Shor’s algorithm, break RSA and ECC with quantum computers; 2015, NSA announcement: prepare for the quantum apocalypse; 2017, NIST call for competition/standardization; 2030(?), predicted general purpose quantum computers; bonus points Good understanding of underlying hard problem; Fast, parallelable, hardware friendly; Numerous applications: FHE, ABE, MMap, obfuscation, . . . Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 4 / 29
  • 8. Why lattice the real reason 2030(?), predicted general purpose quantum computers; Data vaulting attack A.k.a., harvest-then-decrypt attack Data need to be secret for, say, 30 years; Quantum computer arrives in, say, 15 years; Perhaps the most practical attack in cryptography! Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 5 / 29
  • 9. Figure source: https://nsa.gov1.info/utah-data-center/ Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 6 / 29
  • 12. This talk Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 9 / 29
  • 13. This talk Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 10 / 29
  • 14. Figure source: Wendy Cordero’s High School Math Site Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 11 / 29
  • 15. Lattice Definition of a Lattice All the integral combinations of d ≤ n linearly independent vectors over R L = Z b1 + · · · + Z bd = {λ1b1 + · · · + λd bd : λi ∈ Z} d dimension. B = (b1, . . . , bd ) is a basis. An example B = 5 1 2 √ 3 3 5 √ 2 1 d = 2 ≤ n = 3 In this talk, full rank integer Basis: B ∈ Zn,n. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 12 / 29
  • 16. Example A lattice L B = 8 5 5 16 All lattice crypto talks start with an image of a dim-2 lattice Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
  • 17. Example A lattice L UB = 1 0 −1 1 8 5 5 16 = 8 5 −3 11 An infinity of basis Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
  • 18. Example A lattice L UB = 1 0 1 1 8 5 5 16 = 8 5 13 21 An infinity of basis Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
  • 19. Example A lattice L UB = 3 1 2 1 8 5 5 16 = 29 31 21 26 An infinity of basis Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
  • 20. Example The Shortest Vector and The First Minima v = 8 5 , with λ1 = 82 + 52 = 9.434 The Shortest Vector Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
  • 21. Example The Determinant det L = det (BBT ) = 103 The Fundamental Parallelepiped Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 13 / 29
  • 22. NTRU lattice NTRU ring Originally: Zq[x]/(xN − 1), q a power of 2, N a prime; Alternative 1: Zq[x]/(xN − x − 1), q a prime; Alternative 2: Zq[x]/(xN + 1), q a prime, N a power of 2 Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 14 / 29
  • 23. NTRU lattice NTRU ring Originally: Zq[x]/(xN − 1), q a power of 2, N a prime; Alternative 1: Zq[x]/(xN − x − 1), q a prime; Alternative 2: Zq[x]/(xN + 1), q a prime, N a power of 2 Ring multiplications: h(x) = f (x) · g(x) Compute h (x) = f (x) × g(x) over Z[x] Reduce h (x) mod (xN − 1) mod q Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 14 / 29
  • 24. NTRU lattice NTRU ring Originally: Zq[x]/(xN − 1), q a power of 2, N a prime; Alternative 1: Zq[x]/(xN − x − 1), q a prime; Alternative 2: Zq[x]/(xN + 1), q a prime, N a power of 2 Ring multiplications: h(x) = f (x) · g(x), alternatively h0, . . . , hN−1 = f0, . . . , fN−1 ×        g0 g1 g2 . . . gN−1 gN−1 g0 g1 . . . gN−2 gN−2 gN−1 g0 . . . gN−3 ... ... ... ... ... g1 g2 g3 . . . g0        mod q Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 14 / 29
  • 25. NTRU lattice NTRU assumption Decisional: given two small ring elements f and g; it is hard to distinguish h = f /g from a uniformly random ring element; Computational: given h, find f and g. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 15 / 29
  • 26. NTRU lattice NTRU assumption Decisional: given two small ring elements f and g; it is hard to distinguish h = f /g from a uniformly random ring element; Computational: given h, find f and g. NTRU lattice qIN 0 H IN ..=               q 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 q . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0 0 . . . q 0 0 . . . 0 h0 h1 . . . hN−1 1 0 . . . 0 hN−1 h0 . . . hN−2 0 1 . . . 0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... h1 h2 . . . h0 0 0 . . . 1               Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 15 / 29
  • 27. NTRU lattice NTRU assumption Decisional: given two small ring elements f and g; it is hard to distinguish h = f /g from a uniformly random ring element; Computational: given h, find f and g. NTRU lattice L = qIN 0 H IN g, f (and its cyclic rotations) are unique shortest vectors in L; Decisional problem: decide if L has unique shortest vectors; Computational problem: find those vectors. Both are hard for random lattices. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 15 / 29
  • 28. NTRU lattice The real NTRU assumption NTRU lattice behaves the same as random lattices. NTRU lattice L = qIN 0 H IN g, f (and its cyclic rotations) are unique shortest vectors in L; Decisional problem: decide if L has unique shortest vectors; Computational problem: find those vectors. Both are hard for random lattices. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 15 / 29
  • 29. NTRU lattice vs random lattice 256 0 172 1 256 0 17 1 (g, f ) = (1, 3) v = (17, 1) Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 16 / 29
  • 30. Lattice signatures GGHSign hash-then-sign generic lattice NTRUSign hash-then-sign NTRU lattice Fiat Shamir with abort FS, Rejection sampling generic lattice GPV hash-then-sign generic lattice BLISS FS, Rejection sampling NTRU lattice Dilithium FS, Rejection sampling generic lattice Falcon hash-then-sign NTRU lattice pqNTRUSign HTS, Rejection sampling NTRU lattice Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 17 / 29
  • 31. GGHSign Signing key: a good basis B Verification key a bad basis H Sign Hash message to a vector v Use B to find the closest vector c (Babai’s algorithm) Verification Check Dist(v − c) is small NTRUSign Good basis: (g,f) Bad basis: h Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 18 / 29
  • 32. Transcript security Breaks GGHSign, NTRUSign; Each signature is a vector close to the lattice (info leakage); Recover enough of distance vectors (blue dots) gives away a good basis of the lattice; Seal the leakage with rejection sampling. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 19 / 29
  • 33. GPV sampler: a randomized Babai function The idea A trapdoored lattice L, i.e. L⊥ A := {v : Av = 0 mod q}, Lh := {(u, v) : uh = v mod q} A trapdoor S, or (g, f ), and a smooth parameter ηε(L) A target lattice point v Outputs another vector s, s.t. s is uniform over L dist(s, v) Gaussian over Zn Bottle neck: trapdoor generation Bonsai Tree, Gadget matrix, . . . Falcon = GPV + NTRUSign + more ticks Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 20 / 29
  • 34. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 21 / 29
  • 35. Falcon Public key security: recover f and g from h; Forgery: as hard as finding a preimage for GPV without secret key Transcript security: output is already Gaussian independent from secret basis; no need for rejection sampling. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 22 / 29
  • 36. Modular Lattice Signatures The core idea Given a lattice L with a trapdoor T, a message m, find a vector v v ∈ L v ≡ hash(m) mod p Can be instantiated via any trapdoored lattice SIS, R-SIS, R-LWE, etc pqNTRUSign is an efficient instantiation using NTRU lattice Efficient trapdoor f , g. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 23 / 29
  • 37. pqNTRUSign Sign (f , g, h = g/f , p = 3, R, m) Hash message into a “mod p” vector vp, up = hash(m|h) Repeat with rejection sampling: Sample v0 from certain distribution; compute v1 = p × v0 + vp Find a random lattice vector v1, u1 = v1 · I, h “v-side” meets the congruent condition. Micro-adjust “u-side” using trapdoor f and g Compute a = (u1 − up) · g−1 mod p Compute v2, u2 = a · p × f , g Compute v, u = v1, u1 + v2, u2 Output v as signature Remark v = v1 + v2 = (p × v0 + vp) + p × a · f = p × (v0 + a · f ) + vp Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 24 / 29
  • 38. pqNTRUSign Verify (h, p = 3, R, m, v) Hash message into a “mod p” vector vp, up = hash(m|h) Reconstruct the lattice vector v, u = v · I, h Check vp, up = hash(m|h) Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 25 / 29
  • 39. pqNTRUSign Public key security: recover f and g from h; Forgery: as hard as solving an approx.-SVP in an intersected lattice; Transcript security - achieved via rejection sampling. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 26 / 29
  • 40. Rejection Sampling Consider b ..= v0 + a · f “large” v0 drawn from uniform or Gaussian; “small” a drawn from sparse trinary/binary; sparse trinary/binary f is the secret. RS on b b follows certain publicly known distribution independent from f ; for two secret keys f1, f2 and a signature b, one is not able to tell which key signs b - witness indistinguishability. Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 27 / 29
  • 41. Rejection Sampling Rejection sampling on Uniform Sample v0 uniformly from [−q 2 , q 2 ]N Accept b when b is in [−q 2 + B, q 2 − B]N Before rejection 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.001 0.0011 -600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600 "notuniforminq" 1/1031.0 Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 28 / 29
  • 42. Rejection Sampling Rejection sampling on Uniform Sample v0 uniformly from [−q 2 , q 2 ]N Accept b when b is in [−q 2 + B, q 2 − B]N After rejection 0 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.001 0.0012 -600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600 "uniforminq" 1/1021.0 Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 28 / 29
  • 43. Rejection Sampling Rejection sampling on Gaussian Sample v0 from discrete Gaussian χN σ Accept b when b is Gaussian Before/after rejection Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 28 / 29
  • 44. Thanks! to study the underlying principle to acquire knowledge (idiom); pursuing knowledge to the end. Figure source: Google Image & www.hsjushi.com Z.Zhang (OnBoard Security Inc.) NTRU crypto April 27, 2018 29 / 29