LAB 10 SOIL GEOGRAPHYIn this module, you will identify and expl.docx

LAB 10: SOIL GEOGRAPHY
In this module, you will identify and explain the geographic
distribution, patterns, and processes associated with Earth’s
soils.
Note: Please refer to the GETTING STARTED lab module to
learn tips on how to set up and maneuver through the Google
Earth () component of this lab.
KEY TERMS
The following is a list of important words and concepts used in
this lab module:
Cation-exchange capacity (CEC)
Particle size –sand, silt, clay
Soil profile
CLORPT
Pedogenic processes
Soil structure
Diagnostic horizon
Pore space
Soil solution
Eluviation
Soil color – hue, value, chroma
Soil Taxonomy
Humus
Soil consistence
Soil texture
Illuviation
Soil horizons - O, A, E, B, C, R
Transpiration
Inorganic material (matter)
Soil moisture
Organic material (matter)
Soil pH

LAB MODULES LEARNING OBJECTIVES
After successfully completing this module, you should be able
to:
· Identify the fundamental components of soil
· Explain the factors that influence the development of soil
(CLORPT)
· Identify soil orders and soil series by diagnostic
characteristics and location
· Explain soil profiles and soil horizons
· Recognize soils by texture and color
· Describe the geography of soils at various taxonomic
levels
INTRODUCTION
This module examines the geography of soil. Topics include soil
classifications, soil horizons, soil moisture, pH and color. While
these topics may appear to be disparate, you will learn how they
are inherently related.
The modules start with five opening topics, or vignettes, which
are found in the accompanying Google Earth file. These
vignettes introduce basic concepts of the geography of soil.
Some of the vignettes have animations, videos, or short articles
that will provide another perspective or visual explanation for
the topic at hand. After reading the vignette and associated
links, answer the following questions. Please note that some
components of this lab may take a while to download or open,
especially if you have a slow internet connection.
Expand SOIL GEOGRAPHY and then expand the
INTRODUCTION folder.
Read Topic 1: The Earth’s Soils.
Question 1: Looking at the map, what is the soil moisture
terminology used for regions with relatively humid climates and
well-distributed rainfall, where water moves down through the
soil via soil pores, like that of eastern USA, the United
Kingdom, Norway, and eastern China?

a. Udic
b. Aridic
c. Ustic
d. Perudic
Read Topic 2: Soil Forming Factors
Question 2: Which factor – climate, organisms, relief, parent
material, or time – would affect most universally the soils in
mountainous areas?
a. climate
b. organisms
c. relief
d. parent material
e. time
Read Topic 3: Soil Characteristics
Question 3: How are colloids beneficial to plants (Hint: What
can they do that helps plants)?
a. Colloids dissolve soil water for plant use
b. Colloids contain acid ions that leach nutrients from soil
c. Colloids harbor positively charged surfaces to attract
nutrients
d. Colloids hold soil nutrients for plant use
Read Topic 4: Soil Horizons
Question 4: The photo image shows a massive horizon of
accumulated clays, oxides, and organics. Does this soil profile
show a massive O horizon, A horizon, E horizon, B horizon, or
C horizon?
a. 0 horizon
b. A horizon
c. E horizon
d. B horizon
e. C horizon
Read Topic 5: Soil Degradation

Question 5: Reading the map, what is the global status of soil in
South Africa, the internal region of Madagascar, and the
majority of eastern China?
a. Very high severity
b. High severity
c. Moderate severity
d. Low severity
Collapse and uncheck INTRODUCTION
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
In this section, you will identify how soils are distributed at a
global scale. Remember, scale is an important concept in
geography, because some patterns can be seen only at the global
(coarse) scale and not at the local (fine) scale.
Expand GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE and then click and select,
Soil Taxonomy Map.
Soils are generally classified using their soil profiles and other
physical, chemical, and biological characteristics. How they are
classified, or grouped into categories, depends on the
classification system used. There are many recognized soil
classification systems in the world, including classification
systems from Canada, Russia, China, Germany, Australia, the
United States, and the internationally recognized FAO World
Reference Base for Soil Resources (WRB). For this section, the
soil order nomenclature (how soils are named) is based on the
United States classification system known as the USDA Soil
Taxonomy. The resultant map overlay shows particular
geographic patterns of soil with climate and relief that are
evident at the global scale.
Doubleclick and select Atlanta. When you arrive at your
destination, choose the dominant soil order for the city. Repeat
this for the remaining questions in this section.
Question 6: What is the predominant soil order for Atlanta,

Georgia, USA and the surrounding region?
a. Ultisols
b. Vertisols
c. Spodosols
d. Oxisols
e. Gelisols
f. Histosols
g. Andisols
h. Aridisols
i. Mollisols
j. Alfisols
k. Inceptisols
l. Entisols
Doubleclick and select Bhopal
Question 7: What is the predominant soil order for Bhopal,
India and the surrounding region?
a. Ultisols
b. Vertisols
c. Spodosols
d. Oxisols
e. Gelisols
f. Histosols
g. Andisols
h. Aridisols
i. Mollisols
j. Alfisols
k. Inceptisols
l. Entisols
Doubleclick and select Hamar
Question 8: What is the predominant soil order for Hamar,
Norway and the surrounding region?
a. Ultisols
b. Vertisols
c. Spodosols
d. Oxisols
e. Gelisols

f. Histosols
g. Andisols
h. Aridisols
i. Mollisols
j. Alfisols
k. Inceptisols
l. Entisols
Doubleclick and select Yaounde
Question 9: What is the predominant soil order for Yaounde,
Cameroon and the surrounding region?
a. Ultisols
b. Vertisols
c. Spodosols
d. Oxisols
e. Gelisols
f. Histosols
g. Andisols
h. Aridisols
i. Mollisols
j. Alfisols
k. Inceptisols
l. Entisols
Doubleclick and select Sarawak
Question 10: Sarawak is a Malaysian state located on the Island
of Borneo. The predominant soil order for most of Sarawak is
the same as which of the following locations?
a. Yaounde, Cameroon
b. Hamar, Norway
c. Bhopal, India
d. Atlanta, Georgia
Collapse and uncheck GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
SOIL ORDER
Physical, chemical, and other unique properties help classify
soils at all levels of taxonomy. Soils are classified from the
highest level, the soil order, down to the lowest level, the soil
series. The levels between soil order and soil series are soil

suborder, great group, subgroup, and families. The USDA Soil
Taxonomy recognizes 12 soil orders, 64 suborders, over 300
great groups, and over 20,000 soil series.
The soil order level is important at the macro (global) scale, or
when general descriptions of soil are needed. The soil series
level is important at the micro (local) scale, or when specific
soil descriptions are needed. At the local scale, soils are very
complex and can vary significantly within a relatively small
area due to various environmental factors. These factors can
include the steepness of the terrain, the size and speed of
streams, the native plants or crops that grow on it, the type of
parent material (rocks) below it, the age of the soil, and soil
disturbance (for example, fire).
Continue practicing your identification of soil orders at a global
scale.
Expand SOIL ORDER and then click and select Identification.
If you need help with identification, click and select
Information. This link takes you to The Twelve Soil Orders of
Soil Taxonomy web page hosted by the USDA Natural
Resources Conservation Service. You can use this to help you
identify soils 1 through 12.
Question 11: Soil 1:
<Question 11-22: Pull from the following list>
a. Alfisols
b. Andisols

c. Aridisols
d. Entisols
e. Gelisols
f. Histosols
g. Inceptisols
h. Mollisols
i. Oxisols
j. Spodosols
k. Ultisols
l. Vertisols
SOIL PROFILE
The USDA Soil Taxonomy uses color, texture, structure, and
other soil properties of a soil profile, measured from the surface
down to two meters depth (NCRS). Within the soil profile, soil
horizons are important in the identification of the soil order and
lower taxonomic levels. Soil horizons at the surface are
sometimes known as epipedons. Many soils have a diagnostic
horizon or other soil characteristics that are unique to that soil
and help to differentiate them from other soil types.
Expand SOIL PROFILE, and then doubleclick and select Soil
Taxonomy Map. Next, double-click and select Soil 1. In this
section, you will look at six different soil profiles. To identify
each soil order, an image along with CLORPT (CLimate,
Organisms, Relief, Parent material, Time) information and
diagnostic characteristics are provided. After you identify the
soil order, expand the folder and select and click Location A
and Location B to determine the most likely location.
Question 23: What is Soil 1? _____________________
a. Aridisols
b. Inceptisols
c. Ultisols
d. Vertisols
Question 24: This soil order is most likely to be found at or
around Location A, B, C or D?

a. Location A
b. Location B
c. Location C
d. Location D
a. Alfisols
b. Inceptisols
c. Mollisols
d. Spodosols
around Location E, F, G, or H?
a. Location E
b. Location F
c. Location G
d. Location H
a. Alfisols
b. Gelisols
c. Histosols
d. Inceptisols
around Location I, J, K, or L
a. Location I
b. Location J
c. Location K
d. Location L
a. Alfisols
b. Entisols
c. Oxisols
d. Ultisols

around Location M, N, O, or P?
a. Location M
b. Location N
c. Location O
d. Location P
a. Alfisols
b. Histosols
c. Inceptisols
d. Spodosols
around Location Q, R, S, or T?
a. Location Q
b. Location R
c. Location S
d. Location T
SOIL TEXTURE
One common physical soil property that helps to classify soils
is soil texture. Soil texture is one of the first things determined
for a given soil or soil horizon, and equates to the size of the
particles for a given soil. The three relative sizes of soil
particles include sand (largest/coarse), silt (medium), and clay
(smallest/fine). Most soils contain a percentage of each of these
particle sizes. Figure 1 shows the USDA Soil Texture Triangle
which determines soil texture classes by percent sand, silt, and
clay.
Figure 1. USDA Soil Texture Triangle (NCRS).
Use the Soil Texture Triangle to determine the soil texture class
for each of the following examples. Note that the numbers for
each separate (sand, silt, clay) on the Soil Texture Triangle are

directionally aligned with the associated lines.
Question 33: What is the soil texture class for a soil that is 50
percent clay, 30 percent silt, and 20 percent sand?
a. Silty clay loam
b. Clay
c. Loam
d. Sandy loam
e. Sandy clay loam
Question 34: What is the soil texture class for a soil that is 15
percent clay, 45 percent silt, and 40 percent sand?
a. Silty clay loam
b. Clay
c. Loam
d. Sandy loam
e. Sandy clay loam
Soil texture can be identified in the field using a texture-by-feel
method, a relatively accurate finger identification technique in
which the combination of sand (gritty), silt (smooth and
flexible), and clay (sticky) are estimated using a series of yesno
questions. Surprising to some, this mechanical-analysis
procedure to identify soils can be highly accurate among trained
soil scientists.
Expand SOIL TEXTURE and then click and select SoilTexture
by Feel to view a video of how this soil texture identification
method is determined in the field.
Texture is important because it relates to weathering and parent
material. It also plays a role in water movement, and nutrient
availability. Finer textures like clay have smaller pore spaces
lending to slower water movement through the soil, and a
propensity for a higher CEC and therefore better nutrient
availability for plants.
Question 35: After wetting and kneading the soil, determine the
steps in soil texture by feel for a clay soil, by moving the four
answers below to place in the correct order.
a. Determine the length of the ribbon

b. Determine if soil can form a ball
c. Determine if the soil is smooth or gritty, or neither
smooth nor gritty
d. Determine if soil can form a ribbon
Question 36: You have a 3cm ribbon that is very gritty. What
type of soil is it?
a. Sandy loam
b. Sandy clay loam
c. Clay loam
d. Silty clay loam
Doubleclick and select California Texture Map. To close the
citation, click the X in the top right corner of the window.
Doubleclick and select Location U. Repeat for Location V and
W.
Based on the Soil Texture Triangle provided, and referring back
to Figure 1, determine the approximate soil texture for each of
the following locations.
Question 37: Soil Texture at Location U is ______________.
a. Clay
b. Loamy sand
c. Silty loam
d. Loam
Question 38: Soil Texture at Location V is ______________.
a. Loam
b. Sand
c. Silt clay
d. Silt
Question 39: Soil Texture at Location W is ______________.
a. Clay
b. Sandy clay
c. Silt loam
d. Clay loam
Question 40: In what location (U, V or W) would soils have the
largest pore space, fastest water movement, lowest cation

exchange capacity (CEC), and limited nutrient availability for
plants?
a. Location U
b. Location V
c. Location W
You have just completed Lab Module 11.
Journal of Intercollegiate Sport, 2014, 7,40-57
http://dx.doi.Org/10.1123/jis.2014-0084
©2014 Human Kinetics, Inc.
Gray Area Ethical Leadership in the NCAA:
The Ethics of Doing the Wrong Things Right
Michael Sagas
University of Florida
Brian J. Wigley
Shenandoah University
The NCAA’s operating manuals provide member institutions
with hundreds of
pages of bylaws that outline how member institutions should
operate their athletic
programs. Interpretations of these rules can lead to sanctions for
student-athletes,
coaches, athletic administrators and institutions. Such rule-
based systems can
potentially lead to the belief that simply following the rules as
written equates
to right or ethical behavior. In this commentary, we used an

ethical leadership
framework primarily built on the leadership and management
thoughts of Bennis
and Nanus (1985) to propose the College Athletics Ethical
Leadership Continuum
which can be used to assess the behaviors, rules, and decisions
made by NCAA
membership. Fundamental principles of this conceptual model
include holding
the student-athlete as the primary stakeholder of college sports
activities, and that
a critical analysis of the present is necessary to provide
leadership for the future.
Based on a distinction between doing things right and doing the
right thing, the
model is applied to four case studies in which NCAA
membership policies and
actions, or lack thereof, are likely compromising the wellbeing
and academic
success of student-athletes.
Keywords: ethical leadership. Division I, Division III
The rules and bylaws that govern how the National Collegiate
Athletic Associa-
tion (NCAA) operates have evolved in unique and complex
ways since the incep-
tion of the association over 100 years ago. The manual has also
grown in size and
scope as is evident from the length o f the most recent 2013-14
operating manuals
that range from 274 to 351 pages depending on the NCAA
division. The operat-
ing manuals for each division define requirements for m em ber
institutions to be
a part o f the association, and also identify what members

schools can and cannot
Sagas is with the Department of Tourism, Recreation and Sport
Management and Faculty Athletics
Representative, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL. Wigley
is with the Byrd School of Business,
and Faculty Athletics Representative, Shenandoah University,
Winchester, VA. Address author cor-
respondence to Michael Sagas at [email protected]
40
W rong Things Right 41
do when operating their programs related to such things as
recruiting, personnel,
eligibility, and the playing season for their sports.
At the Division I level, the regulations and bylaws that govern
the association
are created by the membership of the association though a
legislative process that
submits proposals for new and revised rules to the Legislative
Council, which
serves as the primary legislative body of Division I. The
Legislative Council is
populated by representatives of member institutions including
athletic department
administrators, Faculty Athletic Representatives, and
conference level administra-
tors. Legislation that is approved by the Legislative Council is
sent to the NCAA
Division I Board of Directors (which is populated by member
institution presidents
and chancellors) tor approval to become effective, unless the

legislation is overrid-
den by a five-eighths vote of active members (Davis &
Hairston. 2013). The process
in place for proposals to become legislation at the NCAA
Division III level is very
similar to that ol Division I. Changes in legislation, rules, or
policies come from
either member institutions or conferences, or various standing
committees, to the
Division III Management Council and then the Division III
President’s Council. It
is also important to note that NCAA staff members are
frequently involved with
enforcement and interpretation of the rules for the membership
along with member
institution representatives on various NCAA committees.
Indeed, most of the rules in the three NCAA manuals are
necessary to facilitate
the common good of the association as a whole, and the
solvency and wellbeing
of each member institution of the association. For example,
these bylaws attempt
to protect the safety and well-being of student-athletes (e.g., by
mandating that
institutions have a concussion management plan) and even
prospective student-
athletes (e.g., by limiting when and how often prospective
student-athletes can be
contacted). Several bylaws have also been introduced over the
years to facilitate
a NCAA governance philosophy of competitive equity (Davis &
Hairston, 2 0 13).
Competitive equity essentially amounts to a leveling of the
playing field through
rules and regulations to allow those that have specific

resources, or other sources of
competitive advantage, to remain competitive with those that
have fewer resources.
Some of rules in the NCAA manual make good sense to most
observers,
but some also seem to be quite trivial. For example, does the
NCAA really need
to stipulate to their Division I members that using a limousine
or helicopter for
transportation during a recruiting visit is not a good idea or that
it is acceptable to
feed student-athletes fruit, nuts, and bagels during vacation
periods? The NCAA
Division I working groups that resulted from the Division I
Presidential Retreat
in August of 2 0 11 were working toward remedying the
proliferation of several
meaningless or unenforceable regulations. The work of these
groups attempted
to revise legislation to allow for more autonomy for campuses
in doing what they
teel is right for their student-athletes, regardless of the impact
on association wide
competitive equity (Davis & Hairston, 2 0 13).
Clearly rules are necessary in competitive sport, and the
NCAA’s ruled-based
system is required in an organization with so many
stakeholders, sports, levels, and
teams. However, the reality is that as time passes new situations
have arisen which
facilitated new rules, as well as created specific ways to
circumvent the existing
rules. The use of emerging technologies provides an example.
Twenty years ago

there was obviously no need for rules to regulate contact via the
internet or via
text messaging. While some rules are instituted to address new
realities associated
42 Sagas and W igley
with operating collegiate athletics departments, others are put
into place due to
the identification of loopholes or “ways around” the current
rules that have been
discovered and are being used. These loopholes, while not
against the letter of the
law, may be in violation of the spirit of the rule. Although the
NCAA membership
appears to work to close loopholes as they become apparent,
there can also be
instances when an action is likely not a wise thing to do, but
since it is not directly
addressed in the written rules, doing the act is not considered a
rules violation.
Kvalnes and Hemmestad (2010) argue that, “a rule-based
approach to ethics
can encourage sport practitioners to adopt a loophole mentality
that is likely to
lead to more rather than less unethical behavior in sport” (p.
57). The case of the
National Hockey Leagues’ (NHL) “Sean Avery Rule”
demonstrates the potential
pitfalls of rule-based systems. In a 2008 NHL game between
Avery’s New York
Rangers and the New Jersey Devils, Avery placed himself
immediately in front

of the opposing goal-keeper to distract him and obstruct his
view of the game and
specifically the puck. In response to comments critical of his
strategy, Avery pointed
out—correctly—that he had broken no rule (TSN.CA Staff,
2008). Although the
next day the NHL added a rule which banned his tactic, the
point to be taken from
this example is that it seems impossible to include every
possible transgression or
loophole in a written set of rules.
Critics have argued that highly formalized organizations with
stringent and
complex rules create environments in which the rules
themselves dominate decision-
making. Gough (1994) contends that practical and ethical
thought is hindered by
systems based on legislative rules, creating an environment in
which rules and ethics
are inseparable. Such bureaucratic systems result in the mindset
that “if it is legal,
it is right” (Gough, 1994; Michael, 2006), and this may decrease
the possibility of
athletic administrators considering their own personal
moralities, or considering
specific circumstances when rendering judgment. Kihl (2007)
surveyed NCAA
Division I compliance officers to access the practical morality
among athletic admin-
istrators. One significant finding of Kihl’s work was that
individuals, in the light of
conflict between personal conceptualizations of what is right
under the structured
NCAA’s rule-based system, often resorted to “hiding behind the
rules” (p. 296). By

interpreting the rules in a strict, ‘by-the-book’ manner,
individual responsibility for
determining right or moral conduct is diminished if not
eliminated. We contend that
the NCAA’s legalistic environment may lead stakeholders to
choose strict adherence
to the written rules of the membership, which relieves them of
the more arduous and
personal deliberations about what the right decision may be in a
given circumstance.
From a basic ethical perspective which dictates that what is
ethical is right,
good, and just and what is unethical is considered wrong, bad,
or unjust (Kant &
Paton, 2009), we believe that most sensible observers would
contend that when
a member institution conducts an activity that is impermissible
according to the
NCAA bylaws, it would be wrong (i.e., unethical). Further,
when NCAA member
institutions violate state or federal laws, it is also quite clear
that they conducted
themselves in an unethical way. These ethical situations can be
considered black
and white. However, we feel that there is a large “gray area” in
the rules that are
created and that ultimately govern the NCAA. That is, it is
much less clear from
an ethical lens if not violating a rule clearly suggests that
something is right or
good (i.e., ethical). In other words, is the NCAA bylaw really
the moral minimum
in which to base one’s actions as ethical or unethical?
Furthermore, what is most

Wrong Things Right 43
indistinguishable in our opinion is if something can be deemed
unethical as a
result of a clearly misguided and unfair NCAA rule that is in
the bylaws, or one
that is altogether absent from the NCAA rules. Since the
membership controls the
bylaws and the NCAA controls the enforcement and
interpretation of the bylaws,
the power to adopt rules that are right, good, and ju st appears
to be feasible and
completely in the control of these actors.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework
in which to
view the ethical leadership (or lack thereof) exhibited by NCAA
Division I and
Division III member institutions related to the "gray areas" of
ethical decision
making. Indeed, breaking an NCAA bylaw is not right and
subsequently likely an
unethical behavior. But is the adoption of a poor or misguided
rule, and the omission
and avoidance of other rules that can address real problems for
key stakeholders,
namely student-athletes, also unethical?
We provide an analysis of four distinct cases (two from
Division I and two from
Division III) in which we feel that the avoidance of the adoption
of a rule dictates
behavior that is wrong and potentially unethical, especially
when considering the

well-being, development, and academic success of student-
athletes. Through these
cases we contend that the reliance of NCAA bylaws as a moral
minimum has
led to many NCAA leaders maintaining their ethical high
ground by doing some
wrong things very well (i.e., without a violation of NCAA
rules), but that they are
failing to do the right thing by following a misguided rule, and
failing to address
and adopt others.
College Athletics Ethical Leadership Continuum Model
Many ethical decision making models exist and provide
managers with excellent
perspectives in which to view their behaviors from various
ethical points of view.
Literature related to ethical leadership encourages leaders to
“do the right thing”
(Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Garza Mitchell. 2012) which seems
both obvious and
simplistic. Yet, defining what is “right” or “ethical” can be
difficult.
Numerous scholars (Eddy, 2010; Groves & Larocca, 2011;
Kanungo, 2001;
Preskill & Brookfield, 2009) have made clear the relationship
between leader-
ship style and ethical perspective. Traditionally, authoritarian
and transactional
leadership models were considered most salient to discussions
of organizations
and ethical leadership. These models tend to focus on the
organization and its
rules, rather than individuals within the organization and
external communities.

Although these approaches certainly have merit, current
literature related to leader-
ship focuses more so on deontological ethical values, as the
trend is to emphasize
collaboration and the notion of a social good (Garza Mitchell,
2012). The current
focus on deontology-based leadership emphasizes a focus on
individuals within
organizations and external communities. The foundation of
deontological ethics is
what actors "ought" to do. In a post-Enron era of leadership
marked by a call for
transparency and increasingly dramatic change, leaders must be
aware of the ethical
foundations and implications of their leadership behaviors and
styles so that they
are able to make clear to stakeholders why and how decisions
were made (Garza
Mitchell, 2012). Deontological theories focus on duty, moral
obligations and the
“intentions of the decision maker and the means chosen to
accomplish a task”
(Armstrong & Muenjohn, 2008, p. 25). Given the emphasis on
the obligations and
44 Sagas and Wigley
duty the NCAA and its member institutions have in regards to
the student-athlete
as the primary stakeholder in the proposed model, this ethical
theory seems most
salient. In addition, considering that, as noted above, all
circumstances and possible
dilemmas cannot be accounted for in any set of written rules,

the fact that intentions
and means are considered in deontological ethics makes this
theory most salient
for the current proposal and in collegiate athletics in general.
One potential roadblock to achieving consistent ethical
decision-making and
leadership in collegiate athletics could be the lack of
understanding by leaders
that the issues or conflicts at hand are indeed ethical in nature.
Research in related
fields has demonstrated that leaders often marginalize the
importance of ethics in
the decisions they are charged with making. For example, in a
study of high school
principals, Campbell (1992) found that these educational
leaders believed that their
daily challenges were strategic, professional, administrative,
political or procedural
rather than ethically based. Other studies have also noted that
ethics is not likely
to be considered as a significant focus of work in leadership
positions (Campbell,
1997: Mahoney. 2006; Starratt, 2004). In these and other
studies, ethics was found
to be viewed of secondary importance in terms of its relevance
to authority (Ser-
giovanni, 1992) or decision-making (Shapiro & Stefkovich,
2005).
The framework we have developed to analyze the gray areas of
ethical lead-
ership in the NCAA integrates management and leadership
thought with a deon-
tological ethics lens. Our ethical framework is primarily built
on the leadership

and management thoughts of Bennis and Nanus (1985) as a
frame for how leaders
governing NCAA sports “ought” to behave. These authors
contend that managers
are people who do things right but that leaders are people who
do the right thing.
Bennis later expanded on this notion that distinguishes leaders
from managers by
suggesting “I often observe people in top positions doing the
wrong thing well” and
that “they do not pay enough attention to doing the right thing,
while they pay too
much attention to doing things right” (Bennis, 1989, p. 18). A
recent commentary
advanced by Gillen (2012) expanded on this work suggesting
that doing things
right is not enough in providing innovative leadership.
Addressing the topic of
military behavior, Gillen suggests that doing things right is
primarily focused on
managing the present and that doing the right thing is
essentially concerned with
selectively abandoning the past, while creating the future.
Fundamentally, Gillen’s
framework suggests that managing the present is tactically
focused on compliance,
the status quo, and managing performance and that creating the
future is strategic
and critical in nature, and focused on growth and innovation.
We expand on these perspectives and suggest that NCAA actors
who only do
things right, while avoiding or rejecting the difficult critical
analysis required to
ascertain the right things to do, are failing to provide innovative
and ethical lead-

ership for the association. Given the continually elevated
expectations, visibility,
and resources available to NCAA institutions, a continuous
selective abandoning
of the past in strategic ways, while subsequently creating the
future, is absolutely
essential to providing ethical leadership. Doing things right is
not enough, and doing
the wrong things right is clear ethical failure. Doing the right
thing is the moral
minimum in which to assess ethical behavior and leadership.
And, in our opinion,
the primary stakeholders in which to consider what is right or
wrong should be
the NCAA student-athletes, and not coaches, an athletic
department or program,
a professional league, or media conglomerate.
W r o n g T h i n g s R i g h t 4 5
This framework is depicted in Figure 1 as the College Athletics
Ethical
Leadership Continuum. We contend that ethical leadership can
be conceived on a
continuum in which a moral minimum establishes if a decision
is right or wrong.
As suggested in the model, we feel that the current moral
minimum is likely
just above behaviors that are clearly illegal according to federal
or state laws, or
NCAA, conference, and institutional rules. However, we would
like to suggest that
the moral minimum be raised to a much higher standard than
just above The idea

of doing things right. That is, we suggest that ethical leadership
in the NCAA is
only exhibited by minimally doing the right thing for student-
athletes, first and
foremost. This higher ethical ground considers the student-
athlete as the primary
stakeholder and applies critical analysis to present practices to
allow for a selec-
tive abandonment of past practices, to lead a moral future of
college sports. These
two ethical positions are connected with what we consider to be
the current gray
area of ethical decision-making in college athletics, one in
which most actors are
concerned with serving multiple stakeholders who are often in
direct opposition to
the development, well-being, and academic success of student-
athletes. Examples of
stakeholders whose interests could potentially divert the focus
of collegiate athletics
away from the student-athlete include but are not limited to:
media conglomerates,
sporting goods companies, advertising and sponsorship entities,
and professional
leagues. This position that accepts multiple stakeholders
oftentimes accepts the
Doing the Right Thing
* P r i m a r y s t a k e h o l d e r is t h e s t u d e n t - a t h l e
t e
• C r it ic a l a n a ly s is o f p r e s e n t w h i l e s e l e c t iv
e ly
a b a n d o n i n g t h e p a s t

* L e a d e r s h ip f o c u s e d o n t h e f u t u r e
• S t r a t e g i c a l l y l o o k in g f o r g r o w t h a n d i n
n o v a t i o n
• A v o id in g t h e w r o n g t h in g s t o d o
— ---------- ------------------------------------------ Proposed
Moral Minimum
Doing Things Right
• M u l t i p l e c o m p e t i n g s t a k e h o l d e r s i n c lu d
in g
m e d i a r ig h t s h o ld e r s , in s t i t u t io n s , s t u d e n t
-
a t h l e t e s , c o a c h e s
• A c c e p t a n c e o f s t a t u s q u o
• M a n a g i n g t h e p r e s e n t
• T a c t i c a l l y f o c u s in g o n c o m p l i a n c e
___________ • D o in g t h e w r o n g t h in g s
Current Moral Minimum
D o i n g t h i n g s W r o n g
C o m p l ic i t a n d o v e r t r u l e b r e a k in g
C o m p l ic i t a n d o v e r t l a w b r e a k in g
O b v io u s s t u d e n t - a t h l e t e e x p l o i t a t i o n

Figure 1 — College Athletics Ethical Leadership Continuum
46 Sagas and Wigley
status quo for student-athletes, and rejects the establishment of
rules that could
protect, reward, and elevate them. Compliance is critically
important in this gray
area and thus things are often done right (i.e., by the rules), but
we believe that
there are several instances in which actors are doing the wrong
things altogether.
Thus, we believe that as a collective the NCAA membership and
leadership are
not achieving a moral minimum that is necessary to
progressively evolve as an
association in the best interests of student-athletes.
Although perhaps obvious to some, recent developments in
collegiate athletics
make necessary a statement or rationale for the emphasis of the
student-athlete as
primary stakeholder. The basis for and the foundation of the
NCAA is the concept
of the student-athlete. As quoted from the NCAA strategic plan,
the Core Purpose
and Values statement of the organization reads:
Our purpose is to govern competition in a fair, safe, equitable
and sportsmanlike
manner, and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into higher
education so that
the educational experience of the student-athlete is paramount

(NCAA, 2014a).
Furthermore, it is clear from the messages that the current
President of the
NCAA sends regarding the mission and values of the
organization that the student-
athlete experience is the primary goal of the work of the
association. For example,
this statement from President Mark Emmert’s “About” page on
the NCAA Website
clearly spells out the priority that should be given to student-
athletes:
No matter the size of our stadiums, the number of scholarships
we offer or
the number of zeros in our bottom line, we share the same goal:
to promote
student-athlete success in the classroom, on the field and in life.
Decisions
that support that goal align us with the mission of higher
education - where
the student is always the priority (NCAA, 2014b).
Nowhere to be found in this fundamental charge or the core
values of the
NCAA are media companies, corporate sponsors, or other
economically motivated
stakeholders. It is our contention that college athletics at its
finest occurs when the
student-athlete is paramount.
Case Analysis
To demonstrate the application of this ethical leadership model,
four cases are
presented and analyzed. Each case focuses on the gray areas of
ethical leadership

and represent circumstances at both Division I and Division III
levels.
NCAA Division I Cases
The work of several of the NCAA Division I working groups
that evolved from the
2011 NCAA Presidential Retreat made some excellent progress
toward abandon-
ing the past and refocusing the future with a focus on student-
athletes. As noted
by the NCAA in summarizing the complex process, “The goal of
deregulation is
to protect and enhance the student-athlete experience, shift the
regulatory focus
from competitive equity to fair competition and allow schools to
use the natural
advantages of geography, a talented student-athlete or deeper
pockets” (NCAA,
2013, p. 1). However, procedural and communication mishaps,
attempted and
successful membership voting overrides, and overall NCAA
governance issues
halted much of the significant progress made by these groups.
As suggested by
the two cases below, we feel that several member institutions’
voting behaviors
and statements clearly failed to raise the moral minimum to
above the status quo
for NCAA student-athletes.
Multiyear Scholarships. In 1973, the NCAA membership
adopted legislation that

limited institutions to awarding a maximum athletic scholarship,
which includes
tuition, required fees, room, board, and books, to one calendar
year (Davis &
Hairston, 2013). In the fall of 201 I, the NCAA Board of
Directors adopted new
legislation that permitted institutions to award multiyear
athletic scholarships
for a maximum of five years (Davis & Hairston, 2013: Hosick,
2012). The new
bylaw did not require that institutions award multiyear
scholarships but did give
them the option to do so.
We feel that this legislation clearly protects student-athletes
from coaches that
may use their discretion in renewing a one-year scholarship
offer to run athletes
off of teams after a year or two to make room for better players.
Furthermore, the
one-year scholarship also allowed institutions to not renew
athletic scholarships to
student-athletes that were unable to participate in their sport
because of an athletic
related injury. In essence, colleges and universities had
unlimited discretion to
renew or not renew an athletic scholarship, which clearly
provided the balance of
power in the player—coach relationship to the coach, as
student-athletes are often
defenseless if their scholarship offer is not renewed at the end
of their one-year
agreement (Segrest, 2011).
We contend that ethical leadership was not exhibited in relation
to this important

piece of legislation in two specific ways. First, the legislation
was narrowly upheld,
by just two votes, in an override vote of the membership that
occurred in February
of 2012. A total of 205 institutions voted against the legislation,
but 207 of the 330
votes that were submitted by institutions and conferences were
needed to reach a
five-eighths majority. In media accounts reporting on the
override attempt, it was
suggested that several of the opponents of the legislation were
much more inter-
ested in retaining competitive equity related to recruiting than
they were student-
athlete welfare. For example, Boise State, which voted in
support of the override,
suggested that the multiyear scholarship would be a recruiting
disaster and that it
would pit wealthy schools against those with less financial
means. Further, it also
suggested there are never guarantees that student-athletes will
fit in a program and
thus assuring them a commitment beyond one year is not a good
strategic practice
(Associated Press, 2011).
However, what was most disturbing about the override votes
were not the
motivations offered for objecting to the legislation; it was the
roll-call report
which indicated that several schools with significant wealth and
means were
not interested in guaranteeing the financial welfare of their
student athletes,
despite their budgetary capacity to do so. While a majority of
the override votes

were submitted by programs with smaller football programs that
compete at
the NCAA Football Championship Subdivision level, several
well-resourced
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) institutions also voted in
support to the over-
ride (e.g., Florida State University, University of Texas,
University of Arizona,
University of California-Berkeley, and University of Southern
California).
4 8 S a g a s a n d W ig le y
Furtherm ore, it was quite interesting that Yale University,
which does not
even offer athletics related financial aid, also voted in support o
f the override
(Wolverton, 2013).
Secondly, we feel that unethical leadership has continued to be
exhibited
by several institutions even now that coaches are empowered to
offer multiyear
scholarships. As Dent (2013) notes, since the adoption of the
rule in 2011, mul-
tiyear scholarships are still fairly rare. Dent’s research,
obtained through open
records requests, suggested that of the 82 institutions analyzed
at the Division
I FBS level, only 16 have offered more than 10 multiyear
scholarships, 32 have
offered at least one but less than 10, and 34 had not offered any
at the time of
his analysis in February of 2013. The list of institutions that

have failed to pro-
vide a multiyear commitment to their athletes included several
well-resourced
institutions like the University of Oregon, the University of
Texas, Clemson, and
Texas A&M. Flowever, several institutions have clearly
exhibited ethical leader-
ship on this issue by awarding multiyear scholarships to their
athletes across all
sports, including Fresno State ( N = 316), Illinois ( N = 293),
and Purdue ( N =
122). When assessed against the ethical leadership model we are
proposing, it
is our contention that the well-resourced institutions from the
larger FBS con-
ferences were more interested in preserving the status-quo than
leadership that
is looking to grow and innovate the treatment of student-
athletes. Furthermore,
most institutions have yet to use the multiyear scholarship to
any great degree,
which demonstrates that they are more interested in preserving
the power of the
institution and coach as the primary stakeholders, and are not
considering the
student-athlete as the principal beneficiary of the opportunity to
receive a long-
term commitment.
The $ 2 ,0 0 0 M is c e lla n e o u s E xpense A llo w a n ce .
As indicated, a full financial
scholarship for NCAA Division I athletes consists of tuition,
required fees, room,
board, and books. In late 2011, one of the NCAA working
groups, the Student-
Athlete Well-Being Working Group, submitted a proposal to the
NCAA Board of

Directors to allow institutions to provide financial support for
student athletes that
went above this defined minimum scholarship. This legislation
allowed institutions
to also provide student-athletes funds to pay for miscellaneous
expenses, such
as laundry and occasional travel home. The proposed amount of
this additional
aid was the lesser of an institution’s true cost of attendance or
$2,000 (Davis
& Hairston, 2013). The NCAA Board of Directors approved this
legislation in
their January 2012 Annual Meeting, which allowed schools to
immediately offer
the additional $2,000 financial aid in their scholarship offers to
student-athletes
that were receiving the equivalent of a full grant-in-aid. Thus,
student-athletes
on partial scholarships were not eligible to receive any of the
$2,000 allowance
(Davis & Hairston, 2013).
Proponents of this additional aid for athletes suggested that
athletic financial
aid was artificially restricted to just certain aspects of a
student-athletes’ cost of
attendance in the name of competitive equity. In addition, non-
student-athlete
students on merit based scholarships regularly receive academic
scholarships that
cover the true full cost of attendance which can include
transportation costs, a
personal expense allowance, computer and cell phone expenses,
and even a cloth-
ing maintenance allowance. The $2,000 additional stipend
would thus take a step

toward covering some, if not all, of these expenses for student-
athletes.
The adopted legislation was suspended by the Board of
Directors in December
of 2011 after strong opposition and a successful override vote
by NCAA Division
I membership. Similar to the override votes conducted for and
against the multi-
year scholarship legislation, the failure to provide ethical
leadership in support of
student-athlete welfare can be viewed through an analysis of the
justifications and
the voting roll-call in support of the override. In our view, these
institutions did
advance some legitimate concerns with regard to gender equity,
but also advanced
commentary that was much more concerned with preserving
their competitive
advantage than on student-athlete welfare at the institutions that
could afford to
provide the allowance. For example, Southern Louisiana
University suggested
that the rule would only benefit the “haves and would widen the
chasm between
BCS schools and non BCS schools” (Dennie, 2011, p. 10). East
Tennessee State
University added that the expense allowance would create an
“arms race effect at
a time of economic hardship when many institutions are facing
budget cuts across
campus (Dennie, 2011, p. 6). Tennessee Technological

University even went as far
as suggesting that the allowance amounted to “tattoo money”,
which presumably
meant that student-athletes’ needs for the additional aid will be
used to purchase
frivolous items or services like personal tattoos. Further, some
Ivy League institu-
tions (i.e., Harvard, Cornell), which do not even offer athletic
scholarships, voted
in support of the override (Dennie, 2011).
In light of many of these concerns, the NCAA Board of
Directors did suspend
the legislation and vowed to revisit the potential to meet this
very real shortcoming
for student-athletes through a future piece of legislation that
was attentive to the
feedback they received from the membership. In our opinion,
when assessed against
our proposed College Athletics Ethical Leadership Continuum,
those voting in favor
of the override clearly failed to do the right thing for NCAA
student-athletes at the
schools that could clearly afford to pay lor these additional
miscellaneous expenses
in a manner that is similar to other merit based scholarships on
these same campuses.
Further, we agree with University of Florida president, Bernie
Machen, who was
quoted as saying that it is “just embarrassing” that the increase
in expenditures in
intercollegiate athletics has primarily been funneled to increase
coaches’ salaries
and improve and build facilities, and has yet to result in
additional funding for
student-athletes to meet their very real and actual costs of

attending a university
as a student (Staples, 2012). This funneling of funds away from
student-athletes is
a good example of how member institutions continue to placate
several competing
stakeholders at the expense of student-athletes, and clearly
continue to preserve the
status quo related to supporting and improving student-athlete
well-being.
NCAA Division III Cases
Comparisons between Division I and III athletic programs
commonly focus on
economically related variables such as budgets, television
contracts, licensing
deals, and facilities, or the reality that athletically-related
financial aid is allowable
in Division I, and not allowable at Division III. However,
although more subtle, an
equally important difference between the divisions lies in the
notion of “institutional
autonomy”. Although a manual of 284 pages is in place, in
terms of important
aspects of intercollegiate athletics such as admissions, academic
standards, and eli-
gibility requirements, Division III institutions are granted by
membership the ability
to establish many of their own individual standards and
restrictions. In keeping with
the notion that student-athletes at these institutions should be
treated no differently

than other members of the student body, in most instances
student-athletes must
simply be eligible to enroll and remain in good academic
standing to participate.
The institutional standards for the student body are the exact
standards required
for student-athletes, rather than a set of standards handed down
from the NCAA.
Discussions of drug testing and mandatory penalties for student-
athletes who failed
tests for street drugs provide one of many examples of Division
III membership
protecting vehemently the notion of institutional autonomy. A
report published by
the NCAA from the 2013 Presidents Council and Presidents
Advisory Group meet-
ings included the statement that the majority of institutions
“echoed the sentiment
of a shift towards an approach that allows for more institutional
autonomy when
possible" (Ohle & Herzberger, 2013, p. 1). On the 40th
anniversary of Division
III. the NCAA’s Champion Magazine described the ban on
athletic scholarships
and institutional autonomy as “the two defining characteristics
of Division III”
(Schwarb, 2014, p. 57).
Institutional autonomy is an aspect of Division III athletics that
on the surface
seems positive. The theory behind such decision-making
freedom is that schools
can and will do what is best for their student-athletes and their
institutional missions
and values. However, as Guilford College Sports Studies
Professor Bob Malekoff

points out, “The possible outcomes of institutional autonomy is
that members
would try to compete in ways that go against the ‘academics
first' mentality of the
NCAA” (Childs, 2010, p. 1).
For example, some Division III institutions require only that a
student be eli-
gible to enroll to compete. No stipulation is in place which
makes a student ineligible
while on academic probation. This could mean that a freshman
student-athlete in
a spring semester sport could fail all of his/her classes in the
fall semester and par-
ticipate fully in the spring semester. The result is a student on
academic probation,
with no credits earned and a 0.0 grade point average being
allowed to participate.
Although this is perhaps an extreme example, and may not
occur frequently, there
are Division III schools which allow students to compete
without restriction even
when their grade point averages are below the minimum
standard for graduation.
Examining certain realities of Division III athletics through the
lens of out-
proposed College Athletics Ethical Leadership Continuum might
indicate how some
institutions choose to be competitive by doing things right,
rather than doing the right
thing. Foremost is the notion of the student-athlete as the
primary stakeholder. We
question the ethics of policy— or lack of a policy— which
allows students who are
not just struggling academically but failing academically to

continue to participate
fully in athletic competition. If indeed the success of the
student-athlete is of primary
in importance, then the time, effort, and focus required for
athletics should be shifted
to academic performance. Of course critics will point to
research that supports the
notion that membership on a team is predictive of retention and
graduation, fearing
that if a student-athlete is completely removed from a team
he/she will leave the
institution (Johnson, Wessel, & Pierce, 2013/2014). We counter
by suggesting that
membership develop a system in which the student-athletes in
question be allowed
to maintain participation, but with agreed upon restrictions and
academic support. It
is our contention that if student-athletes are allowed to maintain
their social grouping
and return to competition when academic improvement is
realized, these student-
athletes will be more likely to stay enrolled and succeed
academically.
Lack of Progress-Toward-Degree Requirement. All student-
athletes at the Divi-
sion I level are subject to the NCAA’s “Progress-Toward-
Degree” legislation. This
legislation mandates that to remain eligible for competition a
student-athlete must
earn six hours of credit toward a degree the preceding regular
academic term to

be eligible for the next regular academic term. In addition,
student-athletes must
complete 40% of the coursework required for a degree by the
end of their second
year, 60% by the end of their third year and 80%. by the end of
their fourth year
(NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.4.3). Enacted in 2003, this
legislation is intended
to increase retention and graduation rates by ensuring that
student-athletes take
meaningful course loads, rather than four years of introductory
or low level classes
in an effort only to remain eligible.
At the Division III level the NCAA requirement is that student-
athletes must
be enrolled in a minimum full-time program of studies leading
to a baccalaureate
or equivalent degree and maintain satisfactory progress toward
that degree (NCAA
Division III Bylaws 14.01.2, 14.1.8.1, and 14.1.8.6.4). In many
cases this means
simply that the student-athlete be enrolled in a minimum of 12
credit hours. Where
institutional autonomy comes into play is in the determination
of how “satisfactory
progress” is defined. In many instances as long as a student
remains eligible to enroll
tor another semester, he or she is considered to be making
satisfactory progress and
is therefore deemed eligible for athletic competition. Often
times the only standard
required to be eligible to enroll is to maintain an established
cumulative GPA. Some
Division III institutions use a sliding scale of GPA to determine
eligibility such

as 1.6 for student-athletes with 0-23.99 credit hours, 1.8 for
student-athletes with
24-53.99 credit hours, and 2.0 for student-athletes above 54
credit hours, while
others require a 2.0 or higher regardless of total credit hours
earned.
As troubling as participating in athletic competition with a 1.6
cumulative GPA
may be, the possible unethical issue occurs due to the lack of a
percentage of degree
completion requirement based on years enrolled. Since Division
III requires only
that students be enrolled in 12 credit hours to compete, and not
that they complete
a percentage of a degree each year, it is possible for a student-
athlete to enroll in 12
credit hours and then withdraw from any number of those credit
hours after the end
of the competitive season. At some institutions, for instance, as
long as a football
player enrolls in 12 credit hours at the beginning of the season,
and does not drop
below 12 credit hours during competition, he/she would be
continually eligible to
compete. Even if the player withdraws from six or more credits
the day after the
final game of a season, he/she has broken no rule and is eligible
to compete the
following season as long as his/her GPA remains in the accepted
range. The end
result of this cycle of withdrawing from classes to maintain the
minimum GPA is
student-athletes who have exhausted their athletic eligibility,
yet due to numerous
semesters in which a small number of credit hours were actually

completed, the
student-athlete may be semesters or even years away from
completing a degree.
Critics might argue that the system in place is acceptable due to
the notion that
in Division III student-athletes are to be held to the same set of
standards as the
student body, and members of the student body are not required
to meet progress
toward degree standards. However, in terms of our proposed
model, these critics
fall prey to accepting the status quo and managing the present at
the very least,
and potentially tailing to consider the student-athlete as the
primary stakeholder.
Member institutions must consider the outcomes for student-
athletes who have
exhausted their eligibility and yet remain semesters or years
from graduating. If
the institution is the primary stakeholder, this may be doing the
right thing since
tuition revenues continue to be paid by those students who are
retained for addi-
tional semesters, but we question the ethics of allowing students
to spend four or
five years at an institution, amass considerable student-loan
debt, and yet, end up
not even relatively close to a degree.
R o s te r S iz e s . Two realities give rise to the second

dilemma to be discussed
related to Division III athletics, that of roster sizes. First, again
due primarily to
the concept of institutional autonomy, in Division III there are
no limits on roster
sizes for athletic teams. Second, many small, private, Division
III institutions are
truly “tuition driven”, meaning that a primary source of
institutional revenue is
generated by tuition dollars. This is in significant contrast to
the Division I model
wherein funding often comes from multiple sources.
In 2013, Methodist University, a Division III school in the USA
South Confer-
ence boasted a 2013 football roster of 162 student-athletes. The
average roster size
of the four teams earning a birth into the National Semi-Finals
in the 2013 season
was 120. This figure does not include “freshman rosters” which
in some cases add
an additional 50 or more players to program totals. This is not
an uncommon phe-
nomenon across sports in Division III athletics. Baseball teams
carry as many as
80 players, basketball teams may include 20 plus members, and
sports like lacrosse
and field hockey are also known to have what on the surface
seem to be extreme
roster sizes. Even with the inclusion of a Junior Varsity (JV)
team and schedule, it
seems difficult to imagine that all or even a high percentage of
these athletes will
receive meaningful playing time. Upon further consideration,
the baseball roster size
of 80 seems more egregious than even the football roster size of

160. In football,
with separate offensive and defensive units, two special teams
units, and unlimited
substitutions during play, it is easily conceivable that 60 players
could see action
in a given contest. Baseball however, includes only nine field
players and more
importantly limits substitutions (once a player leaves the line-
up that player cannot
return to action during that game), making it likely that on
average 12-15 players
will participate in any given game. As “the student-athlete
experience” is central
to the Division III philosophy, it seems incongruent to maintain
teams of such size.
Of course the argument could be made that being a part of a
team gives students
a robust experience, as much has been written about the benefits
of team member-
ship. However, the relationship between playing time and
retention and therefore
graduation must be considered given the Division III emphasis
on academic
success. According to Johnson et al. (2013/2014), playing time
was one variable
which was found to be predictive of retention. In addition, the
possibility exists
that the existence of Varsity and JV designations might create
an “us” and “them”
environment within a given team. Some Division III institutions
avoid academic
designations such as “honors” and “advanced” in part to avoid
this same “us” and
“them” mentality among the student body.

Given the tuition-driven theme in place at many Division III
schools, it seems
that coaches and athletic departments are charged with, and
perhaps pressured to,
maintain large roster sizes to generate tuition revenue for their
institutions. Philo-
sophically, athletic departments have become institutional
recruiting units working
in conjunction with, and sometimes as adjuncts to, admissions
departments. This
analogy is even more salient considering at many Division III
schools, the overall
student body includes a high percentage of student athletes. On
average student-
athletes make up 19% of Division III undergraduate student
bodies but numbers can
reach 40-50% (U.S. Department of Education, 2012). For
example, data provided
by the U.S. Department of Education (2012) identified the
following percentages
of undergraduate enrollments who participate on athletic teams
at these Division III
institutions: Averett University (VA) 43%; Bethany College
(WV) 51%; Bluffton
University (OH) 46%; Defiance College (OH) 45%; Huntingdon
College (AL)
46%; LaGrange College (GA) 40%; US Merchant Marine
Academy (NY) 47%.
In a higher education market place that is increasingly
competitive in terms of
attracting students, numerous institutions have added sports

such as football with
a primary goal of increasing admissions figures, and therefore
tuition revenues.
The roster size issue has a history at the Division I level. Until
1973 the NCAA
did not limit the number of scholarships that could be awarded
by individual institu-
tions. Essentially, schools could award as many scholarships as
they could, or chose
to, afford. Abuse ot this open field of scholarship awarding was
included in Gary
Shaw’s eye-opening book Meat on the Hoof: The Hidden World
o f Texas Football
(1972). Before the limitations on scholarships— first in 1973,
then 1978 and most
recently 1992—the University ofTexas would use scholarships
to stockpile athletes
in the talent rich state ofTexas and beyond. The strategy was
based on the notion,
for example, that not only would the University of Texas recruit
and attract the
state’s best quarterback, but also the second, third, fourth, and
fifth best quarter-
backs, not because their coaching staff believed that all five
could contribute, but so
that their opponents in what was then the South West
Conference would not have
access to these players— thus essentially forcing schools like
Texas A&M, Baylor,
and Houston to battle for the sixth, seventh, and eighth best
players at the position.
Although not the sole motivation, the scholarship limits were
put into place for
the sake of parity on the macro level, and for the fairness to the
student-athletes

being convinced to choose the University ofTexas when in
reality there was never
a chance for them to actually play. O f course coaches and
administrators denied
this as a recruiting plan, but it became increasingly clear that
with roster sizes of
100 or more (the 1972 team included 110 student-athletes), only
a small percentage
of the student-athletes would ever compete in any meaningful
way.
Interestingly, NCAA membership places roster size limitations
on teams com-
peting in postseason play. Although this is largely a cost
containment issue, such
limits make clear the idea that smaller numbers of players are
necessary to play the
game at the highest level. In football, for instance, a team
qualifying for playoff
competition is allowed only 58 players on its roster. Clearly the
NCAA and member
institutions go to great lengths to ensure the highest level of
play in each division.
Apparently a 58-player roster is sufficient to reach this goal. In
other words, even
considering economic implications, if the NCAA membership
believed that more
than 58 players were necessary to put the best product on the
field, playoff roster
size limitations would be increased accordingly.
This is not to say we believe a scholarship at Division I or a
roster spot at
Division III should guarantee playing time, but recruiting
players who have no
realistic chance of playing seems unethical. Prima facie it

appears that the practice
of recruiting and bringing to campus so many student-athletes is
being done for the
purpose of revenue generation, rather than to provide real and
meaningful athletic
opportunities. Member institutions should consider whether they
are doing the
right thing by recruiting student-athletes who have little or no
chance of actually
“seeing the field”. More critically, are the student-athletes in
question being sold
a “bill of goods” that is misleading and unjust?
NCAA President Mark Emmert recently stated that, “We have a
responsibility
to provide student-athletes with the opportunity to compete in a
principled, honest
environment, regardless of the division or resource level”
(Emmert, 2014, p. 5). The
membership needs to consider whether it is operating in a
principled and honest
manner when it comes to roster sizes and the realities of tuition-
driven institutions.
Again considering the tenets of the proposed College Athletics
Ethical Continuum,
it does not seem clear that the student-athlete is the primary
stakeholder. Do extreme
roster sizes reflect this principled and honest environment
called for by Emmert? Or
is this again a case of the institution being the prioritized
stakeholder, and perhaps

doing the wrong thing right?
Both cases described herein demonstrate a trend on behalf of
membership
institutions to manage the present rather than selectively
abandoning strategic ways
of the past to manage the future. Division III institutions, in the
current competitive
and economically difficult era manage athletic programs to
increase tuition revenue.
As was pointed out, this model results in athletic departments
acting like arms of
the admissions office rather than student-centered departments
intended to create
equitable, engaging, and beneficial experiences for all students.
Continually allowing student-athletes to enroll and compete in
the absence of
meaningful progression toward graduation is not in the best
interest ot the student-
athletes, particularly considering the escalating amounts of
student loan debt many
student-athletes amass. Similarly, maintaining rosters beyond
which meaningful
playing time is possible gives some student-athletes unrealistic
expectations and
sets them up for disappointment and feelings of failure.
Although our focus is
the student-athlete as primary stakeholder, the institution’s
perspective deserves
attention here as well. Considering the importance of data
related to retention and
graduation rates (Johnson et al„ 2013/2014), it seems apparent
that an institution
would benefit from the proposed changes. It seems intuitive that
student-athletes

who make continuous progress toward a degree, and who have
quality athletic
experiences, are more likely to remain enrolled and graduate. In
the end, the motiva-
tion to maintain the current system is clear. The status quo
generates higher levels
of tuition revenue for Division III institutions in a competitive
higher education
marketplace. However, the current system does not adequately
take into consid-
eration the long-term wellbeing and academic success of many
student-athletes.
C o n c lu s io n s
Utilizing the proposed College Athletics Ethical Leadership
Continuum as a lens,
it seems clear that instances exist in which NCAA member
institutions, by virtue
of their role in interpretation and sanctioning the NCAA itself,
could work to
create an environment in which student-athletes are the primary
stakeholder. That
is, we suggest that college athletics leaders should continually
provide a critical
consideration of the present and demonstrate leadership for
innovation, growth
and the future. The four cases presented provide examples of
policies, practices,
and bylaws that potentially fail to promote the principled and
honest environment
called for by the NCAA’s President (Emmert, 2014). We believe

that obvious and
clear cut examples of cheating and rule breaking are addressed
appropriately by
the NCAA and member institutions, but the cases herein expose
the existence of
a gray area between doing things right and doing the right thing.
This gray area is
dynamic rather than constant and requires careful and at times
difficult consideration
ot key outcomes for student-athletes. Again, under
consideration here are not those
examples of obvious wrong-doing, but the more subtle
interpretations of existing
regulations—those cases when a clear moral minimum may be
difficult to establish.
We acknowledge that our proposal of a higher moral minimum
that insures
that we do things right for our student-athletes first and
foremost can come at a
cost. Although the cost in question may come in different forms
depending on the
NCAA division, it is clear that creating an environment in
which student-athletes
are the primary athletic stakeholders requires critical analysis
and a reallocation of
resources, both human and financial. For example. Division III
institutions could
face potential decreases in tuition revenue, by either adopting
our proposed position
that would require meaningful progress toward degree
legislation, and by reining
in roster sizes. We understand and appreciate the implications
of losses and further
realize that additional programming or savings would be needed
to recover this

lost revenue. An example for these compromised Division III
institutions might be
adding additional sports, adding new and attractive academic
programs, or increas-
ing student activity offerings to attract new students to replace
those lost as a result
of these proposals. At Division I institutions, that regularly
offer both head and
assistant coaches multiyear contracts worth millions of dollars
in several revenue
and nonrevenue sports, there is absolutely no excuse for not
reallocating some of
these same long-term financial commitments toward student-
athletes. At the very
least, these schools should award full cost of attendance
scholarships for a full five
years as the minimum award to athletes on a full grant in aid,
and a percentage of
this amount to those on partial scholarships.
In addition, it should be noted that we do not intend to say that
all NCAA rules
are unethical and that all NCAA members fail to do the right
thing when developing
and enforcing the rules. Obviously, the membership has in place
numerous rules,
restrictions, and standards which are beneficial to the welfare
and academic success
of student-athletes, and are thus already reaching the proposed
higher moral minimal
necessary to provide true ethical leadership in college sports.
However, we also feel
that in several critical areas, such as the situations reviewed in
our case presentations,
the moral minimum in which several NCAA members are acting
on is just too low

and we are stuck with a present that is determined to just do the
wrong things right.
We believe there are several additional cases that could be
examined through the
lens of the College Athletics Ethical Leadership Continuum to
better understand if
current policies and behaviors meet a higher moral minimum
and the right thing to
do standard. These analyses can include the assessment of such
issues as institutional
autonomy, coach and administrator salaries, initial eligibility
standards, drug testing
Policies, university admissions for student-athletes, academic
support services, media
rights contracts, game scheduling and start times, student-
athlete transportation, and
potentially even the role of faculty in the governance process of
college athletics.
In conclusion, through this commentary we have advanced a
College Athletics
Ethical Leadership Continuum, which we feel can be used to
assess the behaviors,
rules, and decisions made by NCAA membership. A
fundamental principle of this
56 Sagas and Wigley
conceptual model includes holding the student-athlete as the
primary stakeholder
of college sports activities, a standard easily justified given the
core values and
mission o f the NCAA. Analyses o f four specific issues

currently challenging the
well-being, success, and development o f student-athletes were
used to provide a
critical analysis of the present to suggest more enlightened
decision making for
the future. Our analyses and conclusions for the four cases we
chose to focus on
indicated that the NCAA membership has compromised the
wellbeing and academic
success o f student-athletes.
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Copyright of Journal of Intercollegiate Sport is the property of
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LABOR RELATIONS IN THE NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE: A MODEL OF
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING?
MATHIEU FOURNIER*
DOMINIC ROUX**
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports leagues make up a world of their own in
which the best
athletes, employed by various teams, display their talents before
thousands of
spectators. The National Hockey League (NHL) is undoubtedly
the most
popular professional sports league in Canada.
The NHL is composed of thirty teams, six in Canada and
twenty-four in
the United States1 that compete every year for the Stanley Cup,
the archetypal
dream of every professional hockey player. Since it was created
in 1917,2 the
NHL has grown into an industry that generates billions of
dollars in revenues,
which are shared by a handful of players and franchise owners
across North
America.
Given the billions of dollars involved from revenues generated
by
spectator ticket sales, television rights, and the sale of related

products, the
* Mathieu Fournier is a lawyer in the province of Quebec.
** Dominic Roux is a professor in the Faculty of Law at
Université Laval and a researcher at the
Inter-University Research Centre on Globalization and Work
(CRIMT). Research for this article was
supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRC) grant under
the research project entitled “Legal Pluralism and Labour Law”
led by professor Michel Coutu at
Université de Montréal. We would like to offer our sincere
thanks to Daniel Dumais, a lawyer at
Heenan Blaikie Aubut, as well as Professor Pierre Verge, from
the Faculty of Law at Université
Laval, for having so generously agreed to review a preliminary
version of our article. The opinions
put forward in this article are those of its two authors only and
do not in any way represent the views
of McCarthy Tétrault LLP. A French version of this text was
initially published in Québec under the
following reference: Mathieu Fournier et Dominic Roux, Les
Relations de Travail dans la Ligue
Nationale de Hockey : un Modèle de Négociation Collective
Transnationale?, 49 LES CAHIERS DE
DROIT 481 (2008).
1. Nat’l Hockey League (NHL), Teams, NHL.COM,
http://www.nhl.com/ice/teams/.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2008).
2. NHL, Hockey for Dummies, NHL.COM, Sept. 20, 2006,
http://www.nhl.com/ice/news/htm?
id=381958.

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148 M A R Q U E T T E S P O R T S L A W R E V I E W
[Vol. 20:1
to deficit.
NHL is now considered a major industry in which the players
and the owners
compete for the largest market share. On the one hand, the
owners have a
legitimate interest in making sure their teams remain profitable,
and if that
proves to be impossible, to decide, in some cases, to move their

franchises to
more lucrative markets or to sell to potential investors.3 On the
other hand,
the players’ desire to secure the best possible annual salary is
just as
legitimate, especially given that their careers are relatively
short.4 To this end,
they are constantly seeking new ways to negotiate, to sell
themselves more
effectively, and to ensure that the contracts they enter into are
lucrative.5
Conversely, the owners seek ways to increase their savings
when it comes to
player salaries, with the goal of increasing their profit margins,
or at the very
least, avoid going in
It was in the context of this ideological and economic
confrontation that a
labor relations system was gradually and autonomously put in
place; a system
that is quite novel, since it was set up outside of existing labor
laws. This
system reached its full maturity in 2005 when the Collective
Bargaining
Agreement (CBA)6 came into effect following negotiations
between the NHL
and the National Hockey League Players’ Association
(NHLPA). From the
mid-1990s, labor relations between the two parties had been
rather strained,
leading to the first strike in the history of professional hockey
in 1992, and to
the first lockout in 1994-1995.7 This was followed by a second
lockout in
2004-2005, this time leading to the cancellation of the entire

hockey season,
including the playoffs, a first in the history of professional
sports in North
America.8 This second lockout led to the signing of the CBA.
This sector-based collective agreement, which applies across
North
America, unilaterally stipulates the great majority of working
conditions for all
NHL players, regardless of the team for which they play.
Moreover, it directly
regulates the negotiations of individual employment contracts
between players
and teams by imposing a whole set of standards covering
various aspects of
the employment relationship.9
3. Melanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of
Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap
Systems, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 189, 190 (2003).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See generally NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE NHL AND THE NHLPA (2005), available at
http://www.nhlpa.com/About-Us/CBA/
[hereinafter CBA].
7. Aubut, supra note 3, at 194.
8. See generally Trois Mois de Lock-Out en 1994-1995,
RADIO-CANADA.CA, http://archives.
radio-canada.ca/sports/hockey/clips/9066/ (last visited Nov. 1,
2009).

9. See generally CBA, supra note 6.
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2009] L A B O R R E L A T I O N S I N T H E N H L 149
Beyond the curious fact that a team—the employer—has the
right to trade
one of its own players—the employee—to another competing
team without
this player having the right to oppose this decision,10 the
system that has been
put in place is certainly of relevance to anyone with an interest

in the theory of
labor law and the fundamental challenges it presently faces.
II. QUEBEC LABOR LAW
It should be noted that, historically, labor law, in particular that
which is
applied in Quebec, was built on the basis of two distinct but
interrelated sets of
rules.11 The first set, which mainly emerged in 1925, is
characterized by
direct state intervention: that is to say that minimum working
conditions began
at that time to be imposed for employees tied to their employer
by an
employment contract. For example, the Act Respecting Labour
Standards,
which is applied in particular to any employer doing business in
Quebec,
stipulates the protection that will be provided to employees:
minimum wage,
maximum working hours, annual leave, notice of termination,
etc., making it
clear that these are minimum standards and that they are of
public order.12
The second set of rules is based on the principle of the
“collective autonomy”
of the parties in an employment relationship: this refers to the
collective
system of labor relations established in Quebec in 1944.13 In
establishing this
system, the legislature was acknowledging a practice which
already existed in
several workplaces; that is, employees were forming
associations, and through
their unions, collectively bargaining to establish the details of

collective
agreements, in the case where the employer freely accepted to
enter into such
a bargaining process, or did so under constraint, following
pressure tactics that
were effectively exerted by the employees.14 This system is
characterized by
some specific components, which are now consecrated in the
Quebec Labour
Code.15
First, employees, by majority vote, can choose a
representative—the
union—that can be “certified” to become their exclusive
representative with
regard to all aspects covered by the negotiation, application,
and
10. Except in the case where a player’s employment contract
includes a non-trade clause. Id. at
art. 11.8.
11. FERNAND MORIN ET AL., LE DROIT DE L’EMPLOI AU
QUÉBEC 77 (3d ed. 2006); PIERRE
VERGE ET AL., LE DROIT DU TRAVAIL PAR SES
SOURCES 29 (Editions Thémis 2006).
12. Act Respecting Labour Standards, R.S.Q., ch. N.1-1, § 93
(2009).
13. See Quebec Leads Again, THE SHAWINIGAN
STANDARD, Mar. 1, 1944, at 2.
14. See id.
15. See Quebec Labour Code, R.S.Q., ch. C-27 (2009).

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[Vol. 20:1
administration of the collective agreement;16 in such a case, the
parties will be
under the obligation to negotiate, diligently and in good faith,
the conditions of
employment of employees forming a group within a given
enterprise.17 Once
it has been concluded, the collective agreement sets out the
conditions of
employment that will apply to all present and future employees
included in the

group concerned, as well as to the employer, subject to public
order.18 Since
the right to strike and to a lockout can only be exercised during
the negotiation
of the initial collective agreement or when this agreement
comes up for
renewal, it follows that these pressure tactics remain prohibited
during the
period of the collective agreement.19 Lastly, arbitration is the
exclusive and
compulsory means of settling grievances relating to the
interpretation and
application of the collective agreement; consequently, the
courts of law are
excluded from this adjudicating role.20
These initial observations reveal the limitations of labor laws,
which are
essentially applicable at the national, or even in the case of
Canada, provincial
level. Such territoriality means that, with few exceptions,21
such laws are
designed to apply at the local level only.22 The transnational
dimension of the
employer’s activities and of labor relations with employees is
therefore not
addressed. For example, the collective system of labor relations
is binding at
the level of a specified employer’s enterprise. Certification is
granted to one
association only with respect to a group of employees under one
employer or
at a firm, branch, or department coming under this employer.23
Multi-
employer certification is therefore prohibited. Moreover, only
one collective

agreement governs the conditions of employment for this group
of
employees.24
In this era of trade globalization and internationalization, in
which
transnational firms have become major players,25 the labor
relations system
that has been established in the NHL presents a very interesting
model of
transnational union representation and collective bargaining.
This Article aims
to sketch only a broad outline of the main characteristics of this
system, which
16. §§ 21, 47.2, 141.
17. § 53.
18. §§ 62, 67.
19. §§ 106, 107.
20. §§ 100, 101.
21. Act Respecting Labour Standards, ch. II.
22. PIERRE VERGE & SOPHIE DUFOUR, CONFIGURATION
DIVERSIFIÉE DE L’ENTREPRISE ET
DROIT DU TRAVAIL 107 (2003).
23. Quebec Labour Code § 21.
24. § 67.
25. BOB HEPPLE, LABOR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 6
(2005).
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has made it possible to go beyond the inherent territoriality of
labor law,
whether state-based or conventional, and the inherent
limitations of its
effectiveness. Moreover, this system indisputably has
transnational and multi-
employer normative import. Lastly, the binding effect and
enforceability of its
rules are ensured by an arbitration mechanism binding the
parties.
In addition, in regards to the theory of labor law, the system
described
here involves many pertinent aspects worth reflecting upon.
The system is,

first and foremost, a private initiative and is strictly contractual
in nature. It is
essentially based on mutual will, as was typically the case, and
will be seen as
this Article examines the era that preceded its adoption, starting
in 1944, of the
laws that introduced collective labor relations systems in
Canada. Thus, it fits
neatly into a “collective autonomy” approach,26 at least in the
sense intended
by the first major labor law theorists; that is, first, a group of
workers
demanding better working conditions from their employer, and
then, to legal
standards governing labor that are applicable to a given
community, such as a
factory, plant, firm, or industry developed through “collective
bargaining” and
set out in a “collective agreement” that then becomes “law” for
the parties
concerned.27 However, it is also possible to see in this system
an example of
“legal pluralism:”28 having been constructed, developed, and
sanctioned
independently from the state, its norms and their effective
implementation are
situated, definitively and almost exclusively, outside of state-
based labor
laws.29
That said, this system involves two levels of negotiation.
Collective labor
relations take place at the sectoral level. The collective
negotiation of working
conditions is definitely centralized, since it involves
representatives of all the

parties concerned, that is, the team owners and NHL directors,
as well as all of
the hockey players employed by any of these teams. The CBA,
signed in 2005
as a result of this process, standardizes some working
conditions for players
26. PIERRE VERGE & GUYLAINE VALLEE, UN DROIT DU
TRAVAIL? ESSAI SUR LA SPÉCIFICITÉ DU
DROIT DU TRAVAIL 25-30 (1997).
27. Hugo Sinzheimer, La théorie des sources et le droit ouvrier,
LE PROBLÈME DES SOURCES EN
DROIT POSITIF, 1934, at 73; see generally GEORGES
GURVITH, LE TEMPS PRÉSENT ET L’IDÉE DE
DROIT SOCIAL (1931); “Pensées allemande et européenne.”
Ulrich Zachert, La légitimité des
rapports juridiques de travail. À propos de la conception de la
légitimité chez Max Weber et Hugo
Sinzheimer, LA LÉGITIMITÉ DE L’ÊTAT ET DU DROIT.
AUTOUR DE MAX WEBER 306 (Michel Coutu &
Guy Rocher eds., 2005).
28. Guylaine Valée, Le droit du travail comme lieu de
pluralisme juridique, in CÉLINE SAINT-
PIERRE & JEAN-PHILIPPE WARREN, SOCIOLOGIE ET
SOCIÉTÉ QUÉBÉCOISE: PRÉSENCES DE GUY
ROCHER 241 (Céline Saint-Pierre & Jean-Philippe Warren eds.,
2006).
29. Id.; see generally Harry Arthurs, Labor Law Without the
State?, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 1
(1996).

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[Vol. 20:1
across the NHL.30 However, above all, it includes an
innovative mechanism
for determining the salary that each team can pay its players,
that is, a salary
cap.31 This point will be elaborated on further in this Article.
32
As regards individual labor relations, these take place at the
local level,
that is, at the level of the firm. Although, indeed, the CBA

significantly
regulates the negotiation of the employment contract between
the player and
the team, this negotiation remains decentralized and individual,
taking place
between these two parties alone. If the parties reach a deadlock
and if the
object of the negotiation involves determining the salary to be
paid to the
player, the parties can, under certain circumstances, go to salary
arbitration,
according to a sophisticated procedure that will be analyzed in
detail further
on. The same is true for grievances concerning the
interpretation or
application of the collective agreement or the individual
employment
contract.33
III. COLLECTIVE LABOR RELATIONS IN THE NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE
The labor relations system that the NHL set up involves a
centralized
multi-employer system for negotiating working conditions
across North
America.34 This collective bargaining process resulted in the
signing of a new
collective agreement in 2005, which was intended, on the one
hand, to
standardize some working conditions across the NHL, and on
the other hand,
to harmonize the salary paid to players by instituting a salary
cap.35
A. Collective Bargaining of Working Conditions: A Centralized

Multi-
Employer Process at the North American Level.
The main area of activity of the NHL involves producing and
marketing
sports competitions engaged in by the NHL’s teams. The
preamble to the
2005 CBA states that the NHL is a “joint venture36 organized
as a not-for-
profit unincorporated association . . . which is recognized as the
sole and
30. See generally CBA, supra note 6.
31. Id. at art. 42.
32. The CBA’s innovative mechanism for determining the salary
cap will be generally discussed
infra Part III.
33. Arbitration for both salary disagreements and grievances
will be discussed infra Part IV.
34. The system for negotiating working conditions will be
discussed infra Part IV.A.
35. The salary cap will be discussed infra Part IV.B.
36. A joint venture is “a business undertaking by two or more
persons engaged in a single
defined project. The necessary elements are: (1) an express or
implied agreement; (2) a common
purpose that the group intends to carry out; (3) shared profits
and losses; and (4) each member’s equal
voice in controlling the project.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 856 (8th ed. 2004).
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be relocated.42
exclusive bargaining representative of the present and future
Clubs of the
NHL . . . .”37 Thus, the NHL is a common legal entity that the
team owners
created in order to set up a professional hockey league. It is
also, according to
this definition, the exclusive representative of its present and
future teams for
the purposes of collective labor negotiations with the NHLPA,
and as such, it

closely resembles an employers’ association as understood in
Quebec labor
law.38 In this respect, however, it should be pointed out that
each individual
team remains the real employer of its players and that the
ultimate power,
when it comes to negotiating, rests in the hands of the teams.
Lastly, having its head office in New York City, the NHL is
directed and
supervised by a board of governors, made up of one member
from each
team.39 The NHL grants franchises to team owners, bestowing
upon them the
privilege of joining the other teams that make up the League.40
The board of
governors decides to whom a franchise should be granted to and
at what price,
as well as, when the case arises, whether a franchise can be sold
or
relocated.41 The NHL also has the power to withdraw a
franchise from its
owner if he does not respect his contractual obligations, violates
NHL rules, or
is headed for bankruptcy. In this case, the NHL then decides to
whom the
franchise can be sold to and where it can
The NHLPA represents all NHL players.43 Its headquarters are
in
Toronto and, in its present form, the NHLPA dates back to June
1967.44 It all
began with a resolution by player representatives from the six
original teams
who elected a Toronto Maple Leafs player, Bob Pulford, as the
NHLPA’s

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