- On December 22, 1999, Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509, a Boeing 747-2B5F aircraft, crashed shortly after takeoff from London Stansted Airport killing all 4 crew members.
- The accident was caused by a combination of mechanical and human errors. One of the aircraft's Inertial Navigation Units had failed, providing incorrect roll data to the captain's indicator. Additionally, the crew failed to properly respond to warning signals and notice the aircraft's unsafe attitude.
- Contributing factors included a lack of teamwork, knowledge, and awareness in the cockpit along with the airline's autocratic organizational culture which inhibited the first officer from speaking up. The accident may have been prevented by
Human Factors Training: There's nothing that can't go wrong. This simple insight forms the foundation of human factors training for pilots. In special courses, pilots are prepared for any possible emergency situation and action strategies. Crews learn to analyze and evaluate their own behavior and that of those around them more effectively. Training leads to more efficient work processes, a functioning error management culture, and increased safety. This is a general prsentation and human factors management in aviation training.
SynopsisOn 31 Oct 2000, Singapore Airlines Flight 006, a Boeing .docxssuserf9c51d
Synopsis
On 31 Oct 2000, Singapore Airlines Flight 006, a Boeing 747-400 aircraft, scheduled for Taipei to Los Angeles, took off on the wrong runway 05R (that was closed for maintenance works and parallel to runway 05L which they had intended to take off) in bad meteorological conditions. Whilst on the take-off roll, the aircraft collided with construction equipment and crashed, resulting in 83 out 179 people being killed.
Analysis using 5-M Model/ Swiss Cheese Model/ SHELL Model
FINDINGS
Man
Qualification and Flying Record of the Crew
· The primary flying crew consisted of the Pilot and Co-pilot. The aircraft captain had been a Captain for the Boeing 747-400 fleet since 1998 and had a total of 11235 hours of flying time.
· The Co-pilot had been a First Officer since 2000 and had a total of 2442 hours of flying time.
Currency and Proficiency
· From the aircrew records, both pilots were qualified and current for their flight. They were also current in simulator training. From interviews, both involved were assessed to be confident in carrying out their assigned duties.
Medical Status
· Both pilot and co-pilot were physically well at the time of the flight. On review of past medical records, both pilots did not have any significant medical conditions of note. Both pilots reported that they had not consumed any medications or intoxicating beverage 72 and 48 hrs prior to the flight. There was no evidence to suggest alcohol or drugs were factors in the accident.
Physiological and Psychological Fitness
· Both pilot and co-pilot were assessed to be psychologically and physiologically fit for the flight. The 2 crew had adequate sleep for the past 72 hrs prior, and were not fatigued on the day of the flight.
Machine
Aircraft Damage
· The Aft fuselage separated from the remainder of the fuselage and was generally intact. The mid and forward fuselage suffered extreme fire damage. The left and right wing were heavily damaged by fire.
Aircraft History
· The incident aircraft was serviceable on the day of the accident and the last maintenance performance was the A check at 17838 hrs, on 29 Oct 2000. The current airframe hours is 18459 hrs, 621 hrs since last service. A review of the maintenance logbooks revealed no related defects in the 30 days of Tech Log entries and showed no evidence that the aircraft was not airworthy.
Medium
Weather
· Taiwan was affected by north-east monsoon flow and typhoon "Xangsane". The Taipei Meteorological Service issued a SIGMET for cumulonimbus, together with several gale and typhoon warnings which was applicable to the airport at the time of the accident.
· Surface Weather observations at the time of the accident varied with winds at 020 degrees, 30 kts gusting to 61 kts, visibility was 450m, RVR was 450m, there was heavy rain, with broken clouds at 200ft and overcast at 500ft.
Airfield Lightings/ Markings/ Signages
· The green taxiway lights immediately after 05R entry point into 05L were not serviceable and the ...
Human Factors Training: There's nothing that can't go wrong. This simple insight forms the foundation of human factors training for pilots. In special courses, pilots are prepared for any possible emergency situation and action strategies. Crews learn to analyze and evaluate their own behavior and that of those around them more effectively. Training leads to more efficient work processes, a functioning error management culture, and increased safety. This is a general prsentation and human factors management in aviation training.
SynopsisOn 31 Oct 2000, Singapore Airlines Flight 006, a Boeing .docxssuserf9c51d
Synopsis
On 31 Oct 2000, Singapore Airlines Flight 006, a Boeing 747-400 aircraft, scheduled for Taipei to Los Angeles, took off on the wrong runway 05R (that was closed for maintenance works and parallel to runway 05L which they had intended to take off) in bad meteorological conditions. Whilst on the take-off roll, the aircraft collided with construction equipment and crashed, resulting in 83 out 179 people being killed.
Analysis using 5-M Model/ Swiss Cheese Model/ SHELL Model
FINDINGS
Man
Qualification and Flying Record of the Crew
· The primary flying crew consisted of the Pilot and Co-pilot. The aircraft captain had been a Captain for the Boeing 747-400 fleet since 1998 and had a total of 11235 hours of flying time.
· The Co-pilot had been a First Officer since 2000 and had a total of 2442 hours of flying time.
Currency and Proficiency
· From the aircrew records, both pilots were qualified and current for their flight. They were also current in simulator training. From interviews, both involved were assessed to be confident in carrying out their assigned duties.
Medical Status
· Both pilot and co-pilot were physically well at the time of the flight. On review of past medical records, both pilots did not have any significant medical conditions of note. Both pilots reported that they had not consumed any medications or intoxicating beverage 72 and 48 hrs prior to the flight. There was no evidence to suggest alcohol or drugs were factors in the accident.
Physiological and Psychological Fitness
· Both pilot and co-pilot were assessed to be psychologically and physiologically fit for the flight. The 2 crew had adequate sleep for the past 72 hrs prior, and were not fatigued on the day of the flight.
Machine
Aircraft Damage
· The Aft fuselage separated from the remainder of the fuselage and was generally intact. The mid and forward fuselage suffered extreme fire damage. The left and right wing were heavily damaged by fire.
Aircraft History
· The incident aircraft was serviceable on the day of the accident and the last maintenance performance was the A check at 17838 hrs, on 29 Oct 2000. The current airframe hours is 18459 hrs, 621 hrs since last service. A review of the maintenance logbooks revealed no related defects in the 30 days of Tech Log entries and showed no evidence that the aircraft was not airworthy.
Medium
Weather
· Taiwan was affected by north-east monsoon flow and typhoon "Xangsane". The Taipei Meteorological Service issued a SIGMET for cumulonimbus, together with several gale and typhoon warnings which was applicable to the airport at the time of the accident.
· Surface Weather observations at the time of the accident varied with winds at 020 degrees, 30 kts gusting to 61 kts, visibility was 450m, RVR was 450m, there was heavy rain, with broken clouds at 200ft and overcast at 500ft.
Airfield Lightings/ Markings/ Signages
· The green taxiway lights immediately after 05R entry point into 05L were not serviceable and the ...
What Do You Do When The Pilots Shut Down The Wrong Engine?Bob Mayer
And the other engine is the one that is malfunctioning? Yes. It happened. This slideshow presents the sequence of events and the six cascades that led to the final crash. Mechanical failure, pilot error, and more all contributed to this event.
How Did A Flyable Plane Crash in Just Over Four Minutes?Bob Mayer
How does a flyable plane go from 30,000 feet to crash into the ocean in just over 4 minutes? Do not read this if you're getting ready to take a flight. A cascade of events, of which human error played a big role. The key is to learn from such an event so the lives lost were not in vain.
How Did A Flyable Plane Crash in Just Over Four Minutes?Bob Mayer
How does a flyable plane go from 30,000 feet to crash into the ocean in just over 4 minutes? Do not read this if you're getting ready to take a flight. A cascade of events, of which human error played a big role. The key is to learn from such an event so the lives lost were not in vain.
Techniques to optimize the pagerank algorithm usually fall in two categories. One is to try reducing the work per iteration, and the other is to try reducing the number of iterations. These goals are often at odds with one another. Skipping computation on vertices which have already converged has the potential to save iteration time. Skipping in-identical vertices, with the same in-links, helps reduce duplicate computations and thus could help reduce iteration time. Road networks often have chains which can be short-circuited before pagerank computation to improve performance. Final ranks of chain nodes can be easily calculated. This could reduce both the iteration time, and the number of iterations. If a graph has no dangling nodes, pagerank of each strongly connected component can be computed in topological order. This could help reduce the iteration time, no. of iterations, and also enable multi-iteration concurrency in pagerank computation. The combination of all of the above methods is the STICD algorithm. [sticd] For dynamic graphs, unchanged components whose ranks are unaffected can be skipped altogether.
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Empowering the Data Analytics Ecosystem: A Laser Focus on Value
The data analytics ecosystem thrives when every component functions at its peak, unlocking the true potential of data. Here's a laser focus on key areas for an empowered ecosystem:
1. Democratize Access, Not Data:
Granular Access Controls: Provide users with self-service tools tailored to their specific needs, preventing data overload and misuse.
Data Catalogs: Implement robust data catalogs for easy discovery and understanding of available data sources.
2. Foster Collaboration with Clear Roles:
Data Mesh Architecture: Break down data silos by creating a distributed data ownership model with clear ownership and responsibilities.
Collaborative Workspaces: Utilize interactive platforms where data scientists, analysts, and domain experts can work seamlessly together.
3. Leverage Advanced Analytics Strategically:
AI-powered Automation: Automate repetitive tasks like data cleaning and feature engineering, freeing up data talent for higher-level analysis.
Right-Tool Selection: Strategically choose the most effective advanced analytics techniques (e.g., AI, ML) based on specific business problems.
4. Prioritize Data Quality with Automation:
Automated Data Validation: Implement automated data quality checks to identify and rectify errors at the source, minimizing downstream issues.
Data Lineage Tracking: Track the flow of data throughout the ecosystem, ensuring transparency and facilitating root cause analysis for errors.
5. Cultivate a Data-Driven Mindset:
Metrics-Driven Performance Management: Align KPIs and performance metrics with data-driven insights to ensure actionable decision making.
Data Storytelling Workshops: Equip stakeholders with the skills to translate complex data findings into compelling narratives that drive action.
Benefits of a Precise Ecosystem:
Sharpened Focus: Precise access and clear roles ensure everyone works with the most relevant data, maximizing efficiency.
Actionable Insights: Strategic analytics and automated quality checks lead to more reliable and actionable data insights.
Continuous Improvement: Data-driven performance management fosters a culture of learning and continuous improvement.
Sustainable Growth: Empowered by data, organizations can make informed decisions to drive sustainable growth and innovation.
By focusing on these precise actions, organizations can create an empowered data analytics ecosystem that delivers real value by driving data-driven decisions and maximizing the return on their data investment.
Levelwise PageRank with Loop-Based Dead End Handling Strategy : SHORT REPORT ...Subhajit Sahu
Abstract — Levelwise PageRank is an alternative method of PageRank computation which decomposes the input graph into a directed acyclic block-graph of strongly connected components, and processes them in topological order, one level at a time. This enables calculation for ranks in a distributed fashion without per-iteration communication, unlike the standard method where all vertices are processed in each iteration. It however comes with a precondition of the absence of dead ends in the input graph. Here, the native non-distributed performance of Levelwise PageRank was compared against Monolithic PageRank on a CPU as well as a GPU. To ensure a fair comparison, Monolithic PageRank was also performed on a graph where vertices were split by components. Results indicate that Levelwise PageRank is about as fast as Monolithic PageRank on the CPU, but quite a bit slower on the GPU. Slowdown on the GPU is likely caused by a large submission of small workloads, and expected to be non-issue when the computation is performed on massive graphs.
2. • Date : 22 DEC 1999
• Place : Near Great Hallingbury (United Kingdom)
• Time : 18:38 UTC
• Operator : Korean Air
• Aircraft Type : Boeing 747-2B5F(SCD)
• Departure Airport : London-Stansted Airport, United
Kingdom
FIGURE 1: KAL CARGO 8509
3. • Destination Airport : Milano - Malpensa Airport,
Italy
• Crew : Occupants : 4 / Fatalities : 4
• Passenger : Occupants : 0 / Fatalities : 0
• Aircraft Damage(s) : Written off (damaged beyond
repair)
• Description of the Incident/Accident.
4. How it Happened
• Previous flight from Tashkent to Stansted arrived at
15.05 UTC.
• The flight engineer made an entry in the Technical Log
prior to leaving the aircraft.
• During turnover repair works on the ADI were carried
out.
• The new crew for the next flight boarded the flight.
• The flight delayed for an hour because ATC had not
receive the flight plan.
• The Flight 8509 was cleared to depart at 18.25 UTC.
• The ADI ‘comparator’ buzzer sound three times when
the flight climbing through 900ft.
5. •Climbing through 1400ft, ATC instructed the crew to
contact ‘London Control’.
•The aircraft banked left progressively and entered a
descent until struck the ground.
FIGURE 2 : During the impact
7. MECHANICAL ERRORS
LIVEWARE – HARDWARE (L-H)
One of its Inertial Navigation Unit (INUs) had partly
failed, providing incorrect roll data to the captain’s
attitude director indicator (ADI).
Captain ADI was showing the right climbing attitude
but not the roll attitude of aircraft.
Despite the problem had been reported, but the
maintenance is misdirected by the ground engineer.
The ground engineer was supposedly replace the no. 1
INUs if he was not misdirected.
8. MECHANICAL ERRORS
The no. 1 INUs was not working in providing the
correct roll attitude.
The pilot ADI was using the no. 1 INU as the roll
attitude.
When the aircraft was turn to left, the captain ADI
shows no movement in roll attitude.
But, the commander was failed to realize that his ADI
roll attitude was not functioning.
He also failed to compare his ADI with the standby ADI
provided at the panel and decide which one is correct
and which is not.
11. HUMAN ERRORS
LACK OF AWARENESS
Comparator Warning
Pilot was not properly respond to the warning.
The comparator warning was triggered for three
times,
The first triggered was at 17 seconds after takeoff,
The second triggered was at 8 seconds (1200 ft agl)
after the first triggered.
12. HUMAN ERRORS
But there was no audio response from the crew
about the warning.
The third triggered was after 5 seconds later, when
the left turn was initiated.
After that, the horn sounding was cancelled by the
commander.
The flight engineer had made three comment.
13. FIGURE 7 : CAPTAIN’S ADI AND THE INST WARN LIGHT
14. HUMAN ERRORS
LACK OF TEAMWORK
FIRST OFFICER ACTION
The first officer either did not monitor the aircraft
attitude during the climbing turn or, did not alert the
commander to the extreme unsafe attitude that
developed.
There was a marked difference in age and experience
between the commander and the first officer.
Also, the first officer was inexperienced. (with 195
hours on type)
The first officer had been criticized prior to takeoff. (By
the pilot)
15. HUMAN ERRORS
Also, because of autocratic organizational
cockpit culture in Korea.
He felt inhibited to bringing the situation
into the commander concerned.
16. HUMAN ERRORS
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE/ REFERENCE
The maintenance activity at Stansted was misdirected,
despite the fault having been correctly reported using
the Fault Reporting Manual (FRM).
The Inertial Navigation Unit (INU) no.1 for pilot was
supposedly be replaced, but instead the Attitude
Director Indicator (ADI) was being fixed off.
Korean Air does not provide a copy of fault isolation
manual (FIM).
17. HUMAN ERRORS
He uncertain about the correct course of action but
does not seek for advice from any specialists at
Stansted or contact maintenance control at Seoul.
Later, endorse help from local engineer.
When removing the ADI from panel, the socket no
2 was pushed back.
The ground engineer feeling that the problem was
with the connecting pin (asking the local eng. to
replace the pin).
18. • The accident could have been prevented if Korea Air’s
accept The Internal Audit Report (20th September 1998)
written by an external New Zealand.
• Change their autocratic cockpit culture that has an
endemic level of complacency, arrogance and
incompetence.
•Repair the ADI with having the correct Fault Isolation
Manual and consider to replace INU.
• Do an observation of the maintenance before the plane
took off.
20. ERROR CHAIN
If any one of the links in this chain had been
broken by building in measures which may have
been prevented a problem at one or more of these
stages.
• The accident could have been prevented if we
break the crew link of the chain.
• The Korean culture. Autocratic cockpit culture.
21.
22. COMPANY
Flight operations selection – upgrading system,
stricter requirement.
Flight crew training and checking – more
training being introduced.
Organisation and management – improve
standardisation, rationalised documentation.
Flight Quality Assurance – various audit.
Maintenance and engineering – manpower,
new system, maintenance training.
23. AVIATION INDUSTRY
Safety Recommendation No 2003-62 – KAL update
their training and programmes.
Safety Recommendation No 2003-63 – KAL review
their policy and procedures.
Safety Recommendation No 2003-64 – Technical
log must have copied at ground.
Safety Recommendation No 2003-65 – Carrying
dangerous good must be informed to the Authority.
Safety Recommendation No 2003-66 – Review the
current methods of tracking air cargo.
Safety Recommendation No 2003-67 – necessary
data and risk management advice.
24. What Can Be Learned From
This Incident/Accident
Flight crew must not using autocratic
organizational culture in their system.
Flight crew must realize their responsibility
when onboard and they must take and
appropriate action when some problem
occurred.
All aircraft must have appropriate Fault
Isolation manual to be referred to do the
maintenance.
25. Organizational Culture
Safety Culture
• ICAO HF -
“a set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social
and technical practices concerned with minimizing
exposure of employees, managers, customers and
members of the general public to conditions
considered dangerous or hazardous.”
26. Figure 9 : On 22 December 1999, Korean Air Cargo
Flight No: 8509 Aircraft: B747-2B5F (HL 7451) on a
cargo flight to Milan-Malpensa, Italy, crashed shortly
after takeoff from London Stansted Airport, Essex,
England killing all 4 on board
27. FIGURE 8 : PART OF BODY OF KAL CARGO 8509 THAT CRASHED
28. FIGURE 9 :AT THE SITE OF THE KAL CARGO 8509 CRASHED
29. FIGURE 10 : VIEW AT NIGHT FROM THE CRASH SITE.
32. REFERENCES
CINEFLIX (undated). Mayday - Bad Attitude (Korean Air Cargo
Flight 8509). Retrieved from YouTube, Retrieved from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aG3_nJYtrO8 on 3 March 2014.
Khoury, M. (2009, October 1). Korean Airlines Safety Audit
Findings. Retrieved from
http://www.flight.org/blog/2009/10/01/korean-airlines-internal-audit-
report-an-airline-waiting-to-happen/ on 4 March 2014.
Wikipedia. (2012). Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509. Retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Cargo_Flight_8509 on 11
March 2014.
"Report on the accident to Boeing 747-2B5F, HL-7451 near
London Stansted Airport on 22 December 1999". Air Accident
Investigation Branch(AAIB), Retrieved from
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/3-2003%20HL-
7451.pdf on 4 March 2014.