On the occasion of the April 17, 2017 Williams Foundation Seminar on integrated force structure design, John Blackburn briefed the findings of the integrated air and missile defense study which was done in preparation for the seminar. The IMAD study was done to illustrate an approach, not provide a definitive set of answers to the problem narrowly considered.
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John Blackburn on Integrated Force Design: The Case of IMAD
1. Multiple re-entry vehicles deployed by one LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile
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The Sir Richard Williams Founda4on
INTEGRATED AIR & MISSILE DEFENCE STUDY
The Challenge of Integrated Force Design
April 2017
Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO (Retd)
http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au
5. Graphics Courtesy of the CSIS Missile Defense Project
What threats are promp4ng
an increased priority for
IAMD in the US?
Never has the United States faced a more complex or comprehensive global challenge in
this area, and the forecast for 2020 and beyond is no more op4mis4c … a dire and growing
air and missile threat to the United States and its interests around the world. Success in
nega4ng it will take no less than a bold, holis4c reimagining of America’s IAMD.
The future IAMD environment will be characterized by a full spectrum of air
and missile threats—ballis4c missiles, air-breathing threats (cruise missiles,
aircra^, UAS), long-range rockets ar4llery, and mortars—all u4lising a range
of advanced capabili4es—stealth, electronic a`ack, maneuvering reentry
vehicles, decoys, and advanced terminal seekers with precision targe4ng.
6. Graphics Courtesy of the CSIS Missile Defense Project
Never has the United States faced a more complex or comprehensive global challenge in this area, and the forecast for
2020 and beyond is no more op4mis4c … a dire and growing air and missile threat to the United States and its
interests around the world. Success in nega4ng it will take no less than a bold, holis4c reimagining of America’s
IAMD.
The future IAMD environment will be characterized by a full spectrum of air
and
missile threats—ballis4c missiles, air-breathing threats (cruise missiles, aircra^,
UAS), long-range rockets ar4llery, and mortars—all u4lising a range of
advanced capabili4es—stealth, electronic a`ack, maneuvering reentry vehicles,
decoys, and advanced terminal seekers with precision targe4ng.
The gap between the threat and the ADF’s IAMD capability is growing
and is likely to be larger in a decade than it is now, despite the
significant level of investment the Government has commi`ed to in the
DIIP.
What threats are
promp4ng an increased
priority for IAMD?
10. Vision 2020 Impera4ves:
Ø Incorporate, fuse, exploit, and leverage every bit of informa4on available regardless of
source or classifica4on, and distribute it as needed to U.S. Forces and selected partners.
Ø Make interdependent Joint and Combined force employment the baseline.
Ø Target development, moderniza4on, fielding, and science and technology efforts to meet
specific gaps.
Ø Focus passive defense efforts on addressing poten4al capability and capacity shordalls in
air and missile defense.
Ø Establish and pursue policies to leverage partner contribu4ons.
Ø Create an awareness of the IAMD mission and the benefits of its proper u4liza4on.
The US Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defence Organisa4on (JIAMDO) has been set up to
manage the US IAMD pordolio, and to iden4fy and coordinate requirements to support
efforts to develop IAMD solu4ons for the warfighter.
Despite the US’s clear vision and applied resources, there are s4ll difficul4es in building a
shared understanding of their way ahead …. as Joint staff, the JIAMDO IAMD Roadmap
remains a recommenda6on, but not a direc6ve.
WHAT IS THE US DOING ABOUT IAMD?
are there lessons we can learn ?
11. The United States’ ability to develop
field-robust yet affordable missile
defense is, in a word, challenging.
1. Cost per kill
2. Target discrimination
3. Left of launch
COST ?
12. March 2017 - General David Perkins, the
commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) - spoke about the necessity
for commanders to address threats holistically.
“The gut instinct was,” he explains, “that’s an air
defense problem, because they’re in the air …
A fly swatter is a better solution than a shotgun.”
This is about Integrated Force Design
http://www.theverge.com/2017/3/16/14944256/patriot-missile-shot-down-consumer-drone-us-military
14. PLATFORMS /
SENSORS
WEAPONS
C4ISR ++
IAMD CANNOT BE DRIVEN FROM JUST ONE COMPONENT OR ONE SERVICE
… IT MUST BE INTEGRATED
IAMD DESIGN – Components ?
“innova4ons must be paired with valid concepts of opera4on to make them effec4ve in
the expected opera4onal environment”
BGen Alex Grynkewich USAF - Air Superiority 2030 Team Lead
CONOPS
JOINT FIRES ? JBM ?
ABM ? AMPHIB OPS ?
19. Defence has a budgeted IAMD Program with some $2B-$3B allocated for an IAMD
Program to be delivered in the period 2018-2030.
Ø The initial IAMD related Projects are closely coordinated and are focused on
integrated outcomes rather than purely individual Project goals. This is a good
example of CAF’s strategic intent - “I would like Air Force in a joint context to begin to
put the joint effect before our own Air Force requirements…”
Ø The approach being adopted for the initial IAMD related Projects is laudable, so why
change anything? There are two reasons:
Ø Firstly - the gap between the threat and the ADF’s IAMD capability gap is likely to be
larger in a decade than it is now; we will need to do something different if we are to
achieve the required level of IAMD capability.
Ø Secondly, the experience of the US is that an IAMD capability cannot be built purely
bottom-up from a Project perspective; however, Defence is yet to define an IAMD
Program-level design that addresses the complexity of IAMD as a “System of
Systems,” as has been done in the US.
Ø A top-down approach will afford the opportunity to maximise our IAMD capability and
address the growing threat-capability gap.
WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD?
20. The main recommendation that emerged from the initial study research was that an
IAMD Program-level design needs to be developed as a matter of priority in order to
provide a top-down, integrated design across all IAMD component and related
Projects.
Ø This recommendation implies, at first glance, the development of an IAMD narrative,
CONOPS guidance, and architectures.
Ø Whilst the US IAMD vision and resulting JIAMDO guidance provides a good template
for Australia, it needs to be adapted for Australia’s specific needs and circumstances.
Ø The Australian IAMD Program needs to develop a Roadmap for IAMD that addresses
issues such as who we follow and what level of acquisition risk is appropriate given the
operational risks we may face in the future.
Ø Such a Roadmap should identify initial Project steps and how we will eventually
integrate with the future US IAMD Program.
WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD?
23. The IAMD study also identified a number of key questions and issues that should be
addressed in addition to CONOPS, C4ISR++, Platforms and Weapons. Examples
include:
Ø Integration versus Interoperability
Ø People
Ø Acquisition and Sustainment
Ø Timing Imperative
Ø Most, if not all, of the issues and questions that arose in the IAMD study apply to the
majority of the Defence Programs and not just to IAMD.
WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD?
So, how do we address IAMD Program design without over-complicating the issue?
Ø CAF’s town plan
Ø CAF portrayed Projects as “streets” in a town; they need an overall town plan which
guides how the streets are aligned and how they integrate with the common services,
power, water, sewerage, that all "streets" need and that cannot be installed afterwards
without significant costs and disruptions.
26. The IAMD study also identified a number of key questions and issues that should be
addressed in addition to CONOPS, C4ISR++, Platforms and Weapons. Examples
include:
Ø Integration versus Interoperability
Ø People
Ø Acquisition and Sustainment
Ø Timing Imperative
Ø Most, if not all, of the issues and questions that arose in the IAMD study apply to the
majority of the Defence Programs and not just to IAMD.
So, how do we address IAMD Program design without over-complicating the issue?
Ø CAF’s town plan
Ø CAF portrayed Projects as “streets” in a town; they need an overall town plan which
guides how the streets are aligned and how they integrate with the common services,
power, water, sewerage, that all "streets" need and that cannot be installed afterwards
without significant costs and disruptions.
Ø What could the town plan look like? Can there be a town plan just for IAMD?
Ø Is the Defence Program structure suitable for integrated force design by individual
Programs?
WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD?
28. Program Structure
WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FOR PROGRAM-LEVEL CAPABILITY DESIGN?
There are 40 Programs listed in the Defence Program
structure … the DIIP also refers to more than 200 “Programs”
in the tables of key investment decisions, the majority of which
are, in fact, Projects.
An IAMD Program is certainly a useful construct to discuss
how a group of Projects, integrated by a common design,
could address a growing air and missile threat.
An IAMD Program would also be of assistance in over-
sighting a group of Projects that are in the acquisition process,
to ensure that they remain integrated.
However, it is difficult to see how an IAMD Program can be
designed by itself … The reality is that an IAMD Program
incorporates component capabilities of many other Programs.
To achieve an integrated force by design, you need an
integrated Program structure … In fact there is one, if it is
used.
29. Program Structure
WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FOR PROGRAM-LEVEL CAPABILITY DESIGN?
The DIIP states “… the six capability Streams in the framework that
are used in the Integrated Investment Program to better represent the
key force elements – how they are typically employed and their
planned enhancements. This was a deliberate move away from
describing our capability investment plans in a stove-piped structure.
It would therefore seem sensible to start design by Streams with each
Program then integrating the detailed Stream design attributes where
appropriate; i.e. the Stream design must be undertaken prior to the
individual Program design. This approach would reduce the integrated
design start point to 6 Streams vice 40 Programs.
Do the Stream leads have a design role? If we are to achieve an
integrated force, we need to stop “driving” Programs as if they were
Projects … They are different beasts.
32. 31
2024
2022
2020
2018
2016
IAMD Program Roadmap… Key Questions / Issues to address
People – Defence / Industry ?
Design as a SoS vice discrete
elements – USN NIFC-CA example ?
JIFC +
Weapons ?
Kinetic / Non-K
Left of Launch ? NOT OPTIONAL
Threat
Cyber
C2 changes ?
EW
IMD Space
Integrated Training ?
T&E
Lessons from US Experience ? Lead indicators ?
JBM / ISR Implications ?
CONOPS ?
Logistics Design Considerations ?
Acquisition / Sustainment?
Future Intel Concepts ?
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CONCLUSIONS
Ø IAMD is a complex issue; building a shared understanding of what IAMD is, is the
first step in understanding what we must do to address what is assessed as a
growing threat.
Ø We need an IAMD narrative or vision to provide the context of, and focus for, our
IAMD Program.
Ø The IAMD Program cannot be built purely bottom-up by Projects if it is to be both
effective and affordable; a top-down direction and focus is essential.
Ø If the Australian Governments of the next decade wishes to have the option of
deploying forces into the Indo-Pacific region; we will need to approach the IAMD
challenge somewhat differently than we have done to date. This will necessitate
revised thinking around concepts of operation, integrated design, acquisition,
sustainment, processes and people.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Ø Defence should commence the design of the integrated force at the Capability
Stream level.
Ø The subsequent design of an IAMD Program should be a priority.
Ø The IAMD Program Roadmap needs to be a Directive vice a recommendation.
Ø The IAMD roadmap should identify initial Project steps and how we will eventually
integrate, where necessary, with the emerging US IAMD Program.
Ø The Program design function needs to catch up with Projects underway and not
impede them.
35. 34
Integrated Force Hypotheses
Ø We must operate as an integrated team from the design, through delivery to the
operation of the force; failure to act as such will incur unacceptable risk in future
operations.
Ø If we don’t “design” the integrated force we are committed to “after-market”
integration
Ø We can’t acquire and operate an integrated force using business models
developed for acquiring stand-alone, stove-piped capabilities.
Ø “Design” is about more than just platforms and systems … it is about how we
design, acquire, operate and sustain an integrated force in a more complex
interconnected global context.
Ø If we over-complicate the “design” process we will stall our efforts and get the
same results we have had over the past 20 years – stove-piped capabilities.
Ø We must however recognise that the task load of the three Services in their raise,
train, sustain and Capablity Manager roles means that simply delivering a large
volume of Force Design guidance to the three Services will not work.
Ø Cultural change, as reflected in CAF’s strategic plan narrative, is required to
prioritise the integrated force outcomes over the individual force priorities where
appropriate.
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SPONSORS
The Williams Foundation thanks the IAMD Study sponsors:
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.
The Williams Foundation thanks Dr Gary Waters
and Jacobs for their support.