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Blue and Gray Berets H4D Final Presentation
- 1. Blue and Gray Berets H4D Team Members Chris Cottrell J.D. Englehart Patrick Hynes Brian Norville Jeremy Straughter
- 2. Team Chris Cottrell J.D. Englehart Patrick Hynes Brian Norville Jeremy Straughter MBA MBA MBA Masters in Technology Management MPM https://www.linkedin.c om/in/chriscottrell https://www.linkedin.c om/in/jdenglehart https://www.linkedin.c om/in/patrickhynes https://www.linkedin.c om/in/brian-norville- 023b09131 https://www.linkedin.c om/in/jeremystraughte r Experience in government work, future USAR intelligence officer, More than four years experience in government contracting, including in direct support of cleared cyber programs for IC customers. More than four years experience developing software for Defense and Intelligence customers as a Software Engineer at Harris Corp. More than four years providing intelligence analysis and document and media exploitation support to the Intelligence Community. More than fifteen years in the United States Army; six years of special operations experience within USSOCOM.
- 3. Problem: Develop a one-way, cross domain solution (CDS) that allows SOCOM to move information from an external media device (e.g. thumb drive, hard drive, SD Card) directly into a SECRET computer system. External Media Stand-Alone System Approved Media Classified Network
- 5. THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
- 7. Initial MVP • One Way Connection • Windows Machine w/virus scanning capability • Small form factor • Support for multiple connections formats • Durable CDS Transfer Source Device Destination Device • Multiple formats to include SD cards, USB, CD ● Windows Machine Temporar y Storage Virus Scan
- 8. Hypothesis Hypothesis Special Operations Command (SOCOM) wants to transfer data from removable media and SSE to a connected Secret computer system. Experiments: USSOCOM, NSW 1. Why does SOCOM need a cross domain solution (CDS) when there are several successful workaround methods? 2. How much time does data transfer currently take? 3. How long do current cross domain transfer processes take? 4. Is the Naval Special Warfare Command aware of how others are solving this problem across SOCOM enterprise? Throughout the interagency/intelligence community?
- 9. Hypothesis Hypothesis The CDS solution is required to go through an accreditation process. Experiments: Customer Interviews- UCDSMO, DSAWG, NSA 1. What is the accreditation process for CDS solutions? 2. Is there a timeframe for the accreditation process? 3. Is there a cost associated with the accreditation process?
- 10. Discovery ◇The need for secure and expedited transfer of data from removable media and SSE to SECRET classified systems ◇There is a multi-organization accreditation process. The process starts with the Air Force CDO, then goes to the Cross Domain Technical Advisory Board (CDTAB), then to the Defense Information Assurance Security Accreditation Working Group (DSAWG), and finally to the DOD Information Security Risk Management Committee (DOD ISRMC). Accreditation costs is between 500k-700k and can take 12 months or more. ◇A solution called TACDS already exists and is currently going through accreditation process. ◇Each military branch has their own cross domain office.
- 11. “ I don’t think this is an issue of lack of technology. The technology is out there.
- 12. Hypothesis Hypothesis Special Operations Command (SOCOM)’s needs are met by the broader community, with occasional new feature introductions and associated accreditation cycles. Experiments: Customer Interview – SOCOM, Perfecta Federal, NSA, Army CDO 1. Why does SOCOM need a cross domain solution (CDS) when there are several successful workaround methods and solutions? 2. Does TACDS solve the needs if approved? 3. Are policies valid?
- 13. Discovery ◇TACDS fits most of customer requirements, but does not support COT. ◇ Accreditation process is slow and does not allow rapid feature introduction. ◇There is an abbreviated accreditation process for new or modified features. Process depends on complexity of feature. ◇The problem of not being able transfer information cross domain is primarily an issue for Theater SOF and personnel in an office setting.
- 14. MVP
- 15. Mission Model Canvas Mission/Problem Description Key Activities Deployment Value Propositions Mission Budget/Cost Mission Achievement/Impact Factors Key Resources Buy-In & SupportKey Partners Beneficiaries Design a one-way CDS to transfer unclassified data to a connected secret computer for dissemination to SOTF Commander. Secure, one-way transfer of tactical ISR data to a SIPR computer Train SOF personnel in proper use of hardware and software. Conducts more missions because the Intelligence Officer provides more consistent targets with better analysis. Provides more targets to operators because the CDS streamlines data transfer process - more information, better analysis, consistent dissemination. SOCOM Acquisition Center Cross Domain Management Office Physically distribute to SOF units through USSOCOM Task Force Commander Operations Officer Intelligence Officer Detachment Commander Intelligence Sergeant Communications Sergeant Staff Judge Advocate SOF personnel can easily use solution to successfully transfer ISR information from unclassified systems to DOD SIPRNet. USSOCOM Acquisition Center ● Comptroller ● Logistics/J4 ● Procurement ● Science & Tech ● PEO C4 Perfecta Federal Brendon Reedy, Sponsor, USSOCOM PEO SOF Warrior XTS Guard 5 Perfecta Federal Software Pricing information not available (we did ask)
- 16. Recommendations 1. Increased information sharing within SOCOM regarding cross domain accreditation process and associated costs. 2. Information sharing on service level cross domain offices. 3. Information sharing on types of Cross Domain Solutions (Example: guards vs. composed). 4. Greater knowledge of existing solutions on the market.
- 17. Way Forward No viable commercial opportunity ◇High CAPEX ◇High barriers to entry (accreditation and time to revenue) ◇Technical expertise not on the team ◇Solutions exist ◇Relatively small market without product suite We have connected USSOCOM and Perfecta Federal. They are in discussions for potential purchase.
- 18. JIDO Framework “…as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD), JIDO will enable rapid tactical responsiveness and anticipate acquisition requirements to prepare for, and react to, battlefield surprise to help meet counter-terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency (COIN), and other related operational challenges, including counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED).”
- 19. JIDO asked for a framework that • Defines the improvised threat • Considers the JIDO mission statement • Considers the operational environment • Could focus on domain and relevant technologies
- 20. • JIDO excels in rapid acquisitions by using its Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund (JIEDDF) • JIDO’s pinwheel is a visualization of the authorities given it by the Joint Staff to counter the IED threat (JROCM) • JIDO lacks the authority to execute the preemptive acquisitions strategies that its mission statement requires • JIDO lacks a framework that articulates how its use of the JIEDDF has achieved the desired outcomes (i.e., threat mitigation and reduction). Key Findings
- 22. 22 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED DTRA-JIDO Rapid Reaction Technology Office X X X Rapid Equipping Force X X X X Rapid Capabilities Offices X X X X Countering Terrorism Technical Support Office X X X JIDO Organizational Comparison ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1. DODD 5105. 62 Establishes DTRA’s mission, organization and management, responsibilities and functions, relationships, authorities, and administration 2. CJCSI 3170.01 Establishes JCIDS as the process used by JROC to fulfill its responsibilities to the CJCS to assess and prioritize joint military capability requirements 3. DoDD 5000.02 Enclosure 13 provides policy and procedure for acquisition programs to fulfill urgent operational needs and other quick reaction capabilities that can be fielded in less than 2 years 4. 2007 NDAA Established the Joint IED Defeat Fund (JIEDDF), a standalone 3-year, flexible appropriation (i.e. “colorless”) 5. JIDO CONOPS Approved by USD(AT&L), the CONOPS establishes JIDO’s mission, responsibilities, organization, lines of operations, authorities, and relationship to DTRA 6. DoDD 5000.71 Establishes the Warfighter Senior Integration Group (W-SIG) to lead and assign responsibility for rapid responses to combatant commander JUONs and JEONs 7. DODD 3000.06 Establishes policy and responsibilities for Combat Support Agencies (CSA) (1, 7) (2,5) (4) (3, 6) JIDO Authorities JIDO operates in a mission space which is unique in DoD (5)
- 23. JIDO enables DOD actions to counter improvised threats with tactical responsiveness and through anticipatory, rapid acquisition in support of GCC efforts to prepare for, and adapt to, battlefield surprise in support of counter- terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency (COIN), and other related mission areas, including counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED). Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization Mission Statement
- 24. 24 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Anticipatory Actions Understanding of Capability Gaps Risk Tolerant Pursue Emerging Technologies Broad Understanding of the Threat Unified Team of Operators & Scientists Improvised Threat Expertise Partnering with Industry, Academia, & Allied Nations Unique Authorities & Processes 0-2 Year Solution Development & Delivery Flexible Funding Authority In-Theater Implementation & Integration Support Rapid Solution Development & Delivery Agile Testing & Evaluation Integrated Approach to Problem Solving Customized and Proven Oversight Process J8 has distinct capabilities in four strategic focus areas, which together compose an integrated solution set unique in DoD JIDO J8 Strategic Focus Areas Maintain Knowledge Leadership Mitigate Battlefield Surprise Ensure Rapid Response Solve Warfighter Problems
- 26. • Deliberate Requirements – Service, CCMD or Agency Driven – Traditional route for capabilities that require significant tech development and/or are not urgent or compelling in nature • Emergent Requirements – CCMD Driven – Supports accelerated acquisition of capabilities needed for an anticipated or pending contingency operation – VCJCS verifies, JCB or JROC validates • Urgent Requirements – CCMD Driven – Urgent and compelling to prevent loss of life and/or mission failure during current operations – Require little tech development and can be resolved in less than two years – DDR validates “Keep right, except to pass” D E L I B E R A T E E M E R G E N T U R G E N T 0 – 2 YRS 0+ to 5 YRS CONFLICT LANE ONLY POTENTIAL CONFLICT LANE 2-6+ YRS Three Requirements “Lanes”
- 28. Mission Model Canvas Mission/Problem Description Key Activities Deployment Value Propositions Mission Budget/Cost Mission Achievement/Impact Factors Key Resources Buy-In & SupportKey Partners Beneficiaries Develop a framework to anticipate improvised threats Refine threat definition parameters Refine risk analysis parameters Method for categorizing threats, prioritizing threats, and categorizing responses to threats in order to more effectively organize understanding of future threats and responses. Joint Staff JIDO Contracted Personnel Adopted by JIDO, and implemented in day-to- day business across the organization Vice Chairman, JCS Vice Chairman, Services Geographic Combatant CommanderContract Personnel JIDO J8
- 29. Those supporting threat tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP) and devices designed, fielded, or employed in any modality of conflict that adversely affect US joint force maneuverability or force protection. -JIDO Concept of Operations Improvised Threat Defined
- 30. Asymmetric Improvised Tactics vs. Means ◇ Organized, unconventional action against a much larger force ◇ Common or Improvised Weapons ◇ Low Barrier to Entry ￭ Inexpensive, ￭ Rapidly producible ￭ Minimal Training ◇ Uses or combines items contrary to their intended purpose
- 33. ● COA #1: Give JIDO an updated authorities document that defines anticipatory acquisitions, improvised threats, and JIDO’s role ● COA #2: Change the Mission Statement to focus solely on the rapid acquisition and not anticipation ● COA #3: JIDO serves as a sensor for potential improvised threats, but takes no further action without GCC/Service concurrence Recommendations