This paper investigates the links between a number of subjective measures of worker wellbeing and within establishment wage dispersion. These may be linked either because wage dispersion influences the way in which individuals perceive their own relative and prospective income or because they are concerned about fairness in general. The analysis is based on a data set where the Quality of Work Survey is matched with register-based information on individuals and establishments. The results show that there is no significant overall association. Some significant relationships, however, can be found if the method of pay is assumed to be performance pay that is based on individual or group performance. The results also suggest that the question as to whether wages are public knowledge can be of importance.
We examine the effects of establishment- and industry-level labor market turnover on employees’ well-being. The linked employer-employee panel data contain both survey information on employees’ subjective well-being and comprehensive register-based information on job and worker flows. Labor market turbulence decreases well-being as experienced job satisfaction and satisfaction with job security are negatively related to the previous year’s flows. We test for the existence of compensating wage differentials by explaining wages and job satisfaction with average uncertainties, measured by an indicator for a high moving average of past excessive turnover (churning) rate. The results are consistent with compensating wage differentials, since high uncertainty increases real wages, but has no effect on job satisfaction.
This study explores the potential role of adverse working conditions at the workplace in the determination of on-the-job search in the Finnish labour market. The results reveal that workers currently facing adverse working conditions have greater intentions to switch jobs and they are also more willing to stop working completely. In addition, those workers search new matches more frequently. There is evidence that adverse working conditions consistently increase the level of job dissatisfaction and, in turn, it is job dissatisfaction that drives workers’ intentions to quit and intensifies actual job search.
The Nonlinear Effects between Communication Satisfaction and Organizational C...IJRTEMJOURNAL
There are many studies on communication, but existing studies have limitations. Above of all,
communication satisfaction research is interested only in the linear effect of communication. Therefore, this study
investigates the nonlinear effect of communication satisfaction in order to supplement the neglected part of
existing studies. For this purpose, the types of communication were classified into supervisory communication and
co-worker communication, and nonlinear effects between communication satisfaction and organizational
commitment were verified. For the analysis 285 data were used, and all hypotheses were supported. Based on the
analysis results, implications and limitations were discussed.
Workforce engagement: What it is, what drives it, and why it matters for orga...Andrea Kropp
Based on a review of the history of the employee engagement construct and its measurement, we define workforce engagement as the aggregate of the work engagement experiences of individual employees in an organization. In contrast to most research on employee engagement, we study
companies rather than individuals and the companies represent a diverse set of industries. We hypothesize and demonstrate on a sample of (up to) 102 publicly traded companies that
workforce engagement significantly predicts organizational financial (adjusting for industry: Return on Assets, Net Margin but not Tobin's q) and customer metrics (the American Customer Satisfaction Index and the Harris Reputation Quotient) 1 and 2 years after the workforce engagement
data were collected. In addition, using a split‐sample approach to avoid method bias, we hypothesize and show that (a) company organizational practices (the strongest correlate),
supervisory support, and work attributes are significant correlates of workforce engagement and (b) that workforce engagement mediates the relationship between these correlates of engagement and the organizational performance metrics. Implications of the findings for research and practice are discussed.
Distortions in performance appraisals and employee perceptions of fairness in...Shantanu Basu
Analyzes the theroretical space surrounding employee performance appraisal in the context of selected US federal government agencies and arrives at interesting conclusions
Objectives: We examine the predictors of sickness presenteeism in comparison with sickness absenteeism. The paper focuses on the effects of working-time match and efficiency demands and differentiates the estimates by a respondent’s self-assessed health. Methods: We use survey data covering 884 Finnish trade union members in 2009. We estimate logit models. All models include control variables such as the sector of the economy and the type of contract. Results: Working-time match between desired and actual weekly working hours reduces both sickness absence and presenteeism in the whole sample that consists of workers with all health levels. The point estimates reveal that working-time match decreases the prevalence of sickness absence by 7% and presenteeism by 8%. However, the estimates that differentiate by a respondent’s health show that this pattern prevails only for those workers who have poor health. Hence, the point estimates for those who have poor health are much larger than the ones for the whole sample. Working-time match reduces the prevalence of sickness absence by 21% and presenteeism by 20% for those workers who have poor health. In contrast, working-time match has no influence whatsoever on the prevalence of work-related sickness for those who have good health. We also find that efficiency demands increase presenteeism in the whole sample. However, additional results reveal that this pattern prevails only for those workers who have good health. Conclusions: The effects of working-time match and efficiency demands on the prevalence of sickness absence and presenteeism are strongly conditional upon a worker’s self-assessed health level. Therefore, the worker’s initial health is an important attribute that has to be taken into account when one is designing appropriate policies to reduce sickness absence and presenteeism.
We examine the effects of establishment- and industry-level labor market turnover on employees’ well-being. The linked employer-employee panel data contain both survey information on employees’ subjective well-being and comprehensive register-based information on job and worker flows. Labor market turbulence decreases well-being as experienced job satisfaction and satisfaction with job security are negatively related to the previous year’s flows. We test for the existence of compensating wage differentials by explaining wages and job satisfaction with average uncertainties, measured by an indicator for a high moving average of past excessive turnover (churning) rate. The results are consistent with compensating wage differentials, since high uncertainty increases real wages, but has no effect on job satisfaction.
This study explores the potential role of adverse working conditions at the workplace in the determination of on-the-job search in the Finnish labour market. The results reveal that workers currently facing adverse working conditions have greater intentions to switch jobs and they are also more willing to stop working completely. In addition, those workers search new matches more frequently. There is evidence that adverse working conditions consistently increase the level of job dissatisfaction and, in turn, it is job dissatisfaction that drives workers’ intentions to quit and intensifies actual job search.
The Nonlinear Effects between Communication Satisfaction and Organizational C...IJRTEMJOURNAL
There are many studies on communication, but existing studies have limitations. Above of all,
communication satisfaction research is interested only in the linear effect of communication. Therefore, this study
investigates the nonlinear effect of communication satisfaction in order to supplement the neglected part of
existing studies. For this purpose, the types of communication were classified into supervisory communication and
co-worker communication, and nonlinear effects between communication satisfaction and organizational
commitment were verified. For the analysis 285 data were used, and all hypotheses were supported. Based on the
analysis results, implications and limitations were discussed.
Workforce engagement: What it is, what drives it, and why it matters for orga...Andrea Kropp
Based on a review of the history of the employee engagement construct and its measurement, we define workforce engagement as the aggregate of the work engagement experiences of individual employees in an organization. In contrast to most research on employee engagement, we study
companies rather than individuals and the companies represent a diverse set of industries. We hypothesize and demonstrate on a sample of (up to) 102 publicly traded companies that
workforce engagement significantly predicts organizational financial (adjusting for industry: Return on Assets, Net Margin but not Tobin's q) and customer metrics (the American Customer Satisfaction Index and the Harris Reputation Quotient) 1 and 2 years after the workforce engagement
data were collected. In addition, using a split‐sample approach to avoid method bias, we hypothesize and show that (a) company organizational practices (the strongest correlate),
supervisory support, and work attributes are significant correlates of workforce engagement and (b) that workforce engagement mediates the relationship between these correlates of engagement and the organizational performance metrics. Implications of the findings for research and practice are discussed.
Distortions in performance appraisals and employee perceptions of fairness in...Shantanu Basu
Analyzes the theroretical space surrounding employee performance appraisal in the context of selected US federal government agencies and arrives at interesting conclusions
Objectives: We examine the predictors of sickness presenteeism in comparison with sickness absenteeism. The paper focuses on the effects of working-time match and efficiency demands and differentiates the estimates by a respondent’s self-assessed health. Methods: We use survey data covering 884 Finnish trade union members in 2009. We estimate logit models. All models include control variables such as the sector of the economy and the type of contract. Results: Working-time match between desired and actual weekly working hours reduces both sickness absence and presenteeism in the whole sample that consists of workers with all health levels. The point estimates reveal that working-time match decreases the prevalence of sickness absence by 7% and presenteeism by 8%. However, the estimates that differentiate by a respondent’s health show that this pattern prevails only for those workers who have poor health. Hence, the point estimates for those who have poor health are much larger than the ones for the whole sample. Working-time match reduces the prevalence of sickness absence by 21% and presenteeism by 20% for those workers who have poor health. In contrast, working-time match has no influence whatsoever on the prevalence of work-related sickness for those who have good health. We also find that efficiency demands increase presenteeism in the whole sample. However, additional results reveal that this pattern prevails only for those workers who have good health. Conclusions: The effects of working-time match and efficiency demands on the prevalence of sickness absence and presenteeism are strongly conditional upon a worker’s self-assessed health level. Therefore, the worker’s initial health is an important attribute that has to be taken into account when one is designing appropriate policies to reduce sickness absence and presenteeism.
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, minkälaisia vaikutuksia lähiesimiehen johtamisella on työntekijöiden kokemaan työtyytyväisyyteen, eläköitymisaikeisiin ennen varsinaista eläkeikää sekä toimipaikkojen tuottavuuteen. Lisäksi selvitetään, onko lähiesimiehen johtamisen merkityksessä työntekijöiden kokemaan työtyytyväisyyteen ja eläkeaikeisiin tapahtunut muutoksia yli ajan. Analyyseissa käytetään laajoja ja kaikkia palkansaajia edustavia työolotutkimuksen aineistoja vuosilta 1990, 1997, 2003 ja 2008 sekä vuoden 2008 työolotutkimuksen aineistoa yhdistettynä kahteen rekisteripohjaiseen aineistoon, toimipaikka- ja yksilöaineistoon (FLEED) sekä teollisuuden toimipaikkojen pitkittäisaineistoon (LPDM).
Saadut tulokset korostavat lähiesimiehen johtamisen merkitystä työntekijöiden hyvinvoinnille. Esimiehen
johtaminen on voimavara, jolla on varsin merkittävä vaikutus työntekijöiden kokemaan työtyytyväisyyteen, kun vakioidaan laajaa joukkoa muita työtyytyväisyyteen vaikuttavia tekijöitä.
Lähiesimiehen johtamisella on myös tilastollisesti merkitsevä vaikutus 45+-vuotiaiden eläköitymisaikeisiin.
Lähiesimiehen johtamisen yhteys toimipaikkojen tuottavuuteen oli positiivinen, mutta tämä suhde oli tilastollisesti merkitsevä ainoastaan, kun tuottavuuden mittarina käytettiin liikevaihtoa
työntekijää kohti kaikkia toimialoja koskevassa analyysissa.
Perception is said to chop down the worker turnover. to scale back absenteeism and to extend the performance of employees. The researcher wants to understand about the worker opinion about the facilities provided to them. At an equivalent time the organization policies and practices aren't accepted by employees. And also to seek out the perception like salary benefits scope for people initiatives and balance between work and private life.
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan työn vaatimusten, työntekijän vaikutusmahdollisuuksien ja esimiehiltä saatavan tuen vaikutuksia erikseen ja yhdessä työssä koettuun hyvinvointiin. Tulokset osoittavat, että vaikutusmahdollisuudet ja esimiehen tuki ovat merkittäviä työhyvinvoinnin selittäjiä.
EFFECT OF ORGANISATIONAL POLITICS ON EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENTIAEME Publication
The purpose of this research paper was to examine the nature of the relationship between organisational politics and employee engagement and was carried out in the year 2018 in Nigeria. This research addressed gaps in literature in three ways. First, this study offered quantitative evidence of the relationships between organisational politics and employee engagement. Second, this study elaborated on theoretical support for the perceived link between organisational politics and employee engagement. Finally, this study developed a model on the link between both variables. The paper adopted a descriptive survey design. Three hundred and fifty-nine questionnaires were retrieved from the staff of private radio broadcasting firms in Southeast Nigeria. The analysis of the data was presented in tables and graphs, and the Spearman correlation was used for analysis. The paper found that organisational politics positively relate to employee engagement. The study also postulated theoretical and managerial implication from the result obtained.
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, minkälaisia vaikutuksia lähiesimiehen johtamisella on työntekijöiden kokemaan työtyytyväisyyteen, eläköitymisaikeisiin ennen varsinaista eläkeikää sekä toimipaikkojen tuottavuuteen. Lisäksi selvitetään, onko lähiesimiehen johtamisen merkityksessä työntekijöiden kokemaan työtyytyväisyyteen ja eläkeaikeisiin tapahtunut muutoksia yli ajan. Analyyseissa käytetään laajoja ja kaikkia palkansaajia edustavia työolotutkimuksen aineistoja vuosilta 1990, 1997, 2003 ja 2008 sekä vuoden 2008 työolotutkimuksen aineistoa yhdistettynä kahteen rekisteripohjaiseen aineistoon, toimipaikka- ja yksilöaineistoon (FLEED) sekä teollisuuden toimipaikkojen pitkittäisaineistoon (LPDM).
Saadut tulokset korostavat lähiesimiehen johtamisen merkitystä työntekijöiden hyvinvoinnille. Esimiehen
johtaminen on voimavara, jolla on varsin merkittävä vaikutus työntekijöiden kokemaan työtyytyväisyyteen, kun vakioidaan laajaa joukkoa muita työtyytyväisyyteen vaikuttavia tekijöitä.
Lähiesimiehen johtamisella on myös tilastollisesti merkitsevä vaikutus 45+-vuotiaiden eläköitymisaikeisiin.
Lähiesimiehen johtamisen yhteys toimipaikkojen tuottavuuteen oli positiivinen, mutta tämä suhde oli tilastollisesti merkitsevä ainoastaan, kun tuottavuuden mittarina käytettiin liikevaihtoa
työntekijää kohti kaikkia toimialoja koskevassa analyysissa.
Perception is said to chop down the worker turnover. to scale back absenteeism and to extend the performance of employees. The researcher wants to understand about the worker opinion about the facilities provided to them. At an equivalent time the organization policies and practices aren't accepted by employees. And also to seek out the perception like salary benefits scope for people initiatives and balance between work and private life.
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan työn vaatimusten, työntekijän vaikutusmahdollisuuksien ja esimiehiltä saatavan tuen vaikutuksia erikseen ja yhdessä työssä koettuun hyvinvointiin. Tulokset osoittavat, että vaikutusmahdollisuudet ja esimiehen tuki ovat merkittäviä työhyvinvoinnin selittäjiä.
EFFECT OF ORGANISATIONAL POLITICS ON EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENTIAEME Publication
The purpose of this research paper was to examine the nature of the relationship between organisational politics and employee engagement and was carried out in the year 2018 in Nigeria. This research addressed gaps in literature in three ways. First, this study offered quantitative evidence of the relationships between organisational politics and employee engagement. Second, this study elaborated on theoretical support for the perceived link between organisational politics and employee engagement. Finally, this study developed a model on the link between both variables. The paper adopted a descriptive survey design. Three hundred and fifty-nine questionnaires were retrieved from the staff of private radio broadcasting firms in Southeast Nigeria. The analysis of the data was presented in tables and graphs, and the Spearman correlation was used for analysis. The paper found that organisational politics positively relate to employee engagement. The study also postulated theoretical and managerial implication from the result obtained.
Creating Pay Transparency In The WorkplaceBambooHR
View with recording here: http://ow.ly/SFVnK
Pay transparency can be one of those topics that people shudder at. But there are many layers of pay transparency and a good strategy will help boost productivity and retain top talent.
Presentation from Enterprise 2.0 SUMMIT in Frankfurt October 28th 2010 on how transparency both enables value-creation and decreases risk for organizations, but also how potential privacy, compliance and security risks need to be managed.
How to make font transparent in PowerPointPresentitude
There are so many great, hidden (or at least not as known) functions in PowerPoint. Without even leaving PowerPoint you can add great effects to your slides.
This is a quick guide how to make text transparent using the ”Merge Shape” functions inside PowerPoint.
Merge away!
This study argues that firms can use profit sharing to raise profits by reducing the risk for inefficient separations by the workers. It is based on the idea of Hall and Lazear (1984) and clarifies their analysis of fixed wage contracts in employment relations of fixed length. It extends their analysis to continuing employment relationships in which the base wage is exogenously given but the firm can unilaterally set a profit sharing parameter. It is argued that the use of down payments, on which the analysis of Hall and Lazear is based, is not possible with continuing employment relationships. Instead the bargaining power will be reflected in the base wage. This reduces the possibilities to adjust the base wage to reduce inefficient separations and may increase the importance of profit sharing. The intuitive positive dependence of the profit sharing parameter on the covariance between the value of the worker’s outside option and his productivity in the firm does not necessarily hold.
We analyse age segregation in hirings and separations using linked employer-employee data from Finland in the period 1990-2004. This allows us to identify at the firm level employees in different age groups that have been hired during the previous year, and employees who have exited the firms.
We analyze firm-level age segregation using segregation curves and Gini indices. The main result is that hirings of older employees have clearly been more segregated than exits or the stock of old employees even though hirings have become slightly less segregated towards the end of the period
in question. At the same time age segregation in exits and stocks has increased and these trends are not sensitive to small unit bias in measurement. We also examine trends in hiring and exit rates using aggregate data. According to our results the oldest age group is again underrepresented in
hirings. There is a positive upward trend in their recruitments related to the increasing cohort size, but it is much weaker than the trend in the relative share of older workers in employment. The exit rate of the older employees indicates cyclical variation while the small number of hirings seems to
be insensitive to changing labour demand. We present a decomposition of employment change by age group and with that decomposition we disentangle the role of hirings and exits from factors related to demographics and cohort effects. The latter factors include the effect of the large babyboom
generation entering the age group of older employees with higher employment rates than earlier cohorts. Finally, our regression analysis shows that larger firms are more likely to hire older employees, but their hiring rates are lower.
Low-wage subsidies are often proposed as a solution to the unemployment problem among the low skilled. Yet the empirical evidence on the effects of low-wage subsidies is surprisingly scarce. This paper examines the employment effects of a Finnish payroll tax subsidy scheme, which is targeted at the employers of older, full-time, low-wage workers. The system’s clear eligibility criteria open up an opportunity for a reliable estimation of the causal impacts of the subsidy, using the difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. Our results indicate that the subsidy system had no effects on the employment rate. However, it appears to have increased the probability of part-time workers obtaining full-time employment.
The paper examines the antecedents of intentions to quit, job search, and actual job switches during a five-year follow-up period. We use a representative random sample of all Finnish employees (N = 2800). The data both contain information on intentions to quit and on-the-job search from a cross-section survey and records employees’ actual job switches from longitudinal register data that can be linked to the survey. Specifically, we study the contribution of adverse working conditions (harms, hazards, uncertainty, physically and mentally heavy work), work organization (promotion prospects, discrimination, supervisor support) and ease-of-movement factors (mental health, wage level, regional unemployment). According to the estimates, adverse working conditions, poor promotions prospects, discrimination, poor supervisor support and mental health symptoms are positively related to unwillingly staying in a job, since these variables increase the probability of turnover intentions or job search but not actual job switches.
A Study on Employee Job Satisfaction at Eid Parry Nellikuppam Cuddaloreijtsrd
Job satisfaction or employee satisfaction is a measure of workers contentedness with their job, whether or not they like the job or individual aspects or facets of jobs, such as nature of work or supervision. Job satisfaction can be measured in cognitive evaluative , affective or emotional , and behavioral components. Job Satisfaction is the favorableness or un favorableness with which the employee views his work. It expresses the amount of agreement between one's expectation of the job and the rewards that the job provides. The objective of the study is to know about the employee job satisfaction factors, the relationship between gender and employee job satisfaction. Descriptive research method is used in the study. This study consists of both primary and secondary data. The tool used in this study is correlation. The population size is 50 and the sample size is 30. From the study it was found that there is no significant relationship between gender and employee job satisfaction. S. Jasmeen | K. Haritha | M. Selva Ganapathy "A Study on Employee Job Satisfaction at Eid Parry Nellikuppam Cuddalore" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-3 | Issue-6 , October 2019, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd29189.pdf Paper URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/management/hrm-and-retail-business/29189/a-study-on-employee-job-satisfaction-at-eid-parry-nellikuppam-cuddalore/s-jasmeen
HRM AND SMALL-FIRM EMPLOYEE MOTIVATIONBEFORE AND AFTER TH.docxpooleavelina
HRM AND SMALL-FIRM EMPLOYEE MOTIVATION:
BEFORE AND AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION
ALEX BRYSON AND MICHAEL WHITE*
A long-running debate in the small-firms’ literature questions the
value of formal human resource management (HRM) practices,
which have been linked to high performance in larger firms. The
authors contribute to this literature by exploiting linked employer–
employee surveys for 2004 and 2011. Using employees’ intrinsic job
satisfaction and organizational commitment as motivational out-
comes, the authors find the returns to small-firm investments in
HRM are U-shaped. Small firms benefit from intrinsically motivating
work situations in the absence of HRM practices and find this advan-
tage disturbed when formal HRM practices are initially introduced.
Firms can restore positive motivation when they invest intensively in
HRM practices in a way that characterizes high performance work
systems (HWPS). Although the HPWS effect on employee motiva-
tion is modified somewhat by the Great Recession, it remains robust
and continues to have positive promise for small firms.
For more than two decades, there has been interest within the humanresource management (HRM) practitioner and research community in
systems of practice that form a cohesive and integrated set designed to max-
imize business effectiveness and employee well-being. These systems are
commonly termed high performance work systems (HPWS), or strategic
human resource management (SHRM), whereby the HRM systems are
tuned to harmonize with business strategic objectives. This system or strate-
gic perspective distinguishes between HRM practices adopted by a firm in a
piecemeal way and more extensive initiatives that cross several domains of
people management.
*ALEX BRYSON ( https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1529-2010) is Professor of Quantitative Social Science at
University College London. MICHAEL WHITE is Emeritus Fellow at University of Westminster.
We thank Paul Edwards for his advice and we acknowledge the Department for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Advisory, Conciliation and
Arbitration Service, and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research as the originators of the
2004 and 2011 Workplace Employee Relations Survey data, and the Data Archive at the University of
Essex as the distributor of the data. For information regarding the data and/or computer programs uti-
lized for this study, please address correspondence to the authors at [email protected]
KEYWORDs: small firms, human resource management, High Performance Work System, workplace moti-
vation, intrinsic job satisfaction, organizational commitment
ILR Review, 72(3), May 2019, pp. 749–773
DOI: 10.1177/0019793918774524. � The Author(s) 2018
Journal website: journals.sagepub.com/home/ilr
Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions
Emerging evidence indicates that HPWS yield worthwhile performance
gains for firms; however, most of this evi ...
Relationship of Demographic Variables and Job Satisfaction among Married WomenIJLT EMAS
The purpose of this study was to study the relationship
between job satisfaction and demographic variables among
married women who are working in academics. The research
was descriptive and survey study. In this study, women working
in technical educational Institutes, from Indore were studied. for
this 300 working women(N=300) were chosen as per their work
in the Institutes, teaching or Non-teaching. A socio- demographic
questionnaire were used for the purpose. The findings revealed
that on the basis of the age and qualification , there is no relation
between factors studied (work environment, job security, roles &
responsibility etc.) and job satisfaction and on the basis of
designation, income and experience, researcher found the
relation between factors studied (work environment, job
security, roles & responsibility etc.) and job satisfaction.
International Journal of Business and Management Invention (IJBMI) is an international journal intended for professionals and researchers in all fields of Business and Management. IJBMI publishes research articles and reviews within the whole field Business and Management, new teaching methods, assessment, validation and the impact of new technologies and it will continue to provide information on the latest trends and developments in this ever-expanding subject. The publications of papers are selected through double peer reviewed to ensure originality, relevance, and readability. The articles published in our journal can be accessed online.
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan epämukavien työolojen ja johtamiskäytäntöjen vaikutuksia työntekijöiden eläköitymiskäyttäytymiseen Suomessa. Yhdistetty tutkimusaineisto sisältää tietoja työoloista, työtyytyväisyydestä, ja eläkeaikeista Tilastokeskuksen työolotutkimuksista sekä toteutuneista eläkkeelle siirtymisistä Eläketurvakeskuksen rekistereistä. Useamman yhtälön mallin tulokset osoittavat, että epämukavien työolojen aiheuttama tyytymättömyys työhön on yhteydessä eläkeaikeisiin, jotka seurantajakson aikana ilmenevät puolestaan aikaisempana eläkkeelle siirtymisenä. Uudet johtamiskäytännöt taas parantavat työtyytyväisyyttä ja eläkeaikomusten vähenemisen kautta pidentävät työuria.
Corporate Social and FinancialPerformance An Extended.docxrichardnorman90310
Corporate Social and Financial
Performance: An Extended
Stakeholder Theory, and Empirical
Test with Accounting Measures
Gerwin Van der Laan
Hans Van Ees
Arjen Van Witteloostuijn
ABSTRACT. Although agreement on the positive sign
of the relationship between corporate social and financial
performance is observed in the literature, the mechanisms
that constitute this relationship are not yet well-known.
We address this issue by extending management�s stake-
holder theory by adding insights from psychology�s
prospect decision theory and sociology�s resource
dependence theory. Empirically, we analyze an extensive
panel dataset, including information on disaggregated
measures of social performance for the S&P 500 in the
1997–2002 period. In so doing, we enrich the extant
literature by focusing on stakeholder heterogeneity, per-
ceptional framing, and disaggregated measures of corpo-
rate social performance.
KEY WORDS: panel data analysis, prospect decision
theory, resource dependence theory, social responsibility,
stakeholder theory
Introduction
Three decades of research into the relationship
between corporate social performance (CSP) and
corporate financial performance (CFP) suggest, by
and large, that corporate well-doing enhances firm
profitability (Orlitzky et al., 2003). The analyses
have remained at a fairly high level of aggregation,
giving rise to the criticism that overall measures of
CSP and CFP do not take the rich variety of
underlying determinants into account (Wood and
Jones, 1995). The current study aims to enhance the
understanding of the drivers of the relationship
between corporate social and financial performance.
For one, theoretically, we will develop hypotheses as
to the impact on the CSP–CFP relationship of
stakeholder heterogeneity and perception biases.
Additionally, empirically, we will explore an
extensive panel dataset that covers the corporations
in the S&P 500 over the 1997–2002 period,
including decomposed information about underly-
ing dimensions of corporate social performance.
More specifically, our key contribution is two-fold.
First, we analyze the effect of heterogeneity
among corporate stakeholder groups on the CSP–
CFP nexus, following Clarkson�s (1995) distinction
between primary or �private� stakeholders, and
secondary or �public� stakeholders. Wood and
Jones (1995) argued that there is a mismatch
between the variables in previous research. For
instance, employees and Greenpeace put different
emphasis on issues of labor conditions and envi-
ronmental pollution. With this critique in mind,
we explicitly incorporate more fine-grained mea-
sures of corporate social performance into our
analysis. After all, the question as to the relation-
ship between corporate social and financial per-
formance cannot be considered separate from the
analysis of how corporations interact with different
stakeholder groups that weigh the underlying CSP
dimensions differe.
This study examines the influence of perceived flexibility within the timing and site of labour on work-family balance. Results indicate that perceived job flexibility is claimed to reinforce work-family balance after controlling for paid work hours, unpaid domestic labour hours, gender, and occupational level. Also given an equivalent workload individual, with perceived job flexibility have more favorable work-life balance. Likewise, employees with perceived job flexibility are ready to work long hours before workload negatively impacts their work-family balance and also these makes the workers feel as stress. Implications of those findings are presented. Also, from the feedback, an employee has suggested to given a vacation leave so as that they are getting to spend enough time with the family. The longer-term benefits of this study observe business sense to support work-life balance.
Similar to Job satisfaction and wage dispersion (20)
Talous & Yhteiskunta -lehden numero 4/2019 sisältää artikkeleita ja haastattelun, jotka kertovat alueellista keskittymistä käsitelleistä tutkimuksista. Suomen seitsemän suurimman kaupunkiseudun väestö kasvaa nopeimmin, kun taas pienempien kaupunkien ja maaseudun väestöosuus supistuu. Muutos on kuitenkin verrattain hidasta, ja sille on myös vastavoimia.
Talous & Yhteiskunta -lehden numeron 3/2019 teemana on työ ja terveys. Artikkeleissa tarkastellaan Suomen terveydenhuoltojärjestelmän toimivuutta ja pohditaan mitä voitaisiin oppia Ruotsissa jo tehdyistä terveydenhuollon uudistuksista. Muissa artikkeleissa käsitellään terveyskäyttäytymisen ja työmarkkinamenestyksen yhteyttä, työttömien aktivointia, työikäisten eritasoisia terveyspalveluja, työaikajoustojen vaikutusta terveyteen sekä informaatioteknologian ja tekoälyn käyttöä mielenterveyspalvelujen tukena. Haastateltavana on THL:n tutkimusprofessori Unto Häkkinen. Hänen mielestään sote-uudistus on tehtävä, vaikka se vaatiikin vielä monen yksityiskohdan ratkaisemista.
Opiskelijavalinta ylioppilaskirjoitusten nykyarvosanojen perusteella ei ole täysin perusteltua, todetaan Aalto-ylipiston ja Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitoksen uudessa tutkimuksessa. Ylioppilaskirjoitusten arvosanoilla on pitkän ajan vaikutuksia. Hienojakoisempi arvosteluasteikko tekisi opiskelijavalinnasta nykyistä reilumman.
Esimerkkiperhelaskelmissa tarkastellaan seitsemää kotitaloutta. Laskelmat kuvaavat ansiotulojen, tulonsiirtojen sekä verojen ja veronluonteisten maksujen kehityksen vaikutusta perheiden ostovoimaan. Perheille lasketaan Tilastokeskuksen tietoihin perustuvat perhekohtaiset kulutuskorit, jotka mahdollistavat perhekohtaisten inflaatiovauhtien ja reaalitulokehitysten arvioinnin. Ensi vuonna eläkeläispariskunnan ostovoima kasvaa eniten ja työttömien vähiten. Esimerkkiperhelaskelmia on tehty Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitoksella vuodesta 2009 lähtien.
Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos ennustaa Suomen talouskasvuksi tänä vuonna 1,3 prosenttia ja ensi vuonna 1,1 prosenttia. Kasvua hidastaa eniten yksityisen kulutuksen kasvun hidastuminen. Toisaalta vienti kasvaa tänä vuonna hieman ennakoitua nopeammin, neljä prosenttia, ja ensi vuonnakin vielä kaksi prosenttia. Tuotannollisten investointien kasvu jatkuu maltillisena, mutta rakentamisen vähentyminen kääntää yksityiset investoinnit kokonaisuutena pieneen laskuun ensi vuonna. Hallituksen vuoteen 2023 mennessä tavoittelemien 75 prosentin työllisyysasteen ja julkisen talouden tasapainon toteutumista on vaikea arvioida, koska nämä tavoitteet on määritelty rakenteellisina ja niiden eri arviointimenetelmät saattavat tuottaa hyvin erilaisia tuloksia.
Suomen palkkataso oli 2015 ylempää eurooppalaista keskitasoa. Suomen suhteellinen asema ei ole juurikaan muuttunut 2010-luvun alun tilanteesta. Hintatason huomioiminen kuitenkin heikentää asemaamme palkkavertailussa. Palkkaerot meillä olivat vertailumaiden pienimpiä ja pysyivät melko samalla tasolla koko tarkastelujakson 2007–2015 ajan. EU-maissa havaittiin erisuuntaista kehitystä palkkaeroissa. Suurin osa palkkojen kokonaisvaihteluista selittyi taustaryhmien sisäisillä palkkaeroilla.
Suomessa toteutettiin vuonna 2005 laaja eläkeuudistus, jossa vanhuuseläkkeen alaikärajaa laskettiin. Tutkimuksessa havaitaan, että ikärajan lasku aikaisti eläkkeelle jäämistä. Kun alaraja laskettiin 65:stä 63:een, myös yleinen eläköitymisikä laski. Taloudellisten kannustimien muutosten vaikutukset eläköitymiseen jäivät paljon heikommiksi alaikärajan muuttamiseen verrattuna. Eläköitymisikään voidaan siis vaikuttaa tehokkaasti ja vähäisin kustannuksin lakisääteistä eläkeikää muuttamalla.
Talous & Yhteiskunta -lehden numeron 2/2019 artikkelit ja haastattelu kertovat tutkimuksista, joita on tehty Suomen Akatemian strategisen tutkimuksen neuvoston hankkeessa "Osaavat työntekijät - menestyvät työmarkkinat". Keskeinen kysymys on, miten sopeudutaan teknologisen kehityksen mukanaan tuomaan työn murrokseen.
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan ammattirakenteiden polarisaatiota sekä sitä, että mihin supistuvissa ja rutiininomaisissa ammateissa olevat työntekijät päätyvät hyödyntämällä kokonaisaineistoa vuosille 1970-2014. Ammattirakenteiden polarisaatio on jatkunut Suomessa jo vuosikymmeniä. Ammattirakennemuutoksen kehityskulku on pääosin tapahtunut siten, että keskitason tuotanto- ja toimistotyöntekijät ovat nousseet urapolkuja pitkin asiantuntijatöihin. Viimeaikaista palveluammattien osuutta on puolestaan kasvattanut se, että nuoret siirtyvät työmarkkinoille palvelutöihin. Rutiininomaisia ja kognitiivisia taitoja vaativien ammattien työntekijöillä on kuitenkin suurempi todennäköisyys nousta korkeammille palkkaluokille rutiininomaista ja fyysistä työtä tekeviin työntekijöihin verrattuna. Rutiininomaista ja fyysistä työtä tekevät tippuvat puolestaan suuremmalla todennäköisyydellä matalapalkka-aloille, ja heidän ansiotason kehitys on myös heikompaa.
Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos on alentanut Suomen talouskasvun ennustettaan kuluvalle vuodelle viimesyksyisestä 2,3 prosentista 1,4 prosenttiin. Kansainvälisen talouden näkymien epävarmuus hidastaa Suomen talouskasvua etenkin kuluvana vuonna. Jos pahimmat uhkakuvat jäävät toteutumatta, kasvu piristyy ensi vuonna hivenen 1,5 prosenttiin. Viime vuonna pysähtynyt viennin kasvu elpyy, ja myös yksityisen kulutuksen kasvu tukee talouskasvua. Suomi on sopeutunut ammattirakenteiden murrokseen yleisesti ottaen hyvin, mutta etenkin perusasteen koulutuksen varassa olevien varttuneiden työntekijöiden työllistämiseen voi olla vaikea löytää työkaluja.
The Labour Institute for Economic Research has lowered its forecast of Finland’s economic growth for the current year from last autumn’s 2.4 per cent to 1.4 per cent. Uncertainty in the international economic outlook will slow Finland’s economic growth, particularly this year. If the worst threats do not materialise, growth will pick up slightly next year to 1.5 per cent. Export growth, which came to a halt last year, will recover and growth in private consumption growth will also provide support to economic growth. In general, Finland has adjusted well to occupational restructuring, but it may be difficult to find means to employ older workers who only have basic education.
Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos on alentanut Suomen talouskasvun ennustettaan kuluvalle vuodelle vii-mesyksyisestä 2,3 prosentista 1,4 prosenttiin. Kansainvälisen talouden näkymien epävarmuus hidastaa Suomen talouskasvua etenkin kuluvana vuonna. Jos pahimmat uhkakuvat jäävät toteutumatta, kasvu piristyy ensi vuonna hivenen 1,5 prosenttiin. Viime vuonna pysähtynyt viennin kasvu elpyy, ja myös yksityisen kulutuksen kasvu tukee talouskasvua. Suomi on sopeutunut ammattirakenteiden murrokseen yleisesti ottaen hyvin, mutta etenkin perusasteen koulutuksen varassa olevien varttuneiden työntekijöiden työllistämiseen voi olla vaikea löytää työkaluja.
Tämä PT Policy Brief tuo esiin havaintoja Suomen tuloerojen kehityksestä 1990-luvun puolivälin jälkeen. Tällä ajanjaksolla tuloerot ovat kasvaneet. Aluksi kasvu oli hyvin nopeaa, kunnes kehitys tasaantui finanssikriisin myötä. Tämä näkyy tarkasteltaessa kehitystä viiden vuoden ajalta lasketuissa keskituloissa. Taloudessa on tuloliikkuvuutta, ts. tulot vaihtelevat vuodesta toiseen. Havaitsemme, että liikkuvuus tuloportaikossa on vähentynyt. Samalla kun tuloerot ovat kääntyneet kasvuun, on tuloverotuksen progressiivisuus alentunut. Valtion tuloveron alennusten ohella tähän on erityisesti tulojakauman huipulla vaikuttanut pääomatulojen voimakas kasvu.
Julkisen budjetin sopeuttamistoimia toteutetaan usein etuuksien indeksileikkauksina tai tuloverojen korotuksina. Näillä toimenpiteillä on tulonjako- ja työllisyysvaikutuksia. Tämä PT Policy Brief esittää SISU-mallilla lasketut vaikutukset käytettävissä oleviin tuloihin tuloluokittain, jos valtion tuloveroasteikkoa korotettaisiin 0,4 prosenttiyksiköllä tai jos kansaneläkeindeksiä leikattaisiin. Molemmissa toimenpiteissä budjetti vahvistuisi 180 miljoonalla eurolla mutta tulonjakovaikutukset ovat huomattavan erilaiset. Oheisen kuvion mukaisesti indeksileikkaukset kohdistuvat voimakkaasti alempiin tulonsaajakymmenyksiin, kun taas tuloveron korotukset kohdistuvat ylempiin kymmenyksiin. Kun huomioidaan muutosten aiheuttamat työllisyysvaikutukset, kokonaiskuva muuttuu vain hieman.
Makeisvero otettiin käyttöön makeisille ja jäätelölle vuoden 2011 alusta. Virallinen perustelu oli kerätä verotuloja, mutta poliittisessa keskustelussa selvä tavoite oli ohjata kulutusta terveellisempään suuntaan. Makeisvero nosti selvästi makeisten kuluttajahintoja, mutta se ei vaikuttanut makeisten kysyntään. Toisaalta vuonna 2014 virvoitusjuomavero nousi sokerillisille juomille, mutta sokerittomat juomat jäivät alemmalle verotasolle. Tämä muutos alensi sokerillisten juomien kulutusta ja ohjasi kulutusta sokerittomiin juomiin. Onnistunut terveellisiin tuotteisiin ohjailu näyttääkin vaativan riittävän läheisen terveellisempien tuotteiden ryhmän olemassaolon.
Talous & Yhteiskunta-lehden "Suuren vaalinumeron" 1/2019 jutut käsittelevät aiheita, jotka voivat nousta esille kevään vaalikeskusteluissa. Pääpaino on ilmastonmuutoksessa: haastateltavana on Maailman ilmatieteen järjestön pääsihteeri Petteri Taalas, ja kahdessa eri artikkelissa pohditaan metsien hiilinielujen ja yhdyskuntarakenteen merkitystä pyrittäessä hillitsemään ilmaston lämpenemistä. Muut artikkelit käsittelevät tuloerojen kasvua, sotea, eläkkeiden riittävyyttä, maahanmuuttajien työllistymistä, EMUn uudistamista, eurooppalaista palkkavertailua ja kestävyysvajeen sopimattomuutta talouspolitiikan suunnitteluun.
Raportissa tehdään laskelmia korkeakouluopiskelijoille suunnatun opintotuen tulorajojen muutosten vaikutuksista. Opintotuen tulorajojen tavoite on, että suurituloisille opiskelijoille ei makseta opintotukea. Samalla nykyiset tulorajat kuitenkin estävät opiskelijoita tienaamasta niin paljon kuin he haluaisivat. Laskelmissa hyödynnetään simulaatiomallia, jonka avulla voidaan arvioida miten opiskelijoiden tulojakauma muuttuisi eri vaihtoehtoisissa opintotuen tulorajojen muutoksissa. Tulosten mukaan nykyisiä tulorajaoja voisi nostaa esimerkiksi 50 prosentilla, jolloin yhdeksän kuukauden ajan opintotukea nostavan opiskelijan vuosituloraja olisi 18 000 euroa nykyisen noin 12 000 euron sijaan. Laskelmien mukaan tällöin päästäisiin opintotuen nykyisten tulorajojen haitallisista tulovaikutuksista laajasti ottaen eroon, koska vain harva opiskelija tienaisi tätä tulorajaa enempää. Ottaen huomioon verotulot ja tulonsiirrot tämä vaihtoehto lisäisi julkisyhteisöjen nettotuloja arviolta 5,9 miljoonaa euroa vuodessa.
Tässä tutkimuksessa tutkitaan diskreettien valintajoukkojen vaikutusta palkansaajien työn tarjonnan reagoimiseen tuloveroihin. Artikkelin empiirisessä osiossa hyödynnetään opintotuen tulorajojen aiheuttamaa tuloveroissa tapahtuvaa äkillistä nousua, ja reformia, jossa tulorajoja nostettiin. Tulosten mukaan vuoden 2008 reformi, jossa tulorajaa nostettiin 9 opintotukikuukautta nostaneille 9000 eurosta 12000 euroon, aiheutti merkittäviä muutoksia opiskelijoiden tulojakaumassa. Tulojakauma siirtyi korkeammalle tasolle lähtien noin 2000 euron tuloista. Koska opiskelijoiden verojärjestelmässä ei tapahtunut muutoksia näin alhaisella tasolla vuoden 2008 reformissa, eivät työn taloustieteen normaalit mallit pysty selittämään tätä siirtymää. Artikkelissa esitetään empiirisiä lisätuloksia, teoreettisia argumentteja ja simulaatiomalli, jotka kaikki viittaavat siihen, että tuloksen pystyy selittämään diskreettien valintajoukkojen mallilla. Lisäksi artikkelissa esitetään, että verotuksen hyvinvointitappiot voivat olla suuremmat kuin empiirisesti estimoidut, jos valintajoukot ovat diskreettejä, mutta niiden ajatellaan olevan jatkuvia.
Talous & Yhteiskunta -lehden uuteen numeroon sisältyy artikkeleita veropohjasta ja -vajeesta, liikenteen veroista, naisista tulojakauman huipulla, työllisyyden kasvusta, mikrosimulaatiomalleista ja digitalisaatiosta. Lehdessä on myös Helsingin yliopiston professori Uskali Mäen haastattelu, jossa käsitellään tieteenfilosofista näkökulmaa taloustieteeseen.
Tutkimuksessa rakennettiin uusia makrotaloudellisia malleja PT:n ennustetyötä varten. Malleilla tehtiin ennusteita vuosille 2017 ja 2018. Mallien BKT-ennuste vuodelle 2017 on 3,1 prosenttia (vrt. toteutunut 2,8 prosenttia) ja vuodelle 2018 1,8 prosenttia (vrt. PT:n 11.9 ennuste 2,7 prosenttia).
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
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Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
A process server is a authorized person for delivering legal documents, such as summons, complaints, subpoenas, and other court papers, to peoples involved in legal proceedings.
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
2. PALKANSAAJIEN TUTKIMUSLAITOS • TYÖPAPEREITA
LABOUR INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH • DISCUSSION PAPERS
Helsinki 2012
278
Job
satisfaction
and wage
dispersion
Mari Kangasniemi*
This study was funded by The Finnish Work Environment Fund whose assistance is gratefully
acknowledged. I would like to thank Petri Böckerman and seminar participants at the Labour
Institute for Economic Research and the Research Institute for the Finnish Industry for useful
comments. Any remaining errors remain my responsibility.
* Labour Institute for Economic Research, Mari.Kangasniemi@labour.fi
3. TYÖPAPEREITA 278
DISCUSSION PAPERS 278
Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos
Pitkänsillanranta 3 A
00530 Helsinki
Puh. 09−2535 7330
Faksi 09−2535 7332
www.labour.fi
ISBN 978–952–209–104–8 (PDF)
ISSN 1795–1801 (PDF)
4. 1
TIIVISTELMÄ
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan toimipaikkojen palkkahajonnan yhteyttä erilaisiin työntekijöiden sub-
jektiivisen hyvinvoinnin mittareihin. Analyysissä hyödynnetään työolotutkimusta yhdistettynä re-
kisteripohjaiseen toimipaikka-työntekijäaineistoon, mikä mahdollistaa toimipaikkojen palkkaerojen
mittaamisen luotettavasti. Käytettyjä hyvinvoinnin mittareita ovat työtyytyväisyys, palkkatyyty-
väisyys, halukkuus vaihtaa työpaikkaa, näkemys syrjinnästä työpaikalla ja se, kuinka usein saa tu-
kea ja kannustusta työtovereilta. Subjektiivinen hyvinvointi ja palkkaerot voivat olla yhteydessä toi-
siinsa joko siksi, että palkkaerot vaikuttavat työntekijän tulkintaan oman palkkansa tai tulevan palk-
kansa suuruudesta tai siksi, että he välittävät yleisesti oikeudenmukaisesta palkkauksesta ja hajonta
kertoo tästä jotain. Tulosten mukaan ei ole yksiselitteistä yhteyttä hajonnan ja hyvinvointimitta-
reiden välillä, mutta kun kiinnitetään palkkausjärjestelmä erityyppisiksi tulospalkkausjärjestelmiksi,
joitakin merkittäviä vaikutuksia on havaittavissa. Näyttäisi myös siltä, että palkkauksen läpinäky-
vyydellä on merkitystä.
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the links between a number of subjective measures of worker wellbeing and
within establishment wage dispersion. These may be linked either because wage dispersion
influences the way in which individuals perceive their own relative and prospective income or
because they are concerned about fairness in general. The analysis is based on a data set where the
Quality of Work Survey is matched with register-based information on individuals and
establishments. The results show that there is no significant overall association. Some significant
relationships, however, can be found if the method of pay is assumed to be performance pay that is
based on individual or group performance. The results also suggest that the question as to whether
wages are public knowledge can be of importance.
INTRODUCTION
There has been an upsurge of interest in using subjective measures of welfare in empirical
economics. Usually the aim is to get a better hold of the actual level of utility that in the more
traditional approach has been considered as implicit. In labour economics, this has given rise to an
increasing number of studies on job satisfaction. As job satisfaction is often considered as a
5. 2
predictor of quits and early retirement, studies relating to job satisfaction are also policy-relevant,
especially in the European countries that are struggling with an ageing labour force. Though it is
fairly well known that performance-related incentive schemes that increase wage dispersion may
improve productivity (Lazear 2000), it is also often assumed, in public discussion on welfare at
work, that a “too competitive” work environment may also have a direct negative impact on
employees’ welfare, for example through increased stress. Theoretical arguments have also been
presented on why wage structures rewarding individual performance may be detrimental for effort,
for example through the lack of co-operation or a negative impact on intrinsic motivation (see e.g.
Benabou and Tirole 2003, Frey and Jegen 2001).
Empirical evidence, however, is not clear about the total impact of wage structures on welfare.
Clark et al. (2009) have shown in the spirit of income comparison literature that the signal effect of
co-worker earnings may be larger than the envy effect. The literature on reciprocity and intrinsic
motivation suggests that there may also be other channels of influence. The main aim of this paper
is to explore whether wage dispersion within establishments is related to various measures of
employee welfare and behaviour. I attempt to complement a traditional study of job satisfaction
with considerations regarding fairness and co-operation as well as the joint effects of methods of
pay and wage dispersion. The aim is to explicitly test the hypothesis whether within establishment
wage dispersion has, on average, an impact on self-reported job satisfaction. Job satisfaction is a
very general measure, and there is little variation in the responses: most respondents are either
satisfied or very satisfied with their job. Therefore, in addition to job satisfaction, I investigate the
relationship between wage dispersion and wage satisfaction, the willingness to change jobs,
perceived fairness and a subjective measure of co-worker support.
The main contribution of the paper is an empirical analysis of a matched data set that allows me to
take advantage of both a comprehensive survey of employees with a number of subjective
assessments of different aspects of working life and reliable register-based data on wages and
personal characteristics. The latter is used to calculate the measures of within-establishment wage
dispersion. I ease the problems arising from the lack of a panel dimension by including a large set
of explanatory variables which are likely to control for a significant part of the individual- and firm-
specific fixed effects and reduce the bias arising from endogeneity.
The main findings suggest that wage dispersion in general has no significant average marginal
effect on the levels of job or wage satisfaction, intentions to change jobs or the degree of perceived
discrimination or help and support received from colleagues. However, when I assume a certain
6. 3
method of pay or split the sample according to whether wages are common knowledge, a few
statistically significant associations can be found. When performance pay based on the performance
of a group of workers is assumed, a higher level of wage dispersion implies a lower probability to
be very satisfied with the job. The probability of always receiving help and support from one’s
colleagues increases with wage dispersion in the subsample where wages are public knowledge, and
I assume individual performance pay for all individuals. In the subsample where wages are not
public knowledge the opposite holds. A lower probability of intention to change jobs to a different
field is associated with higher pay dispersion if individual performance pay is assumed for all
individuals. The average impacts on wage satisfaction and the index of perceived discrimination are
not significant, and whether wages are public knowledge makes little difference. I find some
evidence of the role of the individual location in the wage distribution: for people higher in the
distribution higher dispersion is associated with a higher probability of them considering their pay
as “fair” or “high”. Similarly, a high position in the distribution will decrease the amount of
perceived discrimination in the subsample where wages are public knowledge.
My interpretation of the results is that the impact of wage dispersion is dependent, among other
things, on methods of pay and the factors underlying these, such as the nature of production.
Selection of individuals into jobs probably further reinforces these associations. The people who
work in jobs where individual performance is emphasised are more risk-tolerant and may assume
their chances of upward mobility are high. Due to selection, the results do not allow firm
conclusions about how job satisfaction would change for a given establishment if wage dispersion
suddenly changed. This would require a study using a data set with a panel dimension or the use of
an instrumental variable. We also have only a few or often just one observation per establishment,
which does not allow for controlling for establishment-fixed effects.
Another significant determinant of the association between wage dispersion and subjective welfare
is how people perceive other individuals’ wages. The results mentioned above regarding an
individual’s location in the wage distribution indicate that people do indeed compare their incomes
with those of their colleagues. In the light of this, it seems plausible that a degree of transparency is
required for attaining a supportive environment when rewards depend on performance. Further
research, however, is required to study the role of organisations and transparency.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 I outline theories explaining the possible relationship
between wage dispersion and job satisfaction and discuss the existing literature on related topics, in
section 3 I describe the data and the methods and in section 4 I report the results. Section 5 concludes.
7. 4
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The theory of job satisfaction in economics, on the one hand, is less well developed than that of
wage formation. Despite its shortcomings, self-reported job satisfaction, however, has been found to
be a relatively consistent measure of underlying utility (Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen 2007).
The approach I apply in this paper is to assume that job satisfaction is a reliable composite measure
of overall utility that reflects many aspects of the job: satisfaction with pay as well as future
prospects at work and overall working conditions. On the other hand, as such it is very general and
it is often difficult to point out the exact reasons why certain features of the workplace or the
individual increase or decrease job satisfaction. I therefore complement it with several other
measures of subjective perceptions of the “goodness” of the workplace. These measures will help to
disentangle what role, if any, satisfaction with one’s wage, non-wage characteristics, perceptions of
fairness and equality at work and co-worker relationships and expressions of reciprocity play in
explaining the possible impact of wage dispersion.
There is a fair amount of existing work on job satisfaction. It has been shown that one’s own wage
or a relative wage that is higher usually implies higher job satisfaction: this is also the result when
the endogeneity of wage is controlled for (Lydon and Chevalier 2002). Furthermore, Clark et al.
(2009) have shown that prospects of a higher wage in the future increase job satisfaction. On the
other hand, Card et al. (2011) have shown that revelations about an individual’s position in the
distribution may have a significant negative impact on job satisfaction for those whose wage is
below the median.
If wage dispersion implies something about the individual’s future pay, it may have an impact on
the observed levels of satisfaction. If high dispersion is combined with wage mobility it may imply
higher expected pay growth for those who assume they are capable of improving their position in
the pay hierarchy. On the other hand, even with a reasonable degree of wage mobility, more
dispersion may mean a higher income risk unless it is certain the person will improve their pay.
Thus, the implications for individual welfare depend on the individual level of risk aversion as well
as assumptions about one’s ability to climb the job ladder within the establishment. In the light of
Card et al.’s (2011) results it has to be emphasised that the impact of wage dispersion may be highly
dependent on what individuals know or assume to know about other people’s wages. Naturally,
knowledge of their effort or contents of their jobs may also be significant.
8. 5
Methods of pay are naturally important determinants of both productivity and wage dispersion. But
they may also influence job satisfaction both directly and indirectly. Performance-related pay
typically increases productivity, and also wage dispersion (Lazear 2000, Lemieux et al. 2009). The
adoption of performance pay is, however, only sensible and efficient if the nature of the work is
such that it is possible to observe and measure either effort or the real objective of work precisely
enough. Even when it is possible, there may be significant costs of making a contract complex
enough to cover all aspects of a worker’s performance. Firm heterogeneity and characteristics of the
job clearly have an impact on the optimal compensation scheme, see e.g. Parent (2001).
Generally, people who voluntarily select into performance pay jobs are more productive than those
who prefer to work on a fixed pay scheme. They are also likely to be more risk-loving (Cornelissen
et al. 2011). This has also been shown in experiments (Dohmen and Falk, 2011). Therefore, they
may not suffer from the wage uncertainty that performance-related methods of pay involve. It is
clear, however, that even in the presence of performance-related pay, if wage differentials are not
well grounded, “too” large or random dispersion may lead to dissatisfaction. Optimally, firms
would only use performance-related pay when it was efficient to do so, but in reality it is possible
that the methods of pay that are used are not always fully optimal at each point in time.
In addition to the simple fact that people care about the utility they will derive from their own
income or the expectations regarding their future income, they may well be concerned about other
things, too. Similarly, their behaviour at work may be driven not just by maximisation of their own
current income; their motives may also include, for example, punishing and rewarding either their
employer or their co-workers in order to enforce certain norms.
“Psychological” approaches to job satisfaction emphasise the fact that not all facets of an
employment relationship are formally contractible; the relationship also includes reciprocity, or
behaviour whereby in response to benevolent acts individuals behave in a friendly way and vice
versa, and they may engage in this type of behaviour even when it is actually costly for them (Fehr
and Gachter 2000). Akerlof (1982) brought up the notion in the economic literature that
employment is a “gift relationship” based on mutual reciprocity, and Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
formalised the idea that fair pay increases effort.
Co-operation between workers is another element of production where reciprocity plays a role. If
the work involves working in a group, rewarding the group together may lead to the so-called 1/n
problem, where individual incentives are not strong enough to induce enough effort, as each
9. 6
individual only receives a reward that is proportional to 1/n of the product of their incremental
effort. Therefore, in order to attain optimal productivity there should be an element of reciprocity
among workers, whereby the group forces everybody to comply with norms and participate in
production by suitably punishing and rewarding its members (Cornelissen et al. 2010). For
example, if wage structures within the group reflect rewards that are perceived as unjust the group
may punish individual employees by refusing co-operation or support.
Yet another aspect of job satisfaction and worker behaviour that may be relevant for the
implications of wage structures for individual welfare is intrinsic motivation. According to the
theory, paying for performance in certain circumstances may mean that people lose intrinsic
motivation, which thus reduces their effort and makes them feel less happy with the job (see e.g.
Benabou and Tirole, 2003 and Frey and Jegen, 2001).
There are relatively few empirical studies that study the linkages between wage dispersion and
subjective job satisfaction directly. Pfeffer and Langton (1993) found that increases in wage
dispersion lower job satisfaction and reduce co-operation within academic departments. A number
of studies have explored the links between methods of pay and job satisfaction. McCausland et al.
(2005) show that performance pay increases job satisfaction for highly paid individuals. Green and
Heywood's results (2008) indicate that performance pay increases job satisfaction and they find no
evidence of it crowding out intrinsic motivation.
A related strain of work concerns links between productivity and wage dispersion. A study by
Winter Ebmer and Zweimuller (1999) shows that the relationship between wage dispersion and
productivity is hump-shaped, especially for white-collar workers. They explain the result by
incentives together with a fairness constraint. Lallemand, Plasman and Rycz (2004) find a positive
relationship between wage dispersion and firm performance. Grund and Westergard-Nielsen (2008),
on the other hand, find that the relationship between the dispersion of wage increases and firm
performance is U-shaped.
A few studies have been conducted on job satisfaction and its relationship with various outcomes in
Finland, but to my knowledge the issue of wage inequality has not been touched upon in the
existing work. A few studies have concerned related topics: Böckerman et al. (2012) show that
there is a weak causal link between job satisfaction and productivity in Finnish manufacturing and
Böckerman et al. (2011) examine the relationship between job security and job satisfaction, finding
that job insecurity has no effect on job satisfaction.
10. 7
DATA
A matched data set consisting of the Quality of Work Survey and a one-third random sample from
FLEED (the Finnish Longitudinal Employer–Employee Data) were used for the econometric
analysis. The Quality of Work Life Survey (QWLS) is an extensive personal interview survey
conducted every 5-7 years to monitor employees’ working conditions. The data are collected with
personal face-to-face interviews using a standardised questionnaire. The sample is obtained from
the labour force survey by drawing it from either employed persons or wage and salary earners.
Between 3,000 and 6,500 persons have been interviewed in each round of surveys. The non-
response rate in the Quality of Work Life Survey has varied between 8 and 22 per cent1
. FLEED, on
the other hand, contains background information on the population of working age combined with
enterprise and establishment level data for those who are in employment.
QWLS has a large number of variables that measure various aspects of working life and an
individual’s subjective perceptions thereof. In principle, many of these could be used as explanatory
variables for the more general measures of subjective utility or wellbeing that are the focus of the
paper. However, as pointed out by, for example, Hamermesh (2004), using subjective variables to
explain subjective outcomes may be problematic. The responses are often correlated because of the
general “mood” or “spill over” of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Rather than genuinely explaining
the dependent variable, other subjective measures may just be different aspects of the same
phenomenon and therefore the resulting coefficients do not have a policy-relevant interpretation,
though in some instances, for example changes in the strength of correlation may be of interest. I do
use some responses from the survey as right-hand-side variables: however, I try to limit this to
responses to concrete questions rather than use assessments of the “goodness” or “fairness” of
working conditions.
I use the waves of QWLS from 2003 and 2008 merged with FLEED from the same years and, for
some of the robustness checks, appended with the FLEED observations from the preceding year for
each wave. FLEED is essentially a panel where the whole working history of each sampled
individual is included in the data, but unfortunately QWLS does not have a panel dimension.
1
According to Anna-Maija Lehto (Statistics Finland) researchers at Statistics Finland have made experiments by
calibrating weights to QWLS 2008 to account for non-response in the survey. However, the use of weights to account
for non-response proved to have only a minor effect on the estimation results. This supports the
thinking that non-response does not seriously undermine the representativeness of the data.
11. 8
Job satisfaction is measured by the response to the standard question “How satisfied are you with
your job?”. The corresponding question on wage satisfaction reads “In your opinion, is your pay
fair in comparison with the remuneration paid in other occupations?”. Intentions to change job are
measured by responses to the question “If you could change jobs with the same pay, 1) would you
change to a different occupational field? 2) would you change to the same occupational field? 3)
would you not change at all?”.
Though the wage satisfaction variables specifically define the “relative” wage as remuneration
relative to other occupations, it is reasonable to assume that the respondents’ observations of their
co-workers’ pay influence the responses. People may be better informed about their colleagues’ pay
than the overall wage distribution in the economy. However, when we interpret the results it needs
to borne in mind that the underlying occupations (which I do not control for) may influence the
responses, as occupations often have the reputation of being “high” and “low” wage occupations.
These labels may have a significant effect on an individual’s perception of the fairness of their pay,
even when they lack detailed information on how their wage compares with the others.
In order to further explore the relationship between wage dispersion and subjective perceptions of
fairness at work, we rate the subjective perceptions of fairness at the workplace by calculating an
index that is based on the responses to the question: “Do you reckon that unequal treatment occurs
at your own workplace on the basis of …”. The question lists a number of types of discrimination
(age, sex etc.) and the index is calculated as: 100*(1-(no of positive responses/total number of
responses). Value 100 of the index denotes a workplace where the respondent has observed none of
the forms of discrimination and value 0 means that the respondent reckons that all the listed forms
of discrimination occur there.
The work atmosphere and the availability of co-worker support are graded by responses to the
question “When work seems difficult, do you receive support and encouragement from your
colleagues?” for which the response options are 1) never 2) sometimes 3) often and 4) always.
There are various other questions on teamwork in the questionnaire, but this question is broader and
is also put to those who do not work in formal teams. Other related questions on atmosphere are
also included in the survey. However, this question best matches the aim to disentangle the impact
of wage structures on co-worker attitudes. The other questions mainly concern the attitudes and
behaviour of the management, the impact of work pressure on the atmosphere or the organisation of
work.
12. 9
The distributions of the dependent variables in the data are presented in Figure 1. The distribution
of job satisfaction is highly skewed, the majority of respondents being satisfied or very satisfied
with their job. A large share of respondents say that their wage is “fair”, a much larger share,
however, consider it low rather than high. About half of the respondents would not change their job
for the same pay, and about 45% say they “often” get support and encouragement from their co-
workers. The discrimination index obtains an average value of 91%: thus, on average only a few
forms of discrimination are perceived.
Figure 1 about here
I apply the ordered probit estimation method where the underlying index variable is determined as a
linear combination of the explanatory variables:
(1) iii Xy εβ +=*
but we only observe n categories of y:
(2)
] ]
] ]
] ]
] ]
∈
∈
∈
∞−∈
=
− nnyifn
yif
yif
yif
y
ηη
ηη
ηη
η
,
.
.
,3
,2
,1
1
*
32
*
21
*
1
*
The explanatory variables include gender, age, age squared, dummies for year 2008 and education
levels, log of the individual’s monthly pay, log of the average monthly pay in the establishment,
dummies for having attended training in the past 12 months and having held several occupations
during one’s working life, the number of job changes in the past 5 years, the share of highly
educated within the establishment and the number of observations from the establishment in the
FLEED sample2
. The last variable serves as a proxy for establishment size: the actual size is
approximately three times the number of observations in the FLEED sample. The number of job
changes and the dummy for a change of occupation control for individual fixed effects. They can
indicate a permanently higher tendency to be dissatisfied with any job or even the contrary, or a
lack of desire to change after having changed several times. A positive association may also
emerge as a result from higher levels of satisfaction resulting from an intensive search for a better
2
The means for the explanatory variables are presented in the Appendix.
13. 10
match. The share of the highly educated and access to training serve as proxies for “good”
workplaces where the company makes significant investments in human capital.
In addition to these, measures of within establishment wage dispersion and individual positions in
the wage distribution are included in the regression. Overall, within establishment wage dispersion
is measured by the difference between the 90th and 10th percentile of the residual from a wage
regression within the establishment. In this regression, the explanatory variables used are education
levels, gender, age and age squared. The regression is run for each year separately. In addition to
the measure of overall wage dispersion I try to control for the wage differential between tasks with
different skills content by including a variable measuring the difference of the log of the average
wage between high and low educated individuals in the establishment3
. This difference is zero if all
the employees are from the same skill group: an extra dummy is introduced for these establishments
to control for a possibly unusual organisation or perception of wage differentials by skill.
The dummy variables indicating performance pay are based on questions on whether there is a
performance-related pay system in place and to whom the bonuses are paid: individuals, teams or
departments or the whole organisation. I only consider the response positive if the person also says
that they are covered themself. This is due to reliability issues: individuals themselves are unlikely
to be perfectly aware of pay systems they are not covered by, so trying to control for the general
presence of performance-related pay systems in the establishment might simply lead to a larger
measurement error. On the other hand, the direct impact of different methods of pay on job
satisfaction is most probably only relevant for those who are covered by them. The most common
form of performance pay in these data is a system where bonuses are paid for the whole
organisation, and this occurs in about 22% of the observations in these data. The systems where
performance pay is paid to groups or individuals are less common, covering 10% and 11% of the
observations respectively.
I include various interaction effects in addition to these. Most importantly, the measure of wage
dispersion is interacted with gender, different methods of pay and the individual’s percentile in the
within establishment wage distribution. The latter should capture the effect of people higher in the
wage distribution gaining more or less (if the coefficient is negative) from wage dispersion in terms
of the aspects of individual utility measured by the dependent variables.
3
There is no occupational variable that would cover both years, and using more than two classes of skills would be
feasible and sensible only for establishments with a very large number of observations. Thus, I only use two classes in
order to prevent a further reduction in the sample size.
14. 11
As the data lacks a panel dimension, endogeneity is likely to be a problem for several reasons.
Establishments have individual levels of “natural” wage dispersion which relate to the nature of
their production and organisation. These are probably related to the method of pay and the share of
highly educated individuals but are not completely explained by them. The remaining correlation
with the underlying establishment-specific fixed effect may be partly responsible for any
associations that I find.
Another source of bias is selection into jobs. As pointed out in the theoretical section, individuals
select into jobs that maximise their utility, given their preferences and characteristics. For example,
we may never observe risk-averse individuals who suffer from wage dispersion in jobs where
individual performance pay is applied and wage dispersion is unusually high. Therefore, the results
should be interpreted as describing individuals who are actually covered by certain methods of pay
rather than as the expected effect of wage dispersion and the method of pay for an average person.
Simultaneity is another potential source of endogeneity. However, it does not seem plausible that
satisfaction with job or wages should impact on wage dispersion or the methods of pay. It is
possible to argue that it may be easier for a company to adopt new methods of pay or increase (or
decrease, if dispersion is desirable for the employees) the level of pay dispersion if the level of job
satisfaction is initially high within the company. It is not obvious, however, how this process would
bias the association between satisfaction and dispersion in a cross section after the adoption of a
new method of pay, as satisfaction would naturally adjust to the new pay structures.
RESULTS
The actual coefficient values are difficult to interpret: therefore most of the conclusions are based
on average marginal effects which have been calculated for given regressor values and/or sub-
samples. There are obviously numerous combinations of possible values of regressors as well as
subsamples: in addition to the overall average marginal effects, my conclusions are mainly based on
the average marginal effects of dispersion, assuming that all individuals in the sample are covered
by a certain method of pay. In addition to these, I have run the regressions on subsamples formed on
the basis of whether wages within the establishment are public knowledge4
.
4
The full regression results are presented in the Appendix.
15. 12
The average marginal effects of p9010 on job satisfaction are presented in Table 1. The average
effect is not significant for any of the values without further restrictions on the values of the
regressors (Columns 1, 5 and 9). Similarly, for wage satisfaction (Table 2, Columns 1, 5 and 9) the
overall average marginal effect is not significantly different from zero at the 5% level for any of the
outcomes.
Table 1 about here
However, the strong coefficient for the interaction with individual percentiles suggests that there
may be a different effect of wage dispersion in different parts of the wage distribution. Indeed,
when I calculate the marginal effects separately for the individuals above and below the median, it
turns out that the impact of wage dispersion on wage satisfaction differs between these two groups.
For those above the median, a higher wage dispersion implies a significantly higher probability of
considering their wage as “fair” or “high”.
I further constrain the values of the dummies for different methods of pay, setting each of them to
one at a time, and calculating the average marginal effects of wage dispersion as if everybody was
covered by each of these schemes. This, including the initial estimation of the parameters, is also
done separately for subsamples formed on the basis of the responses to the question as to whether
wages are public knowledge.
The results for job satisfaction (Table 1, Columns 2-4, 6-8 and 9-12) are largely insignificant.
However, when a group performance pay scheme is assumed, a higher level of wage dispersion is
associated with a lower probability of being “very satisfied” with one’s job. The results from the
subsamples are of similar signs, but when wages are public knowledge they are not statistically
significant. When an individual performance pay scheme is assumed, wage dispersion seems to
have an opposite impact on job satisfaction, but the result is not equally strong.
Table 2 about here
There are no clear patterns in the average marginal effects for different outcomes of wage
satisfaction (Table 2 Columns 2-4, 6-8 and 9-12). The marginal effect on the probability of
considering one’s wage “fair” is significantly negative when a group performance pay scheme is
assumed and wages are common knowledge. There are no significant effects for the other
outcomes, but the average marginal effect for the outcomes above “fair” and for considering the
wage “somewhat lower than it should be” is also negative.
16. 13
Table 3 presents the average marginal effects of wage dispersion on willingness to change jobs for
the same pay. Again, there are no significant overall marginal effects either for the complete dataset
or for the subsamples. But when I set the method of pay to individual performance pay, the average
marginal effect on the probability of willingness to change to a different field becomes significantly
negative. Thus, for jobs with individual performance-related pay, wage dispersion seems, if
anything, to increase the attractiveness of the job.
Table 3 about here
For the discrimination index, the coefficients from an OLS estimation presented in the Appendix
are equivalent to the effects on the index keeping everything else constant. Neither the coefficient of
wage dispersion alone nor any of the interactions including dispersion is statistically significant.
Interestingly, the higher the individual percentile the higher the perceived “fairness” of the
workplace, but only when wages are public knowledge. This is consistent with, for example, a view
that people who know they are high up in the pay hierarchy like to think that people are treated
fairly at the workplace, as this would imply that they have deserved their position.
As for receiving help and support, the estimation using the full sample does not reveal any clear
patterns for the association with wage dispersion (table 4, columns 1-4), even when we assume
different types of performance-related methods of pay. However, when the sample is split (table 4
columns 5-12), the results indicate that when wages are public knowledge, wage dispersion is
associated with a higher probability to “always” receive support and encouragement from co-
workers. When wages are not public knowledge, the opposite result is obtained. Clearly, the
transparency of wages and the methods of pay may be a factor in determining how supportive the
atmosphere amongst co-workers is or a proxy thereof. A natural interpretation of this is that people
covered by an individual performance pay scheme are more willing to co-operate if they have a
clear idea of how much each employee is rewarded for their efforts. This can also be seen as a form
of reciprocity.
Table 4 here
As pointed out in the theoretical discussion, gender is a characteristic that may be related to risk
aversion and lower levels of competitive behaviour. The coefficients of the interaction of gender
and wage dispersion in the job satisfaction regression give an indication that gender might be a
significant determinant of the impact of wage dispersion. They suggest that wage dispersion might
have a different association with job satisfaction for women or in workplaces where the majority of
17. 14
women work. The actual average marginal effects of wage dispersion on different outcomes are,
however, significant neither for women nor for men.
The results reported above describe the association of overall wage dispersion with job satisfaction
and other measures of welfare at work. I measure “between” group wage differential by using the
difference in average log wages between high and low skilled (skill measured by education). The
average marginal effects on the probabilities of different outcomes, however, are not significant in
any of the regressions.
Robustness checks
Wage dispersion may naturally be measured by using different statistics: in addition to the
difference between the 90th
and 10th
percentile the standard deviation of the wage variable is an
obvious measure of wage dispersion. Unlike the percentile difference, standard deviation is
influenced by extreme observations. Another obvious extension is to use establishment-fixed effects
in the regression from which the residuals are calculated. The residuals obtained in this way indicate
more precisely how wages vary within establishments, assuming there are differences in average
wage levels between establishments that are due to some factors or abilities that are observed by the
employees but not the researcher. However, it is not inconceivable that people just observe the
returns to observable characteristics (and therefore, the residuals) in the labour market rather than
assume fixed (and justifiable) establishment effects. Thus, this procedure may end up removing
some of the variation that the employees would consider as residual variation.
I ran the basic model of the five outcome variables by using two alternative measures of wage
dispersion: the percentile difference for the residuals obtained from an estimation that includes
establishment-fixed effects and the standard deviation of the residuals from the basic regression.
The results do not essentially differ from those obtained by using the 90th
and 10th
percentile
difference of the residuals from the most basic regression. The patterns are largely the same in the
regressions using the original measure: in some cases the marginal effects are actually statistically
more significant when we use an alternative measure.
It may be that the expectations regarding the distribution of wages, as well as the systems by which
they are set within establishments vary between the private and the public sectors. Wages are also
more often public knowledge in the public sector. Therefore, I also conducted the estimations
limiting the sample to the private sector. This reduces the total number of observations to
18. 15
approximately 900. The results regarding different methods of pay, however, are not fundamentally
different and are thus obviously not driven by pay practices in public sector organisations.
Ordered probit is a logical choice for the method to be used but, as pointed out above, the
interpretation of coefficients is complicated and the average marginal effects need to be calculated
for set values of the regressors, which obviously limits their generality. Therefore, I also ran an
OLS regression on the variables of interest, assuming they were continuous interval variables. The
results indicate effects of the same direction as those obtained by using average marginal effects
calculations based on the ordered probit estimation. The significance levels of the relevant
coefficients (for example, those of the interactions of wage dispersion and the method of pay in the
cases pointed out in the previous section) and total marginal effects are often lower than 10% and
generally at least around 10-15%5
. Therefore, I find that the OLS results at least do not contradict
the results obtained from the ordered probit estimations, but rather support them.
As pointed out in the literature review, future prospects can be the underlying cause of a
relationship between overall wage structures and individual utility. Given this, instead of the
prevailing wage levels and the dispersion thereof, the more significant and interesting indicator of
one’s own chances of a high wage might be the variation in pay changes over time. I ran the
regressions using a measure of the dispersion of changes of the residual instead of a dispersion
measure of the actual residual, and also added a measure of the individual change of the residual.
The number of observations is naturally reduced, as only those who have worked in the same
establishment in the previous year and have a sensible wage observation from both years are
included. The total number of observations is about 1220.
Most of the statistically significant effects occur in the job satisfaction and wage satisfaction
regressions. For job satisfaction, when wages are common knowledge, higher dispersion implies a
higher probability of being very satisfied, and a similar pattern emerges when individual
performance pay is assumed. For wage satisfaction the results indicate that when wages are
common knowledge and individual performance pay is assumed, wage dispersion is associated with
less wage dissatisfaction. When a performance pay scheme for the whole organisation is assumed,
the pattern seems to be the opposite but less significant. When wages are not common knowledge
the overall effect of dispersion on wage dissatisfaction is also negative.
5
The full results are available on request.
19. 16
A natural interpretation of the results obtained in this study is that the features of production and
different reward systems have implications for the links between wage dispersion and the measures
of self-reported worker wellbeing I use. The results also suggest that transparency of wages may
have implications for the co-operativeness of workers. This may be a sign of reciprocal behaviour:
when the pay structures are perceived to be transparent, people are more willing to be supportive of
their co-workers as they feel they know what people are rewarded for. The result may also be due to
underlying factors, such as a generally encouraging work atmosphere which may correlate with the
method of pay and the transparency of pay structures.
Selection of people into jobs is also likely to play a role. Possibly the results regarding the impact of
different pay mechanisms are partly due to the preferences of individuals in different types of jobs.
Those who end up in jobs where competition in individual performance is encouraged and rewarded
(either through a performance-related pay scheme or, for example, promotion opportunities) find
high dispersion either a sign of their own advancement opportunities or a natural outcome of
competition. On the other hand, those who value equality are more likely to work in jobs with a
performance pay scheme aimed at groups or the whole organisation or without a performance pay
scheme. This implies that if we had quasi-experimental data on a random sample of individuals
before and after the introduction of a performance pay scheme and/or a major change in wage
dispersion, the results could be significantly different. From a policy perspective, however, it is
more relevant to know which characteristics of pay systems, such as transparency, could possibly
improve people’s welfare in their chosen workplace.
The results also complement the existing international evidence on income and wage comparisons.
The perception of one’s own value is clearly related to the wages of one’s colleagues. Even though
the question on wage satisfaction is posed so that the point of comparison should be earnings in
other occupations, the marginal effect of wage dispersion for the individuals in high percentiles is to
increase the probability to consider their wages high or fair when the level of log wages is
controlled for. This suggests that people are aware of wages below them. Similarly, when wages are
public knowledge, those who have a high position in the wage distribution consider the workplace
less discriminatory. Both observations are consistent with the view that those who have managed to
attain a high wage within the organisation are likely to consider this as justified rather than assess
the workplace objectively. On the other hand, the results do not strongly support the view that wage
dispersion is generally meaningful, irrespective of one’s own performance and the other
characteristics of the workplace.
20. 17
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper is to examine whether within establishment wage differentials have a
significant impact on worker welfare and where these impacts, if we find any, arise from. The
results suggest that methods of pay or the characteristics of production (which will ultimately
impact on the former) are associated with the welfare impacts of wage dispersion, probably partly
because of selection of people into different types of jobs. The results also support the conclusions
from the existing literature on income comparisons, whereby one’s colleagues' pay is important
when one is assessing one’s own pay.
Future research should further investigate the role of transparency and the knowledge of wages both
within the workplace and in general in determining satisfaction and co-operativeness at work. A
thorough analysis would also require measures of both levels of wage dispersion as well as long-
term wage mobility within establishments and that of individuals. This would further shed light on
the role played by the perceptions and expectations of one’s own future prospects within the
establishment and outside it. Further empirical evidence is also needed to establish whether wage
differentials and wage mobility are associated with the aspects of welfare at work not discussed
here, for example with experiencing stress.
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21. 18
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23. 20
Figure 1. “How satisfied are you with your job?”
%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Very dissatisfied OR
dissatisfied
Satisfied
Very satisfied
Figure 2. “In your opinion, is your pay fair in comparison with the remuneration paid in
other occupations?”
%
0 10 20 30 40 50
Clearly lower than it
should be
Lower than it should
be
Fair
Higher than it
should be
Clearly higher than
it should be
24. 21
Figure 3. “If you could change jobs with the same pay, would you change?”
%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
To a different field
To the same field
Would not change
Figure 4. “When work seems difficult, do you receive support and encouragement from your
colleagues?”
%
0 10 20 30 40 50
Never
Sometimes
Often
Always
25. 22
Table 1.
Average marginal effects of p9010 on job satisfaction
All Wages common knowledge Wages not common knowledge
Outcome Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
-0.0007 0.0493 -0.0027* -0.0009 -0.0026 0.0324 -0.0041 0.0106 0.0006 0.0573 -0.0021 -0.0019Very dissatisfied
(0.0016) (0.0665) (0.0016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0864) (0.0034) (0.0206) (0.002) (0.0898) (0.0013) (0.0018)
-0.0048 0.1524 -0.0277 -0.0064 -0.0161 0.1031 -0.0328 0.0468 0.0087 0.1905 -0.0301** -0.0207Dissatisfied
(0.0126) (0.1137) (0.0175) (0.026) (0.0183) (0.1802) (0.0379) (0.0705) (0.018) (0.1509) (0.0133) (0.0218)
-0.001 -0.0451 -0.0903 -0.0043 -0.024 0.0053 -0.1019 0.0352 0.0301 -0.0758 -0.14 -0.0502Satisfied
(0.0245) (0.1385) (0.1115) (0.0541) (0.0419) (0.145) (0.2693) (0.0225) (0.0302) (0.2103) (0.1332) (0.097)
0.0065 -0.1566*** 0.1207 0.0116 0.0427 -0.1408 0.1389 -0.0925 -0.0394 -0.172*** 0.1721 0.0728Very satisfied
(0.0381) (0.0452) (0.1292) (0.0828) (0.0617) (0.1257) (0.3083) (0.0957) (0.0486) (0.0388) (0.1442) (0.1194)
N 1586 1586 1586 1586 584 584 584 584 992 992 992 992
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.
Average marginal effects of p9010 on wage satisfaction
All Wages common knowledge Wages not common knowledge
Outcome Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
-0.0485* 0.1922 -0.0588 -0.0403 -0.0334 0.3393 -0.082 0.0376 -0.0626* 0.1503 -0.0652 -0.0828Clearly lower
than it should be (0.0259) (0.1607) (0.0638) (0.0534) (0.0421) (0.2236) (0.1281) (0.1063) (0.034) (0.1987) (0.07) (0.0551)
-0.0193 -0.0405 -0.0261 -0.0155 -0.0156 -0.1256 -0.0475 -0.0082 -0.0252 -0.0244 -0.0272 -0.0421Somewhat lower
than it should be (0.0157) (0.0718) (0.0486) (0.0296) (0.0246) (0.1526) (0.1229) (0.0199) (0.021) (0.0751) (0.0593) (0.0583)
0.0544* -0.1362 0.0673 0.0447 0.0408 -0.2011** 0.1046 -0.0296 0.0687* -0.1095 0.072 0.0955Fair
(0.0287) (0.0834) (0.0812) (0.0631) (0.0473) (0.0735) (0.182) (0.0995) (0.0372) (0.1126) (0.0885) (0.0748)
0.0096 -0.0117* 0.0125 0.0079 0.0045 -0.0078* 0.0136 -0.0002 0.0145 -0.0129 0.0154 0.0222Somewhat higher
than it should be (0.0071) (0.0064) (0.0209) (0.0132) (0.0072) (0.0042) (0.0356) (0.0089) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0287) (0.027)
0.0039 -0.0038 0.0051 0.0032 0.0037 -0.0048 0.0113 0.0005 0.0046 -0.0035 0.0049 0.0073Clearly higher
than it should be (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0097) (0.0058) (0.0065) (0.0035) (0.0331) (0.0068) (0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0111) (0.0108)
N 1628 1628 1628 1628 593 593 593 593 1025 1025 1025 1025
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
26. 23
Table 3.
Average marginal effects of p9010 on willingness to change jobs
All Wages common knowledge Wages not common knowledge
Outcome Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
-0.011 0.1446 -0.12** -0.0069 -0.0156 0.2494 -0.0587 0.0624 -0.0033 0.0454 -0.1214** -0.032Change to
another field (0.0354) (0.1843) (0.0513) (0.0734) (0.0568) (0.2943) (0.2074) (0.1411) (0.0469) (0.2078) (0.0546) (0.0848)
-0.0018 0.0053 -0.0589 -0.0007 -0.0035 -0.0175 -0.0172 0.0084 -0.0018 0.0064 -0.068 -0.0112Change to
another job in
the same field
(0.008) (0.0207) (0.0423) (0.0172) (0.0132) (0.0742) (0.0748) (0.011) (0.0107) (0.0204) (0.0511) (0.029)
0.0129 -0.1499 0.1789* 0.0076 0.0192 -0.2319 0.0759 -0.0708 0.005 -0.0518 0.1893* 0.0432No change
(0.0432) (0.1648) (0.0925) (0.0905) (0.0685) (0.2221) (0.282) (0.1491) (0.0573) (0.2279) (0.1037) (0.1135)
N 1621 1621 1621 1621 590 590 590 590 1022 1022 1022 1022
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.
Average marginal effects of p9010 on receiving help and support from colleagues
All Wages common knowledge Wages not common knowledge
Outcome Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
Overall Team
performance
pay
Individual
performance
pay
Company
performance
pay
0.0036 -0.0066 0.0197 0.0134 0.0027 0.0532 -0.0084* 0.0368 0.0035 -0.0105 0.0854 0.0028Never
(0.0063) (0.0125) (0.0301) (0.0177) (0.0097) (0.1313) (0.0045) (0.0465) (0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0753) (0.0161)
0.0043 -0.0532 0.0568 0.0433 0.0108 0.1334 -0.1452*** 0.1062 -0.0041 -0.0895 0.1327** -0.0073Sometimes
(0.027) (0.0911) (0.0807) (0.059) (0.0439) (0.1729) (0.0365) (0.0868) (0.0351) (0.0788) (0.0595) (0.0691)
-0.0111 -0.0326 -0.0212 -0.0129 -0.013 -0.0699 -0.3012** -0.0451 -0.0163 -0.0826 -0.1004 -0.0171Often
(0.0093) (0.0645) (0.0299) (0.0154) (0.0175) (0.1664) (0.134) (0.0556) (0.0122) (0.1284) (0.0851) (0.0165)
0.0032 0.0924 -0.0553 -0.0438 -0.0005 -0.1167 0.4549*** -0.0978 0.0169 0.1825 -0.1177** 0.0216Always
(0.0339) (0.1668) (0.0823) (0.064) (0.0528) (0.1396) (0.1115) (0.0809) (0.0452) (0.2125) (0.0502) (0.0961)
N 1609 1609 1609 1609 585 585 585 585 1014 1014 1014 1014
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
27. 24
APPENDIX
Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean
log(establishment mean monthly pay) 1635 7.923
Has attended training over the last 12 months 1635 0.634
Share of highly educated within establishment 1635 0.266
log(monthly pay) 1635 7.872
Fixed term contract 1635 0.114
Has worked in several occupations 1635 0.150
No. of job changes over the past 5 years 1635 0.702
Single education group within establishment 1635 0.074
Year 2008 1635 0.533
Female 1635 0.546
Age 1635 43.209
Age squared 1635 1994.794
Education level 3 (upper secondary education) 1635 0.417
Education level 5 (Lower level of first stage tertiary education, diplomas) 1635 0.181
Education level 6 (First stage tertiary, bachelor’s degree) 1635 0.124
Education level 7 (First stage tertiary, master’s degree) 1635 0.139
Education level 8 (Upper tertiary, PhD) 1635 0.014
Percentile of individual residual within establishment 1635 52.794
Difference of 90th and 10the percentiles of residuals within establishment 1635 0.786
Performance pay paid to groups or teams 1635 0.098
Performance pay paid to individuals 1635 0.114
Performance pay paid to the whole organisation 1635 0.228
No of observations from the establishment in the FLEED sample 1635 1254.527
Wages public knowledge 1625 0.366
28. 25
Job satisfaction, ordered probit estimation (1)
All
(2)
Wages public
knowledge
(3)
Wages not public
knowledge
log(establishment mean monthly pay) -0.165 0.0928 -0.212
(0.186) (0.334) (0.237)
Has attended training over the last 12 months 0.113* 0.306*** 0.0150
(0.0660) (0.111) (0.0849)
Share of highly educated within establishment 0.294 0.876** 0.0490
(0.207) (0.375) (0.261)
log(monthly pay) 0.339** -0.380 0.624***
(0.169) (0.325) (0.207)
Fixed term contract 0.277*** 0.310* 0.227
(0.105) (0.167) (0.140)
Has held several occupations 0.0273 0.114 0.0185
(0.0847) (0.151) (0.105)
No. of job changes over the past 5 years 0.0329 0.0320 0.0321
(0.0251) (0.0415) (0.0330)
low education#wage differential btw education groups 0.139 0.300 0.00520
(0.123) (0.206) (0.159)
high education#wage differential btw education groups 0.121 0.0699 0.0951
(0.251) (0.461) (0.312)
Single education group within establishment 0.0598 0.110 0.0551
(0.126) (0.193) (0.172)
Year 2008 -0.184*** -0.0489 -0.258***
(0.0624) (0.107) (0.0803)
Female 0.732*** 0.653* 0.856***
(0.224) (0.361) (0.298)
Age -0.0168 0.0632 -0.0475
(0.0260) (0.0461) (0.0330)
Age squared 0.000281 -0.000665 0.000638*
(0.000295) (0.000528) (0.000373)
Education level 3 (upper secondary education) -0.0785 -0.0205 -0.107
(0.0982) (0.164) (0.127)
Education level 5 (Lower level of first stage tertiary -0.0685 -0.227 0.0438
education, diplomas) (0.119) (0.209) (0.150)
Education level 6 (First stage tertiary, bachelor’s degree) -0.106 -0.0407 -0.0718
(0.166) (0.315) (0.203)
Education level 7 (First stage tertiary, master’s degree) -0.296 -0.0785 -0.362
(0.193) (0.364) (0.235)
Education level 8 (Upper tertiary, PhD) -0.210 -0.299 -0.0991
(0.321) (0.601) (0.389)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment -0.000480 0.000869 0.00268
(0.00359) (0.00585) (0.00482)
P9010 of residuals 0.222 0.192 0.294
(0.278) (0.422) (0.382)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of 0.776** 0.919 0.705
a group or a team (0.387) (0.671) (0.490)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of -0.256 -0.192 -0.523
an individual (0.306) (0.710) (0.357)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of 0.0293 0.530 -0.324
the whole company (0.218) (0.346) (0.296)
Female# Percentile of individual residual within -0.00456** -0.00480 -0.00497*
establishment (0.00219) (0.00367) (0.00282)
Female # P9010 of residuals -0.472** -0.553 -0.485
(0.220) (0.342) (0.299)
PPS based on group perf# P9010 of residuals -0.895* -0.789 -0.948
(0.499) (0.854) (0.636)
PPS based on individual perf# P9010 of residuals 0.345 0.275 0.674*
(0.351) (0.841) (0.409)
PPS based on company perf# P9010 of residuals 0.0192 -0.563 0.428
(0.266) (0.420) (0.364)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment # 0.00207 0.00715 -0.00418
P9010 of residuals (0.00452) (0.00721) (0.00611)
No of observations from the establishment in the FLEED 7.50e-06 1.90e-06 1.21e-05
sample (8.09e-06) (1.20e-05) (1.13e-05)
Observations 1586 584 992
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
29. 26
Wage satisfaction (1)
All
(2)
Wages public
knowledge
(3)
Wages not public
knowledge
log(establishment mean monthly pay) 1.264*** 1.431*** 1.212***
(0.174) (0.320) (0.216)
Has attended training over the last 12 months -0.0503 0.0852 -0.127*
(0.0606) (0.105) (0.0767)
Share of highly educated within establishment -0.534*** -0.620* -0.472**
(0.191) (0.352) (0.235)
log(monthly pay) -0.0955 -0.337 -0.0142
(0.158) (0.303) (0.190)
Fixed term contract -0.128 -0.225 -0.0673
(0.0962) (0.156) (0.126)
Has held several occupations 0.0156 -0.0282 0.0467
(0.0784) (0.143) (0.0958)
No. of job changes over the past 5 years 0.0572** 0.0513 0.0520*
(0.0230) (0.0384) (0.0296)
low education#wage differential btw education groups -0.101 -0.00258 -0.214
(0.114) (0.196) (0.144)
high education#wage differential btw education groups -0.0159 -0.260 0.0838
(0.231) (0.438) (0.279)
Single education group within establishment -0.0614 0.0272 -0.130
(0.118) (0.183) (0.160)
Year 2008 0.00461 -0.0564 0.0368
(0.0575) (0.101) (0.0728)
Female -0.0902 0.0110 -0.166
(0.206) (0.339) (0.270)
Age -0.0330 -0.0494 -0.0192
(0.0240) (0.0429) (0.0299)
Age squared 0.000315 0.000502 0.000150
(0.000272) (0.000492) (0.000338)
Education level 3 (upper secondary education) -0.136 -0.332** 0.0101
(0.0915) (0.155) (0.117)
Education level 5 (Lower level of first stage tertiary -0.0906 -0.456** 0.115
education, diplomas) (0.111) (0.198) (0.138)
Education level 6 (First stage tertiary, bachelor’s degree) -0.130 -0.237 -0.00379
(0.154) (0.300) (0.186)
Education level 7 (First stage tertiary, master’s degree) 0.112 0.268 0.119
(0.179) (0.347) (0.215)
Education level 8 (Upper tertiary, PhD) 0.0151 -0.377 0.187
(0.297) (0.615) (0.348)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment 9.69e-05 -0.00138 0.00255
(0.00328) (0.00541) (0.00434)
P9010 of residuals -0.236 -0.250 -0.159
(0.254) (0.397) (0.343)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of 0.788** 1.135* 0.755*
a group or a team (0.366) (0.671) (0.448)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of 0.138 0.0385 0.127
an individual (0.282) (0.646) (0.326)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of 0.247 0.595* 0.0298
the whole company (0.202) (0.326) (0.269)
Female# Percentile of individual residual within -0.00436** -0.00396 -0.00454*
establishment (0.00202) (0.00349) (0.00254)
Female # P9010 of residuals -0.00736 -0.293 0.151
(0.202) (0.325) (0.271)
PPS based on group perf# P9010 of residuals -0.844* -1.318 -0.783
(0.474) (0.864) (0.583)
PPS based on individual perf# P9010 of residuals 0.0525 0.249 0.0143
(0.322) (0.759) (0.372)
PPS based on company perf# P9010 of residuals -0.0428 -0.304 0.130
(0.247) (0.395) (0.332)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment # 0.00979** 0.0130* 0.00701
P9010 of residuals (0.00414) (0.00687) (0.00548)
No of observations from the establishment in the FLEED -2.81e-06 -6.61e-06 -1.52e-06
sample (7.54e-06) (1.16e-05) (1.02e-05)
Observations 1628 593 1025
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
30. 27
Willingness to change job for the same pay (1)
All
(2)
Wages public
knowledge
(3)
Wages not public
knowledge
log(establishment mean monthly pay) -0.318* -0.0168 -0.448**
(0.183) (0.339) (0.227)
Has attended training over the last 12 months -0.0245 -0.161 0.0444
(0.0662) (0.114) (0.0835)
Share of highly educated within establishment 0.303 0.410 0.253
(0.206) (0.386) (0.253)
log(monthly pay) 0.105 -0.214 0.172
(0.165) (0.321) (0.198)
Fixed term contract 0.202* 0.0605 0.260*
(0.105) (0.168) (0.139)
Has held several occupations -0.0939 -0.0957 -0.0874
(0.0864) (0.154) (0.106)
No. of job changes over the past 5 years 0.0718*** 0.113** 0.0451
(0.0265) (0.0457) (0.0334)
low education#wage differential btw education groups 0.147 0.155 0.185
(0.124) (0.214) (0.156)
high education#wage differential btw education groups 0.269 -0.00959 0.386
(0.256) (0.480) (0.310)
Single education group within establishment 0.114 0.323 -0.0356
(0.129) (0.202) (0.174)
Year 2008 -0.134** -0.0278 -0.208***
(0.0624) (0.108) (0.0796)
Female 0.115 0.229 -0.00228
(0.225) (0.371) (0.296)
Age -0.0439* 0.0174 -0.0728**
(0.0259) (0.0465) (0.0325)
Age squared 0.000707** -4.25e-05 0.00106***
(0.000296) (0.000535) (0.000369)
Education level 3 (upper secondary education) -0.181* 0.0319 -0.322**
(0.102) (0.168) (0.132)
Education level 5 (Lower level of first stage tertiary -0.125 -0.0158 -0.234
education, diplomas) (0.123) (0.213) (0.155)
Education level 6 (First stage tertiary, bachelor’s degree) -0.0963 0.224 -0.206
(0.168) (0.321) (0.204)
Education level 7 (First stage tertiary, master’s degree) -0.182 0.246 -0.364
(0.195) (0.370) (0.236)
Education level 8 (Upper tertiary, PhD) -0.583* 0.275 -0.958***
(0.313) (0.639) (0.371)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment 0.00342 0.00712 0.00160
(0.00358) (0.00582) (0.00479)
P9010 of residuals 0.133 0.350 -0.0208
(0.279) (0.440) (0.383)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of 0.406 0.967 0.0467
a group or a team (0.380) (0.677) (0.477)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of -0.511 -0.638 -0.433
an individual (0.322) (0.727) (0.376)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of -0.0602 0.0548 -0.106
the whole company (0.216) (0.349) (0.287)
Female# Percentile of individual residual within -0.00335 -0.00401 -0.00225
establishment (0.00219) (0.00376) (0.00276)
Female # P9010 of residuals 0.0413 -0.295 0.208
(0.223) (0.361) (0.297)
PPS based on group perf# P9010 of residuals -0.480 -0.787 -0.169
(0.486) (0.831) (0.622)
PPS based on individual perf# P9010 of residuals 0.575 0.171 0.663
(0.375) (0.864) (0.438)
PPS based on company perf# P9010 of residuals -0.0181 -0.295 0.139
(0.264) (0.422) (0.354)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment # -0.00258 -0.000724 -0.00362
P9010 of residuals (0.00450) (0.00731) (0.00604)
No of observations from the establishment in the FLEED -2.08e-06 -3.99e-06 1.66e-07
sample (8.21e-06) (1.23e-05) (1.13e-05)
Observations 1621 590 1022
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
31. 28
Index of discrimination (1)
All
(2)
Wages public
knowledge
(3)
Wages not public
knowledge
log(establishment mean monthly pay) -2.755 0.964 -3.572
(2.113) (3.704) (2.711)
Has attended training over the last 12 months -0.925 -0.399 -1.283
(0.748) (1.234) (0.969)
Share of highly educated within establishment 6.642*** 7.380* 6.336**
(2.349) (4.128) (2.971)
log(monthly pay) -0.828 -7.291** 1.203
(1.944) (3.550) (2.412)
Fixed term contract 3.440*** 2.518 3.908**
(1.189) (1.841) (1.601)
Has held several occupations 0.393 0.0655 0.611
(0.970) (1.681) (1.217)
No. of job changes over the past 5 years -0.252 -0.521 -0.117
(0.283) (0.456) (0.374)
low education#wage differential btw education groups 1.314 0.939 1.101
(1.415) (2.334) (1.824)
high education#wage differential btw education groups 1.765 4.906 0.361
(2.850) (5.121) (3.547)
Single education group within establishment 0.466 2.430 -1.126
(1.445) (2.150) (2.018)
Year 2008 0.276 0.000849 0.525
(0.708) (1.184) (0.917)
Female -1.570 -4.977 2.398
(2.527) (3.937) (3.426)
Age -0.150 0.579 -0.440
(0.295) (0.505) (0.379)
Age squared 0.00288 -0.00598 0.00633
(0.00336) (0.00579) (0.00428)
Education level 3 (upper secondary education) -1.819 -1.714 -1.892
(1.128) (1.809) (1.482)
Education level 5 (Lower level of first stage tertiary -2.000 -3.814 -1.025
education, diplomas) (1.368) (2.318) (1.749)
Education level 6 (First stage tertiary, bachelor’s degree) -0.125 -0.620 0.163
(1.898) (3.507) (2.350)
Education level 7 (First stage tertiary, master’s degree) -1.816 -0.267 -2.258
(2.212) (4.058) (2.728)
Education level 8 (Upper tertiary, PhD) -4.327 -7.757 -2.988
(3.647) (6.789) (4.436)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment 0.0618 0.155** 0.00672
(0.0405) (0.0624) (0.0557)
P9010 of residuals 4.396 3.692 5.972
(3.111) (4.564) (4.367)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of 2.481 8.596 0.0504
a group or a team (4.404) (7.386) (5.646)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of -1.090 -2.124 -0.822
an individual (3.482) (7.303) (4.143)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of 2.665 4.951 2.347
the whole company (2.487) (3.825) (3.398)
Female# Percentile of individual residual within -0.0412* -0.0371 -0.0397
establishment (0.0248) (0.0410) (0.0320)
Female # P9010 of residuals 1.067 3.202 -3.228
(2.476) (3.697) (3.461)
PPS based on group perf# P9010 of residuals -2.036 -9.380 1.131
(5.685) (9.383) (7.343)
PPS based on individual perf# P9010 of residuals 1.910 0.297 2.509
(3.983) (8.490) (4.739)
PPS based on company perf# P9010 of residuals -3.777 -5.184 -3.901
(3.043) (4.648) (4.188)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment # -0.0458 -0.0632 -0.0184
P9010 of residuals (0.0510) (0.0780) (0.0706)
No of observations from the establishment in the FLEED -1.37e-05 3.05e-05 -4.61e-05
sample (9.30e-05) (0.000136) (0.000130)
Constant 116.2*** 120.7*** 112.4***
(13.50) (21.42) (18.26)
Observations 1629 593 1026
R-squared 0.039 0.073 0.043
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
32. 29
Receives support and encouragement from colleagues (1)
All
(2)
Wages public
knowledge
(1)
Wages not public
knowledge
log(establishment mean monthly pay) -0.127 -0.186 -0.0579
(0.173) (0.313) (0.218)
Has attended training over the last 12 months 0.132** 0.0915 0.155**
(0.0608) (0.103) (0.0773)
Share of highly educated within establishment 0.386** 0.245 0.497**
(0.191) (0.349) (0.237)
log(monthly pay) 0.332** 0.479 0.233
(0.161) (0.299) (0.197)
Fixed term contract 0.155 0.150 0.212
(0.0973) (0.156) (0.129)
Has held several occupations 0.0647 -0.0146 0.122
(0.0796) (0.143) (0.0982)
No. of job changes over the past 5 years 0.00947 0.0382 -0.0222
(0.0231) (0.0398) (0.0297)
low education#wage differential btw education groups 0.0124 -0.142 0.0828
(0.114) (0.195) (0.145)
high education#wage differential btw education groups 0.0148 -0.492 0.216
(0.232) (0.433) (0.285)
Single education group within establishment -0.0488 -0.186 0.113
(0.117) (0.180) (0.160)
Year 2008 0.0246 0.00901 0.0317
(0.0576) (0.0995) (0.0733)
Female 0.274 0.927*** -0.217
(0.205) (0.334) (0.274)
Age -0.0630*** -0.114*** -0.0343
(0.0242) (0.0425) (0.0304)
Age squared 0.000650** 0.00130*** 0.000289
(0.000274) (0.000487) (0.000342)
Education level 3 (upper secondary education) 0.0312 -0.0788 0.0653
(0.0919) (0.152) (0.118)
Education level 5 (Lower level of first stage tertiary -0.110 -0.324* -0.0189
education, diplomas) (0.112) (0.195) (0.140)
Education level 6 (First stage tertiary, bachelor’s degree) -0.206 0.0483 -0.236
(0.155) (0.297) (0.188)
Education level 7 (First stage tertiary, master’s degree) -0.266 -0.338 -0.177
(0.180) (0.340) (0.219)
Education level 8 (Upper tertiary, PhD) -0.639** -0.700 -0.575
(0.294) (0.558) (0.353)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment -0.000508 0.00382 -0.00252
(0.00333) (0.00528) (0.00453)
P9010 of residuals 0.305 0.498 0.157
(0.255) (0.388) (0.352)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of a -0.187 0.436 -0.356
group or a team (0.358) (0.652) (0.447)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of an 0.427 -0.803 0.745**
individual (0.290) (0.783) (0.340)
Performance pay scheme based on the performance of the 0.0786 0.413 -0.144
whole company (0.201) (0.323) (0.270)
Female# Percentile of individual residual within 0.00136 -0.00406 0.00465*
establishment (0.00202) (0.00347) (0.00255)
Female # P9010 of residuals 0.227 0.0237 0.494*
(0.203) (0.314) (0.280)
PPS based on group perf# P9010 of residuals 0.284 -0.535 0.519
(0.464) (0.843) (0.582)
PPS based on individual perf# P9010 of residuals -0.230 1.694* -0.721*
(0.333) (0.962) (0.389)
PPS based on company perf# P9010 of residuals -0.198 -0.477 0.0192
(0.246) (0.392) (0.334)
Percentile of individual residual within establishment # -0.00744* -0.00940 -0.00705
P9010 of residuals (0.00422) (0.00673) (0.00577)
No of observations from the establishment in the FLEED 4.63e-06 1.29e-05 -3.49e-06
sample (7.55e-06) (1.14e-05) (1.04e-05)
Observations 1609 585 1014
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1