In the past semester, as part of the Princeton University-Rutgers University exchange program, I took a PhD-level class in Political Economy of Development at Princeton for my graduate degree's second concentration in International Development. As part of my intellectually challenging and stimulating experience, I completed the front-end of my first-ever theoretical politics and economics-style academic journal research paper.

1. Japan vs. China in ASEAN:
Political Motives in Fighting for Influence in Southeast Asia
through Infrastructural Investments & Developmental Aid
a paper for Political Economy of Development Class at Princeton University
Ardin, Jia Xiong Yeo
Master of City & Regional Planning Candidate
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey- New Brunswick
Abstract
For many decades till today, Japan has been the largest investor and provider of foreign aid to
infrastructure projects around Southeast Asian countries. As modern-day Japan is an ally of the
West, and as Southeast Asian countries have mostly established bilateral relations with Japan and
the West before they did with the People’s Republic of China, most Southeast Asian countries have
opened up to political, economic and cultural influence from Japan and the West to a some degree.
However, in the past two decades, as China’s international economic and political clout rapidly
develops, it has become interested in engaging with Southeast Asia economically. But many
Southeast Asian countries are increasingly apprehensive of China’s generous offers of assistance
with their infrastructure projects, even though Southeast Asia has had trading relations with China
for thousands of years, and a significant minority of Southeast Asians are of ethnic Chinese descent.
It is widely believed this uneasiness has to do with the communist government of China’s political
aggressiveness towards Southeast Asian countries, most notably the South China Sea dispute, and
therefore it gives these countries reason to hold suspicions towards China for its contradictory
moves. Furthermore, China has been excessive in its ambitions for Southeast Asian infrastructure,
which is part of its recently-launched international development strategy it is engaging with
Southeast Asian as well as other countries, The Belt-and-Road Initiative. This is not something that
Southeast Asia has seen and experienced with Japan post-World War II. Do Southeast Asian
countries have reason to believe that China has political motives in the region? This paper analyzes
case studies of individual projects as well as local media to find out.

2. Introduction
Japan and China are no strangers to the eleven countries of Southeast Asia, ten of which make
up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Chinese have been immigrating
into the region for hundreds of years, with their descendants today forming a significant
proportion of Southeast Asia’s population today. In some countries such as Thailand, the ethnic
Chinese have largely assimilated and integrated into the local culture, while in others such as
Malaysia the ethnic Chinese have remained a distinct cultural group in those societies and
preserved the Chinese culture their ancestors brought with them when they first immigrated.
China has also traded with Southeast Asia for thousands of years, especially since Southeast
Asia sits on a major maritime trading route between China and Europe. Southeast Asia’s first
major exposure to Japan was only during the geopolitical expansion of the Empire of Japan in
the early 20th century, when rapidly-industrializing Japan colonized the entire region during
World War II and imposed its political and economic systems and culture onto Southeast Asia
as part of its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere concept of getting Asian countries under
its influence militarily.
But after World War II, the dynamics of the relationship between Southeast Asia with Japan and
China completely transformed. China became a reclusive Communist state with little
international trade activity, while Japan, whose government was reset by the United States from
an imperialistic monarchy into a democracy, began rapidly developing its economy and
eventually became a regional technological, economic and cultural powerhouse as well as
Asia’s first developed country. The “power” that Japan exuded this time in Asia and the rest of
the world throughout the 20th century, partly due to the restrictions placed on Japan’s
constitution written by the US, was no longer the political or military prowess of its imperialistic
days. Instead, Japan extended its influence through promoting its advanced technologies (such
as electronics and cars) as well as cultural goods (such as teriyaki, anime, manga and
promoting itself as a tourist destination) to the international market, investing in the economies
and infrastructure of developing countries, and forging international relations (especially
Western allies). This has had therefore a particularly strong effect on Southeast Asia throughout
the 20th century, where Japan was a major investor and contributor to the economic
development of the region. Southeast Asians were also exposed to Japanese culture, where
there was a rise in interest in all things Japanese. This occurred despite little Japanese
immigration to the region relative to Chinese immigration. The People’s Republic of China
(PRC) on the other hand did manage to get involved in wars in Southeast Asia, including the
Malayan Emergency, Vietnam War and the Sino-Vietnamese War, but had little interaction with
Southeast Asia until at least after market reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Most Chinese
culture in Southeast Asia during the period after the Chinese Communist Revolution and before
China eventually established international relations in the region consisted of “remnants” of
China’s interactions with them over the centuries before its Communist Revolution. Therefore
Southeast Asians of Chinese ancestry were slowly dissolving their national (but not cultural) ties
with China and affiliating more with their respective countries of residence as they gradually
assimilate and integrate into local culture. Because this was a period of rising Japanese power
and little interaction with China, Japan established its economic hegemony in Southeast Asia
and has remained the top Asian influencer and impactor today, even overtaking the US in the
1980s- the main non-Asian power in the region. As Japan by then has already become more
pro-West (partly because it now runs on a constitution written by the US), and its interactions
with the region coincide with Southeast Asian countries’ forging of ties with the West, Southeast

3. Asian politics and economies has moved towards the direction of the West as they mature
overtime, further distancing themselves from China and its communist inclination, even as Laos
and Vietnam remain communist today. This is evident in many Southeast Asian countries’
strong military alliances with Japan and the US that it does not share with China.
However, in the 1990s and 21st century, Southeast Asia became a region of interest for the
People’s Republic of China as it experienced rapid economic and political rise in the world.
China had established diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries at different times of
the latter half of the 20th century; however it was only in the 1990s when China intended to
establish a sphere of influence to bind Southeast Asia to China politically, economically and
militarily (Ott, 2005), an effort that in 2013 evolved into a larger international development
strategy called the Belt-and-Road Initiative, also known as the The Silk Road Economic Belt and
the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. This is somewhat like Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere concept during World War II, but instead of warfare, China uses diplomatic
and economic means to get the Southeast Asians to its side. In this major international
development strategy proposed by the Chinese government, China intends to forge connectivity
and cooperation throughout the Eurasian continent, in which Southeast Asia is an important
region of interest due to its geopolitical proximity, through investing in infrastructure projects in
these 68 countries. China has also been similarly expanding its international development
contributions to the rest of the world, from Africa to Latin America. Unlike Japan’s Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere concept, China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative seems to be a peaceful
and constructive means of establishing international economic cohesion, however these are not
without suspicion. China is widely believed to have possible geostrategic, political motives
underlying its interest in extending its sphere of influence internationally, especially to Southeast
Asia, as its efforts seem to compete directly with, rather than compliment, Southeast Asia’s
existing relations with Japan and the US. What builds on this suspicion is that this constructive
gesture contradicts with the trouble China created in the region with the South China Sea
dispute, where China is wrestling sovereignty over the South China Sea with several Southeast
Asian countries. On the other hand, Japan’s presence in Southeast Asia is widely considered to
be more benign than China’s, and that Japan’s objectives in engaging with Southeast Asia is
nothing more than an economic, social and cultural relationship with the region. This is
practically because even if it has imperialistic ambitions like in its World War 2 past, Japan’s
constitution does not allow it to build its military might, let alone dominate the region politically
and militarily (Percival, 2006). China, though, seems to have other ideas, which has made
Japan, the US and some Southeast Asians uncomfortable. While Japan pouring in money on
multiple developmental projects such as the Tenom Pangi Hydroelectric Power Station and the
Crocker Range Crossing Road Project in Malaysia was largely welcomed for example, the
Forest City project currently being built by China also in Malaysia “scares the hell out of
everybody” according to a Bloomberg article (Mahrotri & Choong, 2016). Forest City is an
entirely new city of several hundred-thousand built from scratch on the border of Malaysia and
Singapore. There is little domestic interest in the residential and commercial units, and while
that raises fears of becoming a “white elephant” (massively expensive yet wasteful projects due
to its unnecessity), China wants it that way because this would give room for Mainland Chinese
investors and immigrants to flood into Forest City, allegedly as another way of occupying
Malaysian land without military invasion. There has also been speculation that China was
hoping to use the project to challenge Singapore economically as Forest City is located directly
opposite of Singapore’s largest maritime port, allegedly over China’s displeasure of Singapore

4. for its stance on the South China Sea dispute that China should follow international maritime
laws. This frightens both local Malaysians and Singaporeans, and is not something they have
ever experienced with Japanese infrastructure investments. This and many other similar
examples demonstrates the differences in sentiments of Southeast Asians towards Japan and
China in their involvement in Southeast Asia, but the questions remain. Why would Southeast
Asia “forgive” Japan for its World War II atrocities towards them and not tolerate China for its
more recent annoyances towards them? How and to what extent are the present-day
sentiments of Southeast Asians towards Japan and China? And what does that explain
Southeast Asia’s inclination towards Japan and away from China? This is the objective of the
research in this paper.
Literature Review
There has been much attention given to the West’s and more recently China’s contribution to
international development in the form of infrastructure investment and aid worldwide, even
though Japan has been an important contributor since the mid-20th century. This is especially
true in Southeast Asia, as detailed in Foreign Policy Research Institute’s article Japan’s
Enduring Value to Southeast Asia, written by an intern. The intern drew her data from mostly
government sources from countries involved, as well as a few established academic journals.
She used the data to demonstrate graphically the difference between Japan’s and China’s
influence on Southeast Asia, and argued that despite the world’s attention on China’s massive
promises on development funding, Japan has all along been the one who has been consistent
in its execution, and therefore Japan still has the largest influence in Southeast Asia today-
something that should not be overlooked. The article also makes a point that since Japan has
overtaken the US as the largest contributor of international development to Southeast Asia, it
suggests that Southeast Asia would (and should) look to Japan for geopolitical support. Once
Japan revises its constitution to empower its military, it could allay Southeast Asia’s fears of
waning US influence as well as the increase of China’s looming hegemony in the region
(Gallagher, 2018). And it seems to imply that Southeast Asia would be accepting of Japan’s
return to power militarily rather than China because Southeast Asia, Japan and the West are
allies and therefore Japan would be doing it for deterrence purposes, whereas China’s actions
to exert its power, including its territorial claims in the South China Sea and its actions in
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet, comes across as threatening. This article has a certain bias in
favor of Japan because the author is writing in the perspective of Japan and its interests.
There are also several pieces of literature that build on this evidence of China’s increase in its
economic, military, and diplomatic pressure on Southeast Asia, such as Comparative
Connections’ article Playing Catch-up with China. Comparative Connections is an electronic
journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations created by the Pacific Forum CSIS, a subsidiary of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. It also writes from the perspective of Japan, and
also wrote why Southeast Asia is important to Japan- and it is mainly for economic reasons. It
also mentions that Japan has security interests with Southeast Asia, but Japan manages that
through economic development, something that China also does, but China complements it with
political dominance and military might. The US also approaches security issues in Southeast
Asia with its government and military directly involved, however it is through diplomacy rather
than China’s demonstration of power. However, the article warns of Japan’s seemingly waning

5. influence on Southeast Asia due to the rise of China and advocates for Japan to demonstrate
more initiative through national policymaking to catch up with China (Percival, 2006).
As mentioned, China’s engagement in Southeast Asia is a major part of its Belt-and-Road
Initiative, and there has been countless journal articles and media coverage over this
international development strategy with various perspectives, sometimes arguing over China’s
intentions at the global stage with, as well as the major impacts of, this initiative. The
Washington Quarterly’s article, China's “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-
Changer?, is a good and somewhat objective introduction to this strategy. The article wrote that
there is a reason why China considers it a top national priority because this is not just economic
partnerships, but rather an international political strategy to “strengthen authoritarian
governments to China's west and south” that would eventually empower itself to become a
superpower (Rolland, 2017). This is a major breakthrough theory that would be investigated in
this paper.
While existing literature has covered much ground on Japan’s and China’s engagement with
Southeast Asia and focus individually on each country’s intentions, this paper will differentiate
the intentions behind the two countries’ contribution to the international development of
Southeast Asia and determine if China indeed has imperialistic motives, and if so, advocate in
its best interests for Southeast Asia to continue aligning with Japan (and to a larger extent, the
West). This paper hopes to inform policymakers in Southeast Asian countries on the
international development policies that would serve its best interests.
Theory
This paper proposes the theory that unlike Japan, China has imperialistic political and
ideological motives in its contribution to the development of Southeast Asia. As mentioned
above, because Japan is currently constitutionally not allowed to build up its military and is
ideologically aligned with the West (rather than having its distinct own ideology), Japan could
only engage with Southeast Asia for mutual economic and diplomatic benefits. Furthermore,
most of the infrastructure projects backed by Japan are directed by private Japanese
companies, which have no political motives whatsoever or have any intention to further any
Japanese government agenda other than indirectly spurring Japan’s own economy, since they
are primarily concerned with their own profits, or as the Diplomat article puts it, “many Japanese
projects have private backing by companies expecting to make a profit back in Tokyo. These
companies are advancing economic integration in Southeast Asia because it helps their bottom
line” (Borroz & Marston, 2015). In contrast, “compared to Japan’s development model, China’s
state-backed projects are more politically driven” as China-backed projects are funded directly
by the government of an emerging superpower, the world’s largest Communist state, one with
formidable military strength and the world’s 2nd largest economy, which all gives it the huge
military, political, ideological, and economic leverage to impose its power and influence
internationally, including onto Southeast Asia, which it has been doing. China may not have
intentions to colonialize or annex Southeast Asia like Japan did when Japan was an imperial
power during World War 2, or even make Southeast Asia nations communist, but based on
recent events such as the trade disputes with the US and the ongoing South China Sea dispute,
it does seem to want to compete with the West (including the US and Japan) ideologically by
aligning other governments to be more like China’s authoritarianism (Rolland, 2017). This could
be because China still sees the US as a power rival and Japan with resentment for its World

6. War 2 atrocities, and Southeast Asia would be that playing field in which China would compete
with them. The Communist government of China also has a history of interfering with some wars
in Southeast Asia, especially with the agenda of preserving and spreading communism, which
most Southeast Asian governments reject (and even Vietnam which is still Communist today is
very much adverse to China). China influencing Southeast Asia as well as other countries it
invested in to get onto its side would empower China in its quest, which would thereby elevate
China to a superpower status equal to or superseding the US, Japan and the West. This is why
there has been speculation of a new Cold War between China and the West (particularly the
US), that has made Southeast Asia nervous.
Also, there is speculation that getting Southeast Asian countries in debt to China’s infrastructure
loans would eventually lead to China seizing these infrastructure properties and therefore
establishing Chinese presence in these countries, just like how it happened to Sri Lanka when
China poured in money into projects there which became white elephants. Sri Lanka had given
into China’s offers for infrastructure loans and development efforts, whom built huge ports,
highways, airports, and a whole financial district from scratch, among others, that Sri Lanka
arguably does not need. So instead of creating jobs and stimulating the economy for Sri Lanka,
the projects were left unused, local lives were displaced, and Sri Lanka racked up a lot of debt it
now owes China. And because Sri Lanka couldn’t pay off its loans back China, it had to give up
ownership of the projects to China along with the land they sit on. This makes Sri Lankans feel
like their country is being sold to China (Limaye, 2017). This is like China’s way to colonize their
lands without direct political or military invasion. This was also a main concern of Malaysia’s
East Coast Rail Line project fully financed by China, as it was also seen as benefiting China
rather than Malaysians, and is therefore currently under review by the recently-elected new
government of Malaysia for possible suspension (Bland, 2018). That is not something that
Japan has created through its several decades of international development work and trade in
Southeast Asia and elsewhere, not least because Southeast Asia, Japan and the West are still
more politically-aligned with each other than with China.
Although certain Southeast Asian countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, the
Philippines, and Malaysia have at some points given into China’s offers for infrastructure
funding, thereby the competition with Japan on which would dominate Southeast Asia,
Southeast Asia these days no longer seems to be interested in China for funding their
developments (Jamrisko, 2018). Most Southeast Asian countries are still interested in
maintaining their overall cordial relationships with China, however they find more comfort with
Japan and the US in the balance of regional power- another implication that Southeast Asia is
wary of having too much of China’s presence in the region. This is evident with some Southeast
Asian countries’ participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which they were banking
on Japan and the US to be a major leaders and was originally based on an intention to pull
these countries “closer to the United States, and thus reduce Chinese economic
preponderance” (Naughton, Kroeber, De Jonquieres, & Webster, 2015). The US is no longer in
the TPP, but this original intention alone is evidence of Southeast Asia’s and other countries’
desire for balance of power in the region. This includes Japan itself, who has been trying to rise
above the competition it has with China by actively promoting itself to Southeast Asia. The
currently most high-profile case of Japan and China in direct competition with each other for
infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia is the Singapore-Malaysia high-speed railway project
which other countries such as the European Union member countries and South Korea are
bidding on as well. Japan has been aggressively promoting its world-famous Shinkansen (high-

7. speed railway) technology, punctual and clean safety records to the governments of Singapore
and Malaysia, as it has successfully done when it won contracts to build a subway line in the
Philippines and highways in Vietnam and Cambodia (Borroz & Marston, 2015).
With such differing dynamics in their relationships with China and Japan, it is no surprise that
Southeast Asia is wary of China’s imperialistic ambitions in the region and largely regards Japan
as its ally. And Japan does not regard international development contributions by the US,
European Union, the Middle East or even South Korea as such a politically-charged competition
in the international arena as much as with China. This is a unique international dynamic worth
investigating.
Proposed Strategies
To prove the above theory that China has imperialistic motives that Japan does not, this paper
will look for evidence through a further analysis of case studies and relevant observational data
of both China’s and Japan’s relationships with Southeast Asia, with each other and the West.
The above theory only presents situations where Southeast Asia speculates China’s motives
due to the way China carries itself around in the international arena, but this paper’s research
will look for evidence whether China does indeed have those motives while Japan does not.
In order to determine if imperialistic motives exist, this paper will compare an equal number
each of Chinese-backed and Japanese-backed projects in Southeast Asia, organized on a list
side by side and analyzed on a case-by-case basis to see if each of them would benefit China
or Japan more, the host Southeast Asian country more, or if there is an equal and mutual
benefit on both sides, using data such as profits and organizational structures. The outcomes of
completed Chinese-backed and Japanese-backed infrastructure projects will also be scrutinized
side by side, as well as how much social, economic and environmental costs and damages it
has placed on affected local inhabitants- and if there was any effort in remedying the costs and
damages. Another method would be to scrutinize the process of negotiations in these projects,
to see whether local/national governments reach out to the investing countries originally, or if
the investing countries themselves approach the governments offering investment and/or
specific projects.
Then this paper would also try to look at Chinese and Japanese media as well as government
documents on the respective countries’ perspectives of their involvement in Southeast Asia.
Model
In the abovementioned strategies, if either China or Japan is found to be benefiting from an
infrastructure project more than the respective host country in which the project is being built in,
whether economically in terms of profit or politically in terms of successfully pressuring the host
country to align with its wishes and/or ideologies, then this is evidence that China or Japan is
advancing an agenda in the host country.
But that also depends on whether a project has been successful or not in term of the outcomes
it produces, and how much social, economic and environmental costs and damages it has
placed on affected local inhabitants- and if there is, whether there has been concern and efforts
to remedy them. If an existing project funded by either China or Japan is found to be
unsuccessful and/or a “white elephant”, and make local inhabitants’ lives and/or the local

8. environment worse off, then there would be further investigation into whether the project was
initiated out of local needs or political greed. Also, scrutinizing the negotiation process for each
project individually could determine a country’s intentions, for example the way China or Japan
comes forth offering investment could show that it is more interested in its own needs than in
the specific needs of the country. We could also determine from the organization of this study if
there is a certain pattern in terms of China’s and Japan’s patterns in choosing countries to
invest in, and what they invest in.
Also, Chinese and Japanese media as well as government documents may use language to
cover up and/or shed a different light on their intentions with their involvement in Southeast
Asia, but cross-referencing with more objective third-party sources (i.e. not from China, Japan,
Southeast Asia or the US) could help read between the lines and uncover underlying intentions.

9. References
Alegado, S. (2018, February 8). Japan Still Beating China in Southeast Asia Infrastructure Race. Retrieved
from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018‐02‐08/japan‐still‐beating‐
china‐in‐southeast‐asia‐infrastructure‐race
Bland, B. (2018, May 15). China’s south‐east Asia push threatened by new Malaysia regime. Retrieved
from Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/94906ad4‐57eb‐11e8‐bdb7‐f6677d2e1ce8
Borroz, N., & Marston, H. (2015, June 11). Asia’s Infrastructure Investment Battle. Retrieved from The
Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/asias‐infrastructure‐investment‐battle/
Gallagher, E. (2018, January 31). Japan’s Enduring Value to Southeast Asia. Retrieved from Foreign Policy
Research Institute: https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/01/japans‐enduring‐value‐southeast‐asia/
Jamrisko, M. (2018, April 16). Southeast Asia Looks Beyond China to Fund Massive Project Needs.
Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018‐04‐16/southeast‐
asia‐looks‐beyond‐china‐to‐fund‐massive‐project‐needs
Limaye, Y. (2017, May 26). Sri Lanka: A country trapped in debt. Retrieved from BBC:
http://www.bbc.com/news/business‐40044113
Mahrotri, P. T., & Choong, E. (2016, November 21). $100 Billion Chinese‐Made City Near Singapore
'Scares the Hell Out of Everybody'. Retrieved from Bloomberg:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016‐11‐21/‐100‐billion‐chinese‐made‐city‐near‐
singapore‐scares‐the‐hell‐out‐of‐everybody
Naughton, B., Kroeber, R. A., De Jonquieres, G., & Webster, G. (2015, October 7). What Will the TPP
Mean for China? Retrieved from Foreign Policy: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/china‐
tpp‐trans‐pacific‐partnership‐obama‐us‐trade‐xi/
Ott, M. C. (2005). China's Strategic Reach Into Southeast Asia. 22: July.
Percival, B. (2006). Japan‐Southeast Asia Relations: Playing Catch‐up with China. Retrieved from
Comparative Connections: https://csis‐prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs‐
public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/0603qjapan_seasia.pdf
Rolland, N. (2017). China's “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game‐Changer? The
Washington Quarterly, 15.