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SESSION ID:
#RSAC
J. Trent Adams
It’s Not Dead Yet –
Email Security Matters
TECH-F01
Director, Ecosystem Security
PayPal
@jtrentadams
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this presentation are my own, and
not necessarily those of PayPal Holdings, Inc. or any of its affiliates.
#RSAC
It’s Not Dead Yet – Email Security Matters
2
Overview
Trust Matters
Attack Types
Table Stakes Checklist
Securing Your Own Email Flow
Policies & Guidelines
Outbound Authentication
Inbound Verification & Defenses
Securing Email Flows of Your Vendors
Sending On Your Behalf
Sending To Your Employees
Case StudiesTopics Covered
Operation PEST Control
It’s All About the Data
3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful
3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
#RSAC
Email Security – Trust Matters
3
We rely on email being a trusted channel of communication,
and malicious email attacking customers & employees erodes trust.
Unauthorized Account Access
Fraud Losses
Lower NPS
Brand Damage
Unauthorized Network Access
Data Exfiltration
Network Intrusions
Malware & Infections
Customers Employees
Eroded Trust!
#RSAC
Email Security – Attack Types
4
Spoofed Domain Attacks – These are the most convincing to a recipient as the entire
message is designed to mimic the legitimate sender. These messages purport to be from one of
our domains, and are nearly indistinguishable to the victim from a legitimate message. The only
differences are the IP address of the sending server and the existence of a malicious link,
attachment, or illegitimate content. All other aspects of the email appear legitimate.
Cousin Domain Attacks – These attacks differ slightly in that they mimic everything of a
legitimate message other than the sending domain. Rather than spoofing a legitimate domain,
the malicious email is sent from a domain that either looks convincingly like a legitimate one
(e.g. “pavpal.com”) or is otherwise obfuscated, often by confusing subdomains (e.g.
“paypal.customer.service.com”).
Display Name Abuse – These attacks may come from any domain (whether a “cousin
domain” or something different entirely), but the “display name” portion of the “From” field is
modified to look as if it came from one of our brands or products. This may take the form of a
legitimate email address (e.g. “service@paypal.com”) or a functional role
(e.g. “PayPal Customer Service”).
#RSAC
Email Security – Table Stakes
5
Table Stakes Checklist
 Simplify & Standardize Mail Flows (don’t forget to monitor them)
 Throttling & Blackholing (immediately drop what you can on the floor)
 Employ StartTLS (with modern cypher suites)
 Authorize Sending Servers with SPF (be careful with includes)
 Sign & Verify Email Using DKIM (2048-bit keys; rotate frequently)
 Publish and Obey DMARC Policies (be a “reject”)
 Scan and Quarantine / Reject (with extreme prejudice)
 Demand the Same from Vendors (write security policies into contracts)
#RSAC
It’s Not Dead Yet—Email Security Matters
6
Case Studies
Operation PEST Control
It’s All About the Data
3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful
3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
#RSAC
Case Study 1: Operation PEST Control
7
Problem Statement:
 How to strategically address email security and what organizational
structure would be the most effective?
Solution:
 Create a loosely coordinated operational task force made up of
collaborators across the company focused on securing email.
#RSAC
Email Security – Organizational Approach
8
#RSAC
Email Security - Coordination
9
Ensures coordination, consistency,
future-proofing.
Principles, Standards,
& Guidelines
Enables oversight & drives
compliance with policies.
Tool Deployment, Operations,
& Monitoring
Collecting & analyzing data to improve
defenses & alert on threats.
Data Aggregation, Analysis,
& Alerting
Phishing awareness & training is key
to closing the loop.
Education, Training,
& Communications
Ensures scalable interoperability &
prevents vendor lock-in.
External Standards Development
& Evangelism
Actual & suspected attacks must be
investigated and handled.
Incident Analysis & Response
#RSAC
Email Security – Operation PEST Control
10
Visibility into the problem & measuring
the effectiveness of solutions.
Minimizing the virulence of known attacks as
early as possible.
Quick and effective action when an attack is
detected.
Addressing emerging attacks and future-proofing
defenses.
Prevention
Reaction
Innovation
Intelligence
#RSAC
Case Study 1: Operation PEST Control
11
Results:
 An incredibly talented and effective cross-functional team.
 Visibility across the company (by and of the team).
 Dynamic, agile-type development / deployment / reactions.
Challenges:
 Maintaining continuity through organizational changes.
 Budget questions when solutions cross departments.
#RSAC
It’s Not Dead Yet – Email Security Matters
12
Case Studies
Operation PEST Control
It’s All About the Data
3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful
3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
#RSAC
Case Study 2: Data, Data Everywhere
13
Problem Statement:
 To secure our email, we need to define “malicious email” and then
quantify, measure, analyze, and report on the volume, virulence,
and risk posed by various types. How can we do this in a holistic
manner?
Solution:
 Tap into all available touch points and data flows. Analyze the data
for useful information and build dashboards, alerts, and automated
responses.
#RSAC
Email Security – Define “Malicious Email”
14
Malicious Email Includes:
Phishing – Tricking receivers into revealing sensitive information.
Malware Delivery – Installing malware on the receiver’s computer.
False Pretenses – Tricking receivers into taking unauthorized actions.
Malicious Email Abuses all Email Flows:
Transactional (e.g. system-generated receipts, password reset confirmations, etc.)
Communication (e.g. account notices, product updates, etc.)
Marketing (e.g. new product offerings, promotions, etc.)
Conversational (i.e. person-to-person messages sent to/from people internally and externally)
3rd Parties (i.e. email sent by a 3rd party, including email sent to customers or employees)
#RSAC
Email Security – Authentication is Key
15
Support Services & Tools
Mailbox Provider
Senders End User
Analytics Alerting Auditing etc.
. . .
Actionable
Intelligence
Filtering &
Verification
SPF & DKIM
DMARC Policy
Enforcement
DMARC Reports
DMARC
#RSAC
Email Security – Data, Data, Everywhere
16
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
1800000
2000000
Reports & Metrics
Clean Suspect Malicious
Desktop Protection
• Anti-Virus
• Usage Controls
Malicious URL Blocking
Corporate Policies & Guidelines
• Internal Controls
• 3rd Party and Partner Controls
MTAs
• Authentication & Filtering
• Malware Detection
Firewall
• Malicious Content Detection
• Throttling
Click
?
Open
?
YES
NO
NO
Report
Awareness
Training &
Testing
• Domain Blocks
• Pattern Blocks
*
*Simulated Data & Chart
#RSAC
Case Study 2: Data, Data Everywhere
17
Results:
 Analyzed existing logs and data sources.
 Added and refined logging to fill gaps and improve utility.
 Gained visibility into hitherto unknown problems.
 Significantly improved dashboards and metrics for tracking effectiveness.
Challenges:
 Normalizing data from various sources into meaningful information
requires careful consideration.
 Operationalizing research analytics processes can be difficult.
#RSAC
It’s Not Dead Yet – Email Security Matters
18
Case Studies
Operation PEST Control
It’s All About the Data
3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful
3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
#RSAC
Case Study 3: Clueful 3rd Parties
19
Problem Statement:
 Given that email must be sent by 3rd parties, both on behalf of the
company and to employees, how can we ensure their email flows
are secure?
Solution:
 Develop a comprehensive “3rd Party Email Security Guidelines” that
act as a cookbook for implementing email security according to our
requirements.
#RSAC
Email Security – 3rd Party Guidelines
20
Example DKIM Guidance:
1. DKIM keys must be 2048-bit
2. Signing canonicalization must be set to
"relaxed/relaxed"
3. The "d=" domain set to the domain in the
Addr-Spec portion of the RFC5322.From field.
4. The "s=" selector set to the selector name we
provide.
5. The following headers must be signed:
• From
• Subject
• Date
• To
• MIME-Version
• Content-Type
#RSAC
Case Study 3: Clueful 3rd Parties
21
Results:
 Vastly improved our process of on-boarding new vendors.
 Simplified and standardized vendor deployments.
 Clarified the security expectations for project management staff.
Challenges:
 There are always challenges in deployment; the requirements can be met
in various ways and creative, unique solutions are often required.
 Some (often the large, well-known) vendors have hard-coded products
that take months (and in some cases years) to become compliant.
#RSAC
It’s Not Dead Yet – Email Security Matters
22
Case Studies
Operation PEST Control
It’s All About the Data
3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful
3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
#RSAC
Case Study 3: Clueless 3rd Parties
23
Problem Statement:
 Given that email must be sent by 3rd parties, both on behalf of the
company and to employees, how can we ensure their email flows
are secure… when the vendor has no idea how to secure their email
flow?
Solution:
 Send them a copy of the “3rd Party Email Security Guidelines”.
 Provide a subject matter expert to educate and guide them.
 Replace the vendor if they cannot comply.
#RSAC
Case Study 3: Clueless 3rd Parties
24
Results:
 Clarified the process of a vendor becoming compliant.
 Helped vendors modernize and improve their email security for all customers.
 Ensured that we only use compliant vendors.
Challenges:
 Vendors with non-compliant solutions prior to the guidelines being enforced had to be
retroactively brought into compliance.
 Projects started without fully understanding the ramifications of non-compliance were
stalled (or canceled).
 Requires executive leadership willing to support drawing a hard line (which, fortunately,
we have).
#RSAC
Email Security – Takeaways
#RSAC
Email Security – Takeaways
26
1. If you haven’t already done so, immediately deploy DMARC to begin receiving
reports.
2. Catalog all email flows (think hard about this, as some may not be obvious) and
log meaningful data from them.
3. Document policies, standards, and guidelines covering internal and 3rd party
email.
4. Create a tiger team representing all stakeholders identified by the catalog, and
empower them to improve your email security posture.
5. Unleash the tiger team to “move the needle” of the metrics indicated by the data
that has been gathered.
6. Ensure that vendors are held accountable to being compliant with your
requirements.
SESSION ID:
#RSAC
J. Trent Adams
Thanks!
(Questions?)
TECH-F01
Director, Ecosystem Security
PayPal
@jtrentadams
PS: Yes, I was in Star Wars: The Force Awakens. If you have no questions
about this presentation, I’ll happily talk your ear off about that experience.

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It's Not Dead Yet - Email Security Matters

  • 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC J. Trent Adams It’s Not Dead Yet – Email Security Matters TECH-F01 Director, Ecosystem Security PayPal @jtrentadams DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this presentation are my own, and not necessarily those of PayPal Holdings, Inc. or any of its affiliates.
  • 2. #RSAC It’s Not Dead Yet – Email Security Matters 2 Overview Trust Matters Attack Types Table Stakes Checklist Securing Your Own Email Flow Policies & Guidelines Outbound Authentication Inbound Verification & Defenses Securing Email Flows of Your Vendors Sending On Your Behalf Sending To Your Employees Case StudiesTopics Covered Operation PEST Control It’s All About the Data 3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful 3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
  • 3. #RSAC Email Security – Trust Matters 3 We rely on email being a trusted channel of communication, and malicious email attacking customers & employees erodes trust. Unauthorized Account Access Fraud Losses Lower NPS Brand Damage Unauthorized Network Access Data Exfiltration Network Intrusions Malware & Infections Customers Employees Eroded Trust!
  • 4. #RSAC Email Security – Attack Types 4 Spoofed Domain Attacks – These are the most convincing to a recipient as the entire message is designed to mimic the legitimate sender. These messages purport to be from one of our domains, and are nearly indistinguishable to the victim from a legitimate message. The only differences are the IP address of the sending server and the existence of a malicious link, attachment, or illegitimate content. All other aspects of the email appear legitimate. Cousin Domain Attacks – These attacks differ slightly in that they mimic everything of a legitimate message other than the sending domain. Rather than spoofing a legitimate domain, the malicious email is sent from a domain that either looks convincingly like a legitimate one (e.g. “pavpal.com”) or is otherwise obfuscated, often by confusing subdomains (e.g. “paypal.customer.service.com”). Display Name Abuse – These attacks may come from any domain (whether a “cousin domain” or something different entirely), but the “display name” portion of the “From” field is modified to look as if it came from one of our brands or products. This may take the form of a legitimate email address (e.g. “service@paypal.com”) or a functional role (e.g. “PayPal Customer Service”).
  • 5. #RSAC Email Security – Table Stakes 5 Table Stakes Checklist  Simplify & Standardize Mail Flows (don’t forget to monitor them)  Throttling & Blackholing (immediately drop what you can on the floor)  Employ StartTLS (with modern cypher suites)  Authorize Sending Servers with SPF (be careful with includes)  Sign & Verify Email Using DKIM (2048-bit keys; rotate frequently)  Publish and Obey DMARC Policies (be a “reject”)  Scan and Quarantine / Reject (with extreme prejudice)  Demand the Same from Vendors (write security policies into contracts)
  • 6. #RSAC It’s Not Dead Yet—Email Security Matters 6 Case Studies Operation PEST Control It’s All About the Data 3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful 3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
  • 7. #RSAC Case Study 1: Operation PEST Control 7 Problem Statement:  How to strategically address email security and what organizational structure would be the most effective? Solution:  Create a loosely coordinated operational task force made up of collaborators across the company focused on securing email.
  • 8. #RSAC Email Security – Organizational Approach 8
  • 9. #RSAC Email Security - Coordination 9 Ensures coordination, consistency, future-proofing. Principles, Standards, & Guidelines Enables oversight & drives compliance with policies. Tool Deployment, Operations, & Monitoring Collecting & analyzing data to improve defenses & alert on threats. Data Aggregation, Analysis, & Alerting Phishing awareness & training is key to closing the loop. Education, Training, & Communications Ensures scalable interoperability & prevents vendor lock-in. External Standards Development & Evangelism Actual & suspected attacks must be investigated and handled. Incident Analysis & Response
  • 10. #RSAC Email Security – Operation PEST Control 10 Visibility into the problem & measuring the effectiveness of solutions. Minimizing the virulence of known attacks as early as possible. Quick and effective action when an attack is detected. Addressing emerging attacks and future-proofing defenses. Prevention Reaction Innovation Intelligence
  • 11. #RSAC Case Study 1: Operation PEST Control 11 Results:  An incredibly talented and effective cross-functional team.  Visibility across the company (by and of the team).  Dynamic, agile-type development / deployment / reactions. Challenges:  Maintaining continuity through organizational changes.  Budget questions when solutions cross departments.
  • 12. #RSAC It’s Not Dead Yet – Email Security Matters 12 Case Studies Operation PEST Control It’s All About the Data 3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful 3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
  • 13. #RSAC Case Study 2: Data, Data Everywhere 13 Problem Statement:  To secure our email, we need to define “malicious email” and then quantify, measure, analyze, and report on the volume, virulence, and risk posed by various types. How can we do this in a holistic manner? Solution:  Tap into all available touch points and data flows. Analyze the data for useful information and build dashboards, alerts, and automated responses.
  • 14. #RSAC Email Security – Define “Malicious Email” 14 Malicious Email Includes: Phishing – Tricking receivers into revealing sensitive information. Malware Delivery – Installing malware on the receiver’s computer. False Pretenses – Tricking receivers into taking unauthorized actions. Malicious Email Abuses all Email Flows: Transactional (e.g. system-generated receipts, password reset confirmations, etc.) Communication (e.g. account notices, product updates, etc.) Marketing (e.g. new product offerings, promotions, etc.) Conversational (i.e. person-to-person messages sent to/from people internally and externally) 3rd Parties (i.e. email sent by a 3rd party, including email sent to customers or employees)
  • 15. #RSAC Email Security – Authentication is Key 15 Support Services & Tools Mailbox Provider Senders End User Analytics Alerting Auditing etc. . . . Actionable Intelligence Filtering & Verification SPF & DKIM DMARC Policy Enforcement DMARC Reports DMARC
  • 16. #RSAC Email Security – Data, Data, Everywhere 16 0 200000 400000 600000 800000 1000000 1200000 1400000 1600000 1800000 2000000 Reports & Metrics Clean Suspect Malicious Desktop Protection • Anti-Virus • Usage Controls Malicious URL Blocking Corporate Policies & Guidelines • Internal Controls • 3rd Party and Partner Controls MTAs • Authentication & Filtering • Malware Detection Firewall • Malicious Content Detection • Throttling Click ? Open ? YES NO NO Report Awareness Training & Testing • Domain Blocks • Pattern Blocks * *Simulated Data & Chart
  • 17. #RSAC Case Study 2: Data, Data Everywhere 17 Results:  Analyzed existing logs and data sources.  Added and refined logging to fill gaps and improve utility.  Gained visibility into hitherto unknown problems.  Significantly improved dashboards and metrics for tracking effectiveness. Challenges:  Normalizing data from various sources into meaningful information requires careful consideration.  Operationalizing research analytics processes can be difficult.
  • 18. #RSAC It’s Not Dead Yet – Email Security Matters 18 Case Studies Operation PEST Control It’s All About the Data 3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful 3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
  • 19. #RSAC Case Study 3: Clueful 3rd Parties 19 Problem Statement:  Given that email must be sent by 3rd parties, both on behalf of the company and to employees, how can we ensure their email flows are secure? Solution:  Develop a comprehensive “3rd Party Email Security Guidelines” that act as a cookbook for implementing email security according to our requirements.
  • 20. #RSAC Email Security – 3rd Party Guidelines 20 Example DKIM Guidance: 1. DKIM keys must be 2048-bit 2. Signing canonicalization must be set to "relaxed/relaxed" 3. The "d=" domain set to the domain in the Addr-Spec portion of the RFC5322.From field. 4. The "s=" selector set to the selector name we provide. 5. The following headers must be signed: • From • Subject • Date • To • MIME-Version • Content-Type
  • 21. #RSAC Case Study 3: Clueful 3rd Parties 21 Results:  Vastly improved our process of on-boarding new vendors.  Simplified and standardized vendor deployments.  Clarified the security expectations for project management staff. Challenges:  There are always challenges in deployment; the requirements can be met in various ways and creative, unique solutions are often required.  Some (often the large, well-known) vendors have hard-coded products that take months (and in some cases years) to become compliant.
  • 22. #RSAC It’s Not Dead Yet – Email Security Matters 22 Case Studies Operation PEST Control It’s All About the Data 3rd Parties Part 1: The Clueful 3rd Parties Part 2: The Clueless
  • 23. #RSAC Case Study 3: Clueless 3rd Parties 23 Problem Statement:  Given that email must be sent by 3rd parties, both on behalf of the company and to employees, how can we ensure their email flows are secure… when the vendor has no idea how to secure their email flow? Solution:  Send them a copy of the “3rd Party Email Security Guidelines”.  Provide a subject matter expert to educate and guide them.  Replace the vendor if they cannot comply.
  • 24. #RSAC Case Study 3: Clueless 3rd Parties 24 Results:  Clarified the process of a vendor becoming compliant.  Helped vendors modernize and improve their email security for all customers.  Ensured that we only use compliant vendors. Challenges:  Vendors with non-compliant solutions prior to the guidelines being enforced had to be retroactively brought into compliance.  Projects started without fully understanding the ramifications of non-compliance were stalled (or canceled).  Requires executive leadership willing to support drawing a hard line (which, fortunately, we have).
  • 26. #RSAC Email Security – Takeaways 26 1. If you haven’t already done so, immediately deploy DMARC to begin receiving reports. 2. Catalog all email flows (think hard about this, as some may not be obvious) and log meaningful data from them. 3. Document policies, standards, and guidelines covering internal and 3rd party email. 4. Create a tiger team representing all stakeholders identified by the catalog, and empower them to improve your email security posture. 5. Unleash the tiger team to “move the needle” of the metrics indicated by the data that has been gathered. 6. Ensure that vendors are held accountable to being compliant with your requirements.
  • 27. SESSION ID: #RSAC J. Trent Adams Thanks! (Questions?) TECH-F01 Director, Ecosystem Security PayPal @jtrentadams PS: Yes, I was in Star Wars: The Force Awakens. If you have no questions about this presentation, I’ll happily talk your ear off about that experience.