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Choosing the Most Appropriate
    Data Security Solution
     for an Organization
        Ulf Mattsson, CTO Protegrity
2
Ulf Mattsson, CTO Protegrity
    • 20 years with IBM Research & Development and
      Global Services
    • Started Protegrity in 1994 (Data Security)
    • Inventor of 25 patents – Encryption and
      Tokenization
    • Member of
       – PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC)
       – American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X9
       – International Federation for Information Processing
           (IFIP) WG 11.3 Data and Application Security
       – ISACA , ISSA and Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)




4
WE KNOW THAT
       DATA IS
    UNDER ATTACK …

5
Albert Gonzalez
                                            20 Years In US Federal Prison

    US Federal indictments:

            1. Dave & Busters
            2. TJ Maxx
            3. Heartland HPS
               •Breach expenses
               $140M


    Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Gonzalez




6
What about Breaches & PCI?
                                                   Was Data Protected?
                      9: Restrict physical access to cardholder data

                    5: Use and regularly update anti-virus software

                         4: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data

    2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for security parameters

         12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security

    1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect data

       8: Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access

         6: Develop and maintain secure systems and applications

    10: Track and monitor all access to network resources and data

                 11: Regularly test security systems and processes

               7: Restrict access to data by business need-to-know

                                             3: Protect Stored Data
                                                                                                                                         %
                                                                       0     10     20      30       40   50   60   70   80   90   100

    Based on post-breach reviews. Relevant Organizations in Compliance with PCI DSS. Verizon Study


7
WHAT TYPES OF DATA
    ARE UNDER ATTACK
          NOW?

8
What Data is Compromised?

          Personal information (Name, SS#, Addr, etc.)
                                 Payment card numbers/data
                   Unknown (specific type is not known)
                                     Medical records Medical
                                         Classified information
                                                     Trade secrets
                       Copyrighted/Trademarked material
              System information (config, svcs, sw, etc.)
                                Bank account numbers/data
    Sensitive organizational data (reports, plans, etc.)
                                   Authentication credentials…

                                                                          0          20           40   60   80   100   120 %
    By percent of records. Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/



9
Today “Hacktivism” is Dominating


                                                 Activist group
                                 Organized criminal group
             Relative or acquaintance of employee
        Former employee (no longer had access)
                                      Unaffiliated person(s)
                                                        Unknown

                                                                            0   10   20   30   40   50   60   70 %



     By percent of records
     Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/




10
Growing Threat of “hacktivism” by
                                       Groups such as Anonymous




                                                                      Attacks by Anonymous include
                                                                      • 2012: CIA and Interpol
                                                                      • 2011: Sony, Stratfor and HBGary Federal

     Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_events_involving_Anonymous



11
Let’s Review Some Major Recent Breaches
                                        April 2011          May 2011   Jun 2011   Jul 2011   Aug 2011




       Attack
       Type,
       Time
        and
      Impact
         $


     Source: IBM 2012 Security Breaches Trend and Risk Report



12
The Sony Breach & Cloud

     • Lost 100 million passwords and personal details
       stored in clear
     • Spent $171 million related to the data breach
     • Sony's stock price has fallen 40 percent
     • For three pennies an hour, hackers can rent
       Amazon.com to wage cyber attacks such as the
       one that crippled Sony
     • Attack via SQL Injection




13
SQL Injection Attacks are Increasing

                  25,000


                  20,000

                  15,000


                  10,000


                    5,000



                            Q1 2011                             Q2 2011   Q3 2011


     Source: IBM 2012 Security Breaches Trend and Risk Report




14
WHAT IS
     SQL INJECTION?


15
What is an SQL Injection Attack?

                         SQL Command Injected




                  Application



                                        Data
                                        Store




16
New Industry Groups are Targets

     Accommodation and Food Services

                                              Retail Trade

                            Finance and Insurance

        Health Care and Social Assistance

                                                        Other

                                              Information

                                                                     0      10   20   30   40   50   60 %


     By percent of breaches
     Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/




17
The Changing Threat Landscape

             Some issues have stayed constant:

                   Threat landscape continues to gain sophistication
                   Attackers will always be a step ahead of the defenders



             We are fighting highly organized, well-funded crime
              syndicates and nations

             Move from detective to preventative controls needed


Source: http://www.csoonline.com/article/602313/the-changing-threat-landscape?page=2
How are Breaches Discovered?

                            Notified by law enforcement
               Third-party fraud detection (e.g., CPP)
             Reported by customer/partner affected
                       Brag or blackmail by perpetrator
                                                      Unknown
           Witnessed and/or reported by employee
                                                        Other(s)
                  Internal fraud detection mechanism
           Financial audit and reconciliation process
                    Log analysis and/or review process
           Unusual system behavior or performance

                                                                      0        10       20           30   40   50   60   70   %

     By percent of breaches . Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/



19
WHERE IS
     DATA LOST?


20
What Assets are Compromised?

                            Database server
                      Web/application server
                       Desktop/Workstation
                                   Mail server
                     Call Center Staff People
                       Remote Access server
                            Laptop/Netbook
                                    File server
     Pay at the Pump terminal User devices
               Cashier/Teller/Waiter People
Payment card (credit, debit, etc.) Offline data
        Regular employee/end-user People
          Automated Teller Machine (ATM)
                 POS terminal User devices
                POS server (store controller)

                                                                  0         20   40   60   80   100   %
                                                                                                      120
     By percent of records
     Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/




21
Hacking and Malware are Leading
                                                          Threat Action Categories


                             Hacking

                                 Social

                               Misuse

               Environmental

                                                 0                      50    100    150
                                                                                     %



     By percent of records
     Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/




22
Thieves Are Attacking the Data Flow




           Application   Application




023
THIS IS A
     CATCH 22!


24
Securing The Data Flow with Tokenization




     Retail                                        Bank
     Store




              Payment      9999 9999   Corporate
              Network                  Systems




25
WHAT HAS
     THE INDUSTRY
       DONE TO
     SECURE DATA?

26
What Has The Industry Done?
                                                                  Total Cost of Ownership
     Total Cost of                                                    1.   System Integration
      Ownership                                                       2.   Performance Impact
                                                                      3.   Key Management
                     Strong Encryption:
     High -                                                           4.   Policy Management
                        3DES, AES …
                                                                      5.   Reporting
                                                                      6.   Paper Handling
                            Format Preserving Encryption:             7.   Compliance Audit
                                     FPE, DTP …                       8.   …

                                             Basic Tokenization

                                                        Vaultless Tokenization

      Low -
                I      I                I               I                   Time
              1970   2000             2005            2010


27
Case Study: Large Chain Store

     Why? Reduce compliance cost by 50%
        – 50 million Credit Cards, 700 million daily transactions
        – Performance Challenge: 30 days with Basic to 90 minutes with Vaultless
          Tokenization
        – End-to-End Tokens: Started with the D/W and expanding to stores
        – Lower maintenance cost – don’t have to apply all 12 requirements
        – Better security – able to eliminate several business and daily reports
        – Qualified Security Assessors had no issues
            • “With encryption, implementations can spawn dozens of questions”
            • “There were no such challenges with tokenization”




28
Speed of Different Protection Methods

                             Transactions per second
                    10 000 000 -

                         1 000 000 -

                          100 000 -

                            10 000 -

                             1 000 -

                               100 -
                                         I               I          I             I
                                       Basic           Format    AES CBC      Vaultless
                                       Data       Preserving    Encryption      Data
     Speed will depend on
     the configuration             Tokenization   Encryption    Standard     Tokenization


29
Case Studies: Retail
     Customer 1: Why? Three major concerns solved
        – Performance Challenge; Initial tokenization
        – Vendor Lock-In: What if we want to switch payment processor
        – Extensive Enterprise End-to-End Credit Card Data Protection
     Customer 2: Why? Desired single vendor to provide data
       protection
        – Combined use of tokenization and encryption
        – Looking to expand tokens beyond CCN to PII
     Customer 3: Why? Remove compensating controls from the
       mainframe
        – Tokens on the mainframe to avoid compensating controls

30
Impact of Different Protection Methods
                                   Intrusiveness    (to Applications and Databases)




                                                                                                   Encryption
                                                                                                    Standard
                                   Hashing -    !@#$%a^///&*B()..,,,gft_+!@4#$2%p^&*

                     Strong Encryption -        !@#$%a^.,mhu7///&*B()_+!@
Data Type & Format




                                     Alpha -    aVdSaH 1F4hJ 1D3a
                                                                               Tokenizing or
                       Encoding




                                   Numeric -    666666 777777 8888              Formatted
                                                                                Encryption
                                    Partial -   123456 777777 1234

                         Clear Text Data -      123456 123456 1234
                                                                                               Data
                                                                       I
                                                                                               Length
                                                                    Original



31
How Should I Secure Different Data?
                   File                Field
                Encryption          Tokenization
      Use
      Case
                                                      Card
     Simple -                       PII              Holder   PCI
                                                      Data


                PHI
                       Protected
                         Health
Complex -             Information
                                                              Type of
                      I                             I
                                                               Data
                Un-structured                  Structured


32
ANY
     TOKENIZATION
      GUIDELINES?

33
PCI DSS : Tokenization and Encryption
                  are Different




34
Tokenization and “PCI Out Of Scope”

                                                        De-tokenization
                                        No                Available?

                                    Random Number
                                                                               Yes
                                        Tokens?
                                                                      No:
                                        Yes                           FPE

                                   Isolated from Card
                                       Holder Data
      Yes                            Environment?             No
         Out of                                           Scope             No Scope
         Scope                                          Reduction           Reduction

     Source: http://www.securosis.com

35
Case Study: Energy Industry

     Why? Reduce PCI Scope
        • Best way to handle legacy, we got most of it out of PCI
        • Get rid of unwanted paper copies
        • No need to rewrite/redevelop or restructure business
           applications
        • A VERY efficient way of PCI Reduction of Scope
        • Better understanding of your data flow
        • Better understanding of business flow
        • Opportunity to clean up a few business oddities



36
RISK MANAGEMENT



37
Choose Your Defenses
     Cost
            Cost of Aversion –                Expected Losses
            Protection of Data                from the Risk

                        Total Cost


                          Optimal
                           Risk




                                                        Protection
                             I           I                Option
                           Data      Monitoring
                         Lockdown

38
Matching Data Protection with Risk Level


                                    Risk Level     Solution
               Data         Risk
               Field        Level                 Tokenization, str
                                     High Risk
                                                   ong encryption
      Credit Card Number     25       (16-25)
     Social Security Number  20
         Email Address       20                    Monitoring,
        Customer Name        12     Medium Risk   masking, format
         Secret Formula      10       (6-15)        controlling
        Employee Name         9                     encryption
     Employee Health Record   6
             Zip Code         3       Low Risk      Monitoring
                                        (1-5)




39
Security of Different Protection Methods

     Security Level

              High



               Low

                          I             I            I             I
                        Basic        Format       AES CBC      Vaultless
                        Data        Preserving   Encryption      Data
                     Tokenization   Encryption   Standard     Tokenization


40
Use of Enabling Technologies

                  Access controls   1%                          91%

     Database activity monitoring   18%                   47%

            Database encryption     30%             35%

     Backup / Archive encryption    21%                 39%

                   Data masking     28%           28%

     Application-level encryption   7%            29%

                    Tokenization    22%      23%

                                     Evaluating


41
Is Data Masking Secure?

     Risk

                      Data at rest                    Data display
     High –
                       Masking                         Masking

                       Exposure:                        Exposure:
                       Data is only                    Data in clear
                       obfuscated                     before masking




     Low -
                                                                       System
                   I              I            I              I         Type
              Test / dev     Integration    Trouble       Production
                               testing     shooting


42
Data Tokens = Lower Risk
         Risk



                      Data at rest                    Data display
     High –
                       Masking                         Masking
                       Exposure:                        Exposure:
                       Data is only                    Data in clear
                       obfuscated                     before masking




     Low -                            Data Tokens
                                                                       System
                   I              I            I              I         Type
              Test / dev     Integration    Trouble       Production
                               testing     shooting


43
CAN SECURITY HELP
        CREATIVITY?



44
Old Security = Less Creativity

         Risk


           High
                                            Traditional
                                              Access
                                              Control




           Low
                                                                   Access
                           I                               I
                                                                 Right Level
                         Less                             More

     Source: InformationWeek Aug 15, 2011
45
New Data Security = More Creativity

         Risk


           High
                                            Traditional
                                              Access
                                              Control                 New:
                                                                    Creativity
                                                                    Happens
                                                                   At the edge


           Low                                    Data Tokens
                                                                           Access
                           I                                     I
                                                                         Right Level
                         Less                                   More

     Source: InformationWeek Aug 15, 2011
46
About Protegrity
     • Proven enterprise data security software and innovation leader
        – Sole focus on the protection of data
        – Patented Technology, Continuing to Drive Innovation
     • Growth driven by compliance and risk management
        – PCI (Payment Card Industry), PII (Personally Identifiable Information), PHI
          (Protected Health Information)
        – US State and Foreign Privacy Laws, Breach Notification Laws
     • Cross-industry applicability
        –   Retail, Hospitality, Travel and Transportation
        –   Financial Services, Insurance, Banking
        –   Healthcare, Telecommunications, Media and Entertainment
        –   Manufacturing and Government




47
Thank you!
              Q&A
     ulf.mattsson AT protegrity.com
          www.protegrity.com
              203-326-7200


48

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ISACA New York Metro April 30 2012

  • 1. Choosing the Most Appropriate Data Security Solution for an Organization Ulf Mattsson, CTO Protegrity
  • 2. 2
  • 3.
  • 4. Ulf Mattsson, CTO Protegrity • 20 years with IBM Research & Development and Global Services • Started Protegrity in 1994 (Data Security) • Inventor of 25 patents – Encryption and Tokenization • Member of – PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) – American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X9 – International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) WG 11.3 Data and Application Security – ISACA , ISSA and Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) 4
  • 5. WE KNOW THAT DATA IS UNDER ATTACK … 5
  • 6. Albert Gonzalez 20 Years In US Federal Prison US Federal indictments: 1. Dave & Busters 2. TJ Maxx 3. Heartland HPS •Breach expenses $140M Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Gonzalez 6
  • 7. What about Breaches & PCI? Was Data Protected? 9: Restrict physical access to cardholder data 5: Use and regularly update anti-virus software 4: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for security parameters 12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect data 8: Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access 6: Develop and maintain secure systems and applications 10: Track and monitor all access to network resources and data 11: Regularly test security systems and processes 7: Restrict access to data by business need-to-know 3: Protect Stored Data % 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Based on post-breach reviews. Relevant Organizations in Compliance with PCI DSS. Verizon Study 7
  • 8. WHAT TYPES OF DATA ARE UNDER ATTACK NOW? 8
  • 9. What Data is Compromised? Personal information (Name, SS#, Addr, etc.) Payment card numbers/data Unknown (specific type is not known) Medical records Medical Classified information Trade secrets Copyrighted/Trademarked material System information (config, svcs, sw, etc.) Bank account numbers/data Sensitive organizational data (reports, plans, etc.) Authentication credentials… 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 % By percent of records. Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/ 9
  • 10. Today “Hacktivism” is Dominating Activist group Organized criminal group Relative or acquaintance of employee Former employee (no longer had access) Unaffiliated person(s) Unknown 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 % By percent of records Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/ 10
  • 11. Growing Threat of “hacktivism” by Groups such as Anonymous Attacks by Anonymous include • 2012: CIA and Interpol • 2011: Sony, Stratfor and HBGary Federal Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_events_involving_Anonymous 11
  • 12. Let’s Review Some Major Recent Breaches April 2011 May 2011 Jun 2011 Jul 2011 Aug 2011 Attack Type, Time and Impact $ Source: IBM 2012 Security Breaches Trend and Risk Report 12
  • 13. The Sony Breach & Cloud • Lost 100 million passwords and personal details stored in clear • Spent $171 million related to the data breach • Sony's stock price has fallen 40 percent • For three pennies an hour, hackers can rent Amazon.com to wage cyber attacks such as the one that crippled Sony • Attack via SQL Injection 13
  • 14. SQL Injection Attacks are Increasing 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 Q1 2011 Q2 2011 Q3 2011 Source: IBM 2012 Security Breaches Trend and Risk Report 14
  • 15. WHAT IS SQL INJECTION? 15
  • 16. What is an SQL Injection Attack? SQL Command Injected Application Data Store 16
  • 17. New Industry Groups are Targets Accommodation and Food Services Retail Trade Finance and Insurance Health Care and Social Assistance Other Information 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 % By percent of breaches Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/ 17
  • 18. The Changing Threat Landscape  Some issues have stayed constant:  Threat landscape continues to gain sophistication  Attackers will always be a step ahead of the defenders  We are fighting highly organized, well-funded crime syndicates and nations  Move from detective to preventative controls needed Source: http://www.csoonline.com/article/602313/the-changing-threat-landscape?page=2
  • 19. How are Breaches Discovered? Notified by law enforcement Third-party fraud detection (e.g., CPP) Reported by customer/partner affected Brag or blackmail by perpetrator Unknown Witnessed and/or reported by employee Other(s) Internal fraud detection mechanism Financial audit and reconciliation process Log analysis and/or review process Unusual system behavior or performance 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 % By percent of breaches . Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/ 19
  • 20. WHERE IS DATA LOST? 20
  • 21. What Assets are Compromised? Database server Web/application server Desktop/Workstation Mail server Call Center Staff People Remote Access server Laptop/Netbook File server Pay at the Pump terminal User devices Cashier/Teller/Waiter People Payment card (credit, debit, etc.) Offline data Regular employee/end-user People Automated Teller Machine (ATM) POS terminal User devices POS server (store controller) 0 20 40 60 80 100 % 120 By percent of records Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/ 21
  • 22. Hacking and Malware are Leading Threat Action Categories Hacking Social Misuse Environmental 0 50 100 150 % By percent of records Source: 2012, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/Products/security/dbir/ 22
  • 23. Thieves Are Attacking the Data Flow Application Application 023
  • 24. THIS IS A CATCH 22! 24
  • 25. Securing The Data Flow with Tokenization Retail Bank Store Payment 9999 9999 Corporate Network Systems 25
  • 26. WHAT HAS THE INDUSTRY DONE TO SECURE DATA? 26
  • 27. What Has The Industry Done? Total Cost of Ownership Total Cost of 1. System Integration Ownership 2. Performance Impact 3. Key Management Strong Encryption: High - 4. Policy Management 3DES, AES … 5. Reporting 6. Paper Handling Format Preserving Encryption: 7. Compliance Audit FPE, DTP … 8. … Basic Tokenization Vaultless Tokenization Low - I I I I Time 1970 2000 2005 2010 27
  • 28. Case Study: Large Chain Store Why? Reduce compliance cost by 50% – 50 million Credit Cards, 700 million daily transactions – Performance Challenge: 30 days with Basic to 90 minutes with Vaultless Tokenization – End-to-End Tokens: Started with the D/W and expanding to stores – Lower maintenance cost – don’t have to apply all 12 requirements – Better security – able to eliminate several business and daily reports – Qualified Security Assessors had no issues • “With encryption, implementations can spawn dozens of questions” • “There were no such challenges with tokenization” 28
  • 29. Speed of Different Protection Methods Transactions per second 10 000 000 - 1 000 000 - 100 000 - 10 000 - 1 000 - 100 - I I I I Basic Format AES CBC Vaultless Data Preserving Encryption Data Speed will depend on the configuration Tokenization Encryption Standard Tokenization 29
  • 30. Case Studies: Retail Customer 1: Why? Three major concerns solved – Performance Challenge; Initial tokenization – Vendor Lock-In: What if we want to switch payment processor – Extensive Enterprise End-to-End Credit Card Data Protection Customer 2: Why? Desired single vendor to provide data protection – Combined use of tokenization and encryption – Looking to expand tokens beyond CCN to PII Customer 3: Why? Remove compensating controls from the mainframe – Tokens on the mainframe to avoid compensating controls 30
  • 31. Impact of Different Protection Methods Intrusiveness (to Applications and Databases) Encryption Standard Hashing - !@#$%a^///&*B()..,,,gft_+!@4#$2%p^&* Strong Encryption - !@#$%a^.,mhu7///&*B()_+!@ Data Type & Format Alpha - aVdSaH 1F4hJ 1D3a Tokenizing or Encoding Numeric - 666666 777777 8888 Formatted Encryption Partial - 123456 777777 1234 Clear Text Data - 123456 123456 1234 Data I Length Original 31
  • 32. How Should I Secure Different Data? File Field Encryption Tokenization Use Case Card Simple - PII Holder PCI Data PHI Protected Health Complex - Information Type of I I Data Un-structured Structured 32
  • 33. ANY TOKENIZATION GUIDELINES? 33
  • 34. PCI DSS : Tokenization and Encryption are Different 34
  • 35. Tokenization and “PCI Out Of Scope” De-tokenization No Available? Random Number Yes Tokens? No: Yes FPE Isolated from Card Holder Data Yes Environment? No Out of Scope No Scope Scope Reduction Reduction Source: http://www.securosis.com 35
  • 36. Case Study: Energy Industry Why? Reduce PCI Scope • Best way to handle legacy, we got most of it out of PCI • Get rid of unwanted paper copies • No need to rewrite/redevelop or restructure business applications • A VERY efficient way of PCI Reduction of Scope • Better understanding of your data flow • Better understanding of business flow • Opportunity to clean up a few business oddities 36
  • 38. Choose Your Defenses Cost Cost of Aversion – Expected Losses Protection of Data from the Risk Total Cost Optimal Risk Protection I I Option Data Monitoring Lockdown 38
  • 39. Matching Data Protection with Risk Level Risk Level Solution Data Risk Field Level Tokenization, str High Risk ong encryption Credit Card Number 25 (16-25) Social Security Number 20 Email Address 20 Monitoring, Customer Name 12 Medium Risk masking, format Secret Formula 10 (6-15) controlling Employee Name 9 encryption Employee Health Record 6 Zip Code 3 Low Risk Monitoring (1-5) 39
  • 40. Security of Different Protection Methods Security Level High Low I I I I Basic Format AES CBC Vaultless Data Preserving Encryption Data Tokenization Encryption Standard Tokenization 40
  • 41. Use of Enabling Technologies Access controls 1% 91% Database activity monitoring 18% 47% Database encryption 30% 35% Backup / Archive encryption 21% 39% Data masking 28% 28% Application-level encryption 7% 29% Tokenization 22% 23% Evaluating 41
  • 42. Is Data Masking Secure? Risk Data at rest Data display High – Masking Masking Exposure: Exposure: Data is only Data in clear obfuscated before masking Low - System I I I I Type Test / dev Integration Trouble Production testing shooting 42
  • 43. Data Tokens = Lower Risk Risk Data at rest Data display High – Masking Masking Exposure: Exposure: Data is only Data in clear obfuscated before masking Low - Data Tokens System I I I I Type Test / dev Integration Trouble Production testing shooting 43
  • 44. CAN SECURITY HELP CREATIVITY? 44
  • 45. Old Security = Less Creativity Risk High Traditional Access Control Low Access I I Right Level Less More Source: InformationWeek Aug 15, 2011 45
  • 46. New Data Security = More Creativity Risk High Traditional Access Control New: Creativity Happens At the edge Low Data Tokens Access I I Right Level Less More Source: InformationWeek Aug 15, 2011 46
  • 47. About Protegrity • Proven enterprise data security software and innovation leader – Sole focus on the protection of data – Patented Technology, Continuing to Drive Innovation • Growth driven by compliance and risk management – PCI (Payment Card Industry), PII (Personally Identifiable Information), PHI (Protected Health Information) – US State and Foreign Privacy Laws, Breach Notification Laws • Cross-industry applicability – Retail, Hospitality, Travel and Transportation – Financial Services, Insurance, Banking – Healthcare, Telecommunications, Media and Entertainment – Manufacturing and Government 47
  • 48. Thank you! Q&A ulf.mattsson AT protegrity.com www.protegrity.com 203-326-7200 48

Editor's Notes

  1. Big change in this years Verizon reportWe are seeing more identity theftLess payment data theft
  2. We have seen new players