1. US Adventurism in the Persian Gulf
He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
Sun Tzu, Art of War
The first Gulf war, also known as Dessert Storm, was the successful US-Allied response to
Iraq's attempt to invade Kuwait. The war was given the name because it was fought in the
desserts of the Persian Gulf. Even though The United States is believed to have defended a small
state, Kuwait, from a big state, Iraq, the war had more to do than the stated purpose. Prior to the
invasion of Kuwait, Iraq, under the rule of Saddam Hussein, had just fought a war it almost lost -
Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Fortunately for him, and following much US assistance, in the form
of economic aid, intelligence, weapons, and dual-use technology, coupled with their mutual
interest, shared enmity toward Iran, the Iraqi military
triumphed. In retrospect, it is obvious US took that
opportunity to revenge for the Iranian Hostage Crisis
incident. Taking a hard and calculating look at Iraq’s
poor performance in the said Iran-Iraq war, one should
still wonder the reason for which US would support Iraq in the War that when Iraq gassed
Iranians and Kurds, it was not sanctioned. On the contrary, however, in Kuwait’s case, US
unabashedly reprimanded Saddam Hussein for invading the country. Let’s look into what might
have led to US animosity toward Saddam Hussein between the Iraq-Iran war and Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait. And, chiefly, US involvement in the Middle East.

2. US Adventurism in the Persian Gulf
US Middle Eastern Adventurism
To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.
George Washington
Operation Desert storm was a military operation through which US and its allies defended
Kuwait, an Arab country on the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, against Iraq’s invasion. The war
depicted Iraq as a bully; nevertheless, thinking what could have triggered Iraq to invade a nation
such as Kuwait, a country that had just finished supporting same Iraq morally, politically and
financially during the Iraq-Iran war, knowing what the bone of contention between the two
neighboring states was, is a worthy effort. As a matter of fact, according to Afshon Ostovar, the
fear that Iran’s revolutionaries would dominate the region were Saddam to fall, the Arab
sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf eagerly bankrolled the Iraqi war effort. The long war, however,
dealt an enormously disruptive blow on Iraq’s economy. To recover from the loss, Saddam
Hussein desperately sought some sort of “The Marshall Plan (a post-World War II European
Recovery Program to rebuild the economies and spirits of western Europe).” To that end, he
claimed on moral grounds to have borrowed some money to finance a legitimate war. With the
benefit of hindsight, however, that claim, unequivocally fell on deaf ears.

3. US Adventurism in the Persian Gulf
Given Saddam’s claim to be in debt to some Arab countries, including Kuwait, after the 8-
year war, Iraq had to find ways to clear that debt. On the one hand, having fought Islamic
fundamentalism, on behalf of the rest of the Sunni dominated states, including Kuwait, Saddam
Hussein felt Iraq ought to be forgiven its debt. On the other hand, however, when the Gulf States
refused to cancel Iraq’s war debts, he started threatening Iraq’s militarily weak neighbor, Kuwait.
Kuwait’s population at the time, moreover, was estimated at between 60%-70% Sunni, meaning
a Sunni majority, perhaps Saddam Hussein added that to his narrative of holding Kuwait more
responsible for Iraq’s debt forgiveness. As a matter of fact, besides being dominated by the
Sunnis, Kuwait was the second largest source of petroleum in the Middle East. In the light of
being a major source of oil in the Middle East, and perhaps to rake in profits from the scarcity
caused by the protracted war, Kuwait exceeded OPEC oil production quota. Consequently, the
move to produce more oil plummeted the price of oil, which tremendously affected Iraq’s oil
dependent national revenue. Despite Kuwait’s claims to not only have assisted Iraq in a
benevolent manner, and neither having produced oil above the agreed quota, Saddam Hussein
still clung to the accusations. Worse yet, he saw such a move by Kuwait as an act of war through
economic means. As the saying goes, “Forewarned is forearmed,” to show his anger, Saddam
Hussein publically decried Kuwait’s actions by stating how: “[T]he oil quota violators have
stabbed Iraq with a poison dagger,” as well the extent to which “Iraq will not forget the saying
that cutting necks is better than cutting means of living.” Kuwait, to Iraqi government, for the
most part, was that oil quota violator. At the end of war “that had lasted so long and cost so
many lives,” according to Pierre Razoux, in his book The Iran-Iraq War, nothing was achieved.

4. US Adventurism in the Persian Gulf
“[T]he countries’ boundaries,” which were a bone of contention, as further expressed by Razoux,
“remained unchanged.”
Prior to the Iraq-Iran war, and the invasion of Kuwait, however, US policy had just recently
changed totally to facing the Middle East. In his Carter Doctrine speech, President Jimmy Carter
made oil flow security, in the Middle East, a vital item on his US foreign policy. To cement this
oil security interests, which many critics saw as modeled on the
Truman Doctrine, President Carter deployed a Rapid Deployment Joint
Task Force(RDJTF) to the greater Middle East. The RDJTF, indeed,
according to Lt. Gen. Robert Kingston, the program’s commander, was
to assure the unimpeded flow of oil from the Arabian Gulf. Critically
speaking, if one were to parse the term “Unimpeded flow”, coming from a “Lieutenant general”,
it is possible to discover a policy crafted in war fabric. Unfortunately, in 1981, president Carter
lost his reelection bid to Ronald Reagan. But to cleverly build on the “Democratic” President
Carter’s Middle East legacy, the “Republican” President Reagan changed the RDJTF into US
Central Command (USCENTCOM).
To understand how strategically important, the USCENTCOM is to US National interests, in
the greater Middle East, one equally must understand what the War Plan Orange meant to the
US. Indeed, the War Plan Orange, according to globalsecurity.org, was the first US doctrine of
expeditionary warfare. On the one hand, War Plan Orange, which started in 1890 by President
Theodore Roosevelt, was directed towards Japan. Despite its founding in 1890, however, “the
board developed the first Japanese war plans (Orange) in 1904-05.” USCENTCOM, on the other

5. US Adventurism in the Persian Gulf
hand, despite being ostensibly created to protect Saudi Arabia, launched its first attack on 17
May 1987, in the Iraq-Iran war. Subsequently, on January 17, 1991, following the UN Security
Council Resolution 678, which “condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic
composition of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government
of Kuwait,” USCENTCOM, in conjunction with coalition forces, launched Operation Desert
Storm.
Pride delayed resolve
Practically speaking, if one viewed USCENTCOM as a plan to protect Saudi Arabia, looking
at the manner of which US was prepositioning maritime ships at Diego Garcia, and building up
forces in the Middle East, in the run up to those wars, one must have had a second thought
regarding the plausibility of such a claim. For example, prepositioning maritime ships at Diego
Garcia, an Island on the Indian Ocean, a location viewed as a vital and indispensable platform for
projecting American Military power, by the Pentagon, only depicts a harbinger of something
worse than defending Saudi Arabia, to come. In fact, with all that presence in the Middle East
In principle, the [E]nemy, in this context, can only be described as any “impediment” to US
access to oil in the Middle East.

6. US Adventurism in the Persian Gulf
and its environs, US could not lay her hands on who its enemy was. In principle, the [E]nemy, in
this context, can only be described as any “impediment” to US access to oil in the Middle East.
In addition to USCENTCOM, US started Operation Bright Star, which according to the US
military, was “to better relations between Egypt and US.”
Before Saddam Hussein’s full hubristic pride display, US was starting to see Iraqi’s Saddam
Hussein as a key ally in the Middle East, through whom she could secure her Core national
interest initiatives. To prove that, US supported Iraq during the war with Iran. But Saddam
Hussein, on the other end, only saw US as a means to his ends. That is to say, he saw US as his
ladder to supremacy. Not only was the door to supremacy open to Saddam Hussein, but for the
fact that Israel was seen to have often flouted US authority, perhaps Saddam Hussein thought it
plausible to attack Kuwait while hoping Washington would bless his plans, too. As a matter of
fact, according to Lieutenant Colonel Debra K. Rose, USAF, despite President Bush warning
Saddam how “Iraq cannot and will not be able to hold on to Kuwait or exact a price for leaving,”
towards the withdrawal deadline UN gave Iraq, to leave Kuwait, “Saddam Hussein did not
believe US would risk casualties by retaliating.” On the contrary, however, in the act of not
wanting to repeat the same mistake Nixon administration had made with the Shah Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi of Iran, US President Bush openly decried Saddam Hussein for violating Kuwait’s
territorial integrity. In the same momentum, to protect the US vital national interests and status in
the Middle East, and following Saddam Hussein's rejection of diplomatic efforts to solve the
crisis, President H W. Bush deployed US military to join hands with allied forces in restoring
Kuwait’s sovereignty.

7. US Adventurism in the Persian Gulf
Finally, on February 28, 1991, after suffering much defeat, Iraq pledged to honor future
coalition and U.N. peace terms. Thereafter, US President George Bush declared a cease-fire.
Lessons Learned
An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and carries his banner openly.
Cicero
Considering the inherent features of RDJTF to USCENTCOM, and then, Operation Bright
Star, Iraq-Iran war or Invasion of Kuwait did not complicate US raison d’état to the Middle East.
Rather, the two major events came at the right time. Thusly, US took that opportunity to solidify
her vital national interests in the Middle East, which was to maintain oil security for her rapidly
growing domestic oil consumption. To be more to the point, if the only tool one has were a
[T]he proverbial United Nations (UN) right to protect clause (R2P), in the UN resolution
660, on which the coalition forces fought the war, is not a demonstrably reliable enough
reason, as such begs the question in favor of the categorical imperative for the war in
question.

8. US Adventurism in the Persian Gulf
hammer, every object resembles a nail. That is, Saddam Hussein’s gallivanting attitude, in the
Middle East, necessarily was not the prognosis of US military campaign in the region. Rather, as
stated earlier, as how long it took to develop the first Japanese war plans, US, in this case, was
already on the way to utilizing her loaded weapons. In fact, it was only a matter of time. That is,
in respect to US presence in the Middle East, in the twentieth century, the supply in the series of
fortifications, created its own demand.
Therefore, it should be clear now that, when next US wishes to choose a regionally
consequential ally, she should do so circumspectly, albeit hyperopically. The first gulf war, for
the most part, then, despite its slight chance of passing a moral justifiability test, i.e., I am my
brother’s keeper mentality, such would not have occurred had US chosen “abstention” as its
Middle East policy, from the outset. On the other hand, the proverbial United Nations (UN) right
to protect clause (R2P), in the UN resolution 660, on which the coalition forces fought the war, is
not a demonstrably reliable enough reason, as such begs the question in favor of the categorical
imperative for the war in question. So, had US not supported Iraq in the 1980-1988 war, Iraq
would have been defeated very quickly. And at the same time, there would have been more
caution and more intelligence, on US side. Consequently, if such were the moves taken by US,
Kuwait’s invasion could have been thwarted, way ahead of time. Perhaps, in the first place, Iraq
would not have had enough resources to invade Kuwait.