The document discusses several principles of statutory interpretation used when interpreting and applying one statute in relation to another: - Words used in an earlier statute that were authoritatively interpreted by courts are presumed to have the same meaning when used in a similar context in a later statute. - If a statute uses words that appeared in an earlier statute on the same subject, the words are presumed to have the meaning given by previous judicial decisions. - A later statute may help resolve ambiguity in an earlier statute, but does not alter the meaning of the earlier clear language. - Provisions incorporated by reference from one statute into another become part of the latter as if included verbatim.

2. INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION:
 Long Title
 Preamble
 Headings
Marginal Notes
 Punctuation
 Illustration
 Definition Section/ Interpretation Clauses
 Provisio
 Explanation
 Schedules, etc.
ASSISTANCE OF EARLIER STATUTES IN INTERPRETATION:
When words in an earlier statue have received an authoritative exposition by a superior
court, use of the same words in similar context in a later Act will give rise to a presumption
that Parliament intends that the same interpretation should also be followed for construction
of those words in the later statue.
In re Lily Isabel Thomas Case (AIR 1964 SC 855) : ‘rule as to persons in
practicing before the court’
In Article 145(1) of Constitution of India has same meaning as in Section 241(1) of
the Government of India Act, 1935.

3. Reasoning for drawing reference from other legislation:
If an Act of Parliament uses the same language which was used in a former Act of Parliament
referring to the same subject, and passed with the same object, the safe and well known rule
of construction is to assume that the Legislature when using well-known words upon which
there have been well known decisions uses those words in the sense which the decisions have
attached to them. (Greaves v. Tofield, 1880)
Lord Denning: “The true view, is that the court will be slow to overrule a previous
decision on the interpretation of statute when it has long been acted on, and it will be more
than usually slow to do so when Parliament has since the decision, re-enacted the statue in
the same terms, but if the decision is in-fact shown to be erroneous, there is no rule of law
which prevents it being overruled.”
Repealed Statue:
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) – Venkatarama Aiyar, J., observed that “It
is a well-settled rule of construction that when a statute is repealed and re-enacted and words in the
repealed statute are reproduced in the new statute, they should be interpreted in the sense which had
been judicially put on them under the repealed Act, because the Legislature is presumed to be acquainted
with the construction which the courts have put upon the words.”

4. Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar (AIR 1963 SC 1088)
The Supreme Court has construed the words: “the court by which the
person is found guilty” under section 6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act,
1958, referred to decisions construing similar words in section 562 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898, an enactment in pari-materia and held in the light
of those decisions that the word in question were wide enough to include an
appellate court.
ASSISTANCE OF LATER STATUTES IN INTERPRETATION:
 When an earlier Act is truly ambiguous, a later Act may in certain circumstances serve as a
Parliamentary Exposition of the former.
 A later statue is normally not used as an aid to construction of an earlier statue
Lord Sterndale: “I think, it is clearly established- that subsequent legislation on the same subject may
be looked to in order to see what is the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act when it is
ambiguous. I quite agree that subsequent legislation, if it proceeds upon an erroneous construction of
previous legislation, cannot alter the previous legislation, but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier
legislation then the Subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the
earlier.”

5. Ammini v. State of Kerala (AIR 1998 SC 260)
Section 293(4) of CrPC, 1973 before its amendment used the expression
‘Director’ only. After amendment ‘Deputy Director’ and ‘Assistant Director’
were expressly included with the Director.
The Supreme Court after referring to this change held that ‘Joint Director’ who
was higher in rank to Deputy Director and Assistant Director must be deemed
to be included in ‘Director’ otherwise he would also have been expressly
included by the amendment and that this construction was also applicable to
the word ‘Director’ before the section was amended.
P. V. Murali v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996(1) Scale 298, p.304)
Explanation II added to section 2(22) of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and
Hindu Religious Institution and Endowment Act, 1987 was held to be ineffective
as it proceeded on the wrong assumption of the legal position that even after
grant of ‘pattas’ of land of a religious institution under the Andhra Pradesh Inam
(Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1957, the property so granted did
not become the personal property of the grantees but continued to be a religious
endowment. Further, a legislation declaring certain non-existing facts as existing
and proceeding on that basis may also be held to be ineffective.
Explanation II:—Any Inam granted to an archaka, service-holder or other employee of a
religious Institution for the performance of any service or charity in connection with a
religious institution shall not be deemed to be a personal gift to the archka, service-
holder or employee notwithstanding the grant of ryotwari patta to an archaka, service-
holder or employee under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition
and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 but shall be deemed to be a religious
endowment". (1982)

6. INCORPORATION OF EARLIER ACT INTO LATER ACT
When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into
a later Act, the provisions so incorporated becomes part and parcel of the later Act
as if they had been “Bodily transported into it”.
Section 2 ( c) was substituted in 1943 in the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles
Taxation Act, 1930 which defines ‘motor vehicle’ to have the same meaning
as in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Construing Section 2 ( c) of the Taxation Act it was held that the definition
of ‘Motor Vehicle’ in the Motor Vehicles Act as existing in 1943 got
incorporated in the Taxation Act and the amendment of the definition of
‘Motor Vehicle’ in the Motor Vehicles Act in 1956 was not applicable for the
purposes of the Taxation Act.
Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orrisa (AIR 1975 SC 17)
Section 2(18) of the Act was, however, amended by Act 100 of 1956 but there was no
corresponding amendment in the definition of s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act.
Section 2 (18) - "motor vehicle" means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use
upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal
source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not
include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special, type adapted for use only in a
factory or in any other enclosed premises.