Imsi catcher

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GSM adalah teknologi komunikasi seluler yang dikembangkan di Eropa pada 1980-an. Dokumen ini menjelaskan cara kerja IMSI Catcher yang dapat memanfaatkan celah keamanan GSM untuk menangkap identitas pelanggan (IMSI) melalui scanning sinyal, membuat basis stasiun palsu, SMS palsu, atau menyadap lalu lintas aktif untuk menduplikasi kartu SIM secara nirkabel.

IMSI Catcher For Fun and Profit
oleh Tri Sumarno
tri@rndc.or.id

GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications)
adalah salah satu teknologi komunikasi seluler
yang sejak awal tahun 1980-an mulai
dikembangkan di eropa.

IMSI Catcher Attack
● Scanning
● FakeBTS
● FakeSMS
● Active sniffing
● Clone Sim Card OTA

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Présentation GSM

Imsi catcher

1. IMSI Catcher For Fun and Profit oleh Tri Sumarno tri@rndc.or.id

2. GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) adalah salah satu teknologi komunikasi seluler yang sejak awal tahun 1980-an mulai dikembangkan di eropa.

3. Arsitektur GSM

4. Band GSM ● 900Mhz ● 1800Mhz ● 1900Mhz

5. GSM + OpenSource = FUN

6. GSM di-Indonesia

7. Ilustrasi IMSI

8. Hardware

9. Software

10. IMSI Catcher Attack ● Scanning ● FakeBTS ● FakeSMS ● Active sniffing ● Clone Sim Card OTA

11. Ilustrasi Scanning BTS

12. Ilustrasi Fake BTS

13. Ilustrasi Fake SMS

14. Ilustrasi Active Sniffing