SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Identity Providers-as-a-Service built as
Cloud-of-Clouds: challenges and opportunities
Diego Kreutz and Eduardo Feitosa
FedCSIS/SODIS 2014, Warsaw, Poland
Outline
Resilient & Secure IdPs
Motivation & Goals
Deployments & Trade Offs
Open Roads & Opportunities
Experimental Evaluations
Common Threats and Challenges
Cyber Crimes/Attacks!
Software Bugs & Vulnerabilities
Logical Failures
3
4
Vulnerabilities and Treats in IdPs
Vulnerability/Support RADIUS OpenID
Tolerates crash faults (e.g., back-end clusters) YES YES
Tolerates arbitrary faults NO NO
Tolerates infrastructure outages NO NO
Tolerates DDoS attacks NO NO
Risk of common vulnerabilities HIGH HIGH
Risk of sensitive data leakage HIGH HIGH
Diverse security-related vulnerabilities YES YES
Susceptible to resource depletion attacks YES YES
5
What can we do about it?
6
What can we do about it?
Approach 1: try to fix
everything!?
7
What can we do about it?
Approach 2: increase the
system’s resilience and
trustworthiness
Hybrid system architectures, specialized components, clouds, …
8
Current State of Affairs
Fault	
  tolerance/resilience	
  
Level	
  of	
  trust	
  
C1
C2
C3 C4
C6
C5
Goals
9
Develop new hybrid system
architectures.
Use cloud and multi-cloud
environments to increase the
resilience and trustworthiness of
critical systems.
Reduce costs and foster new
business models.
Cloud: some benefits
10
Ø  Elasticity of resources"
Ø  Cost-effectiveness"
§  Reduce CAPEX and OPEX for business"
Ø  Efficient and productive tools and systems"
Ø  Protection against high scale attacks"
Cloud: some challenges
11
Ø  Failures: are still high"
Ø  Performance"
§  Hard to measure"
§  Not yet enough for HPC apps"
Ø  Price models"
§  No standards"
§  No easy way to measure and compare"
Ø  Confidentiality & Privacy"
§  Cloud provider has access to your data"
Multi-Cloud: some benefits
12
Ø  Increasing reliability"
§  Up to three nines"
Ø  Lower costs"
Ø  No vendor lock-in"
Ø  Better privacy and confidentiality"
§  Multi-cloud storage crypto solutions"
Ø  Improved performance"
Ø  Diversity of attack defenses"
Multi-Cloud: challenges
13
Ø  Inter-cloud high network latency"
Ø  Network performance, reliability and costs"
Ø  Privacy and confidentiality"
§  Yet, still easier to solve than in a single cloud"
Ø  Deployment and management costs"
§  Different technologies"
§  Diversity of tools"
§  Lack of standardized interoperability"
Multi-DCs/Cloud Trade Offs
14
PhyMachine1!
Hypervisor 1!
VM1!
Resilient
Service!
OverallSystemPerformance!
HighAvailability(towards3nines)!
ResistancetoAttacksandVulnerabilities!
Single Data Center (Multiple Physical Machines)
SusceptibilitytoPhysicalandLogicalFailures!
PhyMachine2!
Hypervisor 2!
VM2!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine3!
Hypervisor 3!
VM3!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine1!
Hypervisor 1!
VM1!
Resilient
Service!
Multiple Data Centers (Single Cloud Provider)
PhyMachine2!
Hypervisor 2!
VM2!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine3!
Hypervisor 3!
VM3!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine1!
Hypervisor 1!
VM1!
Resilient
Service!
Multiple Cloud Providers
PhyMachine2!
Hypervisor 2!
VM2!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine3!
Hypervisor 3!
VM3!
Resilient
Service!
Outline
Resilient & Secure IdPs
Motivation & Goals
Deployments & Trade Offs
Open Roads & Opportunities
Experimental Evaluations
16
OpenID: traditional architecture
Client / Web
Browser!
Service Provider!
(Relying Party)!
OpenID
server!
steps 4 and 5!
OpenID!
Backends!
SQL$
LDAP$
17
ROpenID Architecture
User
Browser / !
Certificate /
Attributes!
IdP Service
Replicas!
Service Providers
(SPs) / Relying
Parties (RPs)!
IdP Gateways!
Resilient and
Secue IdP!
Secure Authentication!
(confidentiality)!
Alternative Path!
Default Path!
Ø  Arbitrary faults:
§  Between the
CIS and
gateway
18
Client!
Cx!
CIS!
Cx!
Service!
Sx!
Gateway!
Gx!
Timeout A! Timeout B!
Corrupted response !
from replica Sx!
Corrupted response !
from replica Gx!
Byzantine behavior!
from replica Cx!
ROpenID Fault Detection Mechanisms
Ø  Timeouts:"
§  Between client and service"
§  Between service and gateway"
Ø  Corrupted messages detection"
§  Between service and client"
§  Between gateway and service"
19
Main Building Blocks
1.  Virtual Machines"
2.  Trusted Computing Base"
§  e.g. hypervisors"
3.  Trusted Components"
§  e.g. smart cards, TPMs, isolated VMs, secured PCs"
4.  Replication & Recovery Protocols"
§  e.g. BFT-SMaRt and ITVM"
5.  Diversity"
§  e.g. different operating systems"
6.  Strong mutual authentication"
§  e.g. EAP-TLS"
20
What is a TC in our model?
A trusted/secure component can be “any” device capable of ensuring !
the data and operation confidentiality of the target system/environment.!
Smart Cards" TPM" Tamper Resistant
a FPGA"
A Highly Secured
(shielded) Computer"
Virtual TPM"
(e.g. vTPM)"
Secure Hypervisor
(e.g. sHyper)"
Outline
Resilient & Secure IdPs
Motivation & Goals
Deployments & Trade Offs
Open Roads & Opportunities
Experimental Evaluations
22
ROpenID Deployments
23
ROpenID Deployments
24
Deployments & Trade Offs
PhyMachine1!
Hypervisor 1!
VM1!
Resilient
Service!
VM2!
Resilient
Service!
VM3!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine1!
Hypervisor 1!
VM1!
Resilient
Service!
Administrative
Domain1!
Administrative
Domain1!
Administrative
Domain1!
Performance!
Availability!
PhyMachine2!Hypervisor 2!
VM2!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine3!
Hypervisor 3!
VM3!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine1!
Hypervisor 1!
VM1!
Resilient
Service!
Administrative
Domain3!
Administrative
Domain2!
PhyMachine2!
Hypervisor 2!
VM2!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine3!
Hypervisor 3!
VM3!
Resilient
Service!
Susceptibletodepletionattacks!
(a)!
(b)!
(c)!
25
Deployments & Trade Offs
PhyMachine1!
Hypervisor 1!
VM1!
Resilient
Service!
OverallSystemPerformance!
HighAvailability(towards3nines)!
ResistancetoAttacksandVulnerabilities!
Single Data Center (Multiple Physical Machines)
SusceptibilitytoPhysicalandLogicalFailures!
PhyMachine2!
Hypervisor 2!
VM2!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine3!
Hypervisor 3!
VM3!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine1!
Hypervisor 1!
VM1!
Resilient
Service!
Multiple Data Centers (Single Cloud Provider)
PhyMachine2!
Hypervisor 2!
VM2!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine3!
Hypervisor 3!
VM3!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine1!
Hypervisor 1!
VM1!
Resilient
Service!
Multiple Cloud Providers
PhyMachine2!
Hypervisor 2!
VM2!
Resilient
Service!
PhyMachine3!
Hypervisor 3!
VM3!
Resilient
Service!
Wait! What about
resource depletion
attacks?
In virtualized environments,
how malicious VMs can
affect the execution of non-
malicious VMs?
27
Resource Depletion Attacks
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
10 20 40 80 100
Numberofauthentications/s
Number of OpenID clients
ROpenID throughput under CPU depletion attacks
FF-Exec
3vCPUs-Attack
6vCPUs-Attack
12vCPUs-Attack
28
Resource Depletion Attacks
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
10 20 40 80 100
Numberofauthentications/s
Number of OpenID clients
ROpenID throughput under attacks
QuintaVMs
TCP-ACK-A
TCP-SYN-A
TCP-SYN-ACK-A
TCP-SSH-A
Outline
Resilient & Secure IdPs
Motivation & Goals
Deployments & Trade Offs
Open Roads & Opportunities
Experimental Evaluations
30
ROpenID Evaluation
Average Latency:
78.360ms!
Average Latency:
87.343ms!
Average Latency:
32.103ms!
Environment vCPU ECUs MEM Disk Network
UFAM-VMs 2 --- 2GB 20GB Gigabit
Amazon-EC2 4 13 15GB 2x40 SSD High Speed
Amazon-DCs 4 13 15GB 2x40 SSD Public WAN
31
ROpenID Evaluation
Average Latency:
78.360ms!
Average Latency:
87.343ms!
Average Latency:
32.103ms!
# of clients UFAM-VMs Amazon-EC2 Amazon-DCs
20 867.73 1969.17 26.66
40 984.59 2166.58 50.72
80 995.12 2244.30 92.42
100 960.11 2244.04 114.05
Outline
Resilient & Secure IdPs
Motivation & Goals
Deployments & Trade Offs
Open Roads & Opportunities
Experimental Evaluations
33
Multi-DCs/Clouds deployments
IdP-R2!
SP1/RP1!
SP2/RP2!
IdP-R2! IdP-R2!
GW2!
(Colocation)!
GW1!
34
Scaling up ROpenID
Environment 20 clients 40 clients 80 clients 100 clients
UFAM-VMs 867 984 995 960
Amazon-EC2 1969 2166 2244 2444
Amazon-DCs 26 50 92 114
Environment 10k users 100k users 500k users 1M users
UFAM-VMs 4.16% 41.66% 208.30% 416.61%
Amazon-EC2 1.78% 17.82% 89.11% 178.22%
Amazon-DCs 35.07% 350.72% 1753.61% 3507.23%
35
Scaling up ROpenID
Cost/Users 10k users 100k users 500k users 1M users
IaaS $350.40 $3,507.65 $17,531.90 $35,083.80
Service $550.37 $5,503.70 $27,518.50 $55,037.00
Total cost/y $900.77 $9,011.35 $45,060.40 $90,120.80
Environment 10k users 100k users 500k users 1M users
UFAM-VMs 4.16% 41.66% 208.30% 416.61%
Amazon-EC2 1.78% 17.82% 89.11% 178.22%
Amazon-DCs 35.07% 350.72% 1753.61% 3507.23%
Technical and Business Challenges
36
Ø  Efficient networks"
§  Low latency"
§  High throughput"
Ø  Cost-effective three nines"
§  Combined multi-cloud solutions"
Ø  Confidentiality and Privacy"
§  Combined multi-cloud solutions"
37
Multi-DCs/Clouds Efficient Networks
38
Final remarks on multi-cloud IdPs
Ø  New business opportunities for"
§  Cloud providers"
§  Startups"
Ø  Research open reads & challenges"
§  Efficient WANs"
§  Telco Clouds"
§  Multi-cloud elasticity "
§  Multi-cloud interoperability"
§  Confidentiality & Privacy"
SecFuNet Project
(FP7-ICT-2011-EU-Brazil – STREP number 288349)
Acknowledgments
Identity Providers-as-a-Service built as
Cloud-of-Clouds: challenges and opportunities
Diego Kreutz and Eduardo Feitosa
FedCSIS/SODIS 2014, Warsaw, Poland

More Related Content

What's hot

Introduction to SDN
Introduction to SDNIntroduction to SDN
Introduction to SDN
NetCraftsmen
 
SDN Cloud Computing Project Help
SDN Cloud Computing Project HelpSDN Cloud Computing Project Help
SDN Cloud Computing Project Help
Network Simulation Tools
 
Cohesive SDN Summit Presentation: OpenFlow is SDN, SDN is not OpenFlow
Cohesive SDN Summit Presentation: OpenFlow is SDN, SDN is not OpenFlowCohesive SDN Summit Presentation: OpenFlow is SDN, SDN is not OpenFlow
Cohesive SDN Summit Presentation: OpenFlow is SDN, SDN is not OpenFlow
Cohesive Networks
 
Software-Defined Networking(SDN):A New Approach to Networking
Software-Defined Networking(SDN):A New Approach to NetworkingSoftware-Defined Networking(SDN):A New Approach to Networking
Software-Defined Networking(SDN):A New Approach to NetworkingAnju Ann
 
SDN Basics – What You Need to Know about Software-Defined Networking
SDN Basics – What You Need to Know about Software-Defined NetworkingSDN Basics – What You Need to Know about Software-Defined Networking
SDN Basics – What You Need to Know about Software-Defined Networking
SDxCentral
 
Introduction to Software-defined Networking
Introduction to Software-defined NetworkingIntroduction to Software-defined Networking
Introduction to Software-defined Networking
Anees Shaikh
 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) Technology Brief
Software Defined Networking (SDN) Technology BriefSoftware Defined Networking (SDN) Technology Brief
Software Defined Networking (SDN) Technology Brief
Zivaro Inc
 
Software Defined networking (SDN)
Software Defined networking (SDN)Software Defined networking (SDN)
Software Defined networking (SDN)
Milson Munakami
 
SDN Abstractions
SDN AbstractionsSDN Abstractions
SDN Abstractions
martin_casado
 
SDN Adoption Challenges
SDN Adoption Challenges SDN Adoption Challenges
SDN Adoption Challenges
Vimal Suba
 
SDN Adoption
SDN AdoptionSDN Adoption
SDN Adoption
SDxCentral
 
Software Defined Networks
Software Defined NetworksSoftware Defined Networks
Software Defined Networks
Shreeya Shah
 
Introduction to Software Defined Networking (SDN)
Introduction to Software Defined Networking (SDN)Introduction to Software Defined Networking (SDN)
Introduction to Software Defined Networking (SDN)
Bangladesh Network Operators Group
 
Sbrc 2014 Painel SDN
Sbrc 2014 Painel SDNSbrc 2014 Painel SDN
Sbrc 2014 Painel SDN
Christian Esteve Rothenberg
 
Telco Cloud 03 - Introduction to SDN
Telco Cloud 03 - Introduction to SDNTelco Cloud 03 - Introduction to SDN
Telco Cloud 03 - Introduction to SDN
Vikas Shokeen
 
Juniper Unified SDN Technical Presentation (SDN Day ITB 2016)
Juniper  Unified SDN Technical Presentation (SDN Day ITB 2016)Juniper  Unified SDN Technical Presentation (SDN Day ITB 2016)
Juniper Unified SDN Technical Presentation (SDN Day ITB 2016)
SDNRG ITB
 
Introduction to SDN and NFV
Introduction to SDN and NFVIntroduction to SDN and NFV
Introduction to SDN and NFV
CoreStack
 
Introduction to SDN and Network Programmability - BRKRST-1014 | 2017/Las Vegas
Introduction to SDN and Network Programmability - BRKRST-1014 | 2017/Las VegasIntroduction to SDN and Network Programmability - BRKRST-1014 | 2017/Las Vegas
Introduction to SDN and Network Programmability - BRKRST-1014 | 2017/Las Vegas
Bruno Teixeira
 

What's hot (20)

Introduction to SDN
Introduction to SDNIntroduction to SDN
Introduction to SDN
 
SDN Cloud Computing Project Help
SDN Cloud Computing Project HelpSDN Cloud Computing Project Help
SDN Cloud Computing Project Help
 
Cohesive SDN Summit Presentation: OpenFlow is SDN, SDN is not OpenFlow
Cohesive SDN Summit Presentation: OpenFlow is SDN, SDN is not OpenFlowCohesive SDN Summit Presentation: OpenFlow is SDN, SDN is not OpenFlow
Cohesive SDN Summit Presentation: OpenFlow is SDN, SDN is not OpenFlow
 
Software-Defined Networking(SDN):A New Approach to Networking
Software-Defined Networking(SDN):A New Approach to NetworkingSoftware-Defined Networking(SDN):A New Approach to Networking
Software-Defined Networking(SDN):A New Approach to Networking
 
SDN Basics – What You Need to Know about Software-Defined Networking
SDN Basics – What You Need to Know about Software-Defined NetworkingSDN Basics – What You Need to Know about Software-Defined Networking
SDN Basics – What You Need to Know about Software-Defined Networking
 
My cv 2
My cv 2My cv 2
My cv 2
 
Introduction to Software-defined Networking
Introduction to Software-defined NetworkingIntroduction to Software-defined Networking
Introduction to Software-defined Networking
 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) Technology Brief
Software Defined Networking (SDN) Technology BriefSoftware Defined Networking (SDN) Technology Brief
Software Defined Networking (SDN) Technology Brief
 
Software Defined networking (SDN)
Software Defined networking (SDN)Software Defined networking (SDN)
Software Defined networking (SDN)
 
SDN Abstractions
SDN AbstractionsSDN Abstractions
SDN Abstractions
 
SDN Adoption Challenges
SDN Adoption Challenges SDN Adoption Challenges
SDN Adoption Challenges
 
SDN Adoption
SDN AdoptionSDN Adoption
SDN Adoption
 
Software Defined Networks
Software Defined NetworksSoftware Defined Networks
Software Defined Networks
 
Introduction to Software Defined Networking (SDN)
Introduction to Software Defined Networking (SDN)Introduction to Software Defined Networking (SDN)
Introduction to Software Defined Networking (SDN)
 
Sbrc 2014 Painel SDN
Sbrc 2014 Painel SDNSbrc 2014 Painel SDN
Sbrc 2014 Painel SDN
 
Telco Cloud 03 - Introduction to SDN
Telco Cloud 03 - Introduction to SDNTelco Cloud 03 - Introduction to SDN
Telco Cloud 03 - Introduction to SDN
 
Juniper Unified SDN Technical Presentation (SDN Day ITB 2016)
Juniper  Unified SDN Technical Presentation (SDN Day ITB 2016)Juniper  Unified SDN Technical Presentation (SDN Day ITB 2016)
Juniper Unified SDN Technical Presentation (SDN Day ITB 2016)
 
SDN-ppt-new
SDN-ppt-newSDN-ppt-new
SDN-ppt-new
 
Introduction to SDN and NFV
Introduction to SDN and NFVIntroduction to SDN and NFV
Introduction to SDN and NFV
 
Introduction to SDN and Network Programmability - BRKRST-1014 | 2017/Las Vegas
Introduction to SDN and Network Programmability - BRKRST-1014 | 2017/Las VegasIntroduction to SDN and Network Programmability - BRKRST-1014 | 2017/Las Vegas
Introduction to SDN and Network Programmability - BRKRST-1014 | 2017/Las Vegas
 

Similar to Identity Providers-as-a-Service built as Cloud-of-Clouds: challenges and opportunities

Rik Ferguson
Rik FergusonRik Ferguson
Rik Ferguson
CloudExpoEurope
 
Vmug birmingham mar2013 trendmicro
Vmug birmingham mar2013 trendmicroVmug birmingham mar2013 trendmicro
Vmug birmingham mar2013 trendmicrodvmug1
 
Vindicator Overview
Vindicator OverviewVindicator Overview
Vindicator Overviewdp3b58
 
21st Docker Switzerland Meetup - ISTIO
21st Docker Switzerland Meetup - ISTIO21st Docker Switzerland Meetup - ISTIO
21st Docker Switzerland Meetup - ISTIO
Niklaus Hirt
 
DDoS Falcon_Tech_Specs-Haltdos
DDoS Falcon_Tech_Specs-HaltdosDDoS Falcon_Tech_Specs-Haltdos
DDoS Falcon_Tech_Specs-Haltdos
Haltdos
 
PLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek Janik
PLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek JanikPLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek Janik
PLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek Janik
PROIDEA
 
How to get along with HATEOAS without letting the bad guys steal your lunch?
How to get along with HATEOAS without letting the bad guys steal your lunch?How to get along with HATEOAS without letting the bad guys steal your lunch?
How to get along with HATEOAS without letting the bad guys steal your lunch?
Graham Charters
 
Cisco Security Architecture
Cisco Security ArchitectureCisco Security Architecture
Cisco Security Architecture
Cisco Canada
 
Day4
Day4Day4
Day4
Jai4uk
 
Bank World 2008 Kamens 04 29 08
Bank World 2008 Kamens 04 29 08Bank World 2008 Kamens 04 29 08
Bank World 2008 Kamens 04 29 08kamensm02
 
Availability Considerations for SQL Server
Availability Considerations for SQL ServerAvailability Considerations for SQL Server
Availability Considerations for SQL Server
Bob Roudebush
 
Layer 7 Technologies: Web Services Hacking And Hardening
Layer 7 Technologies: Web Services Hacking And HardeningLayer 7 Technologies: Web Services Hacking And Hardening
Layer 7 Technologies: Web Services Hacking And Hardening
CA API Management
 
Layer7-WebServices-Hacking-and-Hardening.pdf
Layer7-WebServices-Hacking-and-Hardening.pdfLayer7-WebServices-Hacking-and-Hardening.pdf
Layer7-WebServices-Hacking-and-Hardening.pdf
distortdistort
 
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the CloudVirtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
Tjylen Veselyj
 
3.2_Securing Microgrids, Substations, and Distributed Autonomous Systems_Lawr...
3.2_Securing Microgrids, Substations, and Distributed Autonomous Systems_Lawr...3.2_Securing Microgrids, Substations, and Distributed Autonomous Systems_Lawr...
3.2_Securing Microgrids, Substations, and Distributed Autonomous Systems_Lawr...
Sandia National Laboratories: Energy & Climate: Renewables
 
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous DeliverySecure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Tim Mackey
 
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous DeliverySecure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Black Duck by Synopsys
 
apl5iy2ftxiwofbhsmxj-signature-584e2459f99b5370bda435f09b42cc84cc8c063b8cd454...
apl5iy2ftxiwofbhsmxj-signature-584e2459f99b5370bda435f09b42cc84cc8c063b8cd454...apl5iy2ftxiwofbhsmxj-signature-584e2459f99b5370bda435f09b42cc84cc8c063b8cd454...
apl5iy2ftxiwofbhsmxj-signature-584e2459f99b5370bda435f09b42cc84cc8c063b8cd454...Chrysostomos Christofi
 
Using hypervisor and container technology to increase datacenter security pos...
Using hypervisor and container technology to increase datacenter security pos...Using hypervisor and container technology to increase datacenter security pos...
Using hypervisor and container technology to increase datacenter security pos...
Black Duck by Synopsys
 

Similar to Identity Providers-as-a-Service built as Cloud-of-Clouds: challenges and opportunities (20)

Rik Ferguson
Rik FergusonRik Ferguson
Rik Ferguson
 
Vmug birmingham mar2013 trendmicro
Vmug birmingham mar2013 trendmicroVmug birmingham mar2013 trendmicro
Vmug birmingham mar2013 trendmicro
 
Vindicator Overview
Vindicator OverviewVindicator Overview
Vindicator Overview
 
21st Docker Switzerland Meetup - ISTIO
21st Docker Switzerland Meetup - ISTIO21st Docker Switzerland Meetup - ISTIO
21st Docker Switzerland Meetup - ISTIO
 
DDoS Falcon_Tech_Specs-Haltdos
DDoS Falcon_Tech_Specs-HaltdosDDoS Falcon_Tech_Specs-Haltdos
DDoS Falcon_Tech_Specs-Haltdos
 
PLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek Janik
PLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek JanikPLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek Janik
PLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek Janik
 
How to get along with HATEOAS without letting the bad guys steal your lunch?
How to get along with HATEOAS without letting the bad guys steal your lunch?How to get along with HATEOAS without letting the bad guys steal your lunch?
How to get along with HATEOAS without letting the bad guys steal your lunch?
 
Cisco Security Architecture
Cisco Security ArchitectureCisco Security Architecture
Cisco Security Architecture
 
Day4
Day4Day4
Day4
 
Bank World 2008 Kamens 04 29 08
Bank World 2008 Kamens 04 29 08Bank World 2008 Kamens 04 29 08
Bank World 2008 Kamens 04 29 08
 
Stu w22 a
Stu w22 aStu w22 a
Stu w22 a
 
Availability Considerations for SQL Server
Availability Considerations for SQL ServerAvailability Considerations for SQL Server
Availability Considerations for SQL Server
 
Layer 7 Technologies: Web Services Hacking And Hardening
Layer 7 Technologies: Web Services Hacking And HardeningLayer 7 Technologies: Web Services Hacking And Hardening
Layer 7 Technologies: Web Services Hacking And Hardening
 
Layer7-WebServices-Hacking-and-Hardening.pdf
Layer7-WebServices-Hacking-and-Hardening.pdfLayer7-WebServices-Hacking-and-Hardening.pdf
Layer7-WebServices-Hacking-and-Hardening.pdf
 
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the CloudVirtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
 
3.2_Securing Microgrids, Substations, and Distributed Autonomous Systems_Lawr...
3.2_Securing Microgrids, Substations, and Distributed Autonomous Systems_Lawr...3.2_Securing Microgrids, Substations, and Distributed Autonomous Systems_Lawr...
3.2_Securing Microgrids, Substations, and Distributed Autonomous Systems_Lawr...
 
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous DeliverySecure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
 
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous DeliverySecure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
Secure Application Development in the Age of Continuous Delivery
 
apl5iy2ftxiwofbhsmxj-signature-584e2459f99b5370bda435f09b42cc84cc8c063b8cd454...
apl5iy2ftxiwofbhsmxj-signature-584e2459f99b5370bda435f09b42cc84cc8c063b8cd454...apl5iy2ftxiwofbhsmxj-signature-584e2459f99b5370bda435f09b42cc84cc8c063b8cd454...
apl5iy2ftxiwofbhsmxj-signature-584e2459f99b5370bda435f09b42cc84cc8c063b8cd454...
 
Using hypervisor and container technology to increase datacenter security pos...
Using hypervisor and container technology to increase datacenter security pos...Using hypervisor and container technology to increase datacenter security pos...
Using hypervisor and container technology to increase datacenter security pos...
 

More from Diego Kreutz

Towards Secure and Dependable Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures
Towards Secure and Dependable Authentication and Authorization InfrastructuresTowards Secure and Dependable Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures
Towards Secure and Dependable Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures
Diego Kreutz
 
Infrastructure Resilience against Attacks and Faults
Infrastructure Resilience against Attacks and FaultsInfrastructure Resilience against Attacks and Faults
Infrastructure Resilience against Attacks and Faults
Diego Kreutz
 
The dark side of SDN and OpenFlow
The dark side of SDN and OpenFlowThe dark side of SDN and OpenFlow
The dark side of SDN and OpenFlow
Diego Kreutz
 
SDNs: hot topics, evolution & research opportunities
SDNs: hot topics, evolution & research opportunitiesSDNs: hot topics, evolution & research opportunities
SDNs: hot topics, evolution & research opportunities
Diego Kreutz
 
Computação em Nuvem: conceitos, tendências e aplicações em Software Livre
Computação em Nuvem: conceitos, tendências e aplicações em Software LivreComputação em Nuvem: conceitos, tendências e aplicações em Software Livre
Computação em Nuvem: conceitos, tendências e aplicações em Software Livre
Diego Kreutz
 
Serviços de rede: uma visão de futuro
Serviços de rede: uma visão  de futuroServiços de rede: uma visão  de futuro
Serviços de rede: uma visão de futuro
Diego Kreutz
 
SecFutNet project - Secutiry for Future Network
SecFutNet project - Secutiry for Future NetworkSecFutNet project - Secutiry for Future Network
SecFutNet project - Secutiry for Future Network
Diego Kreutz
 

More from Diego Kreutz (7)

Towards Secure and Dependable Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures
Towards Secure and Dependable Authentication and Authorization InfrastructuresTowards Secure and Dependable Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures
Towards Secure and Dependable Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures
 
Infrastructure Resilience against Attacks and Faults
Infrastructure Resilience against Attacks and FaultsInfrastructure Resilience against Attacks and Faults
Infrastructure Resilience against Attacks and Faults
 
The dark side of SDN and OpenFlow
The dark side of SDN and OpenFlowThe dark side of SDN and OpenFlow
The dark side of SDN and OpenFlow
 
SDNs: hot topics, evolution & research opportunities
SDNs: hot topics, evolution & research opportunitiesSDNs: hot topics, evolution & research opportunities
SDNs: hot topics, evolution & research opportunities
 
Computação em Nuvem: conceitos, tendências e aplicações em Software Livre
Computação em Nuvem: conceitos, tendências e aplicações em Software LivreComputação em Nuvem: conceitos, tendências e aplicações em Software Livre
Computação em Nuvem: conceitos, tendências e aplicações em Software Livre
 
Serviços de rede: uma visão de futuro
Serviços de rede: uma visão  de futuroServiços de rede: uma visão  de futuro
Serviços de rede: uma visão de futuro
 
SecFutNet project - Secutiry for Future Network
SecFutNet project - Secutiry for Future NetworkSecFutNet project - Secutiry for Future Network
SecFutNet project - Secutiry for Future Network
 

Recently uploaded

Generative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to Production
Generative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to ProductionGenerative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to Production
Generative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to Production
Aggregage
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
James Anderson
 
Securing your Kubernetes cluster_ a step-by-step guide to success !
Securing your Kubernetes cluster_ a step-by-step guide to success !Securing your Kubernetes cluster_ a step-by-step guide to success !
Securing your Kubernetes cluster_ a step-by-step guide to success !
KatiaHIMEUR1
 
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish CachingAccelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Thijs Feryn
 
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Aftab Hussain
 
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdf
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdfObservability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdf
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdf
Paige Cruz
 
Enhancing Performance with Globus and the Science DMZ
Enhancing Performance with Globus and the Science DMZEnhancing Performance with Globus and the Science DMZ
Enhancing Performance with Globus and the Science DMZ
Globus
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
James Anderson
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Ana-Maria Mihalceanu
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdfSmart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
91mobiles
 
Le nuove frontiere dell'AI nell'RPA con UiPath Autopilot™
Le nuove frontiere dell'AI nell'RPA con UiPath Autopilot™Le nuove frontiere dell'AI nell'RPA con UiPath Autopilot™
Le nuove frontiere dell'AI nell'RPA con UiPath Autopilot™
UiPathCommunity
 
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
Pierluigi Pugliese
 
Free Complete Python - A step towards Data Science
Free Complete Python - A step towards Data ScienceFree Complete Python - A step towards Data Science
Free Complete Python - A step towards Data Science
RinaMondal9
 
The Metaverse and AI: how can decision-makers harness the Metaverse for their...
The Metaverse and AI: how can decision-makers harness the Metaverse for their...The Metaverse and AI: how can decision-makers harness the Metaverse for their...
The Metaverse and AI: how can decision-makers harness the Metaverse for their...
Jen Stirrup
 
Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...
Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...
Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...
UiPathCommunity
 
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and SalesThe Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
Laura Byrne
 
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
sonjaschweigert1
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Generative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to Production
Generative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to ProductionGenerative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to Production
Generative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to Production
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
 
Securing your Kubernetes cluster_ a step-by-step guide to success !
Securing your Kubernetes cluster_ a step-by-step guide to success !Securing your Kubernetes cluster_ a step-by-step guide to success !
Securing your Kubernetes cluster_ a step-by-step guide to success !
 
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish CachingAccelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
 
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
 
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdf
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdfObservability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdf
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdf
 
Enhancing Performance with Globus and the Science DMZ
Enhancing Performance with Globus and the Science DMZEnhancing Performance with Globus and the Science DMZ
Enhancing Performance with Globus and the Science DMZ
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
 
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
 
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdfSmart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
 
Le nuove frontiere dell'AI nell'RPA con UiPath Autopilot™
Le nuove frontiere dell'AI nell'RPA con UiPath Autopilot™Le nuove frontiere dell'AI nell'RPA con UiPath Autopilot™
Le nuove frontiere dell'AI nell'RPA con UiPath Autopilot™
 
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
 
Free Complete Python - A step towards Data Science
Free Complete Python - A step towards Data ScienceFree Complete Python - A step towards Data Science
Free Complete Python - A step towards Data Science
 
The Metaverse and AI: how can decision-makers harness the Metaverse for their...
The Metaverse and AI: how can decision-makers harness the Metaverse for their...The Metaverse and AI: how can decision-makers harness the Metaverse for their...
The Metaverse and AI: how can decision-makers harness the Metaverse for their...
 
Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...
Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...
Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...
 
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and SalesThe Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
 
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
 

Identity Providers-as-a-Service built as Cloud-of-Clouds: challenges and opportunities

  • 1. Identity Providers-as-a-Service built as Cloud-of-Clouds: challenges and opportunities Diego Kreutz and Eduardo Feitosa FedCSIS/SODIS 2014, Warsaw, Poland
  • 2. Outline Resilient & Secure IdPs Motivation & Goals Deployments & Trade Offs Open Roads & Opportunities Experimental Evaluations
  • 3. Common Threats and Challenges Cyber Crimes/Attacks! Software Bugs & Vulnerabilities Logical Failures 3
  • 4. 4 Vulnerabilities and Treats in IdPs Vulnerability/Support RADIUS OpenID Tolerates crash faults (e.g., back-end clusters) YES YES Tolerates arbitrary faults NO NO Tolerates infrastructure outages NO NO Tolerates DDoS attacks NO NO Risk of common vulnerabilities HIGH HIGH Risk of sensitive data leakage HIGH HIGH Diverse security-related vulnerabilities YES YES Susceptible to resource depletion attacks YES YES
  • 5. 5 What can we do about it?
  • 6. 6 What can we do about it? Approach 1: try to fix everything!?
  • 7. 7 What can we do about it? Approach 2: increase the system’s resilience and trustworthiness Hybrid system architectures, specialized components, clouds, …
  • 8. 8 Current State of Affairs Fault  tolerance/resilience   Level  of  trust   C1 C2 C3 C4 C6 C5
  • 9. Goals 9 Develop new hybrid system architectures. Use cloud and multi-cloud environments to increase the resilience and trustworthiness of critical systems. Reduce costs and foster new business models.
  • 10. Cloud: some benefits 10 Ø  Elasticity of resources" Ø  Cost-effectiveness" §  Reduce CAPEX and OPEX for business" Ø  Efficient and productive tools and systems" Ø  Protection against high scale attacks"
  • 11. Cloud: some challenges 11 Ø  Failures: are still high" Ø  Performance" §  Hard to measure" §  Not yet enough for HPC apps" Ø  Price models" §  No standards" §  No easy way to measure and compare" Ø  Confidentiality & Privacy" §  Cloud provider has access to your data"
  • 12. Multi-Cloud: some benefits 12 Ø  Increasing reliability" §  Up to three nines" Ø  Lower costs" Ø  No vendor lock-in" Ø  Better privacy and confidentiality" §  Multi-cloud storage crypto solutions" Ø  Improved performance" Ø  Diversity of attack defenses"
  • 13. Multi-Cloud: challenges 13 Ø  Inter-cloud high network latency" Ø  Network performance, reliability and costs" Ø  Privacy and confidentiality" §  Yet, still easier to solve than in a single cloud" Ø  Deployment and management costs" §  Different technologies" §  Diversity of tools" §  Lack of standardized interoperability"
  • 14. Multi-DCs/Cloud Trade Offs 14 PhyMachine1! Hypervisor 1! VM1! Resilient Service! OverallSystemPerformance! HighAvailability(towards3nines)! ResistancetoAttacksandVulnerabilities! Single Data Center (Multiple Physical Machines) SusceptibilitytoPhysicalandLogicalFailures! PhyMachine2! Hypervisor 2! VM2! Resilient Service! PhyMachine3! Hypervisor 3! VM3! Resilient Service! PhyMachine1! Hypervisor 1! VM1! Resilient Service! Multiple Data Centers (Single Cloud Provider) PhyMachine2! Hypervisor 2! VM2! Resilient Service! PhyMachine3! Hypervisor 3! VM3! Resilient Service! PhyMachine1! Hypervisor 1! VM1! Resilient Service! Multiple Cloud Providers PhyMachine2! Hypervisor 2! VM2! Resilient Service! PhyMachine3! Hypervisor 3! VM3! Resilient Service!
  • 15. Outline Resilient & Secure IdPs Motivation & Goals Deployments & Trade Offs Open Roads & Opportunities Experimental Evaluations
  • 16. 16 OpenID: traditional architecture Client / Web Browser! Service Provider! (Relying Party)! OpenID server! steps 4 and 5! OpenID! Backends! SQL$ LDAP$
  • 17. 17 ROpenID Architecture User Browser / ! Certificate / Attributes! IdP Service Replicas! Service Providers (SPs) / Relying Parties (RPs)! IdP Gateways! Resilient and Secue IdP! Secure Authentication! (confidentiality)! Alternative Path! Default Path!
  • 18. Ø  Arbitrary faults: §  Between the CIS and gateway 18 Client! Cx! CIS! Cx! Service! Sx! Gateway! Gx! Timeout A! Timeout B! Corrupted response ! from replica Sx! Corrupted response ! from replica Gx! Byzantine behavior! from replica Cx! ROpenID Fault Detection Mechanisms Ø  Timeouts:" §  Between client and service" §  Between service and gateway" Ø  Corrupted messages detection" §  Between service and client" §  Between gateway and service"
  • 19. 19 Main Building Blocks 1.  Virtual Machines" 2.  Trusted Computing Base" §  e.g. hypervisors" 3.  Trusted Components" §  e.g. smart cards, TPMs, isolated VMs, secured PCs" 4.  Replication & Recovery Protocols" §  e.g. BFT-SMaRt and ITVM" 5.  Diversity" §  e.g. different operating systems" 6.  Strong mutual authentication" §  e.g. EAP-TLS"
  • 20. 20 What is a TC in our model? A trusted/secure component can be “any” device capable of ensuring ! the data and operation confidentiality of the target system/environment.! Smart Cards" TPM" Tamper Resistant a FPGA" A Highly Secured (shielded) Computer" Virtual TPM" (e.g. vTPM)" Secure Hypervisor (e.g. sHyper)"
  • 21. Outline Resilient & Secure IdPs Motivation & Goals Deployments & Trade Offs Open Roads & Opportunities Experimental Evaluations
  • 24. 24 Deployments & Trade Offs PhyMachine1! Hypervisor 1! VM1! Resilient Service! VM2! Resilient Service! VM3! Resilient Service! PhyMachine1! Hypervisor 1! VM1! Resilient Service! Administrative Domain1! Administrative Domain1! Administrative Domain1! Performance! Availability! PhyMachine2!Hypervisor 2! VM2! Resilient Service! PhyMachine3! Hypervisor 3! VM3! Resilient Service! PhyMachine1! Hypervisor 1! VM1! Resilient Service! Administrative Domain3! Administrative Domain2! PhyMachine2! Hypervisor 2! VM2! Resilient Service! PhyMachine3! Hypervisor 3! VM3! Resilient Service! Susceptibletodepletionattacks! (a)! (b)! (c)!
  • 25. 25 Deployments & Trade Offs PhyMachine1! Hypervisor 1! VM1! Resilient Service! OverallSystemPerformance! HighAvailability(towards3nines)! ResistancetoAttacksandVulnerabilities! Single Data Center (Multiple Physical Machines) SusceptibilitytoPhysicalandLogicalFailures! PhyMachine2! Hypervisor 2! VM2! Resilient Service! PhyMachine3! Hypervisor 3! VM3! Resilient Service! PhyMachine1! Hypervisor 1! VM1! Resilient Service! Multiple Data Centers (Single Cloud Provider) PhyMachine2! Hypervisor 2! VM2! Resilient Service! PhyMachine3! Hypervisor 3! VM3! Resilient Service! PhyMachine1! Hypervisor 1! VM1! Resilient Service! Multiple Cloud Providers PhyMachine2! Hypervisor 2! VM2! Resilient Service! PhyMachine3! Hypervisor 3! VM3! Resilient Service!
  • 26. Wait! What about resource depletion attacks? In virtualized environments, how malicious VMs can affect the execution of non- malicious VMs?
  • 27. 27 Resource Depletion Attacks 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 10 20 40 80 100 Numberofauthentications/s Number of OpenID clients ROpenID throughput under CPU depletion attacks FF-Exec 3vCPUs-Attack 6vCPUs-Attack 12vCPUs-Attack
  • 28. 28 Resource Depletion Attacks 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 10 20 40 80 100 Numberofauthentications/s Number of OpenID clients ROpenID throughput under attacks QuintaVMs TCP-ACK-A TCP-SYN-A TCP-SYN-ACK-A TCP-SSH-A
  • 29. Outline Resilient & Secure IdPs Motivation & Goals Deployments & Trade Offs Open Roads & Opportunities Experimental Evaluations
  • 30. 30 ROpenID Evaluation Average Latency: 78.360ms! Average Latency: 87.343ms! Average Latency: 32.103ms! Environment vCPU ECUs MEM Disk Network UFAM-VMs 2 --- 2GB 20GB Gigabit Amazon-EC2 4 13 15GB 2x40 SSD High Speed Amazon-DCs 4 13 15GB 2x40 SSD Public WAN
  • 31. 31 ROpenID Evaluation Average Latency: 78.360ms! Average Latency: 87.343ms! Average Latency: 32.103ms! # of clients UFAM-VMs Amazon-EC2 Amazon-DCs 20 867.73 1969.17 26.66 40 984.59 2166.58 50.72 80 995.12 2244.30 92.42 100 960.11 2244.04 114.05
  • 32. Outline Resilient & Secure IdPs Motivation & Goals Deployments & Trade Offs Open Roads & Opportunities Experimental Evaluations
  • 34. 34 Scaling up ROpenID Environment 20 clients 40 clients 80 clients 100 clients UFAM-VMs 867 984 995 960 Amazon-EC2 1969 2166 2244 2444 Amazon-DCs 26 50 92 114 Environment 10k users 100k users 500k users 1M users UFAM-VMs 4.16% 41.66% 208.30% 416.61% Amazon-EC2 1.78% 17.82% 89.11% 178.22% Amazon-DCs 35.07% 350.72% 1753.61% 3507.23%
  • 35. 35 Scaling up ROpenID Cost/Users 10k users 100k users 500k users 1M users IaaS $350.40 $3,507.65 $17,531.90 $35,083.80 Service $550.37 $5,503.70 $27,518.50 $55,037.00 Total cost/y $900.77 $9,011.35 $45,060.40 $90,120.80 Environment 10k users 100k users 500k users 1M users UFAM-VMs 4.16% 41.66% 208.30% 416.61% Amazon-EC2 1.78% 17.82% 89.11% 178.22% Amazon-DCs 35.07% 350.72% 1753.61% 3507.23%
  • 36. Technical and Business Challenges 36 Ø  Efficient networks" §  Low latency" §  High throughput" Ø  Cost-effective three nines" §  Combined multi-cloud solutions" Ø  Confidentiality and Privacy" §  Combined multi-cloud solutions"
  • 38. 38 Final remarks on multi-cloud IdPs Ø  New business opportunities for" §  Cloud providers" §  Startups" Ø  Research open reads & challenges" §  Efficient WANs" §  Telco Clouds" §  Multi-cloud elasticity " §  Multi-cloud interoperability" §  Confidentiality & Privacy"
  • 39. SecFuNet Project (FP7-ICT-2011-EU-Brazil – STREP number 288349) Acknowledgments
  • 40. Identity Providers-as-a-Service built as Cloud-of-Clouds: challenges and opportunities Diego Kreutz and Eduardo Feitosa FedCSIS/SODIS 2014, Warsaw, Poland