Horsehead Defendants Reply Brief

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
IN RE HORSEHEAD HOLDING
CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
Civil. Action No. 16-292-LPS-CJB
Consolidated
CLASS ACTION
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO LEAD PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Geoffrey G. Grivner (# 4711)
BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC
919 North Market Street, Suite 1500
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Te1ephone: 302.552.4207
Facsimile: 302.552.4295
geoffrey.grivner@bipc.com
Stanley Yorsz
Gretchen L. Jankowski
301 Grant Street, 20th
Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Telephone: 412.562.8800
Facsimile: 412.562.1041
stanley.yorsz@bipc.com
gretchen.jankowski@bipc.com
Attorneys for Defendants
James M. Hensler and Robert D. Scherich
Dated: August 17, 2017
Case 1:16-cv-00292-LPS-CJB Document 57 Filed 08/17/17 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 2677

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
II. ARGUMENT.......................................................................................................................1
A. The Court May Consider the Regulatory Filings, Press Releases, and
Transcripts of Investor Calls At this Stage. .............................................................1
B. Plaintiffs’ Brief Misstates the Record and Otherwise Recites the
Incomplete Allegations in the Complaint, Which Itself Selectively
Reproduces Excerpts of Regulatory Filings, Press Releases, and
Transcripts of Investor Calls....................................................................................3
C. Defendants’ Cautionary Statements Were Not Mere Boilerplate, Nor Did
They Relate to Knowingly False Statements or Omissions.....................................6
D. Defendants Have Accurately Stated the Third Circuit’s Scienter Standard,
and Plaintiffs Have Failed to Meet this Standard. ...................................................8
III. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................10

ii
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page(s)
Cases
Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier v. Alliance Capital Mgt.,
435 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2006).......................................................................................................1
Bartesch v. Cook,
941 F. Supp. 2d 501 (D. Del 2013)..........................................................................................10
Cal. Pub. Emples’. Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp.,
394 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2004).....................................................................................................10
In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation,
7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993)...........................................................................................................6
GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington,
368 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2004)...................................................................................................6, 9
Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc.,
564 F.3d 242 (3rd Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................9, 10
J/H Real Estate Inc. v. Abramson,
901 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1995)..............................................................................................7
Kolber v. Body Cent. Corp.,
967 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (D. Del. 2013).......................................................................................10
Murphy v. Precision Castparts Corp.,
2017 WL 3084274 (D. Or. June 27, 2017) ................................................................................9
Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc.,
736 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2013).....................................................................................................10
Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. Orrstown Fin. Servs., Inc.,
2015 WL 3833849 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2015)............................................................................7
Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp.,
964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992).......................................................................................................8
Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. WahKwong Shipping Group,
181 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 1999).......................................................................................................1
In re Synchronoss Sec. Litig.,
705 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D.N.J. 2010)..........................................................................................10

iii
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308 (2007)...................................................................................................................9
In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig.,
283 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................8
In re Veritas Software Corp. Securities Litigation,
2006 WL 1431209 (D. Del. May 23, 2006)...............................................................................7
Winer Family Tr. v. Queen,
503 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2007).......................................................................................................8

1
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs’ brief regurgitates the skewed and incomplete story that comprises their
Consolidated Class Action Complaint (the “Complaint” or “CAC”), and continues to
misrepresent the disclosures from, and filings by, Defendants James Hensler and Robert Scherich
throughout the Class Period. When confronted with the complete narrative, Plaintiffs resort to
mislabeling Defendants’ statements as “boilerplate,” “false,” and “misleading” without providing
any explanation for these accusations. The Court should decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to accept
these unsupported accusations and should instead focus on the actual disclosures throughout the
Class Period.
Plaintiffs’ legal analysis is likewise flawed. They misstate the legal standards for
cautionary language attached to forward-looking statements, a defendant’s duty to disclose
information on a particular issue, and the requirements for scienter. Accordingly, the Court
should dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.
II. ARGUMENT
A. The Court May Consider the Regulatory Filings, Press Releases,
and Transcripts of Investor Calls At this Stage.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ repeated suggestion, the Court may look to Horsehead’s SEC
filings and the investor call transcripts appended to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.1
That
approach is particularly apt where, as here, the case is all about SEC disclosures—not the
purported mismanagement of the Mooresboro Facility (“Mooresboro”) as Plaintiffs would have
this Court believe.
1
Neither of the cases cited by Plaintiffs, Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier v. Alliance Capital Mgt., 435 F.3d 396 (3d
Cir. 2006) and Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. WahKwong Shipping Group, 181 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 1999),
compel the conclusion Plaintiffs urge upon this Court. Neither case concerned SEC disclosures, let alone citation to
other portions of the very same SEC filings upon which the complaint was based. Further, in Southern Cross, the
Third Circuit recognized that it could “examine” a court opinion “to see if it contradicts the complaint’s legal
conclusions or factual claims” because the plaintiff specifically referenced the opinion in its complaint. 181 F.3d at
427; see also Defs.’ Br. at 1 n.2 (discussing the Court’s authority to consider documents integral to the Complaint).

2
Importantly, Horsehead’s SEC disclosures refute Plaintiffs’ factual misrepresentations
that Defendants concealed equipment issues at Mooresboro in 2014 and early 2015. For
example, Horsehead’s February 2014 Press Release addressed the issues related to water testing,
which Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of never conducting:
We have experienced delays during the past several weeks and some damage to
piping, valves and fittings as a result of severe and prolonged cold weather
conditions. The facility is particularly vulnerable to cold weather during the
water circulation testing phase of the commissioning process. This is not
expected to be the case during normal operations with acidified solutions since
residual heat in the system should be sufficient to minimize the risk of freezing.
We have also experienced delays due to minor equipment issues mostly related to
locating and repairing sources of leaks, which is to be expected during the
commissioning process.
Defs.’ Ex. 2 at 4 (emphasis supplied). The May 12, 2014 Investor Call similarly addresses “a
very significant leak” and “issues, [that] really, didn’t surface until [Horsehead] started operating
more or less in a production mode,” which were “hopefully behind us.” Ex. 7 at 5-6. Horsehead
again addressed “start-up issues including some equipment malfunctions” in its August 2014 10-
Q. Ex. 11 at 64. These documents show that Defendants never “concealed” Horsehead’s
equipment issues.
Nor did Horsehead’s public filings conceal issues with nameplate capacity. In August
2014, Hensler disclosed:
Well, we really haven’t thought much about expanding beyond the 155,000 at this
stage because our focus is on getting there. As I think we’ve said in the past, we
believe that the capacity is there to get to the 170,000, 175,000 range, and it’s a
matter of getting additional zinc units to feed it. And once we get to the rated
capacity level of 155,000, we’ll evaluate whether that, in fact, is the case or
whether we need to put any further investment into Mooresboro to get it up to that
level. But at this stage, that hasn’t been on our radar screen.
Ex. 12 at 9 (emphasis supplied). Throughout the Class Period, Horsehead made similar
disclosures about nameplate capacity. See Ex. 22 at 6 (March 2015 10-K discussing how
“[t]iming [ ]for the completion of the ramp-up to full production cannot be determined with any

3
certainty at this time.”); Exs. 27 at 1 and 28 at 1 (June and July 2015 Press Releases discussing
how Horsehead “remain[ed] focused on ramping up to [its] interim goal of 75% of nameplate
capacity, which [it] hoped to achieve during the third quarter.”).
Horsehead similarly disclosed issues regarding the bottlenecks, such as the bleed
treatment area and clarifiers—again, contrary to Plaintiffs’ allegations. Horsehead’s November
2014 10-Q referenced how Horsehead “reallocated resources to focus on debottlenecking the
zinc production plant in October. . . .” Ex. 15 at 108. Its investor call the same day disclosed
“the problem we’ve been having”—“the clarity of the overflow for this first stage clarifier is not
at design spec. And so we’re bringing too many solids into the sand filters, that’s plugging them
up and that’s what’s restricting the flow.” Ex. 16 at 5. Throughout the next year, Horsehead
likewise addressed the lack of “sufficient capacity in [the] bleed treatment circuit,” the “higher
than expected destruction rates for cathodes and anodes,” and the “persistent equipment
reliability issues.” Ex. 26 at 7; see also Ex. 31 at 38 (August 2015 10-Q disclosing that
“[a]lthough production improved, it was primarily paced by the capacity of our process for
removing impurities from the system, the so-called bleed treatment system, and by intermittent
equipment reliability issues.”).
B. Plaintiffs’ Brief Misstates the Record and Otherwise Recites the Incomplete
Allegations in the Complaint, Which Itself Selectively Reproduces Excerpts of
Regulatory Filings, Press Releases, and Transcripts of Investor Calls.
As these statements illustrate, Defendants repeatedly discussed with Horsehead’s
shareholders and disclosed to the investing public the ongoing technical and operational issues
with Mooresboro. Undeterred, however, Plaintiffs also accuse Defendants of making material
misstatements about Horsehead’s liquidity and financial health. Far from it. See, e.g., Ex. 22 at
28 (February 2015 Form 10-K warning that “[o]ur substantial indebtedness could adversely
affect our financial flexibility and prevent us from fulfilling our obligations under the agreements

4
governing our indebtedness”); Ex. 28 at 1 (July 2015 Press Release stating that “[w]hile the
timing of achieving full zinc production cannot be predicted with certainty at this time, based on
our financing sources we believe we have adequate liquidity to support the ramp-up”).
Horsehead likewise disclosed market risks and commodity pricing in its Form 10-Ks, which it
incorporated into every quarterly and annual report filed during the Class Period. See, e.g., Ex. 4
at 55-58 (March 2013 Form 10-K).
Plaintiffs’ brief is also littered with factual inaccuracies. For example, they conflate
leaching reactors and clarifiers; misstate the number of clarifiers; and misidentify the material of
the clarifiers (which is ceramic in the problem clarifier—hence, no rubber lining).2
Plaintiffs’
brief also neglects to identify the source of many of the purported “misrepresentations,” relying
instead on their re-characterization of paragraphs in the Complaint.
Even more troubling, Plaintiffs repackage third-party statements and imply that they were
those of Horsehead. Attempting to challenge Defendants’ cautionary language, Plaintiffs
represent that “Defendants’ own conference call transcript describes [Horsehead’s] statements as
‘boilerplate risk disclosure.’” Plfs.’ Br. at 13 (quoting Plfs.’ Ex. 12 at 6). But that quotation is
from an analyst’s question during the following exchange:
Daniel Moore – CJS Securities, Inc. At the end of your prepared remarks, Jim,
you mentioned we may experience start-up issues similar to July. I’m just
wondering, is that kind of boilerplate risk disclosure? Are there any issues that
you’re seeing or experiencing as of today that could cause temporary shutdowns
over the coming weeks?
2
Plaintiffs’ brief also includes misleading references, citing to paragraphs in the Complaint unrelated to the
accompanying statement. For instance, they allege that “Defendants made affirmative statements about
Mooresboro’s ability to achieve output above nameplate capacity without significant additional investment.” Pls.’
Br. at 17. Among their “support” for this proposition are paragraphs 77-79 of the Complaint, which include
reproduced testimony from the Bankruptcy Trial – not affirmative statements during the Class Period. This is yet
another example of Plaintiffs’ repeated attempts to plead fraud by hindsight. Elsewhere, Plaintiffs’ brief includes
inaccurate references to their own Complaint, such as when they discuss the number of reactors but cite to a
paragraph discussing “gypsum extraction.” Compare Plfs.’ Br. at 5 n.5 (citing CAC ¶ 72) with CAC ¶ 72.

5
James M. Hensler Nothing that’s identified at this point, but the issue we had in
July was unusual. Did catch us a bit by surprise, and it’s the kind of thing that
happens at times in a start-up situation. So there may be other issues like that
we’re not aware of, but we don’t anticipate them at this point in time.
As for the so-called “boilerplate” used by Horsehead during the Class Period, Horsehead
included detailed, pages-long disclosures in its Form 10-Ks specifically designed to address
financial and liquidity risks. See Ex. 4 at 22 (2013 Form 10-K). Among them:
• The metals industry is highly cyclical. Fluctuations in the availability of zinc and nickel
and in levels of customer demand have historically been severe, and future changes
and/or fluctuations could cause us to experience lower sales volumes, which would
negatively impact our profit margins.
• We may not have sufficient funds to finish the final phase of construction of the new zinc
facility.
• Servicing our debt requires a significant amount of cash, and we may not have sufficient
cash flow from our business to pay the notes or other debt we may occur.
See id. at 19, 20, 22. Along with these “Risk Factors,” the public filings also included detailed
Cautionary Statements that described how certain other factors “could affect our future
performance and the liquidity and value of our securities and cause our actual results to differ
materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements made by us or on our
behalf . . . .” Id. at 4. And they include “the state of the credit and financial markets; decreases
in the prices of zinc and nickel-based products; competition from global zinc and nickel
manufacturers; our ability to implement our business strategy successfully; our ability to
complete the final phase of construction, commissioning and ramp up of our new zinc facility;
[and] our ability to realize the projected benefits from the new zinc facility once fully
operational . . . .” Id. Indeed, the caution concerning the price of zinc was particularly on point
because the price of zinc dropped precipitously in 2014 and 2015. See Plfs.’ Ex. 36 at 74
(November 2015 10-Q describing how “[s]ince May 2015, the price of zinc has fallen
approximately 34% reaching a five-year low in September of 2015 . . . . Changes in zinc pricing

6
have impacted our sales revenue since the prices of the products we sell are based primarily on
LME zinc prices, and they have impacted our costs of production, since the purchase prices of
some of our feedstocks are based on LME zinc prices.”).
C. Defendants’ Cautionary Statements Were Not Mere Boilerplate,
Nor Did They Relate to Knowingly False Statements or Omissions.
Plaintiffs disregard not only the substance of Horsehead’s cautionary statements relating
to forward-looking statements, but also ignore the law governing such statements. In each case
cited by Plaintiffs regarding cautionary language, the court ruled that the cautionary language
was sufficient to protect the forward-looking statements at issue. For instance, in GSC Partners
CDO Fund v. Washington, the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint holding,
in relevant part, that the statement in a circular that collection was “probable” was a “classic
forward-looking statement” since it was prediction of the likelihood of collection on change
orders and claims. 368 F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). Likewise, the Third Circuit in In re
Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint,
holding, in relevant part, that the abundant and meaningful cautionary language in the prospectus
at issue rendered the alleged misrepresentations and omissions immaterial. 7 F.3d 357, 372 (3d
Cir. 1993) (“We can say that the prospectus here truly bespeaks caution because, not only does
the prospectus generally convey the riskiness of the investment, but its warnings and cautionary
language directly address the substance of the statement the plaintiffs challenge.”).
So too here. Defendants have highlighted the numerous, lengthy, meaningful cautionary
statements that accompanied their forward-looking statements in their Opening Brief and
exhibits thereto. See, e.g., Defs.’ Opening Brief at 6-9. In response to this significant evidence
of meaningful cautionary language, Plaintiffs are left to rely upon a single instance where a third
party referred to a single statement as “boilerplate.” Plfs.’ Br. at 13.

7
The cautionary statements made by Defendants are very much akin to those that have
been afforded safe harbor protection. See, e.g., Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. Orrstown Fin.
Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 3833849, at *19 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2015) (affording safe harbor
protection to forward-looking statement accompanied by statement that “[w]hile we believe we
have the resources and internal systems in place to successfully achieve and manage our future
growth, there can be no assurance growth opportunities will be available or that we will
successfully manage our growth.”). Moreover, Plaintiffs make no effort to compare Defendants’
cautionary language with statements that have been rejected by any court. Cf. J/H Real Estate
Inc. v. Abramson, 901 F. Supp. 952, 956-57 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (rejecting vague cautionary
language that warned “[a] number of factors . . . may in the future affect the Company’s ability
to control its medical costs and other operating expenses.”)
With respect to any alleged omission or misrepresentation, Plaintiffs rely upon cases that
are readily distinguishable from the facts alleged here. In In re Veritas Software Corp. Securities
Litigation, plaintiffs asserted that defendants inflated the company’s financial condition by
including, as revenue, contracts that were not yet finalized; “i.e., defendants are alleged to have
improperly recognized revenue, thereby knowingly misrepresenting Veritas’ current and forecast
revenue, net income and earnings per share.” 2006 WL 1431209, at *6 (D. Del. May 23, 2006).
This Court held that these allegations were sufficient to state a claim, stating “plaintiffs have
alleged that the earnings forecasts were false or lacked a reasonable basis when made because
they were related to improper revenue recognition. No manner of cautionary language can cure
false statements knowingly made.” Id. at *7. But here, the alleged misrepresentations
highlighted by Plaintiffs are not so clear-cut. A complaint “must allege that the defendant made
false or misleading statements either intentionally or with deliberate recklessness . . . .” In re

8
Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs
have not adequately pled that any misrepresentation was intentional or deliberately reckless at
the time that it was made.
Indeed, the alleged statements amount to nothing more than fraud by hindsight. See
Defs.’ Opening Brief at 16. Reliance upon statements made by Defendant Hensler in the
bankruptcy proceeding, which certainly did not include any admission of making prior false
statements, does not adequately plead fraud. Winer Family Tr. v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 331 (3d
Cir. 2007) (rejecting fraud claim regarding scope of improvements needed at meat processing
facility based upon subsequent statements made two years after allegedly fraudulent statement).
Furthermore, Plaintiffs mischaracterize Defendants’ duty by stating that they were
obligated to speak “completely” about every aspect of the Mooresboro facility (or any other topic
for that matter). Relying upon Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992),
Plaintiffs appear to suggest that any and all material information regarding Mooresboro must
have been fully disclosed. In reality, many of Plaintiffs allegations of fraud are actually
allegations of mismanagement, which are not actionable. Id. at 281. Further flawed is Plaintiffs’
assertion that any purported omission of information by Defendants was material because of
declines in Horsehead’s stock prices. Plfs.’ Br. at 18. What Plaintiffs ignore, however, is that
Horsehead’s stock price decline closely tracked the declining price in zinc occurring at the same
time.
D. Defendants Have Accurately Stated the Third Circuit’s Scienter Standard,
and Plaintiffs Have Failed to Meet this Standard.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have incorrectly stated the law with respect to scienter
in that Defendants must personally benefit as a result of the fraud. Plfs.’ Br. at 8. In reality,
however, Defendants correctly noted in their Opening Brief that the Complaint lacked

9
allegations that are “typically pled when scienter exists such as how Hensler and Scherich each
personally benefitted as a result of the alleged fraud.” Defs.’ Br. at 15.3
Plaintiffs’ selective
quotation from Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242 (3rd Cir. 2009),
suggesting that the “absence of a motive allegation is not fatal” is simply misleading.
Under Supreme Court precedent, “the court’s job is not to scrutinize each allegation in
isolation but to assess all the allegations holistically. In sum, the reviewing court must ask:
When the allegations are accepted as true and taken collectively, would a reasonable person
deem the inference of scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference.” Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007). With this in mind, the Third Circuit
specifically held in Avaya:
According to our pre-Tellabs jurisprudence, “[m]otive must be supported by facts
stated with particularity, and must give rise to a strong inference of scienter.”
That proposition is no less true after Tellabs, although we no longer make an
independent search for scienter on the basis of motive and opportunity allegations
alone. “[M]otives that are generally possessed by most corporate directors and
officers do not suffice; instead, plaintiffs must assert a concrete and personal
benefit to the individual defendants resulting from this fraud.”
564 F.3d at 278 (quoting GSC Partners, 368 F.3d at 237) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
supplied).
Undeterred by their failure to establish personal benefit, Plaintiffs go on to argue that
scienter is established under the “core operations doctrine.” Plfs.’ Br. at 19. What Plaintiffs
omit from the very case they cite, however, is the fact that “a ‘core operations inference,’ without
more, rarely satisfies the scienter requirement.” Murphy v. Precision Castparts Corp., 2017 WL
3084274, at *17 (D. Or. June 27, 2017). Moreover, the Third Circuit and this Court have
expressly limited application of the core operations inference when analyzing a plaintiff’s
3
Plaintiffs argue, without citing a single case, that the personal benefit achieved by Hensler and Scherich was
keeping their jobs. Plfs.’ Br. at 8 n.6. But such an argument ignores Avaya and prior Third Circuit precedent.

10
satisfaction of the scienter requirement. See Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 247 (3d
Cir. 2013) (“[C]orporate management’s general awareness of the day-to-day workings of the
company’s business does not establish scienter—at least absent some additional allegations of
specific information conveyed to management and related to fraud.”) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs also erroneously contend that Defendants have not challenged the confidential
witnesses whose statements Plaintiffs suggest bolster the existence of scienter. Plfs.’ Br. at 19.
To the contrary, Defendants noted in their Opening Brief that none of the confidential witnesses
reported directly to Hensler or Scherich. Defs.’ Br. at 13 n.9. Nor is there any allegation that
CW1-CW4 ever communicated in any way with Hensler or Scherich. Given the complete lack
of any relationship between the confidential witnesses and Defendants, their statements are of
little or no value in establishing scienter, particularly with respect to any alleged
misrepresentations as to Horsehead’s financial and liquidity status.4
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Complaint with prejudice
and should not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. See, e.g., Kolber v. Body Cent. Corp., 967 F.
Supp. 2d 1061, 1072 (D. Del. 2013).
4
None of the CWs’ statements concern Horsehead’s financial status or its liquidity. See CAC ¶¶ 50-54, 56-59, 62-
66, 68-75. Further, in the few places where the CWs attempt to link their information to what “management” knew,
they do so vaguely, and upon “belief.” See, e.g., CAC ¶¶ 57 & 59. But that, too, is insufficient. The allegations
attributed to confidential sources must instead “contain specific details regarding the basis for the source’s personal
knowledge and describe supporting events in detail.” In re Synchronoss Sec. Litig., 705 F. Supp. 2d 367, 400
(D.N.J. 2010) (citing Cal. Pub. Emples’. Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 2004)). “If the
allegations do not demonstrate the confidential witnesses’ reliability, the Court must ‘discount them steeply.’”
Bartesch v. Cook, 941 F. Supp. 2d 501, 507 (D. Del 2013) (quoting Avaya, 564 F.3d at 263)).

11
/s/ Geoffrey G. Grivner
Geoffrey G. Grivner (# 4711)
919 North Market Street, Suite 1500
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Te1ephone: 302.552.4207
Facsimile: 302.552.4295
geoffrey.grivner@bipc.com
Stanley Yorsz
Gretchen L. Jankowski
BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY
PC
301 Grant Street, 20th
Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Telephone: 412.562.8800
Facsimile: 412.562.1041
stanley.yorsz@bipc.com
gretchen.jankowski@bipc.com
Attorneys for Defendants
James Hensler and Robert Scherich

Horsehead Defendants Reply Brief

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