This turnover action is untimely because Elizabeth Urquhart died in 2005. The statute of limitations in a discovery or turnover proceeding is governed by the CPLR. See SCPA § 102 (“The CPLR and other laws applicable to practice and procedure apply in the surrogate’s court except where other procedure is provided by this act.”). A proceeding “commenced pursuant to SCPA § 2103 has been likened to a replevin action, which has a statute of limitations of three years.” If you are interested to know about the case, get in touch with Earl R. Davis.

1. i
SURROGATE’S COURT STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS
In the Estate of Elizabeth Haynes Urquhart,
Deceased,
TURNOVER PROCEEDING
File No. 2005-4023/B
RESPONDENTS AMERICAN REGIONAL REAL ESTATE PARTNERS INC., CHAI
CAPITAL, LLC, AND EARL DAVIS’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
Sarah D. Lemon, Esq.
Brian Pantaleo, Esq.
One Vanderbilt Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Tel: (212) 801-9200
lemons@gtlaw.com
pantaleob@gtlaw.com
Counsel for Respondents American Regional
Real Estate Partners Inc., Chai Capital,
LLC, and Earl Davis

2. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................II
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1
FACTS .......................................................................................................................................2
THE STANDARD......................................................................................................................4
ARGUMENT..............................................................................................................................5
I. THIS TURNOVER ACTION IS TIME BARRED...........................................................5
II. THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER,
WHICH IS A DISPUTE BETWEEN LIVING PARTIES OVER REAL
PROPERTY THAT ALLEGEDLY VESTED WITH ELIZABETH
URQUHART’S HEIRS INTESTATE. ............................................................................6
III. SCPA § 2103 DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS ACTION TO VOID A DEED. ..................7
IV. THE AVAILABLE PUBLIC RECORDS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE JUNE
2019 GRANTORS WERE SAVANAH BROWN’S HEIRS. ...........................................8
CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................9

3. iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp.,
68 N.Y.2d 320 (1986)............................................................................................................4
Matter of Birnbaum,
131 Misc 2d 925 (Sur Ct, Monroe County 1986) ...................................................................6
Matter of Cagino,
NYLJ, Dec. 19. 2017 (Sur Ct, Albany County 2017) .........................................................6, 7
Gould v. McBride,
36 A.D.2d 706 (1st Dep’t 1971), aff’d, 29 N.Y.2d 768 (1971) ...............................................4
GTF Mktg., Inc. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc.,
66 N.Y.2d 965 (1985)............................................................................................................4
Matter of Lainez,
79 A.D.2d 78 (2d Dep’t 1981)...............................................................................................6
Mallad Constr. Corp. v. Cnty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
32 N.Y.2d 285 (1973)............................................................................................................4
Matter of Neshewat,
237 A.D.2d 524 (2d Dep’t 1997)...........................................................................................5
Matter of Norstar Trust Co.,
132 A.D.2d 973 (4th Dep’t 1987)..........................................................................................5
In re O’Connell,
98 A.D.3d 673 (2d Dep’t 2012).............................................................................................6
In Matter of Parisi,
59 Misc 3d 1020 (Sur Ct, Queens County 2018)....................................................................6
RCA Corp. v. Am. Standards Testing Bureau, Inc.,
121 A.D.2d 890 (1st Dep’t 1986)...........................................................................................4
Will of Quackenbush,
152 Misc.2d 888 (Sur Ct, Jeff. County 1991).........................................................................6
Zuckerman v. City of N.Y.,
49 N.Y.2d 557 (1980)............................................................................................................4
Statutes
SCPA § 102 ................................................................................................................................5
SCPA § 201 ............................................................................................................................6, 7
SCPA § 1902(3)......................................................................................................................6, 7

4. iv
SCPA § 2103 .................................................................................................................. 1, 5, 7, 8
SCPA § 2103(a)..........................................................................................................................7
SCPA § 2103(a)-(c) ....................................................................................................................7
SCPA § 2103(b)..........................................................................................................................7
Other Authorities
CPLR 210 ...................................................................................................................................5
CPLR 210(c)...............................................................................................................................5
CPLR 3212(b).............................................................................................................................4

5. 1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Before the Court can address Karen Urquhart’s (“Karen Urquhart,” “Karen,” or
“Petitioner”) Amended Verified Petition’s1
merits, or lack thereof, this motion for summary
judgment raises three procedural issues:
The limitations period for a claim accruing between a decedent’s death, but before
the Court grants letters of administration, commences no later than three years after
the decedent’s death. Decedent Elizabeth Urquhart died in 2005. Can her estate’s
administrator file a timely petition for a turnover proceeding in 2021?
This Court does not have jurisdiction over disputes between living parties.
Decedent died in 2005, and her real property rights vested intestate with her living
heirs. Living petitioner, Karen Urquhart, now claims that those rights include an
100% interest in a Macon Street property. The petition further asserts that a 2019
deed to living respondents, conveying a partial interest in the same property, is void.
Does the Court have jurisdiction to settle this dispute between living parties?
The Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act creates a mechanism to turnover estate
property that is in a respondent’s possession or control, and to obtain information
to help discover estate property. The Amended Verified Petition does not claim
that respondents possess property. It also fails to allege that respondents are
withholding information. Instead, it seeks to void a duly executed and recorded
deed for real property. Does the petition set forth an actionable claim under the
statute?
The answer to each question is: “No.” So the Petition fails because: (1) it is time barred; (2) the
Court lacks jurisdiction; and (3) it fails to state a claim under SCPA § 2103. These three procedural
deficiencies are each an independent ground for dismissal. And respondents American Regional
Real Estate Partners Inc., Chai Capital, LLC, and Earl Davis (collectively, “Respondents”) are
entitled to Summary Judgment.
But even if the Petition could survive the above procedural hurdles, its challenges to
respondent’s June 2019 deed are meritless. Respondents conducted an extensive investigation to
1
The “Amended Verified Petition” or the “Petition” refers to the Amended Verified Petition
of Karen Urquhart sworn to on November 10, 2021, which is annexed to the Affirmation
of Brian Pantaleo dated January 13, 2022 (the “Pantaleo Aff.”) as Exhibit E.

6. 2
determine that the deed’s grantors were indeed Savanah Brown’s heirs. And the documents
attached to the objection – public birth records, death certificates, and marriage licenses – establish
this kinship. This evidence resolves all factual issues when compared to the hearsay handwritten
family tree attached to an attorney affirmation – that claims Savanah Brown’s parents are different
than the ones on her death certificate. (It also misspells, “Isenhour,” Savanah’s maiden name).
Because the Court cannot consider these self-serving hearsay claims.
As a result, the Petition sets forth no factual or legal basis for the broad relief it seeks. And
thus, the Court should grant this motion for summary judgment, and dismiss the Amended Verified
Petition in its entirety.
FACTS
On or about December 29, 1950, Elizabeth Urquhart and Savanah Brown purchased the
real property located at 15 Macon Street, Brooklyn, New York (the “Property”) as tenants in
common. Aughtry Aff. Ex. D.2
They recorded the deed memorializing this transaction in the
public record. Id. Elizabeth Urquhart died on August 5, 2005. Ver. Obj. Ex. A.
Elizabeth’s granddaughter, Karen Urquhart, first petitioned the Court for Letters of
Administration – ten years later – on August 11, 2015. Pantaleo Aff. Ex. A. According to this
verified petition, Karen claimed that her mother, Judy Urquhart, filed a probate petition in
September 2005, but later withdrew it in September 2010. Id. Karen’s petition further identified
the estimated gross value of decedent’s personal property as $0.00. Id. She described the real
property passing “through intestacy” as “1/2 the interest in the real property located at 15 Macon
Street, Brooklyn, NY 11216.” Id. Karen also filed an Affidavit of Debt with the Court. Id. at Ex.
B. In this affidavit, she separately affirmed that the value of all personal property receivable by
2
“Aughtry Aff.” refers to the Attorney Affirmation of Dewette C. Aughtry dated October
10, 2021, which is annexed to the Pantaleo Aff. as Exhibit E.

7. 3
the estate in the next 18 months was $0.00. Id. And that she had made a diligent search but could
not identify any debts or claims against the estate – including unpaid funeral or medical bills. Id.
Karen would file amended petitions for letters in August 2016 and August 2018. Id. at C
& D. In both amended petitions, Karen repeatedly verified that the real property passing “through
intestacy” was a “1/2 the interest in the real property located at 15 Macon Street, Brooklyn, NY
11216.” Id.
On June 1, 2019, Savanah Brown’s surviving heirs conveyed their interest in the Property
to American Regional Real Estate Partners Inc., Earl Davis, and Chai Capital, LLC. Aughtry Aff.
Ex. C. Savanah Brown (born Savanah Isenhour) died in 1955. Ver. Obj. Ex. A. Respondent was
able to trace Savanah’s family tree to her great grandfather, Charles Isenhour, by reviewing the
marital records of her mother and grandmother – which identified their parents. Id. at B & C.
Charles’s son, and Savanah’s great uncle, was John Isenhour – a link respondents established with
John’s death certificate. Id. at D.
John’s daughter was Johnsie Gertrude Isenhour. Id. at E. Her death certificate indicates
that she died in 1973. Id. She would have been Savanah’s cousin in 1955. Johnsie Gertrude
married John King. Id. at F. They had a daughter – Johnnie Mae Elizabeth King. Id. The grantors
in the June 2019 deed are her children – Joanna E. Robbins-Sumner and Everett Hacket Jr. as
“Surviving heirs/Distributees Johnnie Mae Elizabeth Robbins a/k/a Johnnie Mae E King.” See
Aughtry Aff. Ex. C. According to the North Carolina Birth Index, Joanna and Everett are Johnnie
Mae Elizabeth’s children. Ver. Obj. Exs. G & H.
In or about November 2021, Karen filed the instant Amended Verified Petition and Order
to Show Cause seeking various forms of relief – including an order declaring Elizabeth Savanah’s
“only heir,” a declaratory judgment voiding the deed, and sanctions against the grantees and their

8. 4
attorneys. Pantaleo Aff., Ex. E. Respondents American Regional Real Estate Partners Inc., Earl
Davis, and Chai Capital now move for summary judgment – respectfully requesting the Court
dismiss the Amended Verified Petition in its entirety.
THE STANDARD
Under CPLR § 3212(b), a motion for summary judgment must be granted if, upon all the
papers and proofs submitted, the movant’s cause of action or defense shall be established
sufficiently to warrant the Court as a matter of law in directing judgment in movant’s favor.
Zuckerman v. City of N.Y., 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562 (1980). A movant must make a prima facie
showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating
the absence of a material issue of fact. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324
(1986). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment has the burden of coming forward
with evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish that factual issues exist which
require a trial of the action. GTF Mktg., Inc. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 965,
968 (1985). Averments merely stating conclusions of fact or law are insufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment. Mallad Constr. Corp. v. Cnty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 32 N.Y.2d 285,
290 (1973). Similarly, mere denials cannot preclude summary judgment. Gould v. McBride, 36
A.D.2d 706, 706-07 (1st Dep’t 1971), aff’d, 29 N.Y.2d 768 (1971). To defeat a motion for
summary judgment, the opposing party must demonstrate a real defense requiring a trial. RCA
Corp. v. Am. Standards Testing Bureau, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 890, 891 (1st Dep’t 1986).
Here, the Court should grant summary judgment in the Respondents’ favor. This action is
time barred, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between living parties
concerning real property that vested with decedent’s heirs in 2005. Further, the public records
establish that Respondents’ deed is valid. And Petitioner’s hearsay claims otherwise, do not create

9. 5
a factual issue to preclude dismissal. As a result, the Court should grant summary judgment and
dismiss the petition in its entirety.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS TURNOVER ACTION IS TIME BARRED.
This turnover action is untimely because Elizabeth Urquhart died in 2005. The statute of
limitations in a discovery or turnover proceeding is governed by the CPLR. See SCPA § 102 (“The
CPLR and other laws applicable to practice and procedure apply in the surrogate’s court except
where other procedure is provided by this act.”). A proceeding “commenced pursuant to SCPA §
2103 has been likened to a replevin action, which has a statute of limitations of three years.” Matter
of Norstar Trust Co., 132 A.D.2d 973 (4th Dep’t 1987); see also Matter of Neshewat, 237 A.D.2d
524, 525 (2d Dep’t 1997) (“Generally, the Statute of Limitations applicable to a discovery
proceeding is the three-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 214 (3) for replevin and conversion
actions”).
But CPLR § 210(c) must also apply when a cause of action accrues after death and before
grant of letters administration. So, in an action to recover damages for taking estate property, the
limitations period must “be computed for the time the letters are issued or three years after death,
whichever event first occurs.” (emphasis added). CPLR § 210(c).
Here, Elizabeth died in 2005. But due to the administrator’s delay, letters did not issue
until 2021 – sixteen years later. In enacting CPLR § 210, the Legislature anticipated such a
scenario. The statute computes the limitations period from three years after death – August 5,
2008. And thus, whether this SCPA § 2103 action sounds in replevin (three years), fraud (six
years), or quiet title (ten years), the limitation period expired before Karen filed her 2021 Amended
Verified Petition. As a result, the Court should grant summary judgment, and dismiss the
Amended Verified Petition.

10. 6
II. THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER,
WHICH IS A DISPUTE BETWEEN LIVING PARTIES OVER REAL PROPERTY
THAT ALLEGEDLY VESTED WITH ELIZABETH URQUHART’S HEIRS
INTESTATE.
The Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter – involving a dispute between the Respondents
and Elizabeth’s living heirs concerning vested real property. The “Surrogate’s Court is a court of
limited subject matter jurisdiction and possesses only those powers conferred upon it by statute.”
In re O’Connell, 98 A.D.3d 673, 674 (2d Dep’t 2012). As a result, jurisdiction may be broad when
a proceeding involves administrating an estate. Id. But the Court’s jurisdiction, under SCPA §
201, does not extend to “independent matters involving controversies between living persons.” Id.
quoting Matter of Lainez, 79 A.D.2d 78, 80 (2d Dep’t 1981).
When the dispute involves real property, SCPA § 1902(3) factors in analyzing whether the
action is between living parties, or whether it involves estate administration. This statute
“recognizes the general rule that real property passes outside the estate.” Will of Quackenbush,
152 Misc.2d 888, 893 (Sur Ct, Jeff. County 1991). Likewise, surrogate’s courts have consistently
refused to invoke jurisdiction in real property disputes where some (or all) of the property is not
in the estate. See In Matter of Parisi, 59 Misc 3d 1020 (Sur Ct, Queens County 2018) (dismissing
a partition matter for lack of jurisdiction when only 16.66% was in the estate); Matter of Birnbaum,
131 Misc 2d 925, 929 (Sur Ct, Monroe County 1986) (“a general holding that the Surrogate’s
Court has the blanket authority to adjudicate a partition action in every instance where a decedent’s
estate is a cotenant-in-common in real property is not supported by the case law and expansion of
this court’s jurisdiction in this regard is unsustainable.”); Matter of Cagino, NYLJ, Dec. 19. 2017
at 41 (Sur Ct, Albany County 2017) (dismissing an action when only half of the property was in
the estate, while the other half was owned outright by the four children as living parties). So it

11. 7
follows that a surrogate’s court will not have jurisdiction in a real property dispute where living
heirs claim 100% property ownership against living parties outside the estate. See Id.
Here, this is a real property dispute between living parties. Elizabeth died in 2005. In
multiple affidavits and verified petitions, Karen represented to the Court that no outstanding debts
or claims exist against the estate. Under SCPA § 1902(3), therefore, Elizabeth’s ownership rights
in the Macon Street property – whether it be 50% as Karen verified in her earlier petitions, or
100% as she now claims – vested with Elizabeth’s heirs upon her death. According to Karen’s
own petition, these heirs were John Urquhart (who died in 2010), Judy Urquhart, and Karen. So
Karen and Judy are living parties alleging that they have vested property rights.
Respondents are also all living parties and companies. This action seeks to void their duly
executed and recorded deed. As a result, this is a dispute between living parties concerning real
property. And this Court does not have jurisdiction, under SCPA § 201, to resolve it. So the Court
should grant summary judgment, and dismiss the Amended Verified Petition.
III. SCPA § 2103 DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS ACTION TO VOID A DEED.
Karen does not state a claim for relief under SCPA § 2103 because her petition does not
allege that respondents physically possess estate property, or that they are withholding knowledge
concerning additional estate property. Under SCPA § 2103, an administrator may petition the
surrogate court to turnover property allegedly belonging to the estate, or order a hearing to discover
information about property that a respondent withholds from the estate. See SCPA § 2103 (a)-
(c). Specifically, the petition must allege that property is: (a) “in the possession or control of a
person who withholds it from him;” or (b) “within the knowledge or information of a person who
refuses to impart knowledge or information he may have concerning it or to disclose any other fact
which will aid the petitioner in making discovery of the property.” Id. (a) & (b).

12. 8
Here, the Amended Verified Petition fails to allege that respondents physically possess or
control property. Respondents do not occupy the Macon Street property. They are not collecting
rent from the property. And they are not denying Elizabeth’s living heirs access. Similarly, the
petition fails to allege that respondents are refusing to disclose information or facts “which will
aid the petitioner in making discovery of the property.” Respondent’s deed is public record. Karen
does not allege the estate may own additional properties that respondents are trying to hide.
Rather than pleading these required elements, the petition claims that respondents’ duly
executed and recorded deed is “fraudulent” and void. Simply put, SCPA § 2103 does not provide
a mechanism to void a deed. As a result, the Court should grant summary judgment, and dismiss
the Amended Verified Petition.
IV. THE AVAILABLE PUBLIC RECORDS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE JUNE 2019
GRANTORS WERE SAVANAH BROWN’S HEIRS.
The June 2019 deed memorializes a valid land sale transaction between respondents and
Savanah Brown’s heirs. Savanah Brown (born Savanah Isenhour) died in 1955. Ver. Obj. Ex. A.
According to her death certificate, Savanah’s parents were Frank Carter and Nettie Isenhour. Id.
Nettie’s marital records indicate that Martha Isenhour was her mother. Id. at Ex. B. According to
Martha’s marital records, Charles Isenhour was Martha’s father. Id. at Ex. C. Charles also had, a
son, John Isenhour. Id. at Ex. D. So Martha (Savanah’s grandmother) and John were brother and
sister, because John’s death certificate also identifies Charles as his father. Id. This made John
Savanah’s great uncle.
John’s daughter Johnsie Gertrude Isenhour died in 1973. Id. at Ex. E. She would have
been Savanah’s cousin. Her death certificate identifies John as her father. Id. Johnsie Gertrude
married John King. Id. at F. They had a daughter – Johnnie Mae Elizabeth King. Id. at F.

13. 9
The grantors of the June 2019 deed are Joanna E. Robbins-Sumner and Everett Hackett Jr.
as surviving heirs of Johnnie Mae Elizabeth King (married name: Robbins). Aughtry Aff. Ex. C.
According to their North Carolina Birth Indexes, Joanna and Everett are Johnnie Mae Elizabeth’s
children. Ver. Obj. Exs. G & H. So, relying upon the above records, respondents purchased their
interest in the Macon Street property, which would have been obtained from their kinship with
Savanah.
These public records are far more reliable than a handwritten family tree attached to an
attorney affirmation. See Aughtry Aff. Ex. B.3
Notably, this family tree mis-identifies Savanah’s
own parents – contradicting her death certificate. See Ver. Obj. Ex. A. And it misspells her maiden
name as “Eisehour.”
Alleging that respondents engaged in fraud or illegal activity is even more irresponsible
since Karen knows that Elizabeth only owned 50% of the property. In fact, she represented to this
Court three times – under penalty of perjury – “1/2 the interest in the real property located at 15
Macon Street, Brooklyn, NY 11216” was decedent’s only real property. Now, however, she claims
this half interest is instead a 100% ownership. As a result, the allegations that petition levies
against respondents are not only untenable – but also false. So the Court should grant this motion
for summary judgment, and dismiss the Amended Verified Petition.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss Karen Urquhart’s Amended
Verified Petition in its entirety, grant summary judgment in respondents’ favor, and grant such
other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
3
It is unclear why this family tree, which Karen presumably created, was not attached to her
petition – and instead included in an attorney’s affirmation.

14. 10
Dated: January 13, 2022
New York, New York Respectfully Submitted,
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
By:
/s/ Brian Pantaleo
Sarah D. Lemon, Esq.
Brian Pantaleo, Esq.
One Vanderbilt Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Tel: (212) 801-9200
lemons@gtlaw.com
pantaleob@gtlaw.com
Counsel for Respondents American Regional
Real Estate Partners Inc., Chai Capital,
LLC, and Earl Davis
ACTIVE 62278368v1