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Running head: THE EFFECTS OF HOOVER'S BUREAUCRATIC TACTICS ON COINTELPRO 1
The Effects Of Hoover's Bureaucratic Tactics On COINTELPRO Operations: A Comparison Between
NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE
Steve Durchin

Abstract
Politics can have a negative impact on a nation's security. This is applicable whether the harm is done
by expediting the development of nuclear weapons for religious fanatics to the unsuccessful
degradation of a subversive group. By being able to analyze and how a subversive group was
unsuccessfully confronted, the process of understanding how political interference can interfere with
security can be extrapolated to explain how other factors can hinder national security as well. In the
1960s, the FBI continued a series of intelligence/harassment programs against violent and subversive
groups within the United States against vastly different groups. How did FBI Director Hoover's
political direction of the agency affect the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations in dealing with the
Ku Klux Klan versus those dealing with the New Left? A content analysis of the literature exploring
COINTELPRO operations may possibly demonstrate if Hoover's personal application of the
bureaucratic politics model hindered the success of these counter-subversive operations.

Table of Contents
Abstract 2
Section I: Introduction 4
Background 4
Rationale For Study 6
Research Question 6
Methodology 6
Frames of Reference 7
Rationale for Qualitative Methods 7
Potential Issues in Study 7
Section II: Literature Review 9
Section III: Data Collection Methods 11
Data Sources 11
Research Design 12
Data Analysis Strategy 12
Summary 13
Section IV: Discussion and Conclusions 13
Findings 13
Discussion 16
Conclusion 17
Limitations 17
Future Research 19
Policy Implications 20
References 22
Appendix 1: Page References Used in Content Analysis 25

Section I: Introduction
Background
Politics has been a driving force in the development and operations of the FBI throughout its
history. The important question is how much effect has the influence of politics has on the efficiency
of operations in protecting the United States. In the 1960s, the FBI continued a series of
intelligence/harassment programs against violent and subversive groups within the United States. The
programs were a continuation of COINTELPRO (an acronym for Counter Intelligence Program)
operations in the FBI's long history of addressing the issue of subversion in the United States. Two
specific programs were of note, as they were targeted at vastly different subversive movements. These
specific programs were COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE, targeted at the Ku Klux Klan, and
COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT, directed at the New Left.
COINTELPRO operations had a formal start in 1953 targeting the Communist party, but were a
continuation of the FBI's anti-subversive mission. Jeffreys-Jones (2007) relates that the Justice
Department, to which the FBI is subordinate, was founded as Congress passed the Enforcement Act of
1870 in part as a reaction to Ku Klux Klan subversion. Weiner (2012) adds that there was no policing
agency assigned to the Justice Department, and Congress refused to establish such in fear of an
"American secret police" though the early 20th Century. In 1908, Congress allowed the creation of
what would eventually become the Bureau of Investigation, however, due to fears that the agency could
be used as a "secret police" and enmeshed in politics, this new agency was not authorized to make
arrests or to carry weapons (Kessler, 2003). Theoharis (2004) contends that two factors changed this
state of affairs; the first was the growth of militant leftist groups and the second was the advent of
World War I and German sabotage efforts within the United States.
It was during this period that J. Edgar Hoover joined the Department of Justice. The growth
and the direction of the FBI can not be explored without understanding Hoover's central role and how

his personality affected it. Powers (1987) explains that Hoover's work during this period allowed him
to become "known to his superiors as someone who was reliable and efficient" (p. 54). After World
War I, the Department of Justice continued its war against subversion after a series of bombings by
Leftists included the Attorney General Mitchell Palmer as a target (Gentry, 1991). The Radical
Division of the Bureau of Investigation, which Hoover was in charge of, was tasked with this
responsibility.
Hoover's work as head of the Radical Division put him in good standing when Attorney General
Harlan Stone sought to reform the Bureau of Investigation in 1924; Hoover was selected as Acing
Director of the Bureau. Gentry (1991) contends that Hoover rebuilt the Bureau. In the era prior to
World War II, Hoover's direction of the agency resulted in several changes, including the sanction to
carry weapons, make arrests, and the new name of the agency...the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
These changes, however, included involving the FBI in internal politics. O'Reilly (1982) discusses how
FDR personally directed the FBI to target the subversive activities of Nazis and Communists and
legitimized domestic intelligence operations; FDR also required the agency's use as a political police,
and to solicit bureau reports on the president's critics. In the future, the FBI would provide political
intelligence on political rivals for each and every President through Hoover's tenure at the FBI.
But it was not until Truman that a formal legally sanctioned role was for anti-subversion was
designated for the FBI; Keller (1989) discusses how a Truman directive stated explicitly that the FBI
should be responsible for matters relating to espionage and subversive activities. It was in this
environment that the FBI initiated the first formal COINTELPRO operation, which was against the
Communist Party in the United States, COINTELPRO: CPUSA. Powers (1987) explains how the
FBI's success in this operation led to the use of these methods against other subversive groups.
In the 1960s, the political climate directed COINTELPRO operations against the Ku Klux Klan
and the New Left. J. Edgar Hoover validated the danger of these groups, whose "verbal assaults are

reinforced with violent acts: murder, assault, arson, bombings" (1969, pp. 289-290). While
COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT were not public knowledge, Hoover's
history of public relations suggests that he was aware of the possibility of disclose of the programs and
wished to stress that operations against violent subversive groups was justified.
It is in examining the differences in operations between the two groups that the question of
whether or not politics interferes with security operations arises.
Rationale For Study
Politics can have a negative impact on a nation's security. This is applicable whether the harm
is done by expediting the development of nuclear weapons for religious fanatics to the unsuccessful
degradation of a subversive group. By being able to analyze and explain why a subversive group was
unsuccessfully confronted, the process of understanding how political interference can interfere with
security can be extrapolated to explain how other factors can hinder national security as well.
Research Question
RQ: How did FBI Director Hoover's political direction of the agency affect the efficiency of
COINTELPRO operations?
IV = Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics
DV = The successful use of a COINTELPRO program to degrade a subversive group's ability to harm
the United States.
Methodology
The purpose of the methodology is to clarify what this thesis is asking by explaining how it is
asking those questions. Accordingly, the theory which potentially explain the differences, the general
approach to the study shall be discussed, the frames of reference will be explained, the rationale for
using these methods will be given, and potential issues in the study will be highlighted.
The theory which best explains COINTELPRO operations is the bureaucratic politics model

(also known in variation as growth complex theory, or Pournelle's Iron Law of Bureaucracy).
The primary method used is through content analysis of secondary material exploring both
COINTELPRO operations and Hoover's direction of the Bureau. This includes some use of
phenomenological research, as the viewpoints of Hoover assistants Sullivan and DeLoach will be
examined.
Data will be obtained from secondary sources. These will include academic studies, historical
studies, and biographical sources.
Frames of Reference
What is the mission of the FBI? The mission of the FBI, under the frame of reference for this
study, is to protect the country from domestic threats.
Should New Left operations be counted as a subset as counter communist/leftist operations, or
on its own merits? The term “New Left” should be interpreted as referring specifically to the New Left
in America, unless otherwise stated. It is within reasonable interpretation to interpret COINTELPRO:
NEW LEFT operations in aggregate with other anti-Communist/anti-socialist operations, but for the
purposes of this thesis, COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT is being considered as a discrete set of data.
Rationale for Qualitative Methods
The qualitative approaches collect nonnumerical data to answer the research question in a
descriptive or exploratory manner. Tewksbury (2009) asserts that “Qualitative research methods
provide more emphasis on interpretation and providing consumers with complete views, looking at
contexts, environmental immersions and a depth of understanding of concepts” (p. 39)
Potential Issues in Study
The covert nature of COINTELPRO is the primary issue in this study. Although some material
has been made publicly available through the Freedom of Information Act, it is likely that there is
material that needs to be uncovered to fully explore the nature of the program. Theoharis (1990)

contends that FBI documents released for Freedom of Information Act requests are often redacted and
of limited research value.
Lost material due to time and destruction. There is an issue based on the passage of time. The
Archives note that the material on hand is from the national FBI offices, and that most of the
operational notes were kept at the field offices. It is likely that most of this material is now lost. In
addition, Steinwall (1986) recounts that the FBI destroyed over 700,000 cubic feet of records between
1976 and 1978 although this material has not been specified to include documentation on
COINTELPRO operations.
There may difficulty in assigning qualitative characteristics when comparing New Left
operations against Leftist groups as a whole. SDS, for example, evolved from the Student League for
Industrial Democracy (SLID), a group that the FBI had been monitoring under a different
COINTELPRO program aimed at the Socialist Worker's Party.
Political bias is a serious issue for studies of this type. Most discussion of the COINTELPRO
program is based on the contention that it was somehow “immoral” to investigate and harass violent
groups that had the goal of breaking American law; in addition, the vast majority of this discussion has
been conducted by leftists that focused on leftist groups as “victims” of this program, and ignored
completely COINTELPRO operations against the Klan (not to mention the violent nature of the crimes
committed by the New Left). The majority of the remainder often brushed off efforts against the Klan
as an FBI front for public relations...in a secret program. There is also the question of my own personal
bias.
While it would be nice if research was fundamentally unbiased, Sampson (2012) understands
that bias is normal in research and explains how to mitigate it; “Qualitative researchers contend that
bias is inherent, yet can be described clearly enough to allow the reader to judge if bias has
inappropriately influenced the research” (p. 8). In my own case, I will be upfront about my hostility

towards Leftist ideals, the reality in results from Leftist programs, the political methods that Leftists
employ, the contempt of Leftists for liberty, and the lack of honesty in which Leftists engage in public
discourse.
Section II: Literature Review
This review will provide a limited overview of of the current studies regarding Director
Hoover's involvement in the direction of the FBI, moving on to a lens regarding Hoover's application of
bureaucratic politics (in the general, not specifically theoretical sense of the term) in that direction, and
finally narrowing down into more detail on Hoover's involvement in COINTELPRO operations,.
Denney and Tewksbury (2013) describe different uses of focus in a literature review. The primary focus
relates to the concepts surrounding the research question, and can take an integrative focus which
synthesizes research based on conclusions, a theoretical focus which contrast the use of different
theories to explain an event or set of events, or a methodological focus, which compares the
methodological approaches used in completed research. As qualitative research explores how actions
and situations relate to each other, the theoretical approach will be used for this study. In particular, the
independent variable in this study relies on examination of the bureaucratic politics model, and
Hoover's personal application of the model.
Gentry (1991) and Powers (1987) are in agreement that Hoover's personality played a large part
in his success at the Attorney General's office which led to his appointment and early preeminence at
the Bureau of Investigation, which soon became the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). They also
agree that Hoover's perfectionism and autocratic leadership style were the key components in that
success. Gibson (1994) reinforces this idea of Hoover as an autocratic leader in that all FBI
information roads led to Hoover's office; Gibson's description of Hoover's use of margin comments in
these memos in order to direct the agency supports this argument. Underhill (2012) argues that
Hoover's manipulation of the media played a part in making Hoover, and thus the FBI, a national

Running head: THE EFFECTS OF HOOVER'S BUREAUCRATIC TACTICS ON COINTELPRO
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symbol of heroism. The public image of the FBI is a theme throughout the literature. Gage (2012)
uses the case of Mark Felt to illustrate Hoover's managerial control of the agency in addition to his
desire to protect and exalt the public image of the FBI, but most importantly though the prism of Felt's
loyalty to Hoover the institutional culture that Hoover built in the FBI. The theme that this overview
presents is one of Hoover's domination of the FBI, which comes into play as it ties Hoover individually
to a role as a player in the bureaucratic politics game.
O'Reilly (1982) demonstrates Hoover's early use of bureaucratic politics to adapt to FDR's
expansion of Federal power and to gain a sanction for the continued use of the FBI in addition to
expanding the agencies responsibilities, especially in domestic security concerns. Bowornwathana and
Poocharoen (2010) explain this in the context that administrative reform in government is a function of
politics, not management direction; they also define the bureaucratic politics framework. In this
framework, government is not a single agency, but a competing set of bureaus that seek to protect and
advance their segregate agendas. Webb (2004) shows Hoover's impulse to protect the FBI in domestic
security responsibilities while engaged in a turf battle over control of the FBI's Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS), a foreign intelligence service with responsibility for Latin America. Webb asserts that
Hoover's desire to control the SIS went only as far as his absolute control of the agency, demonstrating
not only Hoover's political infighting ability but reinforcing the idea of Hoover as an autocratic leader.
Keller (1989) discusses Hoover's political alliances with liberals to formalize (thus protecting) the
domestic security responsibilities that FDR had bestowed upon the agency. Stockham (2013) discusses
Hoover's relationship with members of Congress and further explores Hoover's use of the media to
advance the goals of the FBI. In concert with Underhill's assertion of media manipulation, it can be
seen that Hoover used public media as an additional political tool. Keller advances the Liberal Theory
of Internal Security to explain the liberal/Hoover alliance, but also to describe three levels of domestic
security organization based upon a matrix including the level of autonomy. Keller argues that this

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alliance increased the FBI's level of autonomy. As Hoover's domination of the FBI has been
demonstrated, it can be seen that Hoover's ability to succeed at bureaucratic politics advanced his own
autonomy in directing the FBI, and in specific the FBI's domestic security responsibilities.
COINTELPRO operations were the epitome of the FBI response to these domestic
responsibilities. Hoover (1969) presented a public case for the dangers presented by both the Ku Klux
Klan (the targets of WHITE HATE) and the New Left (the targets of NEW LEFT). This also serves as
an indicator of Hoover's motives in dealing with these subversive groups. However, it must be noted
that both NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE were only initiated after direct requests from the White
House to resolve specific domestic security concerns. Cunningham (2003) operationalizes data which
allows direct comparison between the two programs. Sullivan (1979), in his autobiography, discusses
the judgment of senior FBI officials regarding the success of the operations. The current research,
however, does not take into account the relationship between Hoover's political maneuvers and the
success of the operations. Ergo, Hoover's personality, and its resultant affects upon his bureaucratic
infighting, must be analyzed in regards to whether or not these COINTELPRO actions were a success.
Section III: Data Collection Methods
This plan of inquiry discusses the method used to explore the relationship between Hoover's
direction of bureaucratic politics and whether or not that direction had any affect on the success of
COINTELPRO operations. A comparison between the COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and
COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT programs will be made on the basis of two variables: (1) How Hoover
used bureaucratic politics regarding that specific program, and (2) whether that operation was
considered a success or not.
Data Sources
The data sources chosen were selected for their applicability to the study in several criteria; a
phenomenological approach in which those that participated in the operations subjectively judged both

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or either variable, the identification of themes used in text (used primarily in identifying the use of
Hoover's political maneuvering), statistical information, and content analysis. The sources were
located from a variety of origination, although most sources were located from cross-referencing
bibliographies once a data source had been identified. Enough sources were selected to provide a
balance between credibility and validation on one hand, and redundancy on the other.
Research Design
Data needs to be collected for both variables. As the bulk of the data collected will be narrative
in nature, Creswell (2012) suggests coding for themes as a method of analysis. The application of
coding for theme is most suited for the variable of Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics. The level of
success in each program can be weighed on two basis; success against the Klan can be measured in
membership levels and in the narrative of those that conducted the operations, while success against the
New Left can be measured in the narrative of those that took part in New Left terror actions, and the
narrative of those that conducted the operations against them.
Data Analysis Strategy
There are five steps in exploring the relationship between Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics
and whether a given operation could be considered a success. Data should be analyzed with the
purpose of identifying the methods of politics that Hoover used. Then which methods of political
tactics Hoover used in regards specifically to each program (WHITE HATE, NEW LEFT) should be
classified. At this point, an analysis must be made as to whether there was a significant difference in
Hoover's maneuvering between the two programs. Both programs must be judged as to the level of
success. Finally, the political method used must be evaluated against the success or failure of that
operation.

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Summary
The methodology used to explore the relationship between Hoover's direction of bureaucratic
politics and whether or not that direction had any affect on the success of COINTELPRO operations. A
comparison between the COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT programs is
based upon the independent variable of Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics and a dependent vraiable
of the level of that program's success. Data has been gathered from biographies, histories, interviews
and studies regarding both Hoover and COINTELPRO. This data must be analyzed to identify the
methods of politics used by Hoover, and the data must also be used to evaluate the success of the two
COINTELPRO operations.
Section IV: Discussion and Conclusions
Findings
Answering the question, “What effect did Hoover's bureaucratic politics have on the success of
COINTELPRO operations?”, requires a three step process. First, the tools of Hoover's maneuvering
must be identified; second, which types of maneuvers affected which operation in the comparison
between WHITE HATE and NEW LEFT must be stated; and finally, the success of those specific
operations must be judged. These findings are based upon a content analysis of several histories of the
FBI and of biographies of J. Edgar Hoover: Gentry,1991; Keller, 1989; O'Reilly, 1982; Powers,1987;
and Weiner, 2013.
As the concept of bureaucratic politics is classified into types of tactic and identified via the
percentage of literature in which use of the tactic is discussed, the usage of the types should be
explained:
 Acquiescence to a previously resisted policy: Hoover would oppose the use of the FBI in

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certain situations; as political pressure increased, Hoover would acquiesce to the policy to
protect the Bureau's interests.
 Alliance with a politician (i.e. Congressman or President) or a block of politicians: Hoover
would provide public support, provide private information, or would consult with the politician
in the creation of policy. These alliances would be conducted outside the normal chain of
command. Examples include bypassing the Attorney General in dissemination of information.
 Implied threat of media use to expose political opponent: Hoover would suggest to a political
opponent that people close to the opponent were doing illegal or immoral things, and that the
opponent should take steps to protect themselves.
 Reducing operations or refusing to initiate operations: In contrast to the aforementioned
acquiescence, Hoover often refused to take on certain responsibilities for the FBI or reduced
operations that the Bureau was already conducting if he felt that the political situation required
this to be done in order to protect the Bureau.
 Retaliation against critics of the FBI: Hoover regarded the public image of the Bureau as
necessary to its continued existence. Critics that “attacked” the FBI publicly were subject to
retaliation.
 Use of the media, either via a front or via FBI public affairs: The media was used in several
ways; to establish the FBI's position on a policy, to discredit political opponents, to promote the
FBI's image, and to bolster public support
 Using collected data as intelligence rather than to justify criminal charges: Although this tactic
was mainly used to perform the Bureau’s intelligence mission rather than as a bureaucratic
maneuver, because the data had been collected, it was in the files to support the use of other

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types of bureaucratic politics.
Table 1 demonstrates the frequency in which these tactics are discussed in the literature;
Appendix 1 lists the supporting reference material.
It should be noted that Table 1 is a breakdown of the types of bureaucratic politics that Hoover engaged
in as a whole in the direction of the FBI, not simply those that he used in the guidance of
COINTELPRO programs. The most striking difference in the use of these tactics in regards to
COINTELPRO is that Hoover acquiesced to committing the FBI against the Klan (WHITE HATE) at
the behest of LBJ, a reversal of Hoover's policy of withholding intervening in civil rights issues, with
Hoover's decision to curtail operations after the break-in at the Media, Pennsylvania FBI office which
could potentially (and later did in fact) expose extra-legal FBI operations including COINTELPRO.
This reduction in domestic security operations had the greatest effect on NEW LEFT operations due to
the timing of the decision.
How then, to measure the success of the COINTELPRO programs individually? Membership
figures are available for the Klan, but not for the New Left. The ability of these groups to operate in
public can be explored. Finally, the assessment by senior FBI officials of these operations can be
looked into. Drabble's (2008) demonstration that Klan membership dropped significantly meshes with
Assistant Director Sullivan's (1979) determination that COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE was a
successful program. This is in contrast to Sullivan's judgment of the decision to end COINTELPRO:

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NEW LEFT (indeed, all COINTELPRO programs were ended at this time), which left Sullivan and
other FBI agents upset that their most effective weapon against subversives had been removed (Weiner,
2013). Indeed, Varon (2004) notes that the FBI were simply unable to find the Weathermen.
Discussion
For the most part, these findings confirm the established literature in describing Hoover's
personality, his leadership of the FBI, and how these factors related to his use of bureaucratic politics.
The interplay between political infighting tactics and selection of COINTELPRO targets adds some
contradictory depth to the image of Hoover as an inflexible dictator. Hoover curtailed operations
several times during his tenure at the FBI in order to protect the agency as a whole, and took on
operations that he had previously resisted for the same reason. As the discussion moves into the
conclusion, it will take into account the relationship between Hoover's political maneuvers and the
success of the operations.
Ensuring domestic tranquility may have been the task set for the FBI, but Hoover sought to
protect the Bureau politically before committing fully to that mission. The most glaring example of
this lay in the comparison of political tactics that effectively began WHITE HATE to the tactics that
effectively ended NEW LEFT. Hoover resisted using the FBI to prevent Klan terror on the grounds of
federalism, although there are enough examples of his own racism to suggest that he did not hold the
civil rights of black Americans as a priority. After the political desires of the President were made
clear to Hoover, his compliance with this directive bolstered his alliance with the liberals and advanced
the support of the liberals for the Bureau. In contrast, as Hoover became aware of changing popular
and political support for the methods of the FBI, he limited covert operations. In response to
revelations about FBI wiretapping methods, which were exposed in the Fred Black case heard before
the Supreme Court in 1966, Hoover ended the FBI “black bag” method Bureau -wide. Once the FBI

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office in Media had been burglarized (in 1971) and FBI files at the office disseminated to the press,
Hoover ordered an end to all COINTELPRO operations. Hoover was attempting to protect the public
image of the FBI as opposed to its mission. Thus a full operational run at the Ku Klux Klan ended their
effectiveness as a subversive group, but an abrupt end of NEW LEFT operations left the New Left
room to run.
Conclusion
The Ku Klux Klan is an active organization today. How then, can WHITE HATE be portrayed
as a success? The issue lay in human nature. As Durkheim suggests that crime is a normal function of
human society, it can be safe to say that there is a normal urge to seek power in humans, either legally
through the republican process, or illegally through subversion of that process. WHITE HATE ended,
and the pressures that reduced the efficiency of the Klan and prevented its further recruitment of
members ended as well. The history of the government's struggles against the Klan, in the 1870s, the
1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s, through today can testify to the constant need to fight subversion.
In part, this is why the study of effective methods of combating subversion is important. It is
necessary to understand what can cause an effective campaign against a subversive operation and what
can cause a failure of such operations. Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics can illuminate both how an
agency can use such tactics to protect is organizational integrity, as well as how such tactics can
prevent the agency from performing its mission. It should be emphasized that bureaucratic politics is
only one possible factor that can hinder domestic security operations.
Limitations
The selection of bureaucratic politics as a sole independent variable is just one of many
limitations in this study. Since this is a highly complex research question that relies on interpreting
data from conflicting and often partisan sources, there are many limitations to the study.

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The first limitation is the context in which the research question was developed. Perhaps it
would have been better to ask a quantitative question; “Was there a difference in the way that
COINTELPRO programs were conducted against NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE targets?” This is a
question that possibly should be resolved before investigating the relationship between Hoover's use of
bureaucratic politics and the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations in the two programs.
A second contextual issue returns to the issue of the bureaucratic politics model, which as a
variable is just one factor in several that may have affected COINTELPRO success; there is the
possibility that the internal culture of the FBI interfered with the ability of agents to infiltrate the New
Left, the possibility that Sullivan's attempt to replace Hoover as director and the resultant fall-out from
that situation affected field operations, and the possibility that political liberals who had no problems in
countering the right-wing terror of the Klan suddenly discovered “Constitutional” concerns when the
terrorists of the Left were targeted, and thus abandoned the alliance with Hoover.
A possible limitation involving the sampling design is that the sample used to generate the
content analysis is relatively small compared to the amount of literature that exists; the sources that
also could have been used include the Church Committee (Intelligence activities, 1976), from
Theoharis (2004), from Jeffreys-Jones (2007), from Elliff (1979), and from Cunningham (2003).
Material from Churchill (1990) was excluded due to the extreme level of bias in that material. While
Triola (2014) warns that a sample size can be too small in statistical sampling, Krippendorff (2013)
explains that the content analysis method deviates from the representational mode of sampling theory
in that the researcher is seeking to sample texts that can accurately answer the research question, not to
seek to represent the textual population.
The research instrument used was a content analysis. The thoroughness of the manual process
used in this content analysis may be questioned. It is worth the effort to redo this analysis with the
addition of additional source material and a more efficient approach, perhaps using software designed

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for content analysis.
There is also the issue in data collection in estimating the effect that COINTELPRO had on the
New Left. DeLoach (1995) notes this difficulty and briefly mentions possible factors for the
subsequent decline in New Left activity which do include COINTELPRO.
Another data collection limitation is the difficulty in separating Hoover's personal identification
with the agency from his direction of the agency for the Bureau's sake. For instance, Gentry (1991)
notes an example in which Raymond Chandler, the writer, insulted Hoover personally, and was
subjected to the collection of 250 pages of personal data in an FBI file.
The last data collection issue is in using data related to Assistant Director Sullivan's statements.
The literature demonstrates that Sullivan had a pattern of telling his audience what they wanted to hear
at any given time. This applies particularity to data regarding New Left activities; Sullivan
enthusiastically took part in organizing the Huston plan directed at the New Left, yet in his
autobiography claims that the New Left was not a threat...this, at a time Mark Felt was being
prosecuted for covert FBI operations.
Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of the study may benefit from additional theoretical
perspective. Bureaucratic politics is a good model to explain the basics of how Hoover used these
particular tactics and why they succeeded on an organizational advancement basis. Keller's (1989)
Liberal Theory of Internal Security explained the reasons that liberals allied with Hoover, but was too
specific to apply to the research question, and was also excluded from the study. Finally, Loewenstein's
(1937) “Militant Democracy” may explain a Republic's need to combat extremism, but is too general to
apply to the research question, and was excluded.
Future Research
Finally, such a study leads to additional questions. How does a free society identify security
threats? Is the ideology of socialism an inherent threat to a free society? Is the ideology of Islam an

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inherent threat to a free society? What methods of combating racism are effective and do not interfere
with personal liberty? How does security law get written so that security operations are legally
conducted, effective in nature, and attain balance between security and liberty?
Policy Implications
Recommendation 1: The first policy recommendation that springs to mind in regards to the
study derives from Hoover's use of political tactics and his identification with the Bureau that resulted
in a long tenure as Director; although there have been laws to prevent longevity in such offices, the
political abuse that accompanies such offices does not occur solely with longevity (see Lerner's use of
the IRS to attack opponents of the Obama administration for a current example). This abuse is more
easily concealed in security agencies. Therefore an office needs to be established in the judiciary in
which all communications between elected representatives and security officials are monitored. Of
necessity, the monitors would need the appropriate security clearances. The responsibility of this office
would be to ensure that such communications remain within the bounds of the respective office, and
that breaches in this protocol are punished, and the nature of those breaches presented to the public
when they do not present security risks.
Recommendation 2: Individual targets should be legally designated for enhanced security
operations, whether for surveillance or neutralization. A security agency should be required to go
before a security oriented court (similar to the FISA process, yet with the possibility of designating a
citizen as a security risk), and present a solid case that the individual in question presents a risk to the
security of the United States. The benefit of this policy is that members of criminal organizations could
be designated as such when involved in actions that involve subversion of the judicial process such as
intimidation of witnesses or bribery. The reason to focus on individuals as opposed to movements is
based upon the due process principle. However, membership in organizations that are doctrinally
hostile to America, or the public support of hostile ideologies should be prima facie reasons to focus on

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an individual.

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References
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why politics matters. Public Organization Review, 10(4), 303–321.
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Retrieved October 8, 2014 from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
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