Democratic Great Power Support for Contested Autocracy: Understanding the U.S. Response to the Arab Spring

DEMOCRATIC GREAT POWER SUPPORT FOR CONTESTED AUTOCRACY:
UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE ARAB SPRING
An honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts at George Mason University
By
Jason Fasano
Bachelor of Arts
George Mason University
Director: J. P. Singh, Professor
Global Affairs Program
Spring 2016
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA

CONTENTS
List of Figures i
List of Tables i
List of Acronyms ii
Preface iii
Abstract iv
PART I: THE PUZZLE OF GREAT POWER DEMOCRACY ALIGNMENT DECISIONS 1
Chapter 1: Puzzle and Argument 2
Chapter 2: Literature Review 5
THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIC ALIGNMENT 6
REALIST THEORIES 9
CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIES 15
Chapter 3:Methodology: Case StudySelection and Operationalization 22
PART II: ALTERNATIVE MOTIVATIONS FOR THE SAME OUTCOME: 26
U.S. NONINTERVENTION IN THE BAHRAINI AND SYRIAN UPRISINGS 26
Chapter 4: Bahrain: U.S. Non-Interference asSupport for the Status Quo 28
AL KHALIFADYNASTY: EMBATTLED AUTOCRACY 31
C7L AND CBR: SHIITE OPPOSITION GROUPS 36
NUG:SUNNI ISLAMIST REGIME LOYALISTS 43
YFR AND FPM:YOUTH MOVEMENTS 47
CONCLUSION 50
Chapter 5:Syria: Non-Intervention for Lack of Any Viable Alternative 53
THE ASSAD REGIME AND AFFILIATED FORCES:THE EMBATTLED AUTOCRATIC ESTABLISHMENT 55
THE COALITION:THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION 61
FREE SYRIAN ARMY AND YPG:ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS 66
JABHAT AL-NUSRA AND ISIS: ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST JIHADIST ORGANIZATIONS 72
CONCLUSION 76
PART III: SHIFTING ALIGNMENT DECISIONS IN RESPONSE TO ONGOING
DEVELOPMENTS: U.S. SUPPORT FOR VARIOUS ACTORS IN EGYPT AND LIBYA79
Chapter 6:Egypt: Dynamic Fluctuations in Homophily-Utility Distributions 81
THE MUBARAK REGIME AND THE NDP: THE EMBATTLED AUTOCRATIC ESTABLISHMENT 83

THE SPECIAL COUNCILOF THE ARMED FORCES:THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 91
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD:THE ISLAMIST OPPOSITION 99
THE JANUARY 25TH YOUTH COALITION:SECULAROPPOSITIONAND YOUTH MOVEMENTS 105
CONCLUSION 113
Chapter 7: Libya: The Ebb and Flowof Qaddafi’s Utility 118
THE QADDAFI REGIME AND ASSOCIATED INTERESTS: THE AUTOCRATIC ESTABLISHMENT 121
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE FORTHE LIBYAN OPPOSITION (NCLO) AND THE INTERIM
TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL COUNCIL (TNC):THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION COALITION 133
CONCLUSION 141
PART IV: CONCLUSIONS 143
Chapter 8: Findings 144
Chapter 9:Contributions 147
Chapter 10: Limitations 152
Chapter 11: Policy Implications 153
Bibliography 157

Democratic Great Power Support for Contested Autocracy i
List of Figures
FIGURE 1: HOMOPHILY-UTILITY MATRIX 4
FIGURE 2: HOMOPHILY-UTILITY MATRIX FOR ACTORS IN THE BAHRAINI UPRISING 30
FIGURE 3: HOMOPHILY-UTILITY MATRIX FOR ACTORS IN THE SYRIAN UPRISING/CIVIL WAR 55
FIGURE 4: HOMOPHILY-UTILITY MATRIX FOR ACTORS IN THE EGYPTIAN UPRISING 83
FIGURE 5: HOMOPHILY-UTILITY MATRIX FOR ACTORS IN THE LIBYAN UPRISING 121
FIGURE 6: HOMOPHILY-UTILITY MATRIX FOR ALL ACTORS THAT RECEIVED U.S. SUPPORT 145
FIGURE 7:HOMOPHILY-UTILITYMATRIXFOR ALL ACTORSTHAT FAILED TO OBTAIN U.S.SUPPORT
145
List of Tables
TABLE 1: CASE STUDY SELECTION 23
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF BAHRAINI ACTORS' HOMOPHILY/ENMITY AND EXPECTED UTILITY 50
TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF SYRIAN ACTORS'HOMOPHILY/ENMITY AND EXPECTED UTILITY 76
TABLE 4: U.S. ALIGNMENT DECISIONSASA RESULT OF DEVELOPMENTSIN THEEGYPTIAN
UPRISING (2011- 2013) 114
TABLE 5: SUMMARYOF THEQADDAFIREGIME'SHOMOPHILY/ENMITYANDEXPECTED UTILITY
(1969-2011) 133
TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF THE NCLO/TNC'S HOMOPHILY/ENMITY AND EXPECTED UTILITY 140

Fasano ii
List of Acronyms
BDF Bahraini Defense Forces
C7L Coalition of Seven Registered Shi’a Opposition Groups in Bahrain
CBR Coalition for a Bahraini Republic
FPM Bahrain 14 February Peaceful Movement
FSA Free Syrian Army
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GCCPSF Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force
ICC International Criminal Court
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JYC January 25th Youth Coalition (Egypt)
LCU Libyan Constitutional Union
LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LIG Libyan Islamic Group
LLHR Libyan League for Human Rights
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCLO National Coalition for the Libyan Opposition
NDP National Democratic Party (Egypt)
NFSL National Front for the Salvation of Libya
NUG Sunni National Union Gathering (Bahrain)
PKK Kurdistan Worker’s Party
SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Egypt)
SMC Supreme Military Council (Syria)
TNC Interim Transitional National Council (Libya)
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
YFR Youth of the 14 February Revolution (Bahrain)
YPG Popular Protection Units (Syrian Kurdish Militia)

Democratic Great Power Support for Contested Autocracy iii
Preface
This thesis seeks to investigate the underlying causes of what I believe to be
a very troubling paradox in American foreign policy: rhetorical support for human
rights, self-determination, and democracy; but actual policies that demonstrate
wanton disregard for these principles. This study not only seeks to shed light on
these cases, but also more broadly to simply generate a public awareness and
discourse regarding these inconsistencies between American words and actions.
The inspiration for this thesis came from a personal empathy for the people
of the Arab world, who after decades of life under the boot of authoritarian
repression were finally confronted with an opportunity to improve their
circumstances, only to have these dreams fail to materialize. Even more troubling,
was knowing that my tax dollars were funding the brutal suppression, and in many
instances outright slaughter, of peaceful protestors seeking to exercise freedoms
and liberties that Americans take for granted on a daily basis.
The research conducted for this thesis was completed under the guidance of
the Global Affairs Honors Program at George Mason University. I am incredibly
grateful to Professor J.P. Singh for his invaluable guidance and mentorship
throughout the research process. I would also like to thank my classmates,
Mohammad Abou-Ghazala, Andrew Capparelli, Ashley Darlington, Ethan Ellert,
Bruno Ortega-Toledo, Steven Perlamuter, Hannah Rowlette, Kris Scott, and Jimmy
Williams, for their support, insights, peer-reviews, and most of all their friendship.
Lastly, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the countless individuals suffering
under the repression of U.S. supported autocrats, in the Arab world and beyond.

Fasano iv
Abstract
This study seeks to reconcile the discrepancy between pro-democracy
rhetoric and the lack of actual support for democracy movements from the United
States, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring. The study explores the conditions
that lead democratic great powers to provide support to struggling autocracies. The
findings suggest that democratic great powers will support whichever party has the
greatest expected utility in terms of protecting great power national interests,
regardless of the regime type. An important distinction is made here between these
parties’ actual utility in protecting national interests, and the democratic great
powers’ expectations of their utility in doing so, to demonstrate that expectations
rather than actual utilities guide great power behavior. The results also suggest that
homophilous ties (ideological similarities) with either party will increase the
likelihood of great power support for that party. This study draws on the literatures
from the democratic peace theory and offensive realism as a means of
understanding the factors under consideration during calculations of expected
utility. Empirical evidence is provided from four Arab Spring uprisings (Bahrain,
Syria, Egypt, and Libya), selected on the varying levels of expected utility of the
parties involved for the great power and variance in the presence of homophilous
ties with either party. These factors, in turn, explain the varying US response in
each case. This study provides an explanation for what some might call the
hypocritical US support for autocratic allies threatened by democratic uprisings,
despite US rhetoric that encourages democracy.

Part I: The Puzzle of Great Power Democracy Alignment Decisions

Fasano 2
Chapter 1: Puzzle and Argument
On September 23, 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama addressed the UN
General Assembly. In this address, he remarked, “There is no right more
fundamental than the ability to choose your leaders and determine your
destiny. Now, make no mistake: The ultimate success of democracy in the world
won’t come because the United States dictates it; it will come because individual
citizens demand a say in how they are governed” (The White House, 2010).
Approximately three months later, Mohammad Bouazizi’s self-immolation ignited a
wave of protests across the Arab world that put American commitment to these
‘fundamental rights’ to the test.
The United States has a long history of rhetorical advocacy for self-
determination and democratization; and equally long history of actions that directly
oppose this message. U.S. Foreign Policy throughout the Cold War perhaps best
exemplifies this paradox, seeking to prevent the spread of tyrannical Communism
by instead supporting equally tyrannical authoritarian dictatorships. At times, U.S.
policy makers did not even bother applying the veneer of rhetoric to justify such
policies. Such was the case when President Franklin D. Roosevelt boldly asserted
that, “[Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza] may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our
son of a bitch” (Rawson & Miner, 2006, p. 268). In light of this contextualization, it
may then come as no surprise that the U.S. responded to many of the Arab Uprisings
with an entrenched commitment to its autocratic allies in the region. However, what
is rather perplexing is why this policy wasn’t the unanimous U.S. response to every
uprising across the region? If the US is not truly committed to democracy and self-

Democratic Great Power Support for Contested Autocracy 3
determination, why did it actively facilitate the overthrown of Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi’s regime in Libya? On the other hand, if it is committed to these ideals, why
did it remain ambivalent as King Hamad’s troops slaughtered peaceful protestors
attempting to ‘demand a say in how they are governed’ on the streets of Bahrain?
This study therefore seeks to shed light on the conditions under which great
power democracies, such as the U.S., will either support autocratic rulers’ endeavors
to squelch civilian uprisings, or support these civilian uprisings in their endeavors
to democratize their nations.
In response to this puzzle, this study hypothesizes that when a popular
uprising challenges the authority of an autocratic regime, great power democracies
will support the party to the conflict that ranks highest for homophily and expected
utility. Parties to the conflict can include the embattled autocratic regime, or any
element of the opposition. Homophily is a theory that was originally adapted from
sociological studies, and is used to refer to individual actors or groups of actors who
have similar sociodemographic characteristics, and therefore foster a shared sense
of ingroup identity, which exists in contrast to some outgroup or outgroups (Blau,
1977). It is worth noting that the term ‘homophily’ is employed throughout this
paper merely for the sake of simplicity, for this independent variable is actually a
spectrum ranging from homophily (good relations) to enmity (bad relations).
Expected utility theory draws on realist influences, but also incorporates significant
constructivist nuances, and thus focuses its analysis on how an actor’s expectations
and perceptions of other actors’ utility (i.e. their usefulness to the actor’s pursuit of

Fasano 4
its interests) affects the actor’s decisions on how to interact with them (Bueno de
Mesquita, 1988).
Figure 1 below illustrates the homophily-utility matrix, in which all of the
parties to a given conflict are situated based on their relative degrees of homophily
and expected utility in relation to a given great power democracy. This study
hypothesizes that actors ranked nearest to the upper-right corner of this matrix (i.e.
that have the greatest degree of homophily and expected utility) are the most likely
candidates to receive the support of the given great power democracy.
Figure1: Homophily-Utility Matrix
EnmityHomophily
Low High
Expected Utility
Most likely
to recieve
great power
democracy
support
Least likely
to recieve
great power
democracy
support
Ambiguous
Outcomes
Ambigouss
Outcomes

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Given that there is a scarcity of literature directly addressing the topic of
democratic support for autocratic regimes, this study instead draws on literatures
from the fields of alliances and joining behavior. Joining behavior scholarship
provides valuable insight into the decision-making process of third parties,
regarding if and how to intervene in conflicts that do not directly affect them
(Corbetta, 2010). Additionally, although a difference between formal alliances and
informal alignments (the latter of which is the subject of concern for this study)
does exist (Morrow, 1991), the alliance literature nonetheless remains relevant,
since many of the same principles employed in selecting alliance partners also apply
to selecting alignment partners. In both of these literatures, there is a
disproportionate focus on interstate conflicts. Although this study does investigate
actions between states (between democratic great powers and the states into whose
affairs they intervene), the real unit of analysis is not the state itself, but rather the
actors within that state (autocrats and opposition factions). Their lack of focus on
sub-state actors acknowledged, the alliance and joining behavior literatures
nonetheless remain relevant, by providing a conceptual framework for analyzing
third party decisions of which party to support in a conflict.
This study also utilizes Most and Starr’s (1989) ‘opportunity and willingness’
model, which posits that all decision making is a function of both the available
choices present within a given environment (opportunity), and the actor’s
preference ranking of the attractiveness of each available choice (willingness) (p.
23). It should not be assumed that because great powers have extensive resources

Fasano 6
at their disposal, they are exempt from facing limitations on their opportunities. To
understand the decisions they eventually arrive upon, it is therefore critically
important to understand not only the decision-making process that prioritizes and
chooses from among the available decisions, but also the environment that shapes
the availability of these decisions. Specific literatures that have provided relevant
insights into this puzzle will now be addressed, with special attention paid to the
specific limitations and contributions of each of these literatures. As the following
literature review will illustrate, theories that account for the role of identities and
norms regarding interest formation are found to provide the most adequate causal
explanations for the puzzle of great power democracy alignment decisions.
Theories of Democratic Alignment
A multitude of theories make various claims regarding the fundamental
nature of democratic governments. The most well known of these is the democratic
peace theory, which postulates that democratic governments do not go to war with
one another (Huth, 1998; Werner & Lemke, 1997). Corbetta (2010) takes this logic a
step further, arguing, “Democracies not only avoid conflicts with other democracies,
but they also seem to have an implicit interest in the preservation and diffusion of
democracy internationally” (p. 73). Therefore, one could extrapolate that great
power democracies would provide support to the democratic opposition when they
challenge autocratic regimes, in an effort to generate more democratic states with
which the great power democracy will enjoy peaceful relations. However this has
not always been the case; great power democracies often oppose democratization
movements and support autocratic regimes instead.

Alternatively, the theory of democratic unreliability posits that autocratic
governments are actually more reliable alliance partners than democracies, in terms
of actually following through on alliance obligations (Corbetta, 2010; Gartzke &
Gleditsch, 2004; Werner & Lemke, 1997); therefore drawing the drastically different
conclusion that great power democracies have a vested interest in supporting
autocracies, who can be relied on to remain committed to the terms of their
alliances. Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) attribute this finding to the fact that in order
to be a democracy, democratic governments must remain responsive to the
constantly changing whims of the public. Therefore, although the public may have
initially supported the creation of an alliance, by the time the state is actually called
upon to act out its obligations as stipulated in that alliance, this public support could
have waned. Furthermore, the cycling of administrations within democratic
governments means that the administration that is being called on to fulfill alliance
obligations is often times not the same administration that signed on to the alliance
in the first place.
Lastly, the theory of democratic instability provides a different rationale for
why it may actually be more viable for democratic great powers to support
autocratic regimes. According to this theory, although established democracies are
the least likely candidates to engage in war with each other, states in the process of
democratization are the most likely candidates to become involved in a war
(Corbetta, 2010; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). Therefore, great power democracies
seeking to maintain peace would best be able to do so by avoiding democratization
initiatives whenever possible. Additionally, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) assert,

Fasano 8
“States… that make the biggest leap in democratization-from total autocracy to
extensive mass democracy- are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after
democratization as are states that remain autocracies” (p. 6). In other words, when
protestors seek to overthrow an autocrat and institute a democratic government in
their place, they are inadvertently (at least according to Mansfield and Snyder’s
conclusions) leading their nations into a scenario in which war is highly likely. It is
worth noting that the theory of democratic instability is not without its critics. For
instance, Goldsmith (2015) contradicts the assumptions of this theory by providing
empirical evidence to demonstrate the lack of correlation between democratization
and the eruption of violent civil conflict.
The fact that these theories posit drastically different assumptions about the
fundamental nature of democratic governance (and therefore about how great
power democracies should interact with other democracies, or actors attempting to
establish democracies) is not problematic in terms of this study. Instead, the
relevance of these theories is that they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for
the causal outcome being investigated. While democratic peace theory provides an
explanation for democratic great power alignment with democratic actors, it fails to
provide a rationale for the cases in which autocratic regimes are supported.
Conversely, both democratic unreliability theory and democratic instability theory
provide rationale for democratic great power alignment with autocratic regimes,
but fail to provide an explanation for the cases in which opposition elements are
supported. These theories are therefore all problematic for the same reason, which
is that they only provide explanations for one phenomenon (i.e. they explain great

power democracies’ support for either democracies or autocracies), whereas the
reality is that both kind of phenomena occur (i.e. great power democracies support
both democracies and autocracies), and none of these theories adequately address
under which conditions great power democracies will develop preferences for one
or the other.
The reason these theories fail to adequately explain great power democracy
decision making is that they focus on the actor being supported rather than the
actor doing the supporting. In other words, to rely on these theories would be to
attribute the decisions of great power democracies to the characteristics of the
actors they choose to support, when the reality of the matter is that such decisions
more likely stem from attributes of the great power democracy itself, or more
accurately from attributes of the great power democracy’s decision-making process.
Realist Theories
Although the principles put forth by the realist school are not adequate in
and of themselves in terms of providing a satisfactory causal explanation for this
puzzle, they did provide valuable contributions to the development of a more
nuanced approach. Before a more thoroughreview of the specific strengths and
weaknesses of the various realist literatures is conducted, it should be
acknowledged that applying realist principles to this puzzle is somewhat
problematic in that many realists have asserted that nation-states are the primary
units of analysis in international affairs, whereas this study is interested in the
actions of both nation-states (great power democracies) and sub-state actors
(embattled autocratic leaders and democratic opposition elements). This potential

Fasano 10
objection recognized, I nonetheless contend that the realist principles this study
analyzes are relevant and applicable, primarily because they are being applied to
the decision-making process of the great power democracy (i.e. a sovereign nation-
state) but also because the Hobbesian outlook that realism draws upon can be
utilized to understand the decision making process of any group. Moreover, while
the realist paradigm in general has traditionally been associated with the
recognition of states as the primary unit of analysis in international relations, Barkin
(2003, p. 327) argues that this was merely a byproduct of the historical context in
which realism developed, supporting this claim by citing paradigmatic realist E. H.
Carr’s opinion that although states had previously been the most powerful players
in the international arena, there was no reason to believe they would remain so
indefinitely. The more relevant question is what conditions lead actors to develop
this Hobbesian mentality toward each other in the first place? This question will be
taken up in the next section, after a brief overview of the contributions of the realist
literature.
According to the classical realist notion of balancing, states seek to ally
themselves with other states of equal or lesser strength in order to counter the
mutual threat posed by stronger states (Bueno De Mesquita, 1988; Huth, 1998;
Morrow, 1991; Smith, 1996; Werner & Lemke, 1997). However, although the notion
of balancing focuses on the relative power of the actors involved in alliance
formation, it operates on the implicit assumption that mutually perceived threats
exist. Therefore, although considerations of relative power are relevant, the factors

that shape perceptions of what states constitute a ‘threat’ also deserve thorough
analysis, which classical realism fails to address.
The neorealist thesis operates on the assumption that the conditions of
international anarchy structure state’s behavior within that system (Doeser, 2014;
Huth, 1998; Smith, 1996; Wendt, 1992; Werner & Lemke, 1997). Furthermore, the
conditions of anarchy are such that it is generally most beneficial for states to ally
themselves with strong actors, who are capable of making contributions to such an
alliance. According to this line of reasoning, we should expect that great power
democracies would tend to support the stronger actor in a given dispute (i.e. the
autocratic regime) in order to reap the benefits of a strategic alliance with this
strong partner. However, this explanation fails to address why in some scenarios,
support for the autocratic establishment (i.e. the stronger actor) is abandoned.
A third explanation associated with the realist camp also presents itself, the
principle of loss aversion. The loss aversion thesis (Nincic, 1997) asserts that actors
are more willing to accept risks when seeking to maintain the status quo than when
seeking to obtain gains. Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) build on this principle by
asserting that, “[i]nstitutionalized organizations tend to perpetuate themselves, and
alliances that have lasted a long time are more likely to endure” (p. 778). Arguing
from the sociological perspective, Blau (1977) provides support for this theory with
his observation that, “established role relations are resistant to disruption” (p. 38).
By the same logic, Kaw (1990) asserts that, “[t]he uncertainty of insurgent victory
makes them a poor investment venture,” and it is therefore more beneficial for third
parties to “support embattled governments,” with one exception: a third party “will

Fasano 12
favor the antigovernment challenger only if it has poor relations with the local
authorities and therefore has little influence worth preserving” (p. 46). Other
studies have utilized and elaborated on loss aversion theory as well (Corbetta, 2010;
Coyne & Ryan, 2009; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). For instance, both Monshipouri
and Assareh (2011) and Gelvin (2012) argue that loss aversion principles explain
the U.S. preference for accepting the risks associated with supporting embattled
Middle Eastern autocrats rather than gambling with the risk of supporting
democratization movements. To further complicate matters, Wendt (1992)
observes that, “states do not have conceptions of self and other, and thus security
interests, apart from or prior to interaction” (p. 401). A closer look at the causal link
between ‘us and them’ identifications and interest formation will be explored below,
but the relevance of Wendt’s observation to loss aversion is that part of the
attractiveness of maintaining the status quo is simply that ‘prior interaction’ has
existed and taken place between the members of the status quo, whereas supporting
a challenger would introduce and new and unknown actor into the relationship,
whose actions and intentions are likely unpredictable. While valuable in terms of
providing insight as to why great power democracies would support autocratic
regimes, loss aversion theory has two major drawbacks in relation to this study.
First, because it fails to account for what leads great power democracies to perceive
some autocrats as friends and others as foes, it doesn’t provide any explanations for
the conditions under which they will decide to abandon the status quo. Second, it
fails to provide an explanation for scenarios in which a great power democracy
provides support to entrepreneurial autocrats seeking to establish authoritarian

rule in a democratic society (such as U.S. support for the military coup that returned
Egypt to authoritarian rule after its brief experiment with democracy in 2012).
Therefore, two impediments common to all the realist literatures reviewed
here are seen to exist. First, they only provide causal explanations for one
phenomenon or the other. Classical realism provides a potential rationale for
supporting weaker actors, whereas neorealism and loss aversion provide a potential
rationale for supporting stronger actors, but there is nothing to explain what
circumstances lead to support for which type of actor. This limitation is essentially a
result of the second limitation, which is that these theories fail to account for role of
identities and interests in shaping states perceptions of each other, and therefore
the interactions between states. What is far more relevant than how states respond
to perceived threats (the question realist literature typically addresses), is why
states may perceive certain scenarios to be threatening in the first place. Wendt
(1992) asserts that it is neither the fundamental Hobbesian nature of states nor the
conditions of international anarchy from which states derive their interests, but
rather that it is conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ identities which states mutually
attribute to one another which serve as the basis of state interest formation (p. 401).
Katzenstein (1996) elaborates further on the implications the attribution of ‘self’
and ‘other’ identity has on interest formation, stating, “arguments that invoke
balance of threat as an explanation of alliance formation remain incomplete in their
specification of causation, as long as they neglect variable and contested state
identities as the main factor that defines for decision makers what constitutes a
threat in the first place” (p. 63).

Fasano 14
It is worth noting that this constructivist view does not necessarily contradict
realist claims, rather it seeks to imbue realist notions of state pursuit of interests
with a more nuanced understanding of interest formation. Notice Katzenstein’s
critique classifies the realist explanation of balance of threat as ‘incomplete’ rather
than outright useless. He elaborates on this point, that, “the crucial question is not to
establish whether interests prevail over identities and norms or whether identities
and norms prevail over interests. What matters is how identities and norms
influence the ways in which actors define their interests in the first place” (30). This
attempt to amalgamate realism and constructivism into a single mutually
complimentary theory, rather than prioritizing one and discounting the other, may
at first glance appear problematic. On the contrary, a growing body of literature has
been addressing the perceived incompatibility between constructivism and realism,
in an attempt to disprove the notion that these literatures are inherently
contradictory. For instance, Barkin (2003) and Jackson (2004) both argue that the
two scholarly paradigms are perfectly compatible. It is in line with this school of
constructivist-realism that this study seeks to utilize aspects from both, in order to
advance a nuanced theory that utilizes the strengths of each body of scholarship,
while also overcoming the limitations each would otherwise face on its own.
In relation to the opportunity and willingness model, realism therefore
makes significant contributions to the opportunity factor. Realist contributions
(especially neorealism’s focus on the structure and environment within which states
operate) can be regarded as providing the conceptual tools for understanding
opportunity. Herman (1996) succinctly summarizes this view, stating, “If policy

outcomes represent the final phase in a causal sequence, the principle contribution
of realism lies at the front end, in identifying structural constraints on political
action” (p. 272). However, this does not mean that opportunity is exclusively
informed by realist principles, while willingness is exclusively the domain of
constructivist principles. For instance, Price and Tannenwald (1996) assert that,
“Norms structure realms of possibilities; they do not determine outcomes” (p. 148).
In other words, although the international environment may make some options
technically available, normative understandings of their acceptability can still limit
states from actually taking them into consideration. It is in response to realism’s
failure to address these subjects that certain constructivist literatures will now be
examined.
Constructivist Theories
Constructivist theories that explore the role of socially constructed identities
and interests provide the necessary nuances which realism fails to address. Wendt
(1992) explains the causal link between identities and interests as follows:
“Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that
they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests
in the process of defining situations” (p. 398). Thus, the realist literature, with its
exclusive focus on the pursuit of interest, entirely neglects the crucial aspect of
where such interests are derived from in the first place. The independent variables
for this study- homophilous networks and expected utility- therefore speak to the
constructivist school, although the both have significant realist influences.

Fasano 16
Corbetta (2010) borrows homophily theory from the sociological study of
group dynamics in order to apply it to international relations. In sociology,
homophily is defined as the tendency for social association to occur between
individuals with proximate sociodemographic characteristics, whereas individuals
inhabiting zones more remote from each other on the sociodemographic spectrum
are less likely to associate (Blau, 1977, p.36; Corbetta, 2010, p. 67). Blau (1977)
elaborates on the rationale for this tendency, explaining that, “People in similar
social positions share social experiences and roles, and have similar attributes and
attitudes, which promote social intercourse among them” (p. 36). Additionally,
relationships amongst actors exist on a spectrum, ranging from homophily to
neutrality to enmity. Therefore, the relationship between any two actors does not
need to be classified dichotomously as either homophily or enmity, but instead can
be situated anywhere along this spectrum. Although he doesn’t actually employ the
terminology, the notions of homophily and enmity are essentially what Huntington
(1996) is alluding to when he elaborates his rationale for why some civilizations
cooperate with each other while others ‘clash’.
Although the original hypothesis of homophily theory was that homophilous
ties between a third party and a principle actor to a dispute would increase the
likelihood of third party intervention on behalf of that actor, empirical analysis has
actually demonstrated that enmity toward an actor’s opponent is a more accurate
indicator of a third party’s likelihood to intervene on behalf of that actor (Corbetta,
2010; Kaw, 1990; Morrow, 1991; Most & Starr, 1989).

Furthermore, although homophily and enmity are socially constructed
notions, these notions have very practical real world implications. For instance,
Most and Starr (1989) state, “strongly held images of hostility, fear, revenge, and the
like, can bring about misperceptions (or better, selective perceptions) of the
activities of other states. Such perceptions can, in turn, lead to behavior on the part
of the perceiving decision maker’s that provides the interaction opportunities
necessary for war” (p. 43). In essence, the ways in which actors perceive each other
(with feelings of homophily or enmity) fundamentally shape the interactions these
two actors will have. Advocating a similar perspective, Katzenstein (1996) asserts,
“international patterns of amity and enmity have important cultural dimensions. In
terms of material power, Canada and Cuba stand in roughly comparable positions
relative to the United States. But while one is a threat, the other is an ally, a result,
we believe, of ideational factors operating at the international level” (p. 34).
Although the terminology he employs is different, the position he is advocating is
essentially the same one articulated by homophily theory.
A multitude of factors can contribute to perceptions of homophily and
enmity. While the explanation borrowed from sociology is that inhabiting similar
sociodemographic zones leads to interaction, in order to adequately apply this
theory to international relations we must adopt a broader definition. Therefore,
instead of speaking of sociodemographic zones, similarities in a number of
attributes will be considered (more specifics regarding these attributes are offered
in the methodology section below). For instance, Corbetta (2010) makes a relevant
connection between notions of homophily and great power joining behavior, stating

Fasano 18
“[m]ature democracies and autocracies tend to recognize one another as being
similar and side with one another in ongoing disputes. Mature joiners perceive
states who have not clearly embraced a democratic or autocratic identity as
politically distant or simply different” (p. 77). In this argument, Corbetta is utilizing
components of democratic instability theory (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995), but
adapting it to make a statement about how third party perceptions of democratic
instability influence their decision to support fledgling democracies.
Expected utility theory (Bueno De Mesquita, 1988) postulates that a third
party will support whichever actor is expected to have the greatest utility in
advancing the third party’s own interests. Despite obvious significant realist
influence, expected utility is primarily a constructivist theory, because the relevant
unit of analysis is a third party’s expectations of utility- not any ‘objective’ indicator
of utility in and of itself. As Most and Starr (1989) point out, such expectations are
often times the results of, “misperceptions (or better, selective perceptions)” (p. 43).
Thus, in the same way that preconceived notions of ‘us and them’ (Katzenstein,
1996; Wendt, 1992) can shape notions of homophily and enmity, such preconceived
notions can also have considerable influence on notions of expected utility, by
preconditioning a third party to believe a certain actor has more or less utility
depending on the third party’s perception of that actor. It is on this matter that the
theory diverges from conventional realist literatures, which focus on power in and
of itself, not on perceptions and interpretations of such power. On a related note,
Corbetta (2010) adds that, “it is possible to think of similarity in ‘alliance portfolio’
as an indicator of a state’s utility for a certain outcome—that is, how much a state

values having a certain combatant to win” (p. 72). Although ‘alliance portfolio’ isn’t
the same as homophily, this line of reasoning serves to illustrate that an actor’s
expected utility isn’t merely determined by that actor’s power, but instead by the
socially constructed interpretations that give that power meaning.
Coyne and Ryan (2009), Monshipouri and Assareh (2011), Collins and Rothe
(2013), and Doeser (2014) all utilize expected utility theory to assert that the
strategic interests of the U.S. (a great power democracy) are perceived to be best
protected by autocrats. Morrow (1991) also utilizes expected utility rationale,
asserting that actors judge the attractiveness of potential alliance partners on these
actors’ expected utility. Huth (1998) analyzes the effect expected utility has on third
party joining behavior, finding that third parties are most likely to intervene when
one or both of the disputants to a conflict are of military or security importance to
the third party.
On a final note, third party conceptions of the identity of the actors involved
in a dispute are not the only identities that factor into the decision of who to
support; the third party’s self-perception of its own identity also has significant
influence on the decision. Price and Tannenwald (1996) provide sophisticated
insight into this matter, asserting that “[d]iscourses produce and legitimate certain
behaviors and conditions of life as ‘normal’ and, conversely, construct categories
that themselves make a cluster of practices and understandings seem inconceivable
or illegitimate. Prohibitionary norms in this sense do not merely restrain behavior
but are implicated in the productive process of constituting identities as well: actors
have images of themselves as agents who do or don’t do certain sorts of things” (p.

Fasano 20
125). In other words, there is a causal link between legitimizing discourses, the
norms that these discourses produce, the identities that coalesce around these
norms, and ultimately the actions these identities either sanction or condemn. In
relation to alliance preferences, this implies that a third party state could develop
preferences for supporting particular actors based on a self-perception of its
identity as an agent that does or does not support particular kinds of actors. Wendt
(1992) elaborates on the influence conceptions of self-identity has on state decision
making, arguing that, “a state may have multiple identities as ‘sovereign,’ ‘leader of
the free world,’ ‘imperial power,’ and so on. The commitment to and the salience of
particular identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the
actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and
one another and which constitute the structure of the social world” (p. 398).
Therefore, the issue of self-identification is not a simple matter of formulating a
single self-conception with which to identify, instead a state’s notion of its own
identity (and therefore the preferable actions it should engage in to fulfill the role
defined by that identity) may actually vary depending on the specific circumstances
of different scenarios it finds itself in.
Overall, constructivist theories that delve into the role of identity and norms
in interest formation provide the most adequate causal explanations for the puzzle
of great power democracies’ alignment behavior in disputes between embattled
autocrats and democratic opposition movements. Homophily theory draws on these
themes to develop an understanding of how perceptions of state identity affect the
development of state interests, the pursuit of which is the basis for alliance

formation. Expected utility theory builds upon these same principles to investigate
the role these socially constructed identities and interests play in the perceptions of
other actors’ usefulness to the third party’s pursuit of its interests. For both of these,
it is not only the identity of the ‘other’, but also of the ‘self’ that shapes these
perceptions and interactions. Although the democratic and realist literatures do not
offer any adequate causal explanations on their own, they nonetheless remain
relevant, given that homophily and expected utility draw on certain aspects of these
literatures to advance their own hypotheses.

Fasano 22
Chapter 3: Methodology: Case Study Selection and Operationalization
This study seeks to advance the following hypothesis that will be applicable
to the general phenomenon of democratic great power support for either contested
autocracies or incipient democratization movements:
H1: A great power democracy will develop a preference for supporting actors
which are perceived to posses high degrees of homophily and expected
utility.
To do so, this study employs case studies of U.S. relationships with dictators that
faced domestic insurrections during the Arab Uprisings of 2010-2011 (and in some
relevant cases, the aftermath of these uprisings which extend beyond these years).
The Arab Uprisings were selected as an appropriate body of cases to analyze for this
study because they represent roughly comparable set of uprisings that elicited
drastically different U.S. responses.
In choosing which specific cases of the Arab Uprisings to analyze, the study
utilizes what Odell (2001) identifies as the ‘method of difference’, which advocates,
“comparing instances in which the phenomenon does occur with instances in other
respects similar in which it does not” (167). Therefore, according to this design,
cases were selected first on the basis of variability in the dependent variable, i.e. in
the type of actor supported by the U.S. Cases include U.S. support for both embattled
autocrats and incipient democratization movements, in order to maintain variability
in the dependent variable. Additionally, cases were selected on the basis of
variability in the degree of expected utility that the U.S. assigns to the actors
participating in the uprising, and on the basis of variability in the U.S. perceptions of
homophily/enmity with the actors participating in the uprisings.

This methodological rationale of structured focused comparison led to the
selection of four cases for closer analysis: U.S. ambivalence toward the Al Khalifa’s
dynasty’s violent suppression of peaceful protestors in Bahrain in 2011; the
evolution of U.S. ties with Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi , which eventually
culminated in the 2011 U.S./NATO military campaign which assisted in deposing
him; the evolution of U.S. support for Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, and
subsequent support for the 2013 military coup orchestrated by the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces against the democratically elected Freedom and Justice Party
government; and U.S. non-interference on behalf of either dictator Bashar al-Assad
or any element of the opposition in the 2011 Syrian uprising and ensuing civil war.
The rationale for the selection of these four dictatorships as they apply to the
independent variables of this study (homophily and expected utility) are illustrated
in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Case Study Selection
High Utility Low Utility
Homophily Al-Khalifa Dynasty
(Bahrain)
Hosni Mubarak
(Egypt)
Enmity Muammar Qaddafi
(Libya)
Bashar Al-Assad
(Syria)
The dependent variable under analysis in this case study is degree of U.S.
support for the actors involved in each uprising. ‘U.S. support’ is treated as a two-
part variable in this study. All of the following actions will constitute a form of ‘U.S.
support’. First, the direct provision of financial, military, or intelligence assistance to
a particular actor. Second, the indirect provision of material assistance to a
particular actor either via a proxy or a multilateral coalition such as the UN or

Fasano 24
NATO. Alternatively, ‘U.S. non-interference’ will be defined as the lack of clear U.S.
support for any particular actor.
The independent variables this study investigates are homophilious
networks and expected utility. There are two major impediments that must first be
acknowledged in attempting to operationalize these variables in a manner that will
allow for closer analysis. First, both homophily and expected utility are socially
constructed concepts that cannot be objectively measured. Second, even if there
were readily available data on these variables, the subject of analysis for this study
includes non-state actors, many of whom have only very recently coalesced into
formal political organizations, and who therefore would not have data concerning
them anyway. Recognizing these hurdles, this study nonetheless seeks to roughly
approximate a gauge of these variables, by analyzing the presence of certain aspects
that influence them.
For the purposes of this study, the degree of homophily (ranging from
homophily to enmity) between the U.S. and a given actor will be calculated as a
function of the history (or lack thereof) of cooperation (or conflict) between the U.S.
and that actor, the degree of alignment between the U.S. and that actor’s interests,
the ‘maturity’ of that actor’s identity (i.e. how clearly and convincingly that actor has
embraced a stable and predictable self-conception), and the presence of any shared
allies or enemies.
Additionally, this study will define the expected utility a given actor has to
the U.S. as a function of that actor’s history of cooperation/aggression(not
necessarily with the U.S., but more generally with any other actors, in order to

determine if the actor is accommodationist or confrontational), the projected
geopolitical alliance this actor would seek to join (in Middle Eastern affairs, the
region is essentially split into two competing camps, a Sunni camp led by Saudi
Arabia and aligned with the U.S., and a Shi’a camp led by Iran and aligned with
Russia), and lastly the material strength of that actor (the amount of economic and
military resources at their disposal, as well as political capital and legitimacy).

Part II: Alternative Motivations for the Same Outcome:
U.S. Nonintervention in the Bahraini and Syrian Uprisings

This study will first analyze the popular uprisings that challenged the
autocratic establishments in Bahrain and Syria. These cases serve as a particularly
interesting foil to each other, in that they both elicited essentially the same U.S.
reaction (action so limited that it was tantamount to noninterference), but as these
chapters will seek to demonstrate, the motivations underlying these actions (or
rather lack of actions) were polar opposites in these two cases. Therefore non-
interference in Bahrain was the result of the U.S.’s preferred actor (i.e. the Al Khalifa
dynasty) demonstrating its ability to emerge from the confrontation victorious
without U.S. assistance, thus negating the need for U.S. intervention. Alternatively,
U.S. non-interference in Syria thus far has been the result of significant enmity and
low expected utility regarding the embattled Assad regime, but likewise having no
viable prospects for support amongst the various opposition elements. This study
will now proceed with an in depth look at the specific degrees of homophilly and
expected utility the various actors involved in each conflict had for the U.S. This
analysis will then be used to inform the conclusions that the U.S. support for an
actor stems from homophily with and expected utility for that actor, in specific
relation to these cases.

Fasano 28
Chapter 4: Bahrain: U.S. Non-Interference as Support for the Status Quo
Before analyzing the various parties to the Bahraini uprising in terms of their
homophily and expected utility with the U.S. and how this impacted the U.S.
alignment decision in the Bahraini uprising, a brief overview of contemporary
Bahraini history and politics is necessary in order to contextualize this case study.
Bahrain gained independence from British rule in 1971, after which the ruling Al
Khalifa dynasty quickly developed close ties with the U.S. Demographically,
Bahrain’s population is estimated to be about 70 percent Shi’a and 30 percent Sunni,
although official numbers are not actually available. A major complaint of the Shi’a
population has for a long time been sectarian discrimination by the Sunni royal
family. Some of the most overt and insidious manifestations of this discrimination
are gerrymandering of parliamentary districts in order to disenfranchise Shi’a
voters, discrimination in government employment (especially in the armed forces,
the repercussions of which are discussed below), and the political naturalization of
non-Bahraini (often times even non-Arab) Sunnis in order to shift the demographic
balance of the state (International Crisis Group, 2011a).
Despite this, the uprising was not a simple matter of an oppressed Shi’a
majority revolting against its Sunni oppressor. In fact, Shehabi and Jones (2015)
remark that “religious and sectarian markers were visibly absent” from the crowds
(p. 6). Instead, the uprising mobilized various segments of society- including Sunni
Islamists, secular liberals, women’s rights groups, and swaths of disenfranchised
youths- who directed a variety of grievances at the regime, the most common
regarding excessive corruption, discriminatory naturalization policies, and

economic decline and unemployment. After witnessing and drawing inspiration
from their fellow Arab citizens living under repressive autocracy in Tunisia and
Egypt, Bahraini youth activists organized a ‘Day of Rage’ to take place on February
14, 2011. The violence with which the regime responded to these peaceful protests
failed to dissuade citizens from taking to the streets, and instead had the opposite
effect, as the ranks of the crowds swelled in the following days. On March 14, a
month after the initial ‘Day of Rage’, the Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield
Force (GCCPSF) entered Manama and succeeded in suppressing the uprising-
although some ambiguity remains if the Bahraini government actually appealed to
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for this ‘assistance’ or if the GCC simply invaded
and was later granted an ex post facto ‘invitation’ to do so (Shehabi & Jones, 2015, p.
7).
Returning to the puzzle at hand- U.S. alignment decisions in conflicts such as
this- requires a closer look at the actors involved. There were essentially four
different parties to the Bahraini Uprising. First, the Al Khalifa Dynasty, which has
been the Sunni royal family of Bahrain since the 18th century. Second, the Shiite
opposition movement, consisting of both a legally recognized and an unregistered
faction, both of whom advocated essentially the same platform (although they
advanced different tactics in pursuit of these goals). Third, the Islamist reformers,
who advocated for reforms to the current system rather than the outright removal
of the regime, and who both criticized the regime for its corruption and immorality,
but also dismissed the Shi’a community as infidels. And finally, the youth movement,
responsible for organizing the initial protests that got the uprising started, but who

Fasano 30
were soon thereafter sidelined by the better-organized factions of the opposition.
Each of these actors represents a distinct party to the conflict that the U.S. could
have supported. The following analysis will break down the respective levels of
homophily/enmity and expected utility with which U.S. policy makers perceived
each actor. Figure 2 illustrates these estimated homophily/enmity and expected
utility values, and is presented here for the purpose of clarity, so that it may be
referred to as the analysis progresses to further elaborate on the rationale for each
actor’s placement within this matrix.
Figure2: Homophily-Utility Matrix for Actors inthe Bahraini Uprising
Al Khalifa
Dynasty
14 February
Peaceful
Movement
(FPM)
6
Legal Shi'a
Opposition
Coalition (C7L)
Youth of the
February 14
Revolution
(YFR); Coalition
for a Bahraini
Republic (CBR)
Sunni National
Union Gathering
(NUG)
EnmityHomophily
Low High
Expected Utility

Al Khalifa Dynasty: Embattled Autocracy
The U.S. regards the Al Khalifa regime with strong homophily and high
expected utility. The following section of this chapter will elaborate on the
justification for these assertions.
U.S. relations with the Al Khalifa technically date back to 1949, when the first
U.S. naval units were docked at the port of Jufair. At the time, Bahrain remained a
British colony, and although the Al Khalifa technically provided their approval, U.S.
permission was essentially obtained from the British. Therefore, the relevant and
salient relationship between the U.S. and the Al Khalifa can more accurately be
dated to 1971, when Bahrain gained its independence and the British Royal Navy
departed from Jufair, for it was at this time that the Al Khalifa invited the U.S. to
maintain their naval presence in the nation. Other than a brief period of heightened
tensions following U.S. support for Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War (tensions
which defined U.S. relations with virtually all Arab nations at this time, and were by
no means unique to Bahrain), U.S.-Bahraini relations under the Al Khalifa dynasty
have remained felicitous and strong up through the present day (Lawson, 1989).
In terms of interest alignment, the Al Khalifa were not only the ones who
originally invited the U.S. to maintain a naval presence at Jufair after the departure
of the British Royal Navy, they have also taken an active role since then in ensuring
the continued U.S. presence there. For instance, in 1975 Emir Isa bin Salman Al
Khalifa indefinitely suspended the newly formed parliament after it failed to ratify
an extension of the U.S. lease for Jufair (International Crisis Group, 2011a).
Furthermore, Bahrain unequivocally allied itself with the U.S. in the Cold War,

Fasano 32
consistently rebuking Soviet attempts to establish diplomatic relations (Lawson,
1989).Moving beyond the Cold War years, in 1991 Bahrain signed a defense
cooperation agreement with the U.S. granting extended American access to Bahraini
airfields and the right to “pre-positioning of strategic materials”
(ForeignAssistance.gov, 2016).
The Al Khalifa also have a ‘mature identity,’ in the sense that there is no
ambiguity in their commitment to autocratic rule. Contemporary liberalization
initiatives that have introduced nominal democratic measures represent an attempt
to appease popular discontent, rather than an actual shift in the nature of their
identity. This is evidenced by Al Haq’s (an opposition element discussed below)
assertion that the Al Khalifa will never be willing to transition to a legitimate
republican form of government, and that any real change would require their
outright removal (International Crisis Group, 2011a).
Bahrain has a strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia and the GCC, whom it
essentially seeks protection from, both from foreign aggression and its own political
dissidents (thus the GCC intervention on behalf of the Al Khalifa during the uprising
of 2011). The GCC (led by Saudi Arabia in this particular endeavor) is also believed
to have negotiated an agreement with the West which granted GCC military support
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya (discussed
in greater detail in Chapter 8) in exchange for Western acquiescence to the GCC
military intervention on behalf of the Al Khalifa (Shehabi and Jones, 2015, p. 9). The
Al Khalifa, fearing the political power of their own majority Shi’a population, and a
well-documented history of Iranian territorial claims to the Bahraini archipelago,

are extremely wary of Iranian influence within their state. Thus, the U.S. not only has
direct ties with the Al Khalifa, but also shares a common strategic ally (Saudi
Arabia), as well as a common enemy (Iran), thus further strengthening their
relationship.
As this analysis indicates, the U.S. regards the Al Khalifa dynasty with strong
homophily, due to a substantial history of mutually beneficial relations, significant
interest alignment (and total interest alignment regarding the continued presence of
the U.S. Navy at Jufair), the maturity of the Al Khalifa’s identity, and the presence of
shared allies and enemies. The factors that influence U.S. perceptions of the Al
Khalifa’s expected utility will now be analyzed.
After gaining independence in 1971, the Al Khalifa employed a ‘triangular’
foreign policy (Lawson, 1989), which sought to manipulate the dominant regional
powers at the time (Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia) in such a way as to play them off of
each other and prevent any one of these powers from pulling Bahrain into its sphere
of influence. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War which
broke out the following year, the Al Khalifa’s triangle policy lost two of its crucial
players (i.e. Iran and Iraq), and thus Bahrain was, “increasingly...pulled into the orbit
of Riyadh” (Lawson, 1989, p. 134). The relevance of this historical anecdote is two
fold. First, it explains the origins of the contemporary alliance between the Al
Khalifa and the Al Saud dynasties. But more importantly, it demonstrates Bahrainis
aptitude for manipulating their ‘allies’ in order to advance their own interests; an
aptitude that Bahrainis (both the Al Khalifa and some strains of the opposition)
continue to demonstrate into the present day (International Crisis Group, 2011;

Fasano 34
Lawson, 1989). To the extent that the Al Khalifa’s personal interests (Bahraini
sovereignty and autonomy, and their continued reign in the country) are not
considered a threat to U.S. interests in the region, the U.S. should not regard this
aptitude for manipulation as problematic. In other words, although the Al Khalifa
may very well only be allied with the U.S. for their own personal gain, the U.S.
receives a great deal from the arrangement as well, and the relationship is therefore
symbiotic rather than parasitic. Relating to expected utility perceptions, this means
that although the Al Khalifa dynasty has a reputation for manipulating its
benefactors to advance its own interests while inadvertently deviating from their
own, the U.S.-Al Khalifa relationship seems to have overcome this style of
relationship and instead arrived at a mutually beneficial understanding that benefits
both parties. Therefore, despite the Al Khalifa’s aptitude for manipulation in the
past, for the U.S. this aptitude does not significantly detract from the expected utility
of the regime.
In terms of geopolitical alliances, the Al Khalifa are firmly within the
U.S./Saudi camp. Furthermore, there is no real danger of their switching sides and
attempting to increase its ties with the Iranian/Russian camp. Because the Al Khalifa
are an embattled Sunni monarchy facing an uprising from a Shi’a majority
population, Iran would likely choose to support some party of the Shiite opposition
rather than the Sunni monarchs oppressing them. This is not merely conjecture
either, in the past Iran aided Shiite opposition movements seeking to overthrow the
Al Khalifa in the early 1980s (Lawson, 1989). Regardless of the validity of claims
made by Saudi Arabian and other GCC officials that Iranian agents are responsible

for the most recent uprising in Bahrain- claims which no evidence to date has been
able to substantiate (International Crisis Group, 2011a)- it remains highly unlikely
that the Iranian regime would accept the Al Khalifa into their sphere of influence at
the expense of the Shiite population of Bahrain. Therefore, the Al Khalifa are firmly
within the U.S./Saudi camp, and there is currently no reason to believe this
geopolitical alignment would change in the foreseeable future.
Finally, in terms of material strength, the Al Khalifah control the apparatuses
of the state. This not only means that all Bahraini economic and military prowess is
controlled by the Al Khalifa, but also that they are internationally recognized as the
legitimate rulers of a sovereign nation. Bahrain’s membership in the GCC also
provides them with additional backing from the other Gulf countries, meaning the Al
Khalifa essentially have access to the military and economic prowess of these states
as well as their own (given a valid reason to request such access, hence the GCC
assisted the Al Khalifa in suppressing the Shi’a dominated uprising, but the Al
Khalifa would certainly not fare as well if it requested GCC assistance in countering
Saudi influence in order to maintain its autonomy). Beyond that, a significant
portion of the Bahraini military is predominantly composed of foreigners, meaning
it essentially a mercenary force (this is the result of policies designed to encourage
the migration of Sunni Muslims to Bahrain in order to shift the demographics of the
predominantly Shi’a state in the Al Khalifa’s favor)(Islamic Human Rights
Commission, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2015; Katzman, 2015, p. 22; Shehabi
and Jones, 2015). The implication of having a mercenary army composed of foreign
nationals is that this army will likely remain committed to the Al Khalifa regardless

Fasano 36
of what this commitment does to the nation of Bahrain. Therefore, whereas the
Tunisian and Egyptian militaries refused to protect Ben Ali and Mubarak in the
interest of the nation’s overall welfare, the Bahraini military has no such vested
interest in the overall welfare of Bahrain, and therefore would be far less likely to
abandon the Al Khalifa, who are employing them.
The U.S. regards the Al Khalifa dynasty with high expected utility. This
assertion follows from the reasonable expectation for continued mutually beneficial
relations and for continued Al Khalifa adherence to the U.S./Saudi geopolitical
alliance, and the considerable material strength that controlling a nation-state
confers upon them. Returning to Figure 2, the Al Khalifa are thus situated in the
upper-right corner of the matrix (strong homophily- high utility). As the following
analysis will demonstrate, no other actor came close to the Al Khalifa in terms of
homophily or expected utility, which this study contends is reason the U.S. sided
with the Al Khalifa in this dispute.
C7L and CBR: Shiite Opposition Groups
The category of ‘Shiite opposition’ can actually be divided into two distinct
groups, an unnamed coalition of seven legal (in the sense that they are registered
with the state as political organizations) Shiite opposition groups (referred to for
the remainder of this paper as C7L), and the Coalition for a Bahraini Republic
(referred to for the remainder of this paper as CBR), a coalition of unlicensed Shiite
opposition groups. As this section will demonstrate, the U.S. perceives both C7L and
CBR the same way in terms of homophily/enmity, which is with a perception of

weak enmity. However, for reasons elaborated throughout the second half of this
section, the U.S. regards these two actors with different perceptions of expected
utility: perceiving C7L with moderately low expected utility, and CBR with low
expected utility.
Both of these coalitions essentially called for the same demands, amongst
them an end to the naturalization of foreign Sunni Muslims, substantive democratic
reforms, and respect for human rights. Where these two coalitions diverged
however was on the matter of how to go about advocating for such changes.
Neither C7L nor CBR has any history of interaction with the U.S. Additionally,
both groups were formed fairly recently, the coalitions themselves only being
organized in February 2011 in response to the need to organize the disparate
opposition groups operating in the state. The majority of the parties that would
eventually join forces to create C7L were formally founded in 2001, following King
Hamad’s liberal reforms that welcomed formerly exiled opposition leaders back into
the country to participate in the political process. The largest and strongest of these
parties was al-Wifaq, and it therefore played a leadership role in the coalition. The
constituent parties to the CBR were mainly founded in 2006, by defectors from
groups such as al-Wifaq who viewed these organizations’ decision to participate in
that year’s parliamentary elections as a betrayal of the opposition, and therefore
considered al-Wifaq and likeminded parties to have been coopted by the state
(Shehabi & Jones, 2015). The specifics of their respective histories aside, the
relevant point here in terms of homophily considerations is that in each of these

Fasano 38
coalitions’ relatively short-lived histories, neither had any direct interactions with
the U.S.
In terms of interests, the emphasis of both C7L and CBR on human rights and
democratic reforms theoretically puts these groups in alignment with U.S. interests-
assuming (perhaps rather idealistically) that these are interests the U.S. genuinely
desires to pursue, and that stated U.S. support for such things is not merely rhetoric.
Of far more crucial significance however, the Shiite opposition has not articulated a
clear position toward the continued U.S. naval presence at Jufair. The ambiguity
regarding the Shiite opposition’s alignment with the U.S. on this interest (an interest
likely far more salient to U.S. decision making than promotion of democracy and
protection of human rights) therefore likely contributes to U.S. reluctance to
support such groups.
Although the Shiite opposition in Bahrain neither has any formal alliances
nor receives support from any outside powers, Shiite leaders in Saudi Arabia’s
Eastern province, Kuwait, Southern Iraq, and Iran have all expressed support for the
uprising. Beyond rhetorical support, no evidence exists to support claims that
Bahrain’s Shi’a population is receiving assistance from any of these leaders. Despite
this, the Saudi government and other GCC leaders claim that, “[a Shi’a] takeover
would be tantamount to an Iranian one” (International Crisis Group, 2015, p. i). The
Al Khalifa also adopted the view that the Shi’a opposition were agents of Iran,
despite a commission dispatched by their own government failing to find any
evidence to substantiate such claims (Shehabi and Jones, 2015). A 1970 fact finding
mission conducted by the UN also found that, “the overwhelming majority of the

people of Bahrain wish to gain recognition of their identity in a fully independent
and sovereign State free to decide for itself its relations with other states” (United
Nations Security Council, 1970). Therefor, there is little reason to believe a Bahraini
democracy that granted a voice to the Shi’a would facilitate an Iranian intrusion into
the nation’s affairs; instead Bahraini’s- both Sunni and Shi’a- have clearly articulated
a desire for independence and autonomy, not integration into any of their
neighbors’ sphere of influence. Furthermore, to the extent that Bahrain has a proven
history of manipulating its regional ‘allies’ to advance its own agenda, any support
the Shi’a opposition groups could potentially be receiving from Iran (this is purely
hypothetical; again there is no evidence to suggest Iran is assisting the Shi’a
opposition in any form) could easily be interpreted merely as a ploy to gain the
necessary resources to continue their struggle, rather than evidence of any actual
loyalty to the Iranian state.
However, this reality is largely irrelevant to U.S. calculations, what matters is
how the U.S. perceives the scenario. U.S. policy makers’ fears of an Iran-affiliated
‘Shi’a crescent’ coalescing in the Middle East will likely skew their perception of any
Shi’a actors anywhere in the region, regardless of the reality on the ground.
Although no policy maker went so far as to declare that the Shi’a opposition was
directly colluding with Iran, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did express that, “[Iran
is] reaching out to the opposition in Bahrain” and Defense Secretary Robert Gates
later claimed, “there is clear evidence that as the process is protracted,
particularly… the Iranians are looking for ways to exploit it and create problems”
(International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 11). Therefore, although the Shi’a opposition

Fasano 40
doesn’t actually have any formal alliances or affiliations, their perceived affiliation
with Iran significantly harms the U.S.’s perception of them.
The U.S. therefore regards both C7L and CBR with weak enmity. This
estimation is based on the lack of any history of interaction between the U.S. and
these actors, ambiguity regarding their interest alignment, the immaturity of these
actors identities, and the perception of their alignment with Iran.
The same logic that was outlined above regarding U.S. perceptions of the
Shi’a opposition’s allegiance to Iran can likewise be applied to perceptions of the
likely geopolitical alliance Bahrain would orient itself with if either of these groups
were to obtain control of the state. Again, the accuracy of such a perception is
entirely irrelevant, since it is the perception of reality rather than reality itself that
informs decision-making. Therefore, the U.S. perception that both C7L and CBR
would reorient Bahrain into the Iranian/Russian sphere of influence significantly
damages these group’s expected utility.
Despite their numerous similarities, where C7L and CBR differ significantly is
on the matter of how they pursue their goals, and consequently how they interact
with the existing political structure. Even prior to the uprising, C7L sought to enact
gradual change from within the system, while CBR wholeheartedly rejected the
legitimacy of the system and instead sought the type of drastic change that could
only come from toppling it. In the wake of the uprisings, these attitudes continued to
manifest themselves in the way each coalition conducted itself during the protests.
Whereas C7L implored protesters not to take actions the regime could perceive as
confrontational, such as marching into the Sunni neighborhoods of Manama or

marching on the royal palace itself, CBR on the other hand not only advocated such
actions, its members actively took part in them. As the protests ground on, each
group articulated its stipulations for settlement of the conflict in different ways.
While C7L published a list of grievances it desired the regime to address, this list
was ultimately advertised as the end goal that negotiations between C7L and the
regime would work toward. Conversely, CBR published a list of similar demands,
but declared that these were a precondition that the regime must fulfill before any
negotiations could take place (International Crisis Group, 2011a). The implication of
these alternative stances regarding U.S. perceptions of these two groups is that C7L
is perceived to be reasonable and cooperative- perhaps even accommodating;
whereas CBR comes across as radical and confrontational- even though their policy
agendas are essentially identical.
In terms of material strength, C7L and CBR are essentially equal. Although
they are both formally organized and have a modest organizational budget, they do
not possess anywhere near the amount of economic (and no military) might that the
Al Khalifa wield. They do however both have a fair degree of legitimacy, although
each derives theirs from different sources. C7L is regarded by the regional and
international community as legitimate due to its willingness to operate within the
system. Ironically, this willingness to operate within the system is precisely what
has significantly damaged C7L’s credibility amongst the Bahraini populace.
Alternatively, CBR enjoys far greater popular support among the population, due to
its rejection of the regime’s legitimacy, whereas the regional and international

Fasano 42
community regards it as illegitimate due to its rejection of the political system and
refusal to work within it (International Crisis Group, 2011a).
These difference result in different degrees of expected utility for C7L and
CBR. The U.S. regards C7L with moderately low expected utility due to the
perception of allegiance to Iran, the relative lack of material strength, and the
cooperative and reasonable approach to advocating change. On the contrary, the U.S
regards CBR with low expected utility, a slight difference which reflects the
similarities in the first two factors (i.e. perception of allegiance to Iran and relative
lack of material strength), but also acknowledges the more bellicose and
confrontational style of problem solving which CBR advocates.
Figure 2 thus situates each of these groups nearer the lower-left corner
(enmity- low expected utility) of the homophily-utility matrix, meaning the U.S.
would have very little reason to provide support to either of these groups. The
likelihood of U.S. support for either element of the Shi’a opposition is decreased
even further by the relative superiority of the Al Khalifa in measures of homophily
and expected utility. In other words, even if there were no other alternatives, C7L
and CBR would be highly unlikely to obtain U.S. support. The Syrian case analyzed in
the next section of this chapter illustrates the hypothesized U.S. reaction when all
actors are situated within this lower-right quadrant of the homophily-utility matrix.
The fact that in the Bahraini case an actor with strong homophily and high expected
utility is present (i.e. the Al Khalifa) therefore diminishes the Shi’a opposition's
prospects for obtaining U.S. support even further.

NUG: Sunni Islamist Regime Loyalists
The U.S. regards the Bahraini Islamist movement represented by the Sunni
National Union Gathering (NUG) with weak enmity and moderate expected utility,
for reasons detailed throughout this section. As can be seen in Figure 2, although
NUG is equal to several other actors in terms of homophily/enmity, it does rank as
the second highest actor (after the Al Khalifa dynasty) in terms of homophily
enmity.
Following King Hamad’s liberal reforms that permitted the Shiite opposition
to organize and participate in the political process beginning in 2001, the Al Khalifa
regime began supporting Sunni Islamist parties in an attempt to counter the
influence of the Shi’a voting bloc (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 12). This
move resulted in the formation of two Sunni Islamist parties: al-Minbar, commonly
regarded as the Bahraini chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Asala, a more
socially conservative Salafist organization, heavily influenced by Saudi Wahhabism.
In February 2011, al-Minbar and al-Asala merged to form the NUG.
Although neither al-Minbar nor al-Asala had any direct interaction with the
U.S., the Islamist and Wahhabi ideology that these groups proscribe likely informed
the U.S. perception of them. While Islamist parties tend to take a fairly anti-Western
stance (not in the sense of explicit hatred or advocating harm, but in the sense of
asserting national autonomy from corrupting Western influences), Wahhabi
ideology is even more so hostile toward Western incursions into Middle Eastern
affairs. Many scholars have attributed the contemporary growth of radicalization in
the Islamic world to Saudi Arabia’s funding of Wahhabi madrassas throughout the

Fasano 44
region, a phenomenon referred to as ‘Petro-Islam’ because the Saudi’s are able to
fund these madrassas thanks to their nation’s considerable oil wealth (Mandaville,
2013, p. 174-177).
There is no semblance of interest alignment between the U.S. and NUG. NUG
advocates an Islamist platform, meaning they desire to codify Islamic morality into
state law. Although NUG has never clearly articulated a position regarding U.S. naval
forces at Jufair, Islamist ideology tends to be opposed to the presence of Western
forces in Islamic nations, and it is therefore fair to assume that the U.S. would take
this into consideration when evaluating the desirability of NUG.
NUG does have a mature identity, in the sense that it has clearly articulated
an Islamist ideology as the basis of its political platform, and identities rooted in
religious convictions tend not to change (Blau, 1977). NUG would be likely to
maintain close relations with Saudi Arabia, although the rationale behind this
assumption is not simply that they share common Wahhabi influences. NUG is
composed of both the Salafi/Wahabi Al-Asala and the Muslim Brotherhood-style
Islamist Al-Minbar. While Saudi Arabia adheres to Wahhabism itself and would
therefore likely foster positive relations with Al-Asala, the Saudis have
demonstrated an aversion to, and actively intervened against, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s style of political Islamism. For instance, Saudi Arabia provided
significant support to the Egyptian military so that it could initiate a coup d'etat
against the Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party in
Egypt)(International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 24). Saudi aversion to the Brotherhood’s
brand of Islamism aside, a NUG-Saudi alliance would be highly likely to prevail

nonetheless. First of all, both Al-Asala and Al-Minbar were for all intensive purposes
created by the Al Khalifa regime. Given that the Al Khalifa have been politically
dominated by the Al Sauds for some time now, the directive to do so was likely
sanctioned, if not directly generated, by the Al Sauds. Therefor, the Al Khalifa
creation of these Islamist parties could transitively be read as the Al Saud creation
of them. Furthermore, if a new Sunni government were to come to power, the Saudi
government would almost certainly seek to maintain Bahrain as a regional ally by
forging an alliance with this new government, and wouldn’t let the particularities of
its style of Sunni Islamism prevent an otherwise politically viable alliance.
This study therefore finds that the U.S. regards NUG with weak enmity, based
on the general hostility toward the West that Islamism tends to generate, the
absolute lack of interest alignment, the maturity of its identity, and the presence of a
common ally (i.e. Saudi Arabia).
Al-Asala has been critical of both the Al Khalifa regime, calling it corrupt and
immoral, and of the Shi’a opposition, considering Shiites to be infidels and the
opposition to be traitorous. This is largely representative of the conservative Salafi,
and more specifically the ultra-conservative Wahhabi, tendency to express hostility
toward any group that does not adhere directly to its precepts. Despite this, NUG has
remained loyal to the Al Khalifa regime, and advocates reforms to the current
system- some of which coincide with the Shi’a opposition’s proposed reforms (such
as liberalization of the political process and release of political prisoners), others
which do not (such as banning prostitution and the sale of alcohol). Overall then,
NUG has earned a reputation as a highly confrontational actor.

Fasano 46
The geopolitical alliance of an NUG controlled Bahrain would likely remain
loosely affiliated with the U.S./Saudi camp. Although the Islamist ideology may
generate some contention between the U.S. and NUG, the common ally of Saudi
Arabia would likely assist in overcoming this. Furthermore, the Salafi aversion to
Shiism would almost certainly preclude them from reorienting the nation in favor of
the Iran/Russia geopolitical alliance.
In terms of material strength, NUG is graced with the support of both the Al
Khalifa regime and the Islamic banking sector (International Crisis Group, 2011a).
This means that the organization is well funded, and in the unlikely event that the Al
Khalifa regime were to voluntarily step down, NUG would almost certainly be the
actor they would put their weight behind to succeed them, meaning that in this
hypothetical scenario, they would also be vested with the legitimacy of having the
departing rulers endorse them.
In summation, the U.S. regards NUG with moderate expected utility. This
estimation follows from the confrontational stance that NUG has taken toward those
that differ from them, the strong likelihood of their remaining associated with the
U.S./Saudi geopolitical alliance (even if only nominally, by way of its alliance with
Saudi Arabia), and the considerable economic and political resources at its disposal.
As Figure 2 illustrates, similar to the Shi’a opposition, NUG ranks toward the
lower-left (enmity- low expected utility) of the homophily utility matrix. The same
observations can therefore be applied. Succinctly put, NUG’s placement in the matrix
alone is enough to make U.S. support highly unlikely, but its relative position
compared to the Al Khalifa regime reduces this likelihood even more.

YFR and FPM: Youth Movements
Despite being credited as the driving force behind the initial outbreak of the
protests in Bahrain, the youth initially lacked any formal organizational structure,
and coordinated the first protests through predominantly through social media and
word of mouth. These initial youth movements were unique in that they unified
people from a plethora of political trends in a common opposition to the regime.
Eventually, this broad youth movement coalesced into two distinct groups: the
Youth of the 14 February Revolution (referred to for the remainder of this paper as
YFR) and the Bahrain 14 February Peaceful Movement (referred to for the
remainder of this paper as FPM). Acknowledging both similarities and differences
between YFR and FPM, the U.S. regards each with a different perception of
homophily/enmity (regarding YFR with weak enmity and FPM with weak
homophily), but regards both actors with the same perception of low expected
utility.
Because both of these youth movements lacked any formal organizational
structure and were essentially just a amalgamation of disenfranchised adolescents
expressing their frustrations with a regime they perceived to be responsible for
their hardships, there is no group whose history of interaction with the U.S. can be
analyzed.
Once the youth movements coalesced into YFR and FPM, although these
groups were essentially brand new and there was still no history of interaction with
the U.S. to be analyzed, they did at least begin to articulate identities and interests.

Fasano 48
YFR advocated for the overthrow of the regime, and the establishment of a
republican democracy. Furthermore, YFR refused negotiations with the regime. Due
to the symmetry of their views and tactics, YFR soon after allied itself with CBR. FPM
on the other hand has called for substantial democratic reforms, stating it would
accept a constitutional monarchy rather than the outright removal of the regime.
Despite the symmetry in their positions, FPM has not forged an alliance with C7L.
FPM also employed a tactic that no other element of the Bahraini opposition had- it
appealed directly to President Obama, the United Nations (UN), and Interpol,
imploring each to come to the aid of the Bahraini citizens. The actions these appeals
called for included directly assisting the opposition with actions such as treating
injured protestors in the U.S., and by exerting pressure on the regime with actions
such as the deployment of an international peacekeeping force and a warrant for the
arrest of King Hamad and other regime members responsible for the atrocities
against peaceful protesters (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 20).
The different tactics utilized by each faction of the youth movement results in
differing U.S. perceptions in terms of homophily/enmity. The U.S regards YFR with
moderate enmity, due to its lack of history with the U.S., lack of interest alignment,
the immaturity of its identity, and its alignment with the more radical CBR faction.
Alternatively, the U.S. regards the FPM with weak homophily, due to its attempt to
establish relations with the U.S. and other members of the international community,
its modicum of interest alignment (in the sense that it is willing to keep the Al
Khalifa involved in the nation’s government in some capacity, which is technically a
U.S. interest), and its more moderate and conciliatory approach to enacting change.

The geopolitical alliance of either youth group is hard to estimate. Likely the
most relevant observation that can be made on this point is that similar to both CBR
and C7L, the U.S. would perceive the likely orientation of such a group to be toward
the Iran/Russia camp (due to the fact that both movements are composed of
predominantly Shi’a youths). As with CBR and C7L, the actual reality is irrelevant,
since it is the U.S. perception of these actors that influences U.S. decision-making.
Lastly, both YFR and FPM lack any real semblance of material resources.
Even YFR’s alliance with CBR doesn’t give it any advantage in this respect; instead,
rather than gaining access to CBR’s resources through this alliance, YFR is
essentially overshadowed and subsumed by the more powerful actor in the alliance,
hence the observation that, “Although youth groups initially were the driving force
and remain a very significant constituency, unlicensed (predominantly Shiite)
groupings such as al-Haq and al-Wafaa [the two parties that compose CBR]...
apparently have since taken the lead” (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 20).
Whereas YFR and FPM differences resulted in different U.S. perceptions of
them regarding homophily/enmity, there was instead a fair degree of similarity
regarding the factors that contribute to perceptions of expected utility.
Consequently, the U.S. perceives both YFR and FPM with low expected utility, due to
the perception of a likely geostrategic orientation toward Iran and their lack of any
real material resources at their disposal.

Fasano 50
Conclusion
Table 2 below summarizes the findings of this case study. It will now be
argued that these findings provide a causal explanation for the limited U.S.
intervention on behalf of any actor in the Bahraini uprising.
Table 2: Summary of Bahraini Actors' Homophily/Enmityand Expected Utility
Actor Homophily/Enmity Expected Utility
Al Khalifa Dynasty Strong Homophily High Expected Utility
Legal Shi’a Opposition (C7L) Moderate Enmity Moderately Low Expected Utility
Coalition for a Bahraini Republic
(CBR)
Moderate Enmity Low Expected Utility
Sunni National Union Gathering
(NUG)
Moderate Enmity Moderate Expected Utility
Youth of the February 14
Revolution (YFR)
Moderate Enmity Low Expected Utility
14 February Peaceful Movement
(FPM)
Moderate
Homophily
Low Expected Utility
Before relating the above findings to the causal outcome (i.e. U.S. non-
intervention), a closer look at what exactly this ‘non-intervention’ entailed is in
order. The U.S. espoused a considerable degree of rhetoric critical of the Al Khalifa.
As early as March 12, 2011, Defense Secretary Robert Gates criticized the regime for
its “baby steps” toward reform while visiting Manama (International Crisis Group,
2011a, p. i). Two days later these baby steps were replaced by the marching boots of
the GCC forces sent to squash the uprising. Responding to a question regarding
military aid to Bahrain in light of the ongoing protests, a State Department
spokesperson stated, “We have and will continue to use our security assistance to
reinforce reforms in Bahrain. We have seen some important initial steps from the
Bahraini government… but more needs to be done.” The same spokesperson also

declared that “[n]one of these items [i.e. the military provisions being sent to
Bahrain as part of the aid package] can be used against protestors” (U.S. Department
of State, Office of the Spokesperson, 2012), although it is not clear exactly how this
could be known for certain, given that the military aid granted to Bahrain in FY 2012
included funds for the Bahraini Defense Forces (BDF) (Katzman, 2015, p. 33), the
very same body that was responsible for the violent reaction to the early days of the
protests.
Beyond mere rhetoric, the U.S. also cut aid to Bahrain, initially a fairly small
amount (reducing the total aid package from $20.77 million in FY 2010 to $17.39
million in FY 2011) and then more drastically the following year (reducing it to
$11.05 million in FY 2012) (Katzman, 2015, p. 33). Therefore, while it can’t be said
that the U.S. did nothing to exert pressure on the Al Khalifa regime in order to
support, or even protect, the protestors, the reality remains that the U.S. has both
the domestic and the military means to enact regime change in foreign nations if and
when it wants to. This study therefore hypothesizes that U.S. reluctance to actually
take decisive action (be it militarily or the definitive withdrawal of economic aid
altogether rather than cuts) against the Al Khalifa regime was the result of the
strong homophily and high expected utility this actor had for the U.S., and the
comparatively low homophily-expected utility of all other parties to the conflict
which essentially rendered the Al Khalifa the only viable option.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the Al Khalifa not only had the greatest combined
homophily-utility value for the U.S., but they far exceeded any other actor. Because
the Al Khalifa demonstrated their ability to squelch the uprising without U.S.

Fasano 52
assistance (primarily because the GCC intervention provided the necessary
assistance instead), the U.S. therefore didn’t need to intervene into the Bahraini
uprising in order to ensure the outcome it preferred (i.e. the continued reign of the
Al Khalifa dynasty). Therefore, an important clarification must be made that the
hypothesis of this study is that homophily and expected utility are believed to be
indicators of the party U.S. policy makers will develop a preference for, and this
preference formation does not always necessarily translate into actual intervention
on behalf of the preferred actor. As the Bahraini case demonstrates, ensuring a
victorious outcome for the preferred party does not always require intervention.
In fact, one could challenge this hypothesis with the argument that the
limited U.S. intervention into Bahrain (in the form of cuts to foreign aid) was
directed against the Al Khalifa dynasty, and was therefore in support of the
protestors. While I would concede that the basic premise of this challenge is
accurate, I would counter that my hypothesis nonetheless explains why the U.S.
‘intervention’ occurred in the way that it did. In other words, the U.S. only made
limited cuts to the foreign aid budget to Bahrain (as opposed to military
intervention or total withdrawal of aid) because it only wanted to exert influence
insofar as doing so would not actually threaten the Al Khalifa’s prospects for
remaining in power. In sum, although the U.S. did technically support the protestors
by cutting aid, in the long run the U.S. was actually continuing to support the regime
by only cutting foreign aid to a certain extent.

Chapter 5: Syria: Non-Intervention for Lack of Any Viable Alternative
This study will now move on to examine the relevant actors involved in the
Syrian uprising and subsequent civil war, and the varying levels of homophily and
expected utility with which the U.S. perceived each of them, in order to arrive at a
conclusion regarding U.S. rationale for non-intervention into these Syrian affairs.
First, a brief overview of contemporary Syrian history is provided in order to
provide this analysis with proper contextualization.
Syria gained independence from French mandatory rule in the wake of World
War II, after which the young nation was ravaged by a series of military coups. The
Arab Socialist Baath Party came to power in 1963, and has remained in control of
the Syrian government ever since. Hafez Al-Assad declared himself Syrian President
in 1971, and retained the position until his death in 2000, at which time control of
the nation was ceded to his son, Bashar Al-Assad (Blanchard, Humud, & Nikitin,
2015). After foiling an attempted Islamist rebellion in 1982, Assad denied any
political dissidents the ability to organize or voice opposition without facing either
imprisonment or exile (International Crisis Group, 2013). Contemporary Syria is
firmly allied with Iran and Russia, and the embattled Assad regime enjoys
considerable support from both of these allies.
Complaints of the Syrian population had for a long time included, “high
unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility, rampant corruption, lack of
political freedoms, and repressive security forces” (Blanchard, Humud, & Nikitin,
2015, p. 9). When the Syrian uprising first broke out in early 2011, there was
initially no indication that the uprising would be unique from any of the other

Fasano 54
civilian uprisings challenging the rule of autocratic strongmen in the region.
However, as the uprising was met with a heavy handed state response, the protests
quickly turned from peaceful assemblies, to being marked by sporadic acts of
violence against security forces, and from there quickly deescalated into full-scale
insurrection, plunging the nation into outright civil war (Blanchard, Humud, &
Nikitin, 2015).
In relation to the puzzle this study seeks to address (i.e. U.S. alignment
behavior in civil conflicts such as this) a closer look at the specific actors involved in
the Syrian conflict is necessary. First, the embattled autocratic establishment: the
Assad regime and the armed groups (both domestic and provided by regional allies)
that are fighting on its behalf. Second, the political opposition, represented by the
National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Third, armed
opposition groups, a category which identifies both the Free Syrian army fighting to
topple the Assad regime and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the
Popular Protection Units fighting to protect Kurdish lands from pro-Assad forces
and ISIS militants. And finally, the category of Islamic fundamentalist jihadists
organizations, to which both Jabhat al-Nusra (the Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda) and
ISIS belong. Each of these actors will now be analyzed in regard to their degrees of
homophily/enmity and expected utility for the U.S., in order to inform the
conclusions made at the end of this chapter. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of
these actors in the homophily utility matrix, and is provided here so that it may be
referred back to throughout the chapter as the rationale for each actors’ placement
is elaborated.

Figure3: Homophily-Utility Matrix for Actors inthe Syrian Uprising/Civil War
The Assad Regime and Affiliated Forces: The Embattled Autocratic Establishment
Because the Syrian uprising quickly degenerated into a full-fledged civil war,
the parties to the conflict in this case will include both political entities and armed
groups, and often times some combination of the two. Therefore, the embattled
autocracy in the case of Syria is represented primarily by Syrian President Bashar
Al-Assad and his government, but also cannot be understood without incorporating
into the analysis the other armed groups which are actively fighting on behalf of the
embattled Syrian government. These groups include both domestic forces such as
the Syrian Armed Forces (the national military of the Syrian state) and the National
Defense Forces (a patchwork of loosely affiliated armed militia groups all united by
ISIS
Jabhat al-Nusra;
Assad Regime
Free Syrian
Army (FSA)
6
Popular
Protection Units
(YPG)
The National
Coalition of
Syrian
Revolutionary
and Oppositional
Forces ("The
Coalition")
EnmityHomophily
Low High
Expected Utility

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