The document discusses responsible business practices in Myanmar's mining sector based on field research conducted by the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB). Key findings include: flawed community consultation processes for Environmental Impact Assessments; lack of effective grievance mechanisms for communities and workers; poor enforcement of labor and safety standards, including child labor and lack of protective equipment; and issues of informal payments, licensing overlaps, and coordination failures between government agencies. The MCRB aims to improve responsible business through knowledge sharing, capacity building, and multi-stakeholder dialogue based on international standards and local needs.

1. www.mcrb.org.mm
myanmar.responsible.business

3. Introduction to…

Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business

Mining SWIA – Methodology and Project Phases
Emerging field findings related to…

Community consultation

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)

Informal payments

Licensing issues

Grievance Mechanisms

Labour conditions

4. Current core funders:
UK DFID
DANIDA
Norway
Switzerland
Netherlands
Ireland
Founding partners:
MCRB Objective
To provide an effective and legitimate
platform for the creation of knowledge,
capacity and dialogue concerning
responsible business in Myanmar, based
on local needs and international
standards, that results in more
responsible business.
MCRB defines ‘responsible business’ as
‘business activities that work for the
long-term interests of Myanmar and all
its people’.
www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org
15 Shan Yeiktha Street, Sanchaung, Yangon. Tel/Fax: 01 510069

7. I. Scoping of the Sector
•Develop foundational knowledge base to target field research
for validation and deepening of data.
Months 1-4
II. Identification and Assessment of Impacts
•Validate foundational knowledge base with primary data
collected through field research from targeted locations across
the country of focus.
Months 5-6
III. Mitigation and Impact Management
•Identify measures that will help avoid, minimise, mitigate
potential impacts of the sector.
Months 6-9
V. Consultation on draft SWIA and Finalisation
•Present SWIA findings and conclusions, as well as
recommendations, to be validated through consultations with
representatives of government, companies operating/planning
to operate in the country, and representatives of civil society
organisations, trade unions, international organisations, donor
governments.
Months 10-12
I. Pre-
Screening
II. Scoping
III.
Idenification
& Assessment
of Impacts
IV. Mitigation
and Impact
Management
V.
Consultation
& Finalisation

8.  Focus on mining of tin, tungsten, gold, limestone and the production
of cement.
 MCRB field visits to Karen, Shan, Kachin, Bago, Sagaing, Mandalay,
Kayah and Tanintharyi regions.
 Interviews with company, government and CSO representatives as
well as local communities and mine workers in the informal and
formal sector.
 Large, industrial as well as medium-, small- and subsistence-scale
mine operations and processing facilities visited.
 More than 1500 individual stakeholders consulted.

13.  Most mines visited had not carried out any meaningful consultations.
 Where consultation had occurred, it was for more recent projects, often
carried out either to;
(a) satisfy the EIA consultation requirement, or
(b) obtain community signatures as part of mine licensing process.
 There was no or inadequate consultations regarding land seizure, resettlement
and compensation for accidents.
 Consultations were often carried out with male village heads only; were not
undertaken in local languages; planned within short timeframes and/or far
from the affected communities; undertaken after the project had already
been initiated.
 Some consultation included a special representative from an armed group

14.  No mines visited had an operational-level grievance mechanisms in place
and continuous consultation was rare.
 Cases of ongoing company-community engagement centered on donations
rather than project-induced issues. On the whole, donations consulted on
more frequently than other topics.
 Any on-going consultation was most frequently informal and may have taken
place through village or religious events rather than as part of company
outreach strategy.
 Community members interviewed by MCRB recommended that companies
consulting on EIAs should provide a summary of findings in non-technical
language with plenty of time for community to review document prior to
consultation meeting.

15. Some of the issues reported by community members
included...
EIA consultants invited all villagers to a consultation but only gave one
day’s advance notice
During consultations, EIA consultants used Burmese which is not the local
language; there was an informal translator but not a professional
EIA consultants only spoke to the village leaders/heads of households
Community members felt that EIA consultants purposefully used technical
terms during the consultations so people could not understand
Companies would organise small consultations, but only one time, when
they needed signatures to sign off on project
One company only consulted with group of village elders who were
supportive of project
Promises made to communities by companies (regarding job
opportunities, compensation etc.) not honoured

17.  Many mines had failed to carry out required EIAs.
 Community reports indicate that EIA consultation process is frequently flawed.
 Companies reported not knowing how to carry out an impact assessment and
therefore asking other companies for their reports to adapt and ‘copy-paste’.
 MCRB review of EIAs obtained through field visits also revealed copy-pasting
and references to other countries.
 Many mining company EIAs reviewed by MCRB are not thorough and complete
assessments of past, current and potential environmental and social impacts.
 One minerals processing factory manager admitted to not understanding the
EIA process and therefore not implementing an EMP.

21.  A prospective ‘pit owner’ may get an informal ‘license’ by applying jointly
with a village administrator at the township Forestry Department. The
applicant pays a fee to the department in the presence of the village
administrator, the size of which is unknown, to obtain the permission to
operate an informal mine on forest land.
 Taxes were collected from unlicensed miners by local authorities as well as
armed groups, often based on the horsepower of machines used by miners.
In one area, ‘pit owners’ would pay a yearly fee of 20 lakh per excavator
used in cash to armed group.
 Some armed groups also tax ‘pit owners’ at the mine site 2-3 times per year. In
one area visited, such payments averaged at 100,000 MMK for one pit.
 ‘Pit owners’ may also pay additional informal taxes to the local government.
In one case, 50,000 MMK was collected from ‘pit owners’ on a monthly basis
by the village administrator.

22.  There were reports of inappropriate payments made to mining
enterprise production monitors by mining companies themselves.
One mine reported that they record a monthly bribe to a production
monitor as ‘CSR’ in their accounts.
 Several cases where donations were made to village administration
or village elders were seen as illegitimate by wider community. Such
payments made to personal accounts and managed by individuals
with limited oversight by company

24.  In nearly all locations visited there were overlapping land claims either between
different mining companies, between mine companies and other types of
companies and/or between mines and communities.
 Issues with inter-departmental and inter-agency coordination meant that licenses
awarded at Union-level and regional level to different companies were found to
overlap.
 A lack of coordination was also found to create issues with legal enforcement.
Township-level authorities reported that they could not enforce regulations where
mine licenses had been awared by district-level authorities, even where license-
holders are not complying with regulation.
 Township-level authorities from various departments also reported communication
issues between the township and district-levels.

27.  Companies did not have effective grievance mechanisms in place, most
companies had no grievance handling system whatsoever.
 Companies frequently reported that they felt that formal grievance
mechanisms were unnecessary as they had an informal understanding with
communities about their openness to hearing complaints.
 Some companies referred to staff members while others used ‘mail boxes’ for
workers or community members to submit complaints. No information was
provided on how grievances would be handled and so these mechanisms
were most often not used or trusted.
 In some of these cases, there were language barriers between mine or
factory staff and community members.
 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights set out good practice on
complaints and grievance handling which can be used.

30. Formal sector Informal (unlicensed) sector
• Rare reports of child labour • Child labour on mine sites not unusual
• Lack of HSE enforcement and training – many
mines had policies not adhered to
• Lack of knowledge about unsafe practices –
miners expose themselves to harm, e.g. mercury
• Often inadequate PPE provided; workers do not
wear equipment supplied
• Most often no PPE
• No mines visited had an employee union
• Excessive working hours, 24-hour long shifts
including underground
• Excessive working hours, 24-hour long shifts
including underground
• Procedures for awarding compensation in case
of accidents unclear, compensation often
inadequate
• Often no compensation in case of accident
• Gender discrimination in pay and access to work • Women often work with chemicals, women
sometimes
• Some companies retain worker salaries illegally • Some ‘pit owners’ retain workers salaries to pay
back loans on machinery; workers underpaid
• Workers frequently do not have a contract; some
workers with contracts not given a copy
• Companies make extensive use of ‘daily
labourers’
• Workers live in poor-quality accommodation;
some have inadequate access to water for
drinking and sanitation; some may not come
and go freely (e.g. locked in residences from
9pm-7am)
• Gold miners burn mercury amalgam in their homes

33.  Field findings identified four main governance issues in Myanmar’s
mining sector;
 Lack of community consultation, not least in regard to land
 Poor complaints/grievance handling
 Labour/HSE law
 Informal payments/donations and a lack of transparency

34. www.mcrb.org.mm
myanmar.responsible.business