This document discusses whether parental bedtime storytelling can be justified while upholding principles of fair equality of opportunity. It outlines John Rawls' theory of a just society, including the principle of fair equality of opportunity (FEO), which aims to eliminate arbitrary social advantages. Some argue bedtime storytelling violates FEO by giving some children advantages over others. However, requiring strict FEO could require eliminating the family institution altogether. Instead, the document argues for a mitigation approach: parents have freedom to tell stories, and later institutional measures can mitigate circumstance differences between children. While luck egalitarians object that storytelling could provide too much advantage or misinformation, the mitigation approach better balances justice, equality and family integrity.

1. A Nightmare on FEO Street
o Introduction
Can we justify the overriding of Fair Equality of Opportunity, or other versions of Equality of
Opportunity, when we tell children bedtime stories? At simple sight, bedtime storytelling seems
like one of the most harmless and positive actions that parents can embrace towards their children.
Through dazzling and wondrous narratives, children can develop their imagination, language
skills, reflective thinking, morality, memorization and their relationship with their progenitors.
Upbringing of this caliber can translate into the formation of citizens with impeccable moral traits
and broad skills.
However, certain justice principles might be offset as a result of these practices, mainly Fair
Equality of Opportunity (FEO) proposed in Rawls’s Theory of Justice. Some interpretations of the
latter principle would object that bedtime storytelling gives more advantage to children over
others. In this essay, I will argue that parent´s freedom to tell bedtime stories to their children is
justified as long as the mitigation of circumstance differences that might derive from bedtime
storytelling is undertaken rather than telling parents to refrain from this practice because it
compromises the liberties of the family to a degree where it might affect it. The position of the
family must also be defended in order to justify the actions of parents through the importance of
this institution. The first section of this essay will go over the general points of Rawls’s Theory of
Justice, the core elements of FEO and why this element of Rawls’s proposal is pivotal in the design
of a society that vanquishes arbitrary and social disadvantages. In the second section, I discuss
how the family is inserted by Rawls in his theoretical framework, a take on Equality of Opportunity
(EoP) from a luck egalitarian perspective, the issues that surge between FEO and the family and
the complications of inducing a fully-fledged version of FEO in society. Consequently, the third
part examines the mitigation argument, proposed by Mason, that family must be given the liberty
to tell their children bedtime stories and that the inequalities of upbringing will be dealt at later
stages of children´s life’s and Segall’s (2013) luck egalitarian rebuttal that has some objections to
bedtime storytelling. In the end, the conclusions are drawn to defend the mitigation approach to
tell children bedtime stories.

2. o Why FEO matters
In order to understand FEO, Rawls’s theory has to be explained. In his canonical book, A Theory
of Justice, Rawls lays the groundwork of his conception of justice in a society driven by principles
of equality and liberty. Institutions, or the basic structure as he contextualized, must be guided by
two core principles. The first one dictates that all the members of society are entitled to freedom
of speech, freedom to vote, freedom of personal property, the ability to run for public office and
be treated in accordance to the rule of law; these are inalienable rights that cannot be traded nor
modified. The second principle is comprised by two lexicographical elements: Fair Equality of
Opportunity and the Difference Principle.
The first one grants open competition of coveted advantaged social position regardless of emerging
arbitrary or social circumstances. Individuals that possess the skills and the eagerness to employ
them should compete in a levelled playing field ensuring that the best candidate will be selected
(Rawls, 1999: 63). On the other hand, the Difference Principle allows social inequalities to stand
as long as the better off contribute to the socioeconomic improvement of the disadvantaged social
stratums. Both of these principles would be embedded into the basic structure to ensure justice and
advantageous conditions for individuals taking into account that certain inequalities will arise.
Rawls’s goal with FEO is to annihilate the dominative socioeconomic influences from the upper
class of society to give people, with competent skills and desire, an equal chance. The competition
of coveted positions in society heavily leans towards individuals who hold higher endowments,
vast economic resources and great networks of contacts.
To avoid such discrepancies, Rawls’s framework through FEO would treat all of the members of
society equally and provide an identical educational formation, funded by the government, in order
to assure that some individuals do not have the socioeconomic advantage over others. Taking
children to private schools and other activities would not be permissible. If an arrangement of
opportunities were to be established, then the most capable individuals would have the job they

3. justly acquired, social discrimination within institutions would be nullified and a more just social
environment would blossom.
o How does family void FEO?
Even though FEO sounds like a grand proposal for an ideal society, it requires a lot of
modifications not only at institutional instances but also lifestyle and practices that individuals
undertake commonly where they do not perceive that they are offsetting justice principles. Rawls
did not elaborate so meticulously to see how far FEO should be employed, especially regarding
the activities of the family. Several arguments were drawn to see if the family could be included
in the basic structure of Rawls’s Theory of Justice and, if it did, which changes to the family
structure would have to be made in order to accommodate a modulation towards FEO. Rawls filled
this gap later stating that the family is part of the basic structure, but he clarifies that the family
does not have to undergo the same treatment as other institutions that belong to the basic structure
on the grounds that certain liberties would be compromised by the imposition of guidelines that
would suffocate certain freedoms. Rawls’s boundary of the application of his principles of justice
is drawn between the political and the public and the non-public and the private. This means that
the family is not under scrutiny as other institutions (Rawls, 1999:162).
Nonetheless, other takes on EoP have surfaced from other philosophical strands. Luck
egalitarianism, for instance, asserts that the wellbeing of individuals should be only determined by
the choices they make and not by random circumstances. Hence, individuals must counteract
inequalities that are within their reach by either neutralizing actions or refraining to act in order to
preserve equality. In any case, luck egalitarians do realize that some inequalities will stand no
matter what; they just require a justification1 to permit such disparities and must be of arbitrary
nature. Within this line of thought, Segall (2013) frames the concept of Radical Equality of
Opportunity (REO), which incorporates requirements of formal and substantive EoP at a more
profound degree. REO would require us to neutralize all the social and natural obstacles that
1 A justification would have to clarify and give sufficient reasons why an advantage should not be neutralized or
excused. The predicaments for luck egalitarians begin to showup when we try to justify inequalities that are morally
arbitrary; meaning that they are not provoked by choice. (Segall, 2013: 15).

4. impede every individual to have the same qualities and to justly allocate less-than-ultimate goods
(jobs, university slots) when it offsets the said unjust inequalities in overall inequalities.
Such takes on EoP, as well as other egalitarianism views, have inferred that the family and the
nurturing of children will create great differences between individuals on the long run that could
otherwise be prevented. Egalitarians set forth that the priorities of the family are not directed
towards the preservation of egalitarian principles, but rather they try to provide their kin with a set
of the best possible conditions for them to grow up. These trends might permeate themselves when
parents send their children to private schools where they are given an above average education,
grooming their talents, displaying affectionate care and spending quality time with them. Despite
the fact that these actions might be perceived as positive, not all of the children have the privilege
to have caring parents at their side to support them in a covenant of their best interests. Most
families cannot spare money to pay for such accommodations, so they have to raise their children
with what they have at their disposal.
The family faces extraordinary dilemmas and possible tradeoffs in order to accomplish FEO in its
entirety. Do we need to change the institution of family in order to establish a fully-fledged version
of FEO, which would undoubtedly provide the egalitarian playing field for everyone to have the
same conditions to develop their skills?
There are tremendous implications that we would face if we were to employ a complete version of
FEO. One way to possible to rectify this unequal footing would be through the abolition of the
family as a whole. This course of action would completely restructure the way we conceive a
society because it entails that we eliminate sentimental roots between human beings and come up
with new ways to embed people in a frigid environment. Let´s try to imagine a society without the
family. After being conceived, John and Arthur would immediately be taken to a complex, possibly
operated by the State, where they would be raised under a uniformed upbringing system. Both of
them would not be favored, emotional links with their procreators would be nonexistent, the two
would receive the same quality of education and everyone that resided in that complex would be
socially isolated in order to prevent the development of social networks that might create “clans”.

5. After their formation would be complete, they would be let out in the real world and only then we
could prevent an unfair advantage during the upbringing stages of humans2.
This measure is indeed preposterous because it would lead to the elimination of core basic liberties
and compromise the rational traits that citizens have to develop to function in a society. We would
be affecting the moral nucleus of society and the abilities of individuals to trust, build empathy,
responsibility and values that contribute to the quality of human beings. The prospect of the
consequences, from a moral and societal dimension, if we got rid of the institution of the family is
atrocious; a cooperative society is more functional than one that is individualistic. The role of a
parent cannot be substituted by the State. The trade-off of reaching circumstances where FEO
would be set ideally is too onerous and thus it is imperative that we keep the family structure.
o Justifying bedtime storytelling and the mitigation approach
Since there is not a normative handbook for parents how to act impartially with their children,
some specifications must be made regarding what progenitors must absolutely do and what they
should refrain when it comes to parenting. Bedtime storytelling can benefit children, parents and
society through the interactions that contributes to the strengthening of familial relationship
goods.3 The bond that could be welded by bedtime storytelling generates trust between parents and
children which could not be replicated by institutions. Through these practices progenitors would
practice constitutive parenting and not illegitimate favoritism (Brighthouse & Swift, 2009).
As for the disadvantages spawned by these activities, Rawlsians have a way to counteract the
future differences in the later stages of life. By proposing a neutralization of bedtime storytelling
we create a polarization in which parents now refrain from acting in the benefit of their children.
A progressive approach of this matter comes in the form of mitigation. Seeing that neutralizing
2 Mason (2006) highlights that we could achieve FEO if a system of lottery where children would be reassigned to
different parents after they are born. He later says that this solution would not fulfils its underlying rationale because
it is not within the scope of FEO (80).
3 Brighthouse and Swift (2009) estipulate that, regardless of what certain justice principles predominate, there must
be a line of activities that enhance parent-child relationships by protecting the interests of both parties. Such links will
be deemed as familial relationship goods.The latter cover the physical, cognitive, emotional and moral development
of children, as well as the parental responsibility and the societal expectative that future citizens will have a good
sense of justice. Within the range of these relationship goods, bedtime storytelling is permissible.

6. bedtime storytelling would be too costly, mitigation of the residual effects that are caused by
different upbringings might be dealt principles of diverse natural. This scheme was elaborated by
Mason(2006)4. It states that parents should have a high degree of freedom of upbringing their
children while correcting the circumstance differences when they enter school systems. When
children start to go to school, they would receive the same quality of education and then a
difference could be made when infants acquire knowledge. Let´s presume that John´s parents took
more time than Arthur´s parents for bedtime storytelling, but when both get into the school system
they would receive the same quality of education and the same opportunities without offsetting the
liberties that parents have when they raise their children in their early stages of their lives. If we
were to intrude on how John and Arthur´s parents should tell their children stories, we would be
compromising their core liberties and thus affecting the familial relations altogether. This freedom
is completely granted, but in order to balance out the conditions for all citizens, parents would not
be allowed to give their kin certain benefits that other children cannot receive universally. So we
would be putting restraints on parents to improve the competition of all the future individuals of a
society based. I contend, along with Mason, that our society benefits more from setting a playing
field in which if someone really desires to put his skills into action then he or she should have the
same chance of competing for coveted positions as the other members of society. Through this
path, we protect the integral role of bedtime storytelling.
 Luck Egalitarian objections
On the other hand, the Segall’s (2013) luck egalitarian view contests that bedtime storytelling is
warranted on two premises. This parental practice is too valuable to be neutralized because it
contributes to the strengthening of parent-child relationships. Even though it would be thought that
he would reject it, on a prima facie ground, on the basis that it creates inequalities, Segall states
that bedtime storytelling can be granted because of the moral standards that preserve justice and
liberty of individuals. Nevertheless, he does state parents might have some pro-tanto reasons to
refrain from telling bedtime stories. In this perspective, there would be two types of storytelling,
4 Mason’s (2006) proposal is to install principles aimed to level the playing field for children at an institutional tier
instead of offsetting parental trends. A sufficiency principle, the basic skills principle, establishes that each child is
entitled to an adequate education that provides him with a set of abilities so that he has a wider range of options in the
future. While the educational access principle would knock out a lot of educational institutions that are deemed as
elite and give out more advantage for students than others.People with reduced purchasing power would not have to
acquire debts in order to go to acclaimed universities; the endowment issue would be taken care of.

7. one that clearly does not give advantage over others and one that does not. It is in this juncture that
Segall inquires if Rawlsians might actually still support storytelling because it is not clearly giving
any (or too much) advantage to children. Segall sets that maybe some people (mitigators) might
be upset if there is a tremendous degree of advantage given to children through bedtime
storytelling. The author does acknowledge that it would be hard to have a strict control on bedtime
storytelling from an institutional dimension because it would be simply too onerous to monitor
parents when they recite night tales to their children. Also, there might be some emergent concerns
with nocturne storytelling due to the fact that parents might give inaccurate accounts that impair
the child’s knowledge5. Overall, bedtime storytelling is justified as long as it doesn’t create
inequalities nor distorts reality.
In the next section, I argue that the mitigation approach has more advantages over the luck
egalitarian perspective.
o Conclusions
In retrospect, both arguments are receptive on parent’s freedom to tell bedtime stories to their
children but on very different conditions. The responsible – sensitive perspective is willing to go
some differences in raising children go on as long as the interest of the parent – children bond is
protected and the subsequent effects of such differences will be dealt in as they grow older because
it is more manageable to mitigate the disparities from an institutional standpoint. On the other side
of the coin, storytelling is a legitimate force that enhances the relationship between parents and
their children which is founded on moral values of society. Certain restrictions would have to be
taken into consideration so that too much advantage is endowed to certain children as well as some
content disputes; alternatively, storytelling might have not help but actually subsiding more
uncorrectable differences in citizen´s circumstances. This objection does bring up some
questionable factors that might challenge the perception regarding bedtime storytelling, but the
fact of the matter is that we must protect the integrity of the family and how parents establish links
5 Segall exemplifies that if parents transfer erroneous misconceptions to their children through bedtime storytelling
they might go on in living with false perceptions of the world. Let´s say that we tell children that the Earth is flat and
this fact sticks in their head; this might be more dangerous than beneficial because children might lag when they attend
to school.

8. with their children. These actions do have repercussions when these same children grow up and
the skills they have developed early on, but a solution to correct the circumstances at later stages
is more manageable and healthy for society.
Although Segall claims that he offers a “more coherent” justification of bedtime storytelling
(2013:170), it is hard to see how we can check up if bedtime storytelling can be gauged in terms
of advantage or on what basis would parents would refrain from telling bedtime stories. It is true
that Mason’s view does not refer to the moral sensibility of the issue opting to concentrate in the
cardinal differences between neutralization and mitigation, but the reality is that there can be more
control on the blowback effects of morally arbitrary and parental advantages from the institutional
level rather than trying to restrain familial practices which could potentially put in jeopardy the
autonomy of the family. He himself acknowledges that it would be complex to monitor the content
or measure the advantage of bedtime storytelling.
In spite of the degree of freedom we grant to parents, we would set restraints to ensure they do not
favor their children by sending them to elite colleges. In Mason’s approach, we are actually dealing
with future inequalities that are so feared by luck egalitarians. From the luck egalitarian angle, the
problem would be deal head on but it is not that clear how this might actually help society level
the playing field if we are inhibiting some important bonds from coming into fruition. My
conclusion would be then that there is too much at stake if we were to categorize supportive and
unsupportive bedtime storytelling and tell parents to refrain from this practice if we do create
inequalities. This inequality is worth leaving intact even though the consequences for
disadvantaged children are heavy, but that is why we must make up for them at a later stage. I do
acknowledge that some factual distortion might come about in bedtime storytelling, but the integral
value for the family and the development of the child are heavier if we set out to rectify the
differences at latter stages.
The dream of a scenario of a fully fledged FEO centered society quickly turns into a nightmare if
we interfere with the family.

9. o References
 Brighthouse, Harry & Swift, Adam (2009) Legitimate Parental Partiality, Philosophy
and Public Affairs, No. 37, 43 – 80.
 Mason, Andrew (2006) Levelling the Playing Field: The Idea of Equality of
Opportunity and its place in Egalitarian thought, 1st Edition, Oxford University Press,
United States, 235 p.
 Mason, Andrew (2011) Putting story-reading to bed: a reply to Segall, Critical Review
of International Social and Political Philosophy, Volume 14, No. 1, 81-88 p.
 Rawls, John (1993) "Political Liberalism", Columbia University Press, New York.
 Rawls, John (1999) A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
 Segall, Shlomi (2011) If you are a Luck Egalitarian, How Come You Read Bedtime
Stories to your Children?, Critical Review of International Social and Political
Philosophy, Volume 14, No. 1, 23-40 p.
 Segall, Shlomi (2013) Equality and Opportunity, 1st Edition, Oxford University Press,
United Kingdom, 223 p.