Federalism and models of Intergovernmental relation

1. Federalism and IGR
Questions
1) What is the place of IGR in understanding federalism?
2) Do you imagine federalism short of IGRs?
3) How do you analyze the dynamics of federalism?

2. Federalism and IGR
Federalism
Multi-tiered government combining elements of shared
rule and territorial self-rule.
The essence of federalism as a normative principle is
the perpetuation of both union and non-centralization at
the same time.
A matter of formal constitutional division, appropriate
institutions, pattern of political behavior and political
culture.
Watts, R. L. (2006) Origins of cooperative
and competitive federalism

3. Federalism and IGR
1.Constitutional/Institutional
K.C. Wheare 1964
2. Political/Bargain
W. Riker 1964
3. Sociological
W. Livingston 1952
5.Symmetry/Asymmetry
C.D. Tarlton1965
4. Process
C. J. Friedrich 1964
Birch A.H,(2011) Approaches to study of Federalism; Tarlton, C(1965), Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism:
A Theoretical Speculation,the Journal of Politics,Vol 27, No 4, pp 861-74.

4. Federalism and IGR
 A virtue of IGR is that it is to be found in all federal
systems, ubiquitous but context sensitive and appears to be
unique to federalism (Agranoff 2012; Trench 2006) .
Thus,federalism has to constitute institutions and
processes to facilitate IGR for those areas where
governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably
overlap.

5. Federalism & IGR
The variants, models and
evolutions of federalism are
basically the functions of
IGR.

6. Federalism & IGR
IGR=Measures the dynamics of the
Federalism.
As politics and government have changed over
time, so have IGRs.

7. Evolution of federalism
1
•Dual federalism
2
•Cooperative federalism
3
•Competitive Federalism

8. 1. Dual Federalism
Traditional conception of federalism
Parallel set of institution on federal and Cus
Federal and state governments were theoretically distinguished
and functionally separate.
Layer Cake Metaphor: each layer separate, independent and
neatly one on top of the other
Watertight compartments
Coordinate Theory
Never worked in practice
Question
Is this model obsolete?
Place of IGR in this model?

9. 2. Cooperative Federalism
1930s and post-World War II, apparent in all the
classical federations.
Therefore, did not represent radical new
modification to the essential nature of federations, but
rather a sharpened accentuation of the characteristics
already implicit in the interdependent operation of all
federal systems as forms of partnership, compact

10. 2. Cooperative Federalism
P
L
S F
Federal, state and local serve the same people; generally
share the same goals (Elazar, Riker).

11. 2. Cooperative Federalism
Marble Cake Metaphor
Holds that the cooperative relations among the
varying levels of government result in an intermingling
of activities.
Mutual interdependence-majority of issues have
national, regional and local implications.
Reflection of reality?

12. 2. Cooperative Federalism
Why cooperative federalism?
Three factors contributed, however, to the intensification of
interdependence and the need for IGC in the twentieth century.
1) the general trend to increased activity by governments at all levels.
This meant that in all federations the increased activities of both
orders of government led to greater areas of overlap and
interpenetration, and hence the need to manage this
interdependence more effectively in order to minimize
intergovernmental competition, friction and conflict.
Watts, R.L(2006), the origin of cooperative
and competetive federalism

13. 2. Cooperative Federalism
2. The new policy areas not envisaged at the time their
constitutions were drafted.
Examples have been such fields as the environment and
energy where complementary action by both order of
government proved necessary- the very nature of these
policy areas has usually required cooperative action.

14. 2. Cooperative Federalism
3. In the area of financial arrangements within
federations, interdependence was sharpened by the
different considerations affecting the allocation of
taxing powers and of expenditure responsibilities to
different orders of government.
IGRT?
=These almost invariably widened the vertical and horizontal
financial imbalances requiring intergovernmental financial transfers
and the establishment of processes and institutions for the periodic
adjustment of financial relations among governments.

15. 2. Cooperative Federalism
Likewise, social equity without harming
traditional state autonomy[through fiscal tool and
policy decisions harmless to CUs autonomy]. E.g.
market failure, Environmentalism, Racial,
Poverty, Individual rights etc.
Cooperative federalism significantly
transformed American Society – having social
equity as its primary objective
Kincaid, John(2011), A Competitive Challenges to Cooperative Federalism: Towards theory of federal Democracy

16. 2. Cooperative Federalism
a) Improve information base=better dm
and reconcile policy differences
b) Coordinate policies in areas where
jurisdiction is shared, complementary
c) To achieve national objectives
d) Coordinated public sector provision

17. Why IG Cooperative?
e)To accommodate differences eg. Fiscal
disparity, policy capacity etc
f) Avoid complexity and rigidity and ensure
flexibility and adaptation
g) Not to eliminate competition and
conflict but manage it
h)Learning from each other
i) Strength of cooperation

18. Why IG Cooperation…
All federal systems, as interdependent partnerships,
have required IGC for their effective operation-
particularly in the areas of finance and social policy
 Significant variations even among federations in the
extent and character of this IGC.

19. 2. Cooperative Federalism
Cooperative Federalism
Arm’s
length
Interlocking voluntary

20. 2.1. Interlocking Relation
Interlaced federalism
Intricate and interwoven pattern of cooperation
where most legislation is enacted by the federal
legislature but administered by the Länder, have
developed IGC and joint action to such an extreme that
they can be called “interlocking relations” eg. Germany
most federal laws administered by Länder

21. 2.1. Interlocking Relation
Constitutionally, FG enact framework legislation with
which lander enact more detailed laws
For example, federal institutions focus on equity and
uniformity but at the cost of flexibility and innovation
[Joint decision making trap]

22. 2.2. Voluntary cooperation
B/n Interlocking relation and arm’s length”
collaboration
 Switzerland, Australia and India provide differing
examples, with Australia a pioneer in the systematic
development of a range of formal intergovernmental
institutions and mechanisms.

23. 2.3. Arm’s Length” Cooperation
Relatively autonomous and competitive
Typified by the United States and to some extent
Canada
But have emphasized the autonomous legislation
and policy making of their states and provinces, to the
extent that this has been characterized as “arm’s
length” collaboration

24. 2. Cooperative Federalism
Questions
1) How do you evaluate the cooperative
federalism?
2) Is IGR confined to cooperation?

25. Criticism on IGC
4 broad sets of critical comments on IGC
1) undermines democratic accountability; serving the
interests of the governments involved rather than of
the citizens. e.g. Canada [Albert Breton 1985]

26. Criticisms …
2) Excess cooperation undermines autonomous
initiative and freedom of action of governments at
both levels; and produce inflexibility and
uncertainty. E.g. Germany “interlocking
federalism” [Fritz Scharpf (1988)]
Joint Decision Making Trap
 insignificant competitiveness
 IGR prevents responsive government because of the
need for governments to agree with each other than
to act in pursuit of their own goals.

27. Criticisms …
3) Executive-legislature balance-executive federalism of
parliamentary federations [Watts 1999]
executives tend to dominate
constrained the role of their legislatures
Legislatures are simply expected to ratify
intergovernmental agreements reached by their
governments to which other governments have
already agreed.
Example, Canada

28. Criticisms …
4) Impact upon the autonomy of the constituent unit governments
-superior financial resources and policy making- able to dominate
the IGC processes. [Kincaid 1990
 imposing “unfunded mandates” on the states.
.

29. 3. Competitive Federalism
Criticisms against cooperative federalism have
produced a rise in the advocacy of “competitive federalism.”
The 21st century IGR is towards Competitive
federalism(Watts 2006; Kincaid 2011).
Rarely have these advocates argued that IG cooperation
can be avoided altogether.
Interdependence within federal political systems entails both
intergovernmental cooperation and competition.
How much cooperation ?
 How much competition?

30. 3.Competetive Federalism
In real world, we do not find any fully
dualist/ water tight compartments and
cooperative federalism.
Conceptually placed on continuum –
opposite poles are dual and competitive.

31. 3. Competitive Federalism
Dual Federalism
Competitive
Federalism
Cooperative Federalism
Arm’s
length
Interlocking Voluntary

32. 3. Competitive Federalism
 Albert Breton;
 John Kincaid;
 Ronald L. Watts
Central Concept of “Competition”
In economic theory, Competition is a remedy for
monopoly in market place, so too is competition a possible
remedy for contemporary problems of American
federalism[big, centr, leviathan ]
Public Choice/ Laboratory of Democracy

33. 3. Competitive Federalism
But they have argued for the benefits that can flow
from a much greater emphasis upon the autonomy and
competitive initiatives of individual governments within
federal systems.
It is significant that this advocacy has been strongest
in those federations where IGC has contributed to a
centralizing trend, most notably Germany, Australia and
even the United States, although it has also been felt in
the more decentralized federations like Canada and
Switzerland.

34. New consensus on Federalism
New consensus need to be forged comprising of key elements:
cooperative equality, competitive efficiency and dual
accountability
Dual
cooperation
competition
Kincaid, John(2011), Towards the Theory of
Federal Democratic Theory

35. Evolution of IGR [Wright1988]
Three Models:
1. Coordinate theory
2. Inclusive Theory
3. Overlapping Theory

36. Evolution of IGR_D. L. Wright
Coordinate theory
Inclusive Theory
Overlapping
Theory

37. Coordinate Theory
The two levels as
independent &
autonomous
Dual federalism
LGs- mere subjects of
SG
Obsolete??
NG
SG
LG
LG

38. Inclusive Theory
Assumes hierarchical
authority (Wright
1988:44)
FG as most powerful
actor
Inactive position of
SG/LGs in IGR
Dependency
relationship
National government
Sub national
Government
LG

39. Overlapping Theory
Exclusive areas of authority
Interaction of the three
No one level is predominant
in all instances
Many argue and elucidate the
model as realistic and
applicable in contemporary
federation
Admits inevitability of
cooperation/ interdependence
Roles of all levels in IGR
NG
NG/LG NG SG LG
LG
SNG
SG LG

40. Evolution of IGR
Agranoff ‘s 4 epochs of IGR
Based on the Core focus of the epochs and its
administrative implications:
1. Legal And Political
2. Welfare State Interdependency
3. Government And NGO Partnerships And;
4. Collaborative Networks.

41. 1) Legal and Political Epoch
19th C, when dual federalism was emphasized
as coequal state and federal governments, each
operating in its own sphere, autonomous and
coequal within that sphere.
Administrative structures are mostly hierarchical
within jurisdiction and operate mostly on
independent bases.

42. 2. Welfare state interdependency
The idea of welfare of the population as and end
in itself
The idea that one of the central purposes of the
state was the improvement of the whole society—
its health, skills, and education, its longevity, its
productivity, its morals, its family life etc has
heightened interdependency

43. 2. Welfare …
New welfare program heightened centralization
of power
Accelerated federal-state welfare programs or
emergency of new policy tools

44. 3. Government partners
NGOs became a part of the public IGR apparatus
along with federal, state, and local governments.
By the 1960s and 70s the tools of government,
particularly grants, loans, loan guarantees, and joint
ventures in services delivery, had joined procurement
in a more prominent way
Tendency to believe in minimalist state
Influence of the new public mgmt Theory
Evermore political alliance b/n government and pvt

45. 4. Collaborative Networking
Mostly governance oriented?
Recently emerging IGR era
Public agencies and NGOs network for purposes of
exchanging information, enhancing one another’s
capabilities, to smooth services interactions and to
solve policy and program problems (Agranoff 2007).
Networks of local government, business
associations, and economic development agents have
worked among themselves at the community level.

46. 4. Collaborative …
Network management clearly requires public
agency administrators to spend a great deal of their
time in transactions regarding their activities with a
host of other governments and nongovernmental
agents- as working partners with multiple external
organizations engaging in mutual problem solving

47. Conclusion
The evolution of federalism and dynamics of
federalism is strongly tied to IGR
More recent constitutions (revised ones) give greater
recognition to IGR and IG institutions.
IGR as pragmatic and analytical tool of federalism. it
helps to cope with changing circumstances without
depreciating the constitutional/ legal frameworks
(Agranoff 1994, Watts 2001, 2006).
Reflection?
Q. Does IGR matter?