Fast, Fair and Final Reforming Canada’s Refugee Syst.docx

Fast, Fair and Final:
Reforming Canada’s
Refugee System
September 2009
By Peter Showler and Maytree
www.maytree.com/policy
Ce document est la propriété de l'éditeur original et est diffusé à
University of Alberta par desLibris suivant les termes de licence
stipulés au www.deslibris.ca

Fast, Fair and Final: Reforming Canada’s Refugee System
© 2009, The Maytree Foundation
Author: Peter Showler
Peter Showler is the Director of the Refugee Forum, located at
the Human Rights
Research and Education Centre, University of Ottawa. The
Refugee Forum undertakes
various research and law reform initiatives dealing with refugee

law. Peter teaches
Immigration and Refugee Law and Advanced Refugee law. Peter
is the former
Chairperson of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
(1999-2002) and is the
author of Refugee Sandwich: Stories of Exile and Asylum. For
the past two years,
Professor Showler and the Refugee Forum, in cooperation with
the Institute for Research
and Public Policy, have been engaged in a comparative study of
the asylum systems of
several of the industrialized countries including the United
Kingdom, France, Belgium,
the United States and Australia. The policy proposals and
commentary are based on that
research. The Institute intends to publish Professor Showler’s
research paper in the
coming months.
This material is copyright by the original publisher and
provided to University of Alberta by desLibris subject to the
licensing terms found at www.deslibris.ca
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
...............................................................................................
............. 1
Introduction............................................................................
............................................. 2
The Canadian Asylum
System....................................................................................

........ 3
The Inland Claim Process
...............................................................................................
4
Strengths and Weaknesses of the System
....................................................................... 5
Characteristics of a Good Inland Asylum System
.............................................................. 9
Fast
...............................................................................................
................................... 9
Fair
...............................................................................................
................................... 9
Effective
...............................................................................................
......................... 10
Efficient..................................................................................
....................................... 10
Final
...............................................................................................
............................... 10
Guidelines to Achieve a Good Inland Asylum System
.................................................... 10
1. Minimize the number of steps in the asylum process.
.......................................... 10
2. Ensure the first decision is the best decision.
....................................................... 11
3. Ensure decision-makers are competent and independent.

.................................... 11
4. Meet the requirement for competent legal representation.
................................... 12
5. Let the claimant tell his or her story.
.................................................................... 12
6. Be smart. Manage the case load. Stream cases for increased
efficiency. ............. 13
7. Invest in good objective country information.
...................................................... 13
Proposal for Better Asylum
System..................................................................................
13
1. Security and eligibility
screening.......................................................................... 14
2. Refugee Claim Decision
....................................................................................... 14
3. Appeal
...............................................................................................
.................... 15
4. Federal Court
...............................................................................................
......... 15
5. Removal
...............................................................................................
................. 16
Other Policies and Procedures Related to the Asylum Process
........................................ 16
Conclusion
...................................................................................... .........
......................... 20

Figure 1 – Diagram of Existing
System............................................................................ 21
Figure 2 - Diagram of Proposed
System.......................................................................... 22
Fast, Fair and Final: Reforming Canada’s Refugee System 1
Executive Summary
Canada’s refugee claim system is too slow – it can take up to
eight years to finalize a
claim. On average, it requires 18 months for a first decision at
the Immigration and
Refugee Board (IRB) because of a backlog of 60,000 claims.
Thousands of refused
claimants remain in limbo for years, waiting for redress from
their refused claim or for
removal from Canada. The delays hurt legitimate refugees and
can attract frivolous
claims. They rob us of the credibility we need to meet our legal
and moral obligations to

protect individuals who are escaping violence, torture or death.
The government has stated its intention to reform the inland
refugee claim system. It has
not yet put forward specific proposals but it has indicated that it
favours an approach
similar to that of the United Kingdom, where government
officials make rapid decisions
based on limited information and limited procedural rights for
the refugee claimant. The
UK’s system also employs an early fast-track process with even
fewer rights for claims
that are assumed to be unfounded. The fast-track claims are
selected from a list of
presumably safe countries of origin that has included countries
that produce a significant
number of refugees. Determining who is a refugee is extremely
difficult; it requires close
examination of the individual claim and cannot be easily and
reliably decided by
objective categories. In countries where this model has been
implemented, there are a
high number of poorly reasoned decisions that often clog up the
multiple levels of appeal,
contributing to overall delays in the system.
The proposal presented in this paper suggests a different
approach that is based on three
pillars: 1) a good first decision, 2) a reliable appeal, and 3) the
prompt removal of failed
claimants. It builds on the strengths of the current system,
namely that it is accessible,
provides a good first decision, and grants legitimate refugees
permanent residence. It also
addresses the system’s weaknesses including that IRB members
are politically appointed,

there is no appropriate appeal in place, refugees often have
inadequate or poor counsel,
and there are an excessive number of ineffectual administrative
stages before removal
occurs.
This paper recommends that the government minimize the
number of steps in the refugee
process, by creating a strong system that would remove the need
for the Pre-Removal
Risk Assessment, ‘back-end’ Humanitarian and Compassionate
applications (H&C) and
their associated judicial reviews. It recommends the creation of
a new Refugee Tribunal
with two divisions, a Refugee Claim Division and a Refugee
Appeal Division, to replace
the IRB. The tribunal members would be appointed solely on
merit. The Refugee Claim
Division would employ informal procedures to allow refugees to
tell their story, and each
claimant would be represented by a lawyer. Under this proposal,
refugee claims would be
decided in six months, reviewed in four months and removed
within three months of a
negative appeal decision.
The changes proposed would make our refugee system fast, fair
and final. It would
reduce the claim process from several years to an average of 13
months. It would ensure
accurate and fair decisions, and result in the timely removal of
failed claimants.

Fast, Fair and Final: Reforming Canada’s Refugee System
By Peter Showler, Director, The Refugee Forum, University of
Ottawa
Introduction
Canada’s inland refugee system has attracted considerable
controversy over the summer.
Visa restrictions on Mexico and the Czech Republic have been
linked to flaws in the
refugee system; the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and
Multiculturalism has called
for reform and, most recently, the acceptance of a white South
African refugee claimant
by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) has called into
question the quality of IRB
decisions.
While these recent developments have brought refugee policy
into the spotlight, in fact,
Canada’s asylum system has been the subject of controversy
almost since the inception of
the IRB in 1989. Critics allege that the system is too generous,
too accessible, that the
acceptance rate is too high. Other critics say that the IRB makes
too many obvious
mistakes, that there is no reliable appeal of IRB decisions and
that there is an over-
reliance on the judicial review process which is not designed to
correct the types of errors

that occur at the IRB. Supporters of the program hail the
fairness of IRB decisions and
procedures, the IRB’s strong training programs and the quality
of its country information
research. They note that the IRB has been consistently praised
by international observers,
including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Notwithstanding the supporters of the system, most observers
agree that the asylum
system is in trouble and needs reform. The system is not
resourced to handle the annual
number of claims arriving and, as a result, the IRB is
confronting a serious backlog of
claims and delays in completing decisions. The Refugee Appeal
Division has not been
implemented despite two bills before parliament and even
without an appeal, the
processing time for the review and removal of rejected claims is
far too long. While exact
timelines are not known, reasonable estimates suggest that the
adjudication and removal
of a failed refugee claim takes on average four to six years
which is far too long. Lengthy
delays encourage frivolous claims and serve neither the
interests of Canada nor genuine
refugees.
The government has stated its intention to reform the inland
refugee claim system. It has
not yet put forward specific proposals but it has indicated that it
favours an approach
similar to that of the United Kingdom. In the UK system, public
service officials make
the first-level asylum decisions and claimants from particular
countries of origin, who are

deemed to have unfounded claims, are directed into a fast track
procedure for a rapid
decision and removal. Such an approach is understandably
attractive, especially as a
solution to high volume claimant countries with low acceptance
rates such as Mexico or
as means of discouraging frivolous claims. But is it practical?
Does it accurately reflect
the realities of making refugee decisions?
Variations of this model of asylum have been employed by most
European countries with
mixed results. Critics have alleged that quick decisions by
poorly trained decision-makers
have resulted in too many mistakes and legitimate refugees have
been unjustly deported
to persecution. They allege that public servants are not
independent and make badly
reasoned decisions based on policy and poor country
information. In addition, these
changes did not make the system more efficient overall. Most of
these European asylum
systems have multiple levels of appeal. Poor decisions by public
servants at the front end
of the system have placed heavy burdens on the appeal
processes. Counter-intuitively in
some cases this has resulted in a slow process with failed

claimants remaining in the
country for too long a period.
The proposal presented in this paper is based on a different
approach which is based on
three pillars: 1) a good first decision, 2) a reliable appeal, and
3) prompt removal of failed
claimants. It recognizes that determining who is a refugee is
incredibly difficult and, as a
result, claims cannot be easily and reliably decided by objective
categories even from
countries with low acceptance rates. (Furthermore, frivolous
claims can be made by
individuals from countries with relatively high acceptance
rates.) Sound decisions require
a close and expert examination of the particular claimant’s story
and of the objective
country evidence.
The proposal is organized into the following sections:
1. A description of Canada’s current refugee system
2. Characteristics of a good asylum system
3. Guidelines for achieving a good asylum system
4. A proposal for a better asylum system
5. Policies and procedures related to the asylum system
6. Conclusion
The Canadian Asylum System
The starting point for a discussion about Canada’s refugee
system is the 1951 United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (The

Convention). As a signatory
to the Convention, Canada has agreed not to return anyone who
arrives at their borders to
their country of origin if they will be subject to persecution.
Canada, like the other
signatories of the convention, has considerable latitude in
designing the process by which
they determine who is or is not a refugee.
According to the Convention, a refugee is someone who has a
well-founded fear of
persecution due to their race, religion, nationality, political
opinion or particular social
group. However, this is a legal definition and, as a result, it is
interpreted differently by
courts in different countries. In Canada, the definition used by
the Convention has been
adopted and supplemented with the concept of “a person in need
of protection.” That is,
someone who is in danger of torture or is at risk of death and
cruel or unusual
punishment. However, the core notion for both definitions is the
same: someone who has
a reasonable possibility of being very seriously harmed if they
are sent back to their
country.

Canada has two separate refugee programs, the Overseas
Sponsorship Program and the
Inland refugee program. The first program selects refugees
overseas, principally from
refugee camps, and brings them to Canada where they are
granted permanent residence
upon arrival. The Inland program assesses the refugee status of
anyone who seeks refugee
protection within Canada or at a Canadian port-of-entry. This
proposal deals solely with
the Inland refugee system.
Historically, an average of 25,000 people claim refugee status
every year in Canada. Last
year 36,700 people made refugee claims. The IRB currently has
a backlog of 60,000
claims. Of these, approximately 45% will be accepted as
refugees. IRB decisions
currently require 18 months on average due to the backlog.
There are an estimated 10,000
to 20,000 failed claimants located somewhere in the judicial
review and pre-removal
stages of the process. On average, the process for failed claims
from date of claim to
removal can take from four to six years.
The Inland Claim Process
An individual makes a claim for refugee status at the port-of-
entry or a CIC office. The
officer conducts a security check, determines the claimant’s
eligibility to apply for
refugee status and if eligible, refers the claim to the
Immigration and Refugee Board
(IRB). If the claimant is not eligible, removal proceedings are
begun unless the claimant

has legal status in Canada.
The IRB is an independent tribunal that reports to parliament
through the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration. A member of the IRB decides
whether the claimant is a
refugee after a hearing where the claimant has the right to be
represented by legal
counsel. If the individual is accepted as a refugee, he or she can
apply for permanent
residence. Approximately 45% of claimants are accepted as
refugees.
If the IRB rejects the claim, there is no appeal available to the
claimant. However, the
refused claimant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for
leave for judicial review.
If leave is granted, the court will conduct a judicial review of
the IRB decision.
Approximately 13% of leave applications are approved for
judicial review.
If the Federal Court does overturn the IRB decision, the claim is
sent back to the IRB for
a new hearing. If the court denies the judicial review
application, either at the leave stage
or after reviewing the decision, the claimant can then be
removed from Canada.
Before removal, the refused claimant is entitled to a Pre-
Removal Risk Assessment
(PRRA). Often there is a significant delay before the PRRA
process begins, as long as
one to three years. Eventually, the refused claimant receives a
notice that the Canadian
Border Services Agency (CBSA) is prepared to begin removal.

At that point, the refused
claimant can apply to CIC for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment.
This is not an appeal of
the original IRB decision. It is an assessment based on new
evidence of whether the
person is at risk of serious harm in their home country. Very
few PRRA applications are
granted, about 2%. If the PRRA is denied, then the person is
removed from Canada.
Before removal, the refused claimant can apply to the Federal
Court for a stay of removal
and a judicial review of the PRRA decision.
At any time during the refugee claim process, a claimant can
also apply for permanent
residence in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds (an “H&C”
application). Often the application is made after a refusal of the
Federal Court
application. An H&C application is not formally a part of the
asylum process but often
removal will not occur until CIC has responded to the
application. The H&C application
is usually based on events that have occurred in Canada such as
marriage, children born
and raised in Canada or long-lasting and sustaining links with

their community.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the System
The proposal put forward in this document would build on the
existing system’s strengths
while addressing its weaknesses.
Strengths
1. The system is accessible to refugees: Compared to other
countries, Canada’s
asylum system is very accessible. There is a moderate detention
policy, less than
2% of applicants are denied a refugee hearing, claimants are
given social
assistance if needed, and claimants are allowed to work and
attend school. This is
consistent with our obligations as a signatory to the Convention.
Countries who
deny these benefits to claimants are in breach of their
obligations. These same
countries often have a vastly larger population of illegal
residents due in part to
their inhospitable refugee system.
The full process for refused claimants may include the
following stages:
• Eligibility decision – Canadian Border Services Agency
(CBSA)
• Refugee Claim decision – Immigration and Refugee Board
• Application for Leave for Judicial Review and Judicial Review

– Federal Court
• Removal Ready Notice to refused claimants – CBSA
• Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) – CIC
• Humanitarian and Compassionate Application for Permanent
Residence – CIC
• Applications for Judicial Review of PRRA or H&C decisions –
Federal Court
• Applications for Stay of Removal linked to JR applications –
Federal Court
• Removal of the claimant – CBSA
2. The system emphasizes the importance of the first decision:
Except for
Belgium who recently changed their system, Canada is the only
country to
employ the principle of “First Decision, Best Decision.” Other
countries have
government officials make an early decision with a limited
opportunity for the
refugee to present their case. These systems rely on lengthy
appeal procedures to
review the first decision. By allowing the claimant a full
opportunity to tell their
story to an expert tribunal, Canada’s system helps to ensure that
the first decision
will be the correct one. At the IRB, time and care is taken to
obtain the relevant
evidence before the hearing takes place. Every decision,

positive and negative,
includes a set of reasons that explains why a person is or is not
a refugee.
3. The system grants refugees permanent residence: Even when
determined to be
legitimate refugees, most countries only grant temporary
residence in the country.
Such policies prevent family reunification and often lead to the
existence of poor,
ethnic ghettos. Canada allows refugees to apply for permanent
residence and to
bring their immediate family members to Canada. (Many of
whom have been
trapped in refugee camps or dangerous conflict zones for
several years.) By
granting permanent residence, Canada allows refugees to get on
with their lives
and to avoid many of the social problems caused by temporary
residence.
Refugees from the Inland refugee system represent about 7% of
Canada’s new
permanent residents each year.
Weaknesses
1. IRB members are politically appointed: The effectiveness and
reliability of the
refugee claim system is dependent on the competence and
expertise of IRB
members, particularly since each refugee claim is decided by a
single member.
IRB members are appointed and re-appointed by the federal

cabinet. Although
there is some initial merit assessment of candidates, the process
is ultimately a
political and secretive one that does not yield the best
candidates available. There
are many very competent IRB members but the overall quality
of the decisions
and the productivity of the Board would be greatly improved by
a non-political
appointment process.
2. There is no Refugee Appeal Division: Refugee decisions are
difficult,
particularly when the claim is decided on the credibility of a
traumatized and
confused claimant speaking a language other than English or
French. Since a
single member makes the decision, mistakes are unavoidably
made – and made
more frequently by less competent members. An appeal to the
Refugee Appeal
Division (RAD) was written into law by the 2002 Immigration
and Refugee Act
to catch IRB errors, but an appeals process was never created.
The only avenue
for appeal in the existing system is the Federal Court process of
judicial review.
However, this process is only designed to catch legal not factual
errors.
Inevitably, in the current system some refugees are mistakenly
sent back to
persecution.

3. Time delays which result from the Review and Removal
Process: The review
and removal process is too complicated with a series of
administrative stages,
each subject to judicial review by the court. The result is a slow
and ineffective
process that changes few original IRB decisions (even if errors
were made) and
takes years to remove failed claimants.
4. Time delays which result from the management of the asylum
process: As
already noted, the current system is complicated and this leads
to delays.
However, there are delays which exist in the current system
because of a
weakness in execution rather than system design. There is a
tendency to see the
asylum system as a series of unrelated steps by different state
agencies with
limited responsibility rather than as a single, coherent process.
As a result, there
are delays between steps in the process.

Time Delays
Except for the Federal Court there are bottle necks, backlogs
and time delays at
every stage of the process beginning with eligibility screening.
• Eligibility screening by CBSA was intended to take three
days. Instead, there
are undisclosed delays that can take weeks and even months.
These delays are
related to excessively long interviews on the substantial nature
of the refugee
claim, an area that lies outside the legislative responsibility of
eligibility
decisions.
• Average time for a first decision before the IRB is 18 months.
As the IRB
backlog ages, that time will increase to approximately two
years.
• The Federal Court decides leave applications within three
months. An
additional four to five months is required for full judicial
review decisions but

that is only 13% of the leave applications. The remaining 87%
enter the
removal process.
• Post-Federal Court/Pre-PRRA: There is an unrecorded time
delay of one to
two years after the court has denied the judicial review before
CBSA initiates
removal process. This is a kind of procedural dead zone where
no agency takes
responsibility for the claim file and the average time of delay is
not measured.
Many files are known to remain in this limbo situation for many
years. Some
claimants will make an H&C application for permanent
residence at this time
although in theory an H&C application does not suspend
removal proceedings.
• The Pre-Removal Risk Assessment process (PRRA): A refused
claimant
cannot be removed before they are given the opportunity to
apply for a PRRA.
The PRRA process is initiated by CBSA sending the failed
claimant a notice to
begin removal proceedings. If the claimant applies for a PRRA,
removal is
suspended until the PRRA decision is made by CIC. That period
includes any
applications to Federal Court challenging the PRRA decision. A
positive
PRRA decision allows the claimant protection status to remain
in Canada.
Only about 2% of PRRA applications are accepted. The
remainder are then
removable unless the Federal Court grants a stay of removal

while the claimant
seeks a judicial review of a negative PRRA decision or a
negative H&C
decision. The average time for the entire PRRA process from
removal ready
notice to removal is 16 months.
Total average time for processing a failed refugee claim from
date of claim to
date of removal: unknown. A reasonable estimate of the average
process time is
four to six years.
Characteristics of a Good Inland Asylum System
To ensure that Canada meets its international obligations to
protect refugees and to
maintain confidence in the system, the inland refugee process
should be: fast, fair,
effective, efficient and final.
Fast
Prompt decisions benefit both the refugee claimant and Canada.

Until their claim is decided, refugees live with the uncertainty
and fear of being returned
to persecution. In some cases, refugees have other family
members still in conflict zones,
internally displaced and destitute or in refugee camps. They are
often desperate to resolve
their own claim in order to bring their family members to
safety. Secondarily, having
been forced to flee their country, they are eager to get on with
their lives. As refugee
claimants, they are in a legal limbo which does not allow them
to fully engage in career
or education opportunities that would allow them to contribute
more fully to Canadian
society.
Lengthy delays may have the unintended consequence of
encouraging fraudulent refugee
claims. This is because, in the existing system, refugee
claimants can work legally in
Canada for many years. Prompt decisions and removal
discourage fraudulent claimants
seeking a long period of employment in a wealthy country.
However, it is important to
note that not all rejected claims are fraudulent. Many rejected
refugee claimants believe
themselves to be refugees even though they do not fit the
definition according to
Canadian law. There is no means of knowing what percentage of
refused claims is
actually fraudulent.
Fair
Fairness is a legal as well as a moral value. In law, it refers to
the duty to act fairly and

providing a claimant with a reasonable opportunity to tell his or
her story. This includes
procedural protections such as the right to an interpreter, legal
counsel, a hearing, the
reasons for the decision, etc. It also means that the decision-
maker is not biased and bases
the decision solely on the evidence and the law. The essence of
the fairness principle is
that the claimant has a reasonable chance to prove his or her
claim and the decision is not
based on extrinsic factors.
If the claimant is not given a fair opportunity to make his or her
claim, then Canada has
not truly complied with its obligations under the 1951 UN
Convention. Unfair procedure
or practice undermines the integrity of the asylum system and
makes it difficult for
governments to remove refused claimants promptly with moral
authority.
Canada has often served as a model to nations that have not
always complied with their
obligations. Any reforms to the system should consider the
impact that poor reforms
would have on the entire system of international protection as
well as our reputation

around the world.
Effective
While fairness requires that the decision-maker is not biased,
effectiveness requires that
the decision-maker is competent. Since the consequences of
error are extreme –
persecution, loss of life or torture – a high rate of accuracy is
necessary in making
negative decisions. It is also important to be accurate in making
positive decisions
because if too many unfounded claims are accepted, the asylum
system could be brought
into public disrepute, undermining the entire asylum process. In
addition, a lax system
could attract fraudulent claimants.
Efficient
Asylum systems must be able to respond to large and variable
claim loads with limited
resources like any other function of government. Therefore, in
addition to being fair, fast
and effective, the system must also be efficient, avoiding
unnecessary steps or the waste
of resources.
Final
The system should be viewed as a coherent whole from
beginning of the claim to the
final conclusion. Although there are interim decisions
throughout the claim process, the
management of the system should be such that it results in a
reliable final outcome.

Finality means either receiving permanent residence if it is a
positive decision or being
removed from Canada if the claim is ultimately denied after the
appeal process.
Guidelines to Achieve a Good Inland Asylum System
In order to achieve a fast, fair, effective, efficient and final
refugee system, reforms to the
current system must follow the following guidelines.
1. Minimize the number of steps in the asylum process.
While a good asylum program requires an appeal process, it is
important to minimize the
number of steps that a claimant must go through to achieve a
positive or negative
decision. It requires administrative energy to move cases from
one stage to another,
particularly where a different administrative agency has
responsibility for the file.
Ensuring there are only a minimum number of steps would
simplify the process.
2. Ensure the first decision is the best decision.

While there may be a preliminary screening stage to remove
ineligible claims, the first
decision on the merits of a claim should be made by a well-
trained and competent
decision-maker who has all of the necessary documentary and
testimonial evidence to
make an authoritative and well-reasoned decision. It should
allow the claimant a full
opportunity to present their case. Systems that do not allow a
comprehensive decision at
this first stage are often bogged down in the appeals process
since a solid evidentiary
foundation is not laid for the appellant body or clear lines of
legal reasoning are not
provided.
The logic of this principle is that a positive decision can be
relied on for referral for
permanent residence. For negative decisions, the appeal body
will have a solid body of
evidence as a basis for reconsidering the claim.
3. Ensure decision-makers are competent and independent.
Competence
Decision-makers are the point of the pencil in an effective
asylum system. Most refugee
decisions are difficult judicial exercises. In order to decide a
large number of claims
rapidly with limited procedural rights, great reliance is placed
on the competence of the
decision-maker.
If member competence is a key element in a renewed and
effective asylum system, then

the appointment and retention of decision-makers must be based
solely on competence
with no role for political interference in appointment or re-
appointment of members.
Independence
Independence means that a decision-maker decides a claim
based solely on the evidence
and the law without any external interference from government.
Refugee status is defined
by law and interpreted by the courts, but the application of the
law is undertaken solely
by the decision-maker. Parliament may change the law but
government policy should not
be used to say who is or is not at risk of persecution.
With a few exceptions, the principle of independence has
generally been respected by the
Canadian government and IRB management who also has a duty
to ensure consistency in
its decision-making process. However, the government’s recent
public declarations about
the invalidity of Czech and Mexican refugee claims may be an
exception to that
principle.

4. Meet the requirement for competent legal representation.
Refugees often do not understand the refugee claim process and
have a limited ability to
effectively testify or gather the necessary evidence to prove
their claim. Some form of
legal assistance is required to effectively and quickly present
the claim.
Within both the IRB and government bureaucracies, there are
two views of legal counsel.
Some see legal counsel as obstructive to the claim process, as
an agent that presents a
one-sided version of the evidence and that delays the process by
making specious
arguments for judicial review at every administrative stage in
the process.
The second view is that legal representatives have an important
role in the claim process.
By ensuring the legal rights of their client, they become added
insurance that the process
is fair. Because they have early and more informal access to the
claimant, they can
contribute to the speed and reliability of the claim process in a
number of ways.
Specifically, legal counsel can:
• narrow and frame important legal issues;
• gather the relevant evidence in advance of the hearing;
• deliver all relevant information early before the hearing;
• elicit the relevant testimony at the hearing;
• make the legal arguments that the claimant cannot make; and
• improve the reliability of the decision, even a negative one, by
ensuring that all

factors favourable to the claimant have been considered.
There are partial truths to both views. Good legal
representatives assist the claim process
and poor representatives are a hindrance. Poor representation
injures both the claimant
and the process.
Under Canadian law, refugee claimants may be represented by
lawyers or consultants.
Unfortunately, too many legal representatives, both consultants
and lawyers, provide
inexcusably poor service to their refugee clients. The cause for
this circumstance is
primarily the vulnerability of the refugee client who lacks the
knowledge and capacity to
demand or even recognize effective representation. Inadequate
regulation, lack of
training, the confidentiality of the refugee process and
ineffective complaint mechanisms
are also factors contributing to poor legal service.
To achieve the five objectives, an asylum system must ensure
that the claimant is
provided with prompt and effective legal representation.
5. Let the claimant tell his or her story.
In addition to effective legal representation, claimants must
have a genuine opportunity to
prove their claim and tell their story. Reliable documentary
information is often not
available. In virtually all refugee claims, the claimant is the
primary and often the sole
witness. Credibility cannot be reliably assessed on written

materials and lawyer’s
submissions alone. In questioning claimants, officials must be
informal wherever
possible. Overly strict rules of procedure can inhibit the ability
of the claimant to give a
spontaneous account of their experiences. Adversarial methods
and procedures are more
likely to elicit confusion and misinformation. Informal
procedures require that the
decision-maker be both skilful and unbiased in hearing and
assessing the testimony.
6. Be smart. Manage the case load. Stream cases for increased
efficiency.
While the tribunal must always ensure that streaming
procedures do not create a
reasonable apprehension of bias, there are a number of ways
that cases can be grouped in
order to make the process more efficient. Cases can be streamed
by country of origin, age
(minor claimants), simplicity of issues, persons in detention or
unique claimant
circumstances.

The system should not become clogged with obvious decisions
that can be made quickly.
The IRB already has an expedited process for manifestly
positive cases that may be
accepted after an informal interview. With proper safeguards, it
is possible to fast track
cases whether the outcome is positive or negative.
7. Invest in good objective country information.
Although refugees may know their own experience, they are
often unable to obtain the
relevant objective information about their country. Country
information, particularly
from oppressive regimes and conflict zones, is often general and
vague. It requires a
significant investment of resources to maintain good
documentary evidence. Refugee
decisions can be made more reliably and more quickly with
sound objective evidence.
Proposal for Better Asylum System
It is possible to design a refugee claim system that follows
these guidelines, and is fair,
fast, effective, efficient and final. Specifically, it would be a
system that can reliably
evaluate, review and remove refused claims within a thirteen-
month period. It would
include the following stages:
1. Security and eligibility screening
2. Refugee claim decision
3. Appeal

4. Judicial Review
5. Removal
1. Security and eligibility screening
CBSA or CIC officers receive the claim as they do now. There
is a brief screening for
eligibility and security factors with immediate referral to the
tribunal except for ineligible
claims. Normally ineligible claims are less than 2% of claims.
Claimants with security
concerns are detained, as they are in the existing system.
The eligibility and security screening by CBSA/CIC is very
brief. It does not include a
substantive consideration of the claim or extensive information
gathering outside of
security and identity concerns. CBSA/CIC will retain the
authority to suspend or annul
asylum proceedings for ineligibility where new information is
obtained subsequent to the
referral to the Refugee Tribunal.
The current CBSA practices of deferring some eligibility
decisions for weeks or months
is eliminated.

2. Refugee Claim Decision
The claim is referred within one week to a Refugee Tribunal
which consists of two
divisions: the Refugee Claim Division (RCD) and the Refugee
Appeal Division (RAD).
The tribunal is independent. Tribunal members are experts,
selected by an independent
committee solely on merit and the operational needs of the
tribunal. It is essential that the
political aspect of the appointment process be completely
removed. Political involvement
not only undermines the appointment of the best candidates, it
discourages superior
candidates from applying for the position.
At least half of all members would be lawyers. Public servants
could apply for
appointment through the selection process and serve upon
secondment from the public
service. Members and member managers are not appointed by
the federal cabinet.
Appointments and re-appointments are for specific terms with a
maximum of three terms.
The federal cabinet appoints the Chairperson of the Refugee
Tribunal.
Creation of a separate refugee tribunal will correct some of the
long-standing managerial
challenges of the IRB which currently has three divisions and
would have four with the
addition of a Refugee Appeal Division. The Immigration

Division and the Immigration
Appeal Division do different types of work and would form
their own Immigration
tribunal.
In this proposal, Refugee Claim Division procedures are as
informal as possible within
the basic administrative law principles of natural justice. The
process remains
inquisitorial rather than adversarial. The tribunal maintains
objective information on
refugee source countries. Claimants have a right to counsel and
an interpreter. There is a
federally funded duty counsel system to ensure effective legal
representation and early
delivery of claimant information to the tribunal. The use of
clinic-based duty counsel will
allow for earlier and more reliable information being delivered
to the RCD. Procedures
including the Personal Information Form will be greatly
simplified. The hearing of the
claims will be as informal as possible. Excellent country
information and member
training programs will be essential.
Fast-track streaming can be done for priority cases that can be
decided within a few

months. Average processing time is six months. Tribunal offices
are located regionally.
3. Appeal
Refused claimants and the government have a right of appeal of
all RCD decisions. The
appeal is made to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), a
separate appeal division of the
tribunal. The role of the RAD is to correct errors of fact, fact
and law or law. New
evidence can be submitted by affidavit on the appeal. Live
testimony may be allowed in
exceptional cases at the sole discretion of the tribunal. Written
reasons are provided for
every appeal decision. The RAD will have the power to confirm
the RCD decision,
overturn it and substitute a different decision or return the
decision to the RCD for
another hearing.
Appeals will be decided by a single member. To resolve issues
of inconsistency between
RCD decision-makers, special three-member panels of the RAD
will have the authority
to write decisions that are binding on the RCD.
Average processing time is four months and priority cases can
be streamed more quickly.
The RAD is a smaller division than the RCD. It is
geographically centralized to ensure
consistency between RAD members. For exceptional cases, the
RAD will have the
authority to hear live evidence. Where significant amounts of
additional evidence are

required, the claim would be returned to the RCD for rehearing.
RAD members must be lawyers, have a minimum of three years
experience on the RCD
and superior performance evaluations. They are appointed by
the same independent
committee for a minimum of seven years. The appeal division is
geographically
centralized.
4. Federal Court
Judicial review cannot be completely excluded from the refugee
determination process,
but it can be limited to issues of law. In this proposed system,
the appropriate role for the
court is limited to developing the refugee law jurisprudence and
supervising the powers
and procedures of the various players in the asylum system.
There is a two stage process – a request for leave to the judicial
court, and judicial
review. At the leave stage, the court makes an early assessment
to determine if there is a
serious issue of law to be decided. If not, the claimant is
immediately removable. If there
is an issue of law, the court initiates its full judicial review
procedure.

Well reasoned decisions by the appeal division will allow the
Federal Court to quickly
triage applications to identify the few cases that raise a
legitimate issue of law. The court
will no longer have to be concerned with evidentiary errors as it
now must do. The
court’s job is made easier by having both the original RCD
decision and the Appeal
Division’s confirmation of that decision. The leave decisions
can be made within 45 days
of the tribunal decision. If there is an issue of law, the appeal
process may take several
months but a small percentage of cases (less than 5%) should
not impede the overall case
removal process.
5. Removal
There is no Pre-Removal Risk Assessment for refused claims if
removal occurs within
90 days of the appeal decision. If removal exceeds 90 days, the
claimant can request a
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment based solely on new evidence.
Removals will be much more direct and effective because CBSA
can rely on the integrity
of the tribunal decision and the appeal. If the refused claimant
has been in the country for
ten months by the time of the Appeal decision, he or she is not
so well established in the
community. CBSA can rely on the fact that only 5% of removal

stream cases will be
given a full judicial review and begin removal preparations
concurrently with the federal
court leave process. Although removals to some countries are
difficult, most removals to
high volume countries such as Mexico do not present such
difficulties. It is imperative
that CBSA be provided with sufficient resources to remove the
great majority of refused
claimants within the three-month period. Voluntary removal
programs are successful and
should be instituted.
Other Policies and Procedures Related to the Asylum Process
The proposal focuses on the core of the refugee claim process.
Several related issues such
as detention policy, legal representation, humanitarian claims,
the selection process for
tribunal members and security cases must be addressed.
Legal Representation
As discussed above, good legal representation facilitates fast
and effective decision
making. The quality of legal representation before the IRB has
been very poor. Some
provinces provide legal aid for refugee claimants, some do not.
The inadequacies of legal
representation of refugee claimants, both by lawyers and
consultants, is well known
anecdotally but has not been seriously addressed by any
institution. Refugee hearings are
confidential and few people other than the hearing participants
– the IRB member, the

claimant, the legal representative – are aware of negligent
service on the part of legal
counsel.
Disciplinary proceedings by law societies are driven by client
complaint mechanisms that
are utterly inadequate for badly served refugee clients who are
alienated, vulnerable,
deferential and inarticulate. Consultants are not effectively
regulated. There is an IRB
complaints procedure to inform law societies of the negligent or
unethical conduct of
lawyers, but it is cumbersome and rarely used. Out of concern
for the appearance of bias,
IRB members and the IRB are reluctant to initiate complaints.
During the passage of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, a Code of Conduct
was proposed for all legal
representatives that would give the IRB the authority to
discipline chronically negligent
consultants or, if a lawyer, forward complaints to his or her law
society. The proposal
was opposed by some law societies including the Law Society
of Upper Canada and the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration declined to sign the
Code into law.

It is recommended that the federal government provide funding
to all provinces to
operate duty counsel programs that can provide fast, accessible
legal service with a much
higher level of expertise and reliability. Legal aid clinics
specializing in refugee law are
the most economical and efficient model of providing that level
of expertise. Similar
successful models of legal representation are currently used by
Belgium and Australia.
The program allows the government to stipulate that only
lawyers can represent refugee
claimants before the Refugee Tribunal. Although this would
appear to be a significant
added cost to the asylum system, the much faster processing
would result in overall
savings to federal and provincial governments. In this case, the
dictum is to think outside
the funding envelope, not the box.
Humanitarian applications
Some refugee claimants have circumstances that fall more
naturally within humanitarian
reasons for remaining in Canada rather than within the refugee
definition. There is a
difference between “front-end” humanitarian claims that are
primarily based on country-
of-origin circumstances (although family relations in Canada
may also be a factor), and
“back-end” claims that are determined on factors relating to
long term residence in
Canada. Prompt processing within 13 months removes the
factors related to long-term
residence in Canada. In the system proposed in this paper,
refugee claimants would not

be allowed to make humanitarian claims within Canada after the
date of their refugee
claim hearing (a four-to-six-month period). Such a policy may
seem harsh since many
refugee claimants who remain in the current asylum system for
several years eventually
succeed on humanitarian grounds due to long-term residence
and exemplary conduct.
However, if Canada’s asylum system is to succeed, we cannot
continue to blur the lines
between refugees and humanitarian cases based on long-term
residence in Canada.
There is a potential option for RCD decision makers to decide
the humanitarian
application after rejection of the refugee claim. The process
would be more efficient than
making a separate humanitarian application to CIC and would
keep the appeal and
Judicial Review in the same track. But there are also negative
factors to consider before
recommending such a process. The complexity of the evidence
is broadened, the hearing
would be longer and the reasons for decision would be more
complex. While the refugee
decision is based solely on fact and law, humanitarian
applications are based on the
discretion of the Minister and, unlike refugee decisions, are
subject to government policy.
At this time, no recommendation is made for or against the idea.
Whether the

humanitarian application is made by an RCD member or a CIC
official, the decision must
be completed concurrently with the refugee claim decision to
avoid delays in the Federal
Court or the removal process.
Detention
Canada has always maintained a moderate detention policy.
Detention is extremely
expensive. Aggressive detention policies have not proven to be
effective deterrents to
refugee flows in Australia and the United States. No significant
change to current
detention policy is recommended.
Removal Policies
The UNHCR has often recommended voluntary removal
programs. It is an example of a
less adversarial approach that can be far more effective than
forced removal. Voluntary
removal programs assist refused claimants to return to their
country and can include the
discretionary payment of transportation costs. Such programs
have been successful in
other countries and a pilot program that was undertaken by CIC
in 2000 resulted in a high
removal rate. The program hastens and facilitates removal and
is money well spent. It is
highly recommended.

The Role of Government in the Asylum Process
It is controversial to recommend that the federal cabinet take no
role in the appointment
of tribunal members although it is obvious that a more
pragmatic method of appointment
should be instituted. Traditionally in the Westminster model of
democracy, the Governor-
in-Council has maintained the right to appoint members of
quasi-judicial tribunals. Thirty
years ago, when tribunals were relatively new legal creations
with less burdensome
workloads that approach may have been justified. Not so long
ago, Canada, like the
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, appointed
members with no expertise,
often on a part-time basis. The challenges relating to making
refugee decisions, and high
volume of claimants now require a more professional approach.
However, it is reasonable to ask what role government can and
should play in the
operation of the refugee tribunal. Firstly, the government should
appoint the Chairperson
of the tribunal who is responsible for its management and
effective operation. Although
the tribunal is independent in regard to its judicial role, the
Chairperson submits an
annual report to parliament through the Minister of Citizenship,
Immigration and
Multiculturalism and is accountable to the supervisory roles of
the Auditor General and
other federal agencies dealing with privacy, access to
information, bilingualism and the
Public Service Commission. The government also controls
tribunal resources through

annual budget allocations and Treasury Board monitoring.
Lastly, there is a disciplinary
procedure whereby members can be removed by the federal
cabinet upon the
recommendation of a Federal Court judge. All of these
government structures are more
than adequate to ensure an appropriate balance between
government control and
independent decision-making.
Resource Implications
These are preliminary proposals and a cost-analysis has yet to
be undertaken. Some
recommendations will require additional resources. These
include the recommendation to
create a clinic-based system for legal representation and the
creation of an appeal
division.
However, the proposal would also lead to very significant
savings. The Federal Court’s
work load would be significantly reduced. The Federal Court,
by its very nature, is an
expensive institution. Approximately 65% of its case load deals
with immigration and
refugee applications. Pre-Removal Risk Assessments and
Humanitarian applications

would also be greatly reduced taking a major administrative
burden off Citizenship and
Immigration Canada. Prompt and final decisions will ultimately
reduce the flow of
frivolous claims in the future although it is not possible to
estimate the level of reduction.
Finally, although many refused claimants do contribute to the
economy, many are
marginalized due to their quasi-legal status and unavoidably
become a burden on federal
and provincial budgets. Removal of failed claims within 13
months will represent a major
saving to both federal and provincial governments.
Two-tier systems: The use of objective criteria to fast track
manifestly unfounded claims.
We cannot assume that claims from a country with a high
rejection rate
automatically fall into a manifestly unfounded category. Mexico
is a good
example with an 11% acceptance rate which means that 11% of
Mexican
claimants are at risk of persecution. A very great number of the
other Mexican
claims will appear quite similar on the facts presented. It will
require the normal
claim procedure to distinguish the cases in regard to credibility
assessment and on
technical points of law. Such cases are not amenable to an early,
fast-track
procedure and it would be a fundamental error to seek to force
such cases into a

fast-track procedure. It either results in unjust decisions and
early removal of
viable claims or a high number of referrals back to the general
claim stream which
is a waste of resources.
Conclusion
There can be no pretence that making refugee decisions is an
easy task. The essential
challenge for any asylum system is to make a very large number
of difficult refugee
claim decisions quickly when the consequences of error are
serious. This paper proposes
a model that meets this challenge, and meets the five policy
criteria for a successful
asylum system.
1. Fair: This proposal is designed to allow refugee claimants a
fair opportunity to
prove their refugee claim within the requirements of Canadian
law. It is also fair
to the Canadian government by creating safeguards that will
ensure that the
system does not attract frivolous claims.

2. Fast: This proposal would result in a first decision within a
six-month period,
final decisions within a ten-month period and removal of the
majority of refused
claimants within 13 months. It provides early protection for
refugees and their
families, it catches mistakes quickly and places a less burden on
provincial and
federal governments than the current system because refused
claimants are not
living in Canada for long periods of time.
3. Effective: The investment in a high quality of decision-
making at both levels of
the Refugee Tribunal will result in a high rate of accurate and
reliable asylum
decisions.
4. Efficient: Accurate and reliable early decisions, confirmed
with an appeal
process, will allow the entire asylum system to function more
efficiently. It will
place less demand on the Federal Court, and will reduce the
number of
administrative steps related to removal.
5. Final: Prompt removal is based on the integrity and
reliability of the refugee
decision rather than the speed and arbitrariness of the decision.
Removal within
13 months discourages migrants or unscrupulous consultants

from using the
asylum system inappropriately.
Given the increasing migratory movements of people across
borders and ongoing global
conflicts, asylum systems will continue to come under pressure
from large numbers of
asylum seekers. The challenge will be to make well-reasoned
and accurate decisions that
ensure that refugees are given protection while sustaining the
integrity of Canada’s
asylum process.
Figure 1 – Diagram of Existing System
Figure 2 - Diagram of Proposed System

Established in 1982, Maytree is a private foundation that
promotes
equity and prosperity through its policy insights, grants and
programs.
The foundation has gained international recognition for its
expertise in
developing, testing and implementing programs and policy
solutions
related to immigration, integration and diversity in the
workplace, in
the boardroom and in public office.
M A Y T R E E | 170 Bloor St W, Suite 804, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada M5S 1T9 | 416.944.2627 | © 2009 The Maytree
Foundation

Vancouver Centre of Excellence
Research on Immigration and
Integration in the Metropolis
Working Paper Series
No. 04-04 (Revised)
The Economic Experiences of Refugees in Canada
Don DeVoretz, Sergiy Pivnenko and Morton Beiser
May 2004

RIIM
Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis
The Vancouver Centre is funded by grants from the Social
Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, Citizenship &
Immigration Canada,
Simon Fraser University, the University of British Columbia
and the University of
Victoria. We also wish to acknowledge the financial support of
the Metropolis
partner agencies:
• Health Canada
• Human Resources Development Canada
• Department of Canadian Heritage
• Department of the Solicitor General of Canada
• Status of Women Canada
• Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
• Correctional Service of Canada
• Immigration & Refugee Board
Views expressed in this manuscript are those of the author(s)
alone. For more
information, contact the Co-directors of the Centre, Dr. Daniel
Hiebert,
Department of Geography, UBC (e-mail: [email protected]) or
Acting Co-
Director, Dr. Jennifer Hyndman, Department of Geography,

SFU (e-mail:
[email protected]).
The Economic Experiences of Refugees in Canada
by
Don DeVoretz
Willy Brandt Guest Professor, IMER, Malmö University,
Sweden
Co-Director: RIIM, Simon Fraser University, Canada
E-mail: [email protected]
Sergiy Pivnenko
Researcher, RIIM
Centre for Excellence, Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, B.C. V5A 1S6
E-mail: [email protected]
Morton Beiser
Senior Research Scientist
CERIS Center for Excellence, University of Toronto

Email: [email protected]
Revised May, 2004
Please direct all inquires to [email protected]
We would like to note the financial support of RIIM,
Vancouver’s Centre of Excellence and IMER, Malmö
University while writing this paper. In addition, excellent
referee comments greatly improved the text.
mailto:[email protected]
2
Abstract: Canada admits refugees on the basis of compassion
and not economic criteria. It is
however, important to document the economic successes or
failures among Canada’s refugee

population in order to understand how post arrival integration
policies affect refugee economic
performance. This essay examines a set of economic indicators
from Canada’s IMDB database to
assess the post 1981 Canadian refugee economic experience.
With the aid of a standard human
capital model we answer a series of economic questions
including the length of time required for
refugee economic integration, their use of Canada’s social
safety net, refugee poverty levels and
refugee economic performance vis-à-vis Canada’s family
immigrant class. Our main findings are
that employed Canadian refugees earn an amount equal to that
earned by their family class
reference group circa 1980-2001. However, the incidence of
social assistance attachment for
refugees is substantial and for those refugees who receive any
assistance their total income is at
the near destitute level.
Keywords: Refugees, immigrant earnings and human capital

3
Introduction
Canada’s immigration and refugee legislation admits permanent
residents through a variety of
gateways which all require prior assessment to qualify for
admission: the independent or
economic class, via a family reunification gateway or by
refugee designation.1 From an economic
viewpoint the government’s designation of the assessment
gateway influences the economic
outcomes of the foreign-born. In fact, most foreign arrivals to
Canada including refugees are not
economically screened by Canada but are singly selected.2 In
short, those who self-select to leave
home, but experience no further economic screening upon
arrival to Canada will be referred to in
this paper as singly selected.3 Double selection in the
immigrant literature argues that the
immigrant first self-selects by leaving and then the destination
country will select them again if

the immigrant offers himself as an economic or independent
mover.4 This second selection based
upon human capital attributes of the Canadian bound economic
immigrants, presumably leads to
their speedier integration into the Canadian economy. In turn,
the condition of the Canadian
economy at the refugee’s or immigrant’s time of arrival is often
an important influence on their
ultimate economic success. 5
This chapter concentrates on the economic performance of
refugees. As one of more
than 150 signatories to the UN Convention on refugees, Canada
is committed to protecting the
persecuted and stateless. Canada is also one of a much smaller
group of Convention signatories
who offer not just temporary protection, but the option of
permanent resettlement. Humanitarian
concerns presumably motivate the decision to offer refugees the
opportunity for permanent
resettlement, and such concerns probably provide sufficient
justification to perpetuate this policy.
1 The economic or independent class is further subdivided into
entry gates for principal applicants and
dependents. Only the principal applicants are assessed for their

potential economic contribution under
Canada’s points system. Thus, they constitute the doubly
selected group. The accompanying minors or the
spouse of the principal applicant of the spouse are not assessed
but can not enter Canada unless the
principal applicant passes the points assessed selection
procedure. Thus, this paper will treat all members of
the independent class, both principal members and their
dependents as doubly screened.
2 In fact, only 25% of all arrivals (none refugees) must pass
economic criteria to earn 65 plus points on
human capital attributes prior to admission.
3 Clearly, Canada attempts to insure that the bone fides exist
for self proclaimed refugees, but in terms of
their economic outcome there is no explicit selection technique
employed by Canada to gain admission.
This also holds for the family class of immigrants.
4 The 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) of
2002 made some substantial changes in
both economic criteria for entry of the economic class and the
adjudication of refugees. However, all the
refugee arrivals under study in this paper were admitted under
the 1978 Immigration Act. See Yan Shi
2003) for complete details of both the 1978 and 2002
Immigration Acts.
5 This is termed the scarring effect. If the economy is weak
upon arrival then many immigrants never
experience the economic “catch-up” that immigrants who arrive
in economically robust periods experience.

4
Critics, however, suggest that the policy is misguided, because
it brings grave economic
consequences in its wake. This paper addresses these concerns
by investigating the question:
what is the labour market outcome for refugees in Canada?
To qualify for Canadian admission, those refugees who arrive in
Canada must meet
several criteria. Convention refugees are people who leave
their country because of a well-
founded fear that they will be persecuted due to their religious
beliefs, race, nationality, political
opinion or membership in a persecuted group. In addition to
Convention refugees, Canada has
been admitting Protected Persons,6 that is, inhabitants of
designated refugee-producing countries.
Asylum seekers are defined as those persons “seriously and
personally affected by: civil war,
armed conflict, or massive violations of human rights.”
Inhabitants of the designated countries7
meet the definition of Convention refugees, and can include
people who suffer because their
country denies them the rights of freedom of expression,
dissent, or the right to engage in trade

union activity. However, unlike Convention refugees or asylum
seekers, Protected Persons must
apply for resettlement from outside Canada. These refugee
applicants are admitted under special
rules and are considered either a Convention refugee or a
member of a humanitarian designated
class.
The humanitarian designated class was introduced by the federal
government in 1997 to
provide for the possibility of resettlement to individuals
personally or seriously affected by
situations including civil war and armed conflict. Refugees may
be selected abroad for
resettlement in Canada or may apply for and receive Convention
refugee status from the federal
Immigration and Refugee Board within Canada. Finally, it is
important to note that Canada’s
refugee assessment contains no explicit economic criteria for
entry although a suitability criterion
based on the refugee’s presumed ability to integrate is used in
the selection procedure.
6 Under the 2002 legislation, or the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act this entry group is now

referred to as the Humanitarian Designated Classes.
7 List of countries posted on CIC web site at
www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/resettle-5.html.
5
Figure 1: Refugee Arrivals to Canada: 1980-2001
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001

Canada
Quebec
Source: Landed Immigrant Data System (LIDS), CIC Canada
Canada total: 535,652
Quebec total: 105,840
Between 1980 and 2001 Canada received a total of 535,131
refugees from a wide variety
of source countries. Figure 1 documents dramatic fluctuations in
refugee arrivals between 1980
and 2001, with numbers ranging from a high of 40,000 in 1980
(corresponding to the “Boat
People” crisis in Southeast Asia which stimulated the largest
admission of refugees in Canada’s
history) to a low of 15,000 in 1983. Since Canada does not have
an explicit or implicit refugee
quota the total number of yearly refugee arrivals is a product of
both external events and
Canada’s overall yearly immigrant target levels.8 The fall in
refugee levels in the 1980s and the
rise in the early 1990s largely mimics the movement of total
announced immigration targets.
During the last seven years, the number of refugee arrivals has

become stabilized at fewer than
25,000 per year, roughly 10 percent of the immigrant total.
Figures 2 and 3 provide an insight into political hot spots of a
given era, demonstrating
the manner in which changing world conditions influence
refugee flows to Canada. During the
period 1980-1995, Southeast Asia, Poland and El Salvador
accounted for more than half of all
refugee admissions. By contrast, between 1995 and 2000,
refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina, Sri
Lanka, Somalia and the Middle East made up 54 percent of all
such admissions.
8 Since the early 1990s Canada’s goal has been to admit 50% of
its immigrants in the economic class . The
rest of the admissions including refugees is a a residual of any
years total target. Thus, any change is total
immigrant intakes affects the absolute number of refugees
admitted.
6

Figure 2: Refugee Arrivals to Canada in 1980-1994 by
Source Country
Other
48%
Vietnam
21.1%
Cambodia
5.0%
Poland
18.9%
El Salvador
6.9%
Total: 373,867 arrivals
Figure 3: Refugee Arrivals to Canada in 1995-2000
by Source Country
Iraq
5%
Somalia
5%
Other

46%
Bosnia
Hercegovina
18.8%
Iran
6.2%
Sri Lanka
12.1%
Afghanistan
6.9%
Total: 161,785 arrivals
7
Given this fluctuating number of refugee claimants and their
heterogeneity across source
countries it is appropriate to ask how these various refugee
groups fared in the Canadian

economy. The central goal of this chapter is to answer this
question. It proposes to analyze the
economic performance of Canadian refugees in terms of the
standard human capital model. This
model basically states that individuals prior to or after arrival in
Canada differentially invest in
themselves to increase their endowment of human capital
(education and language) depending on
their age and ability. In turn, differential rates of investment by
individuals lead to different
economic outcomes in the labor market.
Given that refugees are selected largely under the criterion of
humanitarian compassion
with presumably little consideration given to their human
capital attributes very few economists
have analyzed Canadian refugee economic performance to date.
What we would like to measure
is the refugee economic integration overtime in Canada. For
example, how long does this process
of economic integration take and how does it compare to the
family reunification class?
Moreover, what is the refugee experience with poverty and the
use of social assistance or
unemployment insurance in Canada? Finally, does refugee

economic performance depend on how
refugees are sponsored?
We next provide a brief literature review and present some
stylized facts about the human
capital characteristics of refugees. Given this background we
then report refugee earnings and
their relative rates of economic integration into the Canadian
economy after arrival and their use
of Canada’s social safety net. Finally, we assess Canadian
refugee economic integration in
general.
Literature Review
The academic literature has primarily focused on legal or
political issues of refugee claimants in
Canada. Thus, the economic aspect of refugee resettlement has
received little attention. Research
on the “Boat People,” Southeast Asian refugees from Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia (Beiser 1999;
Caplan, Whitmore & Choy 1989; Haines 1987; Strand &
Woodrow, 1985; Fass 1986) who were
admitted to the U.S. and Canada suggests that, after an initial
decade of economic struggle,

refugee employment rates approximate, and perhaps better those
of the receiving society and that
refugee service demands are lower. Because these studies have
focused on a particular group of
refugees who arrived in North America during a particular
historical era, the conclusions are
necessarily limited.
8
The lack of a comprehensive research on the economic status of
refugees partially owes
to inadequate census data. Census data in the U.S. or Canada
only discloses foreign birth status
and does not reveal entry status (e.g. refugee, family class
immigrant, etc.) of an immigrant and
thus precludes any detailed economic analysis of the refugee
sub-group. Nonetheless, some
imaginative census based work has been reported. 9
A more reliable data source is available to refugee scholars in
Canada. The Longitudinal

Immigration Data Base (IMDB) combines information from
landing records compiled by
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) with information
from refugee or immigrant personal
income tax returns. If we combine these two data sets we can
track income performance of
different immigrant admission categories including refugees
after 1980. However, education,
occupation and language ability in Canada’s official languages
are recorded as “tombstone”
information. In other words, the values of these variables are
only known at the time of the
refugee’s landing.10
The IMDB data set allows an economic analysis across entry
categories of immigrants
over a sufficiently long enough time period to identify cohort,
period and aging affects on
differential refugee economic outcomes.
A study by Citizenship and Immigration, Canada (1998)
utilizing the IMDB database
revealed important differences (and some similarities) in the
labour market behavior of Canada’s
major immigrant admission categories.11 An important example
of both differential and then

converging behavior is the finding that although Canadian
refugees reported substantially lower
employment earnings than economic applicants, their earnings
patterns relative to three other
immigrant entry categories were very similar.12 Moreover,
refugees who had been in Canada for
twelve or more years reported average employment earnings at
or near the Canadian-born
average. Nonetheless, this study reported that refugees admitted
prior to 1990 typically reported
the highest rates of unemployment benefit usage when compared
with any other immigrant
category or the Canadian-born population. Also after two years
in Canada refugees again report
the highest rates of social assistance usage.
9 For example, in the U.S., Cortes (2001) used the 1980 and
1990 U.S. censuses to generate a synthetic
panel of refugee and economic immigrants. Even with these
limitations, Cortes found that refugees have
higher rates of human capital accumulation and thus even
though their earnings start below other U.S.
immigrants their annual earnings grow faster than these
immigrants.
10 Some tombstone data, age at arrival, years in Canada can be
extrapolated into the future.
11 These groups included the family class, economic principal

applicants, the spouses and dependents of
these economic principal applicants, and refugees.
12 These immigrant groups included the family class, and the
spouses and dependents of economic principal
applicants.
9
DeSilva (1997) employed a IMDB sub sample of male
immigrants who landed during the
period 1981-1984 to test the commonly held belief that
Canadian refugees perform poorly when
compared with other immigrant categories. His analysis was
restricted to four immigrant entry
classes: independents, assisted relatives, Convention refugees,
and the designated class, the last
two being combined into one group for the purposes of
regression analysis. DeSilva found that
although independently selected immigrants were the highest
foreign-born income earners, they
experienced the smallest earnings growth after arrival. In
contrast, the designated refugee class
reported the most rapid increase in earnings.

Overall, DeSilva’s study demonstrated a rapid convergence in
earnings among
immigrants and refugees over time. Although the refugee and
assisted relative classes initially
showed a significant earnings disadvantage compared with the
independents, the gap narrowed
over time. Given that refugees had the weakest language ability
upon landing, their economic
progress was deemed strong.
DeSilva’s tests also revealed that differences between refugee
and immigrant human
capital endowments at the time of landing account for only a
small portion of their subsequent
earnings across these groups. This implies that one has to look
at factors other than educational
and demographic characteristics at arrival to explain the
observed earnings differentials. Finally,
DeSilva argues that the economic success of refugees was
highly conditioned on their region of
origin. The most successful among them were those from
Europe, whereas many of refugees from
Africa and Southeast Asia have performed poorly.
Using the data from the Refugee Resettlement Project (RRP),

Beiser and Hou (2000)
examined gender differences in English-language acquisition
and employment consequences of
language proficiency. The results of the study confirmed that
English proficiency was a
significant determinant of the unemployment rate and labour
force participation of refugees in the
long term.
In sum, the literature on Canadian refugee economic
performance points to the use of the
IMDB as the primary data source for this analysis. In addition,
these studies argue that earnings
convergence occurs between refugees and any reference group
overtime (12 years) with
educational attainment and language acquisition conditioning
the speed of convergence. We will
explore this presumed earnings convergence in more detail in
the following section.
10

Stylized Facts
Canadian researchers as noted are fortunate in having at their
disposal two administrative data
bases which, when combined, yield the researcher a portrait of
the immigrant upon arrival (LIDS:
Landed Immigrant Data System) and records of their economic
performance while residing in
Canada (IMDB: Immigration Data Base). The LIDS or landings
records are exhaustive and cover
every permanent legal immigrant to Canada who arrived after
1980. It is a snapshot that records
various socio-economic and demographic features upon arrival.
The 2002 version of LIDS which
we use covers 4.1 million entrants between 1980 and 2001. The
IMDB or immigration database
combines both the LIDS database to the immigrant’s yearly tax
records. This administrative
database only covers immigrants who file an income tax and
hence the coverage is limited to 40-
50 percent of all past arrivals. We will employ this data set to
generate some stylized facts below
and in our more extensive analysis in the next section.13
The human capital attributes of refugees varied considerably

and were, to some extent a
reflection of educational opportunities available in refugee
producing countries.
49.6%
36.4%
14.0%
66.9%
22.0%
11.0%
50.6%
23.8%
25.5%
80.4%
13.3%
6.3%
74.8%
14.5%
10.7%

49.5%
17.9%
32.6%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Refugee Family Skilled Refugee Family Skilled
Figure 4: Educational Qualifications of Foreign-born by Entry
Class
and Source Region: 1980-2001 arrivals
Bachelor's Degree
and Above
Trade Certificate or
Diploma
Secondary or Less
Europe Other Regions*
*United States excluded

13 The IMDB has one major weakness, namely the
disappearance of immigrants overtime through death,
emigration or retirement but otherwise provides a time series
picture of refugee and immigrants.
11
Figure 4 illustrates the influence of source area on educational
heterogeneity. For
example, approximately fifty percent of refugees from Europe
who arrived between 1980 and
2001 had some post-secondary education compared to only 20
percent who came from other
regions.14 If we compare the educational attainment levels for
European immigrants across entry
gates we can see that refugees from Europe were as well
educated as skilled Canadian immigrants
in general. Refugees from non-European sources were the least
educated of all immigrant classes:
80 percent had no more than a secondary level of education. It
should be noted that the non-

European refugee groups contain a wide variety of source
countries with different levels of
development and masks the true diversity of the entrants’
backgrounds.
25.5%
74.5%
51.6%
48.4%
69.6%
30.4%
43.1%
56.9%
47.1%
52.9%
67.8%
32.2%
0%
20%
40%

60%
80%
100%
Refugee Family Skilled Refugee Family Skilled
Figure 5: Canadian Language Ability of Foreign-born by Entry
Class
and Source Region: 1980-2001 arrivals
None
English or/and
French
Europe Other Regions*
*United States excluded
Knowledge of Canada’s official languages followed a different
pattern (Figure 5).
English or French language ability is one of a number of ways
in which applicants for
independent immigrant status can earn enough points to qualify
for admission. As a
consequence, the fact that, regardless of source region, almost
70 percent of all immigrants in this
category spoke at least one of Canada’s official languages is not

surprising. The proportion of
family class immigrants who spoke either English or French was
substantially lower – about 50
14 The reported percentages for greater than post-secondary
educational levels for Africa (28%), Asia
(23%) and South and Central America (25%) were all about half
the European level.
12
percent – a proportion which, once again, did not vary by source
region. Refugees were less
likely to have a command of English or French than other
immigrant classes: however, the group
least likely to possess this advantage was refugees from Europe.
Further analysis (not shown)
demonstrated the uneven distribution of official language ability
across refugee groups: 75
percent of refugees from Europe spoke neither of Canada’s
official languages, in comparison with
57 percent of refugees from other regions who spoke neither
language.

A consideration of Figures 4 and 5 together allows a comparison
of educational and
linguistic skills for Canada’s family and refugee classes circa
1980-2001. The comparisons are
striking. European refugees were more highly educated than
either independent or family class
immigrants from this region, but were more likely to be
linguistic disadvantaged.15
For non-European family class members the educational
attainments and linguistic skills
are near identical to non-European refugee attainments. In sum,
European refugees are a unique
group in terms of higher educational levels and less linguistic
skills. These differential human
capital endowments of education and language should affect
refugee economic performance,
which we document below.
Refugee Economic Outcomes
Economic Outcomes: Entry cohorts and Immigrant admission
categories
The IMDB data set allows us to analyze the economic outcome
of refugees from several

dimensions. Essentially, the methodology employed here is to
identify a class or type of earnings
(e.g. employment income, social assistance) and ask how did the
refugee group who reported this
type of earnings fare vis-à-vis other entry categories. We will
also expand this analysis by
computing refugee total income, that is we combine the
refugee’s target income (e.g. employment
earnings) with all other sources of earnings (self-employed,
social assistance, etc.) reported for
the refugee.
Figure 6 presents an overview of total earned income by all
employed refugees seven
years after arrival for three different cohorts based on date of
arrival: 1980, 1985 and 1990.16 A
further distinction is made to isolate regional differences by
specifying the earnings of refugees in
Canada and for the province of Quebec since Quebec selects its
own refugees. This Figure allows
15 The relatively low level of language proficiency for
European refugees is no doubt due to the fact that
they come from non-English/French-speaking areas (Balkans
and Poland), whereas over 25% of family
class and skilled workers emigrate from British Islands and
France.

16 Figure 6 reports total income from all sources for refugees
who reported employment earnings.
13
us to detect if there is an entry or period effects. In other words
have the earned income prospects
of refugees changed between those refugees who entered in the
1980s or 1990s? The answer is
no, since seven years after their respective arrival dates the
1980 and 1990 refugee cohorts
reported near identical earned incomes. A period affect
nevertheless appears in 1992 when
refugees for the 1985 cohort earned about $2,000 more (1992
constant dollars) after seven years
in Canada than either the 1980 or 1990 cohorts. Thus, although
no long-term decline in refugee
earned income appears after 1980, it was better to have arrived
before Canada’s recession of the
early 1990s. In addition, Figure 6 clearly portrays the economic
penalty for refugee settlement in
Quebec. We return to the cause of this 15% provincial penalty

in a later section. 17
$24,964
$20,880
$26,875 $26,410
$22,118
$28,380
$24,683
$20,793
$25,915
$0
$3,000
$6,000
$9,000
$12,000
$15,000
$18,000
$21,000
$24,000

$27,000
$30,000
19
92
C
an
ad
ia
n
do
lla
rs
1980 arrival 1985 arrival 1990 arrival
Figure 6: Total Income of 3 Employed Refugee Cohorts: 7 years
since arrival
Canada
Quebec
Ontario
(1987 earnings) (1992 earnings) (1997
earnings)
Source: IMDB Mobility Series MOB101E
Figures 7-A, 7-B and 7-C report the earnings for employed
refugees across three

subdivisions of the refugee entry gate for three cohorts. Each
refugee gate reflects a presumed
different degree of sponsorship or support mechanism after
arrival in Canada. In short, those
refugees who fall in the category “In Canada” are self
sponsored asylum seekers. The remaining
two categories: Private and Government reflect respectively the
presence of a Canadian sponsor
in the private or public sector. Given our above arguments we
would expect that sponsored
17 This provincial difference could arise because of the Quebec
economy’s weakness or the weak
endowment of human capital found in Quebec refugees or both.
14
refugees would after 7 years do better economically than asylum
seekers who lack some of these
support mechanisms. A clear pattern emerges in favor of the
privately sponsored refugee group
since between 1987 and 1997 the income prospects of Canadian

refugees changed dramatically
by refugee entry gates. The “In Canada” or asylum-seeking
refugees experienced a 20 percent
decline in constant 1992 dollars even after allowing for 7-year
integration period. Government
sponsored refugees experienced a more modest decline over this
period (-12%) while privately
sponsored refugees had a modest 5% rise in their earnings.
$22,975 $1,126
$22,145 $788
$23,917 $1,011
$0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 $25,000 $30,000
Government
Private
In Canada
R
ef
ug
ee
c
la

ss
Figure 7-A: Total income of employed principal applicant
by refugee entry class: 1980 arrivals, 1987 income
Employment Income Other Income
Source: IMDB Mobility Series MOB 101E
(in 1992 dollars)
LICO
$20,524 $2,052
$23,632 $1,836
$19,565 $1,620
$0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 $25,000 $30,000
Government
Private
In Canada
R
ef
ug
ee
c
la

ss
Figure 7-B: Total income of employed principal
applicant by refugee entry class: 1985 arrivals, 1992
income
(in 1992 dollars) LICO
15
$20,172 $944
$23,313 $1,094
$19,143 $996
$0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 $25,000 $30,000
Government
Private
In Canada

R
ef
ug
ee
c
la
ss
Figure 7-C:Total income of employed principal
applicant by refugee entry class: 1990 arrivals, 1997
income
Moreover, there exist little absolute earnings differences across
entry gates except for the
privately sponsored 1985 and1990 cohorts of refugees who did
earn significantly more than other
entry groups after 7 years in Canada.
$22,187 $13,918
$26,256 $14,907
$21,337 $12,326

$0 $10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000
Government
Private
In Canada
R
ef
ug
ee
c
la
ss
Figure 7-D: Total income of the two-person (both employed)
refugee family by entry class: 1990 arrivals, 1997 income
Male (Principal Applicant) Female (Spouse)
These refugee earnings performances greatly exceed the Low
Income Cutoff (LICO)
level if we assume that both partners in a refugee household
found employment.18 Figure 7-D

demonstrates this point since the low income cutoff (LICO)
level rises only to 20,233 (1992
18 For a two-person urban household living in a city with a
population of 500,000 or more the low income
cutoff was $20,233 (1992 Canadian dollars) in 1997.
16
Canadian dollars) but combined male and female refugee
employment earnings for the 1990 entry
cohort ranges from $33,663 to $41,163 (1992 Canadian dollars).
Nonetheless, the absolute level of earnings for any entry group
is not high. Thus we must
ask two further questions. How did other non-refugee entry
groups to Canada fare after arrival in
Canada? Furthermore, what effect did this weak and declining
income-earning performance in
general have on refugee poverty levels and use of Canada’s
social assistance programs? We
answer these questions below.

Refugee Economic Integration
Previous research (DeVoretz, 1995) has demonstrated the
important effect of length of
resettlement on economic performance. On average, it takes
immigrants, as a whole, 12 years or
more to achieve their full economic potential. Analyses in this
section describe the effects of
time on economic performance for different immigrant classes.
Figure 8-A: Assimilation Profiles for 1980 Family Class,
Skilled
and Refugee Cohorts: Employment Earnings
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
$40,000
$45,000
$50,000
0 3 6 9 12 15 18
Years since arrival

19
92
C
an
ad
ia
n
do
lla
rs
Refugees
Family
Class
Skilled
Workers
In particular, in this section we attempt to answer the earlier
posed questions of degree of
refugee economic integration by comparing refugee economic
performance to family class
immigrants over time. Figures 8-A and 8-B report the degree of
refugee earnings integration in
terms of years since arrival in Canada for both the 1980 and

1985 cohorts respectively. For the
17
1980 cohort refugee employment earnings slightly exceed the
earnings of family class members
for the entire reporting period.19 Moreover, real (1992 dollars)
employment earnings for the 1980
cohort of refugees doubled from 15,000 dollars to 30,000
dollars after 17 years in Canada. In both
these dimensions, earnings relative to the family class and the
growth in refugee earnings over
time, it can be argued that the 1980 refugee cohort assimilated
into the Canadian labour market.
However, if we (incorrectly) used the doubly selected skilled
worker group as the reference group
than the degree of refugee integration would be nil. In fact, the
effect of double selection is made
clear from the earnings of skilled workers who uniformly earn
approximately $20,000 more than
the singly selected family and refugee classes for the 1980
cohort.

Fast, Fair and Final Reforming Canada’s Refugee Syst.docx

Fast, Fair and Final Reforming Canada’s Refugee Syst.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to Fast, Fair and Final Reforming Canada’s Refugee Syst.docx

Similar to Fast, Fair and Final Reforming Canada’s Refugee Syst.docx (19)

More from aryan532920

More from aryan532920 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Fast, Fair and Final Reforming Canada’s Refugee Syst.docx