The document discusses the implications of changes in U.S. and European political landscapes on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, highlighting two proposed models for conflict resolution in the Donbas. It details legislative efforts for special governance in conflict-affected areas, contrasting various proposals from Ukrainian parties and the Russian side, with emphasis on issues like local self-governance and the status of the Russian language. Despite some commonalities in approaches to reintegration, significant disagreements remain regarding the permanence of special status for these areas.

1. Donbas: Reintegration or Сonservation
The change of the presidential administration in the United States of America as
well as the forthcoming elections in a number of European countries may influence
the stance of these countries with respect to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the
ways of resolving it. Ukraine risks losing the support of leading world powers.
Thus, it is required to analyze and to form the adequate response to those changes.
Certain Ukrainian institutions have started developing models of the new agenda
concerning the completion of the armed phase of the conflict, the agenda which
will be suitable for Ukraine, though two models to resolve the conflict in the
Donbas based on the Minsk Agreements have already been proposed. There is also
a model developed by Samopomich Party. However, the latter is not based on the
Minsk Agreements .
1
The author of the first model (according to their chronology) is President of
Ukraine Petro Poroshenko.
Ukrainian Act ​On the special order of local self-government in certain areas of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions​ which was voted for by the Parliament in September
2014, after the conclusion of the first Minsk Agreements. The Act was signed by
the President on October 17, 2014. .
2
The main provisions of the Act are as follows:
● The special order of local self-government in certain areas of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions will be introduced for three years ;
● Amnesty for those who have not committed felonies ;
● Provision of conditions for using Russian in education, MM, by state and
central power bodies, and in other spheres of life;
● Powers of deputies and officials elected at preterm elections cannot be
stopped earlier;
1
​The complex of measures to implement the Minsk Agreements kremlin.ru/supplement/4804
2
Draft law On the special order of local self-government in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
//w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52182

2. ● Special order of appointing prosecutor's office and court's chiefs with the
participation of local self-government bodies;
● Bodies of central power may conclude agreements with respective bodies of
local self-government on economic, social, and cultural development of
certain districts by latter's initiative ;
● The state supports social and economic development of certain areas of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions ;
● Executive power bodies support transborder cooperation of certain areas of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions with the Russian Federation;
● People's militia squads are to be organized in certain areas.
Despite the fact that the draft law was signed by the President, it has had no
continuation.
Opposition Block deputies developed another draft law - ​On peculiarities of
governing certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions​ – which ​per se​ is
similar to the above mentioned one .
3
The Opposition also proposes to introduce the special order temporarily, but do not
identify the period itself. The draft law presents the self-government system on the
uncontrolled territory in more detail.
Both documents (presented by the President and by the Opposition) propose the
organization of people's militia, provision of the special status of Russian,
possibility to develop transborder cooperation with the Russian Federation and
accordance in appointing prosecutors and judges.
Main provisions of the draft law proposed by the Opposition Block:
● The Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) has created an interim body –
Donbas Interregional Territorial Department (DITD) with an independent
system of state government on the principles of decentralization and large
powers of local self-government;
3
On peculiarities if governing certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
//w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=58512

3. ● The borders of DITD, the list of towns, districts, and localities which will be
included in DITD has been identified;
● DITD power and local self-government bodies guarantee the management of
the life on the territory of their jurisdiction, solve economic and social
development problems, in particular, humanitarian issues of culture,
language, identity, freedom of religion;
● Power bodies of DITD make decisions on creating, identifying the structure
and the quantity of the people's militia, coordinate their activities, consider
the issues connected with the appointment of chiefs of the bodies of the
Interior, security service, and the prosecutor's office;
● The DITD chief is elected by secret ballot for a 5-year term;
● The DITD Representative Meeting, as well as the state, has the power to
give a special status to Russian and other minorities.
Representatives the Samopomich political party faction and other parties have
registered a draft law​ On Temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine , which
4
presupposes a complete blockade of the uncontrolled territory by the Ukrainian
power with the exception of the transit of people. The draft law is technically
difficult to implement. It envisages no water supply to the uncontrolled territories
which could be done only if some towns of the controlled territory will be
disconnected, for example, Mariupol. That is why some alterations are to be made
in this draft.
Though the draft was developed by representatives of a number of factions, it is
mainly lobbied by Samopomich.
4
Draft Law On the temporary occupied territory of Ukraine //w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=59833

4. Samopomich draft law presupposes:
● Ukraine is not responsible for protecting life and health, and for saving
property of people who live on temporarily occupied territories;
● Refusal from the duties connected with providing welfare allowances and
pensions to those who live on temporarily occupied territories (the authors of
the law think that this is the duty of the Russian Federation as it occupied
this territory);
● The Russian Federation is responsible for violations of rights and freedoms
of a person and a citizen defined by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine
that may happen on temporarily occupied territories;
● Supplying fuel and energy resources and providing centralized water supply
to temporarily occupied territories is forbidden;
● Railway and vehicle cargo traffic as well as passenger traffic (with the
exception of humanitarian cargos) are forbidden;
● If the occupied territory is liberated martial law is imposed throughout the
area;
● After the liberation of the occupied territory any kind of election is
temporarily banned there.
The Russian Federation initiatives and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions
Representatives of the Russian Federation and of certain areas of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions have their own vision of the Minsk Agreements implementation.
These demands are changed and reviewed from time to time. Some of them are
rather declarative and political and go beyond the Minsk Agreements. The main
ones are as follows:
● From time to time the “DPR” demands taking control over the whole
territory of the Donetsk region ;5
5
​The future of the Minsk Agreements is restoring the “DPR” territorial integrity. - Aleksandr Zakharchenko.
//dnr-online.ru/budushhee-minskix-soglashenij-vozvrashhenie-territorialnoj-celostnosti-dnr-aleksandr-zaxarchenko

5. ● The Russian side and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions insist on
the fact that political conditions are the priority ;6
● A direct dialogue with certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
representatives;
● Guarantees of granting a permanent not temporary “special status” to
uncontrolled territories ;7
● A constitutional reform which would secure the special status ;8
● Official status of the Russian language;
● Central authorities’ support of financial growth;
● Forming the “people’s militia”, agreeing about the appointments of heads of
prosecutors’ offices and judges.
● Amnesty;
● Local elections.
Conclusions
There is still no expert assessment of each scenario or a real discussion about them.
The society is sure that each plan just reflects the way some political or social
group sees the resolution of the conflict. The discussion is mostly about mutual
accusations of collaboration with the enemy and this prevents the society from
reaching an agreement about the conflict resolution.
Giving Ukrainian authorities the control over the uncontrolled part of the border is
not discussed in laws and draft laws. Draft laws are models which reflect parts of
the Minsk Agreements implementation. According to them, Ukrainian authorities
must get back the control over the border. The procedure of giving back the control
is another key question. The Russian side and certain areas of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions insist that the control can be regained only after the election but
the Ukrainian side does not agree to this.
6
Lavrov: Poroshenko’s words about Minsk-2 implementation contradict the Agreements //ria.ru/world/20170123/1486273320.html
7
​Putin says that he wants to be “good neighbours” with Ukraine and to do this Kyiv has to start a direct dialogue with militants
//www.unian.ua/politics/1393671-putin-zayaviv-scho-hoche-bachiti-v-ukrajini-dobrogo-susida-dlya-tsogo-kijiv-povinen-pochati-pryamiy-dialog-
z-boyovikami.html
8
​Gryzlov: the law securing the special status for the Donbas should be adopted according to “Steinmeier formula”
//rian.com.ua/politics/20160127/1004257454.html

6. Half a year later, the Ukrainian side has not demonstrated any kind of a road map
which would show its vision of the Minsk process implementation . All the9
existing ways of the Donbas conflict resolution can be divided within two main
directions: reintegration or conservation. Those who criticize reintegration plans do
not offer any alternatives besides waiting for something.
On the other hand, despite the seeming political polarity of those who elaborate the
ways for reintegration (namely, the president of Ukraine, Opposition Block,
representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and of the Russian
Federation), their plans are almost identical in their contents and the main disputes
are about the succession of their implementation.
Reintegration plans have some common features:
● Granting uncontrolled districts a “special status” which would allow their
self-governance in Ukraine (Opposition Block and Presidential
Administration offer to provide the areas with it on a temporary basis);
● Development of cross-border cooperation of certain areas of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions with the Russian Federation regions;
● Additional guarantees for the Russian language;
● Forming the “people’s militia”, agreeing about the appointments of heads of
prosecutors’ offices and judges;
● Restoration of social and economic connections.
The general consensus about these points has been reached only on declarative
level. Of course, the parties can interpret these points according to their own
vision, however, there is some general vision. The main point where the consensus
has not been reached yet if the so-called “special status”. Representatives of
Ukrainian political parties see it as a temporary measure only while representatives
of the Russian Federation and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions see it
as a part of changes into the Constitution of Ukraine.
9
​Kyiv will insist on its “road map” in Minsk //www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2016/11/29/7128284/

7. Powerful criticism of reintegration plans which comes from a part of the society
and some political forces (especially the right-wing ones) should not be forgotten
either. There is a certain risk that if there finally is some progress in the process,
the society will not accept its results.