This study examines whether the ownership stakes of directors in mutual funds are related to fund performance. The researchers collected data on the ownership of independent and non-independent directors of large equity mutual funds. They found that funds with low director ownership, or "skin in the game", significantly underperformed peers. This underperformance was both statistically significant and economically large. Further analysis showed fees only explained a small part of the underperformance, suggesting director oversight impacts more than just fee negotiations. The study aimed to distinguish between directors having private information on future performance versus a lack of incentive alignment causing the underperformance, finding evidence supported the latter explanation.
This paper examines the relationship between mutual fund manager ownership stakes in the funds they manage and the performance of those funds. The author hypothesizes that greater manager ownership will be positively associated with fund returns and negatively associated with fund turnover, as higher ownership would better align manager and shareholder interests by reducing agency costs. Using a dataset of manager ownership disclosures from 2004-2005, the author finds that funds with higher manager ownership had higher returns and lower turnover, supporting the hypotheses. However, manager ownership was not related to a fund's tax burden.
11.concentrated share ownership and financial performance of listed companies...Alexander Decker
This document summarizes previous research on the relationship between concentrated share ownership and financial performance of listed companies. It discusses how agency theory suggests that concentrated ownership can improve performance by reducing agency costs through increased monitoring of managers. However, other research has found potential negative effects of concentrated ownership through manager entrenchment. The document reviews mixed findings in previous empirical studies conducted primarily in developed countries. It argues there is a need for more research in emerging markets like Ghana due to differences in business contexts. The main objective of the study described is to analyze the relationship between share concentration and performance of listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange.
Concentrated share ownership and financial performance of listed companies in...Alexander Decker
This document summarizes a research study that examined the effect of share ownership concentration on the financial performance of listed companies in Ghana. The study used panel data regression analysis to measure performance using Tobin's Q and return on assets, and analyzed the relationship between these performance metrics and ownership concentration, institutional ownership, and insider ownership. The results found statistically significant relationships, suggesting that concentrated ownership, institutional ownership, and insider ownership are positively associated with higher financial performance of companies on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The study concludes that Ghanaian ownership is heavily concentrated and that concentrated structures should be encouraged to improve monitoring and performance.
This document summarizes seven commonly held myths about boards of directors that are not supported by empirical evidence. The myths discussed include: 1) an independent chairman always provides better oversight; 2) staggered boards always harm shareholders; 3) directors meeting independence standards are truly independent; 4) interlocked directorships reduce governance quality; 5) CEOs make the best directors; 6) directors face significant liability risks; and 7) company failure is always the board's fault. The document reviews relevant research studies for each myth and finds mixed or inconclusive evidence regarding their impact. It concludes that more attention should be paid to the board process rather than just its structural features in evaluating governance quality.
Brennan, Niamh [2006] Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Is there an E...Prof Niamh M. Brennan
Reflecting investor expectations, most prior corporate governance research attempts to find a relationship between boards of directors and firm performance. This paper critically examines the premise on which this research is based. An expectations gap approach is applied for the first time to implicit expectations which assume a relationship between firm performance and company boards. An expectations gap has two elements: A reasonableness gap and a performance gap. Seven aspects of boards are identified as leading to a reasonableness gap. Five aspects of boards are identified as leading to a performance gap. The paper concludes by suggesting avenues for empirically testing some of the concepts discussed in this paper.
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, PhiladelphiaProfessorAlokeGhosh
- The document examines the relationship between accounting losses/profits and CEO turnover.
- Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1997-2007, it finds losses significantly increase the likelihood of CEO turnover within two years, with the probability increasing further based on the magnitude of the loss.
- Notably, it finds that accounting performance measures are no longer important predictors of turnover once an indicator for losses is included, suggesting losses dominate as a metric for judging managerial competence.
- The document examines how an external emphasis on boards prioritizing the monitoring function can negatively impact their ability to provide resources. It argues that appointing fully independent nominating committees in response to this emphasis undermines resource provision in two ways.
- First, it reduces information sharing between managers and nominating committees, leading to a mismatch between directors' experience and the firm's specific resource needs.
- Second, it decreases trust between the CEO and board, resulting in a less collaborative relationship that hinders resource provision.
- To mitigate these issues, the author proposes including a non-CEO executive on nominating committees to better understand the firm's resource needs and foster a more cooperative CEO-board dynamic.
This document is a dissertation submitted by Danial Adibi in April 2016 for the degree of BSc (Hons) in Accounting and Finance at Cass Business School. The dissertation examines the relationship between corporate governance, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, and analysts' forecasting performance using a sample of 142 companies listed on the FTSE All-Share Index. The literature review discusses prior research on the role of analysts, corporate governance attributes such as board size and composition, and how these may impact analysts' forecast accuracy and bias. The study aims to contribute new evidence on this topic in the UK market.
This paper examines the relationship between mutual fund manager ownership stakes in the funds they manage and the performance of those funds. The author hypothesizes that greater manager ownership will be positively associated with fund returns and negatively associated with fund turnover, as higher ownership would better align manager and shareholder interests by reducing agency costs. Using a dataset of manager ownership disclosures from 2004-2005, the author finds that funds with higher manager ownership had higher returns and lower turnover, supporting the hypotheses. However, manager ownership was not related to a fund's tax burden.
11.concentrated share ownership and financial performance of listed companies...Alexander Decker
This document summarizes previous research on the relationship between concentrated share ownership and financial performance of listed companies. It discusses how agency theory suggests that concentrated ownership can improve performance by reducing agency costs through increased monitoring of managers. However, other research has found potential negative effects of concentrated ownership through manager entrenchment. The document reviews mixed findings in previous empirical studies conducted primarily in developed countries. It argues there is a need for more research in emerging markets like Ghana due to differences in business contexts. The main objective of the study described is to analyze the relationship between share concentration and performance of listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange.
Concentrated share ownership and financial performance of listed companies in...Alexander Decker
This document summarizes a research study that examined the effect of share ownership concentration on the financial performance of listed companies in Ghana. The study used panel data regression analysis to measure performance using Tobin's Q and return on assets, and analyzed the relationship between these performance metrics and ownership concentration, institutional ownership, and insider ownership. The results found statistically significant relationships, suggesting that concentrated ownership, institutional ownership, and insider ownership are positively associated with higher financial performance of companies on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The study concludes that Ghanaian ownership is heavily concentrated and that concentrated structures should be encouraged to improve monitoring and performance.
This document summarizes seven commonly held myths about boards of directors that are not supported by empirical evidence. The myths discussed include: 1) an independent chairman always provides better oversight; 2) staggered boards always harm shareholders; 3) directors meeting independence standards are truly independent; 4) interlocked directorships reduce governance quality; 5) CEOs make the best directors; 6) directors face significant liability risks; and 7) company failure is always the board's fault. The document reviews relevant research studies for each myth and finds mixed or inconclusive evidence regarding their impact. It concludes that more attention should be paid to the board process rather than just its structural features in evaluating governance quality.
Brennan, Niamh [2006] Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Is there an E...Prof Niamh M. Brennan
Reflecting investor expectations, most prior corporate governance research attempts to find a relationship between boards of directors and firm performance. This paper critically examines the premise on which this research is based. An expectations gap approach is applied for the first time to implicit expectations which assume a relationship between firm performance and company boards. An expectations gap has two elements: A reasonableness gap and a performance gap. Seven aspects of boards are identified as leading to a reasonableness gap. Five aspects of boards are identified as leading to a performance gap. The paper concludes by suggesting avenues for empirically testing some of the concepts discussed in this paper.
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, PhiladelphiaProfessorAlokeGhosh
- The document examines the relationship between accounting losses/profits and CEO turnover.
- Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1997-2007, it finds losses significantly increase the likelihood of CEO turnover within two years, with the probability increasing further based on the magnitude of the loss.
- Notably, it finds that accounting performance measures are no longer important predictors of turnover once an indicator for losses is included, suggesting losses dominate as a metric for judging managerial competence.
- The document examines how an external emphasis on boards prioritizing the monitoring function can negatively impact their ability to provide resources. It argues that appointing fully independent nominating committees in response to this emphasis undermines resource provision in two ways.
- First, it reduces information sharing between managers and nominating committees, leading to a mismatch between directors' experience and the firm's specific resource needs.
- Second, it decreases trust between the CEO and board, resulting in a less collaborative relationship that hinders resource provision.
- To mitigate these issues, the author proposes including a non-CEO executive on nominating committees to better understand the firm's resource needs and foster a more cooperative CEO-board dynamic.
This document is a dissertation submitted by Danial Adibi in April 2016 for the degree of BSc (Hons) in Accounting and Finance at Cass Business School. The dissertation examines the relationship between corporate governance, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, and analysts' forecasting performance using a sample of 142 companies listed on the FTSE All-Share Index. The literature review discusses prior research on the role of analysts, corporate governance attributes such as board size and composition, and how these may impact analysts' forecast accuracy and bias. The study aims to contribute new evidence on this topic in the UK market.
Board of director’s characteristics and bank’s insolvency riskAlexander Decker
This document discusses research on the relationship between characteristics of boards of directors and insolvency risk in Tunisian banks. Specifically, it examines the impact of board size, percentage of independent directors, CEO-chairman duality, and board diversity on insolvency risk. The research develops hypotheses about each characteristic, citing prior studies. It proposes that larger board size, higher percentage of independent directors, and greater cognitive diversity (measured by institutional directors) would reduce insolvency risk, while CEO-chairman duality and demographic diversity (measured by foreign directors) may increase risk. The document outlines the methodology that will be used to empirically test these hypotheses.
This document compares the financial performance of ANZ Bank and Commonwealth Bank (CBA) in 2015 based on analysis of their annual reports and key financial ratios. It finds that while CBA outperformed ANZ in terms of profitability, as measured by its higher return on equity ratio of 17.75% compared to ANZ's 14.08%, further analysis of additional financial ratios is needed to understand the drivers of each bank's performance. It analyzes various ratios related to profitability, expenses, assets, interest rates, and efficiency and concludes that overall CBA's performance was better than ANZ's in 2015 due to factors such as higher financial leverage and return on assets as well as better management of earnings and expenses.
The document summarizes a study on the advisory boards of Dutch family businesses. It aims to provide insight into why and how these businesses set up advisory boards through qualitative case studies of eight firms. The study finds that privately held Dutch family businesses set up advisory boards for several reasons: to have a sounding board, to professionalize the business, to support succession planning, to have a controlling mechanism, and to access specific resources. It also finds that the process of setting up an advisory board generally consists of six steps, though the pace differs between firms depending on contextual factors. The study seeks to address gaps in understanding the advisory board's role by taking a practice perspective on their establishment within family businesses.
Internal corporate governance mechanisms and agency co evidence from large ks...Alexander Decker
This document summarizes a study that analyzed the relationship between various internal corporate governance mechanisms and agency costs in large firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange from 2003-2010. The study used two proxies for measuring agency costs - asset utilization ratio and asset liquidity ratio. Several independent variables thought to influence agency costs were examined, including board/committee activities, board size, CEO tenure, block ownership percentage, largest investor percentage, and CEO/chairman duality. The results found that agency costs decreased with more frequent board/committee meetings and lower block ownership. Higher agency costs were associated with larger board size, longer CEO tenure, and CEO/chairman duality.
Does firm volatility affect managerial influenceAlexander Decker
This document discusses how firm volatility may affect managerial influence on firm performance. It develops a theoretical framework drawing from existing literature on group decision-making. The hypothesis is that the effect of managerial ability on firm value differs according to a firm's characteristics like risk and volatility. An empirical analysis tests this hypothesis using data on Korean firms from 1999-2008. Managerial ability is controlled by focusing on those who graduated from top universities. The analysis finds the influence of such managers on Tobin's Q (a measure of firm value) varies interactively with a firm's volatility, market risk, and return variability.
This document summarizes a research paper about using advisory boards as a strategic practice in family businesses. The paper proposes studying advisory boards at the micro-level using a strategy as practice perspective to understand how they are actually used. It presents a case study of a medium-sized family firm that has recently established an advisory board. The paper aims to develop understanding of advisory boards as an informal governance mechanism and identify the enabling and constraining factors of working with one. It argues that a strategy as practice lens can provide rich insights into the routines, interactions, roles and activities involved in an advisory board's strategizing work.
This document summarizes academic literature on trust and its relationship to performance. It defines trust as an expectation of competence, honesty and goodwill. Trust is important when there is risk and lack of control. The document discusses how interpersonal and inter-organizational trust can positively impact performance by easing negotiations and reducing conflict. It also examines how trust within teams can improve cooperation and knowledge sharing, leading to better performance. The document uses a New Year's Eve party case study to analyze how trust was important for its success with little investment.
This document discusses the relationship between corporate social responsibility, financial performance, and institutional ownership. It hypothesizes that financial performance mediates the relationship between social responsibility and institutional ownership. Specifically, it argues that social responsibility can positively or negatively impact financial performance, which then attracts or repels institutional investors when making investment decisions. The document reviews prior literature which has found mixed results on the direct relationship between social responsibility and institutional ownership. It aims to help explain these mixed findings by examining the mediating role of financial performance.
AICD - The role of trust in ensuring business performance and good governanceGordon Irons
This document discusses two research studies on the role of trust in governance and organizational performance. The first study interviewed 100 company Chairs and identified trust as the most important factor enabling effective board decision-making. Specifically, trust allowed for diversity of views, independence of mind, and openness to alternatives. The second study interviewed 50 CEOs and found trust was critical to organizational resilience.
The document analyzes differences in how Chairs and CEOs discussed the role of trust. Chairs emphasized trust's role in enabling critical reflection, while CEOs focused on trust supporting deep relationships. However, both groups saw trust as important for open communication. The document also examines gender differences, finding male Chairs placed more emphasis on trust supporting predict
This document discusses theories of corporate governance, including agency theory, stakeholder theory, and stewardship theory. Agency theory focuses on the relationship between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers), and how separation of ownership and control can lead to issues. Stakeholder theory considers a wider group beyond just shareholders. Stewardship theory views managers as stewards aiming to achieve high performance. The document argues the best approach combines aspects of stakeholder and stewardship theories.
Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchmentLucianus Kelen
This paper examines the relationship between classified boards and firm value. It finds that classified boards, which stagger the election of directors over multiple years, are associated with lower firm value. The paper also finds evidence that classified boards entrench management and reduce accountability to shareholders. Specifically, classified boards decrease the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance, reduce the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance, deter proxy contests led by shareholders, and decrease the likelihood that shareholder proposals will be implemented. The evidence suggests classified boards hurt shareholders by insulating management from market discipline rather than providing benefits related to stability and continuity.
This document summarizes a research paper about mutual fund flows and performance. It contains the following key points:
1) The paper presents a rational model of active portfolio management that can reproduce many observed patterns in mutual fund performance and flows, without relying on investor irrationality.
2) In the model, fund flows rationally respond to past performance even though performance is not persistent on average, due to competitive capital allocation to managers.
3) The model shows that lack of performance persistence does not imply managers lack skill or that evaluating performance is wasteful, as differential ability exists but is not consistently rewarded due to competitive capital allocation.
This document discusses a research paper that investigates why mutual fund performance does not persist over the long run. It finds that fund flows and manager changes act as mechanisms that prevent persistent outperformance or underperformance. For winner funds, high inflows reduce future performance, and losing a top manager also lowers returns. However, winner funds not experiencing high inflows or a manager change outperform those facing both by 3.6% annually. For loser funds, internal governance through manager replacement is more important than external governance from outflows. Firing an underperforming manager and experiencing outflows together improves future performance more than the individual effects alone.
This study examines how hedge fund manager characteristics impact fund performance. The authors analyze data on over 1,000 hedge fund managers, including SAT scores, education levels, work experience, and age. They find managers from higher-SAT undergraduate institutions tend to have higher raw and risk-adjusted returns, more inflows, and take less risk. Unlike mutual funds, the study also finds hedge fund flows do not negatively impact future performance.
This paper examines the relationship between portfolio manager ownership stakes in the mutual funds they manage and those funds' future performance. The paper finds:
1) Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the average stake represents a modest percentage of assets under management.
2) Higher managerial ownership is positively associated with improved future risk-adjusted fund performance - performance improves by about 3 basis points for each 1 basis point of managerial ownership.
3) Both the component of managerial ownership predicted by other fund characteristics and the residual component are significant in predicting future fund performance, indicating managerial ownership provides new information to investors.
This document is a dissertation submitted by Mohit Kumar to Leeds University Business School in partial fulfillment of an MSc in Finance and Investment. The dissertation examines the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance during a financial crisis using a sample of 180 UK firms from 2009-2011. The dissertation includes an abstract, acknowledgements, table of contents, literature review on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, research methods and methodology, findings and conclusions.
IMPACT OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS – AN INDIAN STUDYAMITENDRA SINGH
This study examines the impact of family ownership characteristics on capital structure decisions of Indian firms. Prior literature provides mixed evidence on whether family firms prefer more debt or equity. Some research suggests family firms use more debt to maintain control by avoiding dilution of voting rights from issuing equity. However, others argue family firms prefer less debt to reduce the high firm-specific risk associated with their undiversified ownership stakes. This study aims to investigate which motivation, control or risk reduction, dominates for Indian family firms by analyzing the relationship between various family ownership characteristics and leverage. The results will provide insights on the capital structure behavior of a key type of firms, family businesses, that dominate the Indian corporate landscape.
r Academy of Management Journal2015, Vol. 1015, No. 1, 1–9..docxmakdul
r Academy of Management Journal
2015, Vol. 1015, No. 1, 1–9.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2014.4006
FROM THE EDITORS
RETHINKING GOVERNANCE IN MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
In the field of management, the study of gover-
nance has primarily dealt with decision-making by
boards of directors, chief executives, and senior
managers. The corporate governance literature has
generated important insights regarding incentive
alignment, risk taking, and coordination chal-
lenges. Emerging trends, highlighted in this issue,
raise new questions regarding managerial roles,
organizational contexts, internal and social pro-
cesses, and changes in governance over time. We
encourage management scholars to rethink their
approach to governance research by considering
stakeholder engagement, the implications of big
data, social impact, global dimensions, and com-
parative analysis of governance. A broadened con-
ceptualization of governance may also deal with the
dynamics of interorganizational arrangements, in-
cluding the co-creation of organizations of varying
governance forms.
WHAT IS GOVERNANCE?
In this “thematic issue,” we assembled articles
that reflect evolving practices in governance.1
Corporate governance is the system by which
companies are directed and controlled. Boards of
directors are responsible for the governance of
their companies. The shareholders’ role in gover-
nance is to appoint the directors and the auditors
and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate gov-
ernance structure is in place. The responsibilities
of the board include setting the company’s strategic
aims, providing the leadership to put them into
effect, supervising the management of the business,
and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship.
The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations,
and the shareholders in general meeting (Cadbury,
1992). Corporate governance is therefore about
what the board of a company does and how it sets
the values of the company, but is distinct from the
operational management of the company by full-
time executives.
These views of corporate governance stem pre-
dominantly from a financial perspective. For ex-
ample, Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) address
corporate governance as “the ways in which sup-
pliers of finance to corporations assure themselves
of getting a return on their investment. How do the
suppliers of finance get managers to return some
of the profits to them? How do they make sure
that managers do not steal the capital they supply
or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers
of finance control managers?” These views stem
primarily from an agency theoretical perspective
that investigates the consequences of separation of
ownership and control in the modern corporation
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Recent corporate ac-
tivity and views, however, have an expanded view
of governance as involving stewardship and lead-
ership, in addition to the narrower financial pru-
dence role. From a survey of board members from
15 countri ...
This paper presents a model to value cash holdings for all-equity financed firms with growth opportunities. The model considers the tradeoff between agency costs of free cash flow and costs of external financing. It derives the optimal dynamic cash retention policy and shows that firms optimally retain only a fraction of cash flows. The model implies that high cash flow volatility decreases the value of cash and that optimal cash retention can delay investment timing. Empirical tests on US firm data from 1980-2010 confirm these implications, finding a negative relationship between cash value and volatility in the context of growth options.
JP Morgan Chase The Balance Between Serving Customers and Maxim.docxpauline234567
JP Morgan Chase: The Balance Between Serving Customers and Maximizing Shareholder Wealth
Penelope Bender
William Woods University
BUS 585: Integrated Studies in Business Administration
Dr. Leathers
Abstract
This paper investigates why JP Morgan Chase and other financial institutions struggle to balance client interests over maximizing wealth.
It is an exploratory study done through literature review.
Often financial institutions, like JP Morgan, put profits ahead of the interests of those they serve.
The paper contributes to better understanding of corporate culture.
This paper investigates why JP Morgan Chase and other financial institutions struggle to balance client interests over maximizing shareholder wealth. This exploratory study is done through a literature review to answer why financial institutions, specifically JP Morgan, often put profits ahead of those they serve. The study will provide evidence of the complex nature of balancing client interests over maximizing shareholder and individual wealth and the need for tighter internal and external oversight. This paper contributes to a better understanding of why corporate culture encourages profit over stakeholders’ interests.
2
Research Question
Why does JP Morgan Chase and other financial institutions struggle to balance client interests over maximizing shareholder wealth?
Employees of JP Morgan Chase and other large banks work in their best interests to increase wealth and succeed by meeting management goals. However, because of the complex nature of large banks, an individual(s), unethical behavior can go unchecked.
3
Problem Statement
JP Morgan Chase competes globally and faces competition from other large banks in the US and abroad.
JP Morgan Chase is part of a complex system of regulation, self-interests, and wealth creation.
The interests of shareholders and investors is sometimes overshadowed by agents working in their own best interests.
Financial markets are a complex web of interests, and because of opportunities for individual profits, regulating individual’s actions without stricter regulations and internal oversight is impossible.
The study is not meant to be a moral or ethical analysis but merely why the complex relationship exists and will continue to exist in capitalist society. This paper contributes to a better understanding of why capitalism or financialism’s (Clarke, 2014) fundamentals encourage wealth creation. Financial markets are a complex web of interests, and because of opportunities for individual profits, regulating individual’s actions without stricter regulations and internal oversight is impossible.
4
Literature Review
The literature review showed a connection between self-interests, regulators, competition, and risk, which all lead to a complex system of conflicting agendas.
5
How Self-Interests Influence Behavior
Ross (1973) explains that all employment relationships are agency relationships and moral hazards are generally .
Board of director’s characteristics and bank’s insolvency riskAlexander Decker
This document discusses research on the relationship between characteristics of boards of directors and insolvency risk in Tunisian banks. Specifically, it examines the impact of board size, percentage of independent directors, CEO-chairman duality, and board diversity on insolvency risk. The research develops hypotheses about each characteristic, citing prior studies. It proposes that larger board size, higher percentage of independent directors, and greater cognitive diversity (measured by institutional directors) would reduce insolvency risk, while CEO-chairman duality and demographic diversity (measured by foreign directors) may increase risk. The document outlines the methodology that will be used to empirically test these hypotheses.
This document compares the financial performance of ANZ Bank and Commonwealth Bank (CBA) in 2015 based on analysis of their annual reports and key financial ratios. It finds that while CBA outperformed ANZ in terms of profitability, as measured by its higher return on equity ratio of 17.75% compared to ANZ's 14.08%, further analysis of additional financial ratios is needed to understand the drivers of each bank's performance. It analyzes various ratios related to profitability, expenses, assets, interest rates, and efficiency and concludes that overall CBA's performance was better than ANZ's in 2015 due to factors such as higher financial leverage and return on assets as well as better management of earnings and expenses.
The document summarizes a study on the advisory boards of Dutch family businesses. It aims to provide insight into why and how these businesses set up advisory boards through qualitative case studies of eight firms. The study finds that privately held Dutch family businesses set up advisory boards for several reasons: to have a sounding board, to professionalize the business, to support succession planning, to have a controlling mechanism, and to access specific resources. It also finds that the process of setting up an advisory board generally consists of six steps, though the pace differs between firms depending on contextual factors. The study seeks to address gaps in understanding the advisory board's role by taking a practice perspective on their establishment within family businesses.
Internal corporate governance mechanisms and agency co evidence from large ks...Alexander Decker
This document summarizes a study that analyzed the relationship between various internal corporate governance mechanisms and agency costs in large firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange from 2003-2010. The study used two proxies for measuring agency costs - asset utilization ratio and asset liquidity ratio. Several independent variables thought to influence agency costs were examined, including board/committee activities, board size, CEO tenure, block ownership percentage, largest investor percentage, and CEO/chairman duality. The results found that agency costs decreased with more frequent board/committee meetings and lower block ownership. Higher agency costs were associated with larger board size, longer CEO tenure, and CEO/chairman duality.
Does firm volatility affect managerial influenceAlexander Decker
This document discusses how firm volatility may affect managerial influence on firm performance. It develops a theoretical framework drawing from existing literature on group decision-making. The hypothesis is that the effect of managerial ability on firm value differs according to a firm's characteristics like risk and volatility. An empirical analysis tests this hypothesis using data on Korean firms from 1999-2008. Managerial ability is controlled by focusing on those who graduated from top universities. The analysis finds the influence of such managers on Tobin's Q (a measure of firm value) varies interactively with a firm's volatility, market risk, and return variability.
This document summarizes a research paper about using advisory boards as a strategic practice in family businesses. The paper proposes studying advisory boards at the micro-level using a strategy as practice perspective to understand how they are actually used. It presents a case study of a medium-sized family firm that has recently established an advisory board. The paper aims to develop understanding of advisory boards as an informal governance mechanism and identify the enabling and constraining factors of working with one. It argues that a strategy as practice lens can provide rich insights into the routines, interactions, roles and activities involved in an advisory board's strategizing work.
This document summarizes academic literature on trust and its relationship to performance. It defines trust as an expectation of competence, honesty and goodwill. Trust is important when there is risk and lack of control. The document discusses how interpersonal and inter-organizational trust can positively impact performance by easing negotiations and reducing conflict. It also examines how trust within teams can improve cooperation and knowledge sharing, leading to better performance. The document uses a New Year's Eve party case study to analyze how trust was important for its success with little investment.
This document discusses the relationship between corporate social responsibility, financial performance, and institutional ownership. It hypothesizes that financial performance mediates the relationship between social responsibility and institutional ownership. Specifically, it argues that social responsibility can positively or negatively impact financial performance, which then attracts or repels institutional investors when making investment decisions. The document reviews prior literature which has found mixed results on the direct relationship between social responsibility and institutional ownership. It aims to help explain these mixed findings by examining the mediating role of financial performance.
AICD - The role of trust in ensuring business performance and good governanceGordon Irons
This document discusses two research studies on the role of trust in governance and organizational performance. The first study interviewed 100 company Chairs and identified trust as the most important factor enabling effective board decision-making. Specifically, trust allowed for diversity of views, independence of mind, and openness to alternatives. The second study interviewed 50 CEOs and found trust was critical to organizational resilience.
The document analyzes differences in how Chairs and CEOs discussed the role of trust. Chairs emphasized trust's role in enabling critical reflection, while CEOs focused on trust supporting deep relationships. However, both groups saw trust as important for open communication. The document also examines gender differences, finding male Chairs placed more emphasis on trust supporting predict
This document discusses theories of corporate governance, including agency theory, stakeholder theory, and stewardship theory. Agency theory focuses on the relationship between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers), and how separation of ownership and control can lead to issues. Stakeholder theory considers a wider group beyond just shareholders. Stewardship theory views managers as stewards aiming to achieve high performance. The document argues the best approach combines aspects of stakeholder and stewardship theories.
Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchmentLucianus Kelen
This paper examines the relationship between classified boards and firm value. It finds that classified boards, which stagger the election of directors over multiple years, are associated with lower firm value. The paper also finds evidence that classified boards entrench management and reduce accountability to shareholders. Specifically, classified boards decrease the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance, reduce the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance, deter proxy contests led by shareholders, and decrease the likelihood that shareholder proposals will be implemented. The evidence suggests classified boards hurt shareholders by insulating management from market discipline rather than providing benefits related to stability and continuity.
This document summarizes a research paper about mutual fund flows and performance. It contains the following key points:
1) The paper presents a rational model of active portfolio management that can reproduce many observed patterns in mutual fund performance and flows, without relying on investor irrationality.
2) In the model, fund flows rationally respond to past performance even though performance is not persistent on average, due to competitive capital allocation to managers.
3) The model shows that lack of performance persistence does not imply managers lack skill or that evaluating performance is wasteful, as differential ability exists but is not consistently rewarded due to competitive capital allocation.
This document discusses a research paper that investigates why mutual fund performance does not persist over the long run. It finds that fund flows and manager changes act as mechanisms that prevent persistent outperformance or underperformance. For winner funds, high inflows reduce future performance, and losing a top manager also lowers returns. However, winner funds not experiencing high inflows or a manager change outperform those facing both by 3.6% annually. For loser funds, internal governance through manager replacement is more important than external governance from outflows. Firing an underperforming manager and experiencing outflows together improves future performance more than the individual effects alone.
This study examines how hedge fund manager characteristics impact fund performance. The authors analyze data on over 1,000 hedge fund managers, including SAT scores, education levels, work experience, and age. They find managers from higher-SAT undergraduate institutions tend to have higher raw and risk-adjusted returns, more inflows, and take less risk. Unlike mutual funds, the study also finds hedge fund flows do not negatively impact future performance.
This paper examines the relationship between portfolio manager ownership stakes in the mutual funds they manage and those funds' future performance. The paper finds:
1) Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the average stake represents a modest percentage of assets under management.
2) Higher managerial ownership is positively associated with improved future risk-adjusted fund performance - performance improves by about 3 basis points for each 1 basis point of managerial ownership.
3) Both the component of managerial ownership predicted by other fund characteristics and the residual component are significant in predicting future fund performance, indicating managerial ownership provides new information to investors.
This document is a dissertation submitted by Mohit Kumar to Leeds University Business School in partial fulfillment of an MSc in Finance and Investment. The dissertation examines the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance during a financial crisis using a sample of 180 UK firms from 2009-2011. The dissertation includes an abstract, acknowledgements, table of contents, literature review on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, research methods and methodology, findings and conclusions.
IMPACT OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS – AN INDIAN STUDYAMITENDRA SINGH
This study examines the impact of family ownership characteristics on capital structure decisions of Indian firms. Prior literature provides mixed evidence on whether family firms prefer more debt or equity. Some research suggests family firms use more debt to maintain control by avoiding dilution of voting rights from issuing equity. However, others argue family firms prefer less debt to reduce the high firm-specific risk associated with their undiversified ownership stakes. This study aims to investigate which motivation, control or risk reduction, dominates for Indian family firms by analyzing the relationship between various family ownership characteristics and leverage. The results will provide insights on the capital structure behavior of a key type of firms, family businesses, that dominate the Indian corporate landscape.
r Academy of Management Journal2015, Vol. 1015, No. 1, 1–9..docxmakdul
r Academy of Management Journal
2015, Vol. 1015, No. 1, 1–9.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2014.4006
FROM THE EDITORS
RETHINKING GOVERNANCE IN MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
In the field of management, the study of gover-
nance has primarily dealt with decision-making by
boards of directors, chief executives, and senior
managers. The corporate governance literature has
generated important insights regarding incentive
alignment, risk taking, and coordination chal-
lenges. Emerging trends, highlighted in this issue,
raise new questions regarding managerial roles,
organizational contexts, internal and social pro-
cesses, and changes in governance over time. We
encourage management scholars to rethink their
approach to governance research by considering
stakeholder engagement, the implications of big
data, social impact, global dimensions, and com-
parative analysis of governance. A broadened con-
ceptualization of governance may also deal with the
dynamics of interorganizational arrangements, in-
cluding the co-creation of organizations of varying
governance forms.
WHAT IS GOVERNANCE?
In this “thematic issue,” we assembled articles
that reflect evolving practices in governance.1
Corporate governance is the system by which
companies are directed and controlled. Boards of
directors are responsible for the governance of
their companies. The shareholders’ role in gover-
nance is to appoint the directors and the auditors
and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate gov-
ernance structure is in place. The responsibilities
of the board include setting the company’s strategic
aims, providing the leadership to put them into
effect, supervising the management of the business,
and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship.
The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations,
and the shareholders in general meeting (Cadbury,
1992). Corporate governance is therefore about
what the board of a company does and how it sets
the values of the company, but is distinct from the
operational management of the company by full-
time executives.
These views of corporate governance stem pre-
dominantly from a financial perspective. For ex-
ample, Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) address
corporate governance as “the ways in which sup-
pliers of finance to corporations assure themselves
of getting a return on their investment. How do the
suppliers of finance get managers to return some
of the profits to them? How do they make sure
that managers do not steal the capital they supply
or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers
of finance control managers?” These views stem
primarily from an agency theoretical perspective
that investigates the consequences of separation of
ownership and control in the modern corporation
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Recent corporate ac-
tivity and views, however, have an expanded view
of governance as involving stewardship and lead-
ership, in addition to the narrower financial pru-
dence role. From a survey of board members from
15 countri ...
This paper presents a model to value cash holdings for all-equity financed firms with growth opportunities. The model considers the tradeoff between agency costs of free cash flow and costs of external financing. It derives the optimal dynamic cash retention policy and shows that firms optimally retain only a fraction of cash flows. The model implies that high cash flow volatility decreases the value of cash and that optimal cash retention can delay investment timing. Empirical tests on US firm data from 1980-2010 confirm these implications, finding a negative relationship between cash value and volatility in the context of growth options.
JP Morgan Chase The Balance Between Serving Customers and Maxim.docxpauline234567
JP Morgan Chase: The Balance Between Serving Customers and Maximizing Shareholder Wealth
Penelope Bender
William Woods University
BUS 585: Integrated Studies in Business Administration
Dr. Leathers
Abstract
This paper investigates why JP Morgan Chase and other financial institutions struggle to balance client interests over maximizing wealth.
It is an exploratory study done through literature review.
Often financial institutions, like JP Morgan, put profits ahead of the interests of those they serve.
The paper contributes to better understanding of corporate culture.
This paper investigates why JP Morgan Chase and other financial institutions struggle to balance client interests over maximizing shareholder wealth. This exploratory study is done through a literature review to answer why financial institutions, specifically JP Morgan, often put profits ahead of those they serve. The study will provide evidence of the complex nature of balancing client interests over maximizing shareholder and individual wealth and the need for tighter internal and external oversight. This paper contributes to a better understanding of why corporate culture encourages profit over stakeholders’ interests.
2
Research Question
Why does JP Morgan Chase and other financial institutions struggle to balance client interests over maximizing shareholder wealth?
Employees of JP Morgan Chase and other large banks work in their best interests to increase wealth and succeed by meeting management goals. However, because of the complex nature of large banks, an individual(s), unethical behavior can go unchecked.
3
Problem Statement
JP Morgan Chase competes globally and faces competition from other large banks in the US and abroad.
JP Morgan Chase is part of a complex system of regulation, self-interests, and wealth creation.
The interests of shareholders and investors is sometimes overshadowed by agents working in their own best interests.
Financial markets are a complex web of interests, and because of opportunities for individual profits, regulating individual’s actions without stricter regulations and internal oversight is impossible.
The study is not meant to be a moral or ethical analysis but merely why the complex relationship exists and will continue to exist in capitalist society. This paper contributes to a better understanding of why capitalism or financialism’s (Clarke, 2014) fundamentals encourage wealth creation. Financial markets are a complex web of interests, and because of opportunities for individual profits, regulating individual’s actions without stricter regulations and internal oversight is impossible.
4
Literature Review
The literature review showed a connection between self-interests, regulators, competition, and risk, which all lead to a complex system of conflicting agendas.
5
How Self-Interests Influence Behavior
Ross (1973) explains that all employment relationships are agency relationships and moral hazards are generally .
This document discusses the effective management of capital structure. It begins by defining capital structure as the mix of debt and equity used to finance a firm. It then reviews several theories around optimal capital structure, including the Modigliani-Miller theory and more recent market timing theory. The document presents the methodology used, which was a qualitative analysis of secondary literature. It discusses the results, including that an optimal capital structure balances debt and equity to minimize costs. Finally, it concludes that financial performance depends on a well-structured mix of debt, preferred stock, and common equity.
Determinants of capital_structure_an_empR Ehan Raja
This document summarizes a research paper that investigates the determinants of capital structure for manufacturing firms in Pakistan. The paper reviews various capital structure theories and identifies firm-specific factors that may influence a firm's debt ratio. An empirical analysis is then conducted using data from 160 Pakistani manufacturing firms to determine which factors, such as profitability, size, liquidity, etc., are significantly related to the debt ratios of these firms. The findings indicate several factors predicted by trade-off theory, pecking order theory, and agency theory help explain the financing behavior of Pakistani firms, suggesting some universal applicability of capital structure models from Western settings.
Corporate governance and bank performance: Empirical evidence from Nepalese f...Rajesh Gupta
This paper examines the effects of corporate governance on bank performance in the context of Nepal. Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are dependent variables for bank performance, and board size, female board members, financial institutions, CEO duality, independent directors, firm size, firm age, earnings per share, and the capital adequacy ratio are independent variables for corporate governance.
Earnings managment and ownership structure evidence from nigeriaAlexander Decker
This document examines the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management in Nigeria using data from the banking sector. It discusses prior literature on earnings management and how it relates to insider ownership, institutional ownership, and external block ownership. The study aims to determine if there are significant relationships between each type of ownership and earnings management. The methodology employs a pooled data design using secondary data from 10 Nigerian banks from 2006-2010. Regression analysis will be used to analyze the relationships and test hypotheses regarding the impact of ownership structure on earnings management.
Prior performance and risk taking ammannbfmresearch
This document discusses using a dynamic Bayesian network approach to analyze the behavior of mutual fund managers, specifically how prior performance impacts risk-taking. The key findings are:
1) In contrast to some theories and studies, the analysis found that prior performance has a positive impact on the choice of risk level - successful fund managers take on more risk in the following year by increasing measures like volatility, beta, and tracking error.
2) Poor-performing fund managers were found to switch to more passive strategies.
3) Bayesian networks allow capturing nonlinear patterns and assigning probabilities to different outcomes, providing a more robust approach than previous studies on this topic.
This document summarizes research that challenges several commonly held beliefs about best practices for corporate boards of directors. It discusses four such myths:
1. That the chairman should always be independent of the CEO. Research finds no consistent relationship between chairman independence and company performance, and in some cases forced separation can hurt the company.
2. That staggered boards are always bad for shareholders. While they can entrench poor management, staggered boards can also benefit shareholders by allowing long-term planning and protecting valuable company assets.
3. That directors meeting NYSE independence standards are truly independent. Factors like social connections can compromise a director's independence even if they meet regulatory standards.
4. That interlocked directorships always
This study examines the impact of corporate governance and investor confidence on earnings management of firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. It uses annual data from 2015 for a sample of 408 Thai listed companies, excluding financial firms. Structural equation modeling is used to analyze the direct and indirect relationships between variables. Corporate governance factors examined include the largest shareholder, CEO duality, institutional ownership, board size, and auditor (Big 4 firm). Earnings management is measured using discretionary accruals. Investor confidence is represented by return on equity. The results found that the largest shareholder influences earnings management and investor confidence the most. Institutional ownership influences both earnings management and investor confidence. Having a Big 4 auditor influences investor confidence. However,
This document summarizes a study comparing the performance of mutual funds managed by individual managers versus teams of managers. The study finds that funds managed by teams have similar risk-adjusted performance to individually-managed funds, despite team-managed funds growing at a faster rate. Additionally, team-managed funds have significantly lower risk, lower cross-sectional performance differences, lower expenses, and lower portfolio factor loadings than individually-managed funds. The study uses a large sample of domestic and international mutual funds to test these findings.
Contoh Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Profitabilitas Terhadap Nilai PerusahaanTrisnadi Wijaya
1) The study examines how profitability influences firm value, with capital structure (leverage) as a mediator, and industry type and firm size as moderators.
2) The authors hypothesize that profitability has a positive effect on firm value but a negative effect on leverage. Leverage, in turn, is expected to negatively impact firm value.
3) Industry type and firm size are expected to moderate the relationships between profitability, leverage, and firm value. The study uses data from Taiwanese listed companies to test these hypotheses.
This document summarizes a study examining 125 equity mutual funds that closed to new investment between 1993 and 2004. The study tests three hypotheses about why funds close: 1) The "good steward" hypothesis argues funds close to restrict inflows and maintain performance, and will perform well after reopening. 2) The "cheap talk" hypothesis posits closing has no real cost if fees increase and existing investors contribute, compensating managers. 3) The "family spillover" hypothesis claims closing diverts attention to other funds in the same family. The study finds little support for good steward performance, but evidence managers raise fees consistent with cheap talk, and little family benefit except briefly around closure.
Standard & poor's 16768282 fund-factors-2009 jan1bfmresearch
This document summarizes a study by Standard & Poor's on factors that predict investment fund performance. The study analyzed both qualitative factors like fund size, expenses, and age as well as quantitative metrics like Jensen's alpha and information ratio. The key findings were:
- For developed markets, larger funds with lower expenses tended to outperform. But for emerging markets, smaller funds did better due to differences in liquidity.
- Jensen's alpha and information ratio best predicted future performance of developed market equity funds over shorter time periods.
- Past performance was informative over 2 years but less so over 1 year due to noise. Fund selection should focus on factors predicting shorter term outperformance.
Performance emergingfixedincomemanagers joi_is age just a numberbfmresearch
1) Younger fixed-income managers tend to outperform older, more established managers in terms of gross returns. Returns are significantly higher for emerging managers in their first year and first five years compared to later years.
2) The study examines 54 fixed-income managers formed since 1985 that had majority employee ownership. Most were formed before 2000, when barriers to entry increased.
3) Business risk is low for emerging managers, as only 6.8% of the 88 examined managers are no longer in business. Higher first-year and early-period returns for emerging managers indicate they provide alpha during their hungry startup phase.
This document analyzes different categories of active mutual fund management based on measures of Active Share and tracking error. It finds that the most active stock pickers have outperformed their benchmarks after fees, while closet indexers and funds focusing on factor bets have underperformed after fees. Performance patterns were similar during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Closet indexing has become more popular recently. Fund performance can be predicted by cross-sectional stock return dispersion, favoring active stock pickers when dispersion is higher.
The document summarizes findings from the Standard & Poor's Indices Versus Active Funds (SPIVA) Scorecard, which compares the performance of actively managed mutual funds to relevant benchmarks. Some key points:
- Over the past 3 years, the majority (over 50%) of actively managed large-cap, mid-cap, small-cap, global, international, and emerging market funds underperformed their benchmarks.
- Over the past 5 years, indices outperformed a majority of active managers in nearly all major domestic and international equity categories based on equal-weighted returns. Asset-weighted averages also showed underperformance in 11 out of 18 domestic categories.
- For fixed income funds, over 50% under
This document summarizes research on the relationship between portfolio turnover and investment performance. Recent studies have found no evidence that higher portfolio turnover leads to lower returns, as was previously thought. Trading costs have declined over time, and portfolio turnover is not a good proxy for actual trading costs, which depend more on trade size and type of security traded. A 2007 study directly estimated trading costs and found no clear correlation between costs and returns. The author's own analysis of mutual funds from 2007-2008 also found little relationship between turnover and performance. Therefore, advisors should not assume higher turnover means lower returns.
This document discusses using active share and tracking error as measures of portfolio manager skill. It defines active share as the percentage of a fund's portfolio that differs from its benchmark index. Tracking error measures systematic factor risk by capturing how much a fund's returns vary from its benchmark. Research shows funds with high active share and moderate tracking error tend to outperform on average. The document examines how active share and tracking error can help identify skillful managers by focusing on their portfolio construction process rather than just past returns.
This document is a guide to the markets published by JPMorgan that provides data and analysis across various asset classes including equities, fixed income, international markets, and the economy. It includes sections on returns by investment style and sector for equities, economic indicators and drivers, interest rates and other data for fixed income, international market returns and valuations, and asset class performance and correlations. The guide contains over 60 charts and analyses global and domestic financial trends and investment opportunities.
The document discusses whether the concept of "Alpha" is a useful performance metric for investors. It makes two main arguments:
1) Alpha alone does not determine if a portfolio has superior risk-adjusted returns, as portfolio volatility and correlation to benchmarks also influence risk-adjusted returns.
2) Alpha is dependent on leverage - a higher reported Alpha could simply be due to using leverage rather than superior investment skill.
The document concludes that Alpha is a misleading performance measure and not suitable as the sole metric, especially for investors concerned with total risk and returns rather than just a single return component.
Fis group study on emerging managers performance drivers 2007bfmresearch
This study examined the performance of emerging investment managers over three years ending in 2006. It found that:
1) For large cap managers, increased firm assets were negatively correlated with risk-adjusted returns for core and growth strategies, but not for value. This may be because increased assets led to less concentrated core portfolios, lowering returns.
2) For small cap managers, risk-adjusted returns were highest for firms with less than $500 million in assets, possibly due to added resources like analysts. Returns leveled off between $500 million and $1 billion, and declined above $1 billion.
3) Having more research analysts was consistently positively correlated with higher risk-adjusted returns across strategies, while the impact
The document discusses Barclays' process for evaluating and selecting investment managers. It states that identifying the right asset allocation and implementing it properly are both important for achieving investment goals. The process involves both science, through a formal and structured methodology, and art, by applying judgment and philosophy. Barclays aims to identify managers most likely to perform well through rigorous due diligence and ongoing monitoring. The paper will explain Barclays' comprehensive approach to manager analysis, selection, and review.
Active managementmostlyefficientmarkets fajbfmresearch
This survey of literature on active vs passive management shows:
1) On average, actively managed funds do not outperform the market after accounting for fees and expenses, though a minority do add value.
2) Studies suggest some investors may be able to identify superior active managers in advance using public information.
3) Investors who identify superior active managers could improve their risk-adjusted returns by including some exposure to active strategies.
This document summarizes recent academic research on active equity managers who deliver persistent outperformance. It discusses studies finding that:
1) While the average equity manager underperforms after fees, a minority of managers have demonstrated persistent outperformance that cannot be attributed to chance alone.
2) Managers with higher "active share" (the degree to which their portfolio composition differs from the benchmark) tend to generate greater risk-adjusted returns.
3) Managers with lower portfolio turnover and a focus on strong stock selection, rather than market timing, are more likely to outperform over time.
The document evaluates how Brown Advisory's investment approach aligns with the characteristics identified in these studies as being associated with persistent
The document discusses China's transition to a consumer-driven economy. It provides analysis from CLSA China Macro Strategist Andy Rothman on trends in China's economy including the declining importance of exports, strong growth in domestic consumption, increasing incomes driving spending, and continued growth in infrastructure investment. The analysis suggests China's economy remains healthy and growing despite slowing external demand.
This report provides an analysis of defined contribution retirement plans based on 2010 Vanguard recordkeeping data. Some key findings include:
- Median and average account balances reached their highest levels since tracking began in 1999, recovering from market declines.
- Use of target-date funds as investment options and default investments continues to grow significantly, with 42% of participants using them and 20% wholly invested in a single target-date fund.
- Professionally managed investment options like target-date funds are being used by an increasing number of participants, with 29% solely invested in an automatic investment program in 2010 compared to just 9% in 2005.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
This study explores performance persistence in mutual funds. The authors find:
1) Funds that perform relatively poorly compared to peers and benchmarks are more likely to disappear, indicating survivorship bias can be relevant in mutual fund studies.
2) Mutual fund performance persists from year to year on a risk-adjusted basis, though much of the persistence is due to repeated underperformance relative to benchmarks.
3) Persistence patterns vary dramatically between time periods, suggesting performance is correlated across managers due to common strategies not captured by risk adjustments. Poorly performing funds also persist instead of being fully eliminated by the market.
This study examines persistence in mutual fund performance over 1962-1993 using a survivorship-bias-free database. The author finds:
1) Common factors in stock returns and differences in mutual fund expenses explain almost all persistence in mutual fund returns, with the exception of strong underperformance by the worst-performing funds.
2) The "hot hands effect" documented in prior literature is driven by the one-year momentum effect in stock returns, but individual funds do not earn higher returns from actively following momentum strategies after accounting for costs.
3) Expenses have a negative impact on performance of at least one-for-one, and higher turnover also negatively impacts performance, reducing returns by around 0.95
Information ratio mgrevaluation_bossertbfmresearch
This document discusses using the Information Ratio (IR) to evaluate mutual fund managers. The IR measures excess return over a benchmark relative to excess return volatility. While commonly used, the IR has limitations that depend on benchmark choice, data frequency, and fund return distributions. The document aims to empirically analyze IR characteristics across different asset classes and countries to determine if it is a reliable performance measure or if guidelines are needed for its use.
This document discusses returns-based style analysis (RBSA), a technique developed by William Sharpe to determine the style of a portfolio or mutual fund using only returns data. The document provides an overview of RBSA and compares it to holdings-based style analysis. It then describes how to implement RBSA using Excel by constructing a portfolio of indices to minimize the tracking error between the returns of the portfolio being analyzed and the index portfolio returns. The document concludes by providing an example RBSA using the Dodge & Cox Balanced Fund to illustrate the technique.
Solution Manual For Financial Accounting, 8th Canadian Edition 2024, by Libby...Donc Test
Solution Manual For Financial Accounting, 8th Canadian Edition 2024, by Libby, Hodge, Verified Chapters 1 - 13, Complete Newest Version Solution Manual For Financial Accounting, 8th Canadian Edition by Libby, Hodge, Verified Chapters 1 - 13, Complete Newest Version Solution Manual For Financial Accounting 8th Canadian Edition Pdf Chapters Download Stuvia Solution Manual For Financial Accounting 8th Canadian Edition Ebook Download Stuvia Solution Manual For Financial Accounting 8th Canadian Edition Pdf Solution Manual For Financial Accounting 8th Canadian Edition Pdf Download Stuvia Financial Accounting 8th Canadian Edition Pdf Chapters Download Stuvia Financial Accounting 8th Canadian Edition Ebook Download Stuvia Financial Accounting 8th Canadian Edition Pdf Financial Accounting 8th Canadian Edition Pdf Download Stuvia
5 Tips for Creating Standard Financial ReportsEasyReports
Well-crafted financial reports serve as vital tools for decision-making and transparency within an organization. By following the undermentioned tips, you can create standardized financial reports that effectively communicate your company's financial health and performance to stakeholders.
Fabular Frames and the Four Ratio ProblemMajid Iqbal
Digital, interactive art showing the struggle of a society in providing for its present population while also saving planetary resources for future generations. Spread across several frames, the art is actually the rendering of real and speculative data. The stereographic projections change shape in response to prompts and provocations. Visitors interact with the model through speculative statements about how to increase savings across communities, regions, ecosystems and environments. Their fabulations combined with random noise, i.e. factors beyond control, have a dramatic effect on the societal transition. Things get better. Things get worse. The aim is to give visitors a new grasp and feel of the ongoing struggles in democracies around the world.
Stunning art in the small multiples format brings out the spatiotemporal nature of societal transitions, against backdrop issues such as energy, housing, waste, farmland and forest. In each frame we see hopeful and frightful interplays between spending and saving. Problems emerge when one of the two parts of the existential anaglyph rapidly shrinks like Arctic ice, as factors cross thresholds. Ecological wealth and intergenerational equity areFour at stake. Not enough spending could mean economic stress, social unrest and political conflict. Not enough saving and there will be climate breakdown and ‘bankruptcy’. So where does speculative design start and the gambling and betting end? Behind each fabular frame is a four ratio problem. Each ratio reflects the level of sacrifice and self-restraint a society is willing to accept, against promises of prosperity and freedom. Some values seem to stabilise a frame while others cause collapse. Get the ratios right and we can have it all. Get them wrong and things get more desperate.
Understanding how timely GST payments influence a lender's decision to approve loans, this topic explores the correlation between GST compliance and creditworthiness. It highlights how consistent GST payments can enhance a business's financial credibility, potentially leading to higher chances of loan approval.
Independent Study - College of Wooster Research (2023-2024) FDI, Culture, Glo...AntoniaOwensDetwiler
"Does Foreign Direct Investment Negatively Affect Preservation of Culture in the Global South? Case Studies in Thailand and Cambodia."
Do elements of globalization, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), negatively affect the ability of countries in the Global South to preserve their culture? This research aims to answer this question by employing a cross-sectional comparative case study analysis utilizing methods of difference. Thailand and Cambodia are compared as they are in the same region and have a similar culture. The metric of difference between Thailand and Cambodia is their ability to preserve their culture. This ability is operationalized by their respective attitudes towards FDI; Thailand imposes stringent regulations and limitations on FDI while Cambodia does not hesitate to accept most FDI and imposes fewer limitations. The evidence from this study suggests that FDI from globally influential countries with high gross domestic products (GDPs) (e.g. China, U.S.) challenges the ability of countries with lower GDPs (e.g. Cambodia) to protect their culture. Furthermore, the ability, or lack thereof, of the receiving countries to protect their culture is amplified by the existence and implementation of restrictive FDI policies imposed by their governments.
My study abroad in Bali, Indonesia, inspired this research topic as I noticed how globalization is changing the culture of its people. I learned their language and way of life which helped me understand the beauty and importance of cultural preservation. I believe we could all benefit from learning new perspectives as they could help us ideate solutions to contemporary issues and empathize with others.
In a tight labour market, job-seekers gain bargaining power and leverage it into greater job quality—at least, that’s the conventional wisdom.
Michael, LMIC Economist, presented findings that reveal a weakened relationship between labour market tightness and job quality indicators following the pandemic. Labour market tightness coincided with growth in real wages for only a portion of workers: those in low-wage jobs requiring little education. Several factors—including labour market composition, worker and employer behaviour, and labour market practices—have contributed to the absence of worker benefits. These will be investigated further in future work.
South Dakota State University degree offer diploma Transcriptynfqplhm
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How Does CRISIL Evaluate Lenders in India for Credit RatingsShaheen Kumar
CRISIL evaluates lenders in India by analyzing financial performance, loan portfolio quality, risk management practices, capital adequacy, market position, and adherence to regulatory requirements. This comprehensive assessment ensures a thorough evaluation of creditworthiness and financial strength. Each criterion is meticulously examined to provide credible and reliable ratings.
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Optimizing Net Interest Margin (NIM) in the Financial Sector (With Examples).pdfshruti1menon2
NIM is calculated as the difference between interest income earned and interest expenses paid, divided by interest-earning assets.
Importance: NIM serves as a critical measure of a financial institution's profitability and operational efficiency. It reflects how effectively the institution is utilizing its interest-earning assets to generate income while managing interest costs.
Optimizing Net Interest Margin (NIM) in the Financial Sector (With Examples).pdf
Does skiningamematter cremers
1. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS Vol. 44, No. 6, Dec. 2009, pp. 1345–1373
COPYRIGHT 2009, MICHAEL G. FOSTER SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WA 98195
doi:10.1017/S0022109009990408
Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director
Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund
Industry
Martijn Cremers, Joost Driessen, Pascal Maenhout, and
David Weinbaum∗
Abstract
We use a unique database on ownership stakes of equity mutual fund directors to ana-
lyze whether the directors’ incentive structure is related to fund performance. Ownership
of both independent and nonindependent directors plays an economically and statistically
significant role. Funds in which directors have low ownership, or “skin in the game,” sig-
nificantly underperform. We posit two economic mechanisms to explain this relation. First,
lack of ownership could indicate a director’s lack of alignment with fund shareholder inter-
ests. Second, directors may have superior private information on future performance. We
find evidence in support of the first and against the second mechanism.
I. Introduction
While conflicts of interest in mutual funds between managers, fund sponsors,
and shareholders have recently attracted much popular, academic, political, and
even legal attention, relatively little is known about the importance of director
incentives in mutual funds, or the extent to which effective corporate governance
is related to mutual fund performance.
Most studies of corporate governance have focused on industrial corpora-
tions, and the evidence is mixed. For example, Weisbach (1988), Byrd and
Hickman (1992), Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997), and Brickley, Coles,
∗ Cremers, martijn.cremers@yale.edu, Yale School of Management, Box 20820, New Haven, CT
06520; Driessen, j.j.a.g.driessen@uva.nl, University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics and Econo-
metrics, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Maenhout, pascal.maenhout@
insead.edu, INSEAD, Finance Department, Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau Cedex,
France; and Weinbaum, dweinbau@syr.edu, Syracuse University, Whitman School of Management,
721 University Ave., Syracuse, NY 13244. We thank Hendrik Bessembinder (the editor), Sanjai
Bhagat, Bruno Biais, Francesca Cornelli, Alexei Goriaev, Martin Gruber, Jerome Hass, Roger
Ibbotson, Steven Kaplan, Owen Lamont, Urs Peyer, Martin Shubik, Matthew Spiegel, Paula Tkac,
Heather Tookes, Peter Tufano (the referee), An Yan, and seminar participants at the Yale School of
Management, the 2005 meeting of the European Finance Association, the 2005 Burridge Center Con-
ference, the 2006 meeting of the Western Finance Association, and the 2006 meeting of the European
Financial Management Association for helpful comments and discussions.
1345
2. 1346 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
and Terry (1994) find that more independent boards make decisions that maxi-
mize shareholder value, but Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and Weisbach
(1991), and Klein (1998) find no evidence of a relation between board com-
position and firm performance. In the context of investment companies, Tufano
and Sevick (1997) find that the fees charged by open-end funds are lower when
boards have characteristics that are consistent with effective governance, and Del
Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003) find that board structures conducive to effective
board independence are associated with lower expense ratios and value-enhancing
restructurings, but their results on the relation between governance and discounts
from net asset value (NAV) are mixed.
We ask whether effective governance, particularly director ownership, is as-
sociated with superior mutual fund performance, and if so, what economic mech-
anism could explain that. Disclosure by mutual fund directors of ownership stakes
in the funds they oversee is a relatively new requirement under a rule passed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in January 2001 to help “a mutual
fund shareholder to evaluate whether the independent directors can, in fact, act as
an independent, vigorous, and effective force in overseeing fund operations” (Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (2001)). To the best of our knowledge the link
between the performance of mutual funds and their directors’ stakes has not been
previously investigated in the academic literature.1 To answer these questions, we
assemble a unique database on holdings of board members of the largest equity
mutual funds and investigate whether fund performance is related to the owner-
ship stakes of the directors overseeing those same funds. Specifically, for all the
funds in the largest equity mutual fund families, we collect information on the
ownership stakes of all independent and nonindependent directors.
Our main finding is that effective governance matters a great deal for fund
performance. Specifically, funds in which directors have low ownership stakes, or
“skin in the game,” significantly underperform. This underperformance has size-
able statistical significance and is economically large. This is true for ownership
both at the fund family level and at the individual fund level. Funds in families
in which ownership by independent directors is low generate average annual ab-
normal returns of −2.54%. Similarly, funds with low ownership by nonindepen-
dent directors generate average abnormal returns of −2.48%, and funds with low
ownership by independent directors generate abnormal returns of −2.01%. The
relation between ownership and performance is not linear; rather, it is driven by
the significant underperformance of low (and often zero) ownership funds.
We investigate the extent to which our results are driven by fees. We find
that while fees are indeed higher in low director-ownership funds, and this does
explain part of our results, it in fact explains a surprisingly small fraction of the
1 Upon completion of this paper, we became aware of independent work by Meschke (2005) and
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2005), who also study the governance of mutual funds. Although nei-
ther paper focuses directly on the relation between performance and ownership, they both consider
this relation. Using different data, ownership definitions, and methodology, they find less evidence
that director ownership is related to fund performance. However, among other things, neither paper
forms governance-sorted portfolios of funds as we do. Instead, these papers look at individual fund
performance, which greatly increases the estimation risk in short time series.
3. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1347
results. This suggests that the role of mutual fund boards of directors extends well
beyond fee negotiations.
We posit two hypotheses to explain the relation between director ownership
and fund performance. First, a lack of ownership could lead directors (especially
independent directors) to be less active monitors. A lack of ownership by nonin-
dependent directors (who are fund insiders) might indicate their lack of alignment
with the interests of fund investors. Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) present
evidence that ownership by mutual fund managers has similarly “desirable incen-
tive alignment attributes.” In both cases one might expect increased agency costs
between fund shareholders and fund managers (e.g., Mahoney (2004), Zitzewitz
(2003)) or even between fund shareholders and the family (Gaspar, Massa, and
Matos (2006), Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2004)). The second hypothesis states
that directors may have superior, private information on future fund performance,
choosing not to invest in funds they expect to perform poorly.
Both mechanisms could potentially explain the observed relation. Because it
is not trivial to distinguish between these two mechanisms, we present a simple
model that helps in making the distinction. Specifically, if the underperformance
of low ownership funds is driven by directors’ private information, then direc-
tors should on average pick funds that outperform the funds they do not invest in.
On the other hand, if the underperformance is due to a lack of incentive align-
ment, then no such relation would exist at the director level, even though it would
still be observed at the fund level. Intuitively, this happens because director hold-
ings are correlated if they are driven by superior information. On the other hand,
if directors do not act on superior information, but rather pick funds based on
their own risk profile, then there should be little correlation in holdings across
directors.
Empirically, we find no evidence that directors pick funds that outperform
the funds they do not invest in. This stands in stark contrast to the predictions of
the private information hypothesis. This result is not inconsistent with our finding
that funds with low director ownership underperform. That result holds at the
fund level and is different from this analysis, which focuses on the patterns at the
director level to distinguish between the two economic mechanisms. Since there
is considerable variation in ownership across directors, we obtain very different
results at the director level.
Having ruled out private information, we further argue that if the underper-
formance of low ownership funds is due to a lack of director incentives, then the
underperformance should be most severe in funds where ownership is low and
greater incentive alignment could add value. We consider several proxies for the
importance of director incentives and monitoring to show that this is the case.
Specifically, we argue that director incentives are more important in funds that
pursue more risky strategies or that are more actively managed, as measured by
their idiosyncratic volatility and turnover, respectively. In addition, we use the
finding of Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) that fund performance tends to
decline with fund size, which they attribute to liquidity and organizational dis-
economies. As a result, having appropriately incentivized directors may have
more value for larger funds. Finally, incentive alignment may have more value
in funds that have less independent boards. Using these four proxies for the
4. 1348 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
importance of monitoring and incentive alignment attributes, we indeed find that
the link between ownership and performance is stronger when having appropri-
ately incentivized directors is expected to matter more.2
We make several contributions with this paper. Our first contribution is to the
literature on equity mutual funds: We identify a previously overlooked yet eco-
nomically intuitive determinant of fund performance: namely, director ownership.
We present strong evidence that low ownership funds underperform.
Our second contribution is to the corporate governance literature. This paper
is the first to relate director ownership to performance in the context of mutual
funds. While others have done this for industrial corporations (see, e.g., Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and
Weisbach (1991)), the issues in the mutual fund context are quite different.3 This
paper is also the first to directly relate governance and fund performance, as the
previous literature focuses almost exclusively on fees. We build on the work of
Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Del Guercio et al. (2003) by not only introducing a
new board characteristic, namely, director ownership, but also by directly relating
ownership to performance. An interesting by-product of our approach is that it
enables us to quantify the extent to which the relation between governance and
performance is due to the relation between governance and fees.
Our third contribution is to the individual investor. Following the recent mu-
tual fund scandals, individual investors may wish to know whether a fund is likely
to put its shareholders first. Our results suggest that investors should pay close at-
tention to the incentive structure of their funds’ boards of directors, and to the
information disclosed in a seemingly little-known document, the Statement of
Additional Information (SAI), which has a wealth of information on directors,
including ownership stakes.
Our fourth contribution is to the current policy debate. Here, interpretation is
treacherous because our results only imply association, not necessarily causation.
Still, our results indicate that the disclosure requirements brought about by the
2001 SEC rules were warranted. The latest SEC proposals require even greater
transparency, as well as boards chaired by independent directors and a proportion
of independent directors of at least 75%. Our findings suggest fund ownership
as a mechanism to ensure that directors’ interests are aligned with those of the
shareholders.
We document that this mechanism is especially important for nonindepen-
dent directors. This is perhaps not surprising: Nonindependent directors are not
monitors; rather, they are insiders who are more likely to be intimately involved
with the life of the fund and to affect performance. This finding is consistent with
2 The link between family ownership by unaffiliated directors and fund performance is also consis-
tent with monitoring: Directors typically oversee many funds but may not invest in all of them, even if
they are generally active monitors; hence, while zero ownership in a fund suggests lack of incentives,
if a director has no ownership in any fund, it is very unlikely that the director will be an active monitor.
3 There is evidence in this literature of a nonmonotonic relation between manager and director
ownership and Tobin’s Q, with Q increasing at low levels of ownership and then decreasing. This is not
unexpected in the context of an industrial corporation, where high ownership insulates management
from board discipline and the threat of takeovers (Demsetz (1983)), but it does not apply in the mutual
fund context.
5. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1349
Khorana et al. (2007), who provide strong evidence that risk-adjusted mutual fund
performance is positively related to mutual fund manager ownership.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the legal
roles of mutual fund boards of directors and the main economic hypotheses.
Section III describes our data on mutual fund boards. Section IV reports our re-
sults on how director ownership is related to mutual fund performance. Section V
distinguishes between the incentives hypothesis and the private information hy-
pothesis. Section VI analyzes to what extent our results can be explained by fees.
Section VII concludes.
II. The Roles of Mutual Fund Directors
We briefly review the recent literature on mutual fund boards and develop the
main hypotheses concerning the economic relation between director ownership
and fund performance.
A. Structure of the Mutual Fund Industry
Mandated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, the organizational struc-
ture of the mutual fund industry is unlike that of any other sector of the economy.
Mutual fund management companies run a variety of individual funds. Mutual
funds are investment companies owned by their customers, the investors. As own-
ers, fund shareholders have voting rights and a separate, legally empowered board
of directors that represents their interests. Management companies (also referred
to as fund sponsors, or advisory firms) are separate corporate entities. Manage-
ment companies start mutual funds: Initially, they own all fund shares and select
directors to serve on the initial board. Thereafter, the primary responsibility of
mutual fund boards is to contract for fund management services, as funds have no
employees and outsource all management activities.
The role of mutual fund directors in negotiating fees with the sponsor is
the subject of much prior research (e.g., Tufano and Sevick (1997)). Importantly
however, Phillips (2003) argues that the role of mutual fund directors (especially
independent directors) is more extensive than the negotiation and approval of in-
vestment advisory contracts and fees, and includes, e.g., selection of auditors,
monitoring of compliance with regulatory requirements, and “responsibilities . . .
to oversee many other transactions involving potential conflicts of interest be-
tween the fund’s shareholders and the investment advisor.” The importance of
directors in mitigating potential conflicts of interest is made clear by recent fund
trading scandals and allegations made by the SEC that some fund managers them-
selves had participated in improper trading.4 Zitzewitz (2003) finds that agency
problems may be the root cause of the alleged fund trading activities. Khorana,
Tufano, and Wedge (2005) show that independent boards exhibit less tolerance
4 The SEC has alleged that some portfolio managers have market timed their own funds, and that
a fund manager allowed a hedge fund he had invested in to trade improperly in the fund he managed.
In other instances, fund management companies and fund managers were on opposing sides (see
Mahoney (2004)).
6. 1350 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
of poor performance before initiating a merger. Recent research also suggests
that differences might arise between the interests of the shareholders of a fund
and those of the fund family. For example, Gaspar et al. (2006) show that fund
families use trades across member funds to strategically transfer performance
across funds (see also Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2004)). Regulations dealing with
these matters require that fund boards implement detailed policies that protect
shareholders.
Within the mutual fund industry, some have argued that boards of direc-
tors fail to adequately fulfill the monitoring and advisory roles assigned to them
under the 1940 Act.5 This critique seems based upon the belief that directors,
even legally independent ones, have interests more aligned with those of fund
sponsors than shareholders. According to this argument, mutual fund boards have
been captured by their funds’ sponsors: Directors typically serve on the boards of
many funds within a family and often earn significant compensation; therefore,
they may wish to develop a reputation for not rocking the boat and thus take ac-
tions aimed at protecting their compensation, as opposed to maximizing the fund’s
returns to its shareholders.6
In sum, directors have the important responsibility of monitoring conflicts
of interest and ensuring that transactions with affiliates are in the best interests
of the fund and its shareholders. These responsibilities extend beyond fee nego-
tiations and cannot be dismissed simply because investment advisors are fired
infrequently (Phillips (2003)). These conflict and compliance oversight respon-
sibilities of directors occupy a major part of their role under the 1940 Act and
provide significant protection for shareholders. In addition, nonindependent di-
rectors are executives of funds, and they can have a direct impact on performance.
Nevertheless, there has been virtually no research on the economic role of mutual
fund boards beyond their impact on fees and the extent to which they successfully
fulfill their roles as fiduciaries of mutual fund investors. One of the goals of this
paper is to attempt to fill this gap in the literature.
B. Theory and Hypotheses
This section develops the main hypotheses concerning the economic mecha-
nisms through which director ownership may be related to performance.
Director ownership may be related to fund performance through two eco-
nomic channels. First, lack of ownership could prevent independent directors from
monitoring actively. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that ownership can as-
sist in resolving the moral hazard problem by aligning directors’ interests with
those of shareholders. In the context of mutual funds, this would mean that direc-
tors without ownership might not have the incentive to serve as effective monitors,
thereby increasing agency costs between fund shareholders and fund managers
(e.g., Mahoney (2004), Zitzewitz (2003)) or even between fund shareholders and
5 See,
for example, Carter (2001) for a discussion.
6 Whilefund sponsors have no direct legal means of removing independent directors, as Tufano
and Sevick (1997) point out, they may pressure them into resigning or not seeking reelection. See
Carter (2001) for a specific example.
7. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1351
the family (Gaspar et al. (2006), Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2004)). Nonindepen-
dent directors, on the other hand, while not monitors, are often fund executives
and can significantly affect performance. Ownership on their part can help ensure
that their interests are aligned with those of the fund investors.
Second, directors may have superior, private information on future fund per-
formance. Using their private information, directors would then avoid the funds
they expect to perform poorly.
Both mechanisms suggest a relation between director ownership and fund
performance at the fund level, but they generate very different predictions at the
director level, as we now illustrate by means of a simple model. Assume that there
are d directors overseeing 2f funds, each investing in f funds and not investing in
the other f funds. Consider the following two scenarios.
In the first scenario where directors have superior, private information, some
funds are high type (α = H) and others are low type (α = L). Investors cannot
tell the difference between the two, but directors can, by virtue of their private
information. Directors invest in the high type funds and avoid the low type funds.
In this world, the spread in abnormal fund performance (alpha) at the fund level
is H − L, and the spread in alpha at the director level is also H − L.7
In the second scenario, where director incentives improve performance, all
funds are ex ante identical. If at least one director invests in a fund, the director
exerts greater effort and the fund becomes a type H fund. If, on the other hand, all
directors happen not to invest in a fund, the fund does not benefit from the direc-
tors and becomes a type L fund. This nonlinear effect of ownership is consistent
with our empirical finding that ownership only impacts performance at low own-
ership levels (see Section IV). The directors’ investment decisions are random and
independent of each other, because they are not driven by information, but rather
by each director’s own preferences and other assets in their portfolios besides the
funds they oversee. Clearly, in this second scenario the spread in alpha at the fund
level is again H − L.
The spread in alpha at the director level is the expected alpha on the funds
invested in minus the expected alpha on the funds not invested in. The expected
alpha on the funds invested in is simply H, because if one director invests, the
fund becomes an H fund. The probability that a fund has an alpha of L given that
the director does not invest in it is the probability that the other d − 1 directors
also do not invest (i.e., (1/2)d−1 ). The probability that the alpha is H given that
the director does not invest is 1 − (1/2)d−1 , so the expected spread in alpha at the
director level is given by which tends to 0 as the number of directors increases.
1 1 1
(1) H− 1− H− L = (H − L).
2d−1 2d−1 2d−1
Thus, if directors act on the basis of private information by avoiding funds
they expect to underperform, individual director portfolios should earn positive
7 Note also that the performance differentials at the director and fund levels are identical only
because we assume that directors know fund types. Assuming noisy correlated director signals might
lead to larger spreads at the fund level, because having multiple directors avoiding a fund reinforces
signals. In either case, however, the private information scenario implies that directors should be able
to pick funds that outperform the funds that they do not invest in.
8. 1352 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
risk-adjusted returns. On the other hand, the incentive alignment hypothesis would
be consistent with directors picking funds that do not necessarily outperform the
funds that they do not invest in.
In the empirical work in Section V, we first rule out the private information
hypothesis by considering the director-level portfolios suggested by our model,
and then we use proxies for the importance of director incentives to show that the
relation between director ownership and fund performance is indeed concentrated
in those funds in which incentives matter more.
A possible concern about our work is that director holdings may be due to
fund family policies, perhaps through deferred compensation plans, which are
sometimes set up by mutual funds to minimize the tax burden faced by directors.
While in such cases one would expect tax considerations to drive at least some
directors’ investment decisions, ownership would still improve monitoring of
fund directors if they respond rationally to the incentives imposed on them.
Director ownership through deferred compensation plans could challenge the pri-
vate information mechanism, but we rule out this interpretation of our results in
Section V.
III. Fund Boards and Director Ownership
A. Data Collection
Our sources of mutual fund data are the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) Mutual Fund database and the SEC Edgar database. The CRSP
database contains monthly data on net returns and NAVs, and annual data on
expense ratios, total load fees, turnover, and proportion of assets allocated to
stocks for virtually all mutual funds since January 1, 1962. This database is essen-
tially free of survivorship bias (see, e.g., Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001), Evans
(2004)). The SEC Edgar database contains electronic versions of all the forms
that mutual funds are required by law to file with the SEC. We purchased access
to a large data vendor’s depositary of SEC filings for the period 1996–2004.
We use the SEC Edgar database to create a new database of mutual fund di-
rector holdings in the funds they oversee. Starting January 31, 2002, mutual funds
are required to disclose (in an SAI) detailed information about each member of
their board of directors, including the term of office and the length of time served,
whether or not the director is independent, the number of portfolios in the fund
complex overseen by the director, the dollar range of equity securities in the fund
(beneficially) owned by the director, the aggregate dollar range of equity securi-
ties in all registered investment companies overseen by the director in the family
of investment companies, and the total dollar amount of cash compensation re-
ceived by each independent director for the fund complex. This information must
be disclosed in any SAI filed by the fund; it is available to the public through the
SEC but is typically not furnished by funds to shareholders except upon explicit
request.
The SEC provides strict formatting standards that mutual funds must abide
by. Unfortunately, the vast majority of mutual funds do not follow these format-
ting standards, and consequently there is no formatting consistency across mutual
9. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1353
funds. This means that the SEC forms that contain SAIs cannot be parsed elec-
tronically, so we collected the relevant information by hand.
First, because of the labor intensity of hand-collecting this data, we limit our-
selves to the actively managed equity funds that belong to the top 25 equity mutual
fund families as of January 1996. While a similar analysis could be performed on
bond funds, this paper follows the standard in the literature in narrowing its focus
to equity funds. Specifically, we collect basic information on all the funds that are
in the CRSP database as of January 1996. We then eliminate index funds and all
funds that do not have a strategic insight fund objective code of aggressive growth,
growth, growth and income, or balanced, or that are less than 50% invested in
stocks. We then rank management companies by their total NAVs in those funds
and keep only funds that belong to the 25 largest equity mutual fund families. To
avoid double counting fund returns, we follow the practice of calculating value-
weighted average returns for funds with multiple share classes (see, e.g., Wermers
(2000)). Second, we match the funds from the CRSP database with the SEC data.
Because the two databases use different fund numbering systems, this requires
matching fund names from CRSP with the central index key (CIK) that the SEC
Edgar database uses to identify funds. Third, for every CIK that corresponds to a
fund identified in the second step, we search the SEC Edgar database for all SAIs
filed in 2002, the first year that funds were required to disclose fund ownership
stakes by directors. Some funds that existed in 1996 did not survive until 2002
and thus are not included in our analysis. Fourth, we manually collect from the
matched SAIs the information about the members of the boards of directors that
we use in our analysis, including directors’ ownership of fund shares data. In the
end, we are left with 134 funds across 19 families for which we have director
data. Out of these 134 funds, 31 funds do not have any nonindependent directors,
27 funds are missing nonindependent director ownership data, and 8 funds have
incomplete return histories.
Table 1 provides descriptive information on the main variables of interest for
the mutual funds included in the analysis. While our sample is arguably small, the
next section shows that on the major dimensions of board composition, our sample
looks very much like the larger sample of mutual fund boards from 1992 that
Tufano and Sevick (1997) analyze. Thus, while our sample limits our ability to
draw general inferences about the mutual fund industry, there is reason to believe
that it is generally representative of the boards of directors of the larger U.S.
mutual funds.
Our choice of a January 1996 start date deserves some comment, given that
we only observe director ownership as of December 2001. This is motivated by
the fact that one of the issues we investigate is whether ownership is related to
prior performance. This is an important question, as it helps us to better under-
stand the link between ownership and performance and to interpret our results
as not being driven by directors’ ex ante picking what they expect to be the best
performing funds. Still, two potential issues regarding the start date need to be
addressed. First, we select the largest funds; these are likely to have performed
well, and if performance is persistent, our sample will have funds that perform
better than funds not included. This problem would actually be more serious if
we had used December 2001 data for fund selection. Second, there is the issue of
10. 1354 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
TABLE 1
Main Variables of Interest
Table 1 provides descriptive information on the main variables of interest for the mutual funds included in the analysis.
The sample construction procedure is described in Section III.A. Briefly, we start with all the funds that are in the CRSP
database as of January 1996. We eliminate all funds that are not actively managed equity funds and then rank management
companies by their total net asset values (NAVs) in those funds, and we keep only those funds that belong to the 25 largest
equity mutual fund families. For each fund we then search the SEC Edgar database for director-ownership information.
Funds were first required to disclose director-ownership stakes in 2002. Some funds that existed in 1996 did not survive
until 2002 and thus are not included in the analysis. Our final sample consists of 134 mutual funds and 307 directors in
19 fund complexes. For each complex, column 1 gives the number of funds, column 2 gives the total NAV of the funds
(in $millions, as of December 2001), column 3 gives the standard deviation of the NAVs of the funds in the family (in
$millions, as of December 2001), column 4 gives the average expense ratio (over 2002:1–2004:6), column 5 gives the
average turnover, column 6 gives the average number of directors, column 7 gives the average proportion of independent
directors, column 8 the average fund ownership by nonindependent directors, column 9 the average fund ownership by
independent directors, column 10 the average family ownership by independent directors, and column 11 the average
total compensation by independent directors.
Fund Complex 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Alliance Capital 6 $31,417 $6,176 1.81% 102.13% 8.33 13.99% $0 $24,445 $97,858 $208,184
Mgmt Corp
Delaware Mgmt Co 6 $2,890 $541 1.50% 80.37% 8.67 18.98% $0 $9,048 $45,715 $78,658
Dreyfus Service Corp 18 $19,778 $1,227 1.06% 68.97% 6.94 1.23% $50,001 $2,926 $47,411 $205,142
Federated Securities 10 $10,490 $1,281 1.39% 61.59% 12.00 25.14% $17,000 $3,556 $94,388 $136,513
Corp
Fidelity Mgmt Res 17 $282,556 $22,798 0.84% 106.71% 14.50 22.94% $48,646 $14,596 $99,837 $260,894
American Express 10 $54,365 $8,045 1.22% 95.14% 13.90 21.07% $12,500 $2,367 $92,334 $124,511
Financial Advisors
Kemper Financial 3 $3,919 $2,077 1.42% 60.00% 12.00 25.00% $1,111 $1,852 $84,445 $187,707
Services Inc
New York Life 7 $7,342 $1,261 1.65% 55.85% 7.86 40.00% $31,429 $10,286 $54,001 $54,450
Securities
Merrill Lynch Funds 3 $10,016 $5,238 1.30% 44.59% 10.67 12.63% $50,001 $3,572 $56,390 $221,119
Distributor Inc
New England Funds LP 4 $2,223 $561 1.97% 125.27% 9.00 22.22% $13,751 $7,143 $72,858 $64,643
Oppenheimer Funds Inc 7 $32,427 $5,588 1.33% 97.23% 10.29 8.87% $0 $12,715 $64,144 $98,089
Bisys Fund Services Inc 7 $1,578 $199 1.27% 61.29% 5.57 20.71% $37,501 $278 $17,381 $18,488
Putnam Mgmt Co Inc 2 $8,407 $1,689 1.33% 100.68% 13.00 23.08% $5,001 $19,001 $100,001 $212,500
SEI Financial Mgmt Corp 10 $13,648 $1,542 0.95% 80.09% 6.10 33.93% $7,223 $1,000 $28,125 $62,540
Smith Barney Asset Mgmt 6 $16,690 $1,341 1.25% 57.15% 7.67 20.90% $2,500 $8,786 $32,993 $66,495
State Street Res and 2 $3,093 $1,839 1.06% 85.72% 8.00 12.50% N/A $17,143 $71,429 $83,693
Mgmt Co
Vanguard Group of 9 $191,428 $26,431 0.34% 33.36% 6.89 20.90% $43,751 $17,222 $100,001 $99,157
Investment Co
Van Kampen American 5 $14,913 $510 1.13% 74.64% 9.20 32.67% $8,667 $619 $42,953 $120,411
Capital
Munder Capital Mgmt Inc 2 $1,857 $593 0.98% 26.80% 7.00 14.29% N/A $8,334 $38,334 $74,125
Sum: 134 $709,038 Mean: 1.25% 74.61% 9.35 20.58% $19,358 $8,678 $65,295 $125,122
survivorship bias. Again, this is only relevant if the funds that survived over the
1996–2002 period outperform over the 2002–2004 period. However, even if these
two issues bias the estimated level of outperformance of all funds, what matters
for our analysis is the cross-sectional variation in the performance of the funds
in our sample. So even if we overstate the performance of all the funds in our
sample, we can still analyze the cross-sectional variation with respect to director
ownership.
B. Director Holdings
Table 2 contains basic descriptive statistics on the variables of interest: board
composition and director holdings. Panel A shows that the average board in our
sample has 9.47 members, 1.94 of whom are not independent. We confirm the
finding in Tufano and Sevick (1997) that there is substantial variation in board
characteristics across funds, with boards ranging from 3 to 25 members and non-
independents ranging from 0 to 6. Nonindependent members of the board account
11. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1355
for about 20% of the total on average in our sample, and the percentage of inde-
pendents always exceeds 50%. Thus, while we use a different sample than Tufano
and Sevick (1997), board size and composition in our sample is very much in line
with theirs. The main difference is that the average proportion of independent
board members is 71% in their (1992) sample, which reflects the move toward
greater independence of mutual fund boards in recent years.
TABLE 2
Mutual Fund Board Characteristics
Table 2 reports data at the individual fund level for the 25 largest equity mutual fund sponsors as of December 2001.
Panel A reports the distribution of board size and the number and percentage of nonindependent directors. Panel B
reports the distribution of director-ownership stakes. Since funds do not report exact dollar ownership, but rather ranges
($0, $1 to $10,000, $10,001 to $50,000, $50,001 to $100,000, or more than $100,000), we convert these ranges into dollar
amounts by assuming that the lowest possible dollar amount is always invested. For each fund in the sample, we then
compute the average amount invested by the fund’s directors. Panel B describes the distribution of those averages across
funds. Panel C reports fund-level descriptive statistics on the percentage of directors with zero ownership in the funds they
oversee.
Panel A. Size of Boards and Percentage of Independents
No. of No. of % of
Descriptive Statistics Board Members Nonindependents Nonindependents
Mean 9.47 1.94 19.96
Std. dev. 3.62 1.21 11.05
Minimum 3 0 0
25th percentile 7 1 14.29
Median 9 2 22.22
75th percentile 12 3 25
Maximum 25 6 42.86
Panel B. Director Holdings
Independent Director Nonindependent
Holdings in: Director Holdings in:
Descriptive Statistics Individual Fund Fund Family Individual Fund Fund Family
Mean 8,058 67,170 23,027 88,075
Std. dev 12,711 30,767 30,478 22,656
Minimum 0 0 0 1
25th percentile 0 38,334 0 75,001
Median 1,112 72,858 3,334 100,001
75th percentile 14,000 95,001 50,001 100,001
Maximum 62,001 100,001 100,001 100,001
Panel C. Directors with Zero Holdings
Per Individual Fund: Per Fund Family:
% of Directors Holding Nothing % of Directors Holding Nothing
Descriptive Statistics Independent Nonindependent Independent Nonindependent
Mean 68.36 59.04 20.76 6.28
Std. dev. 32.93 36.51 27.29 17.53
Minimum 0 0 0 0
25th percentile 50 33.33 0 0
Median 78.57 50 10 0
75th percentile 100 100 33.33 0
Maximum 100 100 100 66.67
Funds are not required to disclose the exact dollar amount of director hold-
ings, but only a range: either no investment, or an investment of $1 to $10,000,
$10,001 to $50,000, $50,001 to $100,000, or more than $100,000. We convert
these ranges into dollar amounts by assuming that the lowest possible dollar
amount is always invested (e.g., we record an investment in the range of $10,001
12. 1356 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
to $50,000 as an investment of $10,001).8 Therefore these numbers are very con-
servative estimates of ownership stakes. Panel B contains basic information on
director holdings in both individual fund shares and aggregate fund family shares.
In the average mutual fund, independent directors hold an average of $8,058
in each fund overseen, for a total of $67,170 invested in all the funds overseen by
the directors in the family of mutual funds. For nonindependent directors, these
amounts are even larger: $23,027 and $88,075, respectively. On average therefore,
the stakes of nonindependent directors are more substantial, which is consistent
with the conjecture that nonindependent directors may need stronger ownership
incentives if there is indeed an economic meaning to the legal distinction between
independent and nonindependent directors. Importantly, there is substantial varia-
tion in some, but not all, of these amounts across funds. Specifically, both average
independent director fund family holdings and average nonindependent director
individual fund holdings vary significantly, ranging from $0 to over $100,000, but
the cross-sectional variation in average fund family holdings by nonindependent
directors is much less pronounced.
Panel C of Table 2 shows that a substantial number of directors do not invest
at all in the funds they oversee: In the average individual mutual fund, 68.36% of
independent directors and 59.04% of nonindependent directors have no shares. In
the average fund family, we find that the percentages of independent and nonin-
dependent directors without any shares in any funds in the family are 20.76% and
6.28%, respectively. There is a great deal of variation across funds in the propor-
tion of directors with zero holdings; this is true for both independent and nonin-
dependent directors. There is also variation across fund families in the proportion
of independent directors holding nothing, but the variation in the proportion of
nonindependents holding nothing is much smaller.
In addition to what is described in Panel C of Table 2, it is worth pointing
out that in 31.82% (35.53%) of the individual funds in our sample, no indepen-
dent (nonindependent) director holds anything, and that in only 10.61% (17.11%)
of the funds, all independent (nonindependent) directors have at least one dol-
lar invested. These low percentages suggest a low correlation between holdings
across directors, which is informal evidence against the private information hy-
pothesis. At the fund family level, in 3.82% (0%) of fund families all independent
(nonindependent) directors hold nothing, and in 48.85% (88.31%) all independent
(nonindependent) directors have at least one dollar invested.
IV. Board Characteristics and Fund Performance
In this section, we analyze the returns of various portfolios created by sorting
funds according to different board characteristics. Director ownership is measured
as of December 31, 2001. Performance is measured using monthly fund returns
from January 2002 to June 2004, for a total of 30 months.
8 Our results are robust to using different numbers of portfolios. Other ways of computing average
ownership measures (e.g., sorting on the ratio of ownership to director compensation) produce very
similar results.
13. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1357
We categorize funds in our sample according to three variables: i) average
fund family ownership by independent directors, ii) average individual fund own-
ership by independent directors, and iii) average individual fund ownership by
nonindependent directors. Table 2 reports some summary statistics on these three
variables and on an additional variable, namely, the average family ownership of
nonindependent directors. As was pointed out earlier, there is almost no variation
across funds in this additional variable, as most nonindependent directors have
family ownership in the highest range, so we do not consider this variable further.
For each variable, we sort funds into four groups based on the quartiles of
the variable (see Panel B of Table 2). Thus, funds in which the average family-
level investment by independent directors is greater than $95,000 are classified
as funds with high independent family ownership, and funds in which the av-
erage family-level investment by independent directors is less than $38,334 are
considered funds with low independent family ownership. Funds with indepen-
dent family ownership between $38,334 and $72,857 and those with independent
family ownership between $72,858 and $95,000 are the other two categories. Sim-
ilarly, we also divide funds into four quartiles based on the other two variables.
We construct three separate sets of quartile portfolios (one set per governance
variable) and three long/short portfolios that buy funds with high values of the
particular governance variable (quartile 4) and sell funds with low values of that
governance variable (quartile 1). We note that, since it is not possible to literally
short funds, the long/short strategies should not be viewed as trading strategies,
but merely as a convenient way to calculate differences in performance. For each
portfolio, we construct and report both value- and equal-weighted returns.
To ensure that our results are not driven by differences in risk or style,
we calculate abnormal returns using a four-factor model that includes the three
Fama-French (1993) factors and a momentum factor, as in Carhart (1997) and
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The estimated abnormal return is the constant α in
the regression
(2) Rt = α + β1 · MKTt + β2 · SMBt + β3 · HMLt + β4 · UMDt + εt ,
where Rt is the excess return over the risk-free rate to a portfolio in month t, and
MKTt is the excess return on the market portfolio and SMBt , HMLt , and UMDt
are, respectively, the returns on three long/short portfolios that capture size (small
minus big), book-to-market (high minus low), and momentum (up minus down)
effects.
In addition to standard t-statistics, we also calculate bootstrap empirical
p-values, lest we overly rely on standard statistical assumptions for our relatively
short sample. For each sort, we run 1,000 bootstraps, each time randomly assign-
ing funds to portfolios, and we compare the actual t-statistics to the empirical
distribution of the t-statistics from these bootstraps. Nonnormality of mutual fund
returns may drive a wedge between the bootstrap and asymptotic p-values, and we
therefore conservatively require statistical significance at the 5% level according
to the bootstrap empirical p-values.
Table 3 contains our results on the relation between mutual fund performance
and the three board characteristics. In addition, it considers the proportion of in-
dependent directors on the board. Panel A considers the performance of portfolios
14. 1358 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
formed on the basis of average ownership in fund family shares by independent
directors. We find that, over the period January 2002 to June 2004, funds with
low independent family ownership earn value-weighted annual abnormal returns
(alphas) of −2.54%, with a t-statistic of −2.95 and a bootstrap empirical p-value
of 0.02. This abnormal underperformance is very significant, both economically
and statistically.
TABLE 3
Portfolios Formed on Governance Variables: One-Way Sorts
Table 3 presents annualized mean return (in %), abnormal return (in %), its t -statistic and bootstrap empirical p -value
for portfolios formed on three measures of director incentives (Panels A through C), and the proportion of independent
directors on the board (Panel D). For each governance variable, we sort funds into portfolios based on the quartiles of the
variable and report the performance of the four portfolios and a long/short portfolio. The indices (1), (2), (3), and (4) refer
to the sorted portfolios, with higher values of the indices designating portfolios of funds with higher values of the indicated
governance variable; for example, “(1)” designates the portfolio of funds in the first quartile of the variable (with low values
of the variable). The long/short portfolio is long “(4)” and short “(1).” We report the results for both value-weighted (VW)
and equal-weighted (EW) portfolios.
Panel A. Portfolios Formed on the Basis of Average Ownership in Fund Family Shares by Independent Directors
(N = 132)
VW Returns EW Returns
Mean Mean
Ownership Return Alpha t -Stat. p -Value Ownership Return Alpha t -Stat. p -Value
(1) 0.35 –2.54 –2.95 0.02 (1) –0.30 –2.85 –4.86 0.01
(2) 1.63 –1.21 –1.50 0.38 (2) 0.78 –2.21 –2.85 0.32
(3) 0.17 –2.07 –2.22 0.13 (3) 1.77 –2.10 –2.24 0.61
(4) 1.76 –0.24 –0.47 0.76 (4) 2.51 –0.76 –1.00 0.99
Long/Short 1.41 2.30 2.88 0.01 Long/Short 2.81 2.10 3.99 0.01
Panel B. Portfolios Formed on the Basis of Average Ownership in Individual Fund Shares by Nonindependent Directors
(N = 76)
VW Returns EW Returns
Mean Mean
Ownership Return Alpha t -Stat. p -Value Ownership Return Alpha t -Stat. p -Value
(1) 0.21 –2.48 –2.63 0.07 (1) 1.79 –2.09 –2.24 0.51
(2) 3.38 0.23 0.14 0.93 (2) 1.71 –1.20 –0.85 0.94
(3) 3.09 0.24 0.20 0.90 (3) 1.60 –1.61 –1.94 0.63
(4) 1.11 –0.37 –0.51 0.76 (4) 2.07 –0.41 –0.70 0.96
Long/Short 0.90 2.11 2.44 0.03 Long/Short 0.28 1.68 1.75 0.15
Panel C. Portfolios Formed on the Basis of Average Ownership in Individual Fund Shares by Independent Directors
(N = 132)
VW Returns EW Returns
Mean Mean
Ownership Return Alpha t -Stat. p -Value Ownership Return Alpha t -Stat. p -Value
(1) 0.14 –2.01 –3.01 0.02 (1) 0.55 –2.28 –3.79 0.04
(2) 0.61 –1.17 –1.31 0.45 (2) 0.68 –2.28 –2.67 0.42
(3) 2.91 –0.21 –0.19 0.90 (3) 2.55 –0.99 –1.02 0.98
(4) 1.32 –0.60 –1.17 0.50 (4) 1.22 –2.10 –2.85 0.33
Long/Short 1.18 1.42 2.27 0.05 Long/Short 0.67 0.17 0.38 0.74
Panel D. Portfolios Formed on the Basis of Proportion of Independent Directors on the Board (N = 133)
VW Returns EW Returns
Proportion Mean Proportion Mean
Independent Return Alpha t -Stat. p -Value Independent Return Alpha t -Stat. p -Value
(1) 0.97 –1.01 –2.35 0.10 (1) 0.90 –2.09 –2.84 0.31
(2) 0.33 –2.13 –2.90 0.03 (2) 1.33 –2.65 –2.95 0.26
(3) 1.46 –0.36 –0.57 0.73 (3) 1.90 –1.24 –1.64 0.86
(4) 3.20 –0.16 –0.11 0.94 (4) 1.06 –1.88 –2.01 0.77
Long/Short 2.24 0.85 0.63 0.68 Long/Short 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.86
15. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1359
Panels B and C of Table 3 consider the performance of portfolios formed
on the basis of average ownership in individual fund shares by nonindependent
directors (Panel B) and independent directors (Panel C). Funds with low noninde-
pendent director fund ownership earn value-weighted annual abnormal returns of
−2.48%, with a t-statistic of −2.63 (bootstrap empirical p-value of 0.07), again
economically large and moderately statistically significant. Similarly, funds with
low independent director fund ownership earn value-weighted annual abnormal
returns of −2.01%, with a t-statistic of −3.01 and a bootstrap empirical p-value
of 0.02.
The results from the equal-weighted sorts in Table 3 are generally similar but
weaker. Independent director fund ownership becomes insignificant. This is con-
sistent with ownership being more important in larger funds, which we confirm in
Section V.
We also perform double sorts on individual and family ownership, and we
find that the worst underperformance is in funds with low director ownership
that belong to families with low director ownership (unreported). As another
robustness check, we construct an alternative ownership variable, based on the
percentage of directors with zero ownership. Results based on this measure are
qualitatively consistent with, but weaker than, the results presented in Table 3.
Given the recent SEC rule requiring that 75% of board members be indepen-
dent and the debate that this has sparked in the industry, it may be of interest to ex-
amine whether sorting funds according to the proportion of independent directors
produces a spread. Panel D of Table 3 clearly shows that there is little evidence
that the proportion of independent directors matters unconditionally: The alpha
of the long/short portfolio is only 85 basis points (bps), with a t-statistic of 0.63.
We revisit this issue below in more detail.
Finally, we consider a regression analysis to support our results based on
portfolio sorts. We use a two-step methodology in which we regress individual
fund abnormal returns on board characteristics, accounting for the estimation risk
of the alphas. In the first step, we estimate fund alphas by running time-series re-
gressions of fund returns on the three Fama-French (1993) factors and a momen-
tum factor. In the second step, we regress these fund-specific alphas on ownership
variables, with and without controls for fund-specific characteristics (distribution
type, objective type, and size), and compute t-statistics that incorporate the first
step estimation risk of the alphas. Specifically, we assume heteroskedastic er-
rors with the residual variance of each fund-specific alpha proportional to its own
variance in the first step. The results in Table 4 show that independent director
family ownership stakes and nonindependent director fund ownership stakes are
both significantly associated with higher fund-specific alphas, with t-statistics of
3.44 and 3.12, respectively. Higher fund alphas are not significantly related to
independent director ownership in individual fund shares. Including controls for
fund characteristics produces similar results, though with somewhat diminished
statistical significance. Overall, even though the regression setup imposes a lin-
ear relationship, we find that the two-step alpha regression methodology produces
results generally consistent with the equal-weighted sorts.
In sum, for independent directors we provide evidence of both an individual
fund effect and a fund family effect. For nonindependent directors, we identify a
16. 1360 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
TABLE 4
Two-Step Alpha Regressions
Table 4 presents results of regressions of fund-specific abnormal returns on board characteristics, taking into account the
estimation risk of alphas. We first estimate fund-specific alphas by running time-series regressions of fund returns on the
three Fama-French (1993) factors and momentum. We then regress these fund-specific alphas on various board char-
acteristics and compute t -statistics that incorporate the first-step estimation risk of the alphas, assuming heteroskedastic
errors with the residual variance of each fund-specific alpha proportional to its own variance. We use standard ordinary
least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates because a full weighted least squares (WLS) estimation is not feasible here (since
we have more funds than months). Institutional fund is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund is only open to institutions,
income objective is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund is an income fund (or a growth income fund), aggressive
growth objective is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund is an aggressive growth fund, and fund size is a quartile dummy
variable. Robust clustered t -statistics are in parentheses.
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept –1.59 –1.04 –0.65 –1.54 –2.17 –0.63 –1.08 –0.63
(–4.45) (–0.78) (–1.84) (–2.99) (–4.38) (–1.13) (–1.45) (–1.13)
Independent director 0.43 0.35
family ownership (3.44) (2.41)
Nonindependent 0.39 0.38
director fund ownership (3.12) (1.79)
Independent director 0.05 –0.30
fund ownership (0.42) (–1.18)
Compensation 0.36 0.76
(2.21) (3.74)
Institutional fund –0.15 –1.16 –0.03 –0.46
(–0.36) (–2.75) (–0.03) (–1.31)
Income objective –1.12 –1.91 –1.06 –2.00
(–3.33) (–4.98) (–2.02) (–5.40)
Aggressive growth –0.55 –0.24 –0.73 –1.60
objective (–0.51) (–0.24) (–0.63) (–1.61)
Fund size 0.43 0.19 0.65 0.17
(2.41) (0.96) (2.63) (0.81)
N 132 76 132 75 132 76 132 75
R2 0.029 0.035 0.001 0.020 0.118 0.114 0.075 0.191
significant individual-fund ownership effect. This is an important finding in light
of the emphasis that regulators and researchers have placed on the role of indepen-
dent directors. This finding makes good economic sense, since nonindependent
directors are, by the very nature of their legal classification, strongly involved in
the life of the fund and perhaps more likely to need incentives to act in the interest
of fund shareholders. Our results point to an important role for nonindependent
directors, as long as the incentives are in place to make their interests align with
those of the shareholders of the funds they oversee.
Analyzing the abnormal returns of the individual quartiles, we do not find
a monotonic relation between ownership and performance. Our results are pri-
marily driven by the very poor performance of funds in the lowest ownership
category: Funds in which no directors own any shares (quartile 1, according to
Panel B in Table 2) earn robustly large and statistically significant negative alphas
of between −2% and −2.5% per year, regardless of the specific measure of direc-
tor ownership. Besides the lowest-quartile portfolios, none of the other abnormal
returns are statistically significant, according to the bootstrap empirical p-values.
While we devise further tests in the subsequent analysis to attempt to distin-
guish between the two mechanisms and alternative interpretations of our findings,
it is clear that information of zero or low director ownership should be viewed
as an alarming signal for mutual fund investors, regardless of the hypothesis and
interpretation.
17. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1361
V. Testing the Economic Mechanisms
The results so far provide evidence of a link between director ownership
and risk-adjusted fund performance. This relation could be driven by two dis-
tinct mechanisms, as described in Section II: namely, the incentive alignment
mechanism and the private information mechanism. According to the incentive
alignment mechanism, directors with stakes in the funds they oversee have di-
rect incentives to act in a way that benefits shareholders by ultimately improving
fund performance, either directly in the case of affiliated directors or through ef-
fective monitoring in the case of independent directors. In contrast, the private
information hypothesis involves directors ex ante selecting and investing in funds
that, according to their private signals and information, are expected to provide
superior performance.
A. Private Information
An important implication of the model in Section II is that, while both the
private information mechanism and the incentive alignment mechanism predict
underperformance of low ownership funds at the fund level, the two mechanisms
generate very different predictions at the director level. Specifically, the model
shows that the private information channel implies that directors, on average,
choose funds that outperform the funds they do not invest in.
To test this hypothesis, we form two portfolios for each director who owns
shares in at least some, but not all, of the funds he or she oversees. The first
portfolio is a value-weighted investment in the funds in which the director has
invested, and the second is a value-weighted investment in the funds in which the
director has not invested. For each director, we then compare the average returns
and alphas of the two portfolios.
We have data on 307 directors, 113 of whom have ownership in some, but
not all, of the funds they oversee. This requirement is added to allow us to focus
on testing the private information mechanism and to differentiate from the fund-
level results. On average, each of these directors oversees 6.5 funds and has zero
ownership in 3.4 funds.
Table 5 reports the mean performance measures between the two director-
level portfolios, averaged across all directors. In stark contrast to the predictions
of the private information hypothesis, the average difference in both alphas and
raw returns is negative, implying that on average directors pick funds that un-
derperform the funds they do not invest in (though in the case of raw returns
the difference is not statistically significant). This result is robust to a variety
of alternative specifications (e.g., equal weighting and weighting by director
compensation).
These results are not inconsistent with our earlier finding that funds with
lowest-quartile director ownership underperform, as highlighted by the model in
Section II. Those results hold at the fund level and are different from the analysis
here, which focuses on the patterns at the director level. Since there is consid-
erable variation in ownership across directors, we obtain very different results at
the director level. In particular, the underperformance at the fund level was driven
18. 1362 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
TABLE 5
Performance of Directors’ Investments
We form two portfolios for each director who owns shares in at least some, but not all, of the funds he or she oversees.
The first portfolio is a value-weighted investment in the funds in which the director has invested, and the second is a
value-weighted investment in the funds in which the director has not invested. For each director, we then compare the
average returns and the alphas of these two portfolios (ownership portfolio minus no-ownership portfolio). Column 1 reports
the average difference across all directors in the performance measures (raw returns and alphas), column 2 reports the
standard deviations, and column 3 gives the t -statistics. We have data on 307 directors, out of which 113 have ownership
in some, but not all, of the funds they oversee.
Performance
Variables Mean Std. Dev. t -Stat.
Raw returns –0.33 5.36 –0.65
Alphas –1.28 3.78 –3.60
by funds in the lowest quartile of director ownership (i.e., funds with zero own-
ership). The analysis in Table 5, on the other hand, specifically focuses on the
subset of directors who have some ownership in some funds, and 0 in others, in
order to test the private information hypothesis.9
To investigate the possibility that directors may have information about funds
in a complex other than the funds they oversee, we consider the performance of
funds in which directors are not board members and may have holdings, by sub-
tracting from each director’s family holdings the sum of the fund-specific hold-
ings across all funds in the family. While this ownership variable is potentially
subject to large measurement error, untabulated results show that funds that direc-
tors do not oversee and in which they may have ownership underperform funds
that they do not invest in (though without statistical significance after adjusting
for the Fama-French (1993) and momentum factors).10
Also, if directors pick funds they expect to outperform, and if there is any
persistence in mutual fund performance, one might expect directors to pick funds
that have done well in the past and avoid funds that have performed poorly. We test
this hypothesis by relating director ownership to past performance. Specifically,
for all 307 directors for whom we have ownership data, we regress log director
ownership on past annual abnormal return (over 1997–2001).
Table 6 reports the results of these regressions. The t-statistics that we report
employ a robust cluster variance estimator (see, e.g., Andrews (1991), Petersen
(2007), and Rogers (1993)). The R2 s in these regressions are low, and neither co-
efficient on past abnormal performance is statistically significant or economically
large. There is little evidence that directors choose funds that have performed well
in the past or avoid funds that have performed poorly.
Our data do not allow us to test directly for performance chasing by directors,
as this requires a time series of ownership. Table 6 does show some weak evidence
that nonindependent director ownership is positively related to past abnormal
9 Table 5 suggests that the fund-level results are driven by directors without ownership in any fund
they oversee. This is also consistent with the results for director ownership at the family level.
10 This analysis only considers directors whose family ownership exceeds aggregate ownership
across all funds in the family where they are directors (suggesting that they may have investments in
funds in the family that they do not oversee) and whose fund-specific ownership is 0 in at least one
fund overseen. We then compare the performance of funds with possible ownership to that of zero
ownership funds.
19. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1363
TABLE 6
Performance Chasing
Table 6 presents OLS regressions of log director ownership as of December 31, 2001, on the annualized abnormal return
of the fund in the years 1997–2001. The t -statistics in parentheses employ a robust cluster variance estimator.
Log
Log Nonindependent
Independent Independent Director Director Fund
Variables Fund Ownership Ownership
Intercept 4.55 3.96
(6.85) (3.36)
Past abnormal return 0.07 0.27
(0.76) (1.90)
N 131 70
R2 0.005 0.030
performance. A regression of log nonindependent director ownership on raw
(rather than abnormal) past returns produces a somewhat larger coefficient on
past returns of 0.31 with a robust cluster t-statistic of 2.01, which may be par-
tially due to a mechanical relation between past raw returns and ownership levels.
However, this positive relation between nonindependent director ownership and
past raw returns is not robust to the inclusion of other variables (as in Table 9).
Importantly, even with performance persistence, our 2002–2004 performance re-
sults are unaffected by this mechanical effect, as they are concentrated in funds
with zero ownership.
B. Incentive Alignment
Having ruled out the private information hypothesis by considering director-
level portfolios, as suggested by our model, we now use proxies for the impor-
tance of appropriately incentivizing directors to show that the relation between
director ownership and fund performance is indeed concentrated in funds in which
incentive alignment is expected to be more important.
We consider double sorts on director ownership and variables related to the
importance of having appropriately incentivized directors. We sort funds on di-
rector ownership and either turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, fund size, or board
independence. Idiosyncratic volatility and turnover proxy for fund strategy risk
and active management. Size follows from the finding of Chen et al. (2004) that
returns tend to decline with fund size, which they attribute to liquidity and organi-
zational diseconomies of scale, suggesting that incentive alignment may be more
valuable in larger funds. Turnover and idiosyncratic volatility are measured over
the period 1997 to 2001. Fund size is measured as fund total NAV as of December
31, 2001. All double sorts are value weighted.
1. Conditioning on Turnover, Idiosyncratic Volatility, and Fund Size
The two-way sorts construct 2 × 4 = 8 different portfolios. For each measure
of the importance of having appropriately incentivized directors, we sort funds
into 2 groups based on the measure (either turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, or
fund size) and into 4 groups based on individual fund ownership by either inde-
pendent or nonindependent directors. To save space, Table 7 only reports results
20. 1364 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
for the low ownership portfolios and the long/short portfolios that buy high own-
ership funds and sell low ownership funds (the full results are available from the
authors).
TABLE 7
Portfolios Formed on Ownership and Proxies for the Importance of Appropriately
Incentivizing Directors: Two-Way Sorts
Table 7 analyzes how proxies for the importance of appropriately incentivizing directors interact with director ownership in
individual fund shares. The proxies are turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, and fund size. Turnover and idiosyncratic volatility
(standard deviation of residuals from the four-factor model) are measured over 1997–2001. Fund size is fund total net asset
value as of December 31, 2001. For each incentive proxy, we sort funds into 2 × 4 = 8 different portfolios, 2 groups based
on the incentive proxy and 4 groups based on director ownership. These double sorts are independent. For each double
sort we report the annualized value-weighted return (in %), abnormal return (in %), and its t -statistic and bootstrap empirical
p -value for the two low ownership portfolios as well as the two long/short portfolios that buy high ownership funds and sell
low ownership fund. The index (i ) refers to the sorted portfolios, with higher values of the index designating portfolios of
funds with higher values of the indicated variable. The long/short portfolios are denoted “(4) – (1).” The sample includes
N = 132 funds with ownership data for independent directors and N = 76 funds with ownership data for nonindependent
directors.
Idiosyncratic
Turnover Volatility Fund Size
(1) (4) – (1) (1) (4) – (1) (1) (4) – (1)
Panel A. Independent Directors
Mean return (1) 0.19 0.80 0.98 –0.24 0.99 2.03
(2) –0.04 2.08 –0.39 2.90 0.06 1.24
Alpha (1) –1.53 1.01 –1.71 1.14 –1.54 –1.85
(2) –3.35 2.59 –2.21 1.64 –2.05 1.49
t -stat. (1) –2.36 1.35 –1.91 1.47 –1.97 –1.32
(2) –2.95 1.93 –2.03 1.43 –2.99 2.26
p -value (1) 0.10 0.29 0.20 0.26 0.18 0.32
(2) 0.04 0.10 0.17 0.28 0.04 0.06
Panel B. Nonindependent Directors
Mean return (1) –0.41 –0.04 0.20 –1.11 2.28 –0.19
(2) 1.02 2.34 0.05 4.40 –0.02 1.12
Alpha (1) –1.83 0.75 –2.12 0.94 –1.87 1.31
(2) –3.40 3.99 –4.32 5.22 –2.54 2.17
t -stat. (1) –1.92 0.90 –2.38 0.91 –1.31 0.66
(2) –2.24 2.52 –2.13 2.68 –2.71 2.51
p -value (1) 0.19 0.53 0.12 0.51 0.40 0.66
(2) 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.05
When conditioning on turnover, we find large abnormal returns for long/short
portfolios based on director ownership in individual fund shares, but only when
turnover is high. The alphas are 2.59% and 3.99% for independent and noninde-
pendent director ownership, respectively. Although both measures of ownership
are economically significant, the bootstrap empirical p-values indicate that sta-
tistical significance only exists for nonindependent directors. This is perhaps not
surprising: If there is a meaningful distinction between independent and nonin-
dependent directors, the incentive alignment mechanism would predict stronger
impact of incentives on nonindependent directors, who are likely to be involved
in running the fund, which is exactly what we find.
Individual fund portfolios’ alphas are also interesting: In funds where incen-
tive alignment is important (high turnover) but lacking (lowest ownership quar-
tile), we find very negative abnormal returns of −3.35% and −3.40% for both
types of directors.
21. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1365
For nonindependent directors, conditioning on idiosyncratic volatility yields
even stronger results. Funds with high idiosyncratic volatility and zero noninde-
pendent director ownership (quartile 1) are characterized by an abnormal return
of −4.32%. The portfolio that sells these funds and simultaneously buys funds
with high idiosyncratic volatility and highest-quartile ownership earns a statis-
tically and economically significant abnormal return of 5.22%. In contrast, the
abnormal return on the corresponding long/short portfolio of low-volatility funds
is less than 1% and insignificant. Funds where having appropriately incentivized
directors is important, but where nonindependent directors have no ownership
incentives, underperform substantially.
The abnormal returns for the long/short portfolios based on independent di-
rector ownership go in the right direction (larger abnormal return when idiosyn-
cratic volatility is high, i.e., when monitoring is expected to be most important
and difficult), but we do not obtain statistical significance. The evidence is again
stronger for nonindependent directors, which is consistent with the view that af-
filiated directors are more likely to directly impact performance.11
If incentive alignment is more important in larger funds (e.g., because of dis-
economies of scale), the link between director ownership and performance should
be stronger in larger funds. The results in the last two columns of Table 7 support
this prediction, as is clear from the significant alphas on long/short portfolios of
large funds, for both independent and nonindependent directors. The long/short
portfolios of small funds have statistically insignificant abnormal returns. Consis-
tent with the other findings and with the monitoring mechanism, the long/short
results are primarily driven by the poor performance of large funds with zero
ownership (alphas of −2.05% and −2.54% for independent and nonindependent
directors, respectively).
2. Conditioning on Board Independence
We conduct a two-way sort on the percentage of nonindependent directors
and fund ownership by all directors (both independent and nonindependent).
Table 8 shows that director ownership only matters when the percentage of
nonindependent directors is high. A portfolio that buys funds with high direc-
tor ownership and sells funds with low director stakes earns an economically and
statistically significant abnormal return of 2.81%, but only when the percentage of
nonindependent directors is high. This long/short result is again driven by the very
substantial underperformance (alpha of −3.25%) of funds that have a high pro-
portion of nonindependent directors and where ownership is in the lowest quartile.
11 The private information mechanism may also suggest that director ownership should be more
strongly related to performance in funds with high turnover or idiosyncratic volatility. However the
director-level results suggested by our model rule out the private information mechanism. Further,
unreported results show no difference in persistence when conditioning on either turnover or idiosyn-
cratic volatility. Hence, directors could not have exploited information about these variables in an
effort to chase return persistence. Also, we find no significant unconditional relation between fund
performance and idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, these proxies for the importance of incentive
alignment are not related to fund performance, and the alphas reported in Table 7 must be driven
by director ownership.
22. 1366 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
TABLE 8
Portfolios Formed on Board Independence and Fund Ownership: Two-Way Sorts
Table 8 analyzes how board independence interacts with director ownership. We sort funds into 2 × 4 = 8 different
portfolios, 2 groups based on the percentage of board members who are not independent and 4 groups based on the
combined ownership of both independent and nonindependent directors. These double sorts are independent. We report
the annualized value-weighted return (in %), abnormal return (in %), and its t -statistic and bootstrap empirical p -value for
the 8 portfolios as well as two long/short portfolios. The index (i ) refers to the sorted portfolios, with higher values of the
index designating portfolios of funds with higher values of the indicated variable. The long/short portfolios are denoted
“(2) – (1)” and “(4) – (1).”
Ownership in Individual
Fund Shares (N = 107)
% Nonindep. (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) – (1)
Mean return (1) 0.17 –0.36 2.15 0.99 0.82
(2) –1.53 3.91 3.23 1.26 2.79
(2) – (1) –1.69 4.27 1.08 0.27
Alpha (1) –1.45 –2.23 –0.90 –1.13 0.32
(2) –3.25 0.45 0.30 –0.43 2.81
(2) – (1) –1.80 2.69 1.20 0.70
t -stat. (1) –1.19 –2.45 –0.86 –2.32 0.30
(2) –2.59 0.21 0.26 –0.66 2.44
(2) – (1) –1.60 1.20 1.10 1.12
p -value (1) 0.46 0.10 0.61 0.11 0.84
(2) 0.08 0.89 0.87 0.69 0.04
(2) – (1) 0.20 0.36 0.41 0.41
Thus the lack of incentives in the form of ownership is most problematic
when there are few independents. Relating to recent changes in SEC policy, it
seems that adequately incentivizing nonindependent directors is as important as
regulating the proportion of independent directors.
Our finding, that funds that lack needed director incentives underperform,
begs the question of how these funds survive in equilibrium: Why would in-
vestors continue to provide capital to funds that make poor decisions and that are
not being scrutinized by directors? This lack of reaction by mutual fund investors
to poorly incentivized directors in underperforming funds is closely related to
the well-documented puzzle that some investors in underperforming funds fail to
react to the underperformance by withdrawing; for example, Berk and Xu (2004)
demonstrate empirically that it is precisely this heterogeneity in investor response
that generates persistence of negative performance even in a rational model with-
out agency problems (Berk and Green (2004)).
3. Determinants of Director Ownership
If mutual fund shareholders benefit from director ownership because of im-
proved incentives, then ownership should be set at the appropriate level to alle-
viate agency problems. Ownership should then vary across funds according to
cross-sectional differences in marginal costs and benefits of improved director
incentives.
In Table 9, we regress log director ownership as of December 31, 2001 (and
director compensation) on fund size, turnover and idiosyncratic volatility (both
computed over 1997–2001), and several control variables (family size, number of
funds in the family, fund expense ratio, and annual abnormal return over 1997–
2001). If board characteristics, including director ownership, are endogenously
and optimally determined, one would expect a positive relation between fund
23. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum 1367
size, past turnover, or idiosyncratic volatility on the one hand, and current direc-
tor ownership.12 The t-statistics that we report employ a robust cluster variance
estimator that assumes independence across fund families but not within them, as
some fund families have policies regarding director ownership.
TABLE 9
Governance Variables and the Importance of Monitoring
Table 9 presents OLS regressions log ownership and log compensation on fund and family characteristics. The first two
columns regress log director ownership in fund shares as of December 31, 2001, on fund characteristics that proxy for
the difficulty or the importance of monitoring: namely, log fund size, idiosyncratic volatility, and turnover (both computed
over 1997–2001). Control variables are log family size, number of funds in family, expense ratio, and past abnormal return.
Column 3 regresses log nonindependent director family-level compensation on log family assets, and the same control
variables. The t -statistics in parentheses employ a robust cluster variance estimator.
Log Log
Independent Nonindependent
Independent Director Fund Director Fund Log
Variables Ownership Ownership Compensation
Intercept –11.76 6.35 8.23
(–2.14) (0.54) (6.49)
Log of fund assets 1.23 0.83 0.04
(3.07) (1.53) (0.96)
Past return volatility 3.53 2.83 0.05
(2.46) (1.68) (0.04)
Turnover –0.23 –0.64 –0.08
(–0.31) (–0.53) (–0.41)
Log of family assets –0.37 –0.23 0.24
(–0.65) (–0.17) (1.77)
Number of funds in family –0.13 0.04 0.04
(–1.40) (0.13) (1.41)
Expense ratio –0.22 –4.42 0.43
(–0.22) (–2.80) (1.90)
Past abnormal return –0.04 0.07 –0.02
(–0.50) (0.51) (–1.22)
Compensation 0.98 –0.13
(2.28) (–0.09)
N 131 70 132
R2 0.258 0.237 0.360
Several interesting results emerge. First, these fund characteristics jointly ex-
plain a significant portion of the variation in ownership across funds: The R2 s
in the ownership regressions are close to 25%. Second, consistent with some
degree of performance maximization, fund size is an important determinant of
fund ownership: The individual fund-level ownership of both independent and
nonindependent directors is positively related to individual fund size but not to
family size (though in the case of nonindependent director ownership this is not
statistically significant). Similarly, director ownership is positively related to id-
iosyncratic volatility (though again in the case of nonindependent director own-
ership this is not statistically significant). Fourth, past turnover does not appear to
12 Directors may not be able to hold shares in funds that are primarily institutional. CRSP started
disclosing the fund type only in 2003, thus we cannot be certain whether funds are institutional before
that. However, this information does not change for any of the funds in our sample between 2003 and
2006. Only 14 of the 134 funds are institutional-only as of 2003. The correlation between independent
director fund ownership and an institutional-only fund dummy variable is −0.08, which is insignificant
(t-statistic of 0.9). For nonindependent directors, this correlation has the “wrong” sign.
24. 1368 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
matter.13 We obtain similar results when we include total fund loads in the regres-
sions in Table 9.
VI. Board Characteristics, Shareholder Fees, and Fund
Performance
An important finding in the mutual fund literature is that shareholder fees
are a major determinant of mutual fund performance. Among others, Blake, Elton,
and Gruber (1993), Carhart (1997), Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993), Jensen
(1968), and Malkiel (1995) document this empirical regularity over various time
periods, types of funds, and methods of accounting for risk and style. The result
that emerges from this literature is that a 1% increase in annual expense ratios
typically lowers performance by 0.8% to 2.2% per year.
Our findings so far support the claim that effective governance is related to
fund performance. In this section we ask to what extent this effect is driven by
fees. This is an important question, because one of our objectives in this paper is
to better understand the economic role of mutual fund boards. Previous research
in this area has focused almost exclusively on the relation between board charac-
teristics and shareholder fees. This is perhaps not surprising, given the literature
on the relation between performance and fees, and the fact that boards of direc-
tors do play the important role of negotiating the terms of the advisory contract.
However, as we have argued earlier in the paper, there is reason to believe that
directors do more. Specifically, directors have the important monitoring role of
resolving a wide array of conflicts of interests between the advisory firm and the
fund’s shareholders. Also, affiliated directors are executives of the fund and can
have a direct impact on performance. In this section, we attempt to quantify the
role of effective governance beyond its relation to shareholder fees.
Our analysis proceeds in two parts. In the first part, we examine the relation
between fund fee levels and our governance variables after controlling for fund-
specific factors and fund board characteristics known to affect fees. In the second
part, we investigate to what extent the relation between director ownership and
fund performance is driven by fees.
A. Expense Ratio Regressions
Following Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Del Guercio et al. (2003), we test
whether effective governance is associated with lower expense ratios. We begin
by replicating their result that expense ratios are negatively related to assets under
management, positively related to board size,14 and negatively related to the pro-
portion of independent members on the board. Column 1 in Table 10 contains the
evidence. We also find evidence that even after controlling for assets under man-
agement, the number of funds in the family matters, as does average turnover.
13 These results are robust to using raw rather than abnormal mutual fund performance and to using
raw rather than idiosyncratic fund volatility. Also, the correlation between turnover over 1997–2001
and 2002–2004 is only 54%.
14 Yermack (1996) also finds that small boards are more effective than large ones in U.S. industrial
corporations.