The document discusses potential government efficiency savings from benchmarking against other countries. It finds that benchmarking Belgium against Switzerland's public sector efficiency could save Belgium 19% of its GDP. Additional savings of 14-20% could be gained through mandatory financial referendums as seen in some Swiss cantons. Combining these factors suggests total potential GDP savings for Belgium of 25%.

1. Overzicht
1. Representatieve Democratie ideaal versus werkelijkheid
2. Waarom representatieve democratie ALTIJD afglijdt
naar particratie
3. Benchmarking the Best in Class
4. Verklaring van de performantieverschillen
5. Grondoorzaak de vergeten basiswaarden
6. Aanbevolen ordening van de samenleving
7. Quantificatie van de winst
8. Een nieuwe en andere rol voor politici

2. Quantification of the
savings

3. Public Sector Efficiency
An International
Comparison
ECB working paper number 242, July 2003 "Public
Sector Efficiency_An International
Comparison“ by Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi
http://www.pedz.uni-
mannheim.de/daten/edz-ki/ezb/03/w-
paper/ecbwp242.pdf

5. Benchmarking Belgium versus
Switzerland
The ECB working paper number 242, July 2003 "Public
Sector Efficiency_An International Comparison“ by
Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi, on Public sectors
Performance Indictors (Table II, in attachment) shows
an overall governmental efficiency for all tasks
executed by the Belgian government a rating of 0.83,
while for Switzerland 1.33. (*)
This means that when Belgium takes over for its
government the AVERAGE Swiss model, the cost of the
Belgian government would be reduced, for the same
service, to 0.83/1.33 = 62%. Since the Belgian
government takes about 50% of the GNP, this study
suggests a potential savings of (100% - 62%) X 50% =
19% of the GNP compared to the average Swiss model.
(*) ECB working paper number 242, July 2003 "Public Sector Efficiency_An International
Comparison“ by Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi http://www.pedz.uni-
mannheim.de/daten/edz-ki/ezb/03/w-paper/ecbwp242.pdf

6. Bijkomende efficiecientieverhoging
door automatische Financiele
Referenda ?
Lars P. Feld, John G. Matsusaka, "Budget referendums and
government spending: evidence from Swiss cantons“ Journal
of Public Economics 87 (2003) 2703– 2724
Lars Feld and Gebhard Kirchgasser, "Local fiscal Referenda:
The dampening effect on taxes and spending",Economic
Policy, 2001

7. 20% Bijkomende Efficientieverhoging door
automatische financiele referenda met lage drempel
Besparing op Uitgaven Overheid door verplichte automatische
Financiele Referenda in vergelijking tot het geval dat deze niet
verplichtend dienen te worden georganizeerd
0.0%
0 5 10 15 20
-5.0%
Besparing (%)
-10.0%
Alleen kantons met Lars P. Feld, John
G. Matsusaka,
verplichte referenda "Budget referendums
-15.0% and government
spending: evidence
from Swiss cantons“
Journal of Public
Economics 87 (2003)
-20.0% 2703– 2724
-25.0%
Drempel Financieel Referendum (M CHF)

8. Bijkomende efficientieverhoging door
Automatische finciele referenda
There are large differences in Switzerland from canton to canton.
When financial referendums are made obligatory, Lars P. Feld,
John G. Matsusaka (**) found in their economic correlation studies
an efficiency improvement of 14% (very large financial treshold) to
20% (small financial treshold) compared to the case where
financial referenda are not obligatory. I.e. additional efficiency
improvements occur compared to the Swiss canton.
(**)Lars P. Feld, John G. Matsusaka, "Budget referendums and government spending: evidence
from Swiss cantons“ Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 2703– 2724
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/I&R%20Researc
h%20and%20History/I&R%20Studies/Feld%20and%20Matsusaka%20-
%20Fiscal%20Evidence%20from%20Swiss%20Cantons%20IRI.pdf
Or http://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/konference/06/03_feld.pdf

9. Bijkomende efficientieverhoging door
Automatische finciele referenda
Introducing automatic financial referenda with low
thresholds in Belgium in addition to the system of
Gemeindefreiheit results is savings of governmetal
costs of 0.083/1.33 x (1-20%) = 50%.
Since the Belgian government takes about 50% of the
GNP, the combination of the ECB study of Afonso,
Schuknecht and Tanzi, and the study of Feld and
Matsusaka study suggests a potential savings of (100%
- 50%) X 50% = 25% % of the GNP.

10. Libertarian View on
Savings Possible
David R Barker
David R Barker in an interview with Stefan
Moulyneux estimates the saving which can be
obained in a libertarian society to be between
20% to 30% of the GNP per capita.
He asks: Is this worth the trouble to change
society?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YasmmiR0PrM
&feature=youtube_gdata

11. Additional growth of the GNP
Savings in GNP per capita
10% 20% 25%
invested part (1/3 of savings) 3.0% 6.0% 7.5%
additional growth of GNP per capita
1 1.03 1.06 1.075
2 1.0609 1.1236 1.155625
3 1.092 1.191016 1.242297
4 1.125 1.262477 1.335469
5 1.159274 1.338226 1.435629
6 1.194052 1.418519 1.543302
7 1.229874 1.50363 1.659049
8 1.26677 1.593848 1.783478
9 1.304773 1.689479 1.917239
10 1.343916 1.790848 2.061032
11 1.384234 1.898299 2.215609
12 1.425761 2.012196 2.38178
13 1.468534 2.132928 2.560413
14 1.51259 2.260904 2.752444
15 1.557967 2.396558 2.958877