Deck 2010 Annual Outlook

December 09, 2009

Economics Group

Special Commentary

Annual Economic Outlook 2010

Rebalancing the U.S. Economy
for a New Course

Dear Valued Clients,
We hope your ship has found a safe harbor in which to weather the
gale of what was the worst recession in a half century.
While the recession may be behind us, 2010 will not be all fair winds
and following seas. The coming year may provide some opportunities
in which to venture out from port. However, we would urge you to
stay close to shore as the coming year has many risks lurking just
over the horizon for those who choose to head far out to sea.
Please read on as we explore the challenges and opportunities that
will face your business, and the U.S. and global economies in the year
ahead.
-Wells Fargo Economics Group

This report is available on wellsfargo.com/research and on Bloomberg WFEC

Annual Economic Outlook 2010 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC
December 09, 2009 ECONOMICS GROUP

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

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Executive Summary: Charting the New Course
Trading was fundamentally transformed by the European Age of Discovery, which was pioneered
by Portuguese navigators, such as Bartolomeu Dias and Vasco da Gama, who set sail down the
West African coast, eventually making it to India by the end of the 16th century. The new course
broke the stranglehold that the Ottoman Turks had on the overland spice trade and the
considerable wealth that it provided. Ferdinand Magellan and Juan Elcano further altered world
navigation by 1522 when their expedition circumnavigated the globe. In the 21st century, financial
trading has been permanently altered by the global crisis associated with subprime mortgages,
structured products and credit default swaps. Yet, there still exists an imperative need to finance
economic activity.
Our economic ship has been thrown off course and is still listing. We face three problems. First, Our economic ship
how can we right our ship with new and traditional policy tools to regain a sense of stability in the has been thrown
economy? Second, what is our new course and at what speed can our ship move forward? Finally, off course and is
how has our destination changed in terms of growth, inflation, employment and the dollar? still listing.
Figure 1 Figure 2
Real GDP Real Personal Consumption Expenditures
Bars = CAGR Line = Yr/Yr Percent Change Bars = CAGR Line = Yr/Yr Percent Change
10.0% 10.0% 8.0% 8.0%
GDPR - CAGR: Q3 @ 2.8%
8.0% GDPR - Yr/Yr Percent Change: Q3 @ -2.5% 8.0%
6.0% 6.0%
Forecast
6.0% 6.0%
Forecast 4.0% 4.0%
4.0% 4.0%

2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%

0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

-2.0% -2.0%
-2.0% -2.0%
-4.0% -4.0%

-4.0% -4.0%
-6.0% -6.0% PCE - CAGR: Q3 @ 2.9%
PCE - Yr/Yr Percent Change: Q3 @ -0.1%
-8.0% -8.0% -6.0% -6.0%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Economic forecasting, like sailing, requires constant adjustment to changing winds, currents and
the occasional hazard. While the worst of the storm has passed, our ship is still struggling against
fierce winds. We are far from an equilibrium point in the economy. We continue to anticipate
subpar growth in 2010, with both the pace and composition of the expansion being very different
than what we are used to or what we may wish. The pace of the expansion is characterized by real
growth of 2.2 percent in 2010 with inflation at just 1.8 percent. Positive contributions to growth
will likely come from rising consumer spending, business investment—particularly equipment
and software, housing and of course, federal spending. Improved consumer spending will reflect
the upturn in real personal income due to eventual job creation, a longer work week and rising
wages. We expect real incomes to benefit from continued low consumer inflation. Business
investment should improve as financing costs remain low and business expectations of final sales
improve. Corporate profits will likely grow, which would improve cash flow and provide liquidity
for business investment. We expect housing to continue its recovery as income and consumer
confidence improve demand and housing finance continues to be supported by low interest rates.
Our forecast shows federal spending stimulus will continue to be applied in the first half of next
year and will only gradually begin to slow in the second half as election-year imperatives take
over. As for trade, global growth and the weak dollar will stimulate exports but rising domestic
consumption and increased energy prices will temper some of the positive effects.
Also putting a damper on hopes for a swift recovery are both the disappointing outlook for
housing and the slow growth in consumer spending. For our society, the modest pace of
expansion implies only slow improvement in the labor market with the unemployment rate

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remaining high. We expect sustained positive monthly payroll numbers will start to appear in the
late spring of 2010. Our complete forecast can be found beginning on page 26.
Figure 3 Figure 4
Nonfarm Employment Change Real Nonresidential Construction
Change in Employment, In Thousands Bars = CAGR Line = Yr/Yr Percent Change
600 600 30.0% 30.0%

20.0% 20.0%
400 400 Forecast

10.0% 10.0%
200 200
0.0% 0.0%

0 0 -10.0% -10.0%

-200 -200 -20.0% -20.0%

-30.0% -30.0%
-400 -400
-40.0% -40.0%

-600 -600
-50.0% Non-res Construction - CAGR: Q3 @ -15.2% -50.0%
Nonfarm Employment Change: Nov @ -11,000 Non-res Construction - Yr/Yr Percent Change: Q3 @ -22.1%
-800 -800 -60.0% -60.0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Dept. of Labor and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Already, we sense that the convergence process to a new economic equilibrium has been more
difficult than policymakers estimate. Job growth has been non-existent. Credit growth has been
restrained and the recovery in housing far less significant than expected. Still, inflation remains
subdued as unemployment limits the acceleration in wages and unit labor costs. Our central
tendency for inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), is 1.5 to 2.0 percent. Slow
real growth will run into political pressures in the year ahead as economic realities fall short of
political rhetoric. Finally, concerns remain about the long-run pace of growth in the economy as
well as the ability of the recovery to sustain itself at a pace that meets the expectations of
consumers and workers especially as an election nears. It is not clear how much of the recent
economic upturn can be sustained without government support. Recent improvements in
business surveys and capital goods orders may have peaked, at least near term. The remaining
downside risks reflect weakness in the labor market, with implications for income growth and
consumer confidence.
How long can When the tempest in financial markets made the seas wild and hazardous in autumn of last year,
expansionary most market-watchers were grateful the government stepped in to provide emergency financing
economic policy to shore up the banks and provide liquidity to the frozen credit markets. The threat of a complete
persist? collapse of the financial system made otherwise free market capitalists willing to accept
government help—any port in a storm. But how long can expansionary economic policy persist
before the negative feedback effects from excess support begin to show? This is the crucial
question for decision-makers in the coming year. A general willingness to spend by government is
facing a populace less willing and less able to fund that spending. The nation adds to its debt load
each year and depends upon foreign savers to supply the financing. As we move into 2010, the
Federal Reserve will face a difficult economic environment. While an exit strategy represents our
base case estimate for the path of monetary policy, considerable risks exist to both the expected
path as well as execution of an “exit strategy.” We discuss how policy-makers could right the ship
in our policy outlook section which begins on page 6.
Just as the Federal Reserve and the Treasury took measures to calm the U.S. financial system,
their counterparts in foreign countries took action as well. Indeed, governments of the world’s
major countries averted catastrophe last year by taking steps to recapitalize, provide loan
guarantees and increase deposit insurance while at the same time engaging in stimulative
economic policies. As the storm clears, another unique aspect of this recovery is that the U.S. is
not the primary catalyst for global economic growth. Quite the contrary, the speed and character
of the U.S. recovery reflects the influences of global capital flows and the allocation of production
to serve global needs. There will be a new growth model for global economies going forward.
Which countries will be the catalysts for growth? Will growth be export-driven or will internal

4


economic growth take the lead? We consider the new course and speed for the global recovery in
our international outlook section on page 12. We also consider whether the dollar will continue to
play the role of the world’s most important reserve currency.
Real estate markets around the country have seen some modest improvement in recent months, The recovery in
but much of that improvement can be attributed to tax rebates that effectively subsidize the cost residential real
of housing. The residential real estate market is not actually making way. The recovery in this estate seems to
sector seems to have more to do with government subsidies than it does with a resurgent private have more to do
demand for real estate. Federal government support, with massive purchases of mortgage-backed with government
securities by the Federal Reserve is helping drive down mortgage rates even as a tax-credit for subsidies than with
first-time homebuyers lifts demand. This has created a sense of stability; but what happens when resurgent demand.
that support is withdrawn? Is the housing recovery self-sustaining in any way? Meanwhile,
commercial real estate remains in the midst of the storm. Nonresidential construction has pulled
back significantly as many commercial projects have been delayed or canceled outright as
financing has become much harder to secure. The ongoing correction in both residential and
commercial real estate continues to hang over the economy as the rising tide of defaults and
foreclosures of residential and commercial properties continue to put stress on the financial
system. Supply and demand fundamentals are still deteriorating. In our real estate section on
page 16, we discuss our view that residential construction may grow modestly through continued
support from the government, while the commercial real estate sector will continue to deteriorate.
California and Florida were two of the hardest hit states during the recession, as both were key
participants in the housing boom and bust. Overbuilding in residential and commercial
construction will continue to weigh on both states over the next few years but signs of growth are
beginning to emerge, particularly in northern California and parts of central Florida. Find out if
fairer winds are headed for California and Florida in our regional spotlight section on page 21.
Just as the Portuguese explorers found a new route to wealth in East Asia, so too must the
U.S. economy chart a new course to prosperity in today’s changing global financial markets. In
this outlook, we explore how that new course is likely to take shape in the coming year and we
describe some of the hazards that might be encountered along the way.

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Economic Policy: Implications of Massive Government Spending
A willingness to When the ship is heading into uncharted waters, it is no time to raise sails and pick up speed.
spend by the How long can expansionary economic policy persist before the negative feedback effects from
government is excess support begin to show? This is the crucial question for decision-makers in the coming year.
facing a populace What are the real and financial implications—both short- and long-term—of our current path of
increasingly less spending and taxes? A general willingness to spend by government is facing a populace
willing and able to increasingly less willing and able to fund that spending. Unable or unwilling to reconcile the
fund that spending. spending/revenue imbalance, the nation adds to its debt load each year and depends on foreign
savers to supply the financing.
Fiscal Policy: Party Is Over, Bills Coming Due
Fiscal year 2009 for the United States government ended this past September with the closing
bell sounding to the sour tune of a $1.438 trillion deficit. Some perspective: $ 1.4 trillion is equal
to more than $4,500 for every person living in the United States. Many measures of debt have
never been as high during peacetime—wartime spikes in debt levels were temporary, however,
and therefore did not permanently damage economic growth prospects. In contrast, the current
path of indebtedness shows a permanent venture into economically unfavorable territory. While
the United States is certainly not in the worst position compared to other developed economies,
its fiscal situation does not leave room for complacency or free spending, especially given our
dependence on foreign capital inflows. This presents a real challenge to policymakers who would
like a fresh start, but cannot disinherit past spending.
Elevated spending and diminished revenues, always a dangerous duo, are byproducts of the
financial crisis and economic downturn as well as the fiscal policy response. During any recession,
government spending tends to increase in the short run to help fill the gap left by private
spending. Concomitantly, receipts fall off because personal income and corporate profits decline,
reflecting shrinking payrolls and declining business sales, respectively. However, the severity of
the recent economic malaise, compounded by the increasing entitlement imbalance, has driven
the deficit to new heights. In parsing the deficit, stimulus spending through TARP and the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act constituted only 24 percent of the 2009 budget
deficit—substantial, but not the whole story. 1 Unusually large increases in healthcare and income
security spending also contributed. With more than 7 million jobs lost, unemployment claims
skyrocketed; in addition, more individuals began to meet eligibility requirements for entitlement
programs, such as food stamps and Medicaid, and these programs felt the pressure. More than
just the economic cycle, the demographic, secular pressures on government spending will become
increasingly evident.
End in Sight? Economic Recovery Alone Will not Restore a Balanced Budget
Cyclical recovery indicates that the nation’s debt will accumulate more slowly in the years
immediately following the recession simply due to a reduction in emergency spending and
stimulus as well as a recovery in tax revenue. Yet, the more meaningful long-run factor of
entitlements will serve to accelerate the severity and immediacy of the deficit problem. Indeed,
fiscal 2010 has already begun, and its fiscal deficit will exceed $1 trillion, barring major near-term
changes. Despite the diminishing effects of short-term deficit drivers, the recession and the
financial crisis, a quick return to fiscal sustainability is off the table.
Federal entitlement programs, Medicare and Social Security, already pose serious threats to fiscal
sustainability. A new national healthcare program will raise additional concerns about long-term
funding of more entitlements. Our election cycle provides an incentive for policymakers to
concern themselves with only short-run benefits rather than the long-run costs of policy
initiatives—a classic time inconsistency problem. 2

1 Joint Statement of Tim Geithner and Peter Orszag on Budget Results for Fiscal Year 2009. Oct. 16,
2009.
2 In economics, time inconsistency refers to the observation that policymakers today can and often do

change policy over time although economic agents commit today to policies that they expect are
permanent. See Kydland, Fynn E., and Edward Prescott (1977): “Rules Rather than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy, 85 (3): 473-491.

6


Knowing the areas that will only become more problematic, it would seem that the solution would
already be close at hand. However, balancing the budget and addressing the fundamental issues
has eluded political decision-makers for generations. Through the next decade, the national debt
is expected to relentlessly increase. The decisions that are made over that time horizon, however,
will have important implications for the sustainability of federal budget deficits in the global
context. From our viewpoint, current fiscal policy, if continued at its present pace, is inconsistent
with the direction of interest rates, inflation and exchange rates. As we view current policy as
unsustainable, then so are the market prices associated with that policy.
Righting the Ship: Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic

“You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today."
Abraham Lincoln
With the ship of state listing badly due to fiscal deficits, even small steps toward averting fiscal While federal
disaster would be most welcome. The longer the nation delays addressing its unsustainable fiscal spending has
path, the worse the day of reckoning. While federal spending has helped fill the gap left by the helped fill the gap
private sector over the past year, stimulus-induced growth is not self-sustaining; growth left by the private
artificially pulled forward merely takes away from future growth. Take, for example, a (relatively sector over the past
small) program such as “cash-for-clunkers”—this spurred sales and production in the auto sector year, stimulus-
at the expense of sales and production down the road. Clearly, a long history of deficits cannot be induced growth is
overcome in a year or even a presidential term, but this is not an excuse to turn a blind eye to the not self-sustaining.
ever-expanding problem.
Since the 1960s, the average deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio has been about
2 percent. Moving closer to that long-run average would show considerable improvement from
the current level of 10 percent.
Figure 5 Figure 6
Federal Budget Balance Federal Gov't Financing and Debt Forecast
Percentage of GDP Office of Management & Budget, Trillions of Dollars
4.0% 4.0% $25 $25

2.0% Forecast 2.0%

$20 $20
0.0% 0.0%

-2.0% -2.0%
$15 $15

-4.0% -4.0%

$10 $10
-6.0% -6.0%

-8.0% -8.0%
$5 $5

-10.0% -10.0%
Budget Balance: Q3 @ -10.0%
-12.0% -12.0% $0 $0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

Source: U.S. Treasury, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Dept. of Commerce and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
For decision-makers, the ratio of the deficit to GDP or alternatively the real stock of government
bonds relative to the economy will become unsustainable if the growth of the real economy falls
short of the real interest rate on the debt. 3 This is the talisman of long-run fiscal sustainability.
Unfortunately, the recent rapid growth of debt/GDP gives rise to an unsustainable debt burden,
given the current mix of interest rates, inflation and the dollar exchange rate.
Yet, over the long term, under current CBO projections, revenues shrink as a percent of GDP,
while spending trends are growing strongly and will likely not turn around without making
difficult choices (Figure 6). Outlays, and specifically the trend of higher spending related to the
major entitlement programs—Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security—will become the crux of

3 Sargent, Thomas J. and Neil Wallace (Fall 1981): “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,” Quarterly

Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

7


future budgetary challenges. The retirement of the Baby Boom generation will exert pressure on
both Social Security and Medicare as they begin drawing on benefits. Healthcare cost increases,
which significantly outpace inflation, reinforce the upward pressure on spending. It is widely
recognized that these programs are at the heart of the problem due to their unsustainable
growth. 4
Deficits, Dollar and Dependence: Does the Government Have a Teaser Rate Loan?
While U.S. indebtedness has risen this year to one of the most inauspicious levels in history, the
confounding reliance on global capital flows for deficit financing makes the debt/growth
imbalance truly ominous. The deficit is financed through public borrowing, and thus far, the
nation has been able to borrow from both the domestic and the foreign public at relatively low
interest rates, making debt servicing (interest expense) a manageable budget item. Fortunately,
high global saving rates and the demand for virtually default-risk free investments, such as
Treasury notes, have produced low borrowing rates for the United States. In addition, countries
with large current account surpluses have stored a large share of their wealth in dollar
denominated assets, further supporting demand for U.S. debt. The Federal Reserve and U.S.
households hold meaningful quantities of Treasury securities; however, the lion’s share of U.S.
Treasuries are owned by foreign investors, public and private, with nearly 50 percent of Treasury
securities outstanding in the second quarter of this year.
Global saving rates Global saving rates and Treasury demand are both liable to change sharply if perceptions of U.S.
and Treasury fiscal and monetary policy discipline slip. For example, in recent months, the role of the dollar as
demand are both the world’s reserve currency has already been called into question. Given our outsized current
liable to change account deficit, this heightens the exchange rate risk for foreign investors and a likely move
sharply when upward in global rates. 5
perceptions of U.S.
fiscal and Figure 7 Figure 8
monetary policy Net Foreign Purchases of Marketable US Treasury Securities
Bonds and Notes, 12-Month Moving Sum, Billions USD
U.S. Purchases of Foreign Securities
Billions of Dollars
discipline slip. $500 $500 $60 $60

$400 $400 $45 $45

$300 $300 $30 $30

$200 $200 $15 $15

$100 $100 $0 $0

$0 $0 -$15 -$15

-$100 -$100 -$30 -$30
Purchases of Foreign Securities: Sep @ $15B
12-Month Moving Sum: Sep @ $333.3B 3-Month Moving Average: Sep @ $16B
-$200 -$200 -$45 -$45
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Source: Federal Reserve, U.S. Department of the Treasury and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Higher rates and slow growth further imbalance the monetarist arithmetic. As this imbalance
grows, or is even just expected to grow, the market adjustments for interest rates, the dollar and
even economic growth deliver a dynamic that further influences market pricing. If the debt load is
perceived as irresponsible or unmanageable by investors, demand for Treasury bonds will fall off,
and the Treasury will have to pay higher interest rates to meet its financing needs. We appear as if
on a knife’s edge between weak and strong economic growth that will have significantly different
implications for debt finance, the dollar and capital flows.

4 Current economic and financial conditions and the federal budget. Ben S. Bernanke, Federal Reserve
Chairman. Testimony in Washington, D.C. June 3, 2009.
5 The implications of outsized current account adjustments on an economy are detailed in Carline L.

Freund’s essay “Current Account Adjustments in Industrialized Countries,” International Finance
Discussion Paper No. 692, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 2000.

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Political Risk for Economic Decision-Makers: Time Inconsistency on a Global Scale
Whether the fiscal outlook improves or worsens from its current abysmal state lies predominantly
in the hands of politicians, and indirectly in the hands of voters. The political climate is an
ever-shifting landscape of priorities and agendas, making it nearly impossible to forecast future
legislation. However, we know that there is a two-year political cycle and that political decisions
today, and their future changes, carry economic risks. Politicians have the luxury of frequently
changing their minds. Individuals and firms must deal with the consequences of these changes.
Within the United States, both sides of the political aisle have addressed this issue, particularly
fiscal conservatives and the coalition of “Blue Dogs” citing fiscal responsibility as an important
legislative consideration. As large spending bills go through, such as emergency stimulus
packages and bail-out programs, each future spending bill, such as healthcare and cap and trade,
becomes more difficult to support to the fiscally astute. Yet, the urge for politicians to show
results in terms of jobs is overwhelming. What makes today’s fiscal policy context so different is
that the economic agents responding to policy changes are global—not just domestic. U.S.
domestic fiscal policy carries global economic implications, and those implications are likely to
fall back on the U.S. economy with significant risks of inflation, higher interest rates and dollar
depreciation.
Monetary Policy: Where Are We and Where Are We Going?
In 1788, France faced daunting fiscal deficits due to royal extravagance and military spending, “Paper money
which combined with ineffective taxation, rendered the government essentially bankrupt. Less eventually returns
than a year later, the chaos of the French Revolution began in earnest. In an attempt to prime the to its intrinsic
pump of the economy, the government issued government debt secured by expropriated church value.”
property. Easy money became addictive, and several more debt issues were arranged. The -Voltaire
excessive reissuance of these notes caused the money supply to skyrocket and hyperinflation to
ensue, exacerbating the violence of the Revolution. By the end of the 18th century, all the issued
government debt was repudiated and became worthless. The years of fiscal turmoil were finally
put to rest by Napoleon Bonaparte, who adopted the franc, and never went back to paper money.
Voltaire predicted such an outcome, saying, “Paper money eventually returns to its intrinsic
value.”
Both the Federal Reserve and the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) have chalked up Considerable risks
quite a list of unprecedented actions over the past year and a half as they moved the traditional exist to both the
target rate to virtually zero and the balance sheet ballooned to more than twice its pre-crisis size. expected path and
As we move into 2010, the Federal Reserve will face a difficult economic environment. While an the execution of an
exit strategy represents our base case estimate for the path of monetary policy, considerable risks exit strategy.
exist to both the expected path as well as execution of that plan. A simple exit strategy represents
a claire idée fausse—a convincing but wrong idea. We will have more on that in a moment. First,
let’s take a step back and look at the entire cycle of monetary policy, something important to
consider as we move through the cycle. Is it currently tight, neutral or accommodative? Second, in
which direction is monetary policy moving—easing, tightening or holding relatively steady?
In mid-2007, the FOMC was holding the target rate, and monetary policy in general, steady at a
level that would general be considered “tight” monetary policy. As economic conditions began to
weaken late in 2007, the FOMC responded by easing monetary policy with a reduction in the
federal funds target rate. However, despite being in easing mode, policy was still considered
“tight” until about the turn of the year. By then, with the Fed in full on “easing” mode, policy
moved through neutral to a moderately accommodative stance before pausing in mid 2008.
“Easing” continued until the funds rate reached zero after evidence of further economic weakness
came forth.
While the Federal Funds target rate has been the key policy metric for some time, this cycle
brought forward “quantitative easing” as a major policy tool for the first time since the Fed was
established. So with a new tool in its kit, the Fed continued to ease monetary policy until the end
of 2008 with quantitative tools, such as lending to nontraditional Fed borrowers or providing

9


loans through an auction process. In the last few months of 2008, the Federal Reserve System’s
balance sheet ballooned. 6
After a long period After a long period of actively easing monetary policy, the Fed has largely held policy relatively
of actively easing constant with the funds rate target at 0–0.25 percent and the balance sheet hovering near
monetary policy, $2 trillion throughout 2009. Clearly, policy remains at an extremely accommodative level—but
the Fed has largely for how long and at what consequences? While the balance sheet has held roughly level in
held policy aggregate size over the past three quarters, the composition of assets has evolved substantially.
relatively constant. Initially, the Fed grew its balance sheet through a hastily cobbled together system of emergency
programs, which while essential to the functioning of the financial system at a time of great stress,
were not carefully planned preannounced actions. As the financial markets have thawed and these
programs have wound down naturally in 2009, they were largely replaced with preplanned and
announced purchase programs for Treasury securities, Agency debt and mortgage-backed
securities (MBS).
Backing Away from Accommodation—Very Slowly
The treasury debt purchase program that began in the spring ended in October with roughly
$300 billion in debt having been acquired. The Fed has also announced a tentative end to its
purchases of Agency debt and Agency MBS at the end of the first quarter of 2010 with an
aggregate purchase target of about $1.425 trillion. After these programs finish, the Fed’s balance
sheet should start to slowly shrink as many of the remaining emergency programs naturally run
off or are closed down. This will be the subtle beginning of a long “tightening” process. We do not
expect that the Fed will be actively working to tighten policy for most of 2010 and will be content
to let policy slowly tighten from its unprecedentedly accommodative level. However, policy will
still be very accommodative by historical standards for the early part of 2010. As we get closer to
the end of the year, the Fed will need to begin considering how to tighten monetary policy more
rapidly, by either raising the Federal Funds target, shrinking its balance sheet or a combination of
both. If the 2002-2004 experience taught us anything, it was that “too low for too long” can be
just as damaging as tightening policy too soon.
Figure 9 Figure 10
Federal Funds Target Rate Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
Rate Trillions
7.00% 7.00% $2.5 $2.5
Other
Foreign Swaps
PDCF & TAF
6.00% Forecast 6.00% Commercial Paper & Money Mkt.
$2.0 Repos & Discount Window $2.0
Agencies & MBS
5.00% 5.00% Treasuries

$1.5 $1.5
4.00% 4.00%

3.00% 3.00%
$1.0 $1.0

2.00% 2.00%

$0.5 $0.5
1.00% 1.00%

Federal Funds: Q3 @ 0.25%
0.00% 0.00% $0.0 $0.0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2007 2008 2009

Source: Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
When it does become time to raise the Federal Funds target rate in late 2010 or early 2011, it will
again be important to have more control over the size and composition of the balance sheet.
However, there will be two important considerations to keep in mind at that point. First, in
influencing interest rates and controlling money supply growth, it is not necessarily the size of the
Fed’s balance sheet that matters but rather the direction and magnitude of growth. The Fed does
not necessarily have to shrink its balance sheet back below $1 trillion to raise interest rates. In
fact, it is likely that the balance sheet will persist above its previous average indefinitely. Second, a

6 Reserve bank credit averaged $870 billion over the first half of 2008 before the Fed began its policy of
quantitative easing. The balance sheet eventually peaked at $2.25 trillion in December 2008.

10


key change will give the Fed some extra flexibility in removing quantitative easing while pushing
up short-term interest rates—the ability to pay interest on banks’ reserve balances held at the Fed.
In mid-2008 as the FOMC was reducing the target rate, but still trying to maintain a target, the
Fed did not yet have the authority to pay interest on its reserves. 7 With this authority, the FOMC
has another way to influence short-term interest rates without altering the money supply and its
balance sheet. Once begun, tightening may be quicker than many market participants expect with
the Fed raising the target rate and shrinking the size of its balance sheet at the same time. This
will likely be the major story for 2011 and even into 2012.
An Easy Exit Strategy? Once begun,
While an exit strategy represents our base case estimate for the path of monetary policy, tightening may
considerable risks exist to both the expected path as well as execution. A simple exit strategy be quicker than
represents a claire idée fausse—a convincing but wrong idea. First and foremost, the economy many market
remains extremely fragile and any unexpected hiccups could necessitate an easing of policy or an participants
extension of the accommodative period. Next, in the coming year, Chairman Bernanke and the expect.
rest of the board will likely face a torrent of political scrutiny. Much will be directed toward the
Fed's role as a supervisor of bank holding companies, but this scrutiny could easily creep into
Congressional scrutiny of monetary policy if the Fed's independence is not diligently protected.
Adding to these issues will be the reconfirmation hearing for Chairman Bernanke to another
four-year term as chairman, which has just begun. By midyear, Vice Chairman Kohn will also be
up for reappointment. The amount of time that both men will potentially spend on Capital Hill
answering questions about past and future Fed policy could be considerable. Finally, the massive
deficit that the federal government continues to run could eventual prove problematic for the
independence of monetary policy. If fiscal policy remains as loose as it currently is into 2011, the
Fed may have to tighten more aggressively than would otherwise be necessary to offset outsized
fiscal deficits. The interaction of expansive fiscal and tighter monetary policy will generate greater
volatility for rates, the dollar and the economy.

7 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 authorized interest payments as of Oct. 1, 2008.

11


Global Catastrophe Averted: But How Do We Set Sail Going Forward?
Major central Last autumn, the global economy plunged into its deepest recession in decades as financial
banks slashed markets seized up in the wake of Lehman Brothers’ failure. By early 2009, industrial production
policy rates, and in the 30 countries that comprise the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
governments in (OECD) was down more than 15 percent from year-earlier levels (Figure 11). It could have been
most major far worse, however. The governments of the world’s major countries averted catastrophe last year
countries opened by taking steps to prevent a wholesale collapse of their financial systems via recapitalization, loan
the fiscal taps. guarantees and increased deposit insurance. In addition, governments responded to the crisis
with stimulative economic policies. Major central banks slashed policy rates to unprecedented
levels, and governments in most major countries opened the fiscal taps. But what is the growth
model for global economies going forward, and which country(ies) will be the locomotive? Will
growth be export-driven or will internal economic growth take the lead?
Figure 11 Figure 12
OECD Industrial Production China Real GDP
Year-over-Year Percent Change Year-over-Year Percent Change
10% 10% 14.0% 14.0%

12.0% 12.0%
5% 5%

10.0% 10.0%
0% 0%

8.0% 8.0%
-5% -5%
6.0% 6.0%

-10% -10%
4.0% 4.0%

-15% -15%
2.0% 2.0%

OECD Industrial Production: Aug @ -11.3% Year-over-Year Percent Change: Q3 @ 8.9%
-20% -20% 0.0% 0.0%
76 80 84 88 92 96 00 04 08 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Source: OECD, IHS Global Insight and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
So far, the stimulus medicine appears to be working, because most foreign economies are starting
to grow again. Let’s start with the developed world. Real GDP in the Euro-zone rose 1.5 percent
(annualized rate) on a sequential basis in the third quarter, and the Japanese economy, which
contracted sharply late last year and earlier this year, has managed to post positive growth rates
over the past two quarters. Real GDP in the United Kingdom fell further in the third quarter, but
the rate of contraction has slowed significantly from the beginning of 2009. Even in the developed
economies that are growing again, however, recoveries are not yet truly self-sustaining.
Unfortunately labor markets generally remain very weak, restraining growth in consumer
spending.
If there are bona- If there are bona-fide self-sustaining recoveries under way, they are occurring in some developing
fide self-sustaining countries. For example, real GDP growth in China has picked up significantly over the past few
recoveries under quarters due, at least in part, to aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus (Figure 12). Stronger
way, they are economic growth in China is helping to lift GDP growth rates across Asia. The South Korean
occurring in some economy has expanded at a double-digit pace in the past two quarters, and real GDP in India rose
developing 7.9 percent, year over year, in the third quarter. That said, there is more behind Asian economic
countries. growth than simply China. Most countries in the region opened the fiscal taps, which helped to
stimulate economic activity. Moreover, many Asian countries did not become overly levered
during the last expansion. Therefore, banking systems in the region did not collapse, which
allowed credit growth to remain buoyant.
Latin America is picking up where it left off before the world financial markets collapsed last year,
and most of the help, again, is coming from the region’s export sector and particularly from the
strong recovery in commodity prices. Domestic demand in some Latin countries is starting to
recover—real consumer spending in Brazil rose 2 percent in the second quarter of this year
relative to the same period of 2008—yet it would be premature to claim that most economies in
the region have entered the realm of self-sustaining recoveries. For example, Chilean final

12


domestic demand in the third quarter was still down 4 percent on a year-earlier basis, and Mexico
lags even further behind the rest of the Latin region due, at least in part, to its extensive trade
links with the U.S. economy and its dependence on the U.S. consumer and auto demand.
Clear Sailing for Strong Global Recovery in 2010? Probably Not
Looking into 2010, we project that the major economies of the world will remain in expansion The pace of
mode, but we believe that the pace of recovery will remain frustratingly slow. As with the United recovery for major
States, consumers in some large foreign economies—the United Kingdom and Spain spring to economies will
mind—went on a borrowing binge earlier this decade. We project that growth in consumer remain
spending will remain restrained in these economies as consumers delever and repair balance frustratingly slow.
sheets that have been battered by falling house prices and financial asset losses. Our forecast calls
for real GDP to grow a bit more than 2 percent in the advanced economies of the world next year.
If realized, our forecast would be a welcome relief from the 3 percent contraction that was
suffered in 2009. However, 2 percent growth would feel sluggish compared to the 3 percent
annual growth rate that the advanced economies of the world averaged during the 2004-2007
period.
Turning to the developing world, most Asian economies should achieve solid growth rates next
year as momentum from the self-sustaining recoveries that have already taken hold in the region
should carry over into next year. Although most governments should remove some policy
stimulus in 2010, governments do not need to slam on the brakes thanks to benign inflation.
Growth in Latin America should also strengthen next year, but not to the same extent as in
developing Asia. If growth in the rest of the world should falter, which we do not anticipate, Latin
economies would also suffer a relapse in growth that would manifest itself through downward
pressure on commodity prices. Mexico will likely continue to lag the rest of Latin America,
because the sluggish recovery we project for the United States should restrain growth south of the
border.
Medium Term: High Saving Rates Mean Strong Growth in the Developing World
A decade ago, rates of economic growth in the advanced economies and in the developing world
were approximately equal (Figure 13). During that decade, growth in the developing world was
pulled down by the effects of frequent financial crises that were concentrated in emerging markets
(e.g., China in the early 1990s, the “Tequila” crisis in 1995, the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98).
Figure 13 Figure 14
Gross Domestic Product Gross National Savings
Annual Percent Change Percent of GDP
10.0% 10.0% 40.0% 40.0%

8.0% 8.0% 35.0% 35.0%

6.0% 6.0% 30.0% 30.0%

4.0% 4.0% 25.0% 25.0%

2.0% 2.0% 20.0% 20.0%

0.0% 0.0% 15.0% 15.0%

-2.0% -2.0% 10.0% 10.0%

-4.0% Emerging Economies: 2009 @ 1.7% -4.0% 5.0% Developing Economies: 2009 @ 32.7% 5.0%
Advanced Economies: 2009 @ -3.4% Advanced economies: 2009 @ 16.9%
-6.0% -6.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008

Source: International Monetary Fund and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
In the current decade, however, developing economies have generally grown faster than their
advanced counterparts. The underlying fundamental driving the acceleration in developing
country growth is the significant rise in national saving rates in those economies (Figure 14). 8 For
example, the gross national saving rate in India has risen from about 25 percent of GDP a decade

8 National saving rates aggregate the saving rates of the consumer, business and public sectors.

13


ago to more than 35 percent today. The national saving rate in China has shot up to nearly
50 percent. High saving rates are important, because they finance rapid rates of capital
accumulation that drive long-run economic growth. 9
On a secular basis, we believe that the developing world will continue to grow faster than
advanced economies for a number of years, because we do not expect to see a significant decline
in national saving rates in most developing economies. Indeed, we would not argue with the
forecast of the International Monetary Fund that developing Asia will grow more than 8 percent
per annum in the medium term (i.e., three to five years from now). 10 In the IMF’s view, Latin
America will achieve 4 percent growth in the medium term, significantly less than the projection
for developing Asia, but stronger than the 3 percent per annum rate that the region averaged
between 1980 and 2008. Unless national saving rates in Latin America rise significantly—they
have been stable around 20 percent of GDP over the past few decades—the region will grow
slower on a trend basis than developing Asia. The IMF projects that the advanced economies
should grow about 2.5 percent per annum in the medium term. Although personal saving rates
likely will rise in many advanced economies over the next few years, gaping budget deficits mean
that it will be difficult for national saving rates to rise significantly.
Figure 15 Figure 16
Composition of Foreign Reserve Holdings U.S. Trade Weighted Dollar Major Index
Trillions of U.S. Dollars March 1973=100
$7.0 $7.0 115 115
Other
Japanese Yen 110 110
$6.0 Euro $6.0
U.S. Dollar 105 105

$5.0 $5.0 100 100

95 95
$4.0 $4.0
90 90
$3.0 $3.0
85 85

$2.0 $2.0 80 80

75 75
$1.0 $1.0
70 70
Major Currency Index: Dec @ 73.2
$0.0 $0.0 65 65
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Source: International Monetary Fund, Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Is the Dollar Doomed as a Reserve Currency?
Not only are high saving rates helping to drive robust growth rates in some developing countries,
but they also help to explain large current account surpluses over the past few years in those
countries. 11 These surpluses have led to a sharp rise in the foreign exchange holdings of the
world’s central banks from about $2 trillion at the beginning of the decade to more than
$7 trillion at present (Figure 15). Although the percentage of total reserves held in dollars has
trended a bit lower over the past decade, the greenback still accounts for the lion’s share of total
reserve holdings. However, large holdings of dollar assets in conjunction with the trend decline in
the value of the greenback are making some countries nervous (Figure 16). Indeed, China and
Russia, which together own about $2.7 trillion worth of foreign currency reserves, have called for
an alternative currency to replace the dollar as the world’s most important reserve currency. Is
the dollar in danger of losing its reserve currency status?
Although the importance of the dollar will surely erode over time, we are not overly concerned
about the world’s central banks dumping their holdings of dollar assets in favor of something else.
The primary investment objectives of central banks are safety and liquidity, and the $7 trillion

9 For a discussion of saving, investment and long-run growth in East Asia see Alwyn Young, “The Tyranny
of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 110(3), 1995, 641-680.
10 See IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2009.
11 A country incurs a current account surplus when its national saving rate exceeds its gross investment

rate. That is, the country produces more than it consumes, which equates to its current account surplus.

14


worth of marketable Treasury securities outstanding, all of which are AAA rated, offers central
banks the largest, safest and most liquid financial market in the world.
Could the euro supplant the dollar as the world’s principal reserve currency? Figure 15 implies Could the euro or
that holdings of the euro have risen steadily from less than 20 percent 10 years ago to more than another foreign
25 percent today. That said, we do not expect the euro to replace the dollar as the world’s currency supplant
principal reserve currency anytime soon. There is no central European government per se, so the dollar as the
foreign central banks need to buy the securities of individual European governments. The world’s principal
German, French and Italian governments have the largest amounts of government securities reserve currency?
outstanding among individual countries in the euro area, but each of those markets is only about
one-quarter the size of the U.S. government bond market. 12 Moreover, there are some concerns
about the long-term viability of European Monetary Union, which reduces the attractiveness of
holding some long-term securities that are denominated in euro.
What about other currencies? The share of reserves held in Japanese yen has declined from about
6 percent a decade ago to only 3 percent at present (Figure 15). Given the long-term concerns
about the Japanese economy, it does not seem likely that the yen will become a meaningful
reserve currency asset. The Chinese renminbi could eventually play a role as a reserve currency,
but until China opens its capital markets, which would allow central banks and private investors
to freely buy and sell Chinese securities, the attractiveness of the renminbi will remain very
limited. In that regard, we do not expect the Chinese government to eliminate its capital controls
anytime soon.
What about some new “international currency,” such as the basket currency that some important
developing countries have proposed? Until a critical mass of securities are issued in this currency,
which likely will not be realized until many years in the future, this new currency would not likely
play a significant role as a reserve currency asset. Although the dollar certainly has its share of
blemishes, other currencies are even less attractive as reserve currencies. In our view, the dollar
will continue to play the role of the world’s most important reserve currency for years to come.
After all, beauty contests are won on a relative, not absolute, basis.

12As of this writing, the outstanding debt of the U.S. government totals more than $12 trillion.
Outstanding debt levels of the French, German and Italian governments range between $2.0 trillion and
$2.5 trillion.

15


Residential Real Estate: Fair Seas or the Calm before Another Storm?
Residential construction finally found its way to fairer winds this year. Is this merely a short-lived
improvement or the calm before a second storm? Federal government support has created a sense
of stability in housing. Massive purchases of mortgage-backed securities by the Federal Reserve
are helping drive down mortgage rates and an $8,000 tax-credit for first-time homebuyers helped
lift demand. But what happens when that support is withdrawn? Is the housing recovery
self-sustaining? A possible warning sign is that sales and new construction, which both improved
during the spring and summer, faltered more recently as the tax credit was set to expire.
The fundamentals While the tax credit was eventually extended and expanded, we expect this program to have
of supply and diminishing returns. 13 Our forecast looks for a weak rebound in residential construction
demand for the compared to prior economic recoveries. The current plan calls for the tax incentives to end in
housing sector June. Housing starts should get at least a modest boost through April, which is just when the peak
remain extremely home-buying season tends to ramp up. Sales and new construction will likely be pulled forward
challenging. into the early part of 2010 and will then fall back a bit in the spring. The fundamentals of supply
and demand for the housing sector remain extremely challenging. On the supply side, excess
supply remains close to 2 million units. As for demand, potential buyers are being held back by
concerns about employment and income prospects on real disposable income. Meanwhile, credit
remains more difficult to qualify for and appraisals are much more conservative today.
Temporary band-aid programs helped limit the housing downdraft but come at the cost of larger
federal deficits. If these programs do not lead to a sustained improvement in underlying demand,
there will be little follow through. We do not see the extension and expansion of the first-time
homebuyer tax credit as influencing the ultimate timing of a sustainable recovery in the housing
market. The demand for new and existing homes will not pick up on a sustainable basis until
employment and income conditions improve. While this may technically begin to happen as soon
as the middle of next year, employment conditions will not likely improve enough to generate a
strong and sustainable recovery in home sales until spring 2011. There are simply too many
households experiencing extreme financial stress to allow the conditions necessary for a stronger
recovery to take hold.
Figure 17 Figure 18
Existing Home Resales Housing Starts
Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate - In Millions Millions of Units
7.5 7.5 2.4 2.4

7.0 7.0 2.1 2.1
Forecast
1.8 1.8
6.5 6.5

1.5 1.5
6.0 6.0
1.2 1.2
5.5 5.5
0.9 0.9

5.0 5.0
0.6 0.6

4.5 4.5 0.3 0.3
Existing Home Sales: Oct @ 6.10 Million
4.0 4.0 0.0 0.0
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Association of Realtors and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC

13The economic concept of diminishing returns is that at a certain point, each additional input applied to
a process will generate less additional output than the prior unit.

16


Remodeling Older Homes: Get a Lemon, Make Lemonade
When you can’t afford to move then you remodel or upgrade your existing home. Spending for
residential additions and alterations has been one notable bright spot. Spending is being driven
by the high volume of foreclosure sales, many of which are being bought by investors. Foreclosed
homes are then repaired and remodeled. Many homes are being divided into duplexes and
triplexes and being put up for rent, which is one reason why the number of vacant homes for rent
spiked upward in recent months. In addition, spending to weatherize homes has increased,
thanks in part to tax incentives.
The volatility in home sales and new construction during the first half of 2010 will likely to give Improvement in
way to a modest improvement in underlying demand during the second half of the year. For all of sales and new
2010, we expect sales of new homes to rise 15 percent and sales of existing homes (Figure 17) to construction
rise around 6 percent. Our forecast also shows new home construction picking up next year, with should take place
starts of single-family homes (Figure 18) rising close to 20 percent and marginal gains for in 2011, but we do
construction of multifamily properties. We look for more improvement in sales and new not look for a
construction to take place in 2011 but do not look for a strong recovery to take hold in the housing strong recovery to
sector until 2012 or later. take hold in the
housing sector
Strange Brew: High Prices, More Foreclosures
until 2012 or later.
We expect prices for existing homes to decline further in 2010, but there are a number of cross
currents that may lead to seemingly contradictory assessments of the health of the housing sector.
The expiration of the first-time homebuyer tax credit will reduce the share of lower-priced homes
in the monthly sales figures, which we think will result in higher average and median sales prices.
We also expect to see some modest improvement in the sales of higher-priced homes, reflecting
the rebound in the equity markets and more attractive financing options on jumbo loans. An
increase in the sales of higher-priced homes would also push up the average and median prices.
These gains, however, could be at least partially offset by a rising volume of foreclosure sales.
Figure 19 Figure 20
Home Prices Mortgage Delinquency
Year-over-Year Percentage Change Percent of Loans Past Due, Seasonally Adjusted
24% 24% 10.0% 10.0%

20% 20%
9.0% 9.0%
16% 16%

12% 12%
8.0% 8.0%
8% 8%

4% 4% 7.0% 7.0%
0% 0%

-4% -4% 6.0% 6.0%

-8% -8%
5.0% 5.0%
-12% -12%
Median Sale Price: Oct @ $173,100
-16% Median Sales Price 3-M Mov. Avg.: Oct @ -9.0% -16%
4.0% 4.0%
FHFA (OFHEO) Purchase Only Index: Sep @ -3.0%
-20% -20%
S&P Case-Shiller Composite 10: Sep @ -8.5% All Loans: Q3 @ 9.6%
-24% -24% 3.0% 3.0%
97 99 01 03 05 07 09 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Source: FHFA, NAR, MBA, S&P Corp, U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Measures of repeat sales, particularly the Case-Shiller indices, will likely see slightly larger price
declines, particularly once the sales of higher-priced homes increase. The higher end of the
market has been moribund for the past year, and price discovery will not occur until a significant
number of transactions take place. We still anticipate housing prices bottoming in nearly every
price measure during 2010. Prices will likely decline an additional 5–10 percent from current
levels, bringing the peak-to-trough decline in home prices to roughly 38 percent by the
Case-Shiller measure.
Foreclosure sales should pick back up during the coming year. A large portion of the mortgage
modifications that have been made in recent years have become delinquent in a relatively short
period of time. The likely culprit is the unusually large number of people out of work for six
months or more and the large number working fewer hours and receiving less pay, commissions

17


and bonuses. The percentage of loans 90 days or more past due, loans in foreclosure and
foreclosures started all set new highs during the third quarter of 2009. Slightly more than
4 million mortgages are now 90 days or more past due or in foreclosure, slightly exceeding the
3.8 million new and previously owned homes currently for sale.
Overall residential real estate will perform better in 2010 than it did in 2009. However, volatility
will remain as prices, construction and sales will vacillate before finding a new equilibrium.
Commercial Real Estate: Storm Warnings Still Out
Smooth sailing is not yet on the horizon for commercial real estate. In fact, commercial real estate
remains in the midst of the storm. Nonresidential construction has pulled back significantly as
many commercial projects have been delayed or canceled outright. Moreover, financing remains
much more difficult to secure. In prior cycles, commercial real estate outlays have been a lagging
indicator, declining well after the recession ended. Private nonresidential construction spending
peaked in mid-2008, and since then, sectors such as lodging, office and commercial construction
spending have all fallen significantly. As the demand for real estate is derived from the underlying
growth in the economy, commercial construction does not tend to turn up until well after
revenues improve and employment picks up.
The rising tide of The ongoing correction in commercial real estate continues to hang over the economy as the
defaults and rising tide of defaults and foreclosures on commercial properties pressure the financial system.
foreclosures on The supply and demand fundamentals are still deteriorating. On the supply side, vacancy rates
commercial are high and rising and there is still a huge overhang of leased but vacant space not included in
properties continue vacancy rate statistics. As for demand, retail sales remain subdued, employment losses continue
to pressure the and global trade has just begun to recover. As a result, rents are being negotiated lower and
financial system. property values continue to fall. As for financing, lenders and servicers are focused on loan
modifications and workouts and very little credit is available for new projects. The net result has
been a substantial pullback in commercial construction that is expected to carry through next
year.
Figure 21 Figure 22
Commercial Real Estate Commercial Real Estate Asking Rent Growth
Percent, Dollars per Square Foot Quarter-over-Quarter Percent Change
12% $180 4% 4%

3% 3%

10%
$140 2% 2%

1% 1%
8%

$100 0% 0%

6%
-1% -1%

$60 -2% -2%
Apartment: Q3 @ -0.5%
4%
Price: Q3 @ $130.1 per SF (Right Axis) Retail: Q3 @ -0.3%
-3% Office: Q3 @ -1.0% -3%
Vacancy Rate: Q3 @ 11.1% (Left Axis)
Cap Rate: Q3 @ 7.8% (Left Axis) Industrial: Q3 @ -2.1%
2% $20 -4% -4%
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Source: REIS, Real Capital Analytics, Property Portfolio Research and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Why Is This Cycle Different?
While many of the challenges facing commercial real estate are well known, there are also
important differences from previous real estate crunches. One of the most notable differences is
that real estate is not nearly as overbuilt as it was in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Vacancy rates
are lower than they were going into the previous real estate bust back in the late 1980s. Supply
was much more constrained during the most recent cycle. Commercial development did not really
get going until the last two years of the economic expansion, and significant office development
was largely confined to a handful of markets. In other areas, however, retail development tended
to follow housing and industrial development tended to grow along with imports. Both grew
rapidly and the problems will take longer to correct this time.

18


Retail development largely coincided with the housing boom, which saw neighborhood shopping
centers follow residential development. The surge in retail development help set off a boom in
imports, leading to massive development of industrial space, particularly near many major
seaports.
The flip side of that import boom was that a huge pool of capital accumulated overseas.
Eventually, this surplus was recycled into various investments, including commercial real estate,
which helped push prices much higher than the fundamentals justified. Once housing values
started falling, consumer spending quickly wound down and the capital markets stumbled. With
the capital markets frozen, investors no longer had access to a cheap source of capital and prices
for commercial properties quickly turned south.
Various measures of commercial property values show prices topped out in late 2007, right about
the time the capital markets froze. We expect further price declines over the next 18 months, as
sales of distressed properties increase. The largest drops will continue to be in areas where
housing weakened the most, including Florida, southern California, Arizona and Nevada. Office
buildings and shopping centers remain exceptionally vulnerable as employment is still falling,
and discretionary consumer spending remains on the back burner.
Righting the Ship: The Dynamics of Real Estate Workout
Despite today’s declining property values and deteriorating fundamentals for commercial real The fire-sale deals
estate, the improvement in the financial markets throughout 2009 has allowed REITS to raise a that followed the
significant amount of capital. So far, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) and private equity savings and loan
firms have had a difficult time putting their capital to work, because there is still a wide gap crisis back in the
between what people are willing to pay for properties and what sellers are willing to take for them. early 1990s are not
Many potential buyers appear to be waiting for the fire-sale deals that followed the savings and likely to
loan crisis back in the early 1990s. Those deals are not likely to materialize to the same extent materialize to the
they did then. same extent they
did then.
Figure 23 Figure 24
Moody's Real Commercial Property Price Index S&P Case-Shiller Home Prices
Year-over-Year Percent Change Percent Decline from Local Market Peak

25% 25% Dallas 4.7%
Denver 7.7%
20% 20% Charlotte 11.8%
Cleveland 14.4%
15% 15% Boston 14.7%
Atlanta 18.5%
10% 10% New York City 19.2%
Portland 19.7%
5% 5% Chicago 21.6%
Seattle 22.5%
Minneapolis 27.0%
0% 0%
Washington 28.1%
San Diego 38.2%
-5% -5%
San Francisco 38.6%
Los Angeles 38.7%
-10% -10%
Tampa 40.1%
Detroit 42.6%
-15% -15%
Miami 46.7%
Phoenix 52.0%
-20% -20%
Las Vegas 55.4%

-25% -25% C-10 29.9%
Commercial Property: Q2 @ -26.9%
C-20 29.3%
-30% -30%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65%

Source: Moody’s, S&P Corp. and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Fire-sales that took place following the savings and loan collapse were brought about by the sheer
number of institutions that failed then and the lack of any viable entities to manage the portfolio
of seized assets. This is not the case today. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is
forming joint loss-sharing partnerships with banks that acquire failed institutions. In addition,
the FDIC is entering into partnerships with the private sector to dispose of larger asset pools that
it takes on from some of the larger bank failures. By taking a significant stake, the FDIC has an
active interest in minimizing losses. In addition, the changes in the mark-to-market accounting
rules and new guidance from the Treasury and Federal Reserve are helping banks extend loans on
their books and by allowing special servicers to modify loans in their portfolios. The net result is
there is less urgency to dump underperforming properties today than there was at this stage of
earlier cycles.

19


Credit: Lenders Lowering the Boom
Most transactions Credit for commercial real estate properties continues to be one of the main obstacles facing the
today are being industry. Most transactions today are being financed by mortgage assumptions with many
financed by borrowers also relying on seller financing and cash. The issuance of commercial mortgage-backed
mortgage securities (CMBS) remains at a near standstill and even more pressing is the estimated
assumptions with $100 billion-$150 billion in CMBS loans that may face difficulty being refinanced in the next
many borrowers three years. While insurance companies, which hold roughly 10 percent of commercial mortgages
also relying on outstanding, have opened their doors to refinance high-quality loans with low loan-to-value
seller financing ratios, there are still a large number of highly leveraged loans in the market. Indeed, the inability
and cash. to refinance many of these loans will lead to even higher delinquency rates.
Another recurring fear is that commercial real estate loans sitting on the books of banks will
trigger another round of bankruptcies. Thus far, many banks have been able to extend debt as
long as interest payments are made. Moreover, new tax rules recently implemented by the
Treasury should help to quell massive write-downs. In addition, to help revive the ailing
commercial real estate industry, existing and newly created CMBS loans became eligible for TALF
funding in June. Although spreads have narrowed significantly since reaching their peak, the
commercial real estate market still has a long road ahead.
Outlook: Trimming the Sails, Waiting for Clearer Skies
We expect construction activity to pull back further over the next 18 months but look for declines
to gradually taper off. Building activity did not get as elevated as in past building cycles and will
likely correct somewhat less. Unfortunately, property values rose much more in many markets
than in previous cycles and will likely decline even further. Moreover, the depth of the recession
means that demand for commercial properties fell much more than in previous downturns. All
property types have seen demand fall substantially and this will continue to restrain new
development. One offsetting factor has been rising investment in alternative energy projects,
many of which will move forward in 2010. We expect nonresidential construction to fall
11.9 percent in 2010, weighing on real GDP growth for the year.

20


Regional Spotlight: Where Did the Sun Go in California and Florida?
From the sailboats in San Diego and seafood in San Francisco to the resorts in Orlando and the
beaches across Florida, visions of sunshine have inspired generations to dream of endless
summers in California and Florida. In 2007, winter hit. California and Florida were two of the
hardest hit states during the recession, as both were key participants in the housing boom and
bust. Overbuilding in residential and commercial construction will continue to weigh on both
states over the next few years, but signs of growth are beginning to emerge, particularly in
northern California and parts of central Florida. The technology sector, healthcare,
defense-related industries and international trade are expected to lead the economic recovery,
while construction, tourism and financial services are expected to lag. State and local
governments will remain under intense pressure due to continuing shortfalls in revenues,
particularly sales tax collections and property tax receipts.
California: Cyclical Recovery
Somewhat surprising, California’s economy appears to be better positioned for economic growth
than Florida. California manufacturing surveys returned to expansion in the third quarter, and
California technology companies have been reporting strong third-quarter earnings and improved
sales outlooks for the coming quarters. This will be a key growth driver for northern California.
Growth will take a bit longer to turn around in southern California and the Central Valley.
A number of factors are behind this improving trend. For manufacturing, aggressive inventory A weak dollar and
cutting in the first half of the year has slowed and some businesses are actually boosting strong demand
production to replenish them, a good sign that businesses see stable demand ahead. A weak dollar from Asia is
and strong demand from Asia is boosting California exports and helping California businesses get boosting California
back on their feet. Lower food and energy prices and the moderation in housing costs are giving exports.
workers real improvement in their buying power. Those that have held on to their jobs have seen
their real hourly earnings rise at a 5 percent growth rate, the best earnings growth rate seen in
more than a decade. This is helping bolster purchasing power, and core retail sales have improved
modestly.
California Housing: Sustained Improvement?
California’s housing market is slowly shifting from a negative to positive for the state’s economy.
The foreclosure moratoria and the federal loan modification program have clearly helped reduce
for-sale inventory and stabilize prices. Median existing home prices have been rising, and the
year-to-year decline in home prices has decelerated back into the high single digits. While the rise
in home sales, the decline in inventories and rebound in home prices are welcome improvements,
they may overstate the extent of improvement in California’s housing markets.
Figure 25 Figure 26
California Existing Homes Sales & Prices California Existing Homes Inventory
Thousands of Units, Thousands of Dollars, 3-Month Moving Average Months Supply, 3-Month Moving Average
700 $700 18 18
California Sales: Oct @ 540.2 (Left Axis)
California Prices: Oct @ $293.1 (Right Axis) 16 16
600 $600
14 14

500 $500 12 12

10 10
400 $400
8 8

300 $300 6 6

4 4
200 $200
2 2
California: Oct @ 4.2 Months
100 $100 0 0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Source: California Association of Realtors Real Estate Trends and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
One notable problem area is the share of seriously delinquent home mortgages, those loans 90
days or more past due, which has more than doubled over the past year. Separate data from the

21


Federal Reserve Bank of New York show the greatest problem areas remain the Central Valley and
portions of southern California, particularly Riverside and San Bernardino. The overall pace of
improvement is likely being exaggerated by various incentive programs to bolster purchases by
first-time homebuyers, restraints on foreclosures and efforts to modify home mortgages.
However, sales are expected to slow in 2010, and that should moderate any improvement in new
home construction.
California: Secular Challenges
California has one of the highest costs of doing business in the country, 17 percent above the
U.S. average, and 24 percent above Oregon, according to data from Moody’s Economy.com. This
is a huge competitive disadvantage when businesses are paying more attention than ever to costs.
New business incorporations in California have slumped about 30 percent from 2007. Less
venture capital investment, higher business costs and taxes are playing a role here. New
businesses are an important engine for new job creation, and California is missing out. Population
growth has been slowing for decades, which reduces the long-term growth potential for the state.
Moreover, the quality of the jobs being created across the state is not what it once was.
California's per capita income in 1980 was 18 percent above the national average. Today,
California's per capita income is just 8.5 percent above the national average, while housing
remains at least 50 percent more expensive. However, this may in part reflect the natural
progression of job creation, in which high income workers require the support of lower income
workers.
Figure 27 Figure 28
California Unemployment Rate California Delinquent Mortgage Rates

October 2009 September 2009
Greater than 17.0% 5.0% to10.0% Greater than 14.0% 4.0% to 7.0%
14.0%to17
.0% Less than 5.0% 10.0%to14
.0% Less than 4.0%
10.0%to14
.0% 7.0%to10
.0%

Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, First American Core Logic and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
This recession has Lastly, this recession has done more damage to California’s economy than most others, which is
done more damage bound to leave lasting scars. California has lost roughly one million jobs in this recession so far.
to California’s Home values across the state have been roughly halved from their value at the peak of the cycle.
economy than most The state’s unemployment rate is likely to rise above 13 percent before it peaks sometime in
others, which is mid-2010, above the U.S. average. Rising unemployment worsens California’s household credit
bound to leave problems and leads to tougher choices on how to balance the state’s fiscal budget going forward.
lasting scars. None of the cyclical and structural problems are insurmountable, but they will take time to heal
and fix. Following a 4.5 percent drop in 2009, we expect nonfarm employment to fall
about 1.4 percent in 2010, even as modest economic growth resumes. So while California is no
longer staring into the abyss, it is likely to remain a relative underperformer economically over
the forecast horizon.
Sunrise Comes a Little Later in Florida: Recovery Delayed
Florida’s economic recovery will take longer to gain momentum. Florida is much more dependent
on the continued inflow of new residents from other parts of the country to drive economic
growth, and migration trends turned exceptionally negative during the recession. Florida saw its
first net out-migration since the immediate aftermath of World War II during 2008 and 2009,
with residents increasingly relocating to other Sunbelt states, such as Georgia, the Carolinas,

22


Tennessee and Texas. The primary reasons for the net outflow have been the dramatic increase in
housing costs, including the price of insurance and property taxes, as well as the state’s greatly
diminished employment prospects, with nonfarm employment falling 8.8 percent over the past
two and a half years, producing a net loss of more than 708,000 jobs.
Efforts have been made to diversify Florida’s economy, strengthening the state’s economic base.
International trade has been a key growth area, particularly in South Florida, which is home to
hundreds of Latin American headquarters for major U.S. and global multinational companies.
Efforts have also been made to bolster the healthcare and biomedical industries in South Florida
and central Florida. While these efforts hold great long-term promise, the immediate impact has
been limited, and the size of these industries is still relatively small compared to the overall
Florida economy.
Figure 29 Figure 30
Florida Nonfarm Employment Florida Net Migration
3-Month Moving Averages In Thousands
8% 8% 500 500

6% 6% 400 400

4% 4%
300 300

2% 2%
200 200

0% 0%
100 100
-2% -2%

0 0
-4% -4%

3-Month Annual Rate: Oct @ -2.0% -100 -100
-6% Year-over-Year Percent Change: Oct @ -4.6% -6%
Household: Year-over-Year Percent Change: Oct @ -5.6% Net Migration: 2009 @ -37
-8% -8% -200 -200
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, FL Demographic Estimating Conf. and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Tourism and retirees are still the key economic drivers for Florida, and both have suffered in Tourism and
recent years. Tourism has fallen from the middle of 2007, with both domestic and international retirees are still the
visitor counts dropping. The net result has been a substantial pullback in the leisure and key economic
hospitality sector. Retirees are also finding it more difficult and too expensive to retire to the drivers for Florida.
Sunshine State, and many that have retired to Florida have seen their investment income from
their portfolios diminish. Income from interest dividends and rents, which accounts for
one-quarter of Florida’s personal income versus 18 percent of the nation’s personal income, fell
7.5 percent over the past year. On the other hand, defense-related spending and technology are
two notable bright spots for Florida. Exports of high tech products have picked up recently,
particularly communications equipment. The improvement has helped offset some of the
continuing problems in the housing sector.
Florida Housing: Oversupply Persists
Housing is more overbuilt in Florida than in any other major state, with some regional variation.
The worst areas are the Gulf Coast, stretching from Tampa’s northern suburbs south to Naples,
and the Atlantic seaboard from West Palm Beach up to Melbourne. Significant overbuilding is
also evident in Miami and Orlando but less so in Fort Lauderdale and Jacksonville. Nationwide
home sales have improved more recently, with distressed deals accounting for roughly one third
of all transactions. In Florida, sales of existing homes through the first 10 months of this year are
running ahead of the comparable period last year, and sales have now risen back to about
70 percent of their previous peak level. The Florida Association of Realtors reports the median
price of an existing home (Figure 32) was roughly $140,000 in October, which is about 45 percent
lower than the peak hit back in mid 2006. While home sales have picked up, many of these homes
remain vacant and have simply moved from the vacant-for-sale category to the vacant-for-rent
category.

23


Figure 31 Figure 32
Florida Housing Starts Florida Median Existing Single-Family Home Price
Year-over-Year Percent Change In Thousands of Dollars
40% 40% $400 $400

30% 30%
$350 $350

20% 20%
$300 $300
10% 10%

$250 $250
0% 0%

-10% -10% $200 $200

-20% -20%
$150 $150

-30% -30%
$100 $100
-40% -40% Miami: Q3 @ $219,807
Orlando: Q3 @ $154,521
$50 $50
-50% -50% Florida: Q3 @ $141,647
Housing Starts: Oct @ -40.5% Tampa: Q3 @ $133,617
-60% -60% $0 $0
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Florida Association of Realtors, National Association of Realtors,
University of Florida Real Estate Research Center and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Florida’s recovery The oversupply of housing will remain a drag on the state’s economic performance for the next
is likely to be long several years, and parts of the state will not see the housing market return to normal for nearly a
and arduous, with decade. The glut of houses will produce one benefit, however, and that will be to return Florida
employment not back to its historic position of being a relatively inexpensive place for retires and young,
likely returning to college-educated adults to relocate. Population growth will not pick up, however, until the
its March 2007 economy improves in other regions and persons wishing to move to Florida can more easily sell
level for at least their homes on attractive terms. Employment should turn positive on a month-to-month basis
five years. around mid-2010, but the unemployment rate will not top out until the fall of that year. But even
after employment begins growing again, the state’s recovery is likely to be long and arduous, with
employment not likely returning to its March 2007 level for at least five years.
Beyond Recovery, Florida Faces Significant Long-Term Challenges
Longer term, the combination of higher housing and insurance costs, along with higher property
taxes, may prevent Florida from completely returning to the inexpensive place to do business that
it was in the 1980s and 1990s. This puts the state at a competitive disadvantage in attracting new
industry compared to Georgia, Alabama, the Carolinas, Tennessee and Texas. While large
investments are being made in healthcare and biomedical facilities, greater efforts need to be
made to encourage more private investment. The state’s financial situation also remains
precarious, with sales tax receipts accounting for close to 60 percent of state revenues and
property taxes providing the bulk of local revenues. The mix has proven toxic in past recessions
and has left the state with a serious budget shortfall, which has brought about cuts in services, as
well as tax hikes and increases in user fees.
Florida faces a long and difficult road to recovery. It will be years before the hangover from the
housing boom goes away. In the mean time, the glut of houses at least helps bring down the
state’s otherwise high cost of living. Eventually, the intrinsic qualities that have drawn
generations of Americans to the Sunshine State will overcome today’s challenges. The recovery
will just take longer than most Floridians would like.

24


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25

26
Wells Fargo U.S. Economic Forecast

Actual Forecast Actual Forecast
2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
December 09, 2009

Real Gross Domestic Product (a) -0.7 1.5 -2.7 -5.4 -6.4 -0.7 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.1 0.4 -2.5 2.2 2.3
Personal Consumption -0.6 0.1 -3.5 -3.1 0.6 -0.9 2.9 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 2.6 -0.2 -0.6 1.2 1.4
Business Fixed Investment 1.9 1.4 -6.1 -19.4 -39.2 -9.6 -4.1 0.0 -2.4 -0.4 1.5 3.2 5.8 4.5 5.5 6.4 6.2 1.6 -17.8 -1.4 4.2
Equipment and Software -0.5 -5.0 -9.4 -25.9 -36.4 -4.9 2.3 1.6 5.3 4.1 5.0 5.8 7.4 5.5 6.3 6.9 2.6 -2.6 -17.4 3.4 6.1
Structures 6.8 14.5 -0.1 -7.2 -43.6 -17.3 -15.2 -14.0 -12.0 -11.0 -7.0 -3.5 1.5 2.0 3.5 5.0 14.9 10.3 -19.2 -11.9 -0.8
Residential Construction -28.2 -15.8 -15.9 -23.2 -38.2 -23.2 19.5 3.5 2.0 3.5 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 7.5 8.0 -18.5 -22.9 -20.4 3.2 5.9
Government Purchases 2.6 3.6 4.8 1.2 -2.6 6.7 3.1 2.7 2.0 1.6 2.9 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.0 1.7 3.1 2.2 2.6 1.6

Net Exports -550.9 -476.0 -479.2 -470.9 -386.5 -330.4 -358.0 -387.6 -378.4 -372.0 -371.8 -374.5 -374.6 -366.6 -354.9 -337.5 -647.7 -494.3 -365.6 -374.2 -358.4
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP 0.4 2.4 -0.1 0.5 2.6 1.7 -0.8 -0.9 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.0 -0.1 0.1
Inventory Change 0.6 -37.1 -29.7 -37.4 -113.9 -160.2 -133.4 -62.5 -25.0 8.0 28.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 19.5 -25.9 -117.5 12.8 48.8
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP -0.2 -1.3 0.3 -0.6 -2.4 -1.4 0.9 2.2 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 1.0 0.3

Nominal GDP 1.0 3.5 1.4 -5.4 -4.6 -0.8 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.7 5.1 2.6 -1.4 3.2 3.9
Real Final Sales -0.5 2.7 -2.9 -4.7 -4.1 0.7 1.9 -0.1 1.0 1.4 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.5 0.8 -1.8 1.1 2.0
Retail Sales (b) 2.6 2.4 0.3 -8.2 -8.9 -9.5 -6.8 0.7 2.8 3.7 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.4 3.3 -0.8 -6.3 3.4 4.4

Inflation Indicators (b)
"Core" PCE Deflator 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.4 2.4 1.5 1.3 1.6
Consumer Price Index 4.2 4.3 5.2 1.5 -0.2 -0.9 -1.6 1.3 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.9 3.8 -0.4 1.8 2.0
"Core" Consumer Price Index 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.6
Producer Price Index 7.2 7.6 9.5 1.4 -2.2 -4.0 -5.1 0.7 2.7 2.8 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 3.9 6.4 -2.7 2.4 2.3
Employment Cost Index 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 3.4 3.0 1.8 1.2 1.7

Real Disposable Income (a) -2.4 9.8 -8.5 3.4 0.2 6.2 -1.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.2 0.5 1.2 1.2 2.0
Nominal Personal Income (b) 3.7 4.0 2.9 1.1 -1.6 -2.0 -1.6 -0.4 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.5 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 5.6 2.9 -1.4 2.9 3.8
Industrial Production (a) 0.2 -4.6 -9.0 -13.0 -19.0 -10.3 5.6 4.7 2.3 3.1 2.8 4.2 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.1 1.5 -2.2 -9.9 2.6 4.1
Capacity Utilization 80.1 78.9 76.9 74.2 70.4 68.7 69.9 70.9 71.2 71.7 71.9 72.5 73.3 73.9 74.6 75.1 80.6 77.6 70.0 71.8 74.2
Corporate Profits Before Taxes (b) -4.9 -12.0 -5.4 -25.1 -19.0 -12.6 -6.7 24.0 22.0 16.0 10.0 8.5 8.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 -4.1 -11.8 -5.2 13.8 8.0
Corporate Profits After Taxes 6.6 -3.7 4.8 -15.8 -19.7 -15.3 -9.2 34.0 32.0 20.0 15.0 9.0 8.5 9.0 10.5 11.0 -4.0 -2.0 -4.4 18.2 9.8

Federal Budget Balance (c) -205.9 26.9 -168.9 -332.5 -448.9 -304.9 -330.8 -376.6 -571.8 -176.2 -255.4 -275.2 -436.9 -168.3 -219.6 -180.0 -161.5 -454.8 -1417.1 -1380.0 -1100.0
Current Account Balance (d) -179.3 -187.7 -184.2 -154.9 -104.5 -98.8 -110.0 -125.0 -130.0 -130.0 -130.0 -135.0 -130.0 -130.0 -125.0 -125.0 -726.6 -706.1 -438.2 -525.0 -510.0
Trade Weighted Dollar Index (e) 70.3 71.0 76.1 79.4 83.2 77.7 74.3 72.9 73.9 76.4 79.1 81.6 82.9 83.2 83.4 83.2 73.3 79.4 72.9 81.6 83.2

Nonfarm Payroll Change (f) -113 -153 -208 -553 -691 -428 -199 -79 -60 20 60 120 130 130 145 155 96 -257 -349 35 140
Unemployment Rate 4.9 5.4 6.1 6.9 8.1 9.3 9.6 10.1 10.2 10.4 10.6 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.2 9.9 4.6 5.8 9.3 10.5 10.3
Housing Starts (g) 1.06 1.02 0.87 0.66 0.53 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.60 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.82 0.88 1.34 0.90 0.55 0.66 0.80
Light Vehicle Sales (h) 15.2 14.1 12.9 10.5 9.5 9.6 11.5 10.6 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.7 12.0 16.1 13.2 10.3 10.6 11.6
Crude Oil - WTI - Front Contract (i) 97.90 123.98 117.98 58.74 43.08 59.62 68.30 77.34 78.00 82.00 79.00 79.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 72.31 99.65 62.08 79.50 80.00

Quarter-End Interest Rates
Federal Funds Target Rate 2.25 2.00 2.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 1.25 2.00 2.75 3.25 4.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 3.25
3 Month LIBOR 2.69 2.78 4.05 1.43 1.19 0.60 0.29 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.65 1.40 2.15 2.90 3.40 4.70 1.43 0.25 0.65 3.40
Prime Rate 5.25 5.00 5.00 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 4.25 5.00 5.75 6.25 7.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 6.25
Conventional Mortgage Rate 5.97 6.32 6.04 5.33 5.00 5.42 5.06 4.85 5.00 5.20 5.20 5.30 5.40 5.50 5.70 5.90 6.10 5.33 4.85 5.30 5.90
3 Month Bill 1.38 1.90 0.92 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.60 1.20 1.90 2.60 3.20 3.36 0.11 0.05 0.60 3.20
2 Year Note 1.62 2.63 2.00 0.76 0.81 1.11 0.95 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.30 1.50 1.80 2.20 2.70 3.30 3.05 0.76 0.80 1.50 3.30
5 Year Note 2.46 3.34 2.98 1.55 1.67 2.54 2.31 2.10 2.20 2.40 2.60 2.80 2.90 3.10 3.30 3.50 3.45 1.55 2.10 2.80 3.50
10 Year Note 3.45 3.99 3.85 2.25 2.71 3.53 3.31 3.35 3.40 3.40 3.50 3.60 3.80 3.90 4.10 4.30 4.04 2.25 3.35 3.60 4.30
30 Year Bond 4.30 4.53 4.31 2.69 3.56 4.32 4.03 4.35 4.40 4.40 4.40 4.40 4.40 4.50 4.70 4.90 4.45 2.69 4.35 4.40 4.90
Forecast as of: December 9, 2009
Notes: (a) C ompound Annual Growth Rate Quarter-over-Quarter (f) Average Monthly C hange
(b) Year-over-Year Percentage C hange (g) Millions of Units
(c) Quarterly Sum - Billions USD; Annual Data Represents Fiscal Yr. (h) Quarterly Data - Average Monthly SAAR; Annual Data - Actual Total Vehicles Sold
(d) Quarterly Sum - Billions USD (i) Quarterly Average of Daily C lose
(e) Federal Reserve Major C urrency Index, 1973=100 - Quarter End
ECONOMICS GROUP
WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC

December 09, 2009

Wells Fargo International Economic Forecast
(Year-over-Year Perc ent Change)
GDP CPI
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
Global (PPP weights) - 0.8% 3.8% 4.0% 2.7% 3.8% 4.0%
Global (Market Exchange Rates) - 2.0% 2.6% 2.8% n/a n/a n/ a

1
Advanc ed Economies - 3.3% 2.3% 2.5% - 0.3% 1.3% 1.7%
United St at es - 2.5% 2.2% 2.3% - 0.4% 1.8% 2.0%
Eurozone - 3.9% 1.9% 2.5% 0.3% 1.3% 1.6%
United Kingdom - 4.6% 1.7% 2.3% 2.1% 2.3% 1.6%
Japan - 5.3% 2.3% 1.6% - 1.4% - 0.9% 0.5%
Korea 0.4% 5.2% 3.6% 2.8% 2.6% 2.9%
Canada - 2.5% 2.3% 2.8% 0.3% 1.8% 1.9%

1
Developing Economies 2.3% 5.5% 5.9% 6.4% 6.7% 6.8%
China 8.2% 8.8% 9.1% - 0.8% 1.9% 2.6%
India 7.0% 8.1% 8.3% 11.1% 10.1% 7.7%
Mexic o - 6.9% 2.8% 3.1% 5.3% 3.5% 3.7%
Brazil 0.0% 2.8% 3.5% 4.9% 4.8% 4.8%
Russia - 7.9% 2.7% 3.1% 11.8% 7.3% 9.2%
Forecas t as of: D ecember 9, 2009
1
Aggregated Using PPP Weights

Wel ls Fargo International Interest Rate Forecast
(End of Quarter Rates)
3- Month LIBOR 10- Year Bond
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
U.S. 0.25% 0.30% 0.35% 0.40% 0.65% 1.40% 2.15% 3.35% 3.40% 3.40% 3.50% 3.60% 3.80% 3.90%
Japan 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 1.35% 1.30% 1.35% 1.45% 1.50% 1.55% 1.70%
Euroland 0.70% 0.70% 1.00% 1.40% 2.00% 2.75% 3.20% 3.25% 3.30% 3.60% 3.90% 4.25% 4.40% 4.45%
U.K. 0.60% 0.60% 0.65% 0.90% 1.45% 2.20% 3.20% 3.65% 3.70% 3.90% 4.20% 4.50% 4.60% 4.75%
Canada 0.50% 0.50% 0.60% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 3.75% 3.30% 3.40% 3.60% 4.00% 4.30% 4.40% 4.45%
Forec ast as of: December 9, 2009
ECONOMICS GROUP

27
WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC

Wells Fargo Securities, LLC Economics Group

Diane Schumaker-Krieg Global Head of Research (704) 715-8437 diane.schumaker@wachovia.com
& Economics (212) 214-5070

John E. Silvia, Ph.D. Chief Economist (704) 374-7034 john.silvia@wachovia.com
Mark Vitner Senior Economist (704) 383-5635 mark.vitner@wachovia.com
Jay Bryson, Ph.D. Global Economist (704) 383-3518 jay.bryson@wachovia.com
Scott Anderson, Ph.D. Senior Economist (612) 667-9281 scott.a.anderson@wellsfargo.com
Eugenio Aleman, Ph.D. Senior Economist (612) 667- 0168 eugenio.j.aleman@wellsfargo.com
Sam Bullard Economist (704) 383-7372 sam.bullard@wachovia.com
Anika Khan Economist (704) 715-0575 anika.khan@wachovia.com
Azhar Iqbal Econometrician (704) 383-6805 azhar.iqbal@wachovia.com
Adam G. York Economist (704) 715-9660 adam.york@wachovia.com
Ed Kashmarek Economist (612) 667-0479 ed.kashmarek@wellsfargo.com
Tim Quinlan Economic Analyst (704) 374-4407 tim.quinlan@wachovia.com
Kim Whelan Economic Analyst (704) 715-8457 kim.whelan@wachovia.com
Yasmine Kamaruddin Economic Analyst (704) 374-2992 yasmine.kamaruddin@wachovia.com

Wells Fargo Securities Economics Group publications are produced by Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, a U.S broker-dealer
registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, and the
Securities Investor Protection Corp. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, distributes these publications directly and through
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Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, and Wells Fargo Securities International Limited. The information and opinions herein are
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SECURITIES: NOT FDIC-INSURED/NOT BANK-GUARANTEED/MAY LOSE VALUE

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