Debt Into Growth: How Sovereign Debt Accelerated
the Industrial Revolution
Jaume Ventura (CREi, UPF and Barcelona GSE)
Hans-Joachim Voth (University of Zurich)
September 2-3, 2016
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 1 / 28
Debt and Expenditure in the UK, 1692-1860
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 2 / 28
Growth of Output in Britain, 1700-1860
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 3 / 28
Estimates of Productivity Growth in England, 1770-1860
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 4 / 28
Real Wages in England, 1700-1850
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 5 / 28
The Question
Why did the country that borrowed the most industrialized …rst?
Answer 1: Debt accumulation was detrimental to industrialization by
crowding out investment and slowing down growth (Williamson 1984)
But crowding-out should work through interest rates, and these did not
increase (Mirowski 1981; Clark 2001, Quinn, 2001, Sussman and Yafeh 2004,
Heim and Mirowski 1987)
Answer 2: Debt accumulation was neutral to industrialization, since it raised
total savings and did not crowd out investment (Barro 1987)
Our answer: Debt accumulation accelerated industrialization!
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 6 / 28
Building blocks of our argument
The Industrial Revolution is the arrival of a new class of capitalists with
better technologies, but few savings
I Hansen and Prescott (2001)
The …nancial system cannot channel funds from nobles to capitalists, and the
latter …nance investment with reinvested pro…ts
I Temin and Voth (2013)
In this setting, sovereign debt accelerates structural change and growth:
I Nobles buy the debt and reduce their low-return investments
I This lowers the demand for labor and wages
I This raises pro…ts and the high-return investments of capitalists
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 7 / 28
Documenting …nancial frictions
Private credit markets worked poorly (Goldsmith banks for the nobles,
Merchant banks for trade, Bubble Act restricts equity)
I One book by two prominent economic historians: Temin and Voth (2013)
I One quote from a prominent historian of the period: “the reservoirs of savings
were full enough, but conduits to connect them with the wheels of industry
were few and meagre ... surprisingly little of [Britain’s] wealth found its way
into the new industrial enterprises ...” (Postan 1935)
About 74% of the wealth was in land and buildings
I Limited trading (leaseholds, perpetual trusts)
Dynamic ine¢ ciency?
I 117 out of 160 years: growth rate > return to government bonds
I Agricultural investments 1770-1810: I = £ 138m. >> rK= £ 43m.
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 8 / 28
Yield on Government Bonds and Returns to Enclosure,
1692-1860
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 9 / 28
UK Debt Dynamics, 1700-1913
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 10 / 28
The pre-industrial economy
Technology and factor markets:
I Production function: yt = A lλ
t kα
t n1 λ α
t
I Land and labor in …xed supply: lt = nt = 1
I To produce one unit of capital, one unit of goods is needed
I All factors are paid their marginal products
The pre-industrial economy contains nobles, masses and the crown:
I The nobles own land and capital, and they save a fraction β of their income
I The masses own the labor, and they do not save
I The crown raises taxes to …ghts foreign wars that cost a fraction x of output
Dynamics: kt+1 = β (λ + α) (1 x) A kα
t
Steady state: k = [β (λ + α) (1 x) A]
1
1 α
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 11 / 28
A stylized model of the Industrial Revolution
Assume a new class of capitalists arrive:
I Like capitalists, they save a fraction β of their income
I Unlike capitalists, ...
F ... to produce one unit of capital, they need 1/π units of goods
F ... they have no land and start with a small share of the capital stock: s0 0
The impact of these capitalists depends crucially on the credit market. We
consider two extreme cases:
I Frictionless credit market
I No credit market
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 12 / 28
Frictionless credit market
Assume there is a competitive private credit market:
I Capitalists …nance their investments with savings of the nobles
I Competition equalizes the interest rate to the return to investment
Dynamics:
kt+1 = π β (λ + α) (1 x) A kα
t
st+1 =
α st
λ + α
Steady-state:
k = [π β (λ + α) (1 x) A]
1
1 α
s = 0
The Industrial Revolution brings fast economic growth, little social change
and large gains in the living standards of the masses
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 13 / 28
The capital stock and the share owned by capitalists
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 14 / 28
Consumptions of the di¤erent groups
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 15 / 28
No credit market
There is no private credit market due to some unspeci…ed friction
Dynamics:
kt+1 = β [λ + α (1 + (π 1) st )] (1 x) A kα
t
st+1 =
π α st
λ + α (1 + (π 1) st )
I Successful Industrial Revolution if π > 1 +
λ
α
Steady state:
k = (π β α (1 x) A)
1
1 α
s = 1
λ
α (π 1)
The Industrial Revolution brings slow economic growth, fast social change
and small gains in the living standards of the masses
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 16 / 28
The capital stock and the share owned by capitalists
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 17 / 28
Consumptions of the di¤erent groups
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 18 / 28
The role of sovereign debt
Assume now that the arrival of the capitalists coincides with a shift from
taxes to debt:
I Foreign wars without raising taxes: dt+1 = Rt dt + x A kα
t
I Nobles willing to buy debt: Rt = α A kα 1
t
I Capitalists not willing to buy debt: π α kα 1
t > Rt
Isn’t sovereign debt just a means to postpone taxes? Yes, but you can
postpone them forever if:
I π β > 1 (noble investments are dynamically ine¢ cient)
I x
π β 1
π 1
λ (the debt does not exceed the savings of the nobles)
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 19 / 28
The role of sovereign debt
Dynamics:
kt+1 = β f[λ + α (1 + (π 1) st )] kα
t + Rt dt g dt+1
st+1 =
π β α st kα
t
β f[λ + α (1 + (π 1) st )] kα
t + Rt dt g dt+1
Steady state:
k = (π β α)
1
1 α
s = 1
λ
α (π 1)
+
x
α (π β 1)
Debt accumulation slows down the Industrial Revolution initially, but then
accelerates it afterwards and takes it to a higher steady state
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 20 / 28
The capital stock and the share owned by capitalists
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 21 / 28
Consumptions of the di¤erent groups
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 22 / 28
A numerical exercise
Is it possible to use such a simple framework to obtain a sense of the
quantitative importance of the mechanism that we highlight here? The
answer is yes, if you add depreciation!
With reasonable parameter values we …nd that:
I With debt it takes about 170 years to travel half the way towards the new
steady state, while in the absence of debt it takes 225 years
I With debt it takes 125 years for capitalists to take over 70% of the capital,
while in the absence of debt it takes 278 years
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 23 / 28
Debt-to-income ratio
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 24 / 28
Social change
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 25 / 28
Income per capita
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 26 / 28
Financial frictions and the Industrial Revolution
Why was growth slow at the start of the Industrial Revolution?
I Lots of inventions and innovations appeared rather quickly
I Financial frictions limited investment by capitalists
Why did the Industrial Revolution generate massive social change?
I Nobles held all wealth and power in 1700, but had lost most of it by 1900
I Financial frictions kept the gains of industrialization in the hands of capitalists
Why did the Industrial Revolution not raise the living standards of workers?
I Real wages did not grow much during the core phase of industrialization
I Sovereign debt crowded-out nobles’investment and kept wages low
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 27 / 28
Lessons for today
Is sovereign debt always growth enhancing? No, of course, just look at the
seminal work of Reinhart and Rogo¤!
This model does not have much to say, for instance, about the recent
sovereign debt crisis in the periphery of Europe (Broner et al. 2014)
But this model might have something interesting to say about Chinese
growth with the following role assignments:
I The “crown”: USA and, to some extent, Europe
I The “nobles”: China’s government (state-owned banks and enterprises)
I The “capitalists”: China’s new entrepreneurial class
I The “masses”: China´s workers
Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 28 / 28

Debt Into Growth: How Sovereign Debt Accelerated the Industrial Revolution

  • 1.
    Debt Into Growth:How Sovereign Debt Accelerated the Industrial Revolution Jaume Ventura (CREi, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Hans-Joachim Voth (University of Zurich) September 2-3, 2016 Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 1 / 28
  • 2.
    Debt and Expenditurein the UK, 1692-1860 Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 2 / 28
  • 3.
    Growth of Outputin Britain, 1700-1860 Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 3 / 28
  • 4.
    Estimates of ProductivityGrowth in England, 1770-1860 Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 4 / 28
  • 5.
    Real Wages inEngland, 1700-1850 Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 5 / 28
  • 6.
    The Question Why didthe country that borrowed the most industrialized …rst? Answer 1: Debt accumulation was detrimental to industrialization by crowding out investment and slowing down growth (Williamson 1984) But crowding-out should work through interest rates, and these did not increase (Mirowski 1981; Clark 2001, Quinn, 2001, Sussman and Yafeh 2004, Heim and Mirowski 1987) Answer 2: Debt accumulation was neutral to industrialization, since it raised total savings and did not crowd out investment (Barro 1987) Our answer: Debt accumulation accelerated industrialization! Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 6 / 28
  • 7.
    Building blocks ofour argument The Industrial Revolution is the arrival of a new class of capitalists with better technologies, but few savings I Hansen and Prescott (2001) The …nancial system cannot channel funds from nobles to capitalists, and the latter …nance investment with reinvested pro…ts I Temin and Voth (2013) In this setting, sovereign debt accelerates structural change and growth: I Nobles buy the debt and reduce their low-return investments I This lowers the demand for labor and wages I This raises pro…ts and the high-return investments of capitalists Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 7 / 28
  • 8.
    Documenting …nancial frictions Privatecredit markets worked poorly (Goldsmith banks for the nobles, Merchant banks for trade, Bubble Act restricts equity) I One book by two prominent economic historians: Temin and Voth (2013) I One quote from a prominent historian of the period: “the reservoirs of savings were full enough, but conduits to connect them with the wheels of industry were few and meagre ... surprisingly little of [Britain’s] wealth found its way into the new industrial enterprises ...” (Postan 1935) About 74% of the wealth was in land and buildings I Limited trading (leaseholds, perpetual trusts) Dynamic ine¢ ciency? I 117 out of 160 years: growth rate > return to government bonds I Agricultural investments 1770-1810: I = £ 138m. >> rK= £ 43m. Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 8 / 28
  • 9.
    Yield on GovernmentBonds and Returns to Enclosure, 1692-1860 Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 9 / 28
  • 10.
    UK Debt Dynamics,1700-1913 Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 10 / 28
  • 11.
    The pre-industrial economy Technologyand factor markets: I Production function: yt = A lλ t kα t n1 λ α t I Land and labor in …xed supply: lt = nt = 1 I To produce one unit of capital, one unit of goods is needed I All factors are paid their marginal products The pre-industrial economy contains nobles, masses and the crown: I The nobles own land and capital, and they save a fraction β of their income I The masses own the labor, and they do not save I The crown raises taxes to …ghts foreign wars that cost a fraction x of output Dynamics: kt+1 = β (λ + α) (1 x) A kα t Steady state: k = [β (λ + α) (1 x) A] 1 1 α Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 11 / 28
  • 12.
    A stylized modelof the Industrial Revolution Assume a new class of capitalists arrive: I Like capitalists, they save a fraction β of their income I Unlike capitalists, ... F ... to produce one unit of capital, they need 1/π units of goods F ... they have no land and start with a small share of the capital stock: s0 0 The impact of these capitalists depends crucially on the credit market. We consider two extreme cases: I Frictionless credit market I No credit market Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 12 / 28
  • 13.
    Frictionless credit market Assumethere is a competitive private credit market: I Capitalists …nance their investments with savings of the nobles I Competition equalizes the interest rate to the return to investment Dynamics: kt+1 = π β (λ + α) (1 x) A kα t st+1 = α st λ + α Steady-state: k = [π β (λ + α) (1 x) A] 1 1 α s = 0 The Industrial Revolution brings fast economic growth, little social change and large gains in the living standards of the masses Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 13 / 28
  • 14.
    The capital stockand the share owned by capitalists Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 14 / 28
  • 15.
    Consumptions of thedi¤erent groups Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 15 / 28
  • 16.
    No credit market Thereis no private credit market due to some unspeci…ed friction Dynamics: kt+1 = β [λ + α (1 + (π 1) st )] (1 x) A kα t st+1 = π α st λ + α (1 + (π 1) st ) I Successful Industrial Revolution if π > 1 + λ α Steady state: k = (π β α (1 x) A) 1 1 α s = 1 λ α (π 1) The Industrial Revolution brings slow economic growth, fast social change and small gains in the living standards of the masses Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 16 / 28
  • 17.
    The capital stockand the share owned by capitalists Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 17 / 28
  • 18.
    Consumptions of thedi¤erent groups Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 18 / 28
  • 19.
    The role ofsovereign debt Assume now that the arrival of the capitalists coincides with a shift from taxes to debt: I Foreign wars without raising taxes: dt+1 = Rt dt + x A kα t I Nobles willing to buy debt: Rt = α A kα 1 t I Capitalists not willing to buy debt: π α kα 1 t > Rt Isn’t sovereign debt just a means to postpone taxes? Yes, but you can postpone them forever if: I π β > 1 (noble investments are dynamically ine¢ cient) I x π β 1 π 1 λ (the debt does not exceed the savings of the nobles) Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 19 / 28
  • 20.
    The role ofsovereign debt Dynamics: kt+1 = β f[λ + α (1 + (π 1) st )] kα t + Rt dt g dt+1 st+1 = π β α st kα t β f[λ + α (1 + (π 1) st )] kα t + Rt dt g dt+1 Steady state: k = (π β α) 1 1 α s = 1 λ α (π 1) + x α (π β 1) Debt accumulation slows down the Industrial Revolution initially, but then accelerates it afterwards and takes it to a higher steady state Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 20 / 28
  • 21.
    The capital stockand the share owned by capitalists Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 21 / 28
  • 22.
    Consumptions of thedi¤erent groups Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 22 / 28
  • 23.
    A numerical exercise Isit possible to use such a simple framework to obtain a sense of the quantitative importance of the mechanism that we highlight here? The answer is yes, if you add depreciation! With reasonable parameter values we …nd that: I With debt it takes about 170 years to travel half the way towards the new steady state, while in the absence of debt it takes 225 years I With debt it takes 125 years for capitalists to take over 70% of the capital, while in the absence of debt it takes 278 years Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 23 / 28
  • 24.
    Debt-to-income ratio Ventura andVoth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 24 / 28
  • 25.
    Social change Ventura andVoth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 25 / 28
  • 26.
    Income per capita Venturaand Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 26 / 28
  • 27.
    Financial frictions andthe Industrial Revolution Why was growth slow at the start of the Industrial Revolution? I Lots of inventions and innovations appeared rather quickly I Financial frictions limited investment by capitalists Why did the Industrial Revolution generate massive social change? I Nobles held all wealth and power in 1700, but had lost most of it by 1900 I Financial frictions kept the gains of industrialization in the hands of capitalists Why did the Industrial Revolution not raise the living standards of workers? I Real wages did not grow much during the core phase of industrialization I Sovereign debt crowded-out nobles’investment and kept wages low Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 27 / 28
  • 28.
    Lessons for today Issovereign debt always growth enhancing? No, of course, just look at the seminal work of Reinhart and Rogo¤! This model does not have much to say, for instance, about the recent sovereign debt crisis in the periphery of Europe (Broner et al. 2014) But this model might have something interesting to say about Chinese growth with the following role assignments: I The “crown”: USA and, to some extent, Europe I The “nobles”: China’s government (state-owned banks and enterprises) I The “capitalists”: China’s new entrepreneurial class I The “masses”: China´s workers Ventura and Voth ( ) Cambridge-INET conference September 2-3, 2016 28 / 28