Cyber Espionage The Silent Crime of Cyberspace Virginia G

Cyber Espionage: The Silent Crime of Cyberspace
Virginia Greiman
Boston University, Boston, USA
[email protected]
Abstract: In recent years, the disclosure of secrets through
cyber infiltration of America’s largest intelligence organization,
the National Security Agency (NSA), has raised the fears of
veteran intelligence officials and close allies around the globe
that
no institution or government is secure from those who roam the
discrete halls of cyberspace. Although espionage has existed
since before the days of the Greek mythological Trojan horse,
no one could have envisioned the sophisticated use of
espionage in today’s networked world. Espionage has been used
for political and military intelligence and economic and
industrial pursuits with a lack of understanding of all of the
impacts on our daily lives. In the context of foreign or
international
law, espionage is sometimes characterized as lawless, without
controls or regulation, and it rarely distinguishes between
economic and security based cyber espionage. Through
empirical analysis this paper explores the treatment of
espionage
under various legal systems including those countries and
regions considered the most advanced at cyber espionage, the
United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China. To
provide greater insight into the different perspectives of cyber
espionage from a legal standpoint, this paper distinguishes the
law of national intelligence collection from the criminal laws
of economic/industrial espionage on the domestic front. The

purpose of this research is to analyze the development of cyber
espionage as a preferred means of contemporary warfare, as
well as a tool for economic and political intelligence. The paper
concludes by responding to the challenges faced by nation-
states in the development of an effective legal system governing
espionage at the domestic and international level.
Keywords: cyber espionage, cybercrime, foreign surveillance,
national intelligence, economic espionage, cyber warfare
1. Introduction
Although many countries all over the world are committing
cyber espionage, the United States, Russia, and China
represent the most sophisticated cyber spying capabilities
(Senate, 2014). A 2011 Report by the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) suggested that
the rise of cyberspace as a platform for
innovation and storage of trade secrets was greatly enhancing
the risks faced by American firms. The report also
found that the United States remains the prime target for foreign
economic collection and industrial espionage
by virtue of its global technological leadership and innovation
(ONCIX, 2011).
Cyber espionage has also become an accepted and even
preferred means of warfare. That is not to say that
cyber espionage will replace traditional means of warfare, but it
is already affecting the nature of nation-state
conflict. Dunn Cavelty (2012) suggests that this shift began
with the Cold War, when the United States and Russia
focused their efforts on covert information gathering over
outright warfare. Because all-out war between major
world powers has become less acceptable in the modern world,
more cautious strategies have continued into
the 21st century. In the last few decades especially, as
technology has become more advanced, cyber espionage

tools have become indispensable to modern military operations
(DoD, 2015). The Defense Department
continues to support the Justice Department and other agencies
in exploring new tools and capabilities to help
deter such activity in cyberspace (DoD, 2015, p. 12). For
example, the United States used verifiable and
attributable data to engage China about the risks posed by its
economic espionage. The attribution of this data
allowed the United States to express concerns regarding the
impact of Chinese intellectual property theft on
U.S. economic competitiveness, and the potential risks posed to
strategic stability by Chinese activity. To deter
China from conducting future cyber espionage, the Justice
Department indicted five members of the People’s
Liberation Army for stealing U.S. intellectual property to
directly benefit Chinese companies. The Chinese
hackers were indicted on 31 counts, 23 of which were under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. While Justice
Officials say the indictment was a breakthrough, others
characterize the punishment as only symbolic as the
likelihood of prosecution is slim (DOJ, 2014).
The 2014 Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) data
breach has been described as the greatest theft of
sensitive personnel data in history. However, neither the scope
nor scale of the breach, nor its significance, has
been fully investigated and shared with victims and the public.
The 22 million victims—and their families—of
this espionage attack share concerns with the deficiency of this
counterintelligence campaign that have not been
answered or addressed (Nakashima, 2015).
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Virginia Greiman
Based on empirical research this paper explores the unique
characteristics of cyber espionage under the laws of
four major powers and the existing legal concepts and doctrines
for national intelligence and cybersecurity and
organizes a conceptual legal structure that frames the
convergence and divergence in espionage laws and legal
practice, and the areas for harmonization and agreement among
nations.
2. Espionage under international law
Espionage, commonly known as spying, is the practice of
secretly gathering information about a foreign
government or a competing industry, with the purpose of
placing one's own government or corporation at some
strategic or financial advantage. In the United States, federal
law prohibits espionage when it jeopardizes the
national defense or benefits a foreign nation (18 U.S.C.A. §
793). Criminal espionage involves betraying U.S.
government secrets to other nations. Importantly, espionage
does not reach the level of use of force under the
U.N. Charter. According to the International Group of Experts
that authored the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the
international law applicable to cyberspace, cyber espionage is
distinct from the underlying acts that enable the
espionage (NATO, 2017).
The definition of a cyber-attack varies widely. For example, the
United States definition of a cyber-attack does
not include espionage as the U.S. has a separate Espionage Act
(Espionage Act of 1917), while Germany makes
no distinction between cyber-attack and probe or espionage
(Germany CSS, 2011, pp. 14-15). However,

espionage’s permissibility under international law remains
largely unsettled; no global regulation exists for this
important state activity (Pun, 2017). The contradiction of
espionage is evident as states deem their own
espionage activities legitimate and essential for national
security, while aggressively pursuing criminal actions
against foreign espionage activity. "The law of espionage is,
therefore, unique in that it consists of a norm
(territorial integrity), the violation of which may be punished by
offended states, however, states have
persistently violated the norm” … (Scott, 1999).
Although it is unclear under international law whether states in
general have a lawful right to spy on other states,
the disallowance of certain activities within espionage is clearer
(Pun, 2017). The treatment of those involved in
spying activities as well as the use of torture to extract
information has been held unlawful by Courts in many
nations (Forcese, 2011). In 2013, fifteen countries, including
the United States and China, agreed that
international law, in particular, the United Nations Charter
applies in cyberspace and explicitly highlighted the
need to elaborate confidence-building measures and norms,
rules, or principles of responsible behavior of States
(UN Report, 2013).
3. The United States Espionage Act, Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, and Economic
Espionage Act
More than one hundred years ago, President Woodrow Wilson
signed the Espionage Act. Enacted soon after the
United States entered World War I in 1917, the Espionage Act
prohibited individuals from expressing or
publishing opinions that would interfere with the U.S. military’s
efforts to defeat Germany and its allies.

Specifically, the Espionage Act made it a crime willfully to
interfere with U.S. war efforts by conveying false
information about the war, obstructing U.S. recruitment or
enlistment efforts, or inciting insubordination,
disloyalty, or mutiny. Ironically, this tension between national
security and free speech rights still exists today.
To be convicted under the 1917 Act, the law requires proof of
intent for the information to be used to injure the
United States or to advantage any foreign nation or reason to
believe that the information will be used for either
of these purposes. Section 794(b) applies “in time of war” and
prohibits the communication of this information
to the enemy or attempts to elicit any information relating to the
public defense. The offenses contained in
sections 794(a) and (b) are punishable by death or imprisonment
for any term of years or for life. Courts have
held that the statute requires the government to prove four
elements under §793 : (1) the defendant lawfully
or unlawfully had possession of, access to, or control over, or
was entrusted with (2) information relating to the
national defense that (3) the defendant reasonably believed
could be used to the injury of the United States or
the advantage of a foreign nation and (4) that the defendant
willfully communicated, delivered, or transmitted
such information to a person not entitled to receive it (§793).
The U.S. Department of Defense tracks the 1917
Espionage Act and defines "espionage" in its Joint Publication
2-01.2 as "[t]he act of obtaining, delivering,
transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the
national defense with an intent, or reason to
believe that the information may be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign
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nation (JP 2-01.2). Espionage is a violation of 18 United States
Code 792-798 and Article 106, Uniform Code of
Military Justice.
The Espionage Act is far from a paradigm of clarity. Scholars
have described it as “incomprehensible if read
according to the conventions of legal textualism, while paying
fair attention to legislative history” (Edgar and
Schmidt, 1986). A major problem that arises from the lack of
clarity is to whom exactly the Espionage Act applies.
The plain meaning of the Espionage Act appears to apply to
everyone including government employees, leakers,
whistleblowers, and members of the press alike. For example,
Section 793(e) prohibits the willful communication
of confidential information by someone who is not authorized to
possess it.
To address with more clarity the role of National Intelligence
and Foreign data collection, the United States
passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978 (FISA)
with major Amendments in 2007 and 2008 to
ease restrictions on surveillance of terrorists suspects where one
party (or both parties) to the communication
are located overseas (FISA, 1978). Despite the ample evidence
that FISA has led federal investigators to
significant victories in the apprehension of terrorists and the
conviction of conspirators passing U.S. secrets on
to foreign nations, it has been criticized for not maintaining the
proper balance between national security and
the protection of individual privacy (Breglio, 2003; Correia,

2014).
Following the end of the Cold War, in the West there was a
noticeable shift of concern about espionage from
that which is political and military in nature to economic
espionage, especially when carried out by cyber means
(U.S. Strategy, 2011). In 1996, Congress passed the Economic
Espionage Act (EEA), to help reduce the theft by
foreign entities of proprietary information and trade secrets of
U.S. businesses. Economic espionage occurs
when a foreign government seeks information to advance its
own technological or financial interest against
another government, foreign company or an individual.
The weaknesses of the Economic Espionage Act has been a
subject of scholarly research. With some finding that
the Act has been difficult to prove with minimal sentences
under para. 1831, while others argue that the
government has taken a hands off approach in helping private
industry, and a lack of support from other nations
assisting in international investigations (Reid, 2016). Notably,
since the inception of the EEA in 1996 there have
been fewer than 10 convictions to date under the law. Walter
Liew, was the first person to be convicted of
economic espionage by a U.S. jury in March 2014 and was
sentenced to 15 years in prison.
4. China’s National Intelligence and Trade Secrets Law
China passed its new National Intelligence Law on June 27,
2017 by the 28th meeting of the Standing Committee
of the 20th National People's Congress. Article 1 of the Law
states its broad purpose under the Constitution …
“to strengthen and safeguard national intelligence work and to
preserve state security and interests” (China,
2017b). The Law further specifies its purpose by providing that
"National Intelligence work adheres to the overall

national security perspective, provides intelligence as a
reference in major national decision-making, provides
intelligence support for the prevention and mitigation of threats
endangering national security, and preserves
the national political power, sovereignty, unity, and territorial
integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable
social and economic development and other major national
interests” (Art. 2). Consistent with China’s
governance of national security, the Law stipulates that "The
Central Military Commission uniformly leads and
organizes military intelligence efforts” (Art. 3). To address
respect for the law and human rights, the Law states
“that the National intelligence efforts shall be conducted in
accordance with law, shall respect and protect
human rights, and shall preserve the lawful rights and interests
of individuals and organizations” (Art. 8).
The United States Intelligence Community in their 2017 Threat
Assessment Report ranked China as the number
one threat against U.S. interests in cyberspace noting that
Beijing will continue actively targeting the US
Government, its allies, and US companies for cyber espionage
(Coates, 2017). As noted in the Report, The
Chinese government continues to conduct pervasive industrial
espionage against U.S. companies, universities,
and the government and direct efforts to circumvent U.S. export
controls to gain access to cutting-edge
technologies and intellectual property in strategic sectors (U.S.-
China, 2017). According to the Intellectual
Property Commission Report by the National Bureau of Asian
Research (NBAR) the scale of international theft
of American intellectual property (IP) is in the hundreds of
billions of dollars per year, on the order of the size of
U.S. Exports to Asia (NBAR, 2013, p. 1).
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China’s espionage laws like the United States encompass both
trade secret protections and national security.
China first enacted trade secret “protections” in 1993 with the
passage of Article 10 of the Unfair Competition
Law, which prohibits businesses from the following: a)
obtaining the trade secret of the rightful party by theft,
inducement, duress or other illegal means; b) disclosing, using
or allowing others to use the trade secrets of the
rightful party obtained by illegal means; or c) disclosing, using
or allowing others to use trade secrets in breach
of an agreement or the confidentiality requirement imposed by
the rightful party (China, 1993).
5. The United Kingdom’s Espionage and Trade Secrets Law
From the earliest days of the British intelligence community,
which was established in the early twentieth
century, there was a close connection between intelligence-
gathering and empire (Walton, 2013). Intelligence
played an essential role in the administration of the empire,
which by the 1920s had grown to encompass one -
quarter of the world’s territory and population. The formation
of the two services that would later become
known as MI5 and SIS commonly called MI6 represented a
fundamental break with all British intelligence-
gathering efforts up to that point. For the first time, the
government had professional, dedicated peacetime
intelligence services at its disposal (Walton, 2013, p. 5).
Historically, the United Kingdom embraced a stronger culture
of secrecy than the United States (Donahue, 2005).

The Official Secrets Act of 1989 is the key statute that prohibits
the unauthorized disclosure of government
information. The law criminalizes “secondary disclosures,” that
is, the publication by journalists or members of
the public of protected information received from government
employees in contravention of the law (OSA,
1989).
The Official Secrets Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 52) was an Act
of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It created
offences of disclosure of information (section 1) and breach of
official trust (section 2). It was replaced in the UK
by the Official Secrets Act 1911. The Official Secrets Act 1989
(c. 6) replaced section 2 of the Official Secrets Act
1911, thereby removing the public interest defense created by
that section. The Official Secrets Bill was enacted
to give increased powers against offences of disclosing
confidential matters by officials, and to prevent the
disclosure of such documents and information by spies, and/or
to prevent breaches of official trust, in order to
punish such offences of obtaining information and
communicating it, against the interests of the British State.
Unlike the U.S., Russia and China, the United Kingdom (UK),
has not criminalized the misappropriation of trade
secrets, and has limited its remedies to civil actions including
injunctive relief, search and seizure orders and
damages (UK, 2017). Based on an extensive consultation paper
on the protection of official data, the UK Law
Commission recently recommended that the UK criminalize the
theft of trade secrets, however, the
recommendations have not been acted upon (UK, 2017). The UK
also proposed changes to the Serious Crime Bill
in order to deter hackers by increasing the penalty under the
Computer Misuse Act to a life sentence.

6. Russia’s Espionage and Trade Secrets Law
Russia's External Intelligence Service (SVR) is the current
incarnation of one of the world's oldest and most
extensive espionage agencies, known for decades as the KGB
(BBC, 2010). While China uses various methods to
steal foreign trade secrets for both political and economic
interests, Russia has recently focused its efforts on
cyber espionage to promote its national economic interests,
while also employing intelligence officers under
diplomatic cover.
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Law No. FZ-190
as amended in 2012 , sets out what is termed “High
Treason,” which is defined as “espionage, disclosure of state
secrets, or any other assistance rendered to a
foreign State, a foreign organization, or their representatives in
hostile activities to the detriment of the external
security of the Russian Federation committed by a citizen of
Russia (RF, 1996, 2012). Under Article 275, of Law
No. FZ-190 high treason shall be punishable by 12 to 20 years
imprisonment with or without a fine in an amount
of up to 500 thousand roubles or in the amount of the wage or
salary, or other income of the convicted person
for a period of up to three years.
According to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSS), which
proposed the bill, the amendments are aimed at
emphasizing that state treason is a broad concept and that
espionage and disclosure of state secrets are forms
of it (RF, 2012). The FSS also stated, in its explanatory memo
to the amendment law, that previous practice in
enforcing the law in cases related to state treason and espionage
identified the necessity of prosecuting acts of
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cooperation with representatives of international organizations
engaged in hostile activities as state treason and
of extending the liability of persons to whom state secrets are
entrusted (Russia Code, Art. 51). The new Law
has caused concern among human rights activists, who argue
that its parameters of state treason are too broad
and that there are no firm criteria to define when cooperation
with an international organization assumes a
criminal character, thereby leaving that assessment to the
discretion of investigative and judicial authorities
(Ozerova, 2012).
Trade Secrets in Russia are protected under the Federal Law on
Commercial Secrecy, Law No. 98-FZ effective 29
July, 2004 as amended in 2006 and 2007. Such secrets are
protected from insiders to whom secrets have been
entrusted, outsiders who obtain the secrets by improper means,
and government agencies that might obtain
and release the secrets (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012).
Violating the trade secret law can entail disciplinary,
civil, administrative, or criminal liability as provided by the
legislation.
7. Challenges to harmonization of the international perspectives
on cyber espionage
As shown by each country’s approach to espionage, domestic
laws are not sufficient to negotiate the challenges
arising from trans-border issues such as those relating to
national security and human rights, the public’s right
of access to information, the individual’s right to privacy, the

corporation’s right to remain competitive, the right
to criminal process, and extraterritorial jurisdiction.
International cooperation and international laws are also
needed—both to allocate authority among political entities, and
to define and protect core substantive values
in the physical and virtual worlds (Bederman and Keitner,
2016). Powerful actors such as the United States,
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have not
gone far enough in addressing global inequality and
the digital divide. International laws can address these
injustices in ways that domestic laws cannot because of
each nation’s own self-interest in national security and
economic advancement.
The United Nations Charter requires that any use of force, cyber
or otherwise, must meet the requirements of
military necessity, distinction between civilians and military
targets, proportionality, and avoidance of
unnecessary suffering (UN Charter, 1945). To the extent that
cyber espionage amounts to an act of war, the
international community must recognize and monitor these
behaviors to maintain a peaceful existence.
Scholars contend that a treaty which bans the use of cyber-
attacks or limits their use is not realistic because
there is currently no way to ensure compliance. More effective
may be the establishment of norms as proposed
by NATO, the OECD and other transnational organizations to
prevent the possibility of a cyber war conducted
through the use of cyber espionage. Developing state practice
and norms relates to current international law,
and rather than prohibiting espionage outright, it might serve as
a more realistic approach. As noted by one
expert, “[i]f states want these voluntary, non-binding norms of
responsible state behavior in cyberspace to be
truly meaningful words that can achieve their desired goals,

then their actions and practice must demonstrate
those tenets. States must demonstrate that they are willing to
take the necessary steps to protect the security
and prevent the misuse of the Internet in their respective
countries” (Hathaway, 2017). This requires a calling
out of wrongful acts conducted by other states, something that
victimized states have been reluctant to do
(Hathaway, 2017, p. 5). We cannot afford to be silent anymore.
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, former Director, Office of
Force Transformation at the Pentagon introduced
the concept of institutionalizing transformation by innovating
faster than our opponents and advocating more
open access to information. If we are to be effective in the
digital age, new approaches must be considered for
national security that may require “less in trying to restrict
information and more in knowing what is occurring”
(Blaker, 2006).
More cooperation among states at the international level is also
clearly needed concerning economic espionage.
Legal scholars have also noted the need for accountability at the
international level when one country is
wrongfully attacked by another (Kuntz, 2013). For example, the
United States’ Cyber Economic Espionage
Accountability Act expresses the sense of Congress that cyber
economic espionage should be a priority issue in
all economic and diplomatic discussions with the People's
Republic of China, with the Russian Federation and
other countries determined to encourage, tolerate, or conduct
such cyber economic espionage (U.S., 2014).
A review of the espionage laws shows the need for the United
States to take a lead in developing better
international collaboration and clearer laws. On the national
security side, this requires stronger sanctions and

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cooperation from the international community, and stronger
penalties for economic espionage. Since the
enactment of the EEA in 1996 the statute has been amended to
increase the fines that can be imposed from
$500,000 to $5 million in the case of an individual and from
$10 million to not more than the greater of $10
million or three times the value of the stolen trade secret
(Economic Penalty Act, 2013). Though these fines are
severe they clearly do not go far enough in changing the
behaviors of the perpetrators.
The United States Espionage Act needs revision to remove
confusion and create a more consistent application
of the law. In order to effectively prosecute legitimate cases of
espionage, courts and prosecutors must clearly
understand what constitutes espionage. Technology and the
classification system for espionage should comport
with modern reality. International cooperation on the conduct of
espionage may take decades, but in the
interim, application of the statute to leakers, whistleblowers and
others requires amendment of this antiquated
law to better protect our nations’ interests and our competitive
advantage in the world.
8. Conclusion
Although States may take different positions on the application,
interpretation and development of international
law, they have reached a consensus on the applicability of

international law to cyberspace. Though the prospects
of a comprehensive binding treaty on cyber espionage remains a
challenge, the existence of a multiplicity of
diverse non-binding norm initiatives, as well as several recent
bilateral agreements reached between the main
cyber powers, demonstrate that cyber norms development is
possible.
Future research must explore possible solutions for enhancing
not only the laws of espionage, but the policies
that inform these laws to meet modern realities. This requires
multilateral cooperation and an international
agreement on the rules and norms that govern cyber espionage
both at the national security and economic level
to better meet the needs of our evolving digital society.
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October 2011. Director of the National Counterintelligence and
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“Report to Congress. Executive Summary and
Recommendations.” One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First
Session, November 2017.
Walton, C. (2013) Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, The
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York, NY.
251
xiii
Virginia Greiman is Professor of Global Cyber Law and
Governance and Megaprojects and Planning at Boston
University
and she teaches at Harvard University Law School. She served
as a diplomatic official to the U.S. Department of State in
Eastern and Central Europe, Asia and Africa and has held
several high level appointments with the U.S. Department of
Justice.
Jeffrey Guion is a Captain in the U.S. Air Force and a graduate
student at the Air Force Institute of Technology. He has a
Computer Science B.S. from Northeastern University and
previously managed the Wing Cybersecurity Office at Edwards
AFB. His is currently working on mission relevant cyber terrain
mapping for his thesis.
Rudy Agus Gemilang Gultom, is a senior researcher at the

Indonesian Defense University (IDU), Indonesia. He finished
his
M.Sc. in Computer Science from the University of Sheffield,
United Kingdom (funded by the British Chevening Scholarship).
He finished his Doctoral Degree in Electrical Engineering from
University of Indonesia, Indonesia (funded by the Indonesian
Government).
Ginger Guzman is currently an international research fellow at
The Institute of World Politics and is a PhD candidate in the
School of Governance, Law, and Society at Tallinn University.
Her research and interests are on cyberpower, security
studies, and, international relations. More specifically her work
examines the role of ideational cyberpower for states.
Sharif Hassan has over 15 years of experience in Cyber
security, specifically adversarial Cyber testing, and is the
manager of
the Lockheed Martin corporate Red Team. Sharif is currently
pursuing his PhD in Computer Science at the University of
Central Florida.
Dr. Moniphia O. Hewling is a Cyber Security Consultant who
currently heads the Jamaica Cyber Incident Response Team, a
division in the Ministry of Science Energy and Technology.
Often described as a cyber-warrior, Dr. Hewling’s main aim at
this juncture is to drive the creation of a robust cyber security
framework for Jamaica.
Vahid Heydari received the M.S. degree in Cybersecurity and
the Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from
the University of Alabama in Huntsville. He is currently an
Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Rowan University,
Glassboro, NJ, USA. His research interests include moving
target defenses, mobile ad-hoc, sensor, and vehicular networks
security.

Dr Corey Hirsch is Chief Information Security Officer of
Teledyne Technologies. He also serves as visiting fellow at both
Warwick Business School, Coventry, and Henley Business
School at University of Reading, U.K. Dr. Hirsch teaches
information security at Stevens Institute of Technology. His
practice and teaching centers around enterprise systems,
leading the ICT function, information security, operations, and
competitor intelligence. His 24-year career with Tektronix,
Inc. included overseas assignments totaling nine years, and
culminated as vice president, Europe. Both LeCroy and
Tektronix participate in the test and measurement industry. Dr.
Hirsch has research interests in information security and
enterprise risk management. He earned his doctorate in business
administration from Brunel University, London.
Michael Bennett Hotchkiss has research interests in the study of
Information Warfare, Propaganda, Disinformation, and
the History of Espionage. Michael possesses a Master of
Organization Development degree (M.O.D.) from Bowling
Green
State University (USA), and a Bachelor of Arts in Industrial
Psychology (minor Criminal Justice, Phi Beta Kappa honors)
from
University of Connecticut (USA).
Gazmend Huskaj is a PhD candidate in Cyber Operations at the
Swedish Defence University. He received his MSc in
Information Security from Stockholm University in 2015 as a
distinguished graduate. Previously, he was Director
Intelligence in the Swedish Armed Forces focusing on cyber-
related issues. He is also a ISACA Certified Information
Security
Manager (CISM).
Steve Hutchinson is a cyber security researcher with ICF

contracted to the US Army Research Laboratory. He has
research
interests in the cognitive aspects of cyber security decision-
making and human-machine interface techniques to augment
analyst capabilities. He has a MS in Instruction Science,
graduate studies in Computer Science, and BS in Electrical
Engineering.
Ehinome Ikhalia holds a PhD in Information Systems and
Computing, Ehinome possesses exceptional insight in the
application of cyber security. He keeps his finger on the pulse
of cyber security and has presented at international
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