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IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND
RISK ASSESSMENT
Mr. RAJASEKAR RAMALINGAM
Department of IT, College of Applied
Sciences, Sur.
Sultanate of Oman.
http://vrrsekar.wixsite.com/raja
Based on
William Stallings, Lawrie Brown,
Computer Security: Principles and
Practice, Third Edition
Content
10.1 Terminology
10.2 Security Risk Assessment
10.3 Detailed Risk Analysis Process
10.3.1 Asset Identification / System Characterizations
10.3.2 Threat Identification
10.3.3 Vulnerability Identification
10.3.4 Analyze Risks / Control Analysis
10.3.5 Likelihood Determination
10.3.6 Impact analysis / Consequence determination
10.3.7 Risk determination
10.3.8 Control Recommendation & Result Documentation
2
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
3
10.1 Terminology
Asset: Anything that has value to the organization
Threat: A potential cause of an unwanted incident which may
result in harm to a system or organization.
Vulnerability: A Weakness in an asset or group of assets
which can be exploited by a threat.
Risk: The potential that a given threat will exploit
vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets to cause loss or
damage to the assets.
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
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10.2 SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT
 Critical component of process
Else may have vulnerabilities or waste money
 Ideally examine every asset verses risk
Not feasible in practice
 Choose one of possible alternatives based on orgs
resources and risk profile
Baseline
Informal
Formal
Combined
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
5
10.2.1 Baseline Approach
 Use “industry best practice”
Easy, cheap, can be replicated
But gives no special consideration to org
May give too much or too little security
 Implement safeguards against most common threats
 Baseline recommendations and checklist documents
available from various bodies
 Alone only suitable for small organizations
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
6
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
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10.2.2 Informal Approach
 Conduct informal, pragmatic risk analysis on organization’s IT
systems
 Exploits knowledge and expertise of analyst
 Fairly quick and cheap
 Does address some org specific issues
 Some risks may be incorrectly assessed
 Skewed by analysts views, varies over time
 Suitable for small to medium sized orgs
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
8
10.2.3 Detailed / Formal Risk Analysis
 Most comprehensive alternative
 Assess using formal structured process
With a number of stages
Identify likelihood of risk and consequences
Hence have confidence controls appropriate
 Costly and slow, requires expert analysts
 May be a legal requirement to use
 Suitable for large organizations with IT systems
critical to their business objectives
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
9
10.2.4 Combined Approach
 Combines elements of other approaches
 Initial baseline on all systems
 Informal analysis to identify critical risks
 Formal assessment on these systems
 Iterated and extended over time
 Better use of time and money resources
 Better security earlier that evolves
 May miss some risks early
 Recommended alternative for most orgs
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
10
10.3 Detailed Risk Analysis Process
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
11
10.3.1 Asset Identification / System Characterizations
 Identify assets
 “Anything which needs to be protected”
 Of value to organization to meet its objectives
 Tangible or intangible
 In practice try to identify significant assets
 Draw on expertise of people in relevant areas of
organization to identify key assets
 Identify and interview such personnel
 See checklists in various standards
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
12
10.3.2 Threat Identification
 To identify threats or risks to assets ask
1. Who or what could cause it harm?
2. How could this occur?
 Threats are anything that hinders or prevents an
asset providing appropriate levels of the key
security services:
 Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability,
Accountability, Authenticity and Reliability
 Assets may have multiple threats
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
13
10.3.2 a) Threat Sources
 Threats may be
Natural “acts of god”
Man-made and either accidental or deliberate
 Should consider human attackers:
Motivation
Capability
Resources
Probability of attack
Deterrence
 Any previous history of attack on organization
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
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10.3.3 Vulnerability Identification
 Identify exploitable flaws or weaknesses in organization’s IT
systems or processes
 Hence determine applicability and significance of threat to
organization
 Note need combination of threat and vulnerability to create a
risk to an asset
 Again can use lists of potential vulnerabilities in standards etc.
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
15
10.3.4 Analyze Risks / Control Analysis
 Specify likelihood of occurrence of each identified threat
to asset given existing controls
 Management, operational, technical processes and
procedures to reduce exposure of org to some risks
 Specify consequence should threat occur
 Hence derive overall risk rating for each threat
Risk = probability threat occurs x cost to organization
 In practice very hard to determine exactly
 Use qualitative not quantitative, ratings for each
 Aim to order resulting risks in order to treat them
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
16
10.3.5 Likelihood Determination
Rating Likelihood
Description
Expanded Definition
1 Rare May occur in exceptional circumstances and may
deemed as “lucky” or very unlikely.
2 Unlikely Could occur at sometime but not expected given
current controls, circumstances and recent events.
3 Possible Might occur at sometime, but just as likely as not.
It may be difficult to control its occurrence due to
external influence
4 Likely Will probably occur in some circumstance and
one should not be surprised if it occurred.
5 Almost
Certain
Is expected to occur in most circumstances and
certainly sooner or later.
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK
ASSESSMENT
17
10.3.6 Impact analysis / Consequence determination
Rating Consequence Expanded Definition
1 Insignificant
 Result of a minor security breach in a single area.
 Impact is likely to last less than several days.
 Require only minor expenditure to rectify.
2 Minor
 Result of security breach in one or two areas.
 Impact is likely to last less than a week.
 Can be rectified within project or team resources.
3 Moderate
 Limited systemic security breaches.
 Impact is likely to last up to 2 weeks.
 Requires management intervention.
4 Major
 Ongoing systemic security breach.
 Impact will likely last 4-8 weeks.
 Requires significant management intervention and
resources.
 Loss of business or organizational outcomes if possible.
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
18
Rating Consequence Expanded Definition
5 Catastrophic
 Major Systemic security breach.
 Impact will last for 3 months or more.
 Senior Management will be required to intervene.
 Compliance costs are expected to be very substantial.
 Possible criminal or disciplinary action is likely.
6 Doomsday
 Multiple instances of major systemic security breaches.
 Impact duration cannot be determined.
 Senior management will be required to place the company
under voluntary administration.
 Criminal Proceedings against senior management is
expected.
Substantial loss of business and failure to meet company’s
objective.
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
19
10.3.7 Risk determination
• Once the likelihood and consequence of each specific threat
have been identified, a final level of risk can be assigned.
• This is typically determined using a table that maps these
values to a risk level, such as those shown in next Table.
• The below table details the risk level assigned to each
combination.
• Such a table provides the qualitative equivalent of
performing the ideal risk calculation using quantitative
values.
• It also indicates the interpretation of these assigned levels.
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
20
Consequences
Likelihood Dooms
day
Catastrophic Major Moderate Minor Insignificant
Almost
Certain
E E E E H H
Likely E E E H H M
Possible E E E H M L
Unlikely E E H M L L
Rare E H H M L L
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
21
Risk Level Description
Extreme (E)  Require detailed research and management.
 Planning at executive / director level.
 Planning and Monitoring required.
High (H)  Require management attention.
 Planning at senior project or team leaders.
 Planning and Monitoring required.
Medium (M)  Can be managed by existing specific.
 Monitoring and response procedures.
 Management by employees.
Low (L)  Can be managed through routing procedures.
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
22
10.3.8 Control Recommendation & Result Documentation
Asset Threat/
Vulnerability
Existing
Controls
Likelihood Consequence Level of
Risk
Risk
Priority
Internet Router Outside Hacker
attack
Admin
password only
Possible Moderate High 1
Destruction of Data
Center
Accidental Fire or
Flood
None (no
disaster
recovery plan)
Unlikely Major High 2
Document in Risk Register and Evaluate Risks
ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND
RISK ASSESSMENT

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cupdf.com_it-security-management-and-risk-assessment.pdf

  • 1. IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT Mr. RAJASEKAR RAMALINGAM Department of IT, College of Applied Sciences, Sur. Sultanate of Oman. http://vrrsekar.wixsite.com/raja Based on William Stallings, Lawrie Brown, Computer Security: Principles and Practice, Third Edition
  • 2. Content 10.1 Terminology 10.2 Security Risk Assessment 10.3 Detailed Risk Analysis Process 10.3.1 Asset Identification / System Characterizations 10.3.2 Threat Identification 10.3.3 Vulnerability Identification 10.3.4 Analyze Risks / Control Analysis 10.3.5 Likelihood Determination 10.3.6 Impact analysis / Consequence determination 10.3.7 Risk determination 10.3.8 Control Recommendation & Result Documentation 2 ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 3. 3 10.1 Terminology Asset: Anything that has value to the organization Threat: A potential cause of an unwanted incident which may result in harm to a system or organization. Vulnerability: A Weakness in an asset or group of assets which can be exploited by a threat. Risk: The potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets to cause loss or damage to the assets. ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 4. 4 10.2 SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT  Critical component of process Else may have vulnerabilities or waste money  Ideally examine every asset verses risk Not feasible in practice  Choose one of possible alternatives based on orgs resources and risk profile Baseline Informal Formal Combined ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 5. 5 10.2.1 Baseline Approach  Use “industry best practice” Easy, cheap, can be replicated But gives no special consideration to org May give too much or too little security  Implement safeguards against most common threats  Baseline recommendations and checklist documents available from various bodies  Alone only suitable for small organizations ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 6. 6 ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 7. 7 10.2.2 Informal Approach  Conduct informal, pragmatic risk analysis on organization’s IT systems  Exploits knowledge and expertise of analyst  Fairly quick and cheap  Does address some org specific issues  Some risks may be incorrectly assessed  Skewed by analysts views, varies over time  Suitable for small to medium sized orgs ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 8. 8 10.2.3 Detailed / Formal Risk Analysis  Most comprehensive alternative  Assess using formal structured process With a number of stages Identify likelihood of risk and consequences Hence have confidence controls appropriate  Costly and slow, requires expert analysts  May be a legal requirement to use  Suitable for large organizations with IT systems critical to their business objectives ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 9. 9 10.2.4 Combined Approach  Combines elements of other approaches  Initial baseline on all systems  Informal analysis to identify critical risks  Formal assessment on these systems  Iterated and extended over time  Better use of time and money resources  Better security earlier that evolves  May miss some risks early  Recommended alternative for most orgs ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 10. 10 10.3 Detailed Risk Analysis Process ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 11. 11 10.3.1 Asset Identification / System Characterizations  Identify assets  “Anything which needs to be protected”  Of value to organization to meet its objectives  Tangible or intangible  In practice try to identify significant assets  Draw on expertise of people in relevant areas of organization to identify key assets  Identify and interview such personnel  See checklists in various standards ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 12. 12 10.3.2 Threat Identification  To identify threats or risks to assets ask 1. Who or what could cause it harm? 2. How could this occur?  Threats are anything that hinders or prevents an asset providing appropriate levels of the key security services:  Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Accountability, Authenticity and Reliability  Assets may have multiple threats ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 13. 13 10.3.2 a) Threat Sources  Threats may be Natural “acts of god” Man-made and either accidental or deliberate  Should consider human attackers: Motivation Capability Resources Probability of attack Deterrence  Any previous history of attack on organization ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 14. 14 10.3.3 Vulnerability Identification  Identify exploitable flaws or weaknesses in organization’s IT systems or processes  Hence determine applicability and significance of threat to organization  Note need combination of threat and vulnerability to create a risk to an asset  Again can use lists of potential vulnerabilities in standards etc. ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 15. 15 10.3.4 Analyze Risks / Control Analysis  Specify likelihood of occurrence of each identified threat to asset given existing controls  Management, operational, technical processes and procedures to reduce exposure of org to some risks  Specify consequence should threat occur  Hence derive overall risk rating for each threat Risk = probability threat occurs x cost to organization  In practice very hard to determine exactly  Use qualitative not quantitative, ratings for each  Aim to order resulting risks in order to treat them ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 16. 16 10.3.5 Likelihood Determination Rating Likelihood Description Expanded Definition 1 Rare May occur in exceptional circumstances and may deemed as “lucky” or very unlikely. 2 Unlikely Could occur at sometime but not expected given current controls, circumstances and recent events. 3 Possible Might occur at sometime, but just as likely as not. It may be difficult to control its occurrence due to external influence 4 Likely Will probably occur in some circumstance and one should not be surprised if it occurred. 5 Almost Certain Is expected to occur in most circumstances and certainly sooner or later. ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 17. 17 10.3.6 Impact analysis / Consequence determination Rating Consequence Expanded Definition 1 Insignificant  Result of a minor security breach in a single area.  Impact is likely to last less than several days.  Require only minor expenditure to rectify. 2 Minor  Result of security breach in one or two areas.  Impact is likely to last less than a week.  Can be rectified within project or team resources. 3 Moderate  Limited systemic security breaches.  Impact is likely to last up to 2 weeks.  Requires management intervention. 4 Major  Ongoing systemic security breach.  Impact will likely last 4-8 weeks.  Requires significant management intervention and resources.  Loss of business or organizational outcomes if possible. ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 18. 18 Rating Consequence Expanded Definition 5 Catastrophic  Major Systemic security breach.  Impact will last for 3 months or more.  Senior Management will be required to intervene.  Compliance costs are expected to be very substantial.  Possible criminal or disciplinary action is likely. 6 Doomsday  Multiple instances of major systemic security breaches.  Impact duration cannot be determined.  Senior management will be required to place the company under voluntary administration.  Criminal Proceedings against senior management is expected. Substantial loss of business and failure to meet company’s objective. ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 19. 19 10.3.7 Risk determination • Once the likelihood and consequence of each specific threat have been identified, a final level of risk can be assigned. • This is typically determined using a table that maps these values to a risk level, such as those shown in next Table. • The below table details the risk level assigned to each combination. • Such a table provides the qualitative equivalent of performing the ideal risk calculation using quantitative values. • It also indicates the interpretation of these assigned levels. ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 20. 20 Consequences Likelihood Dooms day Catastrophic Major Moderate Minor Insignificant Almost Certain E E E E H H Likely E E E H H M Possible E E E H M L Unlikely E E H M L L Rare E H H M L L ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 21. 21 Risk Level Description Extreme (E)  Require detailed research and management.  Planning at executive / director level.  Planning and Monitoring required. High (H)  Require management attention.  Planning at senior project or team leaders.  Planning and Monitoring required. Medium (M)  Can be managed by existing specific.  Monitoring and response procedures.  Management by employees. Low (L)  Can be managed through routing procedures. ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 22. 22 10.3.8 Control Recommendation & Result Documentation Asset Threat/ Vulnerability Existing Controls Likelihood Consequence Level of Risk Risk Priority Internet Router Outside Hacker attack Admin password only Possible Moderate High 1 Destruction of Data Center Accidental Fire or Flood None (no disaster recovery plan) Unlikely Major High 2 Document in Risk Register and Evaluate Risks ITSY3104 - COMPUTER SECURITY A - IT SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT