This document summarizes and analyzes the growing anti-Muslim sentiment in West Bengal following bomb blasts in the state. It discusses three key points: 1) The media has irresponsibly linked the blasts to "Islamic fundamentalism" and terrorism without evidence, fueling divisions. Reports lack transparency about sources and many claims are exaggerated. 2) The state surveillance of Muslims is disproportionate and treats them as perpetual suspects. Civil groups have not defended Muslim minorities. 3) Claims of large-scale illegal immigration from Bangladesh and higher Muslim population growth are not supported by data. Commuting across the border has long been normalized with BSF involvement, and population growth in Bengal is lower than national

1. NOTES
NOVEMber 15, 2014 vol xlix no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly68
Cultivating Communal Hatred
in Bengal
Kumar Rana, Manabi Majumdar
The authors are indebted to Anirban
Chattopadhyay and Dwaipayan Bhattacharya
for helpful discussions, and Sabir Ahmed for
generous sharing of data. Thanks are due also
to Pia Sen, Mukhlesur Rahman Gain, Priyanka
Basu, Toa Bagchi, Susmita Bandyopadhyaya,
Subhra Das and Sangram Mukherji. A very
preliminary draft of this article was partly
presented at a talk at Ganadarpan, a social
organisation of Kolkata, on 18 October 2014.
The discussions following the talk proved to be
immensely helpful. Usual disclaimers apply.
Kumar Rana (k.rana7@gmail.com) is with the
Pratichi Institute, Kolkata and Manabi
Majumdar (manabimajumdar@gmail.com) is
with the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences,
Calcutta and the Pratichi Institute, Kolkata.
Blasts in Khagragarh in
Bardhaman district in West
Bengal on 2 October 2014 have
led to growing anti-Muslim
propaganda in the state. Such
incidents related to political
violence have their roots in the
political-economic structure of
central Bengal where rural
surplus has led to uneven
economic growth, paving the way
to political domination of one
class over another. This can be
seen from the class structure of
the rice belt of Bardhaman,
Hooghly and part of Birbhum
districts, where the proportion of
agricultural labour is still very
high, between 40% and 50%.
There is an urgent need to
separate such instances of
criminal activities, related to the
political economy, from those of
the purported Islamic jihad.
W
est Bengal is seized today by
a brazen, irresponsible and
unsubstantiated uproar about
“Muslim fundamentalism”. In this brief
and necessarily incomplete note, we
seek to analyse this ferment against the
recent blast that occurred in the district
of Bardhaman, looking through the
prisms of media activism, state surveil-
lance and its electoral calculus, and
finally through the lens of social justice.
Media Activism
A proactive media is discovering the wide
network and the threatening spread of
“anti-national”, “Islamic-fundamentalist
jihadi”, and “terrorist activities” in the
Gangetic plains. This distinct anti-Muslim
hype, however, is not something new.
Rather, a fresh round of revitalised divi-
siveness seems to be unfolding, discon-
certingly with added dimensions. Not
just a few newspapers, but almost the
entire print and electronic media is
engaged in a sort of “jihad” against the
“terrorists with jihadi links”. Following
the blast on 2 October 2014 inside a
rented house at Khagragarh area of
Bardhaman town, various sections of a
hysterical media have relentlessly been
competing with each other to draw mile-
age from one “discovery” after another,
almost instinctively linking up essentially
criminal activities with those taken up
by Islamic institutions, mainly madrasas,
and their followers, mostly persons
bearing Arabic names. As evidence, it is
suggested that “literatures in Arabic,
Urdu and Bangla have been found” at
the sites of the blast, in some madrasas
and in the houses raided by the National
Investigation Agency in connection with
the investigation, but they are “yet to
be deciphered” and it is yet to be known
whether the literature as pertain to
the general Islamic religious courses or
something “conspiratorial”. This reminds
us of the routine seizure of easy-to-find
books and literatures (reportedly, includ-
ing issues of the Economic & Political
Weekly) from the suspected Maoists
across the state some years ago! On a
gloomier note, this reminds us of the
infamous terrorist hunts by the security
personnel and state police in different
states of India, particularly in Jammu
and Kashmir in recent times and in the
Punjab in the 1980s.
There is no denying the fact a blast
has taken place at Khagragarh, and cer-
tainly the incidence needed to be inves-
tigated and that the offenders associated
with the unlawful act must be brought
to book. This admitted, it is myopic to
oversimplify issues beyond such obvious
goals. For example, that there exists a
cottage industry of explosives in several
areas of the state is common knowledge,
the clients of which are none other than
political parties of all hues. Some of
these outfits operate from Bardhaman,
Birbhum and Hooghly districts – the so-
called rice bowl of West Bengal and a
site for large-scale violence and fight for
political supremacy resulting in undem-
ocratic turf wars that disallow even fiel-
ding of candidates by political parties
other than the ruling one (Bhattacharya
and Rana 2013; Rana 2013). It seems as
though the media and other anti-terrorist
advocates chose to ignore this culture of
“explosives” in the electoral dynamics of
Bengal and for that matter for most of
the Indian states, only to manufacture
“terror” afresh.
Also, several of the reports in the
media failed to disclose their sources.
We have been told, “Goenda-der sutre
jana geche (it is learnt from the intelli-
gence sources)” that Rajia (wife of Sakil
Ahmed who was killed during the blast
and was allegedly a Bangladeshi nati-
onal) and Alima (wife of Abdul Hakim,
injured during the blast), who were arre-
sted and are now in custody, have been
trained in Islamic jihad quite rigorously
turning them into “steel-nerved” women,
who have refused to disclose anything
to the investigators. But they have
apparently disclosed that they have

2. NOTES
Economic & Political Weekly EPW NOVEMber 15, 2014 vol xlix no 46 69
learnt “how to slaughter people (manush
kotal korteo sikhechi)” (Anandabazar
Patrika, 7 October 2014). Through their
disclosure a large network of terrorist
activities has also been apparently
uncovered. In these alternating narra-
tives of suppression and confession, what
remains missing is of course the vague-
ness of information.
Similarly, out of the number of books
and literature that the investigating agency
has seized from a madrasa, apparently
there was one entitled “Bhalo Mrityur
Upay – The Way to a Good Death”, easily
available to buy. Immediately it was
headlined: “Bhalo Mrityur Kee Upay Batlalo
Madrasa (madrasa prescribes ways to
a good death)” (Anandabazar Patrika,
14 October 2014). Another book, which
was shown by the TV channels as a proof
of jihadi training, was Golam Mortaja’s
Chepe Rakha Itihas (The Suppressed
History), copies of which are available
in the public libraries and libraries of
many eminent institutions. Madrasa after
madrasa have been brought under the
purview of “investigation” and as a result
many of them have not reopened after
the Eid vacation, out of fear. This fearful
reaction from a number of madrasas is
being interpreted as the “proof” of their
being involved in suspicious activities
such as training women jihadis.
In many villages, male adults have
been leaving home for fear of repercus-
sions; this reaction has been uncritically
presented, in the media, as the “hard
evidence” of their terrorist connection.
Any student of history would remember
how village after village became “male-
free” during the Naxalite movement in
the 1970s or at the time of the Lalgarh
movement in 2008-10. The connection
between fleeing and the felt experience
of police atrocities committed upon
innocent people is perhaps more real for
the Muslims, who, as a statistical regu-
larity, are subjected to arrest, beating and
several other atrocious harassments.
Their projection in the media reinforces,
rather than reduces, this “destructive
synergy” between unfair actions and
fearful reactions.
And yet, the same raucous media,
through its studied silence about the daily
livelihood struggles of the largely indigent
Muslim community in the state, works
to invisibilise their presence. To quote
the poet Sankha Ghosh (2003: 440-1),
Communalism keeps growing in our daily
behaviour, through our behavioural belief,
in the depths of our brain…We fail to notice
how, imperceptibly, beneath our own eyes,
another parallel nation takes shape inside
this country; this disconnect between the
two gradually metamorphoses into a com-
plete divorce. Neither English nor vernacular
dailies ever give an impression of the impor-
tant presence of the Muslim community in
the life of the state. In the school and college
curricula on history and literature there is
little reflection of the minority society out-
side the mainstream.
State Surveillance
One can see for oneself how differential
the treatment is that is meted out to the
Muslims by the Border Security Force
(BSF), the state police, government offi-
cials and others. A Muslim is always a
suspect, be it at the airport, at the pass-
port office, line department offices, and
so on. The “othering” of the Muslims,
alas, is not confined to the state and its
institutions. As it appears, the so-called
civil society and the human rights organi-
sations that have played very active
roles in contemporary West Bengal
(from Singur, Nandigram, Kamduni and
Jadavpur) seem not to be interested in the
Muslim minority issue. No civil rights
organisation has so far appeared in the
scene and Siddiquallah Chowdhury,
leader of the Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind had
to announce legal aid for the two women
arrested in connection with the blast
(Anandabazar Patrika, 20 October 2014).
The fear psychosis among the Muslims,
therefore, is not something new: apart
from the memories of communal riots,
the reactivation of strategies to combat
Islamic terrorism by the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alli-
ance government in 2002, supported by
the then Chief Minister of West Bengal
Buddhadeb Bhattacharya who declared
a “war on madrasas not affiliated to the
West Bengal Board of Madrasa Educa-
tion” (Indian Express, 26 January 2002),
made the Muslims feel more vulnerable
to state-tolerated attacks. This feeling
of vulnerability combined with a strong
sense of socio-economic deprivation
that found reinforcement through the
publication of the Sachar Committee
report (which the Left Front govern-
ment was reluctant to accept) made
things politically complex and was par-
tially responsible for the dislodging
of the Left Front government from
power in 2011.
Subsequently, the Trinamool govern-
ment, in a rush to consolidate its elec-
toral base, turned an issue of social jus-
tice and equal citizenship into a matter
of identity-based nursing of constituen-
cies with a clear potential to stir up com-
munal divisiveness. For example, meas-
ures such as stipends for the Muazzins,
recognition of 10,000 new madrasas,
etc, were naturally seen by many non-
Muslims as “Muslim-appeasement”. Also,
concerns and campaigns about Islamic
fundamentalism raised around activi-
ties of a section of Muslims across the
border were not quite addressed by the
Left regime, just as it never took the
issue of socio-economic deprivations of
Muslims in the state seriously. As the
poet Sankha Ghosh (2003: 449) alerts
us, “…as a reaction to this silent avoid-
ance of the issue [activities of the Islamic
fundamentalists in the border regions]
many hitherto moderate Hindus are
veering towards [Hindu] fundamenta-
lism”. The loud discourse on terrorism on
the one hand and the lack of evidence-
based public debate on the other on
concerns of infiltration as also of human
development deficits of the Muslims in
the state have led to a growing polari-
sation between non-Muslims and Muslims
– a trend that fundamentalists of all
hues encourage, as their interests curi-
ously converge.
The socio-demographic disadvantage
of the Muslims of the state (only 17% live
in urban areas – the national correspon-
ding average is more than double) has
led to their under-representation in the
power structure, disabling them from
properly articulating their voice. Only a
minuscule section, mainly urban, of the
self-styled guardians of the community,
has received political support from the
major political parties. The so-called
pro-Muslim politics pursued under the
current regime has turned out to be
politically counterproductive for the
Muslims, with no move towards social

3. NOTES
NOVEMber 15, 2014 vol xlix no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly70
justice, underlining instead religious
boundaries more sharply.
The resultant sentiment has been used
and nurtured with much care and
sophistication by the BJP to harvest
Hindu votes, indeed quite successfully
(it has secured 17% of the total votes
polled in the 2014 elections and has won
two Lok Sabha seats). Now the party is
even more resolute: Narendra Modi’s
electoral speech in May 2014, against
the Bangladeshi immigrants, has been
echoed thereafter in Amit Shah’s by-
election campaigns, and more recently
in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
chief’s “address to the nation” through
the national television. As things stand
now, the BJP and Sangh Parivar in alli-
ance with the media have near success-
fully established in the non-Muslim mind
that (a) Bangladeshi Muslims are regu-
larly infiltrating the country in huge
numbers, (b) they along with “all” the
Muslims of West Bengal are conspiring
against the nation, and (c) the madrasas
are the grooming ground for terrorists.
That these three claims are partly
“manufactured” is clear from publicly
available data.
The Infiltration Issue
Of a total 4,096.7 km Indian borders
with Bangladesh more than half (2,216.7
km) encompasses West Bengal, and a
large part of the border has already been
fenced.1 While most of the border region
is guarded by the BSF, a small part is
under the surveillance of the Sashastra
Seema Bal. Normal life in the border
region seldom escapes the panoptican
gaze of the BSF. During our visits to sev-
eral border villages we got a glimpse of
the treatment meted out to villagers by
the BSF that was no less than harass-
ment. But the harassment of the Muslim
villagers was manifold, they were not
free to exit or enter the village after
sunset. This practice, however, does not
square with the professed role of the
BSF, which is to “promote a sense of
security among the people living in the
border areas”.2 But, the Hindu villagers
enjoyed relatively more freedom. Signi-
ficantly, many people have been routinely
commuting across the border, with the
help of the BSF. Illegal border trade,
which can happen only with the help of
the BSF, is hardly unknown to anybody
in these areas. Transborder crime related
to these activities is also a common
happening. Again, these occurrences
go against the declared role of the BSF:
“...to prevent transborder crimes, unau-
thorised entry into or exit from the terri-
tory of India” and “prevent smuggling or
any other activities”.
However, the issue of commuting,
which has got almost normalised, is dif-
ferent from the BJP’s claim regarding
population explosion in West Bengal
owing to (a) illegal immigration from
Bangladesh, and (b) the allegedly higher
rate of reproduction among Muslims.
First of all, the decadal rate of popula-
tion growth has been declining notice-
ably in West Bengal. In 2001-11, it is
(13.9%) lower than the national average
(17.6%), and much lower than what
obtains in a state like Gujarat (19.2%)
(Census 2011), where Muslim population
is comparatively lower and which does
not have to face “border issues” of a
relative scale. It is true that the rate of
decline of population growth in certain
districts in West Bengal is not as sharp
as in other districts, and that these
districts have a higher concentration of
Muslims and they share borders with
Bangladesh. But there is no obvious
connection here either with religious
identity of the people or with the
border theory.
Rather this can be attributed, follow-
ing the general trend across the world
about which a plethora of literature is
available, to the general socio-economic
status of the people inhabiting these dis-
tricts. And there are counter-examples.
In Uttar Dinajpur, where nearly half the
population consists of Muslims, the dec-
line in the rate of decadal population
growth is 6 percentage points, which is
greater than the state average (4 per-
centage points), and the corresponding
figure for the district of Malda is compa-
rable with the state average. Admittedly,
the decelerating trend is not as signi-
ficant among Muslims as it is among
Hindus in the state (during 1981-91 and
1991-2001 the population growth rate
for the Hindus were 21% and 14%,
respectively, while the corresponding
figures for the Mulsims were 37% and
26%).3 Still, judging from the overall
decline in the rate of population growth
in the state and the trend of decline
among the Mulsims (11% during 1991-
2001) one may safely conclude that
detailed and disaggregated population
data for Census 2011, when available,
could indicate a falling rate of popula-
tion growth among the Muslims of the
state too. Also, a district-level comparison
of population figures can be illuminat-
ing (district-level religion-wise data were
made available only in the 2001 Census,
and we have to wait till the release of
the 2011 district-wise religion data for a
district-level comparison). It is imperative,
therefore, that we bend the arc of political
debate vis-à-vis the Muslim community
in the state away from various myths
and fabrications in order to place at its
centre issues of social justice.
Concerns of Justice
According to the findings of a Public
Report based on a fairly large survey
of over 97,000 households in the state,
livelihood struggles remain the central
experience of the Muslims here, as
nearly 80% of them earn their livelihood
through one form of manual labour or
another.4 The same study revealed that
in 17.3% of the surveyed households, the
highest level of education was illiteracy
and in another 11.8% of the cases this
level happened to be below primary.
The culpability for such deficits in
educational attainments of the Muslims
has often been laid at their own door-
step, hinting at their lack of interest in
their children’s schooling. The reality,
however, tells us a diametrically oppo-
site story. Studies have found that paren-
tal educational aspirations among the
Muslims are comparable to those found
among their Hindu counterparts. It is
rather that a heightened demand remains
unmet due to the lack of appropriate and
adequate supply-side response (Majumdar
and Rana 2012; Pratichi Trust 2009;
Rana 2010; Santra and Rafique 2007).
The survey mentioned above found 3%
of the 325 surveyed villages having a
population more than 1,000 people to
have no educational institution at all.
An analysis of the District Information

4. NOTES
Economic & Political Weekly EPW NOVEMber 15, 2014 vol xlix no 46 71
System of Education (DISE) report for
2011-12 brings this situation up even
more clearly: while blocks with Muslim
population beyond 50% had 5.6 primary
schools per 10,000 people, the corre-
sponding figure for blocks with less than
15% Muslim population was 8.6, the
state average being 7.2. Again, the pupil-
teacher ratio for primary schools in
the blocks having a 50% plus share of
Muslim population was nearly 37:1,
while the same was 23:1 for the blocks
with the corresponding share of 15%
or less, with the state average of 27
(Association SNAP and Guidance Guild
2014). The findings of the studies men-
tioned above, regarding expanding enrol-
ment of Muslim children in the primary
and secondary schools, were reinforced
by the data from the Public Report: in
325 study villages the survey found 829
educational institutions of which only
22 were non-government madrasas. The
average enrolment in different govern-
ment institutions was as follows: primary
schools – 220; SSKs (low-cost primary
schools)5 – 144; upper primary schools
– 312; MSKs (low-cost upper primary
schools) – 272; secondary schools – 875
and higher secondary schools – 1,566.
In all cases the figures far outnumber
the state average.
Myth-making extends beyond the
question of enrolment into areas of
syllabi and curricula. The madrasas, it is
alleged, only impart religious education
(and engage in jihadi trainings). The
recognised madrasas of West Bengal
have, following a report of the Madrasa
Reform Commision chaired by A R Kidwai
(2002), thoroughly revised their syllabus
and curriculum, and in the high madrasas
the syllabus and curriculum are much
broader in scope than what is found in
the West Bengal Board of Secondary
Education.6 Also, we have had the oppor-
tunity to visit some Khariji (Qaumi)
madrasas that have been imparting sci-
ence and language teaching alongside
teachings of Quranic and other religious
texts. A similar trend is also found in
Bangladesh (Anam 2011). This is not to
say that all madrasas are equally tolerant
of free-thinking academic pursuits; nor
is it claimed that no madrasa has any
connection with illegal activities. There
may be some madrasas, just like some
schools run by Hindutvavadi organisa-
tions, that preach and help practise
bigotry, jingoism and even militancy.
But the way in which all madrasas are
being painted with the brush of
terrorism is not only a blatant untruth,
it also deflects attention away from the
woeful public neglect of human devel-
opment conditions and opportunities
that the Muslim community of the state,
especially, deserves in the interest of
social justice.
Crime Records
We conclude by paying a quick look at
some of the available data on crime in
the state. The popular opinion on crime
and religion seems to find an automatic
link between the Muslim community
and terrorist/criminal activities. This
line of argument draws strength from a
unidimensional (mis)reading of availa-
ble data ignoring multiple connections
between class, social identity, governance
structure, and geopolitical situations,
etc, that jointly determine criminal
behaviour. For example, data on prisoners
collected, through a right to information
application by researcher Sabir Ahmed,
from various correctional homes for
2003-07 revealed that during the refer-
ence period Muslim prisoners outnum-
bered their Hindu prison mates (the
rough distribution being 2:1.7 On a deeper
probing of the data available from
Alipore correctional home for 2012-13, it
was found that the distribution of under-
trial prisoners (who constituted more
than 80% of the total for both Hindus
and Muslims) was almost 1:1. Again, 41%
of the Muslim undertrials were simply
illiterate and another 49% had attended
only primary school.
This alerts us to the complex class
settings of the society, where, “law is
also framed by the dominant groups”
and acts of deprived groups “do not get
social sanctions and thus become unlaw-
ful” (Shaban 2009). In all likelihood,
Muslims, with lower degrees of educa-
tional achievements and thin social sup-
port on the one hand and the animosity
of the law-keepers on the other, become
easy prey for arrest and detention
without trial. But, this does not anyway
substantiate the fanatic claim that “Mus-
alman manei criminal (by definition
Muslims are criminals).”
That the propensity to crime is related
to political economy can be seen clearly
from the district-level crime data of West
Bengal for 2012. The district of Bardha-
man with only Muslim population of
about 20% had a crime rate of 965 per
1,00,000 people, while the correspond-
ing figure for Murshidabad with 64%
Muslim population was 190 (GoWB
2014). Bardhaman being a district with
agricultural surplus and preponderance
of industries has a much higher degree
of economic growth. And, as a study
finds, “Economic growth has actually
led to an increase in crime rates”,8 for
several reasons – primarily economic
but ultimately political.
The blast in Khagragarh that has led
to the fanatic anti-Muslim propaganda
has its root in the political-economic
structure of central Bengal where rural
surplus has led to an uneven economic
growth paving the way to political domi-
nation of one class over another. This
can be seen from the class structure of
the rice belt of Bardhaman, Hooghly and
part of Birbhum districts, where despite
a highly flourishing agriculture, the pro-
portion of agricultural labour is still
very high, between 40% and 50%. These
blocks make news headlines with large-
scale political violence. These socio-eco-
nomic trends need much deeper investi-
gation. There is an urgent need to sepa-
rate such instances of criminal activities,
related to the political economy, from
those of Islamic jihad. Propaganda along
this line has already done a lot of harm
to the country by alienating the Muslims
from the rest of the population – the
Meerut “love jihad” rumour is just a
sample of myriad falsely constructed
news9 – but equally sadly by desensitis-
ing the rest about their sense of aliena-
tion. Otherwise, it is hard to fathom how
oblivious many of us are about what a
report based on public hearings (Anhad
2011) on the issues of atrocities upon the
minorities reveals:
The findings of tribunals were quite reveal-
ing about the condition of the Muslim
minorities. Many a testimony moistened the
eyes of the some of the jury members, the

5. NOTES
NOVEMber 15, 2014 vol xlix no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly72
harrowing stories of mothers whose sons
are being tortured, the wives whose hus-
band has been made the victim of police
atrocities; the third degree torture inside
the police custody, the insensitivity of
administration was all there, and was regis-
tered with pain and objectivity it deserved.
In the end, we revert back to the
instance of whipping up of communal
passion in Bengal in the 1960s and the
description of the role that a vernacular
daily played in such incitement that we
find in the writings of Ashok Mitra.
Importantly, there was a significant
counterpoint to this development. The
left intellectual Samar Sen was in
effect editing another daily Hindustan
Standard at that time. To quote Mitra
(2007: 191-2),
The management apparently wanted Hin-
dustan Standard to follow suit [to toe the line
of the vernacular daily]….After an hour’s
heated exchanges with the management one
day, Samarbabu sent in his resignation,
walked out of the office, took a tram from
the Dharamtala crossing to Ballygunge and
never went back.
There is no Samar Sen now; but,
Samar Sens are not just brilliant indivi-
duals, they are very much a social pro-
duct. Bengal society cannot afford to
forget its history: the history of commu-
nal bloodbath and the heroic battles
against the nightmarish violence.
The task of the society in general and
intelligentsia in particular is not only to
act to prevent communal bloodbath but
also to fight for social justice, for ensured
rights of each and every inhabitant of
the land which is to be protected jointly
by all its citizens irrespective of their
religious allegiance, political affiliation,
caste affinity or gender identity. It is
centrally important now to pursue
evidence-based research, clear-headed
thinking and debates on the lives and
livelihoods of people of Bengal including
those from the Muslim community and
to act upon their demands for justice. It
is time that we begin again with counter-
questions and counter-movements such
that we steer clear of the destructively
polar and polarising positions of either
the public silence about the presence and
the role of Muslims in the life of the
state or the frenetic and embedded
propaganda against them. The prere-
quisite of fighting terrorism is fighting
injustice. Terrorisation in the name of
countering terrorism, conversely, streng-
thens terrorism.
Notes
1 See www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/
document/papers/mha07-08/chaps3-07.pdf
accessed on 17 October 2014.
2 See www.bsf.nic.in/en/introduction.html, acces-
sed on 17 October 2014.
3 Cited in Mainuddin (2010: 82.104).
4 See Association SNAP and Guidance Guild
(2014), the survey was carried out by a group of
activists and academics.
5 See Pratichi Trust (2002), Rana et al (2002).
6 See Gupta (2010). On the different types of
madrasas see Puri (2012).
7 Computed from the data collected by Sabir
Ahmed from Alipore Correctional Home, vide
Memo No 1532/RTI-02/2012, dated 14 August
2012, Directorate of Correctional Services,
Government of West Bengal, in response to the
RTI application by him, dated 5 January 2012
and 7 July 2012.
8 See Dutta and Hussain (2009). Also see Ehrich
(1973).
9 The Hindu, “U-turn by Meerut Girl on ‘Love Jihad’”,
14 October 2014; The Indian Express, “Their
‘Love Jihad’ Centrepiece in Tatters, Hindu Outfits
See Plot in Meerut U-turn”, 23 October 2014.
References
Anam, Tahmima (2011): “An Education: Inside
Bangladesh’s Madrasas”, The Guardian, Satur-
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ODISHA
April 5, 2014
Persisting Dominance: Crisis of Democracy in a Resource-rich Region – Manoranjan Mohanty
Shift from Syncretism to Communalism – Pralay Kanungo
Mining and Industrialisation: Dangerous Portents – Banikanta Mishra, Sagarika Mishra
Confronting Extractive Capital: Social and Environmental Movements in Odisha – Kundan Kumar
Who Does the Media Serve in Odisha? – Sudhir Pattnaik
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