SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 39
Download to read offline
BitLocker Deep Dive
Sami Laiho, MVP
Why we need encryption
Why we need encryption?
• Data wise because over 800000 devices get lost or stolen on the
biggest airports in US and Europe yearly
• Security wise because all Windows versions can be cracked with a
single command
• Secure decommissioning
• The format utility (since Windows Vista) deletes the volume metadata and
overwrites those sectors to securely delete any BitLocker keys and by doing so
makes the volume instantly unreadable
Demo – Crack Windows
• Sami Laiho
BitLocker Basics
“Master keys”
• Every sector is protected with full-volume encryption key (FVEK)
• Never used by the System or the User
• FVEK in turn is encrypted with the volume master key (VMK)
• We don’t want to need to change the FVEK as every sector would need to be
re-encrypted
• Used by the system as it’s easier to replace if compromised
• The VMK is protected with another protector or several
Protectors for master keys
• Password protection (no TPM)
• The VMK is password protected
• Available for the OS drive since Windows 8 and used especially with Windows
To Go
• USB-key protection (no TPM)
• The protector key is saved on a USB key
Protectors for master keys
• TPM-protection
• The decryption key is stored on a TPM chip or firmware vault
• “On computers equipped with a compatible TPM, each time the computer
starts, each of the early startup components—such as the BIOS, the master
boot record (MBR), the boot sector, and the boot manager code—examines
the code about to be run, calculates a hash value, and stores the value in
specific registers in the TPM, called platform configuration registers (PCRs).
Once a value is stored in a PCR, the value cannot be replaced or erased unless
the system is restarted. BitLocker uses the TPM and the values stored in PCRs
to protect the VMK.”
• Brief:”If anything in the boot environment changes the disk cannot be
read”
Protectors for master keys
• TPM +PIN
• The TPM is secured with a PIN code
• Harder to break into but harder to administer
• Two-factor authentication
• Mental proof of ownership
• TPM + USB
• Part of the decryption key is stored on the USB key and part on the TPM
• TPM part is secured against changes in the boot environment
• Two-factor authentication
• Physical proof of ownership
”What’s the difference between
physical and mental proof of
ownership?”
Protectors for master keys
• TPM +PIN + USB
• Combines the two previously mentioned
• Network Unlock
• Decryption key stored on a network server
• When on the same network works like a TPM protected machine
• When outside of the network asks for a PIN-code
• Requires Windows 8 and UEFI
Recovery keys
• A recovery key is saved as well and secured by an authenticator
• Certificate or numerical password
• Usually saved to either Active Directory or MBAM
• The whole key or only the ”secret” to open the key
Gamechanger!
• Windows 7 vs Windows 8.1
• In Windows 7 it was recommended to use a two-factor authentication like
PIN-code to build a secure BitLocker implementation
• With Windows 8.1 and certified devices we can build a secure BitLocker
without a two-factor authentication for the first time! → One less password
for your users and easier centralized management for you!
• TPM-only is the recommendation for most companies!
Penetration scenarios
Guessing the passwords
• TPM-lockout for PIN-code entry
• Recovery password is 48 digits long
DMA-attacks
• Direct Memory Access
• FireWire
• Thunderbolt
• ExpressCard
• PCMCIA
• PCI
• PCI-X
• PCI Express
• Allows the memory to be read
• http://www.lostpassword.com/
• http://www.windowsscope.com/
DMA-attacks
• Direct Memory Access
• FireWire
• Thunderbolt
• ExpressCard
• PCMCIA
• PCI
• PCI-X
• PCI Express
• Allows the memory to be read by another computer thus compromising
the in-memory key
• http://www.lostpassword.com/
• http://www.windowsscope.com/
”Hardware’s fault, not Microsoft’s”
”Same for every OS”
DMA-attack countermeasures
• Block it with a policy: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2516445
• Windows 8.1 blocks new devices with DMA from being installed
before the computer is unlocked!
• By Logo requirements
• Instant Go devices shouldn’t have DMA-ports
• Microsoft is driving for ThunderBolt devices to be turned on only after logging
on
Blocking DMA-capable devices
• Sami Laiho
Cold boot attacks
• Probably the best known case is called the Princeton attack
• Memory preserves its state even after losing power but quickly
becomes unreadable
• Can be slowed down with cooling/freezing
Cold boot countermeasures
• You can’t load another Kernel with SafeBoot on
Removing the frozen memory
• You could technically remove the frozen memory and take it to
another computer that has a memory reader and read the key from
the memory
Memory removal countermeasures
• Hard to remove if it’s on-chip
• Denser memory gets the harder it gets to read it
• Again… There are some that require the Pre-Boot authenticator that
prevents this but in reality…
Hacking a computer
Sami Laiho
More info:
• Countermeasures: Protecting BitLocker-encrypted Devices from
Attacks
• http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=41671
• Protect BitLocker from Pre-Boot Attacks
• http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn632180.aspx
Different security levels for
different environments
What are we really against?
Different environments - Different needs
• High security environments could use BitLocker with a pre-boot/two-
factor authenticator to achieve a more secure or compliant solution
• Or a combination
Policies to strengthen the
protection
Make it even more secure?
• Force screensaver and prompt for password
• No Username on Logon or Lockout screen
• Force Hibernate
• Lock TPM if too many logon failures to Windows
Policies to strengthen BitLocker
Sami Laiho
Recap
• For me BitLocker implementation starts when choosing my hardware
• No ThunderBolt, FireWire or PCI-Express → USB 3 rules!
• UEFI with SecureBoot
• TPM
• Even better if dense memory, on board
• Force strong passwords or phrases
• No administrative rights for end-users
• 95% are good with TPM only → Aim for it!
BitLocker key backup and
recovery
Basics of BitLocker recovery
• Save your recovery keys to AD
• http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj592683.aspx
• If you are using BitLocker To Go for USB sticks, go for Data Recovery
Agent (DRA)
• http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd875560(v=ws.10).aspx
Penetration challenge!
How would you break into my devices?
• Let’s play I forgot these at the airport and you found them. This is
what we know:
• Computer models: Surface 2 RT and a Zenbook Prime UX31A
• OS: Windows 8.1
• The computers are on and locked - no user id visible on logon/lockout screen
• Passwords for users are more than 16 characters and complex
• BitLocker with TPM authentication only
• UAC enabled, no admin rights for the logged on user
• AppLocker enabled
• Firewall on with IPSec authentication for inbound connections
• How would you crack it? Bulletproof???

More Related Content

What's hot

Technology Overview - Symantec Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
Technology Overview - Symantec Data Loss Prevention (DLP)Technology Overview - Symantec Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
Technology Overview - Symantec Data Loss Prevention (DLP)Iftikhar Ali Iqbal
 
EPC Group Intune Practice and Capabilities Overview
EPC Group Intune Practice and Capabilities OverviewEPC Group Intune Practice and Capabilities Overview
EPC Group Intune Practice and Capabilities OverviewEPC Group
 
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat Sheet
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat SheetMindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat Sheet
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat SheetJuan F. Padilla
 
Understanding Zero Trust Security for IBM i
Understanding Zero Trust Security for IBM iUnderstanding Zero Trust Security for IBM i
Understanding Zero Trust Security for IBM iPrecisely
 
Windows Autopilot (1).pdf
Windows Autopilot (1).pdfWindows Autopilot (1).pdf
Windows Autopilot (1).pdfabhipotdar
 
Adopting A Zero-Trust Model. Google Did It, Can You?
Adopting A Zero-Trust Model. Google Did It, Can You?Adopting A Zero-Trust Model. Google Did It, Can You?
Adopting A Zero-Trust Model. Google Did It, Can You?Zscaler
 
Understanding the Event Log
Understanding the Event LogUnderstanding the Event Log
Understanding the Event Logchuckbt
 
Enterprise Mobility Suite-Microsoft Intune
Enterprise Mobility Suite-Microsoft IntuneEnterprise Mobility Suite-Microsoft Intune
Enterprise Mobility Suite-Microsoft IntuneLai Yoong Seng
 
Identity and Access Management (IAM)
Identity and Access Management (IAM)Identity and Access Management (IAM)
Identity and Access Management (IAM)Identacor
 
PCI DSS v 3.0 and Oracle Security Mapping
PCI DSS v 3.0 and Oracle Security MappingPCI DSS v 3.0 and Oracle Security Mapping
PCI DSS v 3.0 and Oracle Security MappingTroy Kitch
 
Automated Malware Analysis and Cyber Security Intelligence
Automated Malware Analysis and Cyber Security IntelligenceAutomated Malware Analysis and Cyber Security Intelligence
Automated Malware Analysis and Cyber Security IntelligenceJason Choi
 
Mcafee Epolicy Orchestrator
Mcafee Epolicy OrchestratorMcafee Epolicy Orchestrator
Mcafee Epolicy OrchestratorMindRiver Group
 
Information security
Information securityInformation security
Information securityMustahid Ali
 
Collecting email from the target domain using the harvester
Collecting email from the target domain using the harvesterCollecting email from the target domain using the harvester
Collecting email from the target domain using the harvesterVishal Kumar
 

What's hot (20)

Zero Trust
Zero TrustZero Trust
Zero Trust
 
Ntfs forensics
Ntfs forensicsNtfs forensics
Ntfs forensics
 
Technology Overview - Symantec Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
Technology Overview - Symantec Data Loss Prevention (DLP)Technology Overview - Symantec Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
Technology Overview - Symantec Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
 
Malware forensics
Malware forensicsMalware forensics
Malware forensics
 
EPC Group Intune Practice and Capabilities Overview
EPC Group Intune Practice and Capabilities OverviewEPC Group Intune Practice and Capabilities Overview
EPC Group Intune Practice and Capabilities Overview
 
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat Sheet
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat SheetMindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat Sheet
MindMap - Forensics Windows Registry Cheat Sheet
 
Understanding Zero Trust Security for IBM i
Understanding Zero Trust Security for IBM iUnderstanding Zero Trust Security for IBM i
Understanding Zero Trust Security for IBM i
 
system Security
system Security system Security
system Security
 
Windows Autopilot (1).pdf
Windows Autopilot (1).pdfWindows Autopilot (1).pdf
Windows Autopilot (1).pdf
 
Microsoft Zero Trust
Microsoft Zero TrustMicrosoft Zero Trust
Microsoft Zero Trust
 
Adopting A Zero-Trust Model. Google Did It, Can You?
Adopting A Zero-Trust Model. Google Did It, Can You?Adopting A Zero-Trust Model. Google Did It, Can You?
Adopting A Zero-Trust Model. Google Did It, Can You?
 
Understanding the Event Log
Understanding the Event LogUnderstanding the Event Log
Understanding the Event Log
 
Enterprise Mobility Suite-Microsoft Intune
Enterprise Mobility Suite-Microsoft IntuneEnterprise Mobility Suite-Microsoft Intune
Enterprise Mobility Suite-Microsoft Intune
 
Identity and Access Management (IAM)
Identity and Access Management (IAM)Identity and Access Management (IAM)
Identity and Access Management (IAM)
 
PCI DSS v 3.0 and Oracle Security Mapping
PCI DSS v 3.0 and Oracle Security MappingPCI DSS v 3.0 and Oracle Security Mapping
PCI DSS v 3.0 and Oracle Security Mapping
 
Automated Malware Analysis and Cyber Security Intelligence
Automated Malware Analysis and Cyber Security IntelligenceAutomated Malware Analysis and Cyber Security Intelligence
Automated Malware Analysis and Cyber Security Intelligence
 
Mcafee Epolicy Orchestrator
Mcafee Epolicy OrchestratorMcafee Epolicy Orchestrator
Mcafee Epolicy Orchestrator
 
Information security
Information securityInformation security
Information security
 
Collecting email from the target domain using the harvester
Collecting email from the target domain using the harvesterCollecting email from the target domain using the harvester
Collecting email from the target domain using the harvester
 
Data Privacy Compliance
Data Privacy ComplianceData Privacy Compliance
Data Privacy Compliance
 

Similar to CSF18 - BitLocker Deep Dive - Sami Laiho

Windows 7 professional Vs Windows 7 enterprise
Windows 7 professional Vs Windows 7 enterpriseWindows 7 professional Vs Windows 7 enterprise
Windows 7 professional Vs Windows 7 enterprise247infotech
 
CSF18 - GDPR - Sami Laiho
CSF18 - GDPR - Sami LaihoCSF18 - GDPR - Sami Laiho
CSF18 - GDPR - Sami LaihoNCCOMMS
 
Managing bitlocker with MBAM
Managing bitlocker with MBAMManaging bitlocker with MBAM
Managing bitlocker with MBAMOlav Tvedt
 
CSF18 - The Night is Dark and Full of Hackers - Sami Laiho
CSF18 - The Night is Dark and Full of Hackers - Sami LaihoCSF18 - The Night is Dark and Full of Hackers - Sami Laiho
CSF18 - The Night is Dark and Full of Hackers - Sami LaihoNCCOMMS
 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)k33a
 
Trusted Computing security _platform.ppt
Trusted Computing security _platform.pptTrusted Computing security _platform.ppt
Trusted Computing security _platform.pptnaghamallella
 
Create a Data Encryption Strategy using ADE
Create a Data Encryption Strategy using ADECreate a Data Encryption Strategy using ADE
Create a Data Encryption Strategy using ADERocket Software
 
Developing for Industrial IoT with Linux OS on DragonBoard™ 410c: Session 4
Developing for Industrial IoT with Linux OS on DragonBoard™ 410c: Session 4Developing for Industrial IoT with Linux OS on DragonBoard™ 410c: Session 4
Developing for Industrial IoT with Linux OS on DragonBoard™ 410c: Session 4Qualcomm Developer Network
 
Top 10 secure boot mistakes
Top 10 secure boot mistakesTop 10 secure boot mistakes
Top 10 secure boot mistakesJustin Black
 
Trusted computing introduction and technical overview
Trusted computing introduction and technical overviewTrusted computing introduction and technical overview
Trusted computing introduction and technical overviewSajid Marwat
 
TC and TPM.ppt
TC and TPM.pptTC and TPM.ppt
TC and TPM.pptyhaxpsos
 
Hypervisor and VDI security
Hypervisor and VDI securityHypervisor and VDI security
Hypervisor and VDI securityDenis Gundarev
 
Essential Layers of IBM i Security: System-Access Security
Essential Layers of IBM i Security: System-Access SecurityEssential Layers of IBM i Security: System-Access Security
Essential Layers of IBM i Security: System-Access SecurityPrecisely
 
Security Consideration for Set-top box SoC
Security Consideration for Set-top box SoCSecurity Consideration for Set-top box SoC
Security Consideration for Set-top box SoCWesley Li
 
HKG18-223 - Trusted FirmwareM: Trusted boot
HKG18-223 - Trusted FirmwareM: Trusted bootHKG18-223 - Trusted FirmwareM: Trusted boot
HKG18-223 - Trusted FirmwareM: Trusted bootLinaro
 
Lock it Down: Access Control for IBM i
Lock it Down: Access Control for IBM iLock it Down: Access Control for IBM i
Lock it Down: Access Control for IBM iPrecisely
 
bitlocker requirement and implementation.pptx
bitlocker requirement and implementation.pptxbitlocker requirement and implementation.pptx
bitlocker requirement and implementation.pptxgomsllhi
 
Controlling Access to IBM i Systems and Data
Controlling Access to IBM i Systems and DataControlling Access to IBM i Systems and Data
Controlling Access to IBM i Systems and DataPrecisely
 

Similar to CSF18 - BitLocker Deep Dive - Sami Laiho (20)

Windows 7 professional Vs Windows 7 enterprise
Windows 7 professional Vs Windows 7 enterpriseWindows 7 professional Vs Windows 7 enterprise
Windows 7 professional Vs Windows 7 enterprise
 
CSF18 - GDPR - Sami Laiho
CSF18 - GDPR - Sami LaihoCSF18 - GDPR - Sami Laiho
CSF18 - GDPR - Sami Laiho
 
Managing bitlocker with MBAM
Managing bitlocker with MBAMManaging bitlocker with MBAM
Managing bitlocker with MBAM
 
CSF18 - The Night is Dark and Full of Hackers - Sami Laiho
CSF18 - The Night is Dark and Full of Hackers - Sami LaihoCSF18 - The Night is Dark and Full of Hackers - Sami Laiho
CSF18 - The Night is Dark and Full of Hackers - Sami Laiho
 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
 
Trusted Computing security _platform.ppt
Trusted Computing security _platform.pptTrusted Computing security _platform.ppt
Trusted Computing security _platform.ppt
 
Create a Data Encryption Strategy using ADE
Create a Data Encryption Strategy using ADECreate a Data Encryption Strategy using ADE
Create a Data Encryption Strategy using ADE
 
Developing for Industrial IoT with Linux OS on DragonBoard™ 410c: Session 4
Developing for Industrial IoT with Linux OS on DragonBoard™ 410c: Session 4Developing for Industrial IoT with Linux OS on DragonBoard™ 410c: Session 4
Developing for Industrial IoT with Linux OS on DragonBoard™ 410c: Session 4
 
Top 10 secure boot mistakes
Top 10 secure boot mistakesTop 10 secure boot mistakes
Top 10 secure boot mistakes
 
Trusted computing introduction and technical overview
Trusted computing introduction and technical overviewTrusted computing introduction and technical overview
Trusted computing introduction and technical overview
 
TC and TPM.ppt
TC and TPM.pptTC and TPM.ppt
TC and TPM.ppt
 
Hypervisor and VDI security
Hypervisor and VDI securityHypervisor and VDI security
Hypervisor and VDI security
 
03 bit locker-mod03
03   bit locker-mod0303   bit locker-mod03
03 bit locker-mod03
 
Essential Layers of IBM i Security: System-Access Security
Essential Layers of IBM i Security: System-Access SecurityEssential Layers of IBM i Security: System-Access Security
Essential Layers of IBM i Security: System-Access Security
 
Security Consideration for Set-top box SoC
Security Consideration for Set-top box SoCSecurity Consideration for Set-top box SoC
Security Consideration for Set-top box SoC
 
HKG18-223 - Trusted FirmwareM: Trusted boot
HKG18-223 - Trusted FirmwareM: Trusted bootHKG18-223 - Trusted FirmwareM: Trusted boot
HKG18-223 - Trusted FirmwareM: Trusted boot
 
Lock it Down: Access Control for IBM i
Lock it Down: Access Control for IBM iLock it Down: Access Control for IBM i
Lock it Down: Access Control for IBM i
 
bitlocker requirement and implementation.pptx
bitlocker requirement and implementation.pptxbitlocker requirement and implementation.pptx
bitlocker requirement and implementation.pptx
 
Controlling Access to IBM i Systems and Data
Controlling Access to IBM i Systems and DataControlling Access to IBM i Systems and Data
Controlling Access to IBM i Systems and Data
 
Dakotacon 2017
Dakotacon 2017Dakotacon 2017
Dakotacon 2017
 

More from NCCOMMS

O365Con19 - UI:UX 101 Learn How to Design Custom Experiences for SharePoint -...
O365Con19 - UI:UX 101 Learn How to Design Custom Experiences for SharePoint -...O365Con19 - UI:UX 101 Learn How to Design Custom Experiences for SharePoint -...
O365Con19 - UI:UX 101 Learn How to Design Custom Experiences for SharePoint -...NCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Model-driven Apps or Canvas Apps? - Rick Bakker
O365Con19 - Model-driven Apps or Canvas Apps? - Rick BakkerO365Con19 - Model-driven Apps or Canvas Apps? - Rick Bakker
O365Con19 - Model-driven Apps or Canvas Apps? - Rick BakkerNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Office 365 Groups Surviving the Real World - Jasper Oosterveld
O365Con19 - Office 365 Groups Surviving the Real World - Jasper OosterveldO365Con19 - Office 365 Groups Surviving the Real World - Jasper Oosterveld
O365Con19 - Office 365 Groups Surviving the Real World - Jasper OosterveldNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Developing Timerjob and Eventhandler Equivalents - Adis Jugo
O365Con19 - Developing Timerjob and Eventhandler Equivalents - Adis JugoO365Con19 - Developing Timerjob and Eventhandler Equivalents - Adis Jugo
O365Con19 - Developing Timerjob and Eventhandler Equivalents - Adis JugoNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Sharepoint with (Artificial) Intelligence - Adis Jugo
O365Con19 - Sharepoint with (Artificial) Intelligence - Adis JugoO365Con19 - Sharepoint with (Artificial) Intelligence - Adis Jugo
O365Con19 - Sharepoint with (Artificial) Intelligence - Adis JugoNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - What Do You Mean 90 days Isn't Enough - Paul Hunt
O365Con19 - What Do You Mean 90 days Isn't Enough - Paul HuntO365Con19 - What Do You Mean 90 days Isn't Enough - Paul Hunt
O365Con19 - What Do You Mean 90 days Isn't Enough - Paul HuntNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Tips and Tricks for Complex Migrations to SharePoint Online - And...
O365Con19 - Tips and Tricks for Complex Migrations to SharePoint Online - And...O365Con19 - Tips and Tricks for Complex Migrations to SharePoint Online - And...
O365Con19 - Tips and Tricks for Complex Migrations to SharePoint Online - And...NCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Start Developing Teams Tabs and SharePoint Webparts with SPFX - O...
O365Con19 - Start Developing Teams Tabs and SharePoint Webparts with SPFX - O...O365Con19 - Start Developing Teams Tabs and SharePoint Webparts with SPFX - O...
O365Con19 - Start Developing Teams Tabs and SharePoint Webparts with SPFX - O...NCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Start Your Journey from Skype for Business to Teams - Sasja Beere...
O365Con19 - Start Your Journey from Skype for Business to Teams - Sasja Beere...O365Con19 - Start Your Journey from Skype for Business to Teams - Sasja Beere...
O365Con19 - Start Your Journey from Skype for Business to Teams - Sasja Beere...NCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Lets Get Started with Azure Container Instances - Jussi Roine
O365Con19 - Lets Get Started with Azure Container Instances - Jussi RoineO365Con19 - Lets Get Started with Azure Container Instances - Jussi Roine
O365Con19 - Lets Get Started with Azure Container Instances - Jussi RoineNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Azure Blackbelt - Jussi Roine
O365Con19 - Azure Blackbelt - Jussi RoineO365Con19 - Azure Blackbelt - Jussi Roine
O365Con19 - Azure Blackbelt - Jussi RoineNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Customise the UI in Modern SharePoint Workspaces - Corinna Lins
O365Con19 - Customise the UI in Modern SharePoint Workspaces - Corinna LinsO365Con19 - Customise the UI in Modern SharePoint Workspaces - Corinna Lins
O365Con19 - Customise the UI in Modern SharePoint Workspaces - Corinna LinsNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Be The Protagonist of Your Modern Workplace - Corinna Lins
O365Con19 - Be The Protagonist of Your Modern Workplace - Corinna LinsO365Con19 - Be The Protagonist of Your Modern Workplace - Corinna Lins
O365Con19 - Be The Protagonist of Your Modern Workplace - Corinna LinsNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - How to Really Manage all your Tasks Across Microsoft 365 - Luise ...
O365Con19 - How to Really Manage all your Tasks Across Microsoft 365 - Luise ...O365Con19 - How to Really Manage all your Tasks Across Microsoft 365 - Luise ...
O365Con19 - How to Really Manage all your Tasks Across Microsoft 365 - Luise ...NCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Sharing Code Efficiently in your Organisation - Elio Struyf
O365Con19 - Sharing Code Efficiently in your Organisation - Elio StruyfO365Con19 - Sharing Code Efficiently in your Organisation - Elio Struyf
O365Con19 - Sharing Code Efficiently in your Organisation - Elio StruyfNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Things I've Learned While Building a Product on SharePoint Modern...
O365Con19 - Things I've Learned While Building a Product on SharePoint Modern...O365Con19 - Things I've Learned While Building a Product on SharePoint Modern...
O365Con19 - Things I've Learned While Building a Product on SharePoint Modern...NCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Keep Control of Your Data with AIP and CA - Bram de Jager
O365Con19 - Keep Control of Your Data with AIP and CA - Bram de JagerO365Con19 - Keep Control of Your Data with AIP and CA - Bram de Jager
O365Con19 - Keep Control of Your Data with AIP and CA - Bram de JagerNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - Kaizala a Dive Into the Unknown - Rick van Rousselt
O365Con19 - Kaizala a Dive Into the Unknown - Rick van RousseltO365Con19 - Kaizala a Dive Into the Unknown - Rick van Rousselt
O365Con19 - Kaizala a Dive Into the Unknown - Rick van RousseltNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - How to Inspire Users to Unstick from Email - Luise Freese
O365Con19 - How to Inspire Users to Unstick from Email - Luise FreeseO365Con19 - How to Inspire Users to Unstick from Email - Luise Freese
O365Con19 - How to Inspire Users to Unstick from Email - Luise FreeseNCCOMMS
 
O365Con19 - O365 Identity Management and The Golden Config - Chris Goosen
O365Con19 - O365 Identity Management and The Golden Config - Chris GoosenO365Con19 - O365 Identity Management and The Golden Config - Chris Goosen
O365Con19 - O365 Identity Management and The Golden Config - Chris GoosenNCCOMMS
 

More from NCCOMMS (20)

O365Con19 - UI:UX 101 Learn How to Design Custom Experiences for SharePoint -...
O365Con19 - UI:UX 101 Learn How to Design Custom Experiences for SharePoint -...O365Con19 - UI:UX 101 Learn How to Design Custom Experiences for SharePoint -...
O365Con19 - UI:UX 101 Learn How to Design Custom Experiences for SharePoint -...
 
O365Con19 - Model-driven Apps or Canvas Apps? - Rick Bakker
O365Con19 - Model-driven Apps or Canvas Apps? - Rick BakkerO365Con19 - Model-driven Apps or Canvas Apps? - Rick Bakker
O365Con19 - Model-driven Apps or Canvas Apps? - Rick Bakker
 
O365Con19 - Office 365 Groups Surviving the Real World - Jasper Oosterveld
O365Con19 - Office 365 Groups Surviving the Real World - Jasper OosterveldO365Con19 - Office 365 Groups Surviving the Real World - Jasper Oosterveld
O365Con19 - Office 365 Groups Surviving the Real World - Jasper Oosterveld
 
O365Con19 - Developing Timerjob and Eventhandler Equivalents - Adis Jugo
O365Con19 - Developing Timerjob and Eventhandler Equivalents - Adis JugoO365Con19 - Developing Timerjob and Eventhandler Equivalents - Adis Jugo
O365Con19 - Developing Timerjob and Eventhandler Equivalents - Adis Jugo
 
O365Con19 - Sharepoint with (Artificial) Intelligence - Adis Jugo
O365Con19 - Sharepoint with (Artificial) Intelligence - Adis JugoO365Con19 - Sharepoint with (Artificial) Intelligence - Adis Jugo
O365Con19 - Sharepoint with (Artificial) Intelligence - Adis Jugo
 
O365Con19 - What Do You Mean 90 days Isn't Enough - Paul Hunt
O365Con19 - What Do You Mean 90 days Isn't Enough - Paul HuntO365Con19 - What Do You Mean 90 days Isn't Enough - Paul Hunt
O365Con19 - What Do You Mean 90 days Isn't Enough - Paul Hunt
 
O365Con19 - Tips and Tricks for Complex Migrations to SharePoint Online - And...
O365Con19 - Tips and Tricks for Complex Migrations to SharePoint Online - And...O365Con19 - Tips and Tricks for Complex Migrations to SharePoint Online - And...
O365Con19 - Tips and Tricks for Complex Migrations to SharePoint Online - And...
 
O365Con19 - Start Developing Teams Tabs and SharePoint Webparts with SPFX - O...
O365Con19 - Start Developing Teams Tabs and SharePoint Webparts with SPFX - O...O365Con19 - Start Developing Teams Tabs and SharePoint Webparts with SPFX - O...
O365Con19 - Start Developing Teams Tabs and SharePoint Webparts with SPFX - O...
 
O365Con19 - Start Your Journey from Skype for Business to Teams - Sasja Beere...
O365Con19 - Start Your Journey from Skype for Business to Teams - Sasja Beere...O365Con19 - Start Your Journey from Skype for Business to Teams - Sasja Beere...
O365Con19 - Start Your Journey from Skype for Business to Teams - Sasja Beere...
 
O365Con19 - Lets Get Started with Azure Container Instances - Jussi Roine
O365Con19 - Lets Get Started with Azure Container Instances - Jussi RoineO365Con19 - Lets Get Started with Azure Container Instances - Jussi Roine
O365Con19 - Lets Get Started with Azure Container Instances - Jussi Roine
 
O365Con19 - Azure Blackbelt - Jussi Roine
O365Con19 - Azure Blackbelt - Jussi RoineO365Con19 - Azure Blackbelt - Jussi Roine
O365Con19 - Azure Blackbelt - Jussi Roine
 
O365Con19 - Customise the UI in Modern SharePoint Workspaces - Corinna Lins
O365Con19 - Customise the UI in Modern SharePoint Workspaces - Corinna LinsO365Con19 - Customise the UI in Modern SharePoint Workspaces - Corinna Lins
O365Con19 - Customise the UI in Modern SharePoint Workspaces - Corinna Lins
 
O365Con19 - Be The Protagonist of Your Modern Workplace - Corinna Lins
O365Con19 - Be The Protagonist of Your Modern Workplace - Corinna LinsO365Con19 - Be The Protagonist of Your Modern Workplace - Corinna Lins
O365Con19 - Be The Protagonist of Your Modern Workplace - Corinna Lins
 
O365Con19 - How to Really Manage all your Tasks Across Microsoft 365 - Luise ...
O365Con19 - How to Really Manage all your Tasks Across Microsoft 365 - Luise ...O365Con19 - How to Really Manage all your Tasks Across Microsoft 365 - Luise ...
O365Con19 - How to Really Manage all your Tasks Across Microsoft 365 - Luise ...
 
O365Con19 - Sharing Code Efficiently in your Organisation - Elio Struyf
O365Con19 - Sharing Code Efficiently in your Organisation - Elio StruyfO365Con19 - Sharing Code Efficiently in your Organisation - Elio Struyf
O365Con19 - Sharing Code Efficiently in your Organisation - Elio Struyf
 
O365Con19 - Things I've Learned While Building a Product on SharePoint Modern...
O365Con19 - Things I've Learned While Building a Product on SharePoint Modern...O365Con19 - Things I've Learned While Building a Product on SharePoint Modern...
O365Con19 - Things I've Learned While Building a Product on SharePoint Modern...
 
O365Con19 - Keep Control of Your Data with AIP and CA - Bram de Jager
O365Con19 - Keep Control of Your Data with AIP and CA - Bram de JagerO365Con19 - Keep Control of Your Data with AIP and CA - Bram de Jager
O365Con19 - Keep Control of Your Data with AIP and CA - Bram de Jager
 
O365Con19 - Kaizala a Dive Into the Unknown - Rick van Rousselt
O365Con19 - Kaizala a Dive Into the Unknown - Rick van RousseltO365Con19 - Kaizala a Dive Into the Unknown - Rick van Rousselt
O365Con19 - Kaizala a Dive Into the Unknown - Rick van Rousselt
 
O365Con19 - How to Inspire Users to Unstick from Email - Luise Freese
O365Con19 - How to Inspire Users to Unstick from Email - Luise FreeseO365Con19 - How to Inspire Users to Unstick from Email - Luise Freese
O365Con19 - How to Inspire Users to Unstick from Email - Luise Freese
 
O365Con19 - O365 Identity Management and The Golden Config - Chris Goosen
O365Con19 - O365 Identity Management and The Golden Config - Chris GoosenO365Con19 - O365 Identity Management and The Golden Config - Chris Goosen
O365Con19 - O365 Identity Management and The Golden Config - Chris Goosen
 

Recently uploaded

Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitecturePixlogix Infotech
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationMichael W. Hawkins
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonetsnaman860154
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Allon Mureinik
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhisoniya singh
 
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsAI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsMemoori
 
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationMy Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationRidwan Fadjar
 
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge GraphSIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge GraphNeo4j
 
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptxMaking_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptxnull - The Open Security Community
 
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticsKotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticscarlostorres15106
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksBenefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksSoftradix Technologies
 
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & ApplicationAzure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & ApplicationAndikSusilo4
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountPuma Security, LLC
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
 
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
 
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptxE-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
 
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsAI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
 
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationMy Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
 
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge GraphSIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
 
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptxMaking_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
 
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticsKotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
 
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksBenefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
 
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & ApplicationAzure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
 
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptxVulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
 

CSF18 - BitLocker Deep Dive - Sami Laiho

  • 2. Why we need encryption
  • 3. Why we need encryption? • Data wise because over 800000 devices get lost or stolen on the biggest airports in US and Europe yearly • Security wise because all Windows versions can be cracked with a single command • Secure decommissioning • The format utility (since Windows Vista) deletes the volume metadata and overwrites those sectors to securely delete any BitLocker keys and by doing so makes the volume instantly unreadable
  • 4. Demo – Crack Windows • Sami Laiho
  • 6. “Master keys” • Every sector is protected with full-volume encryption key (FVEK) • Never used by the System or the User • FVEK in turn is encrypted with the volume master key (VMK) • We don’t want to need to change the FVEK as every sector would need to be re-encrypted • Used by the system as it’s easier to replace if compromised • The VMK is protected with another protector or several
  • 7. Protectors for master keys • Password protection (no TPM) • The VMK is password protected • Available for the OS drive since Windows 8 and used especially with Windows To Go • USB-key protection (no TPM) • The protector key is saved on a USB key
  • 8. Protectors for master keys • TPM-protection • The decryption key is stored on a TPM chip or firmware vault • “On computers equipped with a compatible TPM, each time the computer starts, each of the early startup components—such as the BIOS, the master boot record (MBR), the boot sector, and the boot manager code—examines the code about to be run, calculates a hash value, and stores the value in specific registers in the TPM, called platform configuration registers (PCRs). Once a value is stored in a PCR, the value cannot be replaced or erased unless the system is restarted. BitLocker uses the TPM and the values stored in PCRs to protect the VMK.” • Brief:”If anything in the boot environment changes the disk cannot be read”
  • 9. Protectors for master keys • TPM +PIN • The TPM is secured with a PIN code • Harder to break into but harder to administer • Two-factor authentication • Mental proof of ownership • TPM + USB • Part of the decryption key is stored on the USB key and part on the TPM • TPM part is secured against changes in the boot environment • Two-factor authentication • Physical proof of ownership
  • 10. ”What’s the difference between physical and mental proof of ownership?”
  • 11.
  • 12. Protectors for master keys • TPM +PIN + USB • Combines the two previously mentioned • Network Unlock • Decryption key stored on a network server • When on the same network works like a TPM protected machine • When outside of the network asks for a PIN-code • Requires Windows 8 and UEFI
  • 13. Recovery keys • A recovery key is saved as well and secured by an authenticator • Certificate or numerical password • Usually saved to either Active Directory or MBAM • The whole key or only the ”secret” to open the key
  • 14. Gamechanger! • Windows 7 vs Windows 8.1 • In Windows 7 it was recommended to use a two-factor authentication like PIN-code to build a secure BitLocker implementation • With Windows 8.1 and certified devices we can build a secure BitLocker without a two-factor authentication for the first time! → One less password for your users and easier centralized management for you! • TPM-only is the recommendation for most companies!
  • 16. Guessing the passwords • TPM-lockout for PIN-code entry • Recovery password is 48 digits long
  • 17. DMA-attacks • Direct Memory Access • FireWire • Thunderbolt • ExpressCard • PCMCIA • PCI • PCI-X • PCI Express • Allows the memory to be read • http://www.lostpassword.com/ • http://www.windowsscope.com/
  • 18. DMA-attacks • Direct Memory Access • FireWire • Thunderbolt • ExpressCard • PCMCIA • PCI • PCI-X • PCI Express • Allows the memory to be read by another computer thus compromising the in-memory key • http://www.lostpassword.com/ • http://www.windowsscope.com/
  • 19. ”Hardware’s fault, not Microsoft’s” ”Same for every OS”
  • 20. DMA-attack countermeasures • Block it with a policy: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2516445 • Windows 8.1 blocks new devices with DMA from being installed before the computer is unlocked! • By Logo requirements • Instant Go devices shouldn’t have DMA-ports • Microsoft is driving for ThunderBolt devices to be turned on only after logging on
  • 22. Cold boot attacks • Probably the best known case is called the Princeton attack • Memory preserves its state even after losing power but quickly becomes unreadable • Can be slowed down with cooling/freezing
  • 23. Cold boot countermeasures • You can’t load another Kernel with SafeBoot on
  • 24. Removing the frozen memory • You could technically remove the frozen memory and take it to another computer that has a memory reader and read the key from the memory
  • 25. Memory removal countermeasures • Hard to remove if it’s on-chip • Denser memory gets the harder it gets to read it • Again… There are some that require the Pre-Boot authenticator that prevents this but in reality…
  • 27.
  • 28. More info: • Countermeasures: Protecting BitLocker-encrypted Devices from Attacks • http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=41671 • Protect BitLocker from Pre-Boot Attacks • http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn632180.aspx
  • 29. Different security levels for different environments
  • 30. What are we really against?
  • 31. Different environments - Different needs • High security environments could use BitLocker with a pre-boot/two- factor authenticator to achieve a more secure or compliant solution • Or a combination
  • 32. Policies to strengthen the protection
  • 33. Make it even more secure? • Force screensaver and prompt for password • No Username on Logon or Lockout screen • Force Hibernate • Lock TPM if too many logon failures to Windows
  • 34. Policies to strengthen BitLocker Sami Laiho
  • 35. Recap • For me BitLocker implementation starts when choosing my hardware • No ThunderBolt, FireWire or PCI-Express → USB 3 rules! • UEFI with SecureBoot • TPM • Even better if dense memory, on board • Force strong passwords or phrases • No administrative rights for end-users • 95% are good with TPM only → Aim for it!
  • 36. BitLocker key backup and recovery
  • 37. Basics of BitLocker recovery • Save your recovery keys to AD • http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj592683.aspx • If you are using BitLocker To Go for USB sticks, go for Data Recovery Agent (DRA) • http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd875560(v=ws.10).aspx
  • 39. How would you break into my devices? • Let’s play I forgot these at the airport and you found them. This is what we know: • Computer models: Surface 2 RT and a Zenbook Prime UX31A • OS: Windows 8.1 • The computers are on and locked - no user id visible on logon/lockout screen • Passwords for users are more than 16 characters and complex • BitLocker with TPM authentication only • UAC enabled, no admin rights for the logged on user • AppLocker enabled • Firewall on with IPSec authentication for inbound connections • How would you crack it? Bulletproof???