CRITICAL THINKING RUBRIC
Not Proficient
Some Proficiency
Proficient
Highly Proficient
Points Received
(10 x 5)
Identified and
Explained Issues
Fails to identify,
summarize, or explain
the main problem or
question, or represents
the issues inaccurately
or inappropriately.
Identifies main
issues but does not
summarize or
explain them
clearly or
sufficiently.
Successfully
identifies and
summarizes the
main issues, but
does not explain
why/how they
are problems or
create questions.
Clearly identifies
and summarizes
main issues and
successfully and
identifies implicit
issues, addressing
their relationship to
each other.
Recognizes
Stakeholders and
Contexts
Fails to accurately
identify and explain any
context for the issues or
presents problems as
having no connections
to other contexts.
Shows some
understanding of
the influences of
theoretical
contexts on
stakeholders, but
does not identify
any specific ones
relevant to
situation at hand.
Correctly
identified all the
empirical and
most of the
theoretical
contexts
relevant to all
the main
stakeholders in
the situation.
Not only correctly
identifies all the
contexts relevant to
stakeholders, but
also finds minor
stakeholders and
contexts and shows
conflicts of interests
among them.
Takes
Intellectual
Risks
Stays strictly within the
guidelines of the
assignment.
Considers new
directions or
approaches
without going
beyond the
guidelines of the
assignment.
Incorporates
new directions
or approaches to
the assignment
in the final
product.
Actively seeks out
and follows through
on untested and
potentially risky
directions or
approaches to the
assignment in the
final product.
Evaluates
Assumptions
Fails to identify and
evaluate any of the
important assumptions
behind the
recommendations
made.
Identifies some of
the most important
assumptions, but
does not evaluate
them for
plausibility or
clarity.
Identifies and
evaluates all the
important
assumptions, but
not the ones
deeper in the
background–the
more abstract
ones.
Not only identifies
and evaluates all the
important
assumptions, but
also some the more
hidden, more
abstract ones.
Innovative
Thinking
Merely restates existing
ideas.
Experiments with
creating a novel or
unique idea,
format, or product.
Actually creates
a novel or
unique idea,
identifies a new
void, or
proposes a new
product.
Extends a novel or
unique idea,
question, format, or
product to create
new knowledge or
knowledge that
crosses boundaries.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 11
In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in
Domestic Emergencies
Scott R . Tkacz
Copy ...
William & Mary Bill of Rights JournalVolume 15 Issue 1 A.docxadolphoyonker
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 11
In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in
Domestic Emergencies
Scott R . Tkacz
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Scott R . Tkacz, In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in Domestic Emergencies, 15 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 301 (2006), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1/11
United States Army Sergeants Major Academy
Master Leader Course (MLC)
1
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1/11
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
IN KATRINA'S WAKE: RETHINKING THE MILITARY'S ROLE
IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES
Scott R. Tkacz
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 301
I. LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE KATRINA DISASTER ... 303
Hi. HISTORY OF THE LIMITATION ON THE USE OF THE MILITARY IN
DOMESTIC ARENAS ........................................... 307
A. Posse Comitatus Act ...................................... 307
B. Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act ........................ 308
I. HISTORICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE POSSE
COMITATUS ACT ............................................ 312
A. Presidential Power in Federalizing the National Guard ........... 314
IV. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO EXPANDING PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY IN THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS DOMESTICALLY ......... 315
A. The Need for Centralized Decision-Making by a Single Individual
Is Critical in Emergency Situations ........................... 315
B. "Traditional Notions" of Domestic Military Action Are Not
Supported by History ...................................... 318
C. Federal Military Forces Can Receive Adequate Training for
Effective Execution of Domestic Law Enforcement ............... 324
D. Active Military Participation in Domestic Law Enforcement
Does Not Necessarily Mean Permanent Domestic Deployment ..... 326
E. The President Possesses Broad Discretion in Matters Authorized
by Congress ............................................. 330
F. Use of the Military in Domestic Affairs Would Serve to Protect
Civilians' Constitutional Rights, Not to Abrogate Them ........... 332
CONCLUSION .................................................. 333
INTRODUCTION
The massive devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and
Mississippi in August 2005' left behind shattered communities that will be left to pick
up the pieces for months and years to come.2 The alarming number of hurricanes
See infra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. On June 23, 2006, 1 visited New Orleans and
witnessed the destruction firsthand. The severity of the damage is truly difficult to put into words.
2 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, FEMA Calls 60,000 Houses in Storm Area Beyond Repai.
- Hurricane Katrina caused widespread disaster along the Gulf Coast in 2005, overwhelming local and state authorities and demonstrating the incompetence and disorganization of government officials in their response.
- Multiple factors contributed to the poor response, including poor relationships between local and state governments, as well as the failure to complete an emergency preparedness exercise called "Hurricane Pam" in 2004.
- The storm breached levees in New Orleans, flooding the city and causing tremendous damage across Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. Over 1,200 lives were lost in one of the costliest and deadliest hurricanes in U.S. history.
System Failure The Response to Hurricane Katrina.”Hurricane Ka.docxssuserf9c51d
“System Failure: The Response to Hurricane Katrina.”
Hurricane Katrina took place 4 years following the terrorist attacks of September 11th (9/11). With the 2005 Katrina storm being the worst natural disaster and catastrophe, the repercussions of the violent Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans was possibly the most awakening periods the whole of U.S. as a nation will ever experience when dealing with natural disasters. Addressed in this bibliographical analysis is the way in which the various agencies, including the U.S. government have been criticized in the manner in by which they dealt with the affected citizens, various foundations and in general, the communications during that time of dire need. This was because it occurred just three years following the successive development of the DHS – Department of Homeland Security and just a year after the subsequent creation of Natural Response plan by DHS (Senate Report, 2006). However, regardless of the heightened awareness towards Homeland Security, they failed terribly in their response to the disastrous hurricane. Various sources have been reviewed to come up with various solutions and explanations for the problems in order for the vastness of the problems still faced even today do not reoccur. The argument now conveyed below; it was in reality misapprehended breakdown of communication between the U.S. government and the people after Katrina’s arrival which created and/or exposed lack of experience in said authorities, therefore unnecessary death and suffering sparked some expression like sadness, depression, frustration and disgust.
In times of crises like war, natural disasters among others, the societal structures are put under very extreme tests. To date, the largest natural disaster to ever hit the U.S. Mainland is Hurricane Katrina. It left a string of complications which ranged from extensive floods, destroyed man-made levees for a city built below the sea level to even changing the landscape of national and local politics (White House. 2006). The U.S. government with its vastly large bureaucracy believed they were organized and ready to deal with any disaster that would take place within its borders. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is primarily responsible to respond to whichever disaster which hits the U.S. But this was not the case on the wake of August 29th 2005. FEMA encountered a historically unparalleled disaster, making the ineffectiveness of the organization and the U.S. government very blatant. Like any other agency of the government, FEMA is just not sufficiently large to effectively take care of a disaster like Hurricane Katrina. In a special Journal report by Schneider S. K. (2005) titled “Administrative Breakdowns in the Governmental Response to Hurricane Katrina,” it’s highlighted that the federal government could maintain within its payroll sufficient number of people to instantaneously handle every single problem. Through the report, she stresses existen ...
An Analysis of Hurricane Katrina Logistical Disaster ResponseShawn Hamilton
The document provides an overview of the supply chain challenges faced during the response to Hurricane Katrina. It describes the political failures in New Orleans that contributed to the scale of the disaster. It then outlines the roles of various responders, including the US military/National Guard who took over logistics from FEMA. While they distributed vast amounts of aid, issues with incompatible communications equipment between organizations hampered coordination. FEMA failed to adequately prepare for the disaster despite warnings, and struggled to fulfill Red Cross supply requests. The Red Cross itself provided unprecedented shelter and aid but with poor initial planning.
HURRICANE KATRINA A NATION STILL UNPREPARED .docxwellesleyterresa
The document summarizes a Senate report on the government's response to Hurricane Katrina. It finds that while officials were warned of Katrina's potential devastation, they failed to adequately prepare. Evacuation and shelter plans for New Orleans were incomplete. The storm exceeded the response capacity of all levels of government. Leadership failures at the federal, state and local levels compounded the crisis. FEMA and DHS were unprepared for a catastrophe of this scale.
The Hurricane Katrina Debacle 2005As Secretary Chertoff proceed.docxrtodd33
The Hurricane Katrina Debacle: 2005
As Secretary Chertoff proceeded with his reorganization, scientists like Max Mayfield (the director of the National Hurricane Center) predicted another active hurricane season. As always, the greatest fear was that a major storm would hit the Gulf Coast, particularly low-lying New Orleans.
Under James Lee Witt, a Category 5 hurricane impacting New Orleans was considered one of the three possible worst-case disaster scenarios. In fact, since the 1980s, FEMA funds had been used to contract multiple evacuation studies of the New Orleans area. In 1995, a national exercise of the Federal Response Plan entitled “Response 95” used a New Orleans hurricane scenario. This particular exercise was never completed because on the first day of play, a major flood event impacted the Gulf Coast (including the site of the exercise play, New Orleans) and abruptly ended the exercise.
Another disaster exercise termed “Hurricane Pam” was convened and completed in Jul. 2004 with appropriate follow-up requirements to correct the problems and deficiencies discovered during the previous exercise. Unfortunately, the funding to support these corrective actions, which had been adequately budgeted by FEMA, became part of a funding reallocation requested of FEMA by DHS management to support other DHS priorities.
The “Senate Report on Katrina” best describes what occurred during those fateful hours and days in late Aug. The specific danger Katrina posed to the Gulf Coast became clear on the afternoon of Friday, Aug. 26, when forecasters at the National Hurricane Center and the National Weather Service saw that the storm was turning west. Phone calls were immediately made to Louisiana emergency management officials, and in their 5 pm EDT Katrina forecast and accompanying briefings, the meteorologists alerted both Louisiana and Mississippi that the track of the storm was expected to shift significantly to the west of its original track to the Florida panhandle. The National Hurricane Center warned that Katrina could be a Category 4 or even 5 by landfall. By the next morning, Weather Service officials confirmed that New Orleans was squarely at risk.
Over the weekend, the drumbeat of warnings continued. FEMA held video teleconferences on both days, discussing the potential dangers of Katrina and especially the risks to New Orleans. Max Mayfield of the Hurricane Center called the governors of the affected states, something he had only done once before in his 33-year career, and President Bush took the unusual step of declaring a disaster in advance of an emergency event for the states in the projected impact zone.
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Buras, Louisiana, on Monday, Aug. 25, 2005. At the time it was reported as a Category 4 storm when it made landfall. The National Hurricane Center would later downgrade it to a Category 3 storm. In any event, it was considered an extremely dangerous storm by weather forecasters and the National Hurr.
Week 7 Emergency Simulation Assignment 2 page AMA format-cite a.docxcockekeshia
Week 7: Emergency Simulation Assignment
2 page AMA format-cite all sources
Using the link below, participate in the online public health simulation of an emergency to integrate the knowledge you gained from this course in responding to a hypothetical emergency.
· Dirty Bomb! After the Blast – A Public Health Simulation: https://cpheo1.sph.umn.edu/dbomb/index.asp
In the simulation, you worked as a public health professional and made decisions relating to communications, coordination, and response. In the assignment,
· Briefly describe your actions in the simulation relating to communications, coordination, and response.
· Consider how these same areas were handled during Hurricane Katrina as described in this week’s reading: Case Study Response to Katrina (attached)
· Identify one area where you feel you were able to appropriately communicate, coordinate, or respond in this simulation and contrast your actions to those taken by personnel in Hurricane Katrina in the same area.
Provide your responses and the last screen as appropriate to the simulation to the Week 7 Assignment.
Microeconomics – Week #5 Assignment
Costs Table
Directions: Fill in the table.
Units of Output
Total Costs
Total Fixed Costs
Total Variable Costs
Average Total Costs
Average Fixed Costs
Average Variable Costs
Marginal Costs
0
$1,000
1
1,200
2
1,350
3
1,550
4
1,900
5
2,300
6
2,750
7
3,250
8
3,800
9
4,400
1
*This case study accompanies the IRGC report “Risk Governance Deficits: An analysis and illustration of the most
common deficits in risk governance”.
The Response to Hurricane Katrina
By Donald P. Moynihan
1
Hurricane Katrina occurred four years after the attacks of 9/11, three years after the subsequent
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and one year after the DHS had created
a National Response Plan. But despite the heightened attention to homeland security, the
response to Katrina was a failure. The world watched as government responders seemed unable
to offer basic protection from the ravages of nature. The titles of two congressional reports
summarised the sense of failure. A Select House Committee [House Report, 2006] identified “A
Failure of Initiative” while the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[Senate Report, 2006] judged the United States “A Nation Still Unprepared.”
The poor response arose from a failure to manage a number of risk factors. The risks of a major
hurricane striking New Orleans had been long considered, and there was enough warning of the
threat of Katrina that declarations of emergency were made days in advance of landfall. But
responders failed to convert this information into a level of preparation appropriate with the scope
of the impending disaster. The dispersed nature of authority in the US intergovernmental
response system further weakened response, as federal responders failed.
A paper detailing the need to involve the military in disaster management situations. A review of existing legislation and current practice in the United States.
William & Mary Bill of Rights JournalVolume 15 Issue 1 A.docxadolphoyonker
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 11
In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in
Domestic Emergencies
Scott R . Tkacz
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Scott R . Tkacz, In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in Domestic Emergencies, 15 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 301 (2006), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1/11
United States Army Sergeants Major Academy
Master Leader Course (MLC)
1
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1/11
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
IN KATRINA'S WAKE: RETHINKING THE MILITARY'S ROLE
IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES
Scott R. Tkacz
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 301
I. LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE KATRINA DISASTER ... 303
Hi. HISTORY OF THE LIMITATION ON THE USE OF THE MILITARY IN
DOMESTIC ARENAS ........................................... 307
A. Posse Comitatus Act ...................................... 307
B. Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act ........................ 308
I. HISTORICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE POSSE
COMITATUS ACT ............................................ 312
A. Presidential Power in Federalizing the National Guard ........... 314
IV. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO EXPANDING PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY IN THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS DOMESTICALLY ......... 315
A. The Need for Centralized Decision-Making by a Single Individual
Is Critical in Emergency Situations ........................... 315
B. "Traditional Notions" of Domestic Military Action Are Not
Supported by History ...................................... 318
C. Federal Military Forces Can Receive Adequate Training for
Effective Execution of Domestic Law Enforcement ............... 324
D. Active Military Participation in Domestic Law Enforcement
Does Not Necessarily Mean Permanent Domestic Deployment ..... 326
E. The President Possesses Broad Discretion in Matters Authorized
by Congress ............................................. 330
F. Use of the Military in Domestic Affairs Would Serve to Protect
Civilians' Constitutional Rights, Not to Abrogate Them ........... 332
CONCLUSION .................................................. 333
INTRODUCTION
The massive devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and
Mississippi in August 2005' left behind shattered communities that will be left to pick
up the pieces for months and years to come.2 The alarming number of hurricanes
See infra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. On June 23, 2006, 1 visited New Orleans and
witnessed the destruction firsthand. The severity of the damage is truly difficult to put into words.
2 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, FEMA Calls 60,000 Houses in Storm Area Beyond Repai.
- Hurricane Katrina caused widespread disaster along the Gulf Coast in 2005, overwhelming local and state authorities and demonstrating the incompetence and disorganization of government officials in their response.
- Multiple factors contributed to the poor response, including poor relationships between local and state governments, as well as the failure to complete an emergency preparedness exercise called "Hurricane Pam" in 2004.
- The storm breached levees in New Orleans, flooding the city and causing tremendous damage across Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. Over 1,200 lives were lost in one of the costliest and deadliest hurricanes in U.S. history.
System Failure The Response to Hurricane Katrina.”Hurricane Ka.docxssuserf9c51d
“System Failure: The Response to Hurricane Katrina.”
Hurricane Katrina took place 4 years following the terrorist attacks of September 11th (9/11). With the 2005 Katrina storm being the worst natural disaster and catastrophe, the repercussions of the violent Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans was possibly the most awakening periods the whole of U.S. as a nation will ever experience when dealing with natural disasters. Addressed in this bibliographical analysis is the way in which the various agencies, including the U.S. government have been criticized in the manner in by which they dealt with the affected citizens, various foundations and in general, the communications during that time of dire need. This was because it occurred just three years following the successive development of the DHS – Department of Homeland Security and just a year after the subsequent creation of Natural Response plan by DHS (Senate Report, 2006). However, regardless of the heightened awareness towards Homeland Security, they failed terribly in their response to the disastrous hurricane. Various sources have been reviewed to come up with various solutions and explanations for the problems in order for the vastness of the problems still faced even today do not reoccur. The argument now conveyed below; it was in reality misapprehended breakdown of communication between the U.S. government and the people after Katrina’s arrival which created and/or exposed lack of experience in said authorities, therefore unnecessary death and suffering sparked some expression like sadness, depression, frustration and disgust.
In times of crises like war, natural disasters among others, the societal structures are put under very extreme tests. To date, the largest natural disaster to ever hit the U.S. Mainland is Hurricane Katrina. It left a string of complications which ranged from extensive floods, destroyed man-made levees for a city built below the sea level to even changing the landscape of national and local politics (White House. 2006). The U.S. government with its vastly large bureaucracy believed they were organized and ready to deal with any disaster that would take place within its borders. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is primarily responsible to respond to whichever disaster which hits the U.S. But this was not the case on the wake of August 29th 2005. FEMA encountered a historically unparalleled disaster, making the ineffectiveness of the organization and the U.S. government very blatant. Like any other agency of the government, FEMA is just not sufficiently large to effectively take care of a disaster like Hurricane Katrina. In a special Journal report by Schneider S. K. (2005) titled “Administrative Breakdowns in the Governmental Response to Hurricane Katrina,” it’s highlighted that the federal government could maintain within its payroll sufficient number of people to instantaneously handle every single problem. Through the report, she stresses existen ...
An Analysis of Hurricane Katrina Logistical Disaster ResponseShawn Hamilton
The document provides an overview of the supply chain challenges faced during the response to Hurricane Katrina. It describes the political failures in New Orleans that contributed to the scale of the disaster. It then outlines the roles of various responders, including the US military/National Guard who took over logistics from FEMA. While they distributed vast amounts of aid, issues with incompatible communications equipment between organizations hampered coordination. FEMA failed to adequately prepare for the disaster despite warnings, and struggled to fulfill Red Cross supply requests. The Red Cross itself provided unprecedented shelter and aid but with poor initial planning.
HURRICANE KATRINA A NATION STILL UNPREPARED .docxwellesleyterresa
The document summarizes a Senate report on the government's response to Hurricane Katrina. It finds that while officials were warned of Katrina's potential devastation, they failed to adequately prepare. Evacuation and shelter plans for New Orleans were incomplete. The storm exceeded the response capacity of all levels of government. Leadership failures at the federal, state and local levels compounded the crisis. FEMA and DHS were unprepared for a catastrophe of this scale.
The Hurricane Katrina Debacle 2005As Secretary Chertoff proceed.docxrtodd33
The Hurricane Katrina Debacle: 2005
As Secretary Chertoff proceeded with his reorganization, scientists like Max Mayfield (the director of the National Hurricane Center) predicted another active hurricane season. As always, the greatest fear was that a major storm would hit the Gulf Coast, particularly low-lying New Orleans.
Under James Lee Witt, a Category 5 hurricane impacting New Orleans was considered one of the three possible worst-case disaster scenarios. In fact, since the 1980s, FEMA funds had been used to contract multiple evacuation studies of the New Orleans area. In 1995, a national exercise of the Federal Response Plan entitled “Response 95” used a New Orleans hurricane scenario. This particular exercise was never completed because on the first day of play, a major flood event impacted the Gulf Coast (including the site of the exercise play, New Orleans) and abruptly ended the exercise.
Another disaster exercise termed “Hurricane Pam” was convened and completed in Jul. 2004 with appropriate follow-up requirements to correct the problems and deficiencies discovered during the previous exercise. Unfortunately, the funding to support these corrective actions, which had been adequately budgeted by FEMA, became part of a funding reallocation requested of FEMA by DHS management to support other DHS priorities.
The “Senate Report on Katrina” best describes what occurred during those fateful hours and days in late Aug. The specific danger Katrina posed to the Gulf Coast became clear on the afternoon of Friday, Aug. 26, when forecasters at the National Hurricane Center and the National Weather Service saw that the storm was turning west. Phone calls were immediately made to Louisiana emergency management officials, and in their 5 pm EDT Katrina forecast and accompanying briefings, the meteorologists alerted both Louisiana and Mississippi that the track of the storm was expected to shift significantly to the west of its original track to the Florida panhandle. The National Hurricane Center warned that Katrina could be a Category 4 or even 5 by landfall. By the next morning, Weather Service officials confirmed that New Orleans was squarely at risk.
Over the weekend, the drumbeat of warnings continued. FEMA held video teleconferences on both days, discussing the potential dangers of Katrina and especially the risks to New Orleans. Max Mayfield of the Hurricane Center called the governors of the affected states, something he had only done once before in his 33-year career, and President Bush took the unusual step of declaring a disaster in advance of an emergency event for the states in the projected impact zone.
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Buras, Louisiana, on Monday, Aug. 25, 2005. At the time it was reported as a Category 4 storm when it made landfall. The National Hurricane Center would later downgrade it to a Category 3 storm. In any event, it was considered an extremely dangerous storm by weather forecasters and the National Hurr.
Week 7 Emergency Simulation Assignment 2 page AMA format-cite a.docxcockekeshia
Week 7: Emergency Simulation Assignment
2 page AMA format-cite all sources
Using the link below, participate in the online public health simulation of an emergency to integrate the knowledge you gained from this course in responding to a hypothetical emergency.
· Dirty Bomb! After the Blast – A Public Health Simulation: https://cpheo1.sph.umn.edu/dbomb/index.asp
In the simulation, you worked as a public health professional and made decisions relating to communications, coordination, and response. In the assignment,
· Briefly describe your actions in the simulation relating to communications, coordination, and response.
· Consider how these same areas were handled during Hurricane Katrina as described in this week’s reading: Case Study Response to Katrina (attached)
· Identify one area where you feel you were able to appropriately communicate, coordinate, or respond in this simulation and contrast your actions to those taken by personnel in Hurricane Katrina in the same area.
Provide your responses and the last screen as appropriate to the simulation to the Week 7 Assignment.
Microeconomics – Week #5 Assignment
Costs Table
Directions: Fill in the table.
Units of Output
Total Costs
Total Fixed Costs
Total Variable Costs
Average Total Costs
Average Fixed Costs
Average Variable Costs
Marginal Costs
0
$1,000
1
1,200
2
1,350
3
1,550
4
1,900
5
2,300
6
2,750
7
3,250
8
3,800
9
4,400
1
*This case study accompanies the IRGC report “Risk Governance Deficits: An analysis and illustration of the most
common deficits in risk governance”.
The Response to Hurricane Katrina
By Donald P. Moynihan
1
Hurricane Katrina occurred four years after the attacks of 9/11, three years after the subsequent
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and one year after the DHS had created
a National Response Plan. But despite the heightened attention to homeland security, the
response to Katrina was a failure. The world watched as government responders seemed unable
to offer basic protection from the ravages of nature. The titles of two congressional reports
summarised the sense of failure. A Select House Committee [House Report, 2006] identified “A
Failure of Initiative” while the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[Senate Report, 2006] judged the United States “A Nation Still Unprepared.”
The poor response arose from a failure to manage a number of risk factors. The risks of a major
hurricane striking New Orleans had been long considered, and there was enough warning of the
threat of Katrina that declarations of emergency were made days in advance of landfall. But
responders failed to convert this information into a level of preparation appropriate with the scope
of the impending disaster. The dispersed nature of authority in the US intergovernmental
response system further weakened response, as federal responders failed.
A paper detailing the need to involve the military in disaster management situations. A review of existing legislation and current practice in the United States.
The military plays an important role in responding to domestic disasters by providing personnel, equipment, and logistical support. During 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, fighter jets patrolled cities and the National Guard and Coast Guard conducted large-scale rescue operations. While the military is effective at disaster response, there are also debates around federalizing the National Guard, authorizing deadly force, and declaring martial law during relief efforts.
This document summarizes media coverage of Hurricane Katrina from when the storm first made landfall through the aftermath. It analyzes several news reports from sources like National Public Radio, CNN, NBC Nightly News, USA Today, and The New York Times. Some coverage was praised for providing urgent, relevant information and placing the crisis in context. However, other reports were criticized for being sensationalized, focusing on violence and looting rather than relief efforts, or failing to hold government accountable for its response. The document also discusses some pre-storm reporting that informed about New Orleans' vulnerability and outlined FEMA's role in disaster response.
The document discusses journalism best practices around covering Hurricane Katrina. It provides examples of ineffective early reporting that downplayed the storm's severity and failed to objectively report on the lack of aid. It also provides examples of effective reporting from newspapers and TV that accurately conveyed the threat, damage caused, and challenges faced in relief efforts through quoting officials and using background context. Post-hurricane coverage is assessed, with some outlets criticized for an excessive narrow focus on destruction while others engaged experts to discuss response and lessons learned.
The document discusses journalism best practices around Hurricane Katrina coverage. It provides examples of ineffective early reporting that downplayed the storm's severity and failed to objectively convey the lack of aid. It also provides examples of effective reporting from newspapers and TV that accurately conveyed the storm's dangers, impacts, evacuation efforts and challenges with emergency response through factual reporting and expert commentary.
This document provides a summary of several sources on issues related to emergency management and homeland security. It discusses balancing local, state and federal emergency response systems. It also addresses challenges including FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina, the impact of global warming on increasing disaster frequency and severity, and ongoing efforts to combat terrorism both domestically and abroad, including the war in Iraq.
This document provides a summary of several sources on issues related to emergency management and homeland security. It discusses balancing local, state and federal emergency response systems. It also addresses challenges including FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina, the impact of global warming on increasing disaster frequency and severity, and ongoing efforts to combat terrorism both domestically and abroad, including the war in Iraq.
The document provides a summary of several sources on issues related to emergency management and homeland security. It discusses three key points:
1) There is debate around the appropriate balance of local, state, and federal responsibility in emergency response and the need for reform and increased regional coordination.
2) Sources critique the response to Hurricane Katrina by FEMA and argue for the need to better prepare for future natural disasters which may be exacerbated by climate change.
3) On the fifth anniversary of 9/11, sources discuss ongoing threats of terrorism and debate approaches to combating Islamic extremism, protecting civil liberties, and trying suspected terrorists.
This document provides a summary of several sources on issues related to emergency management and homeland security. It discusses balancing local, state and federal emergency response systems. It also addresses challenges including FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina, the impact of global warming on increasing disaster frequency and severity, and ongoing efforts to combat terrorism both domestically and abroad, including the war in Iraq.
Journalism in times of crisis: Hurricane Katrinaagrand905
The document discusses journalism best practices around Hurricane Katrina coverage. It provides examples of ineffective early reporting that downplayed Katrina's threat and failed to objectively convey the unfolding crisis. It also offers examples of effective later reporting that accurately portrayed the hurricane's impacts, provided context on emergency response challenges, and allowed experts to discuss lessons learned and ways to improve future disaster response.
10.11770002716205285404 604MarchTHE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN AC.docxhyacinthshackley2629
10.1177/0002716205285404 604MarchTHE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMYAGILITY AND DISCIPLINE
For more than thirty years, the U.S. emergency manage-
ment community has been increasing its ability to struc-
ture, control, and manage a large response. The result of
this evolution is a National Response System based on
the National Response Plan and the National Incident
Management System that is perceived to have failed in
the response to Hurricane Katrina. Over the same
period, social scientists and other disaster researchers
have been documenting and describing the nonstruc-
tural factors such as improvisation, adaptability, and cre-
ativity that are critical to coordination, collaboration,
and communication and to successful problem solving.
This article argues that these two streams of thought are
not in opposition, but form orthogonal dimensions of
discipline and agility that must both be achieved. The
critical success factors that must be met to prepare for
and respond to an extreme event are described, and an
organizational typology is developed.
Keywords: response; critical success factors; agility;
improvisation; discipline
Extreme events such as the September 11,2001, attacks on the United States, the De-
cember 2004 Sumatra earthquake and Indian
Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the
October 2005 Pakistan earthquake produce cat-
astrophic immediate impacts and cause long-
term disruption of economic and social systems.
With the exception of the 9/11 attacks, these
256 ANNALS, AAPSS, 604, March 2006
DOI: 10.1177/0002716205285404
Agility and
Discipline:
Critical Success
Factors for
Disaster
Response
By
JOHN R. HARRALD
John R. Harrald is the director of the George Washing-
ton University (GWU) Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and
Risk Management and a professor of engineering man-
agement in the GWU School of Engineering and Ap-
plied Science. He is the executive editor of the Journal of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management. He
has been actively engaged in the fields of emergency and
crisis management and maritime safety and port secu-
rity and as a researcher in his academic career and as a
practitioner during his twenty-two-year career as a U.S.
Coast Guard officer, retiring in the grade of captain. He
received his B.S. in engineering from the U.S. Coast
Guard Academy, an M.S. from the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology where he was an Alfred P. Sloan Fel-
low, and an MBA and Ph.D. from Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute.
events exceeded our ability to organize and execute coordinated, effective
response and relief efforts. The national response system crafted over the past
three years by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was tested for
the first time when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. Hurricane Katrina
was a catastrophic event because it was actually two disasters. Comfort (2005, 5)
noted that “the first phase, the hurricane, could legitimately be called a natural
disaster, as it was genera.
A Preliminary Assessment Of Social And Economic Impacts Associated With Hurri...Karla Adamson
The document provides a preliminary assessment of the social and economic impacts of Hurricane Katrina. It summarizes that Katrina caused widespread destruction along the Gulf Coast through storm surge and winds, resulting in over 1,700 deaths. It also exacerbated preexisting social trends and inequalities. While the physical damage was largely inevitable given the region's environmental vulnerabilities, the human impacts are extremely complex. The region has a long history of human settlement in vulnerable areas that require extensive engineering protections, which have unintentionally contributed to land loss and increased risk over time. The devastation highlights the need for improved disaster response and long-term planning given the likelihood of more intense hurricanes and rising seas.
The document discusses media coverage of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in New Orleans from multiple perspectives:
1) Local New Orleans newspapers and TV stations like the Times-Picayune and WDSU provided on-the-ground, real-time coverage during and immediately after the storm.
2) National print and TV news initially provided ineffective coverage but later reported more effectively on the devastation, relief efforts, and human impacts.
3) Five years later, coverage has shifted to commemorating the anniversary and focusing on rebuilding progress, though some areas remain impoverished.
The document discusses media coverage of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in New Orleans from multiple perspectives:
1) Local New Orleans newspapers and TV stations like the Times-Picayune and WDSU provided on-the-ground, real-time coverage during and immediately after the storm.
2) National print and TV news initially provided ineffective coverage but later reported more effectively on the devastation, relief efforts, and human impacts.
3) Five years later, coverage has shifted to commemorating the anniversary and focusing on rebuilding progress, though some areas remain impoverished.
The document discusses media coverage of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in New Orleans from multiple perspectives:
1) Local New Orleans newspapers and TV stations like the Times-Picayune and WDSU provided on-the-ground, real-time coverage during and immediately after the storm.
2) National print and TV news initially provided ineffective coverage but later reported more effectively on the devastation, relief efforts, and human impacts.
3) Five years later, coverage has shifted to commemorating the anniversary and focusing on rebuilding progress, though some areas remain impoverished.
Introduction Ideally, program andor policy interventio.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction Ideally, program and/or policy interventions must seek to address an identified challenge/gap in a given sector/segment of society (McDavid & Hawthorn, 2013). To enable stakeholders make informed decisions on what program/policy choices to make there is the need for information and such information can be gathered through a process known as evaluation – the outcome of an evaluation process creates/provides information and this information influences policy choices and/or programmatic interventions (McDavid & Hawthorn, 2013). In this post, I briefly describe the Mentoring Gang Involved-Youth Project with is being implemented by Roca Inc, a Massachusetts-based nonprofit working with young male adults from Boston, Chelsea, and Springfield Massachusetts. I also explain the type of evaluation employed in evaluating the Project and the kind of data used for the evaluation and I indicate whether comparisons were used. Description of the project According to the Justice Center: Council of State Governments (2012), the Mentoring-gang Involved-Youth Project, targets young male adults between the ages of 17 and 24 who are suffering from substance abuse and are in detention. The primary objective of the Project is to reduce incarceration rates and enhance the ability of participants to retain employment (Roca, 2016). Under the Project, it is recognized that participants lack healthy relationships that will help them say away from criminal and/or antisocial behavior hence under the program three types of mentoring support are offered (Justice Center: Council of State Governments, 2012). The Justice Center: Council of State Governments (2012) informs its readers that mentoring support, under the Project, extends to supporting participants get jobs and remain employed. The project proceeds under the philosophy that keeping participants occurred by positive activities steers them away from antisocial criminal behavior (Justice Center: Council of State Governments, 2012). Some of the mentors under the Project have served jail time and successfully reintegrated into the community and are deemed to be role models hence using them to mentor participants is seen as offering participants with real life examples of persons who were just like them and have managed to emancipate themselves from the hands of criminal/antisocial conduct and are living better lives. Cognitive-restructuring is the objective of the Project and it seeks to achieve this through skills development and behavioral change for/of participants (Roca, 2016). Where this Project successfully restructures the cognitive behavior of participants and they acquire skills and get employment, their economic situation will change and this will translate into economic development. According to Roca (2016) the Project runs for four years - the first two years focus on inculcating into participants behavioral change whilst the remaining period focuses on sustaining the positive ch.
INTRO TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONCase Study 11 Who Brought Bern.docxMargenePurnell14
INTRO TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Case Study 11: Who Brought Bernadine Healy Down? Case Study 11: Who Brought Bernadine Healy Down? Questions for Case study 11 1.Identify and discuss the public service culture present in the case and explain why Wise argue that public service motivation is found more in the government than in private sector. 2.Discuss if the Healy’s motivation for accepting the Red Cross presidency is in line with the public service motives? 3.Discuss what the case study indicates about the modern complexities of professional personnel in the public setting? 4.Does the Wise reading offer some specific answers to contemporary problems of public personnel motivation? If so, how?
.
Introduction
GDD’s Results
Candidate’s Results
GDD/ Candidates Comparison
Recommendation
Purpose:
In the first assignment, students are given a scenario about Global Delivery Direct (GDD), a Norfolk, England medium-sized global delivery company that was started in 1968 by four college friends. . The purpose of this exercise is to see if you can identify the GDD leader in the potential candidates that will be hired to lead the new boutique services department.
Outcome Met by Completing This Assignment
use leadership theories, assessment tools, and an understanding of the role of ethics, values, and attitudes to evaluate and enhance personal leadership skills
Background:
Andrew Rockfish and the other owners have been looking for a competitive edge in the North American market that will translate well to the other divisions. A recent meeting of the owners resulted in the decision to target business organizations with custom services. The decision stems from recent feedback from customers that revealed that for GDD to anticipate the needs of their clients, suppliers and service vendors, the company needed to decrease the turnaround time in delivery and mailing of small packages and letters. Rockfish has decided to offer “boutique” services to its business customers. Catering to businesses will allow GDD to provide personal services that Fed Ex and UPS cannot offer. Customizing the services will allow GDD to increase prices while creating a new niche in the market. It was decided that the initial roll out of this idea would start in the US where an imminent threat from competition lies. Rockfish was on board with this idea and began a campaign among the rest of the company to find ideas that would help to encourage the new ‘Business First” strategic plan.
In response, a sales manager from the mid-west sales team brought this idea from their brainstorming session for Rockfish’s consideration. The sales manager proposed creating several mobile packing stores to bring customer service to businesses directly. GDD would not just pick up and deliver but they would also package. This model could be viewed as an UPS store on wheels. The team got the idea from a local delivery service that started a similar business as a Mail Store on Wheels and it seemed to be doing well. The mail company has five “Mail on Wheels” trucks and focuses on taking small business, not individuals away from the three local UPS and Kinko stores. After a financial review of the company, Rockfish decided to buy the business.
The mail business was started by a young entrepreneur, Adrian Cheng, who ran the business with the philosophy that “customers always get the best of our time and service”. Personal service, friendliness, and as much time as it takes to make the customer happy, was part of the mission statement. Employees were casually dressed and had no deadlines except those given by the customer. Cheng had about 45 employees and ran both.
IntroductionDefine the individual client or community populati.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction
Define the individual client or community population.
This should be about 1-2 paragraphs that identify the client (or the organization).
In this section, for an A paper
, you will address the following elements:
Introduces the client or community population for whom the treatment or service plan is being developed,
Include cultural or diversity issues; also
Include the role of the social worker in supporting the client or population.
Include at least one reference that defines the importance of cultural sensitivity and the role of the social worker working with a client or organization.
Identified Issue/Situation
Describe the situation to be addressed that was identified by the client or the organization
In this section, for an A paper
, you will address the following elements:
Define the identifying issue, situation, or problem in a way that reflects client or community agency,
Discuss the cultural or diversity issues inherent in the client or community situation, and Reflects the interaction between the social worker and the client or community.
Include supporting literature from the course text or other related source.
Problem Statement
How did the client or the organization state the problem?
This should correspond to the Problem statement on the ASI Treatment Plan Template
Goals/Objectives to be Achieved
This should correspond to the Goals section of the ASI Treatment Plan Template.
In this section, for an A paper
, you will address the following elements:
Creates clearly defined objectives and goals with measurable outcomes that reflect the interaction between the social worker and the client or community.
Include literature that discusses how to define objectives and goals with measurable outcomes.
State the goals in measurable terms.
For example, “The client states a desire to quit smoking.” Or “The client states a desire to exercise more often.”
Measurable Goals
For example, the client who wants to quit smoking.
Measurable goals might be: To obtain a prescription for a nicotine patch by XXX date; to go for 3 days without a cigarette starting on XXX DATE; to call a hypnotherapist and find out about how to use hypnotherapy for changing cravings to smoke.”
Each goal should have a target completion date.
Interventions
Describe what the counselor will do to assist the client with achieving the defined goals.
Participation in Treatment Planning Process
What actions will the client (or organization) do to be involved in the plan of action?
Participation of Others in Goals and Plans
Who will the client (or organization) use to support their goals?
Indicators of Successful Completion
How will the client and counselor (or organization and manager) know that successful completion has occurred?
Parallels between Individual Treatment Plans
and Organizational Plans
Describe how an organizational plan would be the same or different from an individual treatment plan.
This is to .
Introduction to Public SpeakingWeek 6 AssignmentIn.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction to Public Speaking
Week 6 Assignment
Informative Speech
It’s time to take what you've learned from all of your prior presentations and add an element of research to create your Informative Speech. You have to be cautious when choosing an Informative topic, as it’s easy to confuse the Informative Speech and a Persuasive Speech as the same thing. However an Informative Speech JUST provides information. The most basic informative speech is the kind that teaches us (much in the way the Demonstration Speech taught us) something detailed about a topic with which we are already familiar. For instance, we know George Washington was our first President, but a lot of people don't know much about his life prior to the military or serving in office. That would make for an interesting Informative Speech.
With an informative Speech, you’ll want to establish credibility by referencing and citing your materials. For example: "In the July 13, 2007 edition of the New York Times, John Smith said that George Washington suffered from depression as a young boy." It is critical that you discuss where you found your information in order to maintain your credibility.
A few parameters:
1. Your speech should be 5-10 minutes in length.
2. Feel free to incorporate visual aids. This is not mandatory, but it makes for a better presentation, as we learned last week.
3. Cite a minimum of two different sources for your materials. Do NOT use Wikipedia as a source. Please copy and paste these sources into the ‘comments’ area when submitting or submit as a paper. I will evaluate your sources.
4. Be sure to have a good introduction, a body that contains at least three main points (with appropriate supporting evidence) and a conclusion that appropriately wraps everything up.
As always, you may draft your speech word for word, but be very careful not to simply read from your paper! We want eye contact and emotion! Good luck with this assignment and have fun!
.
Introduction about topic Intelligence phaseWhat is the .docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction about topic
Intelligence phase
:
What is the problem (opportunity)
Classify the problem (opportunity)
structurt ,unstructuer ,semi structur
i think our search structure
Decompose the problem (opportunity).
The effects of noise on student performance
The effects of temprutur on student performance
The effects of light on student performance
.
Introduction A short summary is provided on the case subject and.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction
A short summary is provided on the case subject and discuss Effat University ICT infrastructure sustainability in 3 pillars (Planet, People, and Profit).
Analysis
(due April 16)
Study the ICT infrastructure of Effat University and provide an analysis of its performance in terms of Green Measures of Performance (Green MoPs).
.
Introduction Illiteracy is the inability to read and write a.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction
Illiteracy is the inability to read and write at an adequate level of proficiency that is critical for communication. Illiterate adults are unable to use printed and written information to function in the society so as to achieve one’s goals and also to develop one’s potential.
According to an international nonprofit ProLiteracy in 2003, there are 36 million adults in the United States alone. This potential includes a broad range of information-processing skills that one can use daily in school and at the community as a whole. Adult illiteracy has become a societal problem because illiterate people can never fully utilize writing and reading skills to make use of their fully potential in the world. The thesis statement of adult illiteracy involves reasons why it identified as a societal problem; the solutions proposed to solve this problem and the statistical information of adult literacy as the global societal problem.
Different types of society exist. These types of illiteracy are technological illiteracy, mathematical illiteracy, visual illiteracy, school illiteracy, community illiteracy and personal illiteracy. All these types of illiteracy are caused by various reasons. These reasons are summarized in the following discussion.
Causes of Adult Illiteracy
People are usually mistaken about illiteracy. School illiteracy is overvalued to the extent that many adults have started to believe the act of reading and writing are the only important things in school. It is this type of reasoning that make many adults less interested in wanting to gain more knowledge and see things beyond the negative images. This has become one of the main reasons why adult illiteracy has increased in the world over the last few years.
Another reason for adult illiteracy is the misuse of groups. Some people tend to agree with the argument that can make one believe that he or she is weak as a reader and he or she won’t be able to achieve literacy even after finishing school. This type of thinking lowers someone’s self-esteem and self-confidence meaning that the person will not bother to seek literacy help. People’s reading attitude are influential in literacy behaviors. According to McKenna in 2001, reading attitudes are influenced by factors such as a person’s social experiences with reading, one’s personal experiences, the cultural norms about reading, cultural norms and the learner’s preferences about reading. Attitude is associated with unwillingness to read. Every learning experience that a child has in school will at some point determine how that child will determine to learn. The learners who have had negative experiences in school will come to view school and learning in total as a bad experience that. This disengagement spreads over to adults. An adult learner who has negative perceptions about school would not want to be associated with it. These learners never get interested in educational process because they don’t see it as valuabl.
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The military plays an important role in responding to domestic disasters by providing personnel, equipment, and logistical support. During 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, fighter jets patrolled cities and the National Guard and Coast Guard conducted large-scale rescue operations. While the military is effective at disaster response, there are also debates around federalizing the National Guard, authorizing deadly force, and declaring martial law during relief efforts.
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The document discusses journalism best practices around covering Hurricane Katrina. It provides examples of ineffective early reporting that downplayed the storm's severity and failed to objectively report on the lack of aid. It also provides examples of effective reporting from newspapers and TV that accurately conveyed the threat, damage caused, and challenges faced in relief efforts through quoting officials and using background context. Post-hurricane coverage is assessed, with some outlets criticized for an excessive narrow focus on destruction while others engaged experts to discuss response and lessons learned.
The document discusses journalism best practices around Hurricane Katrina coverage. It provides examples of ineffective early reporting that downplayed the storm's severity and failed to objectively convey the lack of aid. It also provides examples of effective reporting from newspapers and TV that accurately conveyed the storm's dangers, impacts, evacuation efforts and challenges with emergency response through factual reporting and expert commentary.
This document provides a summary of several sources on issues related to emergency management and homeland security. It discusses balancing local, state and federal emergency response systems. It also addresses challenges including FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina, the impact of global warming on increasing disaster frequency and severity, and ongoing efforts to combat terrorism both domestically and abroad, including the war in Iraq.
This document provides a summary of several sources on issues related to emergency management and homeland security. It discusses balancing local, state and federal emergency response systems. It also addresses challenges including FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina, the impact of global warming on increasing disaster frequency and severity, and ongoing efforts to combat terrorism both domestically and abroad, including the war in Iraq.
The document provides a summary of several sources on issues related to emergency management and homeland security. It discusses three key points:
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2) Sources critique the response to Hurricane Katrina by FEMA and argue for the need to better prepare for future natural disasters which may be exacerbated by climate change.
3) On the fifth anniversary of 9/11, sources discuss ongoing threats of terrorism and debate approaches to combating Islamic extremism, protecting civil liberties, and trying suspected terrorists.
This document provides a summary of several sources on issues related to emergency management and homeland security. It discusses balancing local, state and federal emergency response systems. It also addresses challenges including FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina, the impact of global warming on increasing disaster frequency and severity, and ongoing efforts to combat terrorism both domestically and abroad, including the war in Iraq.
Journalism in times of crisis: Hurricane Katrinaagrand905
The document discusses journalism best practices around Hurricane Katrina coverage. It provides examples of ineffective early reporting that downplayed Katrina's threat and failed to objectively convey the unfolding crisis. It also offers examples of effective later reporting that accurately portrayed the hurricane's impacts, provided context on emergency response challenges, and allowed experts to discuss lessons learned and ways to improve future disaster response.
10.11770002716205285404 604MarchTHE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN AC.docxhyacinthshackley2629
10.1177/0002716205285404 604MarchTHE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMYAGILITY AND DISCIPLINE
For more than thirty years, the U.S. emergency manage-
ment community has been increasing its ability to struc-
ture, control, and manage a large response. The result of
this evolution is a National Response System based on
the National Response Plan and the National Incident
Management System that is perceived to have failed in
the response to Hurricane Katrina. Over the same
period, social scientists and other disaster researchers
have been documenting and describing the nonstruc-
tural factors such as improvisation, adaptability, and cre-
ativity that are critical to coordination, collaboration,
and communication and to successful problem solving.
This article argues that these two streams of thought are
not in opposition, but form orthogonal dimensions of
discipline and agility that must both be achieved. The
critical success factors that must be met to prepare for
and respond to an extreme event are described, and an
organizational typology is developed.
Keywords: response; critical success factors; agility;
improvisation; discipline
Extreme events such as the September 11,2001, attacks on the United States, the De-
cember 2004 Sumatra earthquake and Indian
Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the
October 2005 Pakistan earthquake produce cat-
astrophic immediate impacts and cause long-
term disruption of economic and social systems.
With the exception of the 9/11 attacks, these
256 ANNALS, AAPSS, 604, March 2006
DOI: 10.1177/0002716205285404
Agility and
Discipline:
Critical Success
Factors for
Disaster
Response
By
JOHN R. HARRALD
John R. Harrald is the director of the George Washing-
ton University (GWU) Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and
Risk Management and a professor of engineering man-
agement in the GWU School of Engineering and Ap-
plied Science. He is the executive editor of the Journal of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management. He
has been actively engaged in the fields of emergency and
crisis management and maritime safety and port secu-
rity and as a researcher in his academic career and as a
practitioner during his twenty-two-year career as a U.S.
Coast Guard officer, retiring in the grade of captain. He
received his B.S. in engineering from the U.S. Coast
Guard Academy, an M.S. from the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology where he was an Alfred P. Sloan Fel-
low, and an MBA and Ph.D. from Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute.
events exceeded our ability to organize and execute coordinated, effective
response and relief efforts. The national response system crafted over the past
three years by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was tested for
the first time when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. Hurricane Katrina
was a catastrophic event because it was actually two disasters. Comfort (2005, 5)
noted that “the first phase, the hurricane, could legitimately be called a natural
disaster, as it was genera.
A Preliminary Assessment Of Social And Economic Impacts Associated With Hurri...Karla Adamson
The document provides a preliminary assessment of the social and economic impacts of Hurricane Katrina. It summarizes that Katrina caused widespread destruction along the Gulf Coast through storm surge and winds, resulting in over 1,700 deaths. It also exacerbated preexisting social trends and inequalities. While the physical damage was largely inevitable given the region's environmental vulnerabilities, the human impacts are extremely complex. The region has a long history of human settlement in vulnerable areas that require extensive engineering protections, which have unintentionally contributed to land loss and increased risk over time. The devastation highlights the need for improved disaster response and long-term planning given the likelihood of more intense hurricanes and rising seas.
The document discusses media coverage of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in New Orleans from multiple perspectives:
1) Local New Orleans newspapers and TV stations like the Times-Picayune and WDSU provided on-the-ground, real-time coverage during and immediately after the storm.
2) National print and TV news initially provided ineffective coverage but later reported more effectively on the devastation, relief efforts, and human impacts.
3) Five years later, coverage has shifted to commemorating the anniversary and focusing on rebuilding progress, though some areas remain impoverished.
The document discusses media coverage of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in New Orleans from multiple perspectives:
1) Local New Orleans newspapers and TV stations like the Times-Picayune and WDSU provided on-the-ground, real-time coverage during and immediately after the storm.
2) National print and TV news initially provided ineffective coverage but later reported more effectively on the devastation, relief efforts, and human impacts.
3) Five years later, coverage has shifted to commemorating the anniversary and focusing on rebuilding progress, though some areas remain impoverished.
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1) Local New Orleans newspapers and TV stations like the Times-Picayune and WDSU provided on-the-ground, real-time coverage during and immediately after the storm.
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Introduction Ideally, program andor policy interventio.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction Ideally, program and/or policy interventions must seek to address an identified challenge/gap in a given sector/segment of society (McDavid & Hawthorn, 2013). To enable stakeholders make informed decisions on what program/policy choices to make there is the need for information and such information can be gathered through a process known as evaluation – the outcome of an evaluation process creates/provides information and this information influences policy choices and/or programmatic interventions (McDavid & Hawthorn, 2013). In this post, I briefly describe the Mentoring Gang Involved-Youth Project with is being implemented by Roca Inc, a Massachusetts-based nonprofit working with young male adults from Boston, Chelsea, and Springfield Massachusetts. I also explain the type of evaluation employed in evaluating the Project and the kind of data used for the evaluation and I indicate whether comparisons were used. Description of the project According to the Justice Center: Council of State Governments (2012), the Mentoring-gang Involved-Youth Project, targets young male adults between the ages of 17 and 24 who are suffering from substance abuse and are in detention. The primary objective of the Project is to reduce incarceration rates and enhance the ability of participants to retain employment (Roca, 2016). Under the Project, it is recognized that participants lack healthy relationships that will help them say away from criminal and/or antisocial behavior hence under the program three types of mentoring support are offered (Justice Center: Council of State Governments, 2012). The Justice Center: Council of State Governments (2012) informs its readers that mentoring support, under the Project, extends to supporting participants get jobs and remain employed. The project proceeds under the philosophy that keeping participants occurred by positive activities steers them away from antisocial criminal behavior (Justice Center: Council of State Governments, 2012). Some of the mentors under the Project have served jail time and successfully reintegrated into the community and are deemed to be role models hence using them to mentor participants is seen as offering participants with real life examples of persons who were just like them and have managed to emancipate themselves from the hands of criminal/antisocial conduct and are living better lives. Cognitive-restructuring is the objective of the Project and it seeks to achieve this through skills development and behavioral change for/of participants (Roca, 2016). Where this Project successfully restructures the cognitive behavior of participants and they acquire skills and get employment, their economic situation will change and this will translate into economic development. According to Roca (2016) the Project runs for four years - the first two years focus on inculcating into participants behavioral change whilst the remaining period focuses on sustaining the positive ch.
INTRO TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONCase Study 11 Who Brought Bern.docxMargenePurnell14
INTRO TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Case Study 11: Who Brought Bernadine Healy Down? Case Study 11: Who Brought Bernadine Healy Down? Questions for Case study 11 1.Identify and discuss the public service culture present in the case and explain why Wise argue that public service motivation is found more in the government than in private sector. 2.Discuss if the Healy’s motivation for accepting the Red Cross presidency is in line with the public service motives? 3.Discuss what the case study indicates about the modern complexities of professional personnel in the public setting? 4.Does the Wise reading offer some specific answers to contemporary problems of public personnel motivation? If so, how?
.
Introduction
GDD’s Results
Candidate’s Results
GDD/ Candidates Comparison
Recommendation
Purpose:
In the first assignment, students are given a scenario about Global Delivery Direct (GDD), a Norfolk, England medium-sized global delivery company that was started in 1968 by four college friends. . The purpose of this exercise is to see if you can identify the GDD leader in the potential candidates that will be hired to lead the new boutique services department.
Outcome Met by Completing This Assignment
use leadership theories, assessment tools, and an understanding of the role of ethics, values, and attitudes to evaluate and enhance personal leadership skills
Background:
Andrew Rockfish and the other owners have been looking for a competitive edge in the North American market that will translate well to the other divisions. A recent meeting of the owners resulted in the decision to target business organizations with custom services. The decision stems from recent feedback from customers that revealed that for GDD to anticipate the needs of their clients, suppliers and service vendors, the company needed to decrease the turnaround time in delivery and mailing of small packages and letters. Rockfish has decided to offer “boutique” services to its business customers. Catering to businesses will allow GDD to provide personal services that Fed Ex and UPS cannot offer. Customizing the services will allow GDD to increase prices while creating a new niche in the market. It was decided that the initial roll out of this idea would start in the US where an imminent threat from competition lies. Rockfish was on board with this idea and began a campaign among the rest of the company to find ideas that would help to encourage the new ‘Business First” strategic plan.
In response, a sales manager from the mid-west sales team brought this idea from their brainstorming session for Rockfish’s consideration. The sales manager proposed creating several mobile packing stores to bring customer service to businesses directly. GDD would not just pick up and deliver but they would also package. This model could be viewed as an UPS store on wheels. The team got the idea from a local delivery service that started a similar business as a Mail Store on Wheels and it seemed to be doing well. The mail company has five “Mail on Wheels” trucks and focuses on taking small business, not individuals away from the three local UPS and Kinko stores. After a financial review of the company, Rockfish decided to buy the business.
The mail business was started by a young entrepreneur, Adrian Cheng, who ran the business with the philosophy that “customers always get the best of our time and service”. Personal service, friendliness, and as much time as it takes to make the customer happy, was part of the mission statement. Employees were casually dressed and had no deadlines except those given by the customer. Cheng had about 45 employees and ran both.
IntroductionDefine the individual client or community populati.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction
Define the individual client or community population.
This should be about 1-2 paragraphs that identify the client (or the organization).
In this section, for an A paper
, you will address the following elements:
Introduces the client or community population for whom the treatment or service plan is being developed,
Include cultural or diversity issues; also
Include the role of the social worker in supporting the client or population.
Include at least one reference that defines the importance of cultural sensitivity and the role of the social worker working with a client or organization.
Identified Issue/Situation
Describe the situation to be addressed that was identified by the client or the organization
In this section, for an A paper
, you will address the following elements:
Define the identifying issue, situation, or problem in a way that reflects client or community agency,
Discuss the cultural or diversity issues inherent in the client or community situation, and Reflects the interaction between the social worker and the client or community.
Include supporting literature from the course text or other related source.
Problem Statement
How did the client or the organization state the problem?
This should correspond to the Problem statement on the ASI Treatment Plan Template
Goals/Objectives to be Achieved
This should correspond to the Goals section of the ASI Treatment Plan Template.
In this section, for an A paper
, you will address the following elements:
Creates clearly defined objectives and goals with measurable outcomes that reflect the interaction between the social worker and the client or community.
Include literature that discusses how to define objectives and goals with measurable outcomes.
State the goals in measurable terms.
For example, “The client states a desire to quit smoking.” Or “The client states a desire to exercise more often.”
Measurable Goals
For example, the client who wants to quit smoking.
Measurable goals might be: To obtain a prescription for a nicotine patch by XXX date; to go for 3 days without a cigarette starting on XXX DATE; to call a hypnotherapist and find out about how to use hypnotherapy for changing cravings to smoke.”
Each goal should have a target completion date.
Interventions
Describe what the counselor will do to assist the client with achieving the defined goals.
Participation in Treatment Planning Process
What actions will the client (or organization) do to be involved in the plan of action?
Participation of Others in Goals and Plans
Who will the client (or organization) use to support their goals?
Indicators of Successful Completion
How will the client and counselor (or organization and manager) know that successful completion has occurred?
Parallels between Individual Treatment Plans
and Organizational Plans
Describe how an organizational plan would be the same or different from an individual treatment plan.
This is to .
Introduction to Public SpeakingWeek 6 AssignmentIn.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction to Public Speaking
Week 6 Assignment
Informative Speech
It’s time to take what you've learned from all of your prior presentations and add an element of research to create your Informative Speech. You have to be cautious when choosing an Informative topic, as it’s easy to confuse the Informative Speech and a Persuasive Speech as the same thing. However an Informative Speech JUST provides information. The most basic informative speech is the kind that teaches us (much in the way the Demonstration Speech taught us) something detailed about a topic with which we are already familiar. For instance, we know George Washington was our first President, but a lot of people don't know much about his life prior to the military or serving in office. That would make for an interesting Informative Speech.
With an informative Speech, you’ll want to establish credibility by referencing and citing your materials. For example: "In the July 13, 2007 edition of the New York Times, John Smith said that George Washington suffered from depression as a young boy." It is critical that you discuss where you found your information in order to maintain your credibility.
A few parameters:
1. Your speech should be 5-10 minutes in length.
2. Feel free to incorporate visual aids. This is not mandatory, but it makes for a better presentation, as we learned last week.
3. Cite a minimum of two different sources for your materials. Do NOT use Wikipedia as a source. Please copy and paste these sources into the ‘comments’ area when submitting or submit as a paper. I will evaluate your sources.
4. Be sure to have a good introduction, a body that contains at least three main points (with appropriate supporting evidence) and a conclusion that appropriately wraps everything up.
As always, you may draft your speech word for word, but be very careful not to simply read from your paper! We want eye contact and emotion! Good luck with this assignment and have fun!
.
Introduction about topic Intelligence phaseWhat is the .docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction about topic
Intelligence phase
:
What is the problem (opportunity)
Classify the problem (opportunity)
structurt ,unstructuer ,semi structur
i think our search structure
Decompose the problem (opportunity).
The effects of noise on student performance
The effects of temprutur on student performance
The effects of light on student performance
.
Introduction A short summary is provided on the case subject and.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction
A short summary is provided on the case subject and discuss Effat University ICT infrastructure sustainability in 3 pillars (Planet, People, and Profit).
Analysis
(due April 16)
Study the ICT infrastructure of Effat University and provide an analysis of its performance in terms of Green Measures of Performance (Green MoPs).
.
Introduction Illiteracy is the inability to read and write a.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction
Illiteracy is the inability to read and write at an adequate level of proficiency that is critical for communication. Illiterate adults are unable to use printed and written information to function in the society so as to achieve one’s goals and also to develop one’s potential.
According to an international nonprofit ProLiteracy in 2003, there are 36 million adults in the United States alone. This potential includes a broad range of information-processing skills that one can use daily in school and at the community as a whole. Adult illiteracy has become a societal problem because illiterate people can never fully utilize writing and reading skills to make use of their fully potential in the world. The thesis statement of adult illiteracy involves reasons why it identified as a societal problem; the solutions proposed to solve this problem and the statistical information of adult literacy as the global societal problem.
Different types of society exist. These types of illiteracy are technological illiteracy, mathematical illiteracy, visual illiteracy, school illiteracy, community illiteracy and personal illiteracy. All these types of illiteracy are caused by various reasons. These reasons are summarized in the following discussion.
Causes of Adult Illiteracy
People are usually mistaken about illiteracy. School illiteracy is overvalued to the extent that many adults have started to believe the act of reading and writing are the only important things in school. It is this type of reasoning that make many adults less interested in wanting to gain more knowledge and see things beyond the negative images. This has become one of the main reasons why adult illiteracy has increased in the world over the last few years.
Another reason for adult illiteracy is the misuse of groups. Some people tend to agree with the argument that can make one believe that he or she is weak as a reader and he or she won’t be able to achieve literacy even after finishing school. This type of thinking lowers someone’s self-esteem and self-confidence meaning that the person will not bother to seek literacy help. People’s reading attitude are influential in literacy behaviors. According to McKenna in 2001, reading attitudes are influenced by factors such as a person’s social experiences with reading, one’s personal experiences, the cultural norms about reading, cultural norms and the learner’s preferences about reading. Attitude is associated with unwillingness to read. Every learning experience that a child has in school will at some point determine how that child will determine to learn. The learners who have had negative experiences in school will come to view school and learning in total as a bad experience that. This disengagement spreads over to adults. An adult learner who has negative perceptions about school would not want to be associated with it. These learners never get interested in educational process because they don’t see it as valuabl.
Intro to Quality Management Week 3Air Bag Recall.docxMargenePurnell14
Intro to Quality Management Week 3
Air Bag Recall
Assignment
Review the article “Blow Out” from this week’s reading assignment. This article pertains to the recall of air bag products. Assume you are the manager for a large automotive company that will be using air bags in your products. What risk assessment tools will you use in order to ensure that the product being installed into your vehicles meets safety standards in order to avoid a recall? Use your course materials and outside research to generate a solid analysis on why these methods would be helpful. Your analysis should be supported by research.
Directions for obtaining the file: Login to the Grantham University library by clicking on the Resources tab from the main page. You will then log into EBSCOHost. Once you have accessed the database, simply copy and paste the title of the article and press enter to search and you should now have the file accessible to review.
The requirements below must be met for your paper to be accepted and graded:
•Write between 750 – 1,250 words (approximately 3 – 5 pages) using Microsoft Word in APA style, see example below.
•Use font size 12 and 1” margins.
•Include cover page and reference page.
•At least 80% of your paper must be original content/writing.
•No more than 20% of your content/information may come from references.
•Use at least three references from outside the course material, one reference must be from EBSCOhost. Text book, lectures, and other materials in the course may be used, but are not counted toward the three reference requirement.
•Cite all reference material (data, dates, graphs, quotes, paraphrased words, values, etc.) in the paper and list on a reference page in APA style.
Article
Section:
Features
Business: Cars
Keywords: Safety; Automotive industry; Driving; Accidents; Brain; Congress; Design; Regulations; Vehicles; Weight; Fariello; Cars
Air bags are meant to save lives. Now a massive recall shows how they sometimes can turn deadly
Forensic Investigator Sal Fariello, whose job is to deconstruct car crashes, has witnessed a catalog of carnage caused by air bags over the past two decades. In his collection, there is a photo of a woman who has been horribly scarred by an inflating air bag. There's an X-ray of a driver's broken wrists snapped in the "fling zone" of an air bag that mashed both arms from a 10-and-2 position into the car's roof. He can cite numerous drivers who suffered torn aortas or lacerated brain stems, all the result of being "punched" by an air bag inflating at 200 m.p.h. (322 km/h). "What's sitting in the front of the steering wheel is an explosive device," explains Fariello, the author of Airbag Injuries: Causation & Federal Regulation. "Nasty, unexpected events can occur."
None have been nastier than the injuries and deaths caused by exploding inflators in air bags made by automotive supplier Takata Corp., based in Tokyo. Its air bags have .
Intro to Quality Management Week 3Air Bag RecallAssignment.docxMargenePurnell14
Intro to Quality Management Week 3
Air Bag Recall
Assignment
Review the article “Blow Out” from this week’s reading assignment. This article pertains to the recall of air bag products. Assume you are the manager for a large automotive company that will be using air bags in your products. What risk assessment tools will you use in order to ensure that the product being installed into your vehicles meets safety standards in order to avoid a recall? Use your course materials and outside research to generate a solid analysis on why these methods would be helpful. Your analysis should be supported by research.
Directions for obtaining the file: Login to the Grantham University library by clicking on the Resources tab from the main page. You will then log into EBSCOHost. Once you have accessed the database, simply copy and paste the title of the article and press enter to search and you should now have the file accessible to review.
The requirements below must be met for your paper to be accepted and graded:
•Write between 750 – 1,250 words (approximately 3 – 5 pages) using Microsoft Word in APA style, see example below.
•Use font size 12 and 1” margins.
•Include cover page and reference page.
•At least 80% of your paper must be original content/writing.
•No more than 20% of your content/information may come from references.
•Use at least three references from outside the course material, one reference must be from EBSCOhost. Text book, lectures, and other materials in the course may be used, but are not counted toward the three reference requirement.
•Cite all reference material (data, dates, graphs, quotes, paraphrased words, values, etc.) in the paper and list on a reference page in APA style.
Article
Section:
Features
Business: Cars
Keywords: Safety; Automotive industry; Driving; Accidents; Brain; Congress; Design; Regulations; Vehicles; Weight; Fariello; Cars
Air bags are meant to save lives. Now a massive recall shows how they sometimes can turn deadly
Forensic Investigator Sal Fariello, whose job is to deconstruct car crashes, has witnessed a catalog of carnage caused by air bags over the past two decades. In his collection, there is a photo of a woman who has been horribly scarred by an inflating air bag. There's an X-ray of a driver's broken wrists snapped in the "fling zone" of an air bag that mashed both arms from a 10-and-2 position into the car's roof. He can cite numerous drivers who suffered torn aortas or lacerated brain stems, all the result of being "punched" by an air bag inflating at 200 m.p.h. (322 km/h). "What's sitting in the front of the steering wheel is an explosive device," explains Fariello, the author of Airbag Injuries: Causation & Federal Regulation. "Nasty, unexpected events can occur."
None have been nastier than the injuries and deaths caused by exploding inflators in air bags made by automotive supplier Takata Corp., based in Tokyo. Its air bags have been blamed for killing five motorists in.
INTERVIEW WITH AMERICAN INDIAN COMMUNITY PRACTITIONERSResourcesD.docxMargenePurnell14
INTERVIEW WITH AMERICAN INDIAN COMMUNITY PRACTITIONERS
Resources
Discussion Participation Scoring Guide
.
Interview With American Indian Community Practitioners
Interview with Betty Laverdure
LAUNCH INTERVIEW
|
Transcript
Interviews With American Indian Community Practitioners
Interview with Denise Levy
LAUNCH INTERVIEW
|
Transcript
Values, communication, beliefs, economics, clothing, assumptions, and interpretation are all part of cultural dynamics. Understanding this, review the interviews with American Indian community practitioners. Listen for their expectations toward culturally appropriate ways in which to communicate and work with tribal communities.
Provide a synopsis of the interviews and address the following questions.
How do cultural dynamics impact collaboration?
What are the cultural dynamics at play?
How will you use the information to better understand working with American Indian communities?
.
Interview Each team member should interview an educator about his.docxMargenePurnell14
Interview:
Each team member should interview an educator about his or her philosophy of education.
Consider
the following questions regarding the challenges facing education today:
Where do they think education is headed in the future?
How have their own life experiences shaped their current philosophy regarding education?
Ask 6 questions including the two above.
.
IntroductionRisk management is critical to protect organization.docxMargenePurnell14
Introduction
:
Risk management is critical to protect organizational assets and to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. Many individuals and departments in organizations are involved in risk management; this is especially true when creating a risk management plan.
You, as an employee of YieldMore, are asked to create a risk management plan for the organization.
Scenario
:
In order to help protect the company and ensure it maintains compliance with laws and regulations, senior management at YieldMore has decided to develop a formal risk management plan.
As an employee of YieldMore, your team has been given the task of creating a risk management plan for the organization.
Tasks
:
You will initiate a kick-off meeting to discuss YieldMore’s risk management plan with your team.
Review the responsibilities associated with your assigned role.
Explain the specific responsibilities of your assigned role within the project.
Explain your role and the roles of the other team members to senior management.
.
Interview two different individuals regarding their positions in soc.docxMargenePurnell14
Interview two different individuals regarding their positions in society. Analyze their responses regarding:
Identify each person’s class, race, and gender.
What role has class, race, and gender played in their lives? How do you see these stratifiers as playing a role, even if the interviewee is unaware of it?
Apply one of the sociological perspectives (structural-functional, social-conflict, or symbolic-interaction) to the individuals’ lives. Why did you choose this particular perspective? How does it explain each person’s life and life choices?
What are some the benefits and limitations to using interview as a research methodology?
Analyze each person’s components of culture (language, symbols, material objects, and behaviors) and relate them to his/her stratified position in society.
Please post your completed paper in the
M5: Assignment 1 Dropbox
.
Assignment 1 Grading Criteria
Maximum Points
Described each person’s class, race, and gender.
40
Evaluated the role of social stratification.
.
Internet ExerciseVisit the homepage of Microsoft at www.micros.docxMargenePurnell14
Internet Exercise
Visit the homepage of Microsoft at www.microsoft.com. Access the annual report for 2012. Find the footnotes to the statements and read the disclosures in the note titled Contingencies. Regarding the events described, do you think Microsoft is providing adequate disclosure to its stockholders?
.
Interpersonal Violence Against Women, The Role of Men by Martin Schw.docxMargenePurnell14
Interpersonal Violence Against Women, The Role of Men by Martin Schwartz and Walter DeKeseredy.
Respond to questions 1-3 at the end of the reading.
1- How is ininate partner violence a "male" issue?
2- how dose a patriarchal society perpetuate violence against women?
3- what type of programming and interventions are necessary to stop violence against women?
.
Internet of Vehicles-ProjectIntroduction - what you plan t.docxMargenePurnell14
Internet of Vehicles-Project
Introduction - what you plan to accomplish and why, include an overview of the situation or
organization and what the situation/problem is that you intend to improve - usually 1-2 pages) Cite and support all content appropriately
o
Methodology is a research paper about Action Research, 2-3 pages (include reasons and justification for approach), minimum of five (5) professional references
Reserved for hifsa shaukat
.
Interview an ELL instructor from a Title I school about how assessme.docxMargenePurnell14
Interview an ELL instructor from a Title I school about how assessment is used for placement. You may interview one of the instructors that you have observed during your observations for this course. Inquire also about how placement is determined for both special education and gifted ELLs. Your questions might include (but should not be limited to) the following:
What are the indicators of exceptionality a classroom teacher should look for when a student also has a language barrier?
How can informal as well as formal assessment results factor into placement?
What role do parents and teachers have in placement?
What are some primary factors that are exhibited in underachievement that may not necessarily signal special education needs?
How are changes among individual ELL proficiency levels over the course of the school year accounted for?
How are diagnostic, formative, and summative assessments integrated for ELLs in mainstream classrooms?
What are the benefits of the SIOP protocol for native English speakers as well as those for whom English is an additional language?
Consolidate your findings in a 750-word essay, supporting your findings with at least three current sources from your readings and the GCU Library to support your reasoning.
.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SECURITY SCIENCE Walid.docxMargenePurnell14
This document provides an overview of standards for information security risk management, highlighting challenges in implementing assessments and drivers for adopting standards. It analyzes frameworks including ISO 27001, ISO 27002, ISO 27005, ITIL, COBIT, Risk IT, Basel II, PCI DSS, and OCTAVE. While these frameworks provide guidance, there is no single best solution, and organizations face challenges selecting and properly implementing a framework given their unique needs and resources. The document concludes more research is needed to guide selection of the most appropriate framework.
International Finance Please respond to the followingBased on.docxMargenePurnell14
"International Finance"
Please respond to the following:
Based on the lecture and Webtext materials, address the following:
The IMF and World Bank are the world’s two leading lending institutions, but much of their monetary assistance disappears once it enters the banking systems of developing countries. Cite concrete evidence that supports the assertion that much assistance to developing countries is simply stolen by officials. Determine other main factors that account for the misuse of these funds.
.
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17Celine George
An import error occurs when a program fails to import a module or library, disrupting its execution. In languages like Python, this issue arises when the specified module cannot be found or accessed, hindering the program's functionality. Resolving import errors is crucial for maintaining smooth software operation and uninterrupted development processes.
How to Manage Your Lost Opportunities in Odoo 17 CRMCeline George
Odoo 17 CRM allows us to track why we lose sales opportunities with "Lost Reasons." This helps analyze our sales process and identify areas for improvement. Here's how to configure lost reasons in Odoo 17 CRM
How to Setup Warehouse & Location in Odoo 17 InventoryCeline George
In this slide, we'll explore how to set up warehouses and locations in Odoo 17 Inventory. This will help us manage our stock effectively, track inventory levels, and streamline warehouse operations.
हिंदी वर्णमाला पीपीटी, hindi alphabet PPT presentation, hindi varnamala PPT, Hindi Varnamala pdf, हिंदी स्वर, हिंदी व्यंजन, sikhiye hindi varnmala, dr. mulla adam ali, hindi language and literature, hindi alphabet with drawing, hindi alphabet pdf, hindi varnamala for childrens, hindi language, hindi varnamala practice for kids, https://www.drmullaadamali.com
This slide is special for master students (MIBS & MIFB) in UUM. Also useful for readers who are interested in the topic of contemporary Islamic banking.
How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17Celine George
In Odoo, making a field required can be done through both Python code and XML views. When you set the required attribute to True in Python code, it makes the field required across all views where it's used. Conversely, when you set the required attribute in XML views, it makes the field required only in the context of that particular view.
বাংলাদেশের অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা ২০২৪ [Bangladesh Economic Review 2024 Bangla.pdf] কম্পিউটার , ট্যাব ও স্মার্ট ফোন ভার্সন সহ সম্পূর্ণ বাংলা ই-বুক বা pdf বই " সুচিপত্র ...বুকমার্ক মেনু 🔖 ও হাইপার লিংক মেনু 📝👆 যুক্ত ..
আমাদের সবার জন্য খুব খুব গুরুত্বপূর্ণ একটি বই ..বিসিএস, ব্যাংক, ইউনিভার্সিটি ভর্তি ও যে কোন প্রতিযোগিতা মূলক পরীক্ষার জন্য এর খুব ইম্পরট্যান্ট একটি বিষয় ...তাছাড়া বাংলাদেশের সাম্প্রতিক যে কোন ডাটা বা তথ্য এই বইতে পাবেন ...
তাই একজন নাগরিক হিসাবে এই তথ্য গুলো আপনার জানা প্রয়োজন ...।
বিসিএস ও ব্যাংক এর লিখিত পরীক্ষা ...+এছাড়া মাধ্যমিক ও উচ্চমাধ্যমিকের স্টুডেন্টদের জন্য অনেক কাজে আসবে ...
A workshop hosted by the South African Journal of Science aimed at postgraduate students and early career researchers with little or no experience in writing and publishing journal articles.
1. CRITICAL THINKING RUBRIC
Not Proficient
Some Proficiency
Proficient
Highly Proficient
Points Received
(10 x 5)
Identified and
Explained Issues
Fails to identify,
summarize, or explain
the main problem or
2. question, or represents
the issues inaccurately
or inappropriately.
Identifies main
issues but does not
summarize or
explain them
clearly or
sufficiently.
Successfully
identifies and
summarizes the
main issues, but
does not explain
why/how they
are problems or
create questions.
3. Clearly identifies
and summarizes
main issues and
successfully and
identifies implicit
issues, addressing
their relationship to
each other.
Recognizes
Stakeholders and
Contexts
Fails to accurately
identify and explain any
context for the issues or
presents problems as
having no connections
4. to other contexts.
Shows some
understanding of
the influences of
theoretical
contexts on
stakeholders, but
does not identify
any specific ones
relevant to
situation at hand.
Correctly
identified all the
empirical and
most of the
theoretical
contexts
5. relevant to all
the main
stakeholders in
the situation.
Not only correctly
identifies all the
contexts relevant to
stakeholders, but
also finds minor
stakeholders and
contexts and shows
conflicts of interests
among them.
Takes
Intellectual
Risks
6. Stays strictly within the
guidelines of the
assignment.
Considers new
directions or
approaches
without going
beyond the
guidelines of the
assignment.
Incorporates
new directions
or approaches to
the assignment
in the final
product.
7. Actively seeks out
and follows through
on untested and
potentially risky
directions or
approaches to the
assignment in the
final product.
Evaluates
Assumptions
Fails to identify and
evaluate any of the
important assumptions
behind the
recommendations
made.
8. Identifies some of
the most important
assumptions, but
does not evaluate
them for
plausibility or
clarity.
Identifies and
evaluates all the
important
assumptions, but
not the ones
deeper in the
background–the
more abstract
ones.
9. Not only identifies
and evaluates all the
important
assumptions, but
also some the more
hidden, more
abstract ones.
Innovative
Thinking
Merely restates existing
ideas.
Experiments with
creating a novel or
unique idea,
format, or product.
10. Actually creates
a novel or
unique idea,
identifies a new
void, or
proposes a new
product.
Extends a novel or
unique idea,
question, format, or
product to create
new knowledge or
knowledge that
crosses boundaries.
11. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 11
In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in
Domestic Emergencies
Scott R . Tkacz
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you
by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Scott R . Tkacz, In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's
Role in Domestic Emergencies, 15 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 301 (2006),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1/11
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1/11
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
IN KATRINA'S WAKE: RETHINKING THE MILITARY'S
ROLE
IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES
Scott R. Tkacz
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 301
I. LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE
KATRINA DISASTER ... 303
Hi. HISTORY OF THE LIMITATION ON THE USE OF THE
12. MILITARY IN
DOMESTIC ARENAS ........................................... 307
A. Posse Comitatus Act ...................................... 307
B. Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act ........................ 308
I. HISTORICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO
THE POSSE
COMITATUS ACT ............................................ 312
A. Presidential Power in Federalizing the National Guard
........... 314
IV. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO EXPANDING
PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY IN THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS
DOMESTICALLY ......... 315
A. The Need for Centralized Decision-Making by a Single
Individual
Is Critical in Emergency Situations ........................... 315
B. "Traditional Notions" of Domestic Military Action Are Not
Supported by History ...................................... 318
C. Federal Military Forces Can Receive Adequate Training for
Effective Execution of Domestic Law Enforcement ...............
324
D. Active Military Participation in Domestic Law Enforcement
Does Not Necessarily Mean Permanent Domestic Deployment
..... 326
E. The President Possesses Broad Discretion in Matters
Authorized
by Congress ............................................. 330
F. Use of the Military in Domestic Affairs Would Serve to
13. Protect
Civilians' Constitutional Rights, Not to Abrogate Them ...........
332
CONCLUSION .................................................. 333
INTRODUCTION
The massive devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in
Louisiana and
Mississippi in August 2005' left behind shattered communities
that will be left to pick
up the pieces for months and years to come.2 The alarming
number of hurricanes
See infra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. On June 23, 2006,
1 visited New Orleans and
witnessed the destruction firsthand. The severity of the damage
is truly difficult to put into words.
2 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, FEMA Calls 60,000 Houses in Storm
Area Beyond Repair, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at A14; Eric Lipton, Hurricane Evacuees
Face Eviction Threats at
Both Their Old Homes and New, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at
A20; Adam Nossiter et al.,
New Orleans Is Still Grappling with the Basics of Rebuilding,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,2005, at Al.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
to strike the United States coastline in 2004 and 2005' suggests
that history can, and
14. likely will, repeat itself. Significant breakdowns in
communication and confused
emergency and law enforcement responses from local, state, and
federal officials in
the hours and days after Hurricane Katrina led to chaos and
panic in the affected
areas, endangering citizens' property and lives.4 The delayed
reaction to this crisis
suggests the need for an expansion of existing presidential
authority to use active
military forces to rapidly secure the disaster area and rescue
survivors.5
This Note will argue that Congress should supply the President,
and by ex-
tension, the military, authority to engage in domestic law
enforcement when cir-
cumstances dictate rapid action to prevent widespread loss of
life and property,
such as in the case of Hurricane Katrina. Part I examines the
failure of the local,
state, and federal response in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. Part II explores
the history and legality of presidential authority to deploy
federal troops in do-
mestic theaters. Part IH examines previous instances in which
the President has
used existing statutory authority to use federal troops in
domestic emergencies.
Part IV examines the arguments made against weakening the
posse comitatus
doctrine, and how they translate to modem American policy and
values. Finally,
Part V concludes with recommendations to modify the federal
structure to give the
President more flexibility in ordering federal troops into active
15. duty in times of
extreme emergency.
As of June 2006, the most heavily affected areas of New
Orleans remained deserted, and
rebuilding is only in the preliminary stages. Many community
services, including electricity,
water, healthcare, and police protection are sporadic and
unreliable.
' Six hurricanes struck the United States in 2004, including four
which made landfall in
Florida. ERIC S. BLAKE ET AL., NAT'L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE DEADLIEST,
COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES
TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 TO 2004
(AND OTHER FREQUENTLY REQUESTED HURRICANE
FACTS) app. A (2005), http://www.nhc
.noaa.gov/pdf/NWS-TPC-4.pdf. In 2005, several powerful
hurricanes developed in the
Atlantic basin. Hurricane Dennis made landfall near Navarre
Beach, Florida, as a Category
3 storm on the Saffir-Simpson scale. National Hurricane Center,
Monthly Tropical Weather
Summary (Aug. 1, 2005),
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/tws/MIATWSAT-
jul.shtml.
Hurricane Katrina, before coming ashore near the border of
Louisiana and Mississippi,
became the fourth most intense hurricane ever recorded.
National Hurricane Center,
Monthly Tropical Weather Summary (Sept. 1, 2005),
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/
2005/tws/MIATWSATaug.shtml. Hurricane Rita, in the days
before striking Texas and
Louisiana, was measured as the third most intense hurricane
16. ever recorded. National Hurricane
Center, Monthly Tropical Weather Summary (Oct. 1, 2005),
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
archive/2005/tws/MIATWSAT-sep.shtml. Hurricane Wilma
became the most intense hurricane
ever recorded in Atlantic waters on October 19, 2005, five days
before plowing across the
Florida peninsula. National Hurricane Center, Monthly Tropical
Weather Summary (Nov.
1, 2005),
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/tws/MIATWSAToct.sht
ml.
4 See infra Part I.
5 See infra notes 13-33 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
I. LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE
KATRINA DISASTER
Hurricane Katrina crashed ashore near the border of Louisiana
and Mississippi
on August 29, 20056 with 145-mile-per-hour winds7 and a
twenty- to thirty-foot storm
surge.' The wind and rain from the hurricane caused the levees
protecting the city
of New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain's waters to fail,9
engulfing over eighty
percent of the city in up to twenty feet of water.' ° The flooding
stranded 20,000 New
Orleans residents at the Louisiana Superdome, which was
17. intended only to be a "shelter
of last resort."" Thousands more were stranded on building
rooftops for over two days
without food or water, trying desperately to stay out of the
flood-water. 2
Local and state authorities struggled to respond to the
overwhelmingly massive
rescue and relief effort brought on by the breach of New
Orleans' levees.13 Louisiana
National Guard troops evacuated their headquarters to the
Superdome, and communica-
tions were nonexistent among the troops leading the rescue
effort.14 Governor Bill
Richardson of New Mexico stated that 200 National Guard
troops were packed and
ready to go to New Orleans, but two days passed before state
officials responded to
6 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory
Number 27 (Aug. 29, 2005),
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/pub/al
I22005.public.027.shtml.
" Joseph B. Treaster &Kate Zemike, Hurricane Slams into
GulfCoast; DozensAre Dead,
N.Y. TVEs, Aug. 30, 2005, at Al.
s Don Hammack, Documenting Surge Surveyors: Storm Water
Topped at Least 28 Feet,
SUN HERALD (Biloxi, MS), Oct. 16,2005, at Al. The National
Hurricane Center defines storm
surge as "[a]n abnormal rise in sea level accompanying a
hurricane or other intense storm, and
whose height is the difference between the observed level of the
sea surface and the level that
18. would have occurred in the absence of the cyclone." National
Hurricane Center, Glossary
of NHC/TPC Terms, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutgloss.shtml
(last visited Aug. 21,2006).
9 John M. Barry, After the Deluge, Some Questions, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 13, 2005, at A27.
'0 Joseph B. Treatser & N.R. Kleinfield, New Orleans is
Inundated as 2 Levees Fail; Much
of Gulf Coast is Crippled; Toll Rises, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31,
2005, at Al.
" Robert D. McFadden & Ralph Blumenthal, Bush Sees Long
Recovery for New Orleans;
30,000 Troops in Largest U.S. Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 2005, at Al. Underlining the
desperate situation at the Superdome, Marty Bahamonde, the
sole Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) employee in New Orleans before Katrina
arrived, stated that he was
told the Superdome would be equipped with a FEMA medical
team, 360,000 ready-to-eat
meals and fifteen water trucks before the storm arrived. Eric
Lipton, Worker Tells of Response
by FEMA, N.Y. TmIES, Oct. 21, 2005, at A20. In fact, only five
water trucks and 40,000 ready-
to-eat meals had arrived before the storm. Id. The FEMA
medical team did not arrive until
one day after New Orleans flooded. Id.
12 McFadden & Blumenthal, supra note 11.
" Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, When Storm Hit, National
Guard Was Deluged Too,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at Al.
19. 14 Id. Most cellphones, telephone land lines, and satellite
phones were disabled because
of the storm, and radio frequencies were often jammed from
overuse. The conditions forced
some National Guard commanders to use "runners, like in World
War I," to transfer
information back and forth. Id.
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WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Richardson's offer of assistance. More than 250 members of the
New Orleans Police
Department abandoned their duties in the days following the
flooding, and reports
indicated that some officers even looted homes and businesses.'
6
In the absence of law enforcement in the city, many stranded
residents looted
local stores, carrying away electronics, clothing, shoes, and
firearms. 7 Property owners
defended themselves on their own using shotguns and small
firearms.' 8 By August 31,
two days after the storm's landfall, the Mayor of New Orleans
had ordered the city's
police to abandon search and rescue efforts and return to their
traditional duties of
law enforcement.' 9 Supply trucks were delayed entering the
city because drivers
refused to proceed without a police escort, and Baton Rouge
20. abandoned its offer to send
riot-trained officers to New Orleans after its chief
administrative officer decided
he did not want to place so many of his officers in harm's way.2'
More than 20,000
evacuees gathered at the New Orleans Convention Center, which
had no food, water,
medical care, or security personnel.2' Thirteen of the sixteen
hospitals in greater New
Orleans were closed due to extensive storm damage and fear of
looting.22
Communication among Louisiana officials broke down after the
storm. Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco asked President George W. Bush for
"everything
you've got," which hampered the federal government's decision-
making process in
exactly how to act.23 Blanco's aides stated that the Governor
did not know that the
federal government needed an itemized list for help.24
However, Blanco rejected
President Bush's request to turn over command and control of
the National Guard
troops to a single federal military commander.25 The director of
the Federal Emergency
5 Id.
16 Dan Barry & Jere Longman, A Police Department Racked by
Doubt and Accusations,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A20.
'" Felicity Barringer & Jere Longman, Owners Take Up Arms as
Looters Press Their
Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A16.
21. "8 Id. One resident, John Carolan, reported that three or four
men tried to take his electric
generator by threatening him with a knife and a machete. He
scared them away by firing
warning shots over their head with a revolver. Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 James Dao et al.,New Orleans IsAwaiting Deliverance, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2,2005, at A15.
22 Reed Abelson, Can Hospitals Reopen? It's a Matter of
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2005, at C I.
' Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to
Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Lipton, Breakdowns].
24 David E. Sanger, Bush Wants to Consider Broadening of
Military's Powers During
NaturalDisasters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, atA18. Governor
Blanco stated that she thought
she had requested all federal assistance that could be given,
including active-duty federal troops:
'"Nobody told me that I had to request that' ... 'I thought that I
had requested everything they
had. We were living in a war zone by then."' Eric Lipton et al.,
Political Issues Snarled Plans
for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at Al [hereinafter
Upton, Political Issues].
25 Michael Luo, The Embattled Leader of a Storm-Battered
State Immersed in Crisis,
22. [Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
Management Agency (FEMA), Michael D. Brown, said that
Governor Blanco' s initial
response to the disaster in Louisiana was uncoordinated and
confused, preventing
the agency from taking coherent action to bring the situation
under control.26
The Bush administration's response to the chaos inflicted by
Hurricane Katrina
spurred an internal administration debate as to whether active-
duty military forces
could be used in relief or law enforcement roles.27 The Bush
administration hesitated
to send active-duty military forces because they feared it would
appear that the President
was seizing executive authority from a female governor of
another political party.'
Blanco acknowledged that she was aware of the political
considerations surrounding
relinquishing state control to the federal government and felt
pressured to do so by
members of the Bush administration. 29 Further debate
continued over whether the
President even had authority to order active-duty troops into the
regions affected by
the hurricane if Governor Blanco resisted relinquishing control
over the National
Guard.3" The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
concluded after a series
23. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A26. Governor Blanco's press
secretary stated that Blanco
refused the President's request because "Is]he would lose
control when she had been in control
from the very beginning." Elisabeth Bumiller & Clyde
Haberman, Bush Makes Return Visit;
2 Levees Secured, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at Al.
26 David D. Kirkpatrick & Scott Shane, Ex-FEMA Chief Tells
of Frustration and Chaos,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at Al.
27 Lipton, Breakdowns, supra note 23.
28 Lipton, PoliticalIssues, supra note 24. A Bush administration
official stated, "Can you
imagine how it would have been perceived if a president of the
United States of one party
had pre-emptively taken from the female governor of another
party the command and control
of her forces... ?" Id.
29 Bruce Alpert, Panel Grills La. Governor on Katrina, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Feb. 3, 2006, at 1. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin claimed that
during a meeting between
President Bush and Governor Blanco four days after the
hurricane struck, a discussion about
federalizing the National Guard became so heated that Nagin
suggested the pair "go into
another room to settle their differences." Gerard Shields, Bush
Asks for $18 Billion, BATON
ROUGE ADvoc., Feb. 3, 2006, at Al.
30 Lipton, Breakdowns, supra note 23; Lipton, Political Issues,
supra note 24; see also
24. Gerard Shields, Military Personnel Evaluate Confusion,
Cooperation in Storm, BATON ROUGE
ADvoc., Feb. 10, 2006, at Al. Senator Joseph Lieberman
highlighted the initial confusion sur-
rounding whether the federal military should become involved
in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina:
Our committee has learned... of some disagreements about the
degree to
which the Defense Department should operate on U.S. soil. And
these dis-
agreements may have limited the military's response time and
effec-
tiveness in this case because of the initial hesitation to deploy
active duty
troops and to pre-position assets before Hurricane Katrina made
landfall.
Hurricane Katrina: Defense Department's Role in Response:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Sen. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs), available
at http://hsgac.senate.govLfiles/020906JILOpen.pdf [hereinafter
Defense Department's Role].
20061
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
of meetings that the President had legal authority to take control
of National Guard
25. troops as well as deploy active-duty troops to the affected areas
in the absence of
requests by state officials." However, the decision was a legal
and political risk the
administration was not willing to take, regardless of the
conditions persisting in
New Orleans.32 Instead, the Bush administration chose to rely
on mobilized National
Guard troops from other states to fill the law enforcement
vacuum in New Orleans,
before the President finally ordered 7,200 active-duty forces
into New Orleans five
days after the city was flooded.33
In the wake of the massive logistical and communications
problems experienced
at all levels of government in the effort to respond to the effects
of Hurricane Katrina,
government officials have suggested that the military should
play a greater role in
handling such crises. On September 15, 2005, President George
W. Bush stated that:
It was not a normal hurricane-and the normal disaster relief
system was not equal to it. Many of the men and women of the
Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
United States military, the National Guard, Homeland Security,
and state and local governments performed skillfully under the
worst conditions. Yet the system, at every level of government,
was not well-coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few
days. It is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires
greater
federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces -the
institution of our government most capable of massive logistical
operations on a moment's notice.'
26. President Bush reiterated this concept on September 27, 2005,
urging Congress to
evaluate extending executive authority in times of emergency so
the full assets of the
Department of Defense could be used to respond to catastrophic
natural disasters.3
President Bush said that such measures would be helpful "in
certain extreme circum-
stances, to be able to rally assets for the good of the people. I
don't want to prejudge
the Congress's discussion on this issue, because it may require
change of law."36
Lieberman further noted that "[tihe lack of a [military] plan led
to unnecessary confusion, unnec-
essary bureaucratic struggles, and more human suffering than
should have [occurred]." Id.
" Lipton, Political Issues, supra note 24.
32 Id.
33 Id.
' President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 15,
2005) [hereinafter Bush,
Address to the Nation] (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/09/20050915-8.html).
" President George W. Bush, Remarks at the U.S. Dep't of
Energy (Sept. 26, 2005)
[hereinafter Bush, Remarks] (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/09/20050926.html).
36 Id.
27. [Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
Senator Joseph Lieberman echoed the President's sentiment,
concluding that
"[Hurricane] Katrina showed us that we need to define where
that line [for military
involvement in civilian affairs] is drawn."37
The Northern Command of the U.S. Department of Defense is
developing a
proposal for the creation of a specially-trained and equipped
unit of the military's
active forces to respond to catastrophic domestic events."8 The
proposed unit would
be trained to assist state and local law enforcement with relief
capabilities, working
and training with National Guard units, and would be under the
authority of the
National Guard's governor.39 Specific criteria would be
outlined to determine when
and how the active-duty forces would be used in natural disaster
relief, but the active-
duty forces would only have authority to assist in relief efforts,
and not engage in
law enforcement activity.' The head of the Northern Command,
Admiral Timothy
J. Keating, stated that creation of the unit to assist in relief and
recovery operations
on American soil was permissible, but any extension of the
military's role in
domestic law enforcement would require Congress to change
28. existing federal laws
that currently preclude the military from engaging in law
enforcement activities.4
II. HISTORY OF THE LIMITATION ON THE USE OF THE
MILITARY IN
DOMESTIC ARENAS
A. Posse Comitatus Act
The Posse Comitatus Act of 187842 was enacted in an effort to
reaffirm the deeply
held American principle that civilian and military spheres
should be kept distinctly
separate.43 The extensive use of federal troops serving in
domestic law enforcement
roles during the Reconstruction Era spurred Congress to place
new limits on the
3" Defense Department's Role, supra note 30.
38 Eric Schmitt & Thorn Shanker, Military May Propose an
Active-Duty Force for Relief
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A15.
39 id.
4 id.
41 Id.
42 Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, ch. 263,20 Stat. 145 (codified
as 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000)).
43 Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act:
A Principle in Need of
Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 953, 953 (1997). The Constitution
29. clearly places limits on the
scope of federal military power. Article I, Section 8 gives
Congress the power to create and
fund an army and a navy, to regulate the armed forces, and to
declare war. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cls. 11-16. Article II, Section 2 designates the President
as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, placing a civilian at the top of the military
hierarchy. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 1. The Second Amendment provides for the creation of state
militias to serve as a counter-
balance to the federal military power and the Third Amendment
prevents the stationing of
soldiers in private homes. U.S. CONST. amends. H-11I.
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
military's role in domestic affairs." The ex-Confederate states
were divided into mili-
tary districts from the period of 1865 to 1877 as federal troops
were charged with
"registering the voters, supervising the election of delegates to
constitutional conven-
tions, supervising the conventions and supervising the
ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution."4 5 During the hotly contested
presidential election
of 1876 between Republican Rutherford B. Hayes and Democrat
Samuel Tilden,
President Ulysses S. Grant, a Republican, ordered federal troops
into Florida, Louisi-
ana, and South Carolina to protect the election canvassers and
30. prevent widespread
voting fraud.' The Republican Hayes won the election narrowly
with the help of
the electoral votes of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina;
Democrats blamed the
results on Grant's use of federal troops.47 In response to
Reconstruction in the South
and the election of 1876, the Democrat-controlled House of
Representatives passed
a bill making it unlawful for federal troops to enforce the laws
without express
authorization from Congress.4 8 President Hayes signed the bill
on June 18, 1878. 4 9
B. Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act
Congress permits the President to use federal troops at the
request of state authori-
ties.50 Congress has also extended authority to the President to
federalize the National
Guard in instances where rebellion has made it impossible to
enforce the laws of the
" Sean J. O'Hara, Comment, The Posse Comitatus Act Applied
to the Prosecution of
Civilians, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 767, 771-72 (2005).
41 H. W. C. Furman, Restrictions upon Use of the Army
Imposed by the Posse Comitatus
Act, 7 MIL. L. REv. 85, 94 (1960).
46 Id. at 94-95.
47 Id. at 95.
48 Id. at 95-96; see also United States v. Allred, 867 F.2d 856,
870 (5th Cir. 1989)
31. (stating the legislative impetus of the Posse Comitatus Act arose
from the use of federal
troops in elections within ex-Confederate states).
9 Furman, supra note 45, at 96. The Posse Comitatus Act of
1878 stated:
From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to
employ
any part of the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus,
or
otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such
cases
and under such circumstances as such employment of said force
may
be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of
Congress.
Army Appropriations Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152
(1878) (codified as 18 U.S.C. §
1385 (2000)).
50 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) ("Whenever there is an insurrections
[sic] in any State against its
government, the President may, upon the request of its
legislature or of its governor if the legis-
lature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the
militia of the other States, in the
number requested by that State, and use such of the armed
forces, as he considers necessary to
suppress the insurrection.") The concept that the President has
authority to intervene with force
in situations where local and state law enforcement fails has
origins dating to the drafting of the
Constitution and the 1795 Militia Act. See infra notes 134-48
and accompanying text.
32. [Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
United States in any state or territory.5 Further, the President is
authorized to use the
National Guard or the federal military to suppress an
insurrection, domestic violence,
or conspiracy.5 2 While these three exceptions grant significant
power to the President
during times of emergency, they offer little in the way of
specific circumstances in
which the President may make use of this power. 3 The use of
these statutes as a source
of authority to take executive action has been limited to a few
occurrences,' and only
tangential treatment has been given to these statutes by the
courts," creating uncertainty
as to exactly what statutory limits restrict the President in times
of emergency.56
In 1981, Congress expanded the Posse Comitatus Act to
increase the federal mili-
tary' s ability to share information,5 7 equipment,58 and
assistance in training to local and
51 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2000) ("Whenever the President considers
that unlawful obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority
of the United States, make
it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any
State or Territory by the ordi-
nary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal
service such of the militia of any
33. State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers
necessary to enforce those laws or to
suppress the rebellion.").
52 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2000) ("The President, by using the militia
or the armed forces, or both,
or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers
necessary to suppress, in a State,
any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or
conspiracy, if it: (1) so hinders the
execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States
within the State, that any part or class
of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or
protection named in the Constitution
and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State
are unable, fail, or refuse to pro-
tect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection;
or (2) opposes or obstructs the
execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course
ofjustice under those laws.").
13 Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia
Acts, 114 YALE L.J.
149, 192 (2004).
4 See infra Part Ill.
" See, e.g., Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353, 1401-
03 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(holding the FBI's failure to disclose knowledge of conspiracy
to attack Mississippi "Freedom
Riders" foreclosed President Kennedy's ability to intervene
under the provisions of 10 U.S.C.
§ 333); Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia, 353
F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (D.
D.C. 1973) (holding presidential discretion in exercising powers
34. granted by the Constitution
and implementing statutes to use troops and militia to suppress
civil disorder is not subject to
judicial review). These cases only noted that presidential
authority exists to use the military
against civilians; they did not attempt to define any limits to the
authority. Bergman, 565 F.
Supp at 1401-03; Monarch Ins., 353 F. Supp. at 1254-55.
56 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 (2000). The statutory notes offer
no further guidance on the
implementation of the authority provided in these statutes.
" 10 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). The military is permitted to share
information as "[tihe Sec-
retary of Defense shall ensure, to the extent consistent with
national security, that intelligence
information held by the Department of Defense... or other
civilian law enforcement matters
is provided promptly to appropriate civilian law enforcement
officials." Id.
58 10 U.S.C. § 372 (2000). Congress granted "[t]he Secretary of
Defense .... in accor-
dance with other applicable law, [the power to] make available
any equipment. . . ,base
facility, or research facility of the Department of Defense to any
Federal, State, or local
civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement
purposes." Id.
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WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
35. state law enforcement agencies.59 The impetus for the 1981
amendments was an armed
confrontation between members of the American Indian
Movement (AIM) and local,
state, and federal law enforcement authorities during a seventy-
one-day standoff begin-
ning on February 27, 1973.' 0 AIM protested the failure of the
United States govern-
ment to respect the federal government's treaty obligations with
the Sioux Nation.6
Specifically, AIM claimed the federal government abrogated
Sioux sovereignty by
failing to return the South Dakota Black Hills to Sioux control,
which was mandated
under the terms of the still-existing Fort Laramie Treaty of
1868.62 During the standoff,
members of the U.S. Army's Eighty-Second Airborne Division
were on site to supply
advice and counsel to the law enforcement authorities,
supervising the transfer of
armored personnel carriers, sniper rifles, ammunition, and
flares, as well as providing
aerial reconnaissance from military aircraft. In trials for three
separate defendants
following the conclusion of the Wounded Knee standoff, the
three defendants each
argued that such military involvement was unlawful under the
Posse Comitatus Act.'
The three Wounded Knee courts reached contradictory
conclusions as to the scope
of the Posse Comitatus Act.65 In United States v. Red Feather,"
the trial court found
that "[t]he prevention of the use of military supplies and
36. equipment was never men-
tioned in the debates, nor can it reasonably be read into the
words of the Act. Only the
direct active use of troops was forbidden, unless expressly
authorized by the Consti-
tution or by Act of Congress. 6 7 The Red Feather court defined
"active use" in law
enforcement as "arrest; seizure of evidence; search of a person;
search of a building;
investigation of crime; interviewing witnesses; pursuit of an
escaped civilian prisoner;
See 10 U.S.C. § 373 (2000).
o Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the
Coffin forPosse Comitatus,
12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 126-27 (2003). The outlaw
group looted stores, took hostages,
and established an armed perimeter around their area. Id. at 126.
6 Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and
the Discourse ofTreaty
Rights, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1644 (2000).
62 Id.; see also Fort Laramie Treaty, U.S.-Sioux Nation, Apr.
29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635.
63 Canestaro, supra note 60 at 127. In addition, government
forces fired approximately
500,000 rounds of ammunition in an effort to end the seventy-
one-day standoff. Natsu Taylor
Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security ? The USA PATRIOTAct
in the Context of COINTELPRO
and the Unlawful Repression of PoliticalDissent, 81 OR. L.
REv. 1051, 1097 (2002). It remains
unclear, however, whether President Nixon specifically ordered
37. the federal forces to be
involved or whether the decision was made further down the
chain of command. Charles
Bloeser, A Statute in Need of Teeth: Revisiting the Posse
Comitatus Act After 9/11, FED.
LAW., May 2003, at 24, 28. On August 7, 1974, the day before
Nixon resigned from office,
he refused to comply with a subpoena for Oval Office tapes
relating to the White House's
activities during the Wounded Knee affair. Id. at 28 n.20.
' Canestaro, supra note 60, at 126.
65 Id.
6 392 F. Supp. 916 (D. S.D. 1975).
67 Id. at 922 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
search of an area for a suspect and other like activities." 68 The
Red Feather court's
definition only highlights the confusion surrounding how far the
federal military may
go in participating in domestic law enforcement activities,
particularly when taken
in light of the other Wounded Knee trials.69
In United States v. Jaramillo," the court held that although
merely providing
military materiel to law enforcement does not constitute a prima
facie violation of
the Posse Comitatus Act, the extent and pervasiveness of the
38. military's extensive
support role were questionable.7' The Jaramillo court found that
the prosecution failed
to prove that law enforcement authorities had acted in a lawful
manner because the
court could not find that the military personnel's advice,
counsel, equipment, and
maintenance "did not contribute materially to the operation
being carried out by the
law enforcement officers. 72
In United States v. McArthur,3 the Court held that the scope of
the Posse Comitatus
Act restricted military action only "which is regulatory,
proscriptive or compulsory
in nature, and causes the citizens to be presently or
prospectively subject to regula-
tions, proscriptions, or compulsions imposed by military
authority."'74 The court ruled,
in light of the facts, that the military personnel maintained
adequate separation
between active participation and passive assistance .7 "1 find...
that the government
policy of loaning equipment between branches of the
government extends to the
loaning of expert advisors, as was done here. That is, to my
mind, Colonel Warner
was borrowed as a vehicle might be borrowed. 76 Therefore,
two of the three courts
that examined the Posse Comitatus Act interpreted the
restriction broadly, but all
reached the conclusion that the Posse Comitatus Act restricts
the use of active
military troops without express congressional authorization. 77
6 Id. at 925. The Red Feather court also highlighted what it
39. considered to be "passive"
law enforcement duties, such as, "advice or recommendations
given to civilian law enforce-
ment officers... on tactics-or logistics; presence of military
personnel to deliver military
materiel, equipment or supplies, to train local law enforcement
officials on the proper use and
care of such material or equipment... ; aerial photographic
reconnaissance flights and other
like activities." Id.
69 See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
70 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974).
71 Id. at 1379.
72 Id. at 1380-81.
73 419 F. Supp. 186 (D. N.D. 1975).
74 Id. at 194.
75 Id. at 194-95.
76 Id. at 195.
77 Id. at 194; United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916,
922 (D. S.D. 1975);
Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1379.
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
mH. HISTORICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCEPTIONS
TO THE POSSE
COMITATUS ACT
Presidents have been left to maneuver through the gray areas of
the Act's limita-
40. tions when circumstances demand immediate and decisive
executive action. In an
official opinion from July 1856, Attorney General Caleb
Cushing proposed the
question of domestic military intervention when the Governor of
California requested
presidential intervention to suppress an uprising:
Can the President call forth the militia of one State for the
purpose
of suppressing insurrection in another, or employ the land and
naval forces of the United States for the same purpose, when he
has sufficient knowledge of the fact of insurrection, but no
request for his interposition has been made in due conformity
with the conditions of the statute?
78
Cushing argued that only in the gravest circumstances, when all
other alternatives
have failed, should the President be able to use federal military
force in times of
domestic emergency.79
[T]his high power of the President to cases of doubtful legal
con-
dition ought to be reserved for circumstances of the most
exigent
emergency.., in which all the constitutional powers of the State
shall have been exerted in vain to prevent or suppress domestic
war, and in which also imminent or extreme public disaster can
be
averted only by such interposition of the Federal
Government.80
Cushing believed that the request by the Governor of California
41. for federal military
assistance did not satisfy the requirements for enlisting
presidential authority, because
the Governor could only make such a request if the state
legislature was unable to
convene.81 According to Cushing, the request for military
action was "made by the
Governor of the State, not by its legislature, and made by him
without any allegation
that the legislature could not be convened." 2 Clearly, as early
as 1856, there was
a general reluctance to expand presidential authority to dispatch
federal troops for
law enforcement purposes beyond the prescriptions of the then-
existing statutes.
" Insurrection in a State, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 8, 14 (1856).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 13.
82 Id.
[Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
A century later, Attorney General Herbert Brownell issued an
opinion regarding
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's use of federal troops and the
federalization of the
Arkansas National Guard in the face of local resistance to
school desegregation in
Little Rock, Arkansas. 3 Brownell stated that "[in addition to
42. the constitutional power
in the President in such matters, a series of statutes of broad
sweep enable the President
to deal effectively with civil disturbances within a State when
compelling circum-
stances are present."' Brownell believed compelling
circumstances existed in Little
Rock, because local law enforcement authorities were
demonstrably unable to cope
with the white protesters, combined with "the indifference or
refusal of the Governor
of the State to supply a sufficient force to quell the lawless
movement. 8 5 Brownell
did not believe that the Posse Comitatus Act served as a bar to
presidential action,
stating that "at the time the Posse Comitatus Act was enacted,
the predecessors to
10 U.S.C. 332, 333 were in force and the Congress did not
intend or interpret the act
as impairing whatever powers the President had under those
statutes." 6 Brownell
concluded his affirmation of Eisenhower's action by stating:
When an unruly mob arrogates to itself the power to nullify a
con-
stitutionally-secured right, a statutory prescription, and a court
or-
der, it may reasonably be assumed that the danger of a fast-
moving,
destructive volcanic force is immediately present. Success of
the un-
lawful assemblage in Little Rock inevitably would have led to
mob
rule, and a probable breakdown of law and order in an ever-
increas-
ing area. When a local and State Government is unable or
43. unwilling
to meet such a threat, the Federal Government is not impotent.'
83 Christopher S. Yo et al., The Unitary Executive in the
Modem Era, 1945-2004,90 IOWA
L. REv. 601,625-26 (2005). Eisenhower ordered 1,000
paratroopers from the 101 st Airborne
Division into Little Rock because "[h]e wanted [General
Maxwell D.] Taylor to move
quickly in order to demonstrate how rapidly the Army could
respond. Within a few hours,
Taylor had five hundred paratroopers of the 101st Airborne
Division in Little Rock; another
five hundred were there by nightfall." 2 STEPHEN E.
AMBROSE, EIsENHOWER: THE
PRESIDENT 419-20 (1984).
' President's Power to Use Federal Troops to Suppress
Resistance to Enforcement of
Federal Court Orders-Little Rock, Arkansas, 41 Op. Att'y Gen.
313, 327 (1957). Brownell
specifically referred to 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333. Id.
5 Id. at 328. In his opinion, Brownell highlighted the fact that
Eisenhower complied with
the requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 334, id. at 327, which requires
the President to "immediately
order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their
abodes within a limited time"
before using federal troops. 10 U.S.C. § 334 (2000). In
satisfaction of § 334, President
Eisenhower issued a proclamation on September 24, 1957,
ordering those involved with
trying to prevent the execution of federal court orders to
immediately cease and desist their
44. activities. Proclamation No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7,628 (Sept. 25,
1957).
' 41 Op. Att'y Gen. at 330.
87 Id. at 332.
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
In the face of widespread urban rioting across American cities
during the summer
of 1967, Attorney General Ramsey Clark sent a letter to all fifty
state governors detail-
ing the conditions under which President Lyndon B. Johnson
would be willing to use
federal troops to assist local law enforcement authorities.8"
Clark stated that there were
three prerequisites to the use of federal troops to combat
domestic violence. 9 First,
there must be evidence of serious domestic violence;' second,
such violence cannot be
brought under control by all means of law enforcement
available to the state;9 and
third, the legislature or the governor of the state must make a
request in writing to the
President to employ federal armed forces.' The requirement of a
written request sup-
ported the President's required issuance of a proclamation under
10 U.S.C. § 334, but
in cases of "extreme emergency," a written request would not be
required.93 Clark stated
that even if each of the three prerequisites was satisfied, the
President still retained dis-
45. cretion to "exercise his own judgment as to whether Federal
troops will be sent, and as to
such questions as timing, size of the force, and federalization of
the National Guard."
A. Presidential Power in Federalizing the National Guard
The National Guard of the individual states remains under state
executive control
when not federalized by Congress or the President.95 The Posse
Comitatus Act does not
88 Letter from Ramsey Clark, Attorney Gen., to State
Governors (Aug. 7, 1967), quoted
in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3 n.2 (1972).
89 Id.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. In his letter, Clark said that there was no specific
definition of what consisted
actionable domestic violence, only that the assessment would
have to be made under the
particular circumstances of the events. Id.
9 Id. Clark did not define what would constitute an "extreme
emergency." Id.
94 Id. Clark stated in his letter that:
Preliminary steps, such as alerting the troops, can be taken by
the
Federal government upon oral communications and prior to the
gov-
ernor's determination that the violence cannot be brought under
46. control
without the aid of Federal forces. Even such preliminary steps,
however,
represent a most serious departure from our traditions of local
res-
ponsibility for law enforcement. They should not be requested
until
there is a substantial likelihood that the Federal forces will be
needed.
Id. However, in Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963),
the Supreme Court held
mere preparatory action taken by the President, such as moving
federal troops into areas
where they might be needed, was not a violation of 10 U.S.C. §
333. Id. In 1963, President
Kennedy stationed federal troops at bases in Alabama during the
Birmingham civil rights
demonstrations, but they were never used. Note, Riot Control
and the Use of Federal Troops,
81 HARV. L. REv. 638, 650 (1968) [hereinafter Riot Control].
95 William C. Banks, The Normalization
ofHomelandSecurityAfterSeptember 11: The Role
of the Military in Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response,
64 LA. L. REv. 735,762 (2004).
[Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
reach the National Guard when control rests in the hands of
state governors.' In 1916,
Congress gave the National Guard dual status,' requiring all
47. guardsmen to take oaths
to support the United States and the President as well as the
state and its governor.98 An
amendment to the Dick Act further authorized the President to
draft the National Guard
into federal service for deployment abroad. 9 The Perpich Court
held that the National
Guard could be called into active duty over the objections of the
state's governor even
if there was no pressing national emergency." During the period
for which the guards-
men serve in active federal duty, they lose their status as
members of the state militia,
and are no longer under the command of the governor.' O' The
Perpich Court explicitly
stated that once the National Guard is elevated into feder al
service, they become part
of the regular federal military forces, subject to command of the
President.'0 2
IV. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO EXPANDING
PRESIDENTIAL AuTHoRrry IN
THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS DOMESTICALLY
There are several arguments presented by commentators on the
caveats of reducing
the scope of the Posse Comitatus Act. This Note deals with each
issue separately to
focus on the individual arguments and presents alternative
conclusions as to how
and why the concept of posse comitatus can be reshaped to deal
with the challenges
witnessed during a catastrophic disaster such as Hurricane
Katrina.
48. A. The Need for Centralized Decision-Making by a Single
Individual Is Critical
in Emergency Situations
The American political structure is predicated on a series of
checks and balances
to prevent placing too much authority in the hands of one
person.'0 3 In this context,
" See, e.g., United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 25-26 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding Posse
Comitatus Act inapplicable because Pennsylvania National
Guard unit was not in federal
service at the time in question); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-
989, at 455 (1988) (Conf. Rep.),
as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2583 ("When not in
federal service, the National
Guard is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act.").
9 National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, § 1, 39 Stat. 166, 166
(1916).
98 Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334,343 (1990). The Court
held that Congress had
the authority to activate Minnesota's National Guardsmen and
send them outside the country
for training, despite the objections of the state's governor. Id. at
339-40.
99 Id. at 342-43.
'0o id. at 339-40.
101 Id. at 347.
io Id. at 343-44.
103 Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252, 273 (1991) ("The abuses by the monarch
49. recounted in the Declaration of
Independence provide dramatic evidence of the threat to liberty
posed by a too powerful
executive.").
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
although "[t]he military is likewise subject to civilian control...
its accountability is
centralized through a command authority running to the
President. The centralized
national command authority is not as suited as local officials
are to monitor law en-
forcement practices .... ."" However, the need for quick action
in times of emergency
dictates that the executive, as a unitary decision-maker, have
broad discretion in
deciding when and how to take appropriate action.'0 5
Alexander Hamilton stated that
"[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings
of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings
of any greater number;
and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities
will be diminished."'
6
As interpretations of the Posse Comitatus Act currently stand,
the President's
ability to make rapid decisions is hampered because the
complex statutory web of
50. "this approach include[s] a convoluted command and control
structure, decreased
response time, and continuity-of-operations problems; it also
leaves the federal
response vulnerable to exploitation by the adversary."' 1 7 Only
decisions at the top
of the chain of command, by a single informed individual, can
be reached with
appropriate timeliness and legitimacy.'08
The concept of a centralized chain of command with the
President as commander-
in-chief is the very structure utilized by the military in its
traditional role as the
10 Banks, supra note 95, at 770.
10S Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
106 THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
107 Sean M. Maloney, Domestic Operations: The Canadian
Approach, PARAMETERS,
Autumn 1997, at 135, 150. Canada's political-military structure
in domestic situations is
compared to that of the United States. Id. at 135. Maloney
argues that the greater flexibility
in the Canadian system is more effective because:
[legislation does not prescribe the exact civil-military
relationship at
the operational and tactical levels as it does at the national and
provin-
cial leadership levels, nor does it hamper commanders by
dictating the
levels of response which may be required in violent situations.
51. The mili-
tary is not overburdened with legalities. The government
accepts a high
reliance on military professionalism and training, and on an
organization
which has a higher loyalty than to elected officials.... [I]n all
cases they
have understood that there are limits to the civil authorities'
capability
in terms of coordination, communications, mobility,
organization, discip-
line, and force and have allowed the military to take over when
the
situation required it.
Id. at 148-49. The Canadian structure allows the government to
deploy military forces
"anywhere in or beyond Canada in the case of an emergency"
without parliamentary approval.
Kevin D. Hartzell, Note, Voluntary Warriors: Reserve Force
Mobilization in the United
States and Canada, 29 CORNELINT'LL.J. 537, 563 (1996). An
emergency is simply defined
as "insurrection, riot, invasion, armed conflict or war, whether
real or apprehended." National
Defence Act, R.S.C., ch. N-5, § 2 (2006).
t' John R. Martin, Note, Morrison v. Olson and Executive
Power, 4 TEx. REV. L. & POL.
511, 523-24 (2000).
[Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
52. instrument of defense for the nation." 9 This structure allows
one person to make and
direct decisions regarding the deployment and use of American
military forces world-
wide." 0 The benefit of this structure lies in the fact that the
President as the sole decision-
maker can take swift, decisive action in times of war or crisis
without interference."'
Military affairs frequently demand unique treatment; secrecy,
centralized decision-making, speed, and consistency are of
unusual
importance in this area. These requirements are, in large part,
in-
compatible with the open, decentralized, frequently slow -
moving
give-and-take of a representative legislature. In contrast, the
execu-
tive branch possesses most, if not all, of the qualities necessary
for
efficient and successful military decision-making." 2
However, as witnessed during the Katrina disaster,"3 presidents
do not enjoy the
same discretion domestically when the military is involved." 4
The President and
Governor Blanco bickered over who should assume authority
over the National
Guard," 5 and political and legal considerations prevented the
President from making
immediate moves to deploy active-duty military forces to secure
New Orleans."
6
53. The lack of communication among members of the local, state,
and federal govern-
ments,1 7 combined with the near collapse of the New Orleans
Police Department
81
8
and an overwhelmed and under-equipped National Guard, " 9
left no decision-makers
"0 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty
Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 29-30.
.1. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974) ('The military
establishment is subject
to the control of the civilian Commander in Chief ... and its
function is to carry out the
policies made by those civilian superiors.").
". Eugene V. Rostow, What the Constitution Means by
Executive Power, 43 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 165, 195-96 (1988). Rostow highlighted his point
regarding the value of centralized
command by using nuclear weapons as an example. Id. Despite
the enormous destructive power
of nuclear weapons, the President is invested with sole control
over their use. Id. Giving multiple
decision-makers control, such as sharing control between
Congress and the President, would
necessarily blunt the nation's ability to utilize the weapons
should the need arise. Id. at 196.
112 Comment, Resolving Treaty Termination Disputes, 129 U.
PA.L. REV. 1189, 1210(1981).
54. 113 HOMELAND SEC. CoUNCIL, ExEcuTtvE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, THE FEDERAL
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS
LEARNED 54 (2006), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-leamed.pdf
[hereinafter FEDERAL RESPONSE]
("[A]ctive duty military and National Guard operations were not
coordinated and served two
different bosses, one the President and the other the
Governor.").
"4 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 (2000).
l15 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
with the capacity or resources to bring the situation under
control. Had the lines of
authority been more clear, and the President confident he was
on solid political and
legal ground to dispatch federal troops' 2° as soon as the need
proved evident, there
is no knowing how many lives might have been saved.
Hurricane Katrina clearly
proved that presidential reliance on state approval and consent
for federal military
55. support can cause devastating problems for those most affected
by a disaster.1
2'
A solution to this problem is for Congress to remove the
provision in 10 U.S.C.
§ 331 that requires a state legislature or its governor to request
that the President
federalize the National Guard or deploy active-duty troops in an
emergency.122 This
step would remove the indecision that results when a crisis is of
such magnitude that
it is impossible for state and local officials to make, or even
communicate, informed
decisions. Removal of this provision would also eliminate some
of the political barriers
that frustrated the federal government's response during
Hurricane Katrina as a
result of 10 U.S.C. § 331,'2 when state officials struggled to
keep their status as pri-
mary decision-makers despite their inability to provide effective
leadership. 24 The
President, as commander-in-chief and centralized decision-
maker, is best suited to
direct coordinated action in times of extreme emergency within
the domestic arena,
in exactly the same role that the President assumes in foreign
crises."' Modifying
10 U.S.C. § 331 would significantly streamline a process that
demands centralized
authority as fast as possible after cataclysmic events like
Hurricane Katrina.
B. "Traditional Notions" of Domestic Military Action Are Not
Supported by History
56. One argument for continuing to restrict military activity in
domestic arenas is the
long-standing American practice to avoid using the military in
law enforcement roles.'"
One of the basic premises of the posse comitatus concept is to
delineate the historic
separation of the civilian and military spheres: "The historic
democratic purpose of
relying on the people is clear: to promote popular participation
in law enforcement
120 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
121 FEDERAL RESPONSE, supra note 113, at 54,
("[L]imitations under Federal law and
[Department of Defense] policy caused the active duty military
to be dependent on requests
for assistance. These limitations resulted in a slowed
application of... resources during the
initial response.").
122 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) ("[Tlhe President may [deploy
troops], upon the request of its
legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be
convened .....
123 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
124 Obviously, politics will remain a part of any president's
decision to deploy active-duty
troops into a crisis situation. This can never be completely
avoided, but power struggles
based on political affiliation could be substantially reduced with
a clearer delineation of
presidential authority within 10 U.S.C. § 331.
57. 125 See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
126 David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of
Terror: Civil Liberties
Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CnTY U. L.
REv. 247, 266 (1996).
[Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
and to prevent authoritarian rule by use of the military to
enforce the law."' 27 The
court in Wrynn v. United States'28 underscored this sentiment,
when it stated:
The [Posse Comitatus Act] is not an anachronistic relic of an
historical period the experience of which is irrelevant to the
present. It is not improper to regard it, as it is said to have been
regarded in 1878 by the Democrats who sponsored it, as
expressing
"the inherited antipathy of the American to the use of troops for
civil purposes."' 29
There is no constitutional barrier, however to the use of the
military in law enforce-
ment. a0 Congress possesses the power to deploy military forces
in the domestic arena
at any time, and therefore has the authority to free the executive
from the current
restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act.' But there remains some
58. conflict whether
Congress usurped presidential constitutional authority by the
passage of the Posse
Comitatus Act. 32 In his 1957 opinion to President Eisenhower,
Attorney General
Herbert Brownell, concluding Eisenhower acted within the
confines of the restrictions
placed upon the President by the Posse Comitatus Act,
suggested that there were
"grave doubts as to the authority of the Congress to limit the
constitutional powers
of the President to enforce the laws and preserve the peace
under circumstances
which he deems appropriate."'
133
Although the Founding Fathers were conscious of the
importance of civilian
oversight over military affairs when they drafted the
Constitution,' 34 this sentiment
did not prevent federal forces from being used in domestic law
enforcement soon
after the Constitution's enactment. 13 The Founding Fathers
recognized that the fragil-
ity of the new union might require military intervention to hold
the young nation
127 Id.
12' 200 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
121 Id. at 465 (quoting Edwin Erle Sparks, National
Development, 1877-1885, in 23 THE
AMERICAN NATION, A HISTORY (1907)).
59. 3 Kopel & Olson, supra note 126, at 265.
'31 O'Hara, supra note 44, at 775; see also Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579,588 (1952). The Court in Youngstown affirmed the
notion that Congress possesses
the exclusive ability to make laws, and the President the
authority to execute them. Id. at
587-88. The President may not act unilaterally to set policy and
then also prescribe the
manner in which to execute them. Id. at 588.
132 41 Op. Att'y Gen. at 331.
131 Id. Brownell was careful to qualify this statement by
informing Eisenhower that the
President's actions did in fact comply with the statutory
restrictions. Id.
13 O'Hara, supra note 44, at 769-70.
3 Richard H. Kohn, Using the Military at Home: Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow,
4 CHI. J. INT'LL. 165, 168-69 (2003).
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
together under certain circumstances. 3 6 When local
communities and states were
unable to keep order, James Madison told the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, federal
forces would be used to prevent "society from being
destroyed."'
60. ' 37
From the very beginning of the American constitutional era, the
military engaged
in domestic law enforcement activities before the passage of the
Posse Comitatus Act
in 1878.138 As early as 1793, President George Washington
federalized state militia
troops to enforce his Neutrality Proclamation, designed to
prevent privateers from
pirating British ships. 39 Shortly after, in July 1794, fierce
opposition to federal liquor
taxes sparked the Whiskey Rebellion, which overwhelmed local
authorities in
Pennsylvania."4 Protesters attacked and burned the home of tax
inspector John
Neville. 14, In response, President Washington ordered the
federalization of militia
troops from four states despite the reluctance of Thomas
Mifflin, the Governor of
Pennsylvania. 142 Washington called forth 15,000 men from
Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Maryland, and Virginia, and along with Alexander Hamilton,
joined the new federal-
ized militia to provide much-needed leadership. 143 Once the
state militias had been
federalized, "'the state militias ceased to be under the
jurisdiction of the governors.
Organized as state units they were nonetheless the President's
men exclusively.""44
Despite some commentators' strong objections to the President's
use of federal power
in putting down the insurrection rather than allowing the courts
to handle the crisis,
61. 145
in 1795 Congress reauthorized the President's authority to
federalize state militias
in case of insurrection."4 This action was significant because it
allowed the President
136 Id. at 168. There was general agreement that the military
could be used when the rule
of law failed to compel obedience, but only as a last resort. Id.
However, the drafters dis-
agreed as to the extent that power should be exercised. Id. This
led to granting Congress the
power to "suppress Insurrections," leaving that determination to
Congress, and by extension,
the President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
"' Kohn, supra note 135, at 168.
131 O'Hara, supra note 44, at 770-71.
... Id. at 770.
"4 Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 29, 109-10 (2005).
141 Id. at 110.
142 Id. at 110-11. Although a federal response to a domestic
insurrection technically required
the state legislature or governor to make a formal request for
assistance, it is unclear whether
Pennsylvania ever took such action. Id. at 110. Mifflin, despite
his misgivings regarding the
President's position, nevertheless agreed to support it. Id.
14' Haydn J. Richards, Jr., Redefining the Second Amendment:
The Antebellum Right
to Keep and Bear Arms and Its Present Legacy, 91 KY. L.J.
311, 336 (2003).
62. '" Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary
Executive During the First
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1485 (1997)
(quoting GLENN A. PHELPS,
GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 142-43 (1993)).
141 Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1, 26 (2002).
146 Vladeck, supra note 53, at 163. In fact, the 1795 Militia Act
removed some barriers
to the presidential emergency powers. Id. Unlike the 1792
Militia Act, the 1795 Militia Act
removed the need for a federal court order before the President
could take action, and allowed
[Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
to act "decisively, expeditiously, and, of most significance,
unilaterally" in times of
emergency. 4 7 The 1795 Militia Act established Congress as
having the ultimate
authority in determining the scope of executive power.'48
However, Washington's
action in suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion and Congress's
subsequent affirma-
tion of such action confirmed the need for broad presidential
emergency powers and
set a precedent for future incursions by federal forces into
domestic affairs.
63. The Whiskey Rebellion would not be the last time prior to the
Civil War that the
federal military was called on to enforce the laws. The Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 em-
powered federal marshals to employ a posse comitatus to return
a fugitive slave to his
owner.4 9 In 1854, Attorney General Caleb Cushing issued an
opinion stating active fed-
eral military forces could act as a posse comitatus to enforce the
provisions of the Act:
These considerations apply as well to the military as to the civil
force employed; for the posse comitatus comprises every person
in the district or county above the age of fifteen years, whatever
may be their occupation, whether civilians or not; and including
the military of all denominations, militia, soldiers, marines, all
of
whom are alike bound to obey the commands of a sheriff or
marshal. The fact that they are organized as military bodies,
under
the immediate command of their own officers, does not in any
wise affect their legal character. They are still the posse
comitatus.15
The Fillmore and Pierce administrations in the 1850s did not
hesitate to use the military
to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. 5 ' These actions sparked
violence in the Northern
anti-slavery states, which resented the use of force against
vigilantes harboring fugitive
slaves.'52 Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson spoke of the
ramifications of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850:
The law in one or two instances was enforced in one sense, but
64. how [was it] enforced? Enforced by power, by military or civil
the President to call forth out-of-state militiamen more easily.
Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
"' Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, § 5, 9 Stat. 462, 462-63
(repealed 1864).
"o Extradition of Fugitives from Service, 6 Op. Att'y. Gen. 466,
473 (1854) (citations
omitted).
1' Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress's Power to Enforce
Fourteenth Amendment Rights:
Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARv.
J. ON LEGIs. 187, 262-63
(2005). One example was a contingent consisting of a company
of the United States Army,
a company of Marines, Massachusetts state militiamen, and
Boston police to seize and return
a fugitive slave, Anthony Bums, from Boston to South Carolina.
Id. at 234 n.243.
152 David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth
Century, 1998 BYU L.
REv. 1359, 1439 n.301.
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
power, threatening upon each occasion when resort was had to
65. it to involve the particular community where the attempt was
made in civil strife and bloodshed.'53
Yet, despite the hostility of the Northern states to the incursion
of military forces
in the execution of local and state laws, Congress refused to
prohibit the military
from domestic intervention.'5 4
The structure of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, passed in the
aftermath of the
Civil War, used the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as a model for
military intervention.1
55
The Civil Rights Act explicitly made provisions for federal
military involvement to
enforce it:
[I]t shall be lawful for the President of the United States, or
such
person as he may empower for that purpose, to employ such part
of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the
militia,
as shall be necessary to prevent the violation and enforce the
due
execution of this act.
56
Senator Thomas Hendricks of Indiana warned that it was
unnecessary for the
military to be used to execute the laws, reminding his
colleagues of the rifts caused
by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and the subsequent Civil
66. War:
If men are guilty of crimes, let them be brought before the
courts.
... Are there any Senators here that want this to be a country
governed by military power? Now, in a time of peace, when the
southern armies are abandoned, when the States are rapping at
your door for admission, when they wish to be heard when we
legislate in regard to them; at this time of profound peace in the
country, when there is a more perfect subjugation to law.... we
propose that a law for the benefit of the colored people shall be
executed at the point of the bayonet.'57
113 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866).
"' Steven Lubet, Slavery on Trial: The Case of the Oberlin
Rescue, 54 ALA. L. REv. 785,
786 n.5 (2003). The Fugitive Slave Act passed without an
absolute majority in either
chamber of Congress because many Northern congressmen
abstained from the vote in protest.
Id. President Fillmore signed the bill, believing slavery was
constitutionally entitled to pro-
tection, despite his personal misgivings about it. Id.
115 Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional
Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV.
469, 480 n.41 (1989).
156 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 9, 14 Stat. 27, 29 (1866).
157 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 602 (1866).
[Vol. 15:301
67. IN KATRINA'S WAKE
If Congress was concerned about the traditional notion of
separating the federal
military from domestic activities, it was not evidenced by this
legislation. Indeed,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 merely seems to have extended
nearly eighty years of
law enforcement intervention by the military.'58
The Military Reconstruction Act of 1867 was the final piece of
congressional
action explicitly allowing the military the right to intervene in
domestic affairs prior
to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.'59 The
Military Reconstruction Act
was designed to bring the ex-Confederate states back into the
Union by stripping them
of their remaining vestiges of slavery and disenfranchisement of
blacks."6 The South
was placed under martial law 16 ' and divided into five military
districts, each governed
by a federal military commander. 62 The Military
Reconstruction Act of 1867 also
provided for the establishment of military commissions or
tribunals to replace local
courts at the military commander's discretion. 63 Under
Reconstruction, military rule
would exist in the Southern states until they satisfied a list of
conditions for their
representatives to be reseated in Congress: (1) ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment,
(2) hold a state constitutional convention, (3) adopt a new state
constitution in line
with federal constitutional principles, and (4) have the new state
constitution
68. approved by Congress.' 64 Among the pre-Posse Comitatus Act
events discussed
above, the Military Reconstruction Act is clearly the most
expansive in scope with
its explicit congressional mandate of military involvement in
domestic affairs.
In their conclusions on the state of posse comitatus, some
observers rely on the
assumption that preventing military involvement in domestic
affairs is a deeply
's See supra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
'5 Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Serving the Educational
Interests of African-American
Students at Brown Plus Fifty: The Historically Black College or
University and Affirmative
Action Programs, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1877, 1899 n.103 (2004).
'60 Gabriel J. Chin, The "Voting Rights Act of 1867": The
Constitutionality of Federal
Regulation of Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REv.
1581, 1590 (2004).
16' Diamond, supra note 159, at 1899 n.103; see also Exparte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)
(holding martial law constitutional when it "is called into action
by Congress, or temporarily,
when the action of Congress cannot be invited, and in the case
ofjustifying or excusing peril, by
the President, in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or
foreign war, within districts or
localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures
public safety and private rights").
69. 62 W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty:
Legal, Historical, and
Related Considerations, 48 How. L.J. 1, 42 (2004) ("The
[military] commander was to register
the voters, exclude prominent Confederate leaders, and include
all other male citizens 'of
whatever race, color, or previous condition of servitude."'
(quoting Reconstruction, in 2 THE
VOLUME LIBRARY 1728 (1995) (alteration in original))). The
military commander also held
the power to override state legislation. William H. Rehnquist,
Judicial Independence, 38 U.
RICH. L. REv. 579, 590 (2004).
163 Military Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, § 3, 14 Stat. 428
(1867) ("[W]hen in [the district
military commander's] judgment it may be necessary for the
trial of offenders, he shall have
power to organize military commissions or tribunals for that
purpose.").
"6 Chin, supra note 160, at 1590.
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
rooted tradition within the American legal system. 6 However,
for almost an entire
century leading up to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act,
the military was inter-
mittently used in domestic law enforcement capacities."6 The
passage of the Posse
Comitatus Act in 1878 did not represent a return to a
70. fundamental American tradition;
instead, it came as a result of the political environment of that
era.' 67 Indeed, the
passage of the Posse Comitatus Act possessed racist overtones,
as congressional
Democrats sought to prevent the military from further enforcing
the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments."6 Nearly every
American today likely as-
sumes a rigid division between domestic law enforcement and
military operations,
but that is simply the choice of Congress, not a constitutional
restriction."6 Conse-
quently, the presumption made by commentators that posse
comitatus should be
more strictly enforced, and even strengthened, is predicated on
a misreading of the
historical military-civilian relationship.
C. Federal Military Forces Can Receive Adequate Training for
Effective
Execution of Domestic Law Enforcement
Questions arise whether federal active-duty troops-trained,
prepared, and condi-
tioned to fight foreign or invading enemies - can be safely
placed in the domestic
arena to serve in an entirely different capacity." 0 In an
argument in support of the
Posse Comitatus Act, one commentator argues:
Modem combat is very fast-paced: decisions are made quickly
in
the heat and stress of a life-and-death struggle. Soldiers are
highly
trained to use force in the furtherance of the mission. They are
71. trained to respond with force when facing an adversary because
165 See, e.g., Canestaro, supra note 60, at 142-43.
'6 See generally Part IV.
'67 Furman, supra note 45, at 94-96.
168 Rogers, supra note 162, at 47. The use of the posse
comitatus law to dismantle the
newly secured black enfranchisement was enormously
successful-without the security
guarantees ensured by the presence of federal troops,
"[f]orce and threat of force had put the whites in power. Within
10 or
15 years after 1867 the premature enfranchisement of the Negro
was
largely undone, and undone by veritable revolution." Fraud in
addition
to force was used, including "[g]errymandering, trickery in
election
administration, [and] fraud in casting and counting ballots."
Chin, supra note 160, at 1591-92 (quoting V.0. KEY, JR.,
SOUTHERN POLICS IN STATE AND
NATION 536, 540 (1995)); see also Geoffrey Klingspom, The
Secret Posse, LEGAL AFFAIRS,
March/April 2005, at 23 ("[Tlhe law was enacted for the racist
purpose of preventing federal
soldiers from helping black Americans by enforcing voting laws
in the post-Civil War South.").
'69 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 53, at 163.
"' Michael T. Cunningham, The Military's Involvement in Law
Enforcement: The Threat
72. is Not What You Think, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 699, 715-16
(2003).
(Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
the adversary is likely to do the same. Being under fire changes
the landscape and changes the stakes.... Military personnel have
different approaches to tactical situations than what is required
in a law enforcement situation. The appropriate reaction in an
ad-
versarial law enforcement situation is not necessarily the use of
deadly force; a more deliberative approach may be more
appropri-
ate. Conversely, military personnel involved in a combat
situation
need to quickly decide when deadly force should be used.
Moving
military personnel between these two situations may cause the
soldier to misread or misunderstand a situation and use the
wrong
kind of force.'
7 1
In addition, this position argues that the posse comitatus law
should be strengthened
because "[s]oldiers are taught to violently and effectively
destroy the enemy and
their training does not include sensitivity to constitutional
limitations on search,
seizure, and the use of reasonable force."'
73. 7 2
It cannot be disputed that it would be dangerous to send armed
troops into a hostile
environment for which they have not been trained, but these
problems can be over-
come. President Bush's call to broaden federal authority in
times of crisis, 173 through
Admiral Timothy Keating, head of the United States Northern
Command, 174 does
not envision calling on untrained federal troops.I'7 Rather, it
would prepare specially-
trained and equipped soldiers capable of performing a wide
range of tasks in the event
of a catastrophic domestic emergency. 76 Under one concept,
these so-called "special
response forces" could receive beneficial training with National
Guard units for
domestic emergency situations, because the National Guard
trains and prepares for
assuming law enforcement functions." This training would also
prepare active forces
to coordinate equipment and communication with their local and
state counterparts,
7
1
which was a significant problem experienced by the early
responders in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina. 79 Therefore, concerns over the lack of
proper training'80 can be
171 Id.
172 Christopher H. Lytton, America's Borders and Civil
74. Liberties in a Post-September 11th
World, 12 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 204 (2003).
'71 See Bush, Address to the Nation, supra note 34, at 3, 4.
114 Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 38.
171 Murray Light, Editorial, Northern Command Makes Sense,
BuFF. NEWS, Oct. 23,2005,
at 13.
176 Id.
177 Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 38.
178 FEDERAL RESPONSE, supra note 113, at 95.
179 Geoff Fein, Military Looking at Migrating Some
Capabilities to Civilian Side, 228 DEF.
DAILY (Access Intelligence, LLC, Rockville, Md.), Oct. 13,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR
17654408.
'go See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
ameliorated, if and when there is recognition of the benefits
using federal troops can
bring to stabilizing dangerous situations within the United
States. Preparedness and
planning would reduce the dangers of casting the military in an
unfamiliar role.
Instead, it would be a readily available force that could respond
to the unique
challenges of domestic law enforcement when the-need arises.
75. Another potential benefit to a specially trained, prepared, and
equipped federal
active-duty contingent would be its ability to respond to a wide
variety of natural
disasters, whether it be hurricane, earthquake, flooding,
tsunami, ' tornado, or some
other kind of catastrophic emergency. This is particularly true
for situations in which
local and state authorities are ill-prepared and unable to handle
the scope of the
disaster. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, it is clear that local
law enforcement
authorities are not always better trained to deal with the specific
circumstances of
a natural disaster than a dedicated team of experienced federal
troops. The experience
in New Orleans illustrates the fact that local and state law
enforcement agencies 82
cannot be expected and prepared to handle a sudden, widespread
emergency. There-
fore, a federal first-responder force would be beneficial in
providing law enforce-
ment and rescue support to stabilize what could develop into a
potentially life
threatening situation for thousands of American citizens.8 3
D. Active Military Participation in Domestic Law Enforcement
Does Not
Necessarily Mean Permanent Domestic Deployment
Many recent arguments regarding the erosion of the Posse
Comitatus Act center
on the increasing use of the active federal military in domestic
76. counterterrorism-
a permanent and ongoing demonstration of military force within
the United States. IM
's FEMA posits that tsunamis, while rare, do pose a direct threat
to the United States:
The greatest risk to the United States is believed to be a tsunami
that
would be generated by an earthquake along the Cascadia fault
off the
coast of Washington, Oregon, and northern California. Similar
to those
along the northern coast of Sumatra, a Cascadian earthquake
would be
very large, would result in a tsunami, and would provide only a
few
minutes of warning.
Tsunami Losses Mount, CLAIMS, Feb. 1, 2005, at 212,
available at 2005 WLNR 22076025.
Since 1946, three tsunamis striking the United States coastline
have resulted in fatalities. Id.
Although there is a reduced vulnerability to tsunamis on the
East Coast of the United States,
FEMA maintains that there is a significant threat, which could
result in significant property
damage and loss of life. Id. Half of the population of the United
States lives in coastal zones.
Editorial, Fair Warning; U.S. Should Help Poorer Nations
Protect Themselves From Tsunamis,
SARASOTA HERALD TRm., Jan. 18, 2005, at A16.
182 See supra Part I.
.83 This could potentially prevent a repeat of the scenario in
New Orleans, where National
77. Guardsmen were unable to enter the city because of rampant
lawlessness, and hospitals had
to close because of the fear of looting. See supra notes 17-22
and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Canestaro, supra note 60, at 134-42; see also Steven
G. Brandl, Back to the
(Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
"The [Posse Comitatus Act] remains as much a symbol of our
nation's subordination
of military to civilian control, and to the distaste of military
involvement in domestic
law enforcement, as it is a set of legal strictures."'8 5 Further,
"[t]he new Constitution
mirrored the founders' keen desire to prevent the rise of a
standing military as a sort
of Praetorian Guard, responsible to none but itself, forever
meddling in civilian politics
and agitating for military adventurism."' There is a strong
sentiment that any involve-
ment of the military in law enforcement activities will lead to
"mission creep"' 7 and
install the military as an ongoing, permanent law enforcement
apparatus operating
within the United States.1
8 8
The fear of giving the President, and by extension, the military,
greater freedom
78. for involvement in domestic matters is analogous to the events
in Vietnam following
the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which laid the foundation
for eventual full-scale
war in Vietnam.'" A unanimous vote in the House of
Representatives" and a nearly
unanimous vote in the Senate 9 ' authorized the President "to
take all necessary steps,
including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty requiring assistance in defense
of its freedom."' 9 By
the time the conflict concluded, the war was the longest in
American history, at the
Future: The Implications of September 11, 2001 on Law
Enforcement Practice and Policy,
1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 146-47 (2003).
185 Banks, supra note 95, at 741.
"16 Jack H. McCall, Jr. & Brannon P. Denning, Mission Im-
posse-ble: The Posse Comitatus
Act and the Use of the Military in Domestic Law Enforcement,
39 TENN. B.J., June 2003, at 27.
17 "Mission creep" can generally be defined as the changing of
goals, objectives, and deploy-
ment duration in the middle of a military mission. See, e.g.,
Martin D. Carcieri, Operational
Need, Political Reality, and Liberal Democracy: Two
SuggestedAmendments to Proposition
209-based Reforms, 9 SETONHALLCONST. L.J. 459,464 n.24
(1999); MarkT. Uyeda, Note,
Presidential Prerogative Under the Constitution to Deploy U.S.
Military Forces in Low-
79. Intensity Conflict, 44 DuKE L.J. 777, 813 n.187 (1995). One
such example of mission creep
is the 1969 expansion of the American aerial bombing campaign
at the height of the Vietnam
War. Nicole Barrett, Note, Holding Individual Leaders
Responsible for Violations of Customary
International Law: The U.S. Bombardment of Cambodia and
Laos, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L. REV. 429,433 (2001). President Nixon ordered bombing
campaigns to attack North Viet-
namese positions in Cambodia and Laos. Id. By the time those
bombing operations ceased
in 1973, the United States had dropped more bombs on Laos
than it had dropped during the
entirety of World War II. Id. at 434.
.88 McCall & Denning, supra note 186, at 32; see also Norman
C. Bay, Executive Powerand
the War on Terror, 83 DENy. U. L. REV. 335, 371 (2005) ("The
concern is that 'mission creep'
will result in which the military becomes adjuncts of internal
security agencies including law
enforcement, prosecutors, and domestic intelligence, that had
been entirely civilian in nature.").
i89 Jules Lobel & George Loewenstein, Emote Control: The
Substitution of Symbolfor Sub-
stance in Foreign Policy and International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1045, 1061 (2005).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408,78 Stat. 384
(1964) (repealed 1971).
80. 20061
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
expense of nearly 58,000 American lives. 9 3 At the time,
congressional lawmakers
did not fully appreciate the scope and duration of the power
they were handing to
the President to have almost unfettered control over military
action. 94 The Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution typified the dangers when Congress cedes
too much power and
provides too little oversight over the presidential conduct of
military action. 95
Certainly, a revision of the Posse Comitatus Act to give the
President expanded
authority to employ the military in domestic law enforcement
must contain counter-
balances to prevent a repeat of the mission creep experienced
during the Vietnam Era.'96
The President cannot be given a blank check to deploy the
military in perpetuity.
For instance, the President should not deploy federal troops to
stabilize an area struck
by disaster and then allow them to remain there to fight drug
trafficking long after
the immediate emergency has passed. There must be strict limits
on the duration and
objectives of the deployment so control can be turned back to
the local and state law
enforcement agencies as soon as possible.
The 1973 War Powers Act"9 can be used as a model for how a
81. revised Posse
Comitatus Act and its exceptions can be structured to give the
President adequate
authority while leveling some restrictions on the exercise of
that expanded power.
In an attempt to reassert congressional authority over the
constitutional war-making
power, 98 the War Powers Act imposes a notice requirement on
the President when
military troops engage in combat activities abroad:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which
United
States Armed Forces are introduced. . . the President shall
submit
within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in
writing,
setting forth-(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduc-
tion of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and
legislative authority under which such introduction took place;
and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement. '99
193 Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 189, at 1061.
'94 Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of
Congressional Abdication,
19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 7, 23-25 (2000).
195 Jonathan Simon, Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory
Commissions andExecutive
Power in an Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419, 1426 (2005).
'96 See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
197 War Powers Act of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (2000).
This Note does not address
82. the underlying constitutionality of the War Powers Act.
198 Comment, Congressional Control ofPresidential War-
Making Underthe War Powers
Act: The Status of a Legislative Veto After Chadha, 132 U. PA.
L. REv. 1217, 1218 (1984).
199 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (2000).
[Vol. 15:301
IN KATRINA'S WAKE
In addition, the Act sets a durational limit on presidential
discretion over military
engagement by stating:
Within sixty calendar days .... the President shall terminate any
use of United States Armed Forces... unless the Congress (1)
has
declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such
use of
United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such
sixty-
day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an
armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period
shall
be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the
Presi-
dent determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that un-
avoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United
States
Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces
in
83. the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces."
Whether this statute has been successful in actually limiting the
President from uni-
laterally using military force without the consent of Congress is
unclear.2°' The concept
of congressional time limits and notice requirements on
presidential authorization
of domestic military deployment can be applied to the posse
comitatus statutes.
To ameliorate concerns over the potential for mission creep, a
statutory construc-
tion modeled on the War Powers Act could set time limits;
perhaps ten days. A ten-
day window would give mobilized federal troops enough time to
secure the affected
areas to allow local and state authorities to regroup and assess
the situation. The win-
dow would also give rescuers protection, assistance, and
security in potentially dan-
gerous situations. A ten-day limit would not, however, give the
military an opportunity
to become entrenched in any one place without express
congressional approval for ex-
tended deployment, should that become necessary. Before or at
the end of the ten-
day window, federal troops acting in their law enforcement
capacity would either with-
draw from the region and turn all law enforcement duties back
over to local and state
authorities, or in extreme circumstances have their deployment
extended through con-
sultation between the President and Congress. President Bush
addressed this very point:
84. I do want [Congress] to think about a circumstance that requires
a lot of planning and a lot of assets immediately on the scene in
200 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2000).
20 There has been some reluctance on the part of Congress to
demand that the President
comply with the War Powers Act. Edward Keynes, The War
Powers Resolution: A Bad Idea
Whose Time Has Come and Gone, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 343, 349
(1992). At least three in-
stances in which the President perfunctorily met the reporting
requirements to Congress were
President Ford's action to recover the S.S. Mayaguez in May
1975, President Carter's decision
to send troops to rescue the American hostages in Tehran, Iran
in April 1980, and President
Reagan's invasion of Grenada in October 1083. Id. at 349 n.34,
350-51.
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
order to stabilize. And so what I was speculating about was a
scenario which would require federal assets to stabilize the
situa-
tion, primarily DOD assets-DOD assets, and then hand back
over
to Department of Homeland Security, for example. And I think
it's
very important for us as we look at the lessons of Katrina to
think
about other scenarios that might require a well-planned signifi-
85. cant federal response right off the bat to provide stability.2w2
A short-term durational requirement would provide serious
safeguards preventing
the federal usurpation of law enforcement duties that are
rightfully in the hands of
local authorities.
Similarly, a notice requirement modeled on 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)
would require the
President to keep Congress and the proper state authorities
(such as the governor and
state legislature) informed of the decision to take action, the
duration expectations
of the deployment, and the reasons necessitating the use of
federal troops. Congress
could then fill its proper consultative role while preserving its
ultimate authority to
limit either the scope or the duration of the use of federal
troops. As a result, the
balance of power between the President and Congress would be
protected and
clearly delineated. The threat of mission creep would thus be
significantly reduced.
E. The President Possesses Broad Discretion in Matters
Authorized by Congress
When Congress expressly grants authority to the President, the
President enjoys
broad discretion to use that authority to the fullest extent.' The
Supreme Court high-
lighted this when it upheld President Carter's freezing of Iranian
assets in response
to the seizure and hostage taking of American embassy workers
in Tehran, Iran on
86. November 4, 1979:2o
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authori-
zation from Congress, he exercises not only his powers but also
those delegated by Congress. In such a case the executive action
"would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack
it."205
202 Bush, Remarks, supra note 35, at 4.
203 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462,476 (1994) ("How the
President chooses to exercise
the discretion Congress has granted him is not a matter for our
review."); see also Monarch Ins.
Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-
55 (D. D.C. 1973).
204 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 654, 662 (1981).
203 Id. at 668 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
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IN KATRINA'S WAKE
The Supreme Court affirmed this principle a decade later by
stating, "Where a
statute ... commits decisionmaking to the discretion of the
President, judicial
87. review of the President's decision is not available."2 6
The Supreme Court recognized the need for broad presidential
discretion in
1862 when it stated, "Whether the President in fulfilling his
duties, as Commander-
in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such
armed hostile resistance,
and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him
to accord to them the
character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him ...
"207 The President
is perfectly suited to this role, because "the President is unique
in the federal system.
The President is only one of two elected officials with a
national constituency and
represents the 'single head in whose choice the whole Nation
has a part, making him
the focus of public hopes and expectations.'
20 8
Americans expect the President to use all the tools available to
him to provide
leadership and respond to national crises. 2 9 Former White
House Press Secretary
Scott McClellan acknowledged this view, stating, "'He is the
president, and... it is
his responsibility when it comes to the federal government's
role in these hurri-
canes."' 210 Politically, the President is accountable to all
Americans when he fails,
regardless of whether he had all the tools necessary to
accomplish the task at
hand.2 1' For this reason Congress must not set up the
President, and the federal