Supply Chains for Disaster Response - Hurricane Katrina Case Study

Running Header: Supply Chains for Disaster Response-Hurricane Katrina
M B A 6 3 5 : C r e a t i n g B u s i n e s s O p e r a t i o n s
Supply Chains for Disaster Response:
Hurricane Katrina
Ball, K., Gupta, E., Hamilton, S., Knudsen, A., Malesky, A., Pohl, P.

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Table of Contents
Overview:........................................................................................................................... 3
New Orleans: History and Politics in the face of Hurricane Katrina ......................... 3
US Military and National Guard: Response to Hurricane Katrina ............................. 4
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Role:.......................................... 6
Red Cross’ Role in the Katrina Effort ............................................................................ 7
Assistance from Private Enterprises:.............................................................................. 7
Lessons Learned: Improvement in Future Natural Disaster Outcomes...................... 8
Legal changes:................................................................................................................. 9
Additional Changes: ...................................................................................................... 10
Appendix:......................................................................................................................... 11
Appendix 1: General Overviewof United States Military and the National Guard........ 11
Appendix 2: Information Flow Impediments in disaster reliefSupply Chain for the Red
Cross.............................................................................................................................. 12
Appendix 3: 11 Critical Actions to Strengthen Federal Response Capabilities............... 14
Appendix 4: Six statutes enacted by the 109th Congress................................................ 15
Appendix 5: The National Preparedness System............................................................ 15
Appendix 6: Eight lessons should be learned about howto work effectively with
international partners to accept useful assistance in a disaster:..................................... 16
Appendix 7: 12 principles for preserving the rule of law in times of major disaster....... 17
References:....................................................................................................................... 19

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Overview:
For this project, the Catamounts completed an analysis on Supply Chains for Disaster
Response specific to Hurricane Katrina. The paper will give a brief background on New
Orleans and the politics that played a role in contributing to the massive scale of the
natural disaster. Following this portion of the paper, the focus will shift to the players that
stepped in to supply relief to the victims. According to the article Coordination in
humanitarian relief chains: Practices, challenges and opportunities, “Humanitarian relief
environments engage international relief organizations, host governments, the military,
local and regional relief organizations, and private sector companies, each of which may
have different interests, mandates, capacity, and logistics expertise. Typically, no single
actor has sufficient resources to respond effectively to a major disaster.” (Black, Beamon,
Krejci, Muramatsu, Ramirez, 2010, pg 22) The players that this paper will focus on
would include: Federal and State Government, the US Military and National Guard, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Red Cross, as well as specific
private enterprises. Particular areas of the supply chain’s strength will be listed in
addition to lessons learned and future improvements.
New Orleans: History and Politics in the face of Hurricane Katrina
New Orleans has a very colorful and rich history. The city is situated at the mouth of the
Mississippi River accessing the Gulf of Mexico. Since the 1700’s, New Orleans has been
the busiest northern port in the Gulf of Mexico. (History.com Staff, 2010). In terms of
Supply Chain management, New Orleans was essential to the success of trade in the
United States of America. It was such a valuable port, the British made it a focal point of
the War of 1812, and the North campaigned strongly to control it during the Civil
War. “In its last hundred years the key struggles of New Orleans have been social
(poverty, racial strife) and natural (hurricanes, floods and slowly sinking land).”
(History.com Staff, 2010)
The Louisiana capital was moved from Biloxi to New Orleans just before a major
hurricane devastated the city. This pattern repeats itself again and again. In the 1800’s,
“New Orleans became the United States’ wealthiest and third-largest city. Its port
shipped the produce of much of the nation’s interior to the Caribbean, South America and
Europe.” (History.com Staff, 2010). After the Civil War, railroads became a primary
source of shipment. This change weakened the value of New Orleans’ port but the port
still largely contributed to United States trade. In the 20th Century, New Orleans was
growing. Advancements in technology offered expansion options into low lying
swamplands not previously accessible. “New pump technology drove the ambitious
draining of the low-lying swampland located between the city’s riverside crescent and
Lake Pontchartrain. New levees and drainage canals meant that many residents could live
below sea level. Hurricanes in 1909, 1915, 1947 and 1965 damaged the city, but never
catastrophically.” (History.com Staff, 2010)
That all changed on August 29, 2005 with the direct hit of Category 5 Hurricane
Katrina. Hundreds dead with 4 levees breached, state and federal rescuers could not

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access the area for several days. Clearly, the political dysfunctions led to a catastrophic
breakdown of supply chain management, and it started long before the storm began.
The political players leading to the breakdown of basic services and supply chain
mismanagement include the local government led by Mayor Ray Nagin, the state
government led by Kathleen Blanco, and the Executive Branch of the Federal
Government led by President George W. Bush.
As previously mentioned, the city of New Orleans had been sinking below sea level since
its founding. The building of levees and floodwalls had prevented the sinking of the
city. According to Al Naomi, manager of the Army Corps of Engineers, it was the
floodwalls that failed. The system was built in 1965 and designed to withstand a
Category 3 Hurricane. (Pelley, 2005) Monies designated for the repair, maintenance and
upgrading were diverted to other political purposes which helped set up the catastrophe.
Nagin ordered the “biggest evacuation in American History” two days prior to the
storm’s arrival. Even he did not believe people would evacuate because he saw the
communication failures between the state and federal government "Too many people died
because of lack of action," Nagin says. "Lack of coordination and some goofy laws that
basically say there's not a clear distinction of when the federal government stops and
when the state government starts.” (Pelley, 2005) New Orleans’ unique situation was a
ticking time bomb. The majority of the blame for failed infrastructure and complete
neglect for foreseeing the inevitable lies squarely on the local government.
“Governments may lack the necessary experience and knowledge required to manage
emergencies effectively, especially when the effects of disasters are overwhelming. In
situations in which the government is either non-functional or dysfunctional, the roles of
relief actors are often unclear.” (Black, Beamon, Krejci, Muramatsu, Ramirez, 2010, pg
23) In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the light of responsibility shines brightly on
Louisiana Governor, Kathleen Blanco. While much of the focus of blame was being
directed at the Federal Government, disaster response and planning falls first and
primarily at the local and state levels. “As one FEMA official told ABC News, Louisiana
Gov. Kathleen Blanco failed to submit a request for help in a timely manner. Shortly
before Katrina hit, she sent President Bush a request asking for shelter and provisions, but
didn't specifically ask for help with evacuations. One aide to the governor told ABC
News today Blanco thought city officials were taking care of the evacuation.” (Harris,
2005) Failure in leadership at the Governor’s level reinforced Mayor Nagin’s assertion
of a lack of communication.
A lack of concern from political parties paired with failed leadership and corruption were
the underlying contributors to the following failures: failure to plan appropriately, failure
to execute on any type of strategy, and failure to respond to one of the greatest disasters
in American History.
US Military and National Guard: Response to Hurricane Katrina
Note: Please see Appendix 1 for a general overview on the United States Military and
National Guard’s role in responding to natural disasters. The information below is
specific to Hurricane Katrina.

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Over 72,000 service men and women from the US Military and multiple National Guard
Units responded to the various crises caused directly and indirectly (e.g., catastrophic
levee failures) by Hurricane Katrina. This represented the largest military operation
within the United States since the Civil War (McHale, 2006). In addition to personnel,
20 US ships (including two amphibious assault ships and an aircraft carrier), over 360
helicopters, and 93 fixed wing aircraft were employed in the Hurricane Katrina relief
effort (Buddelmeyer, 2007).
NORTHCOM was actively monitoring the changing weather conditions days prior to
Hurricane Katrina landfall on August 29th 2005. On August 24, NORTHCOM issued its
first warning regarding the coming storm to relevant military and governmental personnel
(Bowman, Kapp, & Belasco, 2005). The Governor of Louisiana declared a state of
emergency on August 26th followed by the Governor of Mississippi on August 27th.
President Bush issued a declaration of emergency on August 30th and Joint Task Force –
Katrina (JTF-Katrina) was activated by NORTHCOM. JTF-Katrina was established to
coordinate the US Military operations in support of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) (Buddelmeyer, 2007). The USS Bataan (amphibious assault ship)
harbored outside of New Orleans and medical airlifts began on August 31st. Over 5,200
troops from the 82nd Airborne and the 1st Cavalry Divisions were deployed on September
3rd and arrived in affected areas on September 5th. The USS Iwo Jima and USS Truman
arrived off the coast of New Orleans on September 6th. By September 7th there were over
17,000 active duty US military troops and close to 43,000 National Guard personnel
dealing with the fallout caused by Hurricane Katrina (Bowman, Kapp, & Belasco, 2005).
Although an evacuation order was given for New Orleans, approximately 100,000
citizens remained in the city (Wombwell, 2009). Once Katrina made landfall there was
virtually no way for these individuals to self-evacuate. Given the fact that local agencies
were completely overwhelmed, the US Military and National Guard units became first
responders. Wombwell (2009) stated that these troops “conducted airborne, waterborne,
and ground search-and-rescue missions; delivered relief aid and medical assistance to
those in need; repaired levees; cleared debris; and provide security for citizens and their
property” (p. 45).
In a somewhat unprecedented move the Director of FEMA, Michael Brown, requested
that the US Military and National Guard take over logistics operations in Louisiana and
Mississippi (US Senate, 2007). This request went well beyond the scope of the
traditional military role in domestic emergency response situations (Wombwell, 2009)
and was a result of FEMA being completely overwhelmed by the task at hand. As a
result of Brown’s request the military began “planning and execution for the
procurement, transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel, and medical
supplies” in Louisiana and Mississippi (US Senate, 2007). The 49th Movement Control
Battalion tracked the distribution of goods for FEMA by using the Army’s tracking
system and greatly increased the efficiency of the supply chain. For example, the
military decreased truck download time from 10 to 14 days down to 3 to 5 days and
decreased the number of trucks in use from 285 to 120. The 49th Movement Control
Battalion alone distributed over 1.7 million gallons of water, 3.6 million meals, and 11.5

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million pounds of ice (Tierney, 2006). In addition, the 565th Quartermaster Company
organized and delivered truckloads of needed items from the police warehouses
following the flooding. This allowed law enforcement additional tools and resources to
start bringing order to the chaos of New Orleans (Adams, 2005).
Supply Chain and Logical Shortcoming
Although the US Military and National Guard were largely spared the blistering
criticisms that were heaped on FEMA in the aftermath of Katrina, areas in need of future
improvement were nevertheless identified. Communication issues resulting from two
distinct chains of command created multiple logistical issues during the crisis. The US
Military operated under NORTHCOM; however, the main National Guard units during
the crisis reported to the Governor of Louisiana or Mississippi. This created situations
where “one hand did not always know what the other hand was doing” and resulted in
both groups sending soldiers to do the same job at the same times. In addition, the
equipment that the National Guard used was not the same type of equipment being used
by the US Military. For example, the radios that the National Guard used were not
always compatible with the radios used by the US Military. This incompatibility further
exacerbated communication issues between these two groups of soldiers. Many of these
issues could have been identified (and fixed) had joint exercises between the US Military
and the National Guard been conducted on a massive natural disaster type scale prior to
Hurricane Katrina. It is therefore recommended that “simulations” be used to identify
“kinks in the armor” which can help our armed forces better prepare to respond to
disaster in the future. These simulations can also help in developing the best possible
supply chain to use in times of national crisis.
FederalEmergencyManagementAgency’s (FEMA) Role:
Much has been said regarding the ineffective response of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in the aftermath of the storm. The aim of this analysis is to
offer insight into the reasons why this federal organization failed to manage the disaster.
 Donald P. Moynihan suggests in a recent case study that “The Katrina disaster
cannot be classified as a surprise. In both the short and long-run, ample warning
of the coming disaster was met with insufficient preparation (Moynihan, 2008).”
He goes on to note that there had been a long anticipated danger of widespread
damage to the New Orleans area due to the unreliable state of the levee system.
However, FEMA took five years to fund the development of a simulation
modeling the effects of a hurricane-making landfall in the city (2008).
 The Red Cross attempted to communicate logistical needs to FEMA, but FEMA
often failed to deliver promised supplies or delivered them in incorrect amounts.
For example, the Red Cross requested 300,000 meals-ready-to-eat for Louisiana
on September 1. The order was cancelled by FEMA, then reordered, and finally
delivered on October 8. Furthermore, FEMA failed to deliver reliable information
to evacuees that housed at Red Cross’ designated shelters (2008). “A lack of
coordination among chain members has been shown to increase inventory costs,
lengthen delivery times, and compromise customer service. Since logistics

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accounts for 80% of relief, relief chain coordination is key to improving relief
chain performance. “ (Black, Beamon, Krejci, Muramatsu, Ramirez, 2010, pg 22)
 FEMA’s focus had shifted in the few years following the September 11th terrorist
attacks that seemed to distract the organization’s leadership away from disaster
response. “One critique was that the “all hazards” preparation focused too much
on terrorism. The Government Accountability Office found in July 2005 that 31
of 39 first responder departments agreed that training was adequate for terrorist
attacks but not natural disasters. The report also found that almost 75 percent of
grant dollars awarded by DHS for first responders in 2005 focused predominantly
on terrorism training (Shoup, 2005).
Red Cross’Role in the Katrina Effort
The Katrina relief effort was the first time a disaster forced the evacuation of an entire
metropolitan area and saw survivors dispersed to every state. More than 245,000 Red Cross
disaster workers assisted millions of people with shelter, food, financial aid, emotional
support and other basic needs. The Red Cross:
- Provided more than 3.8 million overnight stays in shelters in 31 states – seven times
higher than any other disaster up to that time.
- Served almost 68 million meals and snacks – four times more than what the Red
Cross had ever provided during past relief efforts.
- For the first time, served a million meals in a single day.
- Provided emergency financial assistance to 1.4 million families – nearly 20 times
more than any record prior to Katrina.
Even though the numbers above are impressive, the American Red Cross response to
Hurricane Katrina was poorly planned, relied too heavily on inexperienced managers, and
often failed to meet the needs of victims, according to international Red Cross officials
who were dispatched to assist their American counterparts.
In addition, the following problems were present:
- mismatches between the needs and the supplies
- absence of a plan of action to guide the distribution of supplies
- lack of record-keeping that allowed inventory to go astray
- assigning volunteers to tasks for which they were unprepared (managing a fleet of
more than 100 vehicles, inability to match keys and rental documents and no
knowledge of where cars and trucks were, why they had been dispatched and who
had them. )
- assigning experts on distributing relief supplies to extra simple tasks that
unprepared volunteers can do
- lack of accountability, imposed by a weak system of tracking inventory
- Inability to prepare in advance for predictable items
Assistance from Private Enterprises:

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Oftentimes, when a society is faced with a large-scale crisis in which the government
agencies fail to fulfill their obligations to assist the public, a resound call for more
government oversight and involvement occurs. Several argue that in many cases this only
creates more government “red tape” and further restricts the ability of bureaucratic
agencies to be nimble and adapt to ever changing circumstances involving natural
disasters.
According to Steven Horwitz of The Independent Review, any discussion of
organizations that did respond quickly and effectively in the aftermath of storms such as
Katrina are lost in the debate of what went wrong. He goes on to state “Not much has
been said about the role private enterprise played in played in providing necessary
resources in the immediate aftermath and in helping to reestablish a sense of normalcy in
the days and weeks that followed [Hurricane Katrina] (Horwitz, 2009).
Partnering with private enterprises with expertise in logistics can be essential to
supplying areas needing relief. These enterprises are often “directly involved in long- and
short-haul delivery of relief supplies and equipment to the disaster-affected areas. Beyond
physical resources, companies may also share their knowledge and expertise in
transportation systems management, such as fleet management (support vehicle
maintenance and outsourcing decisions), shipment tracking, and delivery route
optimization.” (Black, Beamon, Krejci, Muramatsu, Ramirez, 2010, pg 28) Walmart is
the best example of a company whose proactive and precise approach to assisting in the
recovery effort. The company was able to quickly supply their affected store locations but
also provide essentials to communities in need. Walmart’s ability to take action should be
a blueprint for future governmental disaster response. The core of Walmart’s “business
continuity” department is its tightly scripted protocol for responding to numerous
scenarios ranging from an injured customer in a store to a large-scale natural disaster.
The hallmark of the plan is the expandable structure that is in place within the Emergency
Command Center and the ability to call upon members of senior representatives when
needed. This allows for flexibility and mobility within the decision-making processes.
This was the case in the days leading up to Katrina’s landfall as Walmart mobilized the
command center and prepared to support stores within the wake of potential damage.
Lessons Learned:Improvement in Future Natural DisasterOutcomes
Hurricane Katrina exposed flaws in national preparedness for catastrophic events and the
capacity to respond to them. These deficiencies were present in communications,
evacuations, integration of the military, search and rescue, security, public health,
housing and infrastructure, environmental hazards, debris removal, foreign assistance,
and non-governmental aid.
Inadequacies in the Federal government's response set the stage for transforming how the
government, the private sector, citizens and communities, pursued a strategy for
emergency preparedness and response.

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“This government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina. We are going to review
every action and make necessary changes so that we are better prepared for any challenge
of nature, or act of evil men, that could threaten our people.” President George W. Bush,
September 15, 2001.
After the hurricane, President Bush ordered a comprehensive review of the Federal
response to Hurricane Katrina. This review resulted in The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. The Lessons Learned Report recommended 11
critical actions to strengthen Federal response capabilities. (Appendix 3)
Katrina served as a catalyst for significant changes in federal policy and the organization
of federal agencies. Congress restructured presidential actions in an emergency response
and reorganized functions and authorities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Six statutes enacted by
Congress contain changes that apply to federal emergency management actions.
(Appendix 4)
Legal changes:
This paper examines Title VI of Public Law 109-295 (H.R. 5441), the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Katrina Act). The Katrina Act set out new
law, restructured FEMA, amended the Homeland Security Act (HSA), and modified the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act).
The Katrina Act charged FEMA with many tasks. FEMA, now a distinct entity within
DHS, ensures first responder effectiveness, implements the National Response Plan,
leads the nation’s Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) efforts for all hazards,
partners with non-federal entities to build a national emergency management system,
develops federal and non-federal response capabilities, and addresses regional priorities
with local offices.
The FEMA administrator provides emergency-management-related recommendations to
the secretary and then to Congress. The administrator develops a logistics system to
enable officials to track the location of goods and services throughout the transfer process
from FEMA to the affected states. The administrator updates FEMA’s information
technology systems and consults with government and non-government individuals to
develop a recovery strategy. This strategy should include an assessment of existing
programs, funding and authorities and determine the best use of such programs in
meeting unique disaster requirements.
The housing strategy involves an examination of resources from governments and
nongovernmental entities, increases availability by repairing rental housing, and
addresses the needs of low income and special needs populations.
The Stafford Act mission now highlights the reunification of families by forming a
National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System and the Child Locator Center.
This is accessible by the internet and a toll-free phone number.

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The Katrina Act addresses assistance to people with special circumstances, such as
disabilities or limited English proficiency. It also authorizes search, rescue, care, and
shelter of pets after a major disaster declaration.
The president’s role in emergency response is greatly elevated under the Katrina Act. The
president is charged to support precautionary evacuations and provide transportation
assistance to those displaced. He/she measures and accelerates the delivery of federal
emergency response and aid. The president may provide federal assistance without a
specific request from the state and if unrequested, federal officials must attempt to
coordinate with the state but cannot delay delivery because of these coordination efforts.
The president determines whether a private nonprofit facility is eligible for Stafford Act
Assistance. Eligible private nonprofit facilities serve essential functions such as
education, utility, irrigation, emergency, medical, rehabilitation, and temporary custodial
care. Second tier private nonprofit facilities, such as museums, community arts centers,
libraries, homeless shelters, and senior citizen centers are potentially eligible for
assistance as long as they are deemed essential.
The secretary engages the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the
National Response Plan (NRP) as the framework for emergency response. The NRP
addresses reunification of families, the public health and medical needs of evacuees,
special needs populations, search and rescue requirements, the coordination of agencies,
and mortuary arrangements. The secretary also strategically develops operation plans for
disasters with an emphasis on critical tasks and department and agency responsibilities.
Finally, the Katrina Act implements a comprehensive National Preparedness System to
ensure unity of effort in preparing for and responding to natural and manmade disasters.
(Appendix 5)
Additional Changes:
There were additional lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, not specifically noted in
the Katrina Act. The government needed an effective emergency communication system
shared by all agencies. During Katrina, the radio and telephone systems were so badly
damaged that in the first few days after the storm, public safety units had difficulty
talking to both their own members and other emergency responders. According to
Northwestern University Engineer David Schultz, “The emergency communications
system is clearly going to have to be 'hardened up.” Such "hardening" includes building
special communications lines and antennas that are protected against water, wind and
being knocked out by debris and must have electrical power that won't fail.
Disaster politics, not effective policy, often drives decisions on disaster response. FEMA
has often subsidized routine disasters, which depletes resources for more catastrophic
disasters. The United States could have benefited from international assistance during and
after Hurricane Katrina. The U.S. government received many foreign offers of help, but
delays due to faulty decision-making, logistical bottlenecks, and antiquated legislation

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and regulations caused problems for both American diplomats and the disaster victims.
Research from the Heritage Foundation provided eight lessons learned in terms of
international assistance. (Appendix 6)
Following Katrina, the American Bar Association (ABA)’s House of Delegates adopted a
Model Court Rule on provision of legal services following major disasters. Known as the
“Katrina rule,” it permits out-of-state lawyers to provide pro bono legal services when a
disaster affects the justice system. In 2007, the House adopted 12 principles for preserving
the rule of law in times of major disaster, including recommendations involving federal
flood insurance, the handling of insurance claims, legal assistance for low-income residents,
and care and disposition of animals. (Appendix 6).
Leadership was an essential piece to failed disaster relief efforts, one that affected the
entire system. Crises like Katrina are different from routine emergencies, and require
living systems leadership skills. In non-crisis contexts, leaders adhere to the application
of best practices to predictable phenomena. But crisis leaders need to have conviction and
the vision to lead the community out of disorientation. These leaders need to be creative
and adaptable and act quickly with little and unverified information. Above all they need
to move past bureaucratic inertia and not be afraid to seek new approaches.
Appendix:
Appendix 1: General Overview of United States Militaryand the National
Guard
The US Military and National Guard are uniquely positioned to respond to national
disasters (both manmade and natural) for several reasons. First, the Military and National
Guard both have an organizational infrastructure designed to maintain order and
efficiency in supply operations in the most chaotic of circumstances. Second, both
groups possess technology and mechanical assets on a scale virtually unmatched by other
organizations. Third, these groups are rich in human capital. The United States Military
as well as the National Guard have a tremendous number of personnel at their disposal.
It should also be noted that these individuals receive extensive training in how to respond
effectively to crisis situations as well as how to coordinate operations with other
organizations. With this said, there are notable differences between the US Military and
the National Guard.
United States Military
The US Military is under the command of the Secretary of Defense and ultimately the
President of the United States. The US Military only becomes involved in civil
operations when the resources of the local, state, and federal governments are unable to
respond effectively to a crisis situation. This is typically seen as a response of “last
resort” (Bowman, Kapp, & Belasco, 2005). When this does occur the U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) handles logistics for the US Military’s operations within the
borders of the United States.

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National Guard
Every state in the United States has its own National Guard unit. These units are under
the command of the Governor of their respected state and possess their own equipment.
The National Guard is comprised of citizens of their particular state. This is viewed as an
asset when responding to crisis at the state level given that these individuals often possess
a higher degree of regional expertise and arguably are more invested in what happens to
their state than are others from outside the area. It is, however, possible for National
Guard units to be “federalized” and brought under the direct command of the President of
the United States.
Appendix 2: Information Flow Impediments in disaster reliefSupply Chain
for the Red Cross
1. Inaccessibility
Inaccessibility refers to the inability to obtain data or information that is known or
assumed to exist. Often, we found this was due to physical constraints.
In another example, the Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management (OHSEM) learned that some of the parishes in Louisiana had emptied their
jails and put prisoners onto buses heading toward Houston. OHSEM then attempted to
obtain information from Louisiana’s correctional facilities. The following passage
describes the inability of Louisiana correctional facilities to provide data about prison
inmates evacuated on buses following the New Orleans levee breaks. “They had no
records of who they sent to us, because the computer systems all went under water.”
(Administrative Coordinator for the Harris County Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management) As a reactive strategy, people sought an alternate source of
similar information. “So, we had our DPS contact the Louisiana state troopers to […] get
a copy of their sexual offender list.” (Administrative Coordinator for the Harris County
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management) Thus, inaccessibility can arise
not only when emergency workers face situations for which their information systems are
unprepared, but also when they cannot access sources of information. In such cases,
emergency workers may seek alternate sources or revert to methods that pre-date the
modern age of information processing, such as sending a human messenger for physical
inspection.
2. Inconsistent Data and Information Formats
Inconsistent information and data formats exist when multiple sources of similar data or
information cannot be compared or aggregated due to having different dimensional or
field definitions. Example of inconsistent information appeared in the midst of Katrina
relief efforts when Hurricane Rita spurred an evacuation from the Houston area. Some
media sources reported that hundreds were dying of heat exhaustion on the evacuation
routes. “Because of (media reports), we mobilized various county and city resources to go
up and down the lines of cars handing out water. According to the Red Cross, all needs
were being met. The police were telling us ‘it’s hot but no one’s dying’. The medical
services said they transported 40 people.” (Administrative Coordinator, Harris County
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management) Although the information was
inconsistent, it provided indications to help determine that the media reports of heat

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exhaustion deaths were untrue. Aggregating dissimilar information proved to be more
appropriate as a base for decision making than having no input information at all.
3. Inadequate Stream of Information (Shortage/Overload)
An inadequate stream of information occurs when there is too little or too much data or
information available to an organization.
In contrast to too little information, the Red Cross had to deal with too much information—
more specifically with overwhelming amounts of data in the form of shelter registrations
on paper. In addition to being used for registration, these paper forms provided important
data when trying to find and reunite missing and separated family members.
4. Low information priority is the failure to place appropriate precedence on
information flow activities. Given the humanitarian imperative of the tasks necessary
following disasters, the collecting, processing, and sharing of information may not be a top
priority for managers, workers, or volunteers. For example, central authorities, such as
Harris County OHSEM, did not receive enough information—not only because of
inaccessibility, but also because officers providing help could not dedicate time to data
collection activities.
5. Source Identification Difficulty
Source identification difficulty occurs when an organization does not know where to obtain
the data or information that it wants. Source identification difficulty is similar to
inaccessibility; however, while the latter involves the absence of channels, the former
refers to not knowing where the required information is.
Not knowing where to get the needed information led to an action strategy of inactivity.
That is, since the parties involved did not know where to get information about what their
roles and responsibilities were, they remained inactive while others were waiting for them
to do something. This type of information flow impediment can also be illustrated by the
difficulty experienced when locating or identifying relief clients. As many volunteer
organizations rapidly transformed into shelters, no formal documentation was kept about
these events. As a result, the Red Cross continued to find Katrina relief clients sheltered in
smaller community churches that were not a part of the formal relief efforts even a month
after the disaster. “We would find people sheltered even after Katrina had passed 4 or 5
weeks later that we didn’t know about.” (Community Recovery Manager, American Red
Cross)
6. Storage Media Misalignment
Storage media misalignment occurs when characteristics of the chosen recording or storage
media inherently inhibit efficient information flow activities. For example, it could refer to
the gathering of information on paper, which makes it unsuitable for electronic processing.
This occurs as the initial data gathering takes place in the field at a time when formal
computerized systems are typically not available, or paper data collection is faster than
various electronic means of data collection.
At the same time, however, problems were encountered by the Red Cross as they processed
registrations on paper at the Reliant Center mega shelters. Although paper may be better
for data collection activities, newer information technologies hold important advantages
when processing and sharing information.
7. Unreliability.

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Unreliability refers to an organization’s low level of confidence in data or information it
possesses. This not only refers to information organizations actually receive, but also to
information they send.
Organizations often kept the most meaningful part of the information while still doubting
the details. This was a situation experienced by the Red Cross: “All the data was self-
reported, so there was no verification. You ask for identification, a driver’s license or
picture ID. It has an address and a picture so there’s some verification there, but so many
people came to shelters with no identification whatsoever. They had to wade through water
[…] lots of people lost their wallets. […] (But the data) was good to a point, because you
knew that person survived the evacuation,
8. Unwillingness.
Unwillingness occurs when one organization decides not to transfer data or information to
another organization. This category is closely related to inaccessibility; however, the non-
availability of information does not depend on something physical as inaccessibility does,
but rather on constraints of regulatory law or even personal preference. Continuing a
previous example, when Harris County OHSEM was informed that parishes in Louisiana
had emptied their jails onto buses that were heading toward Houston, Harris County
requested sexual offender lists from the State of Louisiana. Unfortunately, state laws
precluded this information from being shared
As a reactive strategy, Harris County OSHEM responded to this unwillingness, and more
from the American Red Cross, by obtaining the information without permission. “So, what
we did is, we hacked into their system and downloaded the list. […] Now we wanted to
combine this information with the registration information that the Red Cross had captured
electronically already by that time. Well, the Red Cross told us we can’t get that
information. […] it is their policy, it said, at a national level. So no problem, we hacked
their system as well and did a quick cross reference.” (Administrative Coordinator for the
Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management)
Clearly, this impediment touches upon aspects of regulation and even ethics. The actions
taken by relief officers show the desperation of the moment. It is an ethical dilemma
whether to obey a regulation that is thought to preserve individuals’ rights during regular
times or to obtain the required information to protect the lives and livelihoods of entire
communities. In any case, this impediment calls attention to the need for legislating flows
of information throughout major disasters. It also shows that the measures to be taken to
guarantee information flows during disaster times transcend the technical aspects of
information systems.
Appendix 3: 11 Critical Actions to Strengthen Federal Response Capabilities
1. Ensure that relevant Federal, State, and local decision-makers, including leaders of
State National Guards, are working together and in close proximity to one another in the
event of another disaster.
2. Ensure that for events preceded by warning, we are prepared to pre-position an
interagency Federal Joint Field Office (JFO) to coordinate and, if necessary, direct
Federal support to the disaster.
3. Ensure situational awareness by establishing rapid deployable communications, as well
as instituting a structure to consolidate Federal operational reporting with DHS.

15
4. Embed a single Department of Defense point of contact at the JFO and FEMA regional
offices to enhance coordination of military resources supporting the response.
5. Designate locations throughout the country for receiving, staging, moving, and
integrating military resources to ensure the most effective deployment of Federal disaster
relief personnel and assets.
6. Identify and develop rosters of Federal, State, and local government personnel who are
prepared to assist in disaster relief.
7. Employ all available technology to update and utilize the national Emergency Alert
System in order to provide the public with advanced notification of and instruction for
disasters and emergencies.
8. Encourage States to pre-contract with service providers for key disaster relief needs,
such as debris removal and the provision of critical commodities.
9. Enhance the mechanism for providing Federal funds to States for preparations upon
warning of an imminent emergency.
10. Improve the delivery of assistance to disaster victims by streamlining registration,
expediting eligibility decisions, tracking movements of displaced victims, and
incorporating safeguards against fraud.
11. Enhance ongoing review of State evacuation plans and incorporate planning for
Continuity of Government to ensure the continuation of essential and emergency
services.
Appendix 4: Six statutes enacted by the 109th Congress
Title VI of P.L. 109-295 (H.R. 5441), the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006
Sections of P.L. 109-347 (H.R. 4954), the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2005
P.L. 109-308 (H.R. 3858), the Pets Evacuation and Transportation
Standards Act of 2006
P.L. 109-63 (H.R. 3650), the Federal Judiciary Emergency Special
Sessions Act of 2005
P.L. 109-67 (H.R. 3668), the Student Grant Hurricane and Disaster
Relief Act
Sections of P.L. 109-364 (H.R. 5122), the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
Appendix 5: The National Preparedness System
 Identifying and Assessing Risk. This part involves collecting historical and recent
data on existing, potential and perceived threats and hazards. The results of these risk
assessments form the basis for the remaining steps.
 Estimating Capability Requirements. Next, you can determine the specific
capabilities and activities to best address those risks. Some capabilities may already

16
exist and some may need to be built or improved. FEMA provides a list of core
capabilities related to protection, prevention, mitigation, response and recovery, the
five mission areas of preparedness. To see a full list of the core capabilities, including
details about each one, visit our Core Capabilities page on this site.
 Building and Sustaining Capabilities. This involves figuring out the best way to use
limited resources to build capabilities. You can use the risk assessment to prioritize
resources to address the highest probability or highest consequence threats.
 Planning to Deliver Capabilities. Because preparedness efforts involve and affect the
whole community, it’s important that you coordinate your plans with other
organizations. This includes all parts of the whole community: individuals,
businesses, nonprofits, community and faith-based groups, and all levels of
government.
 Validating Capabilities. Now it’s time to see if your activities are working as
intended. Participating in exercises, simulations or other activities helps you identify
gaps in your plans and capabilities. It also helps you see progress toward meeting
preparedness goals.
 Reviewing and Updating. It is important to regularly review and update all
capabilities, resources and plans. Risks and resources evolve—and so should your
preparedness efforts.
Appendix 6: Eight lessons should be learned about how to work effectively
withinternational partners to accept useful assistance in a disaster:
1. Processing Contributions Requires an Efficient System. The United States lacks
efficient procedures for working effectively with international partners that want to help
and who so generously give in foreign disasters. During Hurricane Katrina, the process
for approving international offers of assistance was excessively complicated.
2. Determination of Needs Must Be Streamlined. Part of the issue with accepting
international assistance after either disaster was that U.S. officials tried to avoid accepting
unnecessary aid. The result was that the U.S. did not receive the help it did need. The
U.S. needs the ability to judge the extent of disasters and determine needs quickly. While
a contingency plan cannot be formulated for every possible disaster, preparations can be
made for general scenarios.
3. Logistics Planning Is Crucial. Ideally, the State Department, in close coordination
with the Department of Homeland Security, should inform foreign governments and
international organizations, as well as potential public-sector and private-sector domestic
donors, of what the United States most needs as soon as an emergency occurs. These
priorities can then be adjusted as the situation evolves and after the precise dimensions of
the emergency and the resulting requirements become clearer.
4. Communication Is Essential. One of the major concerns expressed by foreign
countries offering assistance after both disasters was the inability of U.S. officials to give
an answer—any answer—to willing foreign donors.
5. Protect People and Property, Not Bureaucracy. The U.S. needs to find a way to
approve projects promptly and streamline the permit process, whether for domestic or

17
foreign assistance. Due to states’ regulations, foreign doctors were prohibited from
volunteering in the stricken areas after Hurricane Katrina. The federal government should
work with states to identify and resolve these types of impediments.
6. DisasterResponse Should Not Promote Protectionism. The United States can ill
afford to place protectionism over helping its citizens in the aftermath of a disaster. In the
case of Hurricane Katrina, it was clear that the Jones Act hampered the mobilization of
resources.
7. FEMA Must Stay Out of Routine Disasters. For too long, FEMA has federalized
disaster response to the point where every routine disaster receives an onslaught of
federal funds and over stretches FEMA budgets.
Appendix 7: 12 principles for preserving the rule of law in times of major
disaster
Disparate Impact - Policy encourages federal, state, local, tribal and territorial
authorities to identify and address the special needs of vulnerable populations when
planning for and responding to disasters.
Cybersecurity - Policy encourages all private and public sector organizations to
develop, implement, and maintain an appropriate cybersecurity program that complies
with applicable ethical and legal obligations, and is tailored to the nature and scope of
the organization, and the data and systems to be protected.
Rule of Law in Times of Major Disaster – A Set of 12 Principles in support of
preservation of rule of law in times of a major disaster. They are intended to help insure
that justice will continue to be dispensed despite the damage and disruption caused by a
major disaster.
Legal Services and Pro Bono Representation – Policy supporting Pro Bono and Legal
Services Programs (2/09) and a Model Court Rule on Provision of Legal Services
Following Determination of Major Disaster (2/07).
Health Care – Policy addressing Emergency Care in Crisis (8/07) and Public Health
Threats (8/04).
Insurance and Mitigation - A set of seven policies related to improving availability and
affordability of insurance to protect property damage from storms and natural
catastrophes and to improve handling of claims following such events.
Other Policies Related to Disaster - Policy on standards for the care and disposition of
disaster animals (2/10), election procedures in the event of a catastrophe (8/04) and first
responder funding (8/03)
To be integrated in paper or appendix:
Pat’s information about FEMA:

18
The Federal Government represented by FEMA and led by President George W. Bush
had the resources, but lacked the will to act. In the fallout post mortem analysis,
Governor Blanco released many documents painting the communication dysfunctions
among the Federal, Local, and State Agencies. "’We need everything you've got,’ Blanco
is quoted in a memo as telling President Bush on Aug. 29, the day Katrina made landfall.
But despite assurances from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that
500 buses were ‘standing by,’ Blanco's aides were compelled to take action when the
FEMA buses failed to materialize. On September 2nd, Blanco complained to the White
House that FEMA had still failed to fulfill its promises of aid. Blanco noted that she had
already requested 40,000 more troops; ice, water and food; buses, base camps, staging
areas, amphibious vehicles, mobile morgues, rescue teams, housing, airlift and
communications systems, according to a press office e-mail of the text of her letter to
Bush.” (Washington Post Staff Writers, 2005).

19
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21
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