COVID-19, GVCs and jobs - (Mia Mikic)
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This presentation is based on my discussion in the session exploring impacts of COVID-19 on employment in Asia and the Pacific and it is focused on the GVC-trade as the channel of transmission to the labour markets.
![Points to ponder
• GVCs lime-light fading for some time, COVID-19 great disruption looks
like a last straw, but are they out?
• Rise together, fall together? [ who is sneezing and who is catching a
cold?]
• Repositioning of GVCs and jobs
• COVID-19 and shifting from export of goods to directly exporting
labour via DIGITECH?
• Role of regional cooperation]()
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COVID-19, GVCs and jobs - (Mia Mikic)
- 1. COVID-19 pandemic and GVC-trade in Asia-Pacific (early views)* Based on a presentation for a session on “COVID-19 and Global Supply Chains: The Impact on Jobs and Production” 12 June 2020
- 2. Points to ponder • GVCs lime-light fading for some time, COVID-19 great disruption looks like a last straw, but are they out? • Rise together, fall together? [ who is sneezing and who is catching a cold?] • Repositioning of GVCs and jobs • COVID-19 and shifting from export of goods to directly exporting labour via DIGITECH? • Role of regional cooperation
- 3. Finally down; but are the GVCs out? Mikic- ISEAS 3 World Bank, WDR, 2020 The share of world exports that flew through at least 2 borders.... GFC Trade war COVID-19
- 4. Is COVID-19 disruption felt equally across all countries / sectors? Supply shock (auto, electronics) Demand shock (commodities) Services (tourism) suffered the most; agriculture and manufacturing less so
- 6. GVC-linked exports in Asia-Pacific sub-regions (backward and forward linkages), 2017
- 7. Impacts on GVCs: Policy uncertainty • In the current global climate, policies are changing and the trading multilateral system nor other rules /norms are being adhered to. • Pre-COVID-19 we have seen increases in tariffs, sanctions and bans of importation; all rising as countries “weaponize” trade policy. • With COVID-19 an increase in subsidies as well (industrial policy / strategic autonomy vs. GVCs) • Concern still with deepening tensions between the US and China. Mikic- ISEAS 7
- 8. Illustration – Pre-COVID19 trade tension implications • Trade frictions are likely to create winners and losers as GVCs are redrawn. • Indirectly exposed to the trade war, countries have different degrees vulnerability • But redirection of trade and production in GVCs also bring opportunities Mia Mikic 8 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 Mongolia TaiwanProvinceofChina RepublicofKorea HongKong,China Japan VietNam Australia Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines Fiji Cambodia Kazakhstan Pakistan India RussianFederation Turkey LaoPeople'sDemocraticRepublic Bangladesh Kyrgyzstan Nepal Maldives SriLanka BruneiDarussalam Bhutan Index 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 VietNam Indonesia Japan RepublicofKorea TaiwanProvinceofChina India Thailand Turkey Singapore Malaysia Australia Philippines Bangladesh Pakistan Cambodia SriLanka HongKong,China RussianFederation Kazakhstan LaoPeople'sDemocraticRepublic Maldives Fiji Mongolia Nepal Kyrgyzstan BruneiDarussalam Bhutan Index Most vulnerable economies to US increased tariffs on China imports Economies with highest opportunities from US increased tariffs on China imports
- 9. Implications from the trade tensions • The impact of trade tensions to Asia- Pacific region, excluding China, vary widely at the sectoral level. • The losers tend to be export sectors • Automotive, chemical, rubber products for Asia-Pacific region in general • Textiles and apparels, plant fibres for LDCs. • The potential winners are inward- oriented, construction services in particular. Mia Mikic 9 Asia-Pacific, excluding China Asia-Pacific LDCs
- 10. Implications for jobs and inequality • There is a potential loss of 2.7-8.9 million jobs in 13 countries of the region. • Inequality in the region may increase. • Employment losses will be 23-66% higher for unskilled workers, compared to those for skilled workers. • While escalating trade war can put almost 9 million people out of jobs in the region, regional integration can add 12.5 million new jobs. Mia Mikic 10 Effect of trade tensions and regional integration on inequality
- 11. On reshoring: when labour cost arbitrage gets undermined by technology • Labour cost advantage allowed developing countries to offset their other disadvantages in technology, giving them a comparative advantage in traditional labour intensive manufacturing – led to ‘offshoring’. • Advances in technology can undermine this comparative advantage based on labour costs by making production more capital intensive. • In Asia, labour intensity across all sectors, not only goods but also services, has been declining Advances in technology mean it’s potentially cheaper to move production back to the origin country – phenomenon of ’reshoring’. • 1 more robot per 1000 workers, leads to 3.5% increase in reshoring activity=>might lead to more regionalization of network trade Mikic- ISEAS 11
- 12. Weathering trade tensions (pre-COVID-19) • Asia-Pacific may weather worsening trade tensions and global policy uncertainties through continued regional integration. • Implementation of mega-regional deals (RCEP, CPTPP, and EU-Japan) could boost regional exports by 1.3% to 2.9%, depending on the severity of global trade tensions. • Even with the “doomsday” trade war scenario, regional employment could actually increase by more than 3.5 million jobs. • As trade tensions and regional integration lead to resource reallocation, both within and across borders, complementary policies are more necessary than ever. EVEN MORE SO IN THE POST-COVID-19 Mia Mikic 12
- 14. Annex: GVC and the SDGs • By entering into GVCs driven by the inflows of FDI, countries may undercome more NTMs about labour and hence facilitate changes in social standards, such as increased and reasonable wages. • For environmental goals, GVCs are double sided: • Firstly, due to the fragmentation of production, there is increased transport of goods involved in the production process and also, a lot of the parts are make in countries with weak environmental regulations • GVCs are also engines of innovation and that help diffuse and create technology that aids the environment and reduces the impact of production of goods on the environment Mikic- ISEAS 14
- 15. Annex: GVCs and SDGs Cont’d. • Example of GVC participation aiding the achievement of SDGs is the increase of women in the workforce in Viet Nam: • Female employment grew faster than male employment in Vietnamese provinces where GVC participation expanded the most [World Bank, 2020, Forthcoming]. • Also increased education for girls in villages located near garment factory involved in a GVC in Bangladesh Mikic- ISEAS 15
Editor's Notes
- Thank you very much for the invitation – pleasure to contribute from ESCAP side on this extremely relevant topic.
- Not out, but seriously hurt; reincarnation in a more socially acceptable /likable form? Asia is affected but not all countries the same, not all sectors the same, not all companies the same, and certainly not all individuals the same = inequality increased Repositioning – started already with trade war; considerations then were still focused on efficiency + green; now the picture might be different Part of that is what will be the role of technology- Globotics Region needs to get its act together
- The highest growth rate of GVCs was in the 1990’s and since then the participation rate has gradually slowed down and has began to stagnate/decrease. Since then, there is a little progression in increasing their share of global GDP. Nevertheless, half of world trade still goes through GVCs. Multiple reasons the spread and growth of GVCs are slowing down in recent years: 1.trade costs are falling more slowly ; in 2020 RISING 2.the formation of GVCs has now reached a mature stage (maxed fragmentation) 3.and the composition of world economic activity has changed and no new transformational events to further boost shared production (no new CHINA) The slowdown may also be attributed to change in individual countries’ reforms (China) switching from export led to domestic consumption led growth (Chinese exports used to be made up of 60% imports, however China is now starting to create more and more inputs at home that are included in their exports, hence reducing Chinas role and participation in GVCs.) Memo: GVCs have impacts both Positive: Growth, GDP pc, income, productivity, better jobs, women jobs, lower poverty Negative : Rising inequalities, degradation of environment World Bank "World Development Report 2020: Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains" http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/124681548175938170/World-Development-Report-2020-Draft-Report.pdf
- Supply shocks tend to be felt most among countries with greater backward linkages = those whose exports embody imported value added (auto, electronics) Demand shocks tend to be felt most among countries with greater forward linkages.= those that export more basic intermediate goods for higher value added, consistent with greater demand shock impacts Example: Supply: it is estimated that a 2 per cent reduction in exports of intermediate inputs from China to automotive manufacturers in the European Union, Japan, North America, the Republic of Korea and other major automotive-producing economies could lead to a US$7 billion reduction in automotive exports from these economies to the rest of the world. Demand: a considerable decline in the demand for certain primary commodities such as copper and nickel. The demand shock has been particularly disruptive for some commodities, such as oil and dairy products, where excess inventory has led to storage capacity shortages and the destruction of perishables Services: civil aviation and tourism, have been particularly hard hit with a strong negative demand shock in the initial months of the global crisis. Other sectors, such as food retail, have experienced a sharp rise in demand in the short-term with a strong positive demand shock (however, they are facing bottlenecks in upstream industries)
- The impacts of supply disruptions in China have been strong and were quickly transmitted on. Countries relying upon China to supply a high proportion of their manufacturing inputs have quickly seen a corresponding slump in the value of their own manufacturing production and exports. In Viet Nam, where goods exports had previously been rising at double-digit rates, partly because of trade diversion due to US-China trade war, exports declined by 15 per cent in April-May 2020 (compared to the same period in 2019. In Thailand, industrial production growth was down by 18 per cent year-on-year, hitting its lowest growth rate since January 2012 in April. Notably, least developed countries (LDCs) were also heavily impacted. For example, among the ASEAN member States, Cambodia is the economy with most of its exports being dependent on imported inputs from China (so-called backward supply chain linkages), with Chinese input-content accounting for 9 per cent of gross exports, especially in the textile sector. Cambodia’s growth rate is expected to drop to 2.3 per cent in 2020, indicating a decline of almost 5 percentage points from 2019. Backward value chains linkages with China still account for over 2 per cent of gross exports for Lao PDR. Even for economies less reliant on intermediate imports from China used as inputs into their supply chains (commodity exporters, such as Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia and Lao PDR), faced difficulties to maintain markets supplied when China’s production was halted. However, China’s emerging role as a major investor and a key supplier of capital goods and machinery, supplying a third or more of all capital goods imports into Asia-Pacific economies, complicates any effort to reduce dependence on such an influential trading partner.
- GVC linkage is calculated as the sum of foreign value-added in the region’s gross exports and the value-added in regional intermediate exports, then used in further export production. It is scaled as a percentage of the region’s gross exports to the world. ‘Other’ refers to an aggregate of the remaining 30 sectors in each sub-region. A new normal will have strong impacts on Asia-Pacific region, which has significant exposure to GVCs ranging between 30 per cent of gross exports in the Pacific to 43 per cent in the South-East Asia sub-region. With a global recession and a stronger impetus to focus on supply chain robustness, it will be challenging for Asia-Pacific region to maintain the scale of production, trade and FDI at pre-pandemic levels.
- Uncertainty and loss of confidence: Findings from OECD Composite Leading Indicator and the European Union Business and Consumer Survey done in May 2020 indicate lower confidence level than in 2008. The supply chain disruptions, travel restrictions, and lockdowns have had extensive consequences in Asia. For example, in Thailand, the Central Bank announced in May that the Business Sentiment Index fell to the lowest level since 2014 despite its stock market index rebounded significantly from the sharp drop in April. Memo on sanctions: Sanctions disrupt global value chains, and thus affect non-sanctioned goods as well as (largely) non-sanctioning countries. Example- 91% of the trade loss caused by sanctions on Russia by the US is incurred through non-embargoed products, which points to widespread unintended consequences of the sanction policies. Similar to the effect of tariffs, there is a ‘friendly-fire’ effect of sanctions policy – neutral countries are impacted because global value chains are disrupted. Target of sanctions is to effect individuals and firms within a country and not the country as a whole.
- CAVEAT- these were done based on efficiency criteria only. If the new normal will require different criteria, the winners/losers tally might be different. Trade frictions are likely to create winners and losers as GVCs are redrawn Participation in GVCs has been a major driver of the economic development of many economies in the region over the past three decades. In the medium term, the trade frictions could affect the configuration and the expansion of GVCs, particularly if they remain essentially bilateral. Countries exporting raw materials and intermediate products to China would be most negatively impacted . Mongolia is the most vulnerable country in the region because China is almost a single gateway for Mongolia to exports to the world market. Some countries could see positive spill overs because of trade and investment moving away from China. As importers in the United States and China look for alternative suppliers, new opportunities will open up for countries that can leverage from their competitiveness to attract the redirected trade and investment. ESCAP estimates that ASEAN countries are some of the largest potential beneficiaries, in particular Viet Nam and other ASEAN countries. However, the relocation of production will not be completed overnight, and short-term pains and challenges may be expected at the firm level in many countries as the GVC map is redrawn. The retaliatory tariffs imposed by China on the United States’ exports of agricultural and industrial commodities could also increase market opportunities for some commodity-based economies. However, GVC redirection and trade flows induced by trade tensions are not optimal – nor stable. Policy distortions affecting MNE’s decisions to relocate may create inefficiency-related losses as production moves to second-best locations. Trade tensions may also lead investors to postpone investments until policy uncertainties decrease.
- PLEASE NOTE all these are PRE-covid! However, the impact of trade tensions at the sectoral level vary widely. Construction is expected to be the big winner, whereas potential motor-vehicle tariffs are expected affect the automotive and parts sector the most in the region as a whole. Since LDCs are not large automotive or parts producers, sectors experiencing the most declines there are textiles, wearing apparel and plant fibres. Although the sectoral declines observed in LDCs are small, it may be noted that the sectors concerned are labour intensive sectors characterised by a particularly high proportion of female workers. Construction is expected to be the big winner in LDCs and Asia-Pacific as a whole, whereas potential motor-vehicle tariffs are expected affect the automotive and parts sector the most in the region as a whole. Since LDCs are not large automotive or parts producers, sectors experiencing the most declines there are textiles, wearing apparel and plant fibres. Although the sectoral declines observed in LDCs are small, it may be noted that the sectors concerned are labour intensive sectors characterised by a particularly high proportion of female workers.
- In addition, discriminatory trade policies may have potentially serious impact SDGs. The trade conflict will push production to more expensive locations, reducing resource efficiency globally. Some of the production activities may also shift from China to countries with lower environmental standards, leading to higher global emissions. trade tensions could have derail the region’s path toward SDG. Asia and the Pacific would see a net loss of 2.7 million jobs if threatened tariffs are implemented . If the continued trade conflicts impact investor and consumer confidence significantly, net job losses in the region could reach 8.9 million. Regional job losses are primarily driven by losses in China, but other countries also experience total job losses, including Turkey and Bangladesh. Thirteen countries experience net job losses under the wort case scenario. Inequality would increase given thattariff war seems to affect disproportionately more unskilled workers, as the rate of job losses for unskilled workers is 66% higher than that for skilled workers under scenario 1. However, as the trade conflicts deepen under scenarios 2 and 3, the rate of job losses among skilled and unskilled workers narrows to 23%. It is notable that regional integration can add as many as 12.5 million jobs in the region, and when combined with the worst trade war scenario considered, overall, region adds more than 3.5 million jobs. While escalating trade war can put almost 9 million people out of jobs in the region, regional integration can add 12.5 million new jobs.
- Empirical results of Kimura and Obashi (2019) show that the introduction of industrial robots seems to enhance network trade in East Asia, particularly with larger usage of cross-border service outsourcing. As technology has made strides forward, the process of manufacturing has changed significantly, making it sometimes cheaper than paying for the previously used cheap labour in foreign countries and the costs associated with fragmentation. New technology allows for smaller plants and more efficient production, meaning that in the origin country the costs may be lower to produce there. The activity of reshoring is effected by both decreases in cost and availability of robots, and also increases in global labour costs, especially in previous offshoring destinations. Technology impacts are both positive and negative Firstly, as tech progress moves forward, manufacturing in GVCs will be damaged: -Production will become jobless, reducing demand for labour -Goods will become nontraded- ‘reshoring’ [yet environment might benefit] -Services will be boosted however Cheaper and more available telecommunication means services chains can be distributed to remote workers This means technology is pushing us away from manufacturing-led development to services-led development [Globotics] BALDWIN FUTURE OF WORK / WHAT CAN BE DONE FROM HOME (increased inequalities) Covid has changed the future of work via four shocks: massive job losses, massive digital transformations, massive debt burdens, and massive costs of socially distanced office space. These matter in two ways. First, due to sunk cost hysteresis, re-hiring workers is very different than retaining workers. Second, the digital transformations, office-space costs, and debt burdens will push firms to replace domestic workers with ‘telemigrants’ or ‘white-collar robots’. The jobs that return will be those that require face-to-face interactions and involve tasks that AI cannot handle.
- ESCAP ROLE: As the COVID-19 pandemic calls for borderless solidarity, the framework will rely on multilateral, regional and subregional cooperation and multi-stakeholder collaborations. Let us embed regional and subregional cooperation in the three streams of work as an integral part of “Building back better”. • Leverage the intergovernmental platforms of ESCAP--the Commission, Asia-Pacific Forum for Sustainable Development as well as its Ministerial Conferences and Committees. • Work with subregional organizations and entities. • Engage with United Nations entities, including the United Nations Resident Coordinators and country teams, and the five issue-based coalitions. • Work with development partners, including private sector, think tanks, academia and civil society Building back better is the overarching principle of the framework and an integral part of any policy response. Without enhanced resilience, inclusivity and sustainability, external shocks will continue to threaten people’ s lives and livelihoods. The following measures are essential to building back better and will be the basis for the interventions through these streams of work: • Use the Leaving No One Behind methodology to identify those furthest behind in accessing opportunities in Asia and the Pacific. • Analyse policy packages and propose guidelines to ensure compatibility with social inclusivity and climate resilience. • Enhance sustainability of transport connectivity, including urban public transport, as well as digitalization and facilitation of freight transport operations. • Improve ICT resilience and address the digital divide including through co-deployment of fibre optic cable along infrastructure networks to lower costs and reach geographically remote communities. • Develop integrated policies to promote decarbonization, energy efficiency, reduction of pollution and climate change mitigation. • Protect and restore ecosystems as a means of building resilience to future pandemics,including through cooperation on air pollution and biodiversity conservation.
- On top of the improvements in employment numbers for women, we also see that girls from places where there is a nearby company involved in a GVC, the girls have a better level of education, which was found to happen in villages on Bangladesh that were nearby a garment factory that was involved in a GVC [Heath & Mobarak, 2015]. A plausible explanation for this may be due to the increased wages parents receive and a higher emphasis on returns to education. World Bank, Forthcoming, “World Development Report 2020: Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains” Heath, Rachel, and A. Mushfiq Mobarak. 2015. “Manufacturing Growth and the Lives of Bangladeshi Women.” Journal of Development Economics 115 (2015): 1–15.