SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Adapting to the Age of Anonymous
      SOURCE Barcelona - November 17, 2011
                       Joshua Corman
               Director of Security Intelligence
                        @joshcorman
         http://cognitivedissidents.wordpress.com/




                                                     ©2011 Akamai
About Joshua Corman
    Director of Security Intelligence for Akamai Technologies
    •Former Research Director, Enterprise Security [The 451 Group]
    •Former Principal Security Strategist [IBM ISS]

    Industry Experience
    •Expert Faculty: The Institute for Applied Network Security (IANS)
    •2009 NetworkWorld Top 10 Tech People to Know
    •Co-Founder of “Rugged Software” www.ruggedsoftware.org

    Things I’ve been researching
    •Compliance vs Security
    •Disruptive Security for Disruptive Innovations
    •Chaotic Actors
    •Espionage
    •Security Metrics

2                                                                        ©2011 Akamai
Agenda

• Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes

• Deconstructing Anonymous

• Adapting to Anonymous

• Building a Better Anonymous?




                                               ©2011 Akamai
Understanding Anonymous:
The Rise of the Chaotic Actor

            Joshua Corman
            @joshcorman
            Director of Security Intelligence
            Akamai Technologies



            2011 FlashTalks powered by PechaKucha




                                                ©2011 Akamai
5   ©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
Paradox Slide/Deliberate Disinformation




                                          ©2011 Akamai
http://www.csoonline.com/article/682511/the-rise-of-the-chaotic-actor-understanding-anonymous-and-ourselves
                                                                                                              ©2011 Akamai
Some men just want to see the world burn…




                      9                     ©2011 Akamai
Lots & Lots of Anonymous Sects




                      10         ©2011 Akamai
Your Headline Here (in Title Caps)




                       11            ©2011 Akamai
You Choose Your Own Level of Involvement




                     12                    ©2011 Akamai
Anonymous* Unmasked? [*Alleged]




                                  ©2011 Akamai
You Choose Your Own Level of Involvement




                     14                    ©2011 Akamai
You Choose Your Own Level of Involvement




                     15                    ©2011 Akamai
Escalation?




              16   ©2011 Akamai
Anomalous Anonymous?




                   17   ©2011 Akamai
False Flags: Adaptive Persistent Adversaries




    “Anonymous is God’s gift to the Chinese” – CISO

                                                      ©2011 Akamai
Cyber-Neo-McCarthyism

 I am not now…
…nor have I ever
   been…
 …a member of
  Anonymous.
                        ©2011 Akamai
Building a Better Anonymous…




                     20        ©2011 Akamai
Building a Better Anonymous…




                     21        ©2011 Akamai
The easy answers Suggested Background




                                        ©2011 Akamai
Joshua Corman
 @joshcorman



     23         ©2011 Akamai
Agenda

• Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes

• Deconstructing Anonymous

• Adapting to Anonymous

• Building a Better Anonymous?




                                               ©2011 Akamai
PANEL: Whoever Fights Monsters…




                                  ©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
Operation Payback
(Anonymous Takes Center Stage)


August-December 2010
Initial Targets
     • MPAA
     • RIAA
     • Intellectual Property Offices
In December, switched to WikiLeaks “defense”
   • Financial services: PayPal, Mastercard, Visa
   • Public personas: Lieberman, Palin
   • Others: Lawyers, security researchers
Stats:
   • 1k-3k attackers in IRC
   • 1500 copies of LOIC in Hivemind (# in IRC/2)
   • 1.5 Gbps peak attack traffic (# in IRC/2)
   • 750 Mbps sustained traffic (# in IRC/4)

                                                    ©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
Discussion



             ©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
http://cognitivedissidents.wordpress.com/2011/11/11/an-anonymous-ink-blot-rorschach/
  “An Anonymous Ink Blot Rorschach” What do you see in the Anonymous Ink Blot ?




  BRAND
POLLUTION

                                                                                 ©2011 Akamai
BRAND
POLLUTION

            ©2011 Akamai
BRAND
POLLUTION

            ©2011 Akamai
False Cover: Criminal and State Actors




    “Anonymous is God’s gift to the Chinese” – CISO

                                                      ©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
Agenda

• Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes

• Deconstructing Anonymous

• Adapting to Anonymous

• Building a Better Anonymous?




                                               ©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
DDoS is Legion

74% of surveyed
companies experienced
one or more DDoS attacks
in the past year, 31% of
these attacks resulting in
service disruption.1




1   Forrester Research


                             ©2011 Akamai
Some of my data

                                                                     600
• Typical Attack Size: 3-10 Gbps
                                                                     500
• Large Attack Size: 100-200 Gbps
                                                                     400




                                                 Number of Attacks
• Attacks are originating from all geographies
  and are moving between geographies
                                                                     300
  during the attack

                                                                     200


                                                                     100


                                                                       0
                                                                           2009   2010   2011


                                                                                                ©2011 Akamai
July 4th – 7th 2009 DDoS Attack
400,000 Korean Bots Attack Key U.S. Government Web Sites



                                                           Times Above
        Agency – PROTECTED                 Peak Traffic    Normal Traffic
        U.S. Government Customer 1         124 Gbps        598x
        U.S. Government Customer 2         32 Gbps         369x
        U.S. Government Customer 3         9 Gbps          39x
        U.S. Government Customer 4         9 Gbps          19x
        U.S. Government Customer 5         2 Gbps          9x
        U.S. Government Customer 6         1.9 Gbps        6x
        New U.S. Government Customer       0.7 Gbps        SITE DOWN
                                                           before Akamai


                                                                            ©2011 Akamai
Agenda

• Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes

• Deconstructing Anonymous

• Adapting to Anonymous

• Building a Better Anonymous?




                                               ©2011 Akamai
Agenda




         ©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
©2011 Akamai
Discussion



             ©2011 Akamai
Thank You!
  Barcelona, November 17, 2011
              Joshua Corman
               @joshcorman
http://cognitivedissidents.wordpress.com/




                                            ©2011 Akamai

More Related Content

Similar to Adapting To The Age Of Anonymous

Corman Anonymous Csa Chicago 20120712
Corman Anonymous Csa Chicago 20120712Corman Anonymous Csa Chicago 20120712
Corman Anonymous Csa Chicago 20120712
elizmmartin
 
Hacking Google Chrome OS
Hacking Google Chrome OSHacking Google Chrome OS
Hacking Google Chrome OS
kosborn
 
Accessibility of Hacker Tools and the Use of Behavioral Analytics
Accessibility of Hacker Tools and the Use of Behavioral AnalyticsAccessibility of Hacker Tools and the Use of Behavioral Analytics
Accessibility of Hacker Tools and the Use of Behavioral Analytics
Tony Gambacorta
 
Managing content in_a_mobile_world
Managing content in_a_mobile_worldManaging content in_a_mobile_world
Managing content in_a_mobile_worldQuestexConf
 
20110903 candycane
20110903 candycane20110903 candycane
20110903 candycaneYusuke Ando
 
Clobbering the Cloud
Clobbering the CloudClobbering the Cloud
Clobbering the Cloud
SensePost
 
Metricon5 powell - ddos analytics
Metricon5   powell - ddos analyticsMetricon5   powell - ddos analytics
Metricon5 powell - ddos analytics
Ton Hoang
 
Emerging Threats and Attack Surfaces
Emerging Threats and Attack SurfacesEmerging Threats and Attack Surfaces
Emerging Threats and Attack Surfaces
Peter Wood
 

Similar to Adapting To The Age Of Anonymous (8)

Corman Anonymous Csa Chicago 20120712
Corman Anonymous Csa Chicago 20120712Corman Anonymous Csa Chicago 20120712
Corman Anonymous Csa Chicago 20120712
 
Hacking Google Chrome OS
Hacking Google Chrome OSHacking Google Chrome OS
Hacking Google Chrome OS
 
Accessibility of Hacker Tools and the Use of Behavioral Analytics
Accessibility of Hacker Tools and the Use of Behavioral AnalyticsAccessibility of Hacker Tools and the Use of Behavioral Analytics
Accessibility of Hacker Tools and the Use of Behavioral Analytics
 
Managing content in_a_mobile_world
Managing content in_a_mobile_worldManaging content in_a_mobile_world
Managing content in_a_mobile_world
 
20110903 candycane
20110903 candycane20110903 candycane
20110903 candycane
 
Clobbering the Cloud
Clobbering the CloudClobbering the Cloud
Clobbering the Cloud
 
Metricon5 powell - ddos analytics
Metricon5   powell - ddos analyticsMetricon5   powell - ddos analytics
Metricon5 powell - ddos analytics
 
Emerging Threats and Attack Surfaces
Emerging Threats and Attack SurfacesEmerging Threats and Attack Surfaces
Emerging Threats and Attack Surfaces
 

More from Source Conference

Million Browser Botnet
Million Browser BotnetMillion Browser Botnet
Million Browser Botnet
Source Conference
 
iBanking - a botnet on Android
iBanking - a botnet on AndroidiBanking - a botnet on Android
iBanking - a botnet on Android
Source Conference
 
I want the next generation web here SPDY QUIC
I want the next generation web here SPDY QUICI want the next generation web here SPDY QUIC
I want the next generation web here SPDY QUIC
Source Conference
 
From DNA Sequence Variation to .NET Bits and Bobs
From DNA Sequence Variation to .NET Bits and BobsFrom DNA Sequence Variation to .NET Bits and Bobs
From DNA Sequence Variation to .NET Bits and Bobs
Source Conference
 
Extracting Forensic Information From Zeus Derivatives
Extracting Forensic Information From Zeus DerivativesExtracting Forensic Information From Zeus Derivatives
Extracting Forensic Information From Zeus Derivatives
Source Conference
 
How to Like Social Media Network Security
How to Like Social Media Network SecurityHow to Like Social Media Network Security
How to Like Social Media Network Security
Source Conference
 
Wfuzz para Penetration Testers
Wfuzz para Penetration TestersWfuzz para Penetration Testers
Wfuzz para Penetration Testers
Source Conference
 
Security Goodness with Ruby on Rails
Security Goodness with Ruby on RailsSecurity Goodness with Ruby on Rails
Security Goodness with Ruby on Rails
Source Conference
 
Securty Testing For RESTful Applications
Securty Testing For RESTful ApplicationsSecurty Testing For RESTful Applications
Securty Testing For RESTful Applications
Source Conference
 
Esteganografia
EsteganografiaEsteganografia
Esteganografia
Source Conference
 
Men in the Server Meet the Man in the Browser
Men in the Server Meet the Man in the BrowserMen in the Server Meet the Man in the Browser
Men in the Server Meet the Man in the Browser
Source Conference
 
Advanced Data Exfiltration The Way Q Would Have Done It
Advanced Data Exfiltration The Way Q Would Have Done ItAdvanced Data Exfiltration The Way Q Would Have Done It
Advanced Data Exfiltration The Way Q Would Have Done It
Source Conference
 
Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?
Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?
Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?
Source Conference
 
Advanced (persistent) binary planting
Advanced (persistent) binary plantingAdvanced (persistent) binary planting
Advanced (persistent) binary planting
Source Conference
 
Legal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to Cloud
Legal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to CloudLegal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to Cloud
Legal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to Cloud
Source Conference
 
Who should the security team hire next?
Who should the security team hire next?Who should the security team hire next?
Who should the security team hire next?
Source Conference
 
The Latest Developments in Computer Crime Law
The Latest Developments in Computer Crime LawThe Latest Developments in Computer Crime Law
The Latest Developments in Computer Crime Law
Source Conference
 
JSF Security
JSF SecurityJSF Security
JSF Security
Source Conference
 
How To: Find The Right Amount Of Security Spend
How To: Find The Right Amount Of Security SpendHow To: Find The Right Amount Of Security Spend
How To: Find The Right Amount Of Security Spend
Source Conference
 
Everything you should already know about MS-SQL post-exploitation
Everything you should already know about MS-SQL post-exploitationEverything you should already know about MS-SQL post-exploitation
Everything you should already know about MS-SQL post-exploitation
Source Conference
 

More from Source Conference (20)

Million Browser Botnet
Million Browser BotnetMillion Browser Botnet
Million Browser Botnet
 
iBanking - a botnet on Android
iBanking - a botnet on AndroidiBanking - a botnet on Android
iBanking - a botnet on Android
 
I want the next generation web here SPDY QUIC
I want the next generation web here SPDY QUICI want the next generation web here SPDY QUIC
I want the next generation web here SPDY QUIC
 
From DNA Sequence Variation to .NET Bits and Bobs
From DNA Sequence Variation to .NET Bits and BobsFrom DNA Sequence Variation to .NET Bits and Bobs
From DNA Sequence Variation to .NET Bits and Bobs
 
Extracting Forensic Information From Zeus Derivatives
Extracting Forensic Information From Zeus DerivativesExtracting Forensic Information From Zeus Derivatives
Extracting Forensic Information From Zeus Derivatives
 
How to Like Social Media Network Security
How to Like Social Media Network SecurityHow to Like Social Media Network Security
How to Like Social Media Network Security
 
Wfuzz para Penetration Testers
Wfuzz para Penetration TestersWfuzz para Penetration Testers
Wfuzz para Penetration Testers
 
Security Goodness with Ruby on Rails
Security Goodness with Ruby on RailsSecurity Goodness with Ruby on Rails
Security Goodness with Ruby on Rails
 
Securty Testing For RESTful Applications
Securty Testing For RESTful ApplicationsSecurty Testing For RESTful Applications
Securty Testing For RESTful Applications
 
Esteganografia
EsteganografiaEsteganografia
Esteganografia
 
Men in the Server Meet the Man in the Browser
Men in the Server Meet the Man in the BrowserMen in the Server Meet the Man in the Browser
Men in the Server Meet the Man in the Browser
 
Advanced Data Exfiltration The Way Q Would Have Done It
Advanced Data Exfiltration The Way Q Would Have Done ItAdvanced Data Exfiltration The Way Q Would Have Done It
Advanced Data Exfiltration The Way Q Would Have Done It
 
Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?
Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?
Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?
 
Advanced (persistent) binary planting
Advanced (persistent) binary plantingAdvanced (persistent) binary planting
Advanced (persistent) binary planting
 
Legal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to Cloud
Legal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to CloudLegal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to Cloud
Legal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to Cloud
 
Who should the security team hire next?
Who should the security team hire next?Who should the security team hire next?
Who should the security team hire next?
 
The Latest Developments in Computer Crime Law
The Latest Developments in Computer Crime LawThe Latest Developments in Computer Crime Law
The Latest Developments in Computer Crime Law
 
JSF Security
JSF SecurityJSF Security
JSF Security
 
How To: Find The Right Amount Of Security Spend
How To: Find The Right Amount Of Security SpendHow To: Find The Right Amount Of Security Spend
How To: Find The Right Amount Of Security Spend
 
Everything you should already know about MS-SQL post-exploitation
Everything you should already know about MS-SQL post-exploitationEverything you should already know about MS-SQL post-exploitation
Everything you should already know about MS-SQL post-exploitation
 

Recently uploaded

Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered QualitySoftware Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Inflectra
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Ana-Maria Mihalceanu
 
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 previewState of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
Prayukth K V
 
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and SalesThe Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
Laura Byrne
 
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
DanBrown980551
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
James Anderson
 
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMsTo Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
Paul Groth
 
Elevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object Calisthenics
Elevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object CalisthenicsElevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object Calisthenics
Elevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object Calisthenics
Dorra BARTAGUIZ
 
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
Product School
 
When stars align: studies in data quality, knowledge graphs, and machine lear...
When stars align: studies in data quality, knowledge graphs, and machine lear...When stars align: studies in data quality, knowledge graphs, and machine lear...
When stars align: studies in data quality, knowledge graphs, and machine lear...
Elena Simperl
 
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Albert Hoitingh
 
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Jeffrey Haguewood
 
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdfLeading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
OnBoard
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Alan Dix
 
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Frank van Harmelen
 
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdfSmart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
91mobiles
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
DianaGray10
 
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Product School
 
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using SmithyGenerating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
g2nightmarescribd
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered QualitySoftware Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
 
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 previewState of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 preview
 
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and SalesThe Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
 
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
 
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMsTo Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
 
Elevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object Calisthenics
Elevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object CalisthenicsElevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object Calisthenics
Elevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object Calisthenics
 
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
 
When stars align: studies in data quality, knowledge graphs, and machine lear...
When stars align: studies in data quality, knowledge graphs, and machine lear...When stars align: studies in data quality, knowledge graphs, and machine lear...
When stars align: studies in data quality, knowledge graphs, and machine lear...
 
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
 
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
 
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdfLeading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
 
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
 
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdfSmart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
 
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
 
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using SmithyGenerating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
 

Adapting To The Age Of Anonymous

Editor's Notes

  1. Rorschach Test: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rorschach_testWe see in Anonymous what we WANT to see.. We project. Our perceptions say more about us than they do about the multitude of subgroups/causes in Anonymous.
  2. There isn’t AN anonymous either… there are dozens.It is more of a franchise than an Organization.
  3. http://www.csoonline.com/article/682511/the-rise-of-the-chaotic-actor-understanding-anonymous-and-ourselves
  4. Family Tree IMG SOURCE: http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-XS0av6GQlIE/TheLlBBprTI/AAAAAAAAAIU/f6aABTtPyVE/s1600/tree.jpg
  5. Operation Payback – LOIC-ers
  6. IMG Source: http://eandres.glogster.com/Whitchhunt-/
  7. IMG SOURCE: http://www.toonpool.com/cartoons/Leviathan_41513#img9Two logical outcomes…A Hobbes-ian Leviathan will rise… to police the brand – borne of necessity and convenienceThe Brand will be contaminated and the MoralAnons will fleeThis is Social Contract Theory 101 stuff…Hobbes: The State of Nature is a State of War…Locke: The State of Nature is a State of Inconvenience…
  8. IMG SOURCE: http://www.toonpool.com/cartoons/Leviathan_41513#img9Two logical outcomes…A Hobbes-ian Leviathan will rise… to police the brand – borne of necessity and convenienceThe Brand will be contaminated and the MoralAnons will fleeThis is Social Contract Theory 101 stuff…Hobbes: The State of Nature is a State of War…Locke: The State of Nature is a State of Inconvenience…