The paper discusses possible directions and magnitudes of the relationship between the social security driven tax wedge, employment and shadow employment in Russia and Ukraine. The first section presents a summary of the economic and institutional background for development of the current size and structure of the socially driven tax wedge in both countries. The second section presents some theoretical considerations on the relationship between the social protection system, tax wedge, non-employment and finally, shadow employment. The third section contains an attempt to econometrically estimate the magnitude of the possible relationship between the tax wedge and total employment rates in both countries. In the fourth section, the authors try to discover the mechanism of influence of the last reform of the Ukrainian payroll tax system on the structure and size of shadow employment in the country. The last analytical section closes the circle leading the reader back from shadow employment to wages and finally to the issue of access to social security institutions. The last section concludes.
Authored by: Marek Gora, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Irina Sinitsina, Mateusz Walewski
Published in 2009
The paper focuses on the social safety nets in Russian Federation and Ukraine in the view of changes on the labour market since the beginning of economic transition. The authors showed that many past phenomena (e.g. restructuring of the economy, wage and pension arrears, new groups at-risk-of-poverty, demographic transition) caused a need to change an old type social safety net (SSN) into the new one, better adapted to emerging more liberal economy problems.
Additionally, the authors analysed some gender specific issues related to social security that are caused mainly by inequalities in the labour market. Differences of earnings between men and women in Russia caused by sector segregation account for seem to be more important than the gap between gender earnings attributed to the position. In Ukraine the main contributors to gross gender differential of log earnings (that equals to 32%) explained by our model are sector segregation and occupation.
The authors also pointed out to future policy challenges in the area of social security systems in both countries. The retirement reforms introduced recently are a step in the right direction, although their impact will not be felt for a number of years. Other reforms, with more immediate results, are necessary. Social safety nets should be made more efficient and social benefits should be better targeted.
Authored by: Marek Gora, Grzegorz Kula, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Magdalena Rokicka, Anna Ruzik-Sierdzinska
Published in 2009
This paper provides the results of analyses of key problems related to pension systems and their reforms in Russia and Ukraine. The pension systems and their reforms in both countries are compared. They are also compared with the general picture observed in the OECD or selected countries belonging to that area. The analysis focuses on long-term trends rather than short-term shocks. The recent economic crisis is not covered since the analysis was mostly completed by 2008.
Authored by: Marek Gora, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oksana Sinyavskaya
Published in 2010
This paper studies costs and benefits of institutional harmonisation in the context of EU relations with its neighbors. The purpose of this paper is to outline the likely forms of institutional harmonisation between the EU and its Eastern neighbors and provide an
overview of the methodologies that can be used in measuring its effects (costs and benefits). This paper serves as a background for two measurement exercises – one on benefits and another on costs – that are to be undertaken during the second stage of research.
Authored by: Veliko Dimitrov, Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Anna Kolesnichenko, Irina Orlova
Published in 2007
The objective of this paper has been to experiment diverse economic indicators in order to help equip Ukrainian policymakers with a relatively simple tool, which could deliver warning signals about the possibility of upcoming economic problems and thereby assist the Government in designing policy instruments which would help prevent or soften a slowdown or recession.
Authored by: Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Inna Golodniuk, Janusz Szyrmer
The paper discusses the issue of labor force mobility in a broad sense, and analyses how changes in social security policy and the structure of the social safety net (SSN) affects different aspects of labor force mobility. The text is structured as follows: Introduction, then follows Chapter 2, which provides an overview of the labor market and social safety net developments in Russian and Ukraine over the last decade, as well as discusses common features of these countries. The Chapter 3 establishes theoretical models for different aspects of labor force mobility, discusses the availability of data on Russia and Ukraine to test these models, and provides a statistical analysis of the data. The Chapter 4 discusses results of the statistical analysis. The final chapter discusses policy conclusions that can be derived from comparison of the effect of the SSN on labor mobility in these two countries, and extends them to all countries in transition.
Authored by: Marek Gora, Oleksander Rohozynsky
Published in 2009
This paper analyzes the direct and indirect income effects of international labor migration and remittances in selected CIS countries. The analysis is based on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. All net emigration countries would experience a sharp contraction of private consumption in the absence of remittances. In Russia, the main effect of immigration has been to hold down the real wage (as potential capital stock adjustments in response to immigration are not reflected in the authors comparative-static modeling framework). The paper concludes that because of the important contribution of migration and remittances to stabilizing and sustaining incomes in many CIS countries, enhanced opportunities for legal labor migration should figure prominently in any deepening of bilateral relations between CIS countries and the European Union under the European Neighborhood Policy.
Authored by: Aziz Atamanov, Toman Omar Mahmoud, Roman Mogilevsky, Kseniya Tereshchenko, Natalia Tourdyeva
Published in 2009
Ainura Uzagalieva
Vitaly Vavryschuk
In this paper the authors undertake an ex-post evaluation of whether the special economic zones (SEZs) introduced in Poland in 1994 have been successful in meeting regional development objectives. They evaluate the policy of as many of its objectives as possible: employment creation, business creation (which includes attracting foreign direct investment), income or wage effects, and environmental sustainability. They use different panel data methods to investigate this question at the powiat and gmina levels in Poland during the 1995-2011 period. It is also possible to include numerous controls to reduce the problem of the omitted variables bias such as education level, dependency rates, state ownership, general subsidies and whether the area is urban or rural. The results indicate that SEZs in Poland have been successful in a number of their objectives such as private business creation. The positive effect of the policy however mainly comes through foreign direct investment (FDI), whereas the effects on e.g. investment and employment are small or insignificant. In other areas, such as securing higher income levels and locking firms into the sustainability agenda through the adoption of green technologies and reduced air pollution, the authors find only a small positively moderating effect of the policy on what are traditionally economically disadvantaged areas in Poland that used to be dependent on the socialist production model. Hence, despite high levels of FDI, the zones policy has not managed to overcome the legacy of backwardness or lagging regions. The main policy implication of the paper is that SEZs may be successful in stimulating activity in the short run but the policy must be seen as one of necessary temporality and can therefore not stand alone. Before launching SEZs, policymakers must have plans in place for follow up measures to ensure the longer term competitiveness and sustainability implications of such an initiative. There is a need to understand the connection between the specific incentive schemes used (in this particular case tax incentives were used) and the kinds of firms and activities they attract, including the behavioral models that those incentives promote.
Authored by: Camilla Jensen
Published in 2014
The empirical analysis of the determinants of institutional development in transition countries as well as the qualitative country studies summarized in this publication allow for some optimism concerning a potential impact of the EU on institution building and governance quality in CIS countries. Regression analysis reveals a positive impact of EU cooperation agreements below a membership perspective. Alternatively to the EU, entry into the NATO accession process also exerts incentives for better institutions which are often overlooked. In contrast, WTO membership is not found to have any impact on institution building in CIS countries. While there is room for some EU-related optimism given the results from the regression analysis it depends on the country-specific ENP action plans and programs whether or not ENP cooperation actually leads to Europeanization or institutional convergence towards EU standards in the CIS. The case studies on the effectiveness of Neighborhood Europeanization through ENP in Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan reveal that current EU policies towards these countries can be, at best, seen as a catalyst but not as a main driver of institutional convergence. A perspective for a stake in the internal market is on the long horizon for Ukraine only. ENP mechanisms for conflict resolution in Georgia and Azerbaijan have been rather weak before the recent clash in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The top-down institutional convergence, i.e. an EU-first strategy, worked well for Enlargement Europeanization but implemented in the ENP it significantly reduces the leverage of the EU to create a ring of well-governed neighbour states.
Authored by: Thorsten Drautzburg, Andrea Gawrich, Inna Melnykovska, Rainer Schweickert
Published in 2008
The paper focuses on the social safety nets in Russian Federation and Ukraine in the view of changes on the labour market since the beginning of economic transition. The authors showed that many past phenomena (e.g. restructuring of the economy, wage and pension arrears, new groups at-risk-of-poverty, demographic transition) caused a need to change an old type social safety net (SSN) into the new one, better adapted to emerging more liberal economy problems.
Additionally, the authors analysed some gender specific issues related to social security that are caused mainly by inequalities in the labour market. Differences of earnings between men and women in Russia caused by sector segregation account for seem to be more important than the gap between gender earnings attributed to the position. In Ukraine the main contributors to gross gender differential of log earnings (that equals to 32%) explained by our model are sector segregation and occupation.
The authors also pointed out to future policy challenges in the area of social security systems in both countries. The retirement reforms introduced recently are a step in the right direction, although their impact will not be felt for a number of years. Other reforms, with more immediate results, are necessary. Social safety nets should be made more efficient and social benefits should be better targeted.
Authored by: Marek Gora, Grzegorz Kula, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Magdalena Rokicka, Anna Ruzik-Sierdzinska
Published in 2009
This paper provides the results of analyses of key problems related to pension systems and their reforms in Russia and Ukraine. The pension systems and their reforms in both countries are compared. They are also compared with the general picture observed in the OECD or selected countries belonging to that area. The analysis focuses on long-term trends rather than short-term shocks. The recent economic crisis is not covered since the analysis was mostly completed by 2008.
Authored by: Marek Gora, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oksana Sinyavskaya
Published in 2010
This paper studies costs and benefits of institutional harmonisation in the context of EU relations with its neighbors. The purpose of this paper is to outline the likely forms of institutional harmonisation between the EU and its Eastern neighbors and provide an
overview of the methodologies that can be used in measuring its effects (costs and benefits). This paper serves as a background for two measurement exercises – one on benefits and another on costs – that are to be undertaken during the second stage of research.
Authored by: Veliko Dimitrov, Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Anna Kolesnichenko, Irina Orlova
Published in 2007
The objective of this paper has been to experiment diverse economic indicators in order to help equip Ukrainian policymakers with a relatively simple tool, which could deliver warning signals about the possibility of upcoming economic problems and thereby assist the Government in designing policy instruments which would help prevent or soften a slowdown or recession.
Authored by: Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Inna Golodniuk, Janusz Szyrmer
The paper discusses the issue of labor force mobility in a broad sense, and analyses how changes in social security policy and the structure of the social safety net (SSN) affects different aspects of labor force mobility. The text is structured as follows: Introduction, then follows Chapter 2, which provides an overview of the labor market and social safety net developments in Russian and Ukraine over the last decade, as well as discusses common features of these countries. The Chapter 3 establishes theoretical models for different aspects of labor force mobility, discusses the availability of data on Russia and Ukraine to test these models, and provides a statistical analysis of the data. The Chapter 4 discusses results of the statistical analysis. The final chapter discusses policy conclusions that can be derived from comparison of the effect of the SSN on labor mobility in these two countries, and extends them to all countries in transition.
Authored by: Marek Gora, Oleksander Rohozynsky
Published in 2009
This paper analyzes the direct and indirect income effects of international labor migration and remittances in selected CIS countries. The analysis is based on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. All net emigration countries would experience a sharp contraction of private consumption in the absence of remittances. In Russia, the main effect of immigration has been to hold down the real wage (as potential capital stock adjustments in response to immigration are not reflected in the authors comparative-static modeling framework). The paper concludes that because of the important contribution of migration and remittances to stabilizing and sustaining incomes in many CIS countries, enhanced opportunities for legal labor migration should figure prominently in any deepening of bilateral relations between CIS countries and the European Union under the European Neighborhood Policy.
Authored by: Aziz Atamanov, Toman Omar Mahmoud, Roman Mogilevsky, Kseniya Tereshchenko, Natalia Tourdyeva
Published in 2009
Ainura Uzagalieva
Vitaly Vavryschuk
In this paper the authors undertake an ex-post evaluation of whether the special economic zones (SEZs) introduced in Poland in 1994 have been successful in meeting regional development objectives. They evaluate the policy of as many of its objectives as possible: employment creation, business creation (which includes attracting foreign direct investment), income or wage effects, and environmental sustainability. They use different panel data methods to investigate this question at the powiat and gmina levels in Poland during the 1995-2011 period. It is also possible to include numerous controls to reduce the problem of the omitted variables bias such as education level, dependency rates, state ownership, general subsidies and whether the area is urban or rural. The results indicate that SEZs in Poland have been successful in a number of their objectives such as private business creation. The positive effect of the policy however mainly comes through foreign direct investment (FDI), whereas the effects on e.g. investment and employment are small or insignificant. In other areas, such as securing higher income levels and locking firms into the sustainability agenda through the adoption of green technologies and reduced air pollution, the authors find only a small positively moderating effect of the policy on what are traditionally economically disadvantaged areas in Poland that used to be dependent on the socialist production model. Hence, despite high levels of FDI, the zones policy has not managed to overcome the legacy of backwardness or lagging regions. The main policy implication of the paper is that SEZs may be successful in stimulating activity in the short run but the policy must be seen as one of necessary temporality and can therefore not stand alone. Before launching SEZs, policymakers must have plans in place for follow up measures to ensure the longer term competitiveness and sustainability implications of such an initiative. There is a need to understand the connection between the specific incentive schemes used (in this particular case tax incentives were used) and the kinds of firms and activities they attract, including the behavioral models that those incentives promote.
Authored by: Camilla Jensen
Published in 2014
The empirical analysis of the determinants of institutional development in transition countries as well as the qualitative country studies summarized in this publication allow for some optimism concerning a potential impact of the EU on institution building and governance quality in CIS countries. Regression analysis reveals a positive impact of EU cooperation agreements below a membership perspective. Alternatively to the EU, entry into the NATO accession process also exerts incentives for better institutions which are often overlooked. In contrast, WTO membership is not found to have any impact on institution building in CIS countries. While there is room for some EU-related optimism given the results from the regression analysis it depends on the country-specific ENP action plans and programs whether or not ENP cooperation actually leads to Europeanization or institutional convergence towards EU standards in the CIS. The case studies on the effectiveness of Neighborhood Europeanization through ENP in Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan reveal that current EU policies towards these countries can be, at best, seen as a catalyst but not as a main driver of institutional convergence. A perspective for a stake in the internal market is on the long horizon for Ukraine only. ENP mechanisms for conflict resolution in Georgia and Azerbaijan have been rather weak before the recent clash in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The top-down institutional convergence, i.e. an EU-first strategy, worked well for Enlargement Europeanization but implemented in the ENP it significantly reduces the leverage of the EU to create a ring of well-governed neighbour states.
Authored by: Thorsten Drautzburg, Andrea Gawrich, Inna Melnykovska, Rainer Schweickert
Published in 2008
The CIS region is of vital importance for the EU countries considering that both are interconnected through cooperation or membership in supranational political and economic institutions (OSCE, WTO, OECD, NATO, etc.), through transport and energy corridors, through investment, trade and migration trends.
The interests of EU member states in the region are very diverse and are sometimes pursued in contradiction to one another. The overarching interest is of an economic nature, given the large reserves of natural resources (particularly gas and oil) and due to the size of the CIS market of 277 million consumers. Security and immigration issues also rank high on the list, whereas EU countries are less concerned with democratisation trends in the CIS. Russia is the most important CIS partner for a majority of EU countries. Energy plays a disproportionally high role in EU member states (MS) - Russia relations and is also a strong determinant of the overall heterogeneity of EU MS policies towards Russia. The type of bilateral relations which the EU MS maintain with one sub-region of the CIS (particularly the EENP, but increasingly also Central Asia) also affects their relations with Russia. Cultural closeness and a common history still play a large part in the development of bilateral relations. The accession to the EU of Central and Eastern European states has altered the existing relations between them and their eastern CIS neighbours, thereby also modifying their interests in the region. Regrettably, the EU's policies towards Russia and the EENP region have not yet been able to provide a playing field able to compensate for this alteration.
Thus, the present report studies the various interests (political, security, economic, cultural) which underpin relations between the EU member states and the CIS countries and also discusses the latest developments in EU policies towards a specific CIS sub-region (Russia, the Eastern ENP and Central Asia), thereby providing a broad picture of the type of interests, how they are pursued by the EU member states and where these intersect or clash.
Authored by: George Dura
Published in 2008
In this paper we investigate the effects of EU enlargement on price convergence. The internal market is expected to boost integration and increase efficiency and welfare through a convergence of prices in product markets. Two principal drivers are crucial to explain price developments. On the one hand, higher competition exerts a downward pressure on prices because of lower mark ups. On the other hand, the catching up process of low income countries leads to a rise in the price levels and higher inflation over a transition period. Using comparative price levels for individual product categories price convergence can be established. However, the speed of convergence is rather slow, with half lives around 10 years. The enlargement has slightly stimulated the convergence process, and this impact is robust across different groups of countries. Moreover, the driving forces of convergence are explored. In line with theoretical predictions, the rise in competition exerts a downward pressure on prices, while catching up of low income countries leads to a rise in price levels.
Authored by: Christian Dreger, Konstantin Kholodilin, Kirsten Lommatzsch, Jirka Slacalek, Przemyslaw Wozniak
Published in 2007
This paper examines the motives behind foreign direct investment (FDI) in a group of four CIS countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan) based on a survey of 120 enterprises. The results indicate that non-oil multi-national enterprises (MNEs) are predominantly oriented at serving local markets. Most MNEs in the CIS operate as 'isolated players', maintaining strong links to their parent companies, while minimally cooperating with local CIS firms. The surveyed firms secure the majority of supplies from international sources. For this reason, the possibility for spillovers arising from cooperation with foreign-owned firms in the CIS is rather low at this time. The lack of efficiency-seeking investment poses further concern regarding the nature of FDI in the region. The most significant problems identified in the daily operations of the surveyed foreign firms are: the volatility of the political and economic environment, the ambiguity of the legal system and the high levels of corruption.
Authored by: Malgorzata Jakubiak
Published in 2008
The regulatory environment for businesses in Ukraine has been considered unfavorable and market unfriendly. Although various governments have made numerous efforts to improve it, many of these attempts have failed and increasing the quality of the regulatory environment in the country still remains on the agenda of the government. With this report we claim to review a set of measures undertaken in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution in the area of deregulation of business activity. The paper analyzes the effectiveness of actions undertaken in Ukraine in a general framework of successful regulatory policies implemented in other parts of the world. Based on this analysis we developed concrete public policy measures aiming to increase the quality of the regulatory environment in the country, which, in turn, should secure Ukraine’s further movement toward a real, functioning market economy.
Authored by: Ewa Balcerowicz, Oleg Ustenko
Published in 2006
This study seeks to determine the extent to which countries of the former Soviet Union are "infected" by the Dutch Disease. We take a detailed look at the functioning of the transmission mechanism of the Dutch Disease, i.e. the chains that run from commodity prices to real output in manufacturing. We complement this with two econometric exercises. First, we estimate nominal and real exchange rate models to see whether commodity prices are correlated with the exchange rate. Second, we run growth equations to analyse the possible effects of commodity prices and the dependency of economic growth on natural resources.
Authored by: Balazs Egert
Published in 2009
This paper employs a standard Tobin-Markowitz framework to analyse the determinants of capital flows into the CIS countries. Using data from 1996-2006, we find that the Russian financial crisis of 1998 has had a profound impact on capital flows into the CIS (both directly and indirectly). Firstly, it introduced a structural shift in the investors' behaviour by shifting the focus from the external factors to the internal ones, e.g. domestic interest and GDP growth rates. Secondly, it also drastically changed the impact of a number of explanatory variables on capital flows into the CIS. Political risk was found to be the second most important determinant of capital flows into the CIS. Additionally, we report some strong evidence of co-movement between portfolio flows into the CIS and CEEC, coupled with strong complementarity between global stock market activity and portfolio inflows into the CIS. Interestingly, external factors tend to be of a higher significance than internal factors for the largest members (Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) of the CIS; whereas domestic variables tend to have a greater impact on the capital flows into the smaller CIS countries.
Authored by: Oleksandr Lozovyi
Published in 2007
This report, titled "Age and Productivity. Human Capital Accumulation and Depreciation", was released within a project NEUJOBS- “The Impact of Service Sector Innovation and Internationalisation on Growth and Productivity”, funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the 7th Framework Programme.
The report focuses on links between age, productivity and lifelong learning. Various data sources (EU-SILC, LFS, Structure of Earnings Survey, SHARE, ELSA, SHARELIFE) and methodological approaches were used in this report. The analysis identifies clusters of countries with common characteristics of age-earnings profiles (for certain groups of employees) and allows for an explanation of those differences. Some differences can be attributed to the share of sectors, education types, and occupations in country-specific employment. Others are due to labour market institutions and the (dis)incentives to work at older ages provided by social security systems. Additionally, the dynamics of earnings after age 50 differ less between educational and occupational groups than at earlier ages. The authors show that the dynamics of average wages are strongly influenced by the timing of entering and leaving labour market. An estimation of the impact of LLL on productivity (measuredby earnings) at older ages shows that for employees aged 50+, participation in training increases wages in the short-term.
Written by Anna Ruzik-Sierdzinska, Maciej Lis, Monika Potoczna, Michele Belloni and Claudia Villosio. Published in October 2013.
PDF available on our website at: http://www.case-research.eu/en/node/58334
This paper analyzes the costs of (partial) institutional harmonization with the EU acquis which countries of the former USSR are expected to conduct under their Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the EU and European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans. The public sector will have to take an effort of the transposition and adaptation of EU norms, as well as ensuring that they are complied with. Yet, the major part of the adjustment costs will fall on the private sector, as enterprises will have to make substantial investments to comply with new product requirements and business practices.
In this study we used the method of extrapolation of average costs for CEE countries’ harmonization with acquis to estimate the potential harmonization costs for the neighboring countries based on internationally comparative macroeconomic indicators like sectoral and total value added. This involved estimating the EU pre-accession support for the CEE countries by main areas as a percentage of the total or sectoral value added, determining the expected degree of limited harmonization in the ENP countries and estimating “coefficients of limited harmonization”, which was subsequently used for adjustment of the estimated cost of full harmonization.
Authored by: Veliko Dmitrov
After a long period in which state-led development was the dominant economic paradigm, since the 1980s private sector development has been the focus for economic policy makers. It is probably no coincidence that economic growth, stagnant for a few decades in much of the developing world, took off in the 1990s after this policy shift, and has generally remained high (in spite of a wave of crises and recessions in the late 1990s and early 2000s). Privatization has made a great deal of progress in the developing world, particularly in Latin America, though the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have lagged somewhat.
Authored by: Richard Woodward, Mehdi Safavi, Piotr Kozarzewski
Published in 2012
The objective of the PICK-ME (Policy Incentives for Creation of Knowledge – Methods and Evidence) research project is to provide theoretical and empirical perspectives on innovation which give a greater role to the demand-side aspect of innovation. The main question is how can policy make enterprises more willing to innovate? This task is fulfilled by identifying what we consider the central or most salient aspect of a demand-side innovation- driven economy, which is the small and entrepreneurial yet fast growing and innovative firm. We use the term “Gazelle” to signify this type of firm throughout the paper. The main concern of policy-makers should therefore be how to support Gazelle type of firms through various policies. The effectiveness of different policy instruments are considered. For example, venture capitalism is in the paper identified as an important modern institution that renders exactly the type of coordination necessary to bring about an innovation system more orientated towards the demand side. This is because experienced entrepreneurs with superior skills in terms of judging the marketability of new innovations step in as financiers. Other factor market bottlenecks on the skills side must be targeted through education policies that fosters centers of excellence. R&D incentives are also considered as a separate instrument but more a question for future research since there is no evidence available on R&D incentives as a Gazelle type of policy. Spatial policies to foster more innovation have been popular in the past. But we conclude that whereas the literature often finds that new knowledge is developed in communities of physically proximate firms, there is no overshadowing evidence showing that spatial policies in particular had any impact on generating more of the Gazelle type of firms.
Authored by: Itzhak Goldberg, Camilla Jensen
Published in 2014
This paper claims that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU, and in particular the elements related to justice and home affairs (JHA), is a complex, multilayered initiative that incorporates different logics and instruments. To unravel the various layers of the policy, the paper proceeds in three steps: firstly, it lays out some facts pertaining to the origins of the ENP, as its ‘origins’ arguably account for a number of the core tensions. It then presents the underlying logic and objectives attributed to JHA cooperation, which can be derived from the viewpoints voiced during policy formulation. The paper goes on to argue that despite the existence of different logics, there is a unifying objective, which is to ‘extra-territorialise’ the management of ‘threats’ to the neighbouring countries. The core of the paper presents the various policy measures that have been put in place to achieve external ‘threat management’. In this context it is argued that the ’conditionality-inspired policy instruments’, namely monitoring and benchmarking of progress, transfer of legal and institutional models to non-member states and inter-governmental negotiations, contain socialisation elements that rely on the common values approach. This mix of conditionality and socialisation instruments is illustrated in two case studies, one on the fight against terrorism and one on irregular migration. Finally, the paper recommends that the EU draft an Action-Oriented Paper (AOP) on JHA cooperation with the ENP countries that indicates how the EU intends to balance the conflicting objectives and instruments that are currently present in the JHA provisions of the ENP.
Authored by: Nicole Wichmann
Published in 2007
The paper shows that the question that is relevant for the debate on the efficacy of development assistance is not so much as an issue of how much, but rather for what. In view of the growing awareness of ODA’s inefficiency in achieving intended aims, this paper proposes an alternative approach to development assistance policies – economic integration and subsidiarity provides the conditions necessary for ODA to produce higher rates of economic growth on a sustainable basis. Europe is an excellent case in point, in this context. Europe has in the last decades experienced a number of success stories in moving out of poverty and onto sustainable economic growth. The secret of success has been the push towards economic integration, and the adoption of economic reforms at the local, national, and regional level conducive to economic growth. The recipient countries of development assistance have much to learn from the European experience.
Does European economic integration create more inequality between domestic regions, or is the opposite true? We show that a general answer to this question does not exist, and that the outcome depends on the liberalisation scenario. In order to examine the impact of European and international integration on the regions, the paper develops a numerical simulation model with nine countries and 90 regions. Eastward extension of European integration is beneficial for old as well as new member countries, but within countries the impact varies across regions. Reduction in distance-related trade costs is particularly good for the European peripheries. Each liberalisation scenario has a distinct impact on the spatial income distribution, and there is no general rule telling that integration causes more or less agglomeration.
Authored by Arne Melchior
Published in 2009
The aim of the project is to analyze government support for innovation in a comparative perspective by first examining the main existing instruments of financial support for innovation in Turkey and Poland, and secondly to assess their effectiveness by applying recent econometric techniques to firm-level data for both countries obtained from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
Authored by: Wojciech Grabowski, M. Teoman Pamukcu, Krzysztof Szczygielski, Sinan Tandogan
Published in 2013
The current fiscal imbalances and fragilities in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMC) are the result of decades of instability, but have become more visible since 2008, when a combination of adverse economic and political shocks (the global and European financial crises, Arab Spring) hit the region. In an environment of slower growth and higher public expenditure pressures, fiscal deficits and public debts have increased rapidly. This has led to the deterioration of current accounts, a depletion of official reserves, the depreciation of some currencies and higher inflationary pressure.
To avoid the danger of public debt and a balance-of-payment crisis, comprehensive economic reforms, including fiscal adjustment, are urgently needed. These reforms should involve eliminating energy and food subsidies and replacing them with targeted social assistance, reducing the oversized public administration and privatizing public sector enterprises, improving the business climate, increasing trade and investment openness, and sector diversification. The SEMC may also benefit from a peace dividend if the numerous internal and regional conflicts are resolved.
However, the success of economic reforms will depend on the results of the political transition, i.e., the ability to build stable democratic regimes which can resist populist temptations and rally political support for more rational economic policies.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2014
The Journal of Scientific Papers “VUZF REVIEW” published from the year 2016, is issued 4 times a year and is a scientific publication on topical problems of science in various areas of economic theory and practice, management, marketing and applied research methods. The journal is international in the essence and scope. All articles pass through the procedure of reviewing by the editorial board. Editorial Board consist of well-known scientists whose activities contributes to the integration of the global scientific community. OUR AUTHORS ARE: Leading scientists; University professors; Graduate students; Students; Foreign researchers; Scientists; Applicants for degrees.
The Scientific journal “VUZF REVIEW” published from the year 2016, is issued 4 times a year and is a scientific publication on topical problems of science in various areas of economic theory and practice, management, marketing and applied research methods. The journal is international in the essence and scope. All articles pass through the procedure of reviewing by the editorial board. Editorial Board consist of well-known scientists whose activities contributes to the integration of the global scientific community. OUR AUTHORS ARE: Leading scientists; University professors; Graduate students; Students; Foreign researchers; Scientists; Applicants for degrees
The report reviews key issues in energy trade and cooperation between the EU and CIS countries. It describes historical trends of oil and gas demand in the EU, other European and CIS countries and offers demand forecasts until 2030. Recent developments in oil and gas production and exports from Russia and Caspian countries are covered in detail leading to the discussion of the likely export potential of these regions. The key factors determining the production outlook, trade-offs and competition related to energy resources transportation choices are also discussed. The report also covers the interests and role of transit countries in relations between producer and consumer regions. The analytical section leads to policy recommendations that focus mainly on the EU.
Authored by: Sabit Bagirov, Leonid Grigoriev, Wojciech Paczynski, Vladimer Papava, Marcel Salikhov, Michael Tokmazishvili
Published in 2009
The aim of this study is to estimate the impact of the removal of NTBs in trade between the EU and its selected CIS partners: Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (CIS5). The report includes a discussion of methodologies of measurement of non-tariff barriers and the impact of their removal, including a review of previous studies focusing on CEE and CIS regions. Further, we employ a computable general equilibrium model encompassing the following three pillars of trade facilitation: legislative and regulatory approximation, reform of customs rules and procedures and liberalization of the access of foreign providers of services. We conclude that a reduction of NTBs and improved access to the EU market would bring significant benefits to the CIS5 countries in terms of welfare gains, GDP growth, increases in real wages and expansion of international trade. The possible welfare implications of deep integration with the EU range from 5.8% of GDP in Ukraine to sizeable expected gains in Armenia (3.1%), Russia (2.8%), Azerbaijan (1.8%) and Georgia (1.7%).
Authored by: Maryla Maliszewska, Irina Orlova, Svitlana Taran
Published in 2009
The aim of this paper is to examine the issues of gender disparities in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, with a special focus given to countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The analysis is conducted in several dimensions: labour participation, economic opportunity, political empowerment, educational attainment, and health and demography. Beside the comparative study of "in region differentials" done for the CIS, I analyze the trends in gender disparities in comparison to EU-12 and EU-15, using data for the period 1985-2005.
The study confirms the existence of slightly different paths in which gender disparities have evolved over time. While in EU-15 women participation in labour market, their remuneration, and position in public life have significantly increased, in majority of the CIS countries a gradual decrease of female labour activity was reported. In addition female representation in politics and public life has shrunken after and during the transition period. On the other hand in such fields as secondary and tertiary education attainment, health, and demography male population in the CIS region has became more disadvantaged, which also leads to enlarging gender gap.
Authored by: Magdalena Rokicka
Published in 2008
The CIS region is of vital importance for the EU countries considering that both are interconnected through cooperation or membership in supranational political and economic institutions (OSCE, WTO, OECD, NATO, etc.), through transport and energy corridors, through investment, trade and migration trends.
The interests of EU member states in the region are very diverse and are sometimes pursued in contradiction to one another. The overarching interest is of an economic nature, given the large reserves of natural resources (particularly gas and oil) and due to the size of the CIS market of 277 million consumers. Security and immigration issues also rank high on the list, whereas EU countries are less concerned with democratisation trends in the CIS. Russia is the most important CIS partner for a majority of EU countries. Energy plays a disproportionally high role in EU member states (MS) - Russia relations and is also a strong determinant of the overall heterogeneity of EU MS policies towards Russia. The type of bilateral relations which the EU MS maintain with one sub-region of the CIS (particularly the EENP, but increasingly also Central Asia) also affects their relations with Russia. Cultural closeness and a common history still play a large part in the development of bilateral relations. The accession to the EU of Central and Eastern European states has altered the existing relations between them and their eastern CIS neighbours, thereby also modifying their interests in the region. Regrettably, the EU's policies towards Russia and the EENP region have not yet been able to provide a playing field able to compensate for this alteration.
Thus, the present report studies the various interests (political, security, economic, cultural) which underpin relations between the EU member states and the CIS countries and also discusses the latest developments in EU policies towards a specific CIS sub-region (Russia, the Eastern ENP and Central Asia), thereby providing a broad picture of the type of interests, how they are pursued by the EU member states and where these intersect or clash.
Authored by: George Dura
Published in 2008
In this paper we investigate the effects of EU enlargement on price convergence. The internal market is expected to boost integration and increase efficiency and welfare through a convergence of prices in product markets. Two principal drivers are crucial to explain price developments. On the one hand, higher competition exerts a downward pressure on prices because of lower mark ups. On the other hand, the catching up process of low income countries leads to a rise in the price levels and higher inflation over a transition period. Using comparative price levels for individual product categories price convergence can be established. However, the speed of convergence is rather slow, with half lives around 10 years. The enlargement has slightly stimulated the convergence process, and this impact is robust across different groups of countries. Moreover, the driving forces of convergence are explored. In line with theoretical predictions, the rise in competition exerts a downward pressure on prices, while catching up of low income countries leads to a rise in price levels.
Authored by: Christian Dreger, Konstantin Kholodilin, Kirsten Lommatzsch, Jirka Slacalek, Przemyslaw Wozniak
Published in 2007
This paper examines the motives behind foreign direct investment (FDI) in a group of four CIS countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan) based on a survey of 120 enterprises. The results indicate that non-oil multi-national enterprises (MNEs) are predominantly oriented at serving local markets. Most MNEs in the CIS operate as 'isolated players', maintaining strong links to their parent companies, while minimally cooperating with local CIS firms. The surveyed firms secure the majority of supplies from international sources. For this reason, the possibility for spillovers arising from cooperation with foreign-owned firms in the CIS is rather low at this time. The lack of efficiency-seeking investment poses further concern regarding the nature of FDI in the region. The most significant problems identified in the daily operations of the surveyed foreign firms are: the volatility of the political and economic environment, the ambiguity of the legal system and the high levels of corruption.
Authored by: Malgorzata Jakubiak
Published in 2008
The regulatory environment for businesses in Ukraine has been considered unfavorable and market unfriendly. Although various governments have made numerous efforts to improve it, many of these attempts have failed and increasing the quality of the regulatory environment in the country still remains on the agenda of the government. With this report we claim to review a set of measures undertaken in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution in the area of deregulation of business activity. The paper analyzes the effectiveness of actions undertaken in Ukraine in a general framework of successful regulatory policies implemented in other parts of the world. Based on this analysis we developed concrete public policy measures aiming to increase the quality of the regulatory environment in the country, which, in turn, should secure Ukraine’s further movement toward a real, functioning market economy.
Authored by: Ewa Balcerowicz, Oleg Ustenko
Published in 2006
This study seeks to determine the extent to which countries of the former Soviet Union are "infected" by the Dutch Disease. We take a detailed look at the functioning of the transmission mechanism of the Dutch Disease, i.e. the chains that run from commodity prices to real output in manufacturing. We complement this with two econometric exercises. First, we estimate nominal and real exchange rate models to see whether commodity prices are correlated with the exchange rate. Second, we run growth equations to analyse the possible effects of commodity prices and the dependency of economic growth on natural resources.
Authored by: Balazs Egert
Published in 2009
This paper employs a standard Tobin-Markowitz framework to analyse the determinants of capital flows into the CIS countries. Using data from 1996-2006, we find that the Russian financial crisis of 1998 has had a profound impact on capital flows into the CIS (both directly and indirectly). Firstly, it introduced a structural shift in the investors' behaviour by shifting the focus from the external factors to the internal ones, e.g. domestic interest and GDP growth rates. Secondly, it also drastically changed the impact of a number of explanatory variables on capital flows into the CIS. Political risk was found to be the second most important determinant of capital flows into the CIS. Additionally, we report some strong evidence of co-movement between portfolio flows into the CIS and CEEC, coupled with strong complementarity between global stock market activity and portfolio inflows into the CIS. Interestingly, external factors tend to be of a higher significance than internal factors for the largest members (Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) of the CIS; whereas domestic variables tend to have a greater impact on the capital flows into the smaller CIS countries.
Authored by: Oleksandr Lozovyi
Published in 2007
This report, titled "Age and Productivity. Human Capital Accumulation and Depreciation", was released within a project NEUJOBS- “The Impact of Service Sector Innovation and Internationalisation on Growth and Productivity”, funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the 7th Framework Programme.
The report focuses on links between age, productivity and lifelong learning. Various data sources (EU-SILC, LFS, Structure of Earnings Survey, SHARE, ELSA, SHARELIFE) and methodological approaches were used in this report. The analysis identifies clusters of countries with common characteristics of age-earnings profiles (for certain groups of employees) and allows for an explanation of those differences. Some differences can be attributed to the share of sectors, education types, and occupations in country-specific employment. Others are due to labour market institutions and the (dis)incentives to work at older ages provided by social security systems. Additionally, the dynamics of earnings after age 50 differ less between educational and occupational groups than at earlier ages. The authors show that the dynamics of average wages are strongly influenced by the timing of entering and leaving labour market. An estimation of the impact of LLL on productivity (measuredby earnings) at older ages shows that for employees aged 50+, participation in training increases wages in the short-term.
Written by Anna Ruzik-Sierdzinska, Maciej Lis, Monika Potoczna, Michele Belloni and Claudia Villosio. Published in October 2013.
PDF available on our website at: http://www.case-research.eu/en/node/58334
This paper analyzes the costs of (partial) institutional harmonization with the EU acquis which countries of the former USSR are expected to conduct under their Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the EU and European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans. The public sector will have to take an effort of the transposition and adaptation of EU norms, as well as ensuring that they are complied with. Yet, the major part of the adjustment costs will fall on the private sector, as enterprises will have to make substantial investments to comply with new product requirements and business practices.
In this study we used the method of extrapolation of average costs for CEE countries’ harmonization with acquis to estimate the potential harmonization costs for the neighboring countries based on internationally comparative macroeconomic indicators like sectoral and total value added. This involved estimating the EU pre-accession support for the CEE countries by main areas as a percentage of the total or sectoral value added, determining the expected degree of limited harmonization in the ENP countries and estimating “coefficients of limited harmonization”, which was subsequently used for adjustment of the estimated cost of full harmonization.
Authored by: Veliko Dmitrov
After a long period in which state-led development was the dominant economic paradigm, since the 1980s private sector development has been the focus for economic policy makers. It is probably no coincidence that economic growth, stagnant for a few decades in much of the developing world, took off in the 1990s after this policy shift, and has generally remained high (in spite of a wave of crises and recessions in the late 1990s and early 2000s). Privatization has made a great deal of progress in the developing world, particularly in Latin America, though the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have lagged somewhat.
Authored by: Richard Woodward, Mehdi Safavi, Piotr Kozarzewski
Published in 2012
The objective of the PICK-ME (Policy Incentives for Creation of Knowledge – Methods and Evidence) research project is to provide theoretical and empirical perspectives on innovation which give a greater role to the demand-side aspect of innovation. The main question is how can policy make enterprises more willing to innovate? This task is fulfilled by identifying what we consider the central or most salient aspect of a demand-side innovation- driven economy, which is the small and entrepreneurial yet fast growing and innovative firm. We use the term “Gazelle” to signify this type of firm throughout the paper. The main concern of policy-makers should therefore be how to support Gazelle type of firms through various policies. The effectiveness of different policy instruments are considered. For example, venture capitalism is in the paper identified as an important modern institution that renders exactly the type of coordination necessary to bring about an innovation system more orientated towards the demand side. This is because experienced entrepreneurs with superior skills in terms of judging the marketability of new innovations step in as financiers. Other factor market bottlenecks on the skills side must be targeted through education policies that fosters centers of excellence. R&D incentives are also considered as a separate instrument but more a question for future research since there is no evidence available on R&D incentives as a Gazelle type of policy. Spatial policies to foster more innovation have been popular in the past. But we conclude that whereas the literature often finds that new knowledge is developed in communities of physically proximate firms, there is no overshadowing evidence showing that spatial policies in particular had any impact on generating more of the Gazelle type of firms.
Authored by: Itzhak Goldberg, Camilla Jensen
Published in 2014
This paper claims that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU, and in particular the elements related to justice and home affairs (JHA), is a complex, multilayered initiative that incorporates different logics and instruments. To unravel the various layers of the policy, the paper proceeds in three steps: firstly, it lays out some facts pertaining to the origins of the ENP, as its ‘origins’ arguably account for a number of the core tensions. It then presents the underlying logic and objectives attributed to JHA cooperation, which can be derived from the viewpoints voiced during policy formulation. The paper goes on to argue that despite the existence of different logics, there is a unifying objective, which is to ‘extra-territorialise’ the management of ‘threats’ to the neighbouring countries. The core of the paper presents the various policy measures that have been put in place to achieve external ‘threat management’. In this context it is argued that the ’conditionality-inspired policy instruments’, namely monitoring and benchmarking of progress, transfer of legal and institutional models to non-member states and inter-governmental negotiations, contain socialisation elements that rely on the common values approach. This mix of conditionality and socialisation instruments is illustrated in two case studies, one on the fight against terrorism and one on irregular migration. Finally, the paper recommends that the EU draft an Action-Oriented Paper (AOP) on JHA cooperation with the ENP countries that indicates how the EU intends to balance the conflicting objectives and instruments that are currently present in the JHA provisions of the ENP.
Authored by: Nicole Wichmann
Published in 2007
The paper shows that the question that is relevant for the debate on the efficacy of development assistance is not so much as an issue of how much, but rather for what. In view of the growing awareness of ODA’s inefficiency in achieving intended aims, this paper proposes an alternative approach to development assistance policies – economic integration and subsidiarity provides the conditions necessary for ODA to produce higher rates of economic growth on a sustainable basis. Europe is an excellent case in point, in this context. Europe has in the last decades experienced a number of success stories in moving out of poverty and onto sustainable economic growth. The secret of success has been the push towards economic integration, and the adoption of economic reforms at the local, national, and regional level conducive to economic growth. The recipient countries of development assistance have much to learn from the European experience.
Does European economic integration create more inequality between domestic regions, or is the opposite true? We show that a general answer to this question does not exist, and that the outcome depends on the liberalisation scenario. In order to examine the impact of European and international integration on the regions, the paper develops a numerical simulation model with nine countries and 90 regions. Eastward extension of European integration is beneficial for old as well as new member countries, but within countries the impact varies across regions. Reduction in distance-related trade costs is particularly good for the European peripheries. Each liberalisation scenario has a distinct impact on the spatial income distribution, and there is no general rule telling that integration causes more or less agglomeration.
Authored by Arne Melchior
Published in 2009
The aim of the project is to analyze government support for innovation in a comparative perspective by first examining the main existing instruments of financial support for innovation in Turkey and Poland, and secondly to assess their effectiveness by applying recent econometric techniques to firm-level data for both countries obtained from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
Authored by: Wojciech Grabowski, M. Teoman Pamukcu, Krzysztof Szczygielski, Sinan Tandogan
Published in 2013
The current fiscal imbalances and fragilities in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMC) are the result of decades of instability, but have become more visible since 2008, when a combination of adverse economic and political shocks (the global and European financial crises, Arab Spring) hit the region. In an environment of slower growth and higher public expenditure pressures, fiscal deficits and public debts have increased rapidly. This has led to the deterioration of current accounts, a depletion of official reserves, the depreciation of some currencies and higher inflationary pressure.
To avoid the danger of public debt and a balance-of-payment crisis, comprehensive economic reforms, including fiscal adjustment, are urgently needed. These reforms should involve eliminating energy and food subsidies and replacing them with targeted social assistance, reducing the oversized public administration and privatizing public sector enterprises, improving the business climate, increasing trade and investment openness, and sector diversification. The SEMC may also benefit from a peace dividend if the numerous internal and regional conflicts are resolved.
However, the success of economic reforms will depend on the results of the political transition, i.e., the ability to build stable democratic regimes which can resist populist temptations and rally political support for more rational economic policies.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2014
The Journal of Scientific Papers “VUZF REVIEW” published from the year 2016, is issued 4 times a year and is a scientific publication on topical problems of science in various areas of economic theory and practice, management, marketing and applied research methods. The journal is international in the essence and scope. All articles pass through the procedure of reviewing by the editorial board. Editorial Board consist of well-known scientists whose activities contributes to the integration of the global scientific community. OUR AUTHORS ARE: Leading scientists; University professors; Graduate students; Students; Foreign researchers; Scientists; Applicants for degrees.
The Scientific journal “VUZF REVIEW” published from the year 2016, is issued 4 times a year and is a scientific publication on topical problems of science in various areas of economic theory and practice, management, marketing and applied research methods. The journal is international in the essence and scope. All articles pass through the procedure of reviewing by the editorial board. Editorial Board consist of well-known scientists whose activities contributes to the integration of the global scientific community. OUR AUTHORS ARE: Leading scientists; University professors; Graduate students; Students; Foreign researchers; Scientists; Applicants for degrees
The report reviews key issues in energy trade and cooperation between the EU and CIS countries. It describes historical trends of oil and gas demand in the EU, other European and CIS countries and offers demand forecasts until 2030. Recent developments in oil and gas production and exports from Russia and Caspian countries are covered in detail leading to the discussion of the likely export potential of these regions. The key factors determining the production outlook, trade-offs and competition related to energy resources transportation choices are also discussed. The report also covers the interests and role of transit countries in relations between producer and consumer regions. The analytical section leads to policy recommendations that focus mainly on the EU.
Authored by: Sabit Bagirov, Leonid Grigoriev, Wojciech Paczynski, Vladimer Papava, Marcel Salikhov, Michael Tokmazishvili
Published in 2009
The aim of this study is to estimate the impact of the removal of NTBs in trade between the EU and its selected CIS partners: Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (CIS5). The report includes a discussion of methodologies of measurement of non-tariff barriers and the impact of their removal, including a review of previous studies focusing on CEE and CIS regions. Further, we employ a computable general equilibrium model encompassing the following three pillars of trade facilitation: legislative and regulatory approximation, reform of customs rules and procedures and liberalization of the access of foreign providers of services. We conclude that a reduction of NTBs and improved access to the EU market would bring significant benefits to the CIS5 countries in terms of welfare gains, GDP growth, increases in real wages and expansion of international trade. The possible welfare implications of deep integration with the EU range from 5.8% of GDP in Ukraine to sizeable expected gains in Armenia (3.1%), Russia (2.8%), Azerbaijan (1.8%) and Georgia (1.7%).
Authored by: Maryla Maliszewska, Irina Orlova, Svitlana Taran
Published in 2009
The aim of this paper is to examine the issues of gender disparities in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, with a special focus given to countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The analysis is conducted in several dimensions: labour participation, economic opportunity, political empowerment, educational attainment, and health and demography. Beside the comparative study of "in region differentials" done for the CIS, I analyze the trends in gender disparities in comparison to EU-12 and EU-15, using data for the period 1985-2005.
The study confirms the existence of slightly different paths in which gender disparities have evolved over time. While in EU-15 women participation in labour market, their remuneration, and position in public life have significantly increased, in majority of the CIS countries a gradual decrease of female labour activity was reported. In addition female representation in politics and public life has shrunken after and during the transition period. On the other hand in such fields as secondary and tertiary education attainment, health, and demography male population in the CIS region has became more disadvantaged, which also leads to enlarging gender gap.
Authored by: Magdalena Rokicka
Published in 2008
Ukraine belongs to the group of countries which are known for the widespread phenomenon of subsistence and semi-subsistence farming. Individual farmers are not obliged to produce financial reports and their incomes belong to the category of unobservable incomes. When checking the eligibility for social assistance the level of their incomes needs to be estimated. In a country, where poverty rate is quite high, the coverage of the poor with financial aid is relatively low and public finances under constant control, the importance of a fair and justified methodology for income imputation is particularly strong. In this situation, an outdated and unfair current system of agriculture income estimation in Ukraine calls for immediate changes. This paper presents recommendations for the Ukrainian government in the area of agriculture income imputation, where several methods of estimating farm income were proposed (including the one based on Household Budget Survey). The recommendations were preceded with the analysis of five countries' practices in this area: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Poland. A review of different means testing methods, including direct means testing and proxy means testing, served as an introduction to the topic.
Authored by: Dmytro Boyarchuk, Liudmyla Kotusenko, Katarzyna Pietka-Kosinska, Roman Semko, Irina Sinitsina
Published in 2009
This paper presents forecasts for the Financial Stress Index (FSI) and the Economic Sensitivity Index (ESI) for the period 2015-2015 for six countries in the region, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. It is a continuation of the endeavor to construct synthetic indices measuring financial stress and economic sensitivity for twelve Central and East European countries using the Principal Component Analysis. In order to obtain forecasts of the FSI, we estimated Vector Autoregression (VAR) models on monthly data for the period 2001-2012 separately for all the countries. Using quarterly historical values of ESI and FSI, we estimated Dynamic Panel Data Model for the complete sample of countries. Parameters of the model were later used for forecasting the ESI. Obtained results suggest that the FSI will start to rise in 2014 in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Estonia. For Latvia and Hungary, we observed a conversion in the trend, i.e. at the beginning of 2015, when the index should start to fall. According to our forecasts, the ESI will be rising in the next two years, except for Hungary, where we predict a continuous decrease in economic sensitivity.
Authored by: Maciej Krzak and Grzegorz Poniatowski
Published in 2014
The The purpose of this paper is to analyze the various challenges facing European integration and the EU institutional architecture as result of the global financial crisis. The European integration process is not yet complete, both in terms of its content and geographical coverage. It can be viewed as a kind of intermediate hybrid between an international organization and a federation, subject to further evolution. This is also true of the Single European Market and the Economic and Monetary Union, which form the core of the EU economic architecture. Certain policy prerogatives (such as external trade, competition, and the Common Agriculture Policy) are delegated to the supranational level while others (such as financial supervision or fiscal policy) remain largely in the hands of national authorities.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2009
Remittances in Moldova reach 36% of GDP, hence they constitute an essential part of the Moldovan economy. The most visible characteristic of remittances is their unequal distribution. The analysis applying the standard Lorenz Curve proves that 75% receiving households gets only 25% of total amount being sent to the country. The way remittances are distributed does not seem to be random. Higher amounts go in general to younger and more educated households. Remittances strongly influence the economic potential of households, especially if they are high enough. They often constitute the main source of households' income, but they not discourage the members of receiving households from economic activity. It indicates that migration and working abroad is the manifest of economic activity, on the other hand it suggest that lack of employment opportunities in the country is an important reason for migration. Those who obtain remittances tend to have higher share of investments in their total household spending. Significant share of remittances for all groups is spent on education - the basic investment increasing the future competitiveness. In rural areas remittances are much more often used to improve the quality of farms than to start running other businesses. It seems that lack of infrastructure and good governance is the main reason for which educated and young emigrants sending significant amounts of money do not decide to invest them in entrepreneurial activities. Eradicating these impediments for local development should be become a highest priority.
Authored by: Eugene Hristev, Georgeta Mincu, Maya Sandu, Mateusz Walewski
Published in 2009
During the last two decades the CIS countries have received very significant amounts of technical assistance from international development organizations and bilateral donors. While this has played a positive and important role in the transformation of these societies, practically all stakeholders currently share the opinion that many problems have accumulated in the area of technical cooperation with CIS countries. This paper intends to outline these problems, analyze their underlying reasons - including the changing environment for technical cooperation in the CIS - and the interaction of the interests of beneficiaries, donors and providers in the process of implementing technical cooperation projects. The analysis suggests that a good understanding, recognition and coordination of the interests of all TC stakeholders and a reduction in the information gap between the various participants in the technical cooperation process are necessary for improving the effectiveness of technical cooperation.
Authored by: Aziz Atamanov, Roman Mogilevsky
Published in 2008
This paper analyses the public finance performance and the dynamics of government expenditures on education and health in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2007-2010, when the country was hit by the global economic crisis and then by an internal political crisis in 2010. Despite these crisis conditions, public health expenditures have increased substantially. In education, recurrent expenditures have been protected, while capital investments have been cut dramatically. Both sectors suffer from chronic under-financing, which results in an insufficient quality of services. The country's fiscal situation in the medium-term is going to be difficult, so efficiency-oriented reforms need to be implemented in health care and especially in education in order to sustain the development of these critical services in Kyrgyzstan.
Authored by: Roman Mogilevsky
Published in 2011
The paper discusses the current and potential role of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in anchoring economic reforms in the countries of the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood. It claims that it is too early to assess the success of the ENP in this sphere especially given that the actual progress of the ENP agenda has been limited. A review of the empirical evidence on external reform anchors confirms that the ENP shares some features with the EU accession process that has proven to be an effective mechanism supporting major economic, political and social changes in the countries concerned. The eventual ENP economic offer is meaningful and integration with the EU is getting stronger public support in several CIS countries and among their political elites. On the other hand several factors limit the reform anchoring potential of the ENP. This paper offers recommendations on policies that could strengthen this potential.
Authored by: Wojciech Paczynski
Published in 2009
The global food price shock of 2006-2008 has particularly affected poorer strata of populations in several developing countries. In Egypt and some other countries it has put food subsidy schemes to the test. This paper develops two comparable computable general equilibrium models for Egypt and Ukraine which are used to simulate direct and indirect impacts of the food price surge and various policy options on the performance of the main macroeconomic indicators as well as on poverty outcomes. The results illustrate the limited ability of realistic policy responses to mitigate negative social consequences of an external price shock. Food import tariff cuts are a partial remedy faring better than other analysed options. Furthermore, the Egyptian system of food subsidies needs substantial reforms limiting the related fiscal burden and improving the targeting of the poor population.
Authored by: Soheir Aboulenein, Heba El Laithy, Omneia Helmy, Hanaa Kheir-El-Din, Liudmyla Kotusenko, Maryla Maliszewska, Dina Mandour, Wojciech Paczynski
Published in 2010
Labor migration from Eastern Europe and the member countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the Western countries became an important socio-economic issue. Since political systems and the nature of border management in these regions, migrations turned out to be a very complex and unpredictable issue. The purpose of this study is to analyze the region specific actors, practices and policies of migration in the Eastern countries, the possible scenarios and demographic consequences of the future migration flows. In order to address this issue properly, some of the complexities of labor migration phenomenon in the region are uncovered.
Authored by: Xavier Chojnicki, Ainura Uzagalieva
Published in 2008
Labor migration from Eastern Europe and the member countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the Western countries became an important socio-economic issue. Since political systems and the nature of border management in these regions, migrations turned out to be a very complex and unpredictable issue. The purpose of this study is to analyze the region specific actors, practices and policies of migration in the Eastern countries, the possible scenarios and demographic consequences of the future migration flows. In order to address this issue properly, some of the complexities of labor migration phenomenon in the region are uncovered.
Authored by: Xavier Chojnicki, Ainura Uzagalieva
Published in 2008
The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic aspects of EU policy towards its Eastern neighbors in the former Soviet Union. For a long period of time, this region was considered as less important for the EU, as compared to Central and Eastern Europe, which was the subject of a far-reaching economic and political integration offer materialized in two rounds of EU Eastern Enlargements (2004, 2007). However, moving the EU's geographical frontier further to the East and Southeast increased the importance of the CIS region as a potential partner of the enlarged EU. In 2004, East European and Caucasus countries were invited to participate in the European Neighborhood Policy a new EU external policy framework also addressed to the Southern Mediterranean countries. Russia has been attempting to build a strategic political and economic partnership with the EU outside the ENP framework but the content of this relationship is, in fact, very similar to the ENP.
A general weakness of the ENP is that there is a lack of balance between farreaching expectations with respect to neighbors' policies and reforms, and limited and distant rewards that can potentially be offered. Thus, making this cooperation framework more effective requires a serious enhancement of the rewards using, to the extent possible, the positive experience of previous EU enlargements. The nature of contemporary economic relations in the globalized world calls for a more complex package-type approach to economic integration rather than just limiting cooperation to some narrow fields.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2007
Institutional harmonization is an important part of European integration, and its effects are more far reaching than the effects of trade liberalization. In its policy towards neighbors (the European Neighborhood Policy, ENP), the EU puts a lot of stress on the desirability of institutional harmonization, at least in certain areas. In particular, the free trade agreements that the EU envisages concluding with its Eastern neighbors will involve substantial harmonization of product standards, competition policy and a range of other policies and processes. At the very least, the harmonization will have to focus on the areas that relate to improvement of market access, i.e. removing restrictions to trade, harmonizing product standards and the systems of quality control etc. But in order to implement the new standards and rules, the EU neighbors will have to reform many related areas, so that the harmonization will encompass the whole system of economic governance. Not only will such a revamp help attaining better access to the EU markets, but also (and probably more importantly) it will stimulate modernization of the neighbors' economies and bring much needed efficiency gains.
In measurement of benefits of harmonization we refer to two methods: one based on the computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling of welfare effects of better market access, and the other employing a growth model to estimate the wider effects of European institutions on growth. The estimation of costs of harmonization bases on extrapolation of the analogous costs in other countries, in particular CEE. These costs include expenses by a public sector on introduction of harmonization measures, as well as private sector expenses and investments related to their implementation.
Authored by: Anna Kolesnichenko
Published in 2009
Demographic change (driven by the second demographic transition) led to an uncontrolled increase in scale of various social expenditure in the OECD area, especially in continental Europe. Costs of social transfers created fiscal pressure leading to the necessity of tax increases all over Europe, including the New Member States. Employment consequences of emerging higher tax wedge has become the topic of large body of research. However, surprisingly little evidence is known on distribution of that problem across workers. Is the effect of high tax wedge equally spread or certain groups of workers suffer more than others? More specifically, are low productivity workers exposed more to the problems caused by high tax wedge?
Authored by: Marek Gora, Artur Radziwill, Agnieszka Sowa, Mateusz Walewski
Published in 2006
Implementation of the European internal market and East-West integration has been accompanied by dramatic change in the spatial distribution of economic activity, with higher growth west and east of a longitude degree through Germany and Italy. In the east, income growth has been accompanied by increasing regional disparities within countries. We examine theoretically and empirically whether European integration as such can explain these developments. Using a numerical simulation model with 9 countries and 90 regions, theoretical predictions are derived about how various patterns of integration may affect the income distribution. Comparing with reality, we find that a reduction in distance-related trade costs combined with east-west integration is best able to explain the actual changes in Europe's economic geography. This suggests that the implementation of the European internal market or the Euro has "made Europe smaller". In Central Europe, capital regions grow faster and there are few east-west growth differences inside countries. There is no convincing support for the hypothesis that European integration had adverse effects on non-members.
Authored by: Arne Melchior
Published in 2009
This study is part of the project entitled “Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Countries” for the European Commission1. The study was written by Luca Barbone (CASE) Mikhail Bonch- Osmolovskiy (CASE) and Matthias Luecke (CASE, Kiel). It is based on the six country studies for the Eastern Partnership countries commissioned under this project and prepared by Mihran Galstyan and Gagik Makaryan (Armenia), Azer Allahveranov and Emin Huseynov (Azerbaijan), Aleksander Chubrik and Aliaksei Kazlou (Belarus), Lasha Labadze and Mirjan Tukhashvili (Georgia), Vasile Cantarji and Georgeta Mincu (Moldova), Tom Coupé and Hanna Vakhitova (Ukraine). The authors would like to thank for their comments and suggestions Kathryn Anderson, Martin Kahanec, Costanza Biavaschi, Lucia Kurekova, Monica Bucurenciu, Borbala Szegeli, Giovanni Cremonini and Ummuhan Bardak, as well as the dbaretailed review provided by IOM. The views in this study are those of the authors’ only, and should not be interpreted as representing the official position of the European Commission and its institutions.
Written by Luca Barbone, Mikhail Bonch-Osmolovsky and Matthias Luecke. Published in September 2013.
PDF available on our website at: http://www.case-research.eu/en/node/58264
This working document offers a conceptual framework for understanding the processes underpinning the external dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs (ED-JHA). Practically, it defines how the export of JHA principles and norms inform the geopolitical ambitions of the EU, i.e. the use of space for political purposes, or the control and management of people, objects and movement. The author begins by investigating how the ENP reconfigures the ED-JHA, and then goes on to discuss various conceptual stances on governance, specifically institutionalism, constructivism, and policy instruments. To conclude he traces the evolution of this external dimension, emphasising, whenever possible, its continuities and bifurcations. Overall, the aim is to ascertain the extent to which conceptual designs clarify or advance our knowledge of the contents and rationales of the ED-JHA.
Authored by: Thierry Balzacq
Published in 2008
This report is concerned with the analysis of privatization and private sector development for the eastern and southern Mediterranean countries partnered with the European Union and collectively known as MED-11. Noting that the analysis applies to the situation prior to the dislocations of the Arab Spring, we review the shift in the relative shares of the public and private sectors in these countries, as well as the business climate affecting the development of the private sector, examine a number of cultural factors that may influence the development of the private sector, and discuss some alternative scenarios for future developments. In the last 20 years, efforts have been made in all countries of the MED-11 to encourage private sector development and, to a greater or lesser extent, privatization of stateowned assets. However, there is a great deal of differentiation among the countries in the group. In the MED-11, Israel has not only the most business-friendly policy environment but also the most developed private sector, accounting for almost 80% of employment. The other countries of the region can be divided into two groups: one, including Algeria, Libya, and Syria, where reforms promoting privatization and private sector development have been very limited, and the rest, in which they have been much more extensive (the Palestine Authority is, for obvious reasons, a rather special case). A generally poor business environment makes for a large informal sector in almost every country in the region; however, generally speaking, we do not find the cultural factors we examine to be hostile to private sector development. Optimistic, reference and pessimistic scenarios are discussed; which of these is realized in any particular MED-11 country will depend greatly on the direction of change following the events of 2011’s Arab Spring.
Written by Mehdi Safavi and Richard Woodward. Published in October 2012.
PDF available on our website at: http://www.case-research.eu/en/node/57858
Similar to CASE Network Studies and Analyses 398 - Social Security Driven Tax Wedge and Its Effects On Employment and Shadow Employment (20)
The report examines the social and economic drivers and impact of circular migration between Belarus and Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The core question the authors sought to address was how managing circular migration could, in the long term, help to optimise labour resources in both the country of origin and the destination countries. In the pages that follow, the authors of the report present the current and forecasted labour market and demographic situation in their respective countries as well as the dynamics and characteristics of short-term labour migration flows between Belarus and Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, concentrating on the period since 2010. They also outline and discuss related policy responses and evaluate prospects for cooperation on circular migration.
Podręcznik został opracowany w celu przekazania trenerom i nauczycielom podstawowej wiedzy, która może być przydatna w prowadzeniu szkoleń promujących pracę rejestrowaną. Prezentuje on z jednej strony korzyści z pracy rejestrowanej, z drugiej – potencjalne koszty związane z pracą nierejestrowaną. W pierwszej kolejności informacje te przedstawiono w odniesieniu do pracowników najemnych (rozdział 2), podkreślając w sposób szczególny to, że negatywne konsekwencje pracy nierejestrowanej są ponoszone przez całe życie. Ze względu na specyficzną sytuację cudzoziemców pracujących w Polsce konsekwencje ponoszone przez tę grupę opisano oddzielnie (rozdział 3). Ponadto zaprezentowano skutki dotyczące pracodawców z szarej strefy z wyodrębnieniem tych, którzy zatrudniają cudzoziemców (rozdział 4). Uzupełnieniem przedstawionych informacji jest opis działań podejmowanych przez państwo w celu ograniczenia zjawiska pracy nierejestrowanej w Polsce (rozdział 5) oraz prowadzonych w Wielkiej Brytanii, czyli w kraju będącym liderem w walce z szarą strefą (rozdział 6).
European countries face a challenge related to the economic and social consequences of their societies’ aging. Specifically, pension systems must adjust to the coming changes, maintaining both financial stability, connected with equalizing inflows from premiums and spending on pensions, and simultaneously the sufficiency of benefits, protecting retirees against poverty and smoothing consumption over their lives, i.e. ensuring the ability to pay for consumption needs at each stage of life, regardless of income from labor.
One of the key instruments applied toward these goals is the retirement age. Formally it is a legally established boundary: once people have crossed it – on average – they significantly lose their ability to perform work (the so-called old-age risk). But since the 1970s, in many developed countries the retirement age has become an instrument of social and labor-market policy. Specifically, in the 1970s and ‘80s, an early retirement age was perceived as a solution allowing a reduction in the supply of labor, particularly among people with relatively low competencies who were approaching retirement age, which is called the lump of labor fallacy. It was often believed that people taking early retirement freed up jobs for the young. But a range of economic evidence shows that the number of jobs is not fixed, and those who retire don’t in fact free up jobs. On the contrary, because of higher spending by pension systems, labor costs rise, which limits the supply of jobs. In general, a good situation on the labor market supports employment of both the youngest and the oldest labor force participants. Additionally, a lower retirement age for women was maintained, which resulted to a high degree from cultural conditions and norms that are typical for traditional societies.
Until now, the banking sector has been one of the strong points of Poland’s economy. In contrast to banks in the U.S. and leading Western European economies, lenders in Poland came through the 2008 global financial crisis without a scratch, without needing state financial support. But in recent years the industry’s problems have been growing, creating a threat to economic growth and gains in living standards.
For an economy’s productivity to increase, funds can’t go to all companies evenly, and definitely shouldn’t go to those that are most lacking in funds, but to those that will use them most efficiently. This is true of total external financing, and thus funding both from the banking sector and from parabanks, the capital market and funds from public institutions. In Poland, in light of the relatively modest scale of the capital market, banks play a clearly dominant role in external financing of companies. This is why the author of this text focuses on the bank credit allocation efficiency.
The author points out that in the very near future, conditions will emerge in Poland which – as the experience of other countries shows – create a risk of reduced efficiency of credit allocation to business. Additionally, in Poland today, bank lending to companies is to a high degree being replaced by funds from state aid, which reduces the efficiency of allocation of external funds to companies (both loans and subsidies), as allocation of government subsidies is not usually based on efficiency. This decline in external financing allocation efficiency may slow, halt or even reverse the process, that has been uninterrupted for 28 years, of Poland’s convergence, i.e. the narrowing of the gap in living standards between Poland and the West.
The economic characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis differ from those of previous crises. It is a combination of demand- and supply-side constraints which led to the formation of a monetary overhang that will be unfrozen once the pandemic ends. Monetary policy must take this effect into consideration, along with other pro-inflationary factors, in the post-pandemic era. It must also think in advance about how to avoid a policy trap coming from fiscal dominance.
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 deals with the economic characteristics of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the effectiveness of the monetary policy response measures undertaken. In Chapter 3, we analyse the monetary policy decisions of the ECB (and other major CBs for comparison) and their effectiveness in achieving the declared policy goals in the short term. Chapter 4 is devoted to an analysis of the policy challenges which may be faced by the ECB and other major CBs once the pandemic emergency comes to its end. Chapter 5 contains a summary and the conclusions of our analysis.
Purpose: This paper tries to identify the wage gap between informal and formal workers and tests for the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland.
Design/methodology/approach: I employ the propensity score matching (PSM) technique and use data from the Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the period 2009–2017 to estimate the wage gap between informal and formal workers, both at the means and along the wage distribution. I use two definitions of informal employment: a) employment without a written agreement and b) employment while officially registered as unemployed at a labour office. In order to reduce the bias resulting from the non-random selection of
individuals into informal employment, I use a rich set of control variables representing several individual characteristics.
Findings: After controlling for observed heterogeneity, I find that on average informal workers earn less than formal workers, both in terms of monthly earnings and hourly wage. This result is not sensitive to the definition of informal employment used and is
stable over the analysed time period (2009–2017). However, the wage penalty to informal employment is substantially higher for individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution, which supports the hypothesis of the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland.
Originality/value: The main contribution of this study is that it identifies the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland: informal workers in the first quartile of the wage distribution and those above the first quartile appear to be in two partially different segments of the labour market.
The rule of law, by securing civil and economic rights, directly contributes to social prosperity and is one of our societies’ greatest achievements. In the European Union (EU), the rule of law is enshrined in the Treaties of its founding and is recognised not just as a necessary condition of a liberal democratic society, but also as an important requirement for a stable, effective, and sustainable market economy. In fact, it was the stability and equality of opportunity provided by the rule of law that enabled the post-war Wirtschaftswunder in Germany and the post-Communist resuscitation of the economy in Poland.
But the rule of law is a living concept that is constantly evolving – both in its formal, de jure dimension, embodied in legislation, and its de facto dimension, or its reception by society. In Poland, in particular, according to the EU, the rule of law has been heavily challenged by government since 2015 and has evolved amid continued pressure exerted on the institutions which execute laws. More recently, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic transformed the perception of the rule of law and its boundaries throughout the EU and beyond (Marzocchi, 2020).
This Study contains Value Added Tax (VAT) Gap estimates for 2018, fast estimates using a simplified methodology for 2019, the year immediately preceding the analysis, and includes revised estimates for 2014-2017. It also includes the updated and extended results of the econometric analysis of VAT Gap determinants initiated and initially reported in the 2018 Report (Poniatowski et al., 2018). As a novelty, the econometric analysis to forecast potential impacts of the coronavirus crisis and resulting recession on the evolution of the VAT Gap in 2020 is reported.
In 2018, most European Union (EU) Member States (MS) saw a slight decrease in the pace of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, but the economic conditions for increasing tax compliance remained favourable. We estimate that the VAT total tax liability (VTTL) in 2018 increased by 3.6 percent whereas VAT revenue increased by 4.2 percent, leading to a decline in the VAT Gap in both relative and nominal terms. In relative terms, the EU-wide Gap dropped to 11 percent and EUR 140 billion. Fast estimates show that the VAT Gap will likely continue to decline in 2019.
Of the EU-28, the smallest Gaps were observed in Sweden (0.7 percent), Croatia (3.5 percent), and Finland (3.6 percent), the largest – in Romania (33.8 percent), Greece (30.1 percent), and Lithuania (25.9 percent). Overall, half of the EU-28 MS recorded a Gap above 9.2 percent. In nominal terms, the largest Gaps were recorded in Italy (EUR 35.4 billion), the United Kingdom (EUR 23.5 billion), and Germany (EUR 22 billion).
The euro is the second most important global currency after the US dollar. However, its international role has not increased since its inception in 1999. The private sector prefers using the US dollar rather than the euro because the financial market for US dollar-denominated assets is larger and deeper; network externalities and inertia also play a role. Increasing the attractiveness of the euro outside the euro area requires, among others, a proactive role for the European Central Bank and completing the Banking Union and Capital Market Union.
Forecasting during a strong shock is burdened with exceptionally high uncertainty. This gives rise to the temptation to formulate alarmist forecasts. Experiences from earlier pandemics, particularly those from the 20th century, for which we have the most data, don’t provide a basis for this. The mildest of them weakened growth by less than 1 percentage point, and the worst, the Spanish Flu, by 6 percentage points. Still, even the Spanish Flu never caused losses on the order of 20% of GDP – not even where it turned out to be a humanitarian disaster, costing the lives of 3-5% of the population. History suggests that if pandemics lead to such deep losses at all, it’s only in particular quarters and not over a whole year, as economic activity rebounds. The strength of that rebound is largely determined by economic policy. The purpose of this work is to describe possible scenarios for a rebound in Polish economic growth after the epidemic.
A separate issue, no less important, is what world will emerge from the current crisis. In the face of the 2008 financial crisis, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said: “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things that you think you could not do before.” Such changes can make the economy and society function better than before the crisis. Unfortunately, the opportunities created by the global financial crisis were squandered. Today’s task is more difficult; the scale of various problems has expanded even more. Without deep structural and institutional changes, the world will be facing enduring social and economic problems, accompanied by long-term stagnation.
"Many brilliant prophecies have appeared for the future of the EU and our entire planet. I believe that Europe, in its own style, will draw pragmatic conclusions from the crisis, not revolutionary ones; conclusions that will allow us to continue enjoying a Europe without borders. Brussels will demonstrate its usefulness; it will react ably and flexibly. First of all, contrary to the deceitful statements of members of the Polish government, the EU warned of the threats already in 2021. Secondly, already in mid-March EU assistance programs were ready, i.e. earlier than the PiS government’s “shield” program. The conclusion from the crisis will be a strengthening of all the preventive mechanisms that allow us to recognize threats and react in time of need. Research programs will be more strongly directed toward diagnosing and treating infectious diseases. Europe will gain greater self-sufficiency in the area of medical equipment and drugs, and the EU – greater competencies in the area of the health service, thus far entrusted to the member states. The 2021-27 budget must be reconstructed, to supplement the priority of the Green Deal with economic stimulus programs. In this way structural funds, which have the greatest multiplier effect for investment and the labor market, may return to favor. So once again: an addition, as a conclusion from the crisis, and not a reinvention of the EU," writes Dr. Janusz Lewandowski the author of the 162nd mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding.
Dla wielu rodaków europejskość Polski jest oczywista, trudno jest im nawet wyobrazić sobie, jak kształtowałyby się losy naszego kraju bez uczestnictwa w integracji europejskiej. Szczególnie młode pokolenie traktuje osiągnięty przez nas dzięki uczestnictwie w Unii ogromny postęp cywilizacyjny jako coś danego i naturalnego. Jednak świadomość tego, jaki był nasz punkt wyjścia, jaką przeszliśmy drogę i jak przyczyniły się do tego unijne działania oraz jakie wynikały z tego korzyści powinna nam stale towarzyszyć. Bez tej świadomości, starannego weryfikowania faktów i docenienia naszych osiągnięć grozi nam uleganie niesprawdzonym argumentom przeciwników integracji europejskiej i popełnienie nieodwracalnych błędów. Dla tych, którzy chcą poznać te fakty, przygotowany został raport "Nasza Europa. 15 lat Polski w Unii Europejskiej". Podjęto w nim ocenę 15 lat członkostwa Polski z perspektywy doświadczeń procesu integracji, z jego barierami i sukcesami, a także wyzwaniami przyszłości.
Raport jest wynikiem pracy zbiorowej licznych ekspertów z różnych dziedzin, od wielu lat analizujących wielowymiarowe efekty działania instytucji UE oraz współpracy z krajami członkowskimi na podstawie europejskich wartości i mechanizmów. Autorzy podsumowują korzyści członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej na podstawie faktów, nie stroniąc jednakże od własnych ocen i refleksji.
This report is the result of the joint work of a number of experts from various fields who have been - for many years – analysing the multidimensional effects of EU institutions and cooperation with Member States pursuant to European values and mechanisms. The authors summarise the benefits of Poland’s membership in the EU based on facts; however, they do not hide their own views and reflections. They also demonstrate the barriers and challenges to further European integration.
This report was prepared by CASE, one of the oldest independent think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe, utilising its nearly 30 years of experience in providing objective analyses and recommendations with respect to socioeconomic topics. It is both an expression of concern about Poland’s future in the EU, as well as the authors’ contribution to the debate on further European integration.
Poland’s new Employee Capital Plans (PPK) scheme, which is mandatory for employers, started to be implemented in July 2019. The article looks at the systemic solutions applied in the programme from the perspective of the concept of the simultaneous reconstruction of the retirement pension system. The aim is to present arguments for and against the project from the point of view of various actors, and to assess the chances of success for the new system. The article offers a detailed study of legal solutions, an analysis of the literature on the subject, and reports of institutions that supervise pension funds. The results of this analysis point to the lack of cohesion between certain solutions of the 1999 pension reform and expose a lack of consistency in how the reform was carried out, which led to the eventual removal of the capital part of the pension system. The study shows that additional saving for old age is advisable in the country’s current demographic situation and necessary for both economic and social reasons. However, the systemic solutions offered by the government appear to be chiefly designated to serve short-term state interests and do not create sufficient incentives for pension plan participants to join the programme.
Belarus was among the few post-communist countries to resign from comprehensive market reforms and attempt to improve the efficiency of the economy through administrative means, leaving market mechanisms only an auxiliary role. Since its inception, the ‘Belarusian economic model’ has undergone several revisions of a de-statisation and de-regulation kind, but still the Belarusian economy remains dominated by the state. This paper analyses the characteristic features of the Belarusian economic system – especially those related to the public sector – as well as its evolution over time during the period following its independence. The paper concludes that during the post-Soviet period, the Belarusian economy evolved from a quasi-Soviet system based on state property, state planning, support to inefficient enterprises and the massive redistribution of funds to a more flexible hybrid model where the public sector still remains the core of the economy. The case of Belarus shows that presently there is no appropriate theoretical perspective which, in an unmodified form, could be applied to study this type of economic system. Therefore, a new perspective based on an already existing but updated approach or a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates the duality of the Belarusian economy is required.
Belarusian economy has been stagnating in 2011-2015 after 15 years of a high annual average growth rate. In 2015, after four years of stagnation, the Belarusian economy slid into a recession, its first since 1996, and experienced both cyclical and structural recessions. Since 2015, the Belarusian government and the National Bank of Belarus have been giving economic reforms a good chance thanks to gradual but consistent actions aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and economic liberalization. It seems that the economic authorities have sustained more transformation efforts during 2015-2018 than in the previous 24 years since 1991.
As the relative welfare level in Belarus is currently 64% compared to the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries average, Belarus needs to build stronger fundaments of sustainable growth by continuing and accelerating the implementation of institutional transformation, primarily by fostering elimination of existing administrative mechanisms of inefficient resource allocation. Based on the experience of the CEE countries’ economic transformation, we highlight five lessons for the purpose of the economic reforms that Belarus still faces today: keeping macroeconomic stability, restructuring and improving the governance of state-owned enterprises, developing the financial market, increasing taxation efficiency, and deepening fiscal decentralization.
Inflation in advanced economies is low by historical standards but there is no threat of deflation. Slower economic growth is caused by supply-side constraints rather than low inflation. Below-the-target inflation does not damage the reputation of central banks. Thus, central banks should not try to bring inflation back to the targeted level of 2%. Rather, they should revise the inflation target downwards and publicly explain the rationale for such a move. Risks to the independence of central banks come from their additional mandates (beyond price stability) and populist politics.
Estonia has Europe’s most transparent tax system (while Poland is second-to-last, in 35th place), and is also known for its pioneering approach to taxation of legal persons’ income. Since 2000, payers of Estonian corporate tax don’t pay tax on their profits as long as they don’t realize them. In principle, this approach should make access to capital easier, spark investment by companies and contribute to faster economic growth. Are these and other positive effects really noticeable in Estonia? Have other countries followed in this country’s footsteps? Would deferment of income tax be possible and beneficial for Poland? How would this affect revenue from tax on corporate profits? Would investors come to see Poland as a tax haven? Does the Estonian system limit tax avoidance and evasion, or actually the opposite? Is such a system fair? Are intermediate solutions possible, which would combine the strengths or limit the weaknesses of the classical and Estonian models of profit tax? These questions are discussed in the mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding no. 163, written by Dmitri Jegorov, deputy general secretary of the Estonian Finance Ministry, who directs the country’s tax and customs policy, Dr. Anna Leszczyłowska of the Poznań University of Economics and Business and Aleksander Łożykowski of the Warsaw School of Economics.
The trade war between the U.S. and China began in March 2018. The American side raised import duties on aluminum and steel from China, which were later extended to other countries, including Canada, Mexico and the EU member states. This drew a negative reaction from those countries and bilateral negotiations with the U.S. In June 2018 America, referring to Section 301 of its 1974 Trade Act, raised tariffs to 25% on 818 groups of products imported from China, arguing that the tariff increase was a response to years of theft of American intellectual property and dishonest trade practices, which has caused the U.S. trade deficit.
Will this trade war mean the collapse of the multilateral trading system and a transition to bilateral relationships? What are the possibilities for increasing tariffs in light of World Trade Organization rules? Can the conflict be resolved using the WTO dispute-resolution mechanism? What are the consequences of the trade war for American consumers and producers, and for suppliers from other countries? How high will tariffs climb as a result of a global trade war? How far can trade volumes and GDP fall if the worst-case scenario comes to pass? Professor Jan J. Michałek and Dr. Przemysław Woźniak give answers to these questions in the mBank-CASE Seminar Proceeding No. 161.
This Report has been prepared for the European Commission, DG TAXUD under contract TAXUD/2017/DE/329, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States” and serves as a follow-up to the six reports published between 2013 and 2018.
This Study contains new estimates of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Gap for 2017, as well as updated estimates for 2013-2016. As a novelty in this series of reports, so called “fast VAT Gap estimates” are also presented the year immediately preceding the analysis, namely for 2018. In addition, the study reports the results of the econometric analysis of VAT Gap determinants initiated and initially reported in the 2018 Report (Poniatowski et al., 2018). It also scrutinises the Policy Gap in 2017 as well as the contribution that reduced rates and exemptions made to the theoretical VAT revenue losses.
More from CASE Center for Social and Economic Research (20)
Falcon stands out as a top-tier P2P Invoice Discounting platform in India, bridging esteemed blue-chip companies and eager investors. Our goal is to transform the investment landscape in India by establishing a comprehensive destination for borrowers and investors with diverse profiles and needs, all while minimizing risk. What sets Falcon apart is the elimination of intermediaries such as commercial banks and depository institutions, allowing investors to enjoy higher yields.
What price will pi network be listed on exchangesDOT TECH
The rate at which pi will be listed is practically unknown. But due to speculations surrounding it the predicted rate is tends to be from 30$ — 50$.
So if you are interested in selling your pi network coins at a high rate tho. Or you can't wait till the mainnet launch in 2026. You can easily trade your pi coins with a merchant.
A merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold massive quantities till mainnet launch.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
If you are looking for a pi coin investor. Then look no further because I have the right one he is a pi vendor (he buy and resell to whales in China). I met him on a crypto conference and ever since I and my friends have sold more than 10k pi coins to him And he bought all and still want more. I will drop his telegram handle below just send him a message.
@Pi_vendor_247
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview.pptxmarketing367770
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview
If you're dreaming of owning a home in California's rural or suburban areas, a USDA loan might be the perfect solution. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers these loans to help low-to-moderate-income individuals and families achieve homeownership.
Key Features of USDA Loans:
Zero Down Payment: USDA loans require no down payment, making homeownership more accessible.
Competitive Interest Rates: These loans often come with lower interest rates compared to conventional loans.
Flexible Credit Requirements: USDA loans have more lenient credit score requirements, helping those with less-than-perfect credit.
Guaranteed Loan Program: The USDA guarantees a portion of the loan, reducing risk for lenders and expanding borrowing options.
Eligibility Criteria:
Location: The property must be located in a USDA-designated rural or suburban area. Many areas in California qualify.
Income Limits: Applicants must meet income guidelines, which vary by region and household size.
Primary Residence: The home must be used as the borrower's primary residence.
Application Process:
Find a USDA-Approved Lender: Not all lenders offer USDA loans, so it's essential to choose one approved by the USDA.
Pre-Qualification: Determine your eligibility and the amount you can borrow.
Property Search: Look for properties in eligible rural or suburban areas.
Loan Application: Submit your application, including financial and personal information.
Processing and Approval: The lender and USDA will review your application. If approved, you can proceed to closing.
USDA loans are an excellent option for those looking to buy a home in California's rural and suburban areas. With no down payment and flexible requirements, these loans make homeownership more attainable for many families. Explore your eligibility today and take the first step toward owning your dream home.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
The secret way to sell pi coins effortlessly.DOT TECH
Well as we all know pi isn't launched yet. But you can still sell your pi coins effortlessly because some whales in China are interested in holding massive pi coins. And they are willing to pay good money for it. If you are interested in selling I will leave a contact for you. Just telegram this number below. I sold about 3000 pi coins to him and he paid me immediately.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
where can I find a legit pi merchant onlineDOT TECH
Yes. This is very easy what you need is a recommendation from someone who has successfully traded pi coins before with a merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold thousands of pi coins before the open mainnet.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with
@Pi_vendor_247
The Evolution of Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) in India: Challenges...beulahfernandes8
Role in Financial System
NBFCs are critical in bridging the financial inclusion gap.
They provide specialized financial services that cater to segments often neglected by traditional banks.
Economic Impact
NBFCs contribute significantly to India's GDP.
They support sectors like micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), housing finance, and personal loans.
BYD SWOT Analysis and In-Depth Insights 2024.pptxmikemetalprod
Indepth analysis of the BYD 2024
BYD (Build Your Dreams) is a Chinese automaker and battery manufacturer that has snowballed over the past two decades to become a significant player in electric vehicles and global clean energy technology.
This SWOT analysis examines BYD's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats as it competes in the fast-changing automotive and energy storage industries.
Founded in 1995 and headquartered in Shenzhen, BYD started as a battery company before expanding into automobiles in the early 2000s.
Initially manufacturing gasoline-powered vehicles, BYD focused on plug-in hybrid and fully electric vehicles, leveraging its expertise in battery technology.
Today, BYD is the world’s largest electric vehicle manufacturer, delivering over 1.2 million electric cars globally. The company also produces electric buses, trucks, forklifts, and rail transit.
On the energy side, BYD is a major supplier of rechargeable batteries for cell phones, laptops, electric vehicles, and energy storage systems.
how can I sell pi coins after successfully completing KYCDOT TECH
Pi coins is not launched yet in any exchange 💱 this means it's not swappable, the current pi displaying on coin market cap is the iou version of pi. And you can learn all about that on my previous post.
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3. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
The CASE Network is a group of economic and social research centers in Poland,
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus. Organizations in the network regularly
conduct joint research and advisory projects. The research covers a wide spectrum of
economic and social issues, including economic effects of the European integration process,
economic relations between the EU and CIS, monetary policy and euro-accession,
innovation and competitiveness, and labour markets and social policy. The network aims to
increase the range and quality of economic research and information available to policy-makers
and civil society, and takes an active role in on-going debates on how to meet the
economic challenges facing the EU, post-transition countries and the global economy.
1
The CASE Network consists of:
• CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, est. 1991,
www.case-research.eu
• CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research – Kyrgyzstan, est.
1998, www.case.elcat.kg
• Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE Ukraine, est. 1999,
www.case-ukraine.kiev.ua
• CASE –Transcaucasus Center for Social and Economic Research, est.
2000, www.case-transcaucasus.org.ge
• Foundation for Social and Economic Research CASE Moldova, est.
2003, www.case.com.md
• CASE Belarus - Center for Social and Economic Research Belarus, est.
2007.
4. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
2
Contents
Abstract...................................................................................................................................5
1. Introduction .....................................................................................................................6
2. Social security and taxes in Russia and Ukraine – general review of current
situation and last reforms .....................................................................................................8
2.1 Social and Economic Background – general situation in CIS countries .............8
2.2 Financing social security expenditure in CIS and changes driven by the
financial problem..............................................................................................................10
2.3 Recent reforms of tax and social contributions system and current situation in
Russia and Ukraine ..........................................................................................................12
2.3.1 Payroll taxes in Ukraine. ..................................................................................12
2.3.2 Payroll taxes in Russia. ...................................................................................14
3. The relationship between the social security net, taxes, employment and the
shadow employment............................................................................................................16
3.1 Theoretical model....................................................................................................16
3.2 Effect on employment.............................................................................................19
3.3. Effect on shadow economy...................................................................................21
4. Tax wedge and employment – estimation of possible results of tax wedge shift for
employment in Russia and Ukraine....................................................................................23
5. Tax wedge and shadow employment – estimations for Ukraine ..........................28
6. Shadow employment, wages and access to social security in Ukraine and Russia
...............................................................................................................................................34
6.1 Some assessments of the size of the informal employment ..............................34
6.2 Informal employment and wages...........................................................................37
6.3 Impact of being informally employed on access to social security benefits
and EPL .............................................................................................................................39
7. Conclusions...................................................................................................................44
References:...........................................................................................................................46
5. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
Marek Góra is a professor of economics at the Warsaw School of Economics (SGH), where
he got his Ph.D. and habilitation. He has been lecturing and conducting research at SGH
since 1984. Currently, Marek Góra teaches macroeconomics, pension economics, labour
economics, and economic policy for graduate and Ph.D. students. Previously, he also taught
econometrics and economic forecasting. During his academic carrier, Marek Góra completed
research at the London School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Ifo Institute
for Economic Research in Munich. Marek Góra is a Research Fellow at the William Davidson
Institute, University of Michigan and a Research Fellow at Institute for the Study of Labor
(IZA), Bonn. Marek Góra is an author of various articles in the fields of pension economics,
labour economics, unemployment, labour market policies. Marek Góra is the co-author of the
design of the pension reform called Security through Diversity and the leader of a team of
experts who worked on the reform.
Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Ph.D. in Policy Analysis (2007, Dissertation on Social Safety Net
Reform in Ukraine), holds masters degrees in Applied Mathematics, Economics, Policy
Analysis, and Business Administration. He is an economist and researcher with over nine
year experience working in Ukraine and the US, including: leading and managing projects for
Ukrainian think-tank; working with various international organizations, including World Bank,
Soros International Economic Advisory Group, HIID/CASE; and providing support and advise
to decision-makers in Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, and Prime-Minister of
Ukraine. Oleksandr Rohozynsky has been working with CASE Ukraine since 1999.
Irina Sinitsina, Ph.D., is a leading researcher at the Institute of Economics, Russian
Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia) and CASE's permanent representative in Russia, as
well as a member of the Board of Directors of CASE - Transcaucasus in Tbilisi, Georgia. She
specializes in the analysis of social policy, including social security systems, social services,
labour market, income and employment policies in Russia, Poland, Georgia, Ukraine and
other FSU and CEE countries. She has also carried out extensive comparative
macroeconomic studies of the economies in transition in these countries. Irina has
participated in many international advisory projects on fiscal and social policy in Georgia and
Ukraine. Since 1992, she has advised Russian ministries, governmental agencies, and the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation on various social and employment policy issues
3
6. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
Mateusz Walewski graduated from the Department of Economics at the University of
Sussex in the UK (1997) and at the Warsaw University (MA in 1998), where he participated
in an MA programme organised in cooperation wit Columbia University in New York. He
works as a researcher at the CASE Foundation since 1997. He is an author of numerous
publications and unpublished reports concerning labour market, poverty, inflation,
restructuring of the economy and taxation policy but labour market is his main area of
interest. He is among authors of the Polish Economic Outlook Quarterly (PEO) responsible
for labour market issues. He has participated in several advisory projects for central and local
authorities of Poland. He has worked also as an advisor or a researcher in Georgia, Kosovo,
Armenia, Belarus, Montenegro and Yemen.
4
7. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
5
Abstract
The aim of this paper was to analyse possible directions and magnitudes of the relationship
between the social security driven tax wedge, employment and shadow employment in
Russia and Ukraine. Previous results suggest a limited positive relationship between the size
of the tax wedge and shadow employment and in recent years both analysed countries
undertook serious steps in order to reform and to simplify their payroll tax system and
consequently to reduce shadow employment.
Our result suggest that the unskilled persons engaged in unregistered jobs in Ukraine and
Russia are not “rewarded” with higher net earnings. It seems that, in their case, shadow
employment is the way to escape unemployment and resulting poverty, rather than to evade
taxes. Hence, it seems that, in this case, broadening of general employment opportunities for
this group would result in a decrease in shadow employment.
We also found that the effect of the SSN benefits on shadow employment was rather low in
both countries. One of the explanations is the fact that SSN benefits remain largely universal,
and are not sufficiently tied to former employment history and social security contribution
paid.
8. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
6
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse possible directions and magnitudes of the relationship
between the social security driven tax wedge, employment and shadow employment in
Russia and Ukraine. These subjects have been studied earlier both for these two countries
and for a broader set of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries by a number
of researchers (Johnson et al 1999, Kaufman&Kaliberda 1997, Mel’ota et all 2001a, 2001b,
Rutkowski 2006, World Bank 2000 and 2006). Most of the results suggest a limited positive
relationship between the size of the tax wedge and shadow employment.
The first specific feature of this paper, however, is that it draws heavily on earlier, particularly
local, literature on the subject that is probably not familiar to the international reader. It
discusses the relationship between the shape of social security systems in these countries
and the resulting tax wedge. It provides a reader with an up-to-date review of current payroll
tax systems in both countries and provides in-depth analyses of the social and institutional
background for the development of the tax wedge driven shadow employment in the
analysed countries. Last but not least, it also discusses the possible negative social
consequences of being engaged in shadow employment for employees as such.
A separate feature of the paper is that it puts significant pressure on the heterogeneity of the
labor force from the point of view of education (skills) and hence, expected productivity. Most
of the analyses below (if only applicable) differentiate between high-skilled and low-skilled
workers in order to take into account the tax wedge effects on employment levels and that
the fact that shadow employment can vary for different educational (skills) strata of the
population. It seems that the results of our analyses strongly support such a view.
On the other hand, however, the broad coverage of the analysis provided has been achieved
at the expense of its depth. Therefore, if answering the questions of interest is not possible
(mostly due to insufficient data), we try to open areas for further research.
The paper is organised as follows: the first section presents a summary of the economic and
institutional background for development of the current size and structure of the socially
driven tax wedge in both countries. The second section presents some theoretical
considerations on the relationship between the social protection system, tax wedge, non-employment
and finally, shadow employment. The third section contains an attempt to
9. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
econometrically estimate the magnitude of the possible relationship between the tax wedge
and total employment rates in both countries. In the fourth section, the authors try to discover
the mechanism of influence of the last reform of the Ukrainian payroll tax system on the
structure and size of shadow employment in the country. The last analytical section closes
the circle leading the reader back from shadow employment to wages and finally to the issue
of access to social security institutions. The last section concludes.
7
10. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
2. Social security and taxes in Russia and Ukraine – general
review of current situation and last reforms
2.1 Social and Economic Background – general situation in CIS
8
countries
By the end of the 1980’s, the countries of the “Soviet Block” (Eastern European countries
and the Soviet Union) had Social Safety Nets (SSN hereafter) with the most extensive
coverage and costs. For example, the SSN in the United States consists of about 80 mean-tested
federal programs that provide some cash (TAFT program), in-kind (housing and food),
and healthcare assistance (Medicaid) to low-income individuals and households (Lindert
2005), in addition to the government pension program. The total cost of welfare programs in
the US is only about 16% of GDP (UNECE 2005). Western Europe has a more generous and
expensive SSN system that includes government-funded or obligatory health insurance,
higher pension and unemployment benefits, early retirement, and government assistance for
education. This system is more expensive, and European counties spend about 24% of GDP
on the safety net. The SSN of the former Soviet Block countries provided free healthcare and
education (including higher education) to everyone, and the costs of other services, such as
childcare, vacations, etc. were greatly reduced by price equalization mechanisms. B.
Milanovic (1997) showed, in his book, that social transfer constituted about 19% of personal
income in a typical socialist economy, while it accounted for only 14% in a typical market
economy. This difference may be even larger because some benefits provided in-kind or
through discounts by the state enterprises to their workers can not be captured by such a
simple comparison. The pensions were relatively generous and the retirement age was
around 55 for females and 60 for males; in addition, retirees received a package of
discounted or free services, such as housing, phone, and other necessities. Because there
was no unemployment, unemployment benefits were non-existent in these countries. The
cost of the SSN was huge, but was largely carried by the state-owned enterprises and not by
the state budgets.
At the end of 1980’s and beginning of the 1990’s, the Soviet Block countries began
transitioning their economies from the planned to the market economy system. It was
obvious that it would be impossible to make the transition without transforming the SSN
because price controls and the heavy SSN burden on enterprises were not compatible with
the market economy. However, even when the SSN became the government’s responsibility,
11. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
it had to be reformed because (1) it did not match new tasks and poverty profiles, and (2) the
economic slowdown accompanying the transition put constraints on government
expenditures.
The countries of the FSU (Former Soviet Union) took the path of slow reform. They
experienced a longer (more than 6 years) and deeper (60-80% of GDP cumulative decline)
economic slowdown. Due to this slowdown, the average tax revenues in the CIS countries
fell from 28% of GDP in 1992 to 22% of GDP in 1998, and some countries with a slower
transition such as Georgia, Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan experienced a drop in revenues to less
than 15% of GDP (World Bank 2000). The transition to the market economy forced
governments to reduce some budget functions such as direct subsidies to the national
economy, but the SSN systems remained almost unchanged. It seems that FSU countries
were caught in the political lock-up that did not allow cutting any social benefits that are
provided to the whole population. Most of the countries (except Russia and Kazakhstan,
which have significant incomes from crude oil extraction)1 constantly run significant budget
deficits in order to finance government obligations.
The labor market transformation in CIS countries differed from the transformation in countries
of Eastern Europe (current “new” EU states). Despite massive drops in GDP, unemployment
in CIS countries remained at relatively low levels. During the period 1990-1994, average
decline of GDP in the CIS countries was around -11%, while decline in employment was only
-1% (compare to the -3% and -4% respectively in CEE (Central and Eastern Europe)
countries) (Nesporova 2002). During the periods of 1994-1998 and 1998-2004, the figures
were (-0.2%, -0.3%) and (+4.5%,+0.3%) respectively. Only countries involved in armed
conflict, such as Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, experienced a sharp decline in
employment. The real adjustment was felt through the large drop of real wages, which
declined dramatically in the CIS region during the transition. On average, they still remain
lower than in the pre-transition period.
Because of the reluctance to extensively reduce labor during transition in the CIS countries,
a drop in unemployment was not the major precondition to reduce poverty in these countries.
The problem, however, was that low-income employees were first to experience the onset of
massive arrears in wages, pensions and other benefits. (World Bank 2000). By the end of the
1990’s, there emerged new social groups prone to poverty: families of officially employed
persons on unpaid or partially paid leave, public workers, small farmers and rural business
1 This is true only for the period after 2000. As concerns the early and mid-1990’s - vast deficits in SSN budgets
and unpaid benefit mandates were typical in these countries as well.
9
12. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
owners (Ackland&Falkingham 1997). The working poor accounted for about half of the poor
in Russia where about 87% of poor lived in families where one or several members were
employed (Ovcharova 2003). In Ukraine, about 78% of poor families had at least one
working member in 1999 (Libanova 2001).
The economic decline during the initial stage of transition sharply affected the more educated
groups. A World Bank study of poverty in the CIS region in 2000 (World Bank 2000) showed
that contrary to OECD countries, the competitive advantages of higher education in the CIS
were fairly low: not all the qualified workers in the CIS could find positions adequate to their
qualifications. However, later studies found that poverty is negatively correlated with
education. Buitano (2000) showed that in Ukraine, a higher level of education of the head of
the household was significantly and negatively correlated with poverty incidence.
The highest risk of becoming poor in CIS countries is faced by families with a large number
of dependents (children, disabled and pensioners), supported by one working member. The
World Bank study (2000) found that children are especially vulnerable to poverty in Central
Asian CIS, and having a child dramatically reduces the chances of escaping poverty in
European CIS.
Despite common perceptions, the elderly and pensioners are not at a higher risk for falling
into poverty than the rest of the CIS population. Only pensioners unable to work and living in
a single-person household would almost certainly fall into poverty. The low pension age
prevailing in most CIS countries explains this phenomenon. Many pensioners continue to
work after retirement and the pension acts as a supplementary payment sufficient to bring
their income above the poverty line. The World Bank (2000) found that the risk of poverty for
working pensioners is only about one third of the average poverty risk in Russia.
2.2 Financing social security expenditure in CIS and changes
driven by the financial problem
The social welfare system in the CIS countries did not change significantly from the universal
social welfare system inherited from the USSR. The system remains very poorly oriented
towards supporting the poor. Social assistance programs remain aimed at providing services
or supplementary payments to certain groups of the population (elderly, children, disabled),
and poverty reduction, an urgent task, is not at the top of the policy agenda. Inflation, growth,
and the budget deficit have higher priority. Additionally, programs aiming at poverty
alleviation are poorly addressed and the task of poverty reduction is of least importance.
10
13. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
Reacting to the dramatic change in the structure of expenditures, and in order to retain the
Soviet era system of special rates, the governments of the CIS countries introduced a large
number of subsidies or discounts, often provided in-kind. For example, until 2005, Russia
kept 156 types of subsidies and social payments that were directed to 236 different
population groups. Almost 70% of the Russian population received at least one of the welfare
benefits (CSR 2000). At the end of the 1990’s, about 3% of GDP in Moldova was distributed
among more than 100 different subsidies and discounts. Armenia and Ukraine had the same
situation (Fox 2003). As a result, the number of beneficiaries of these assistance programs
became enormously high, while the size of the benefits gradually decreased due to lack of
financing.
Despite the significant expenditures on subsidies and discounts, these programs were very
severely underfinanced. It was estimated by the researchers at the Center of Strategic
Research (Russia) that the financing needed for the subsidies established by federal law in
Russia exceeded 15% of GDP in 1999. In order to improve monitoring and targeting of these
social benefits, Russia monetized the in-kind benefits in 2005 (Federal Law #122). However,
the monetization of the benefits triggered a strong negative social reaction and the reform of
these social benefits in order to reduce their cost did not begin.
The apparent problem of non-payment of social benefits, resulting from the huge difference
between the required expenditures and available revenues, was partially resolved by a
decrease in the real amounts of the payments due to high inflation. Until the beginning of the
21st century, the payments were not automatically indexed with inflation, but rather revised
on irregular bases. As a result, by 2003-2004, the welfare payment became merely symbolic
in most of the countries. For example, the social benefits in Russia amounted to about 6% of
the average wage, and in Ukraine and Azerbaijan to about 3-4% of the average wage.
The largest social welfare item outside the state budget in FSU countries is pensions,
reaching 7-12% of GDP. Despite being the largest expenditure item, due to lack of funding,
the actual pension benefits paid were considered only valuable additional income for working
pensioners, and alone were not able to provide income sufficient to stay out of poverty. For
example, the universal pension in Georgia in 2000 was only 23% of the living wage, and in
Ukraine the average pension was only 36% of the living wage in 2003. Following the
example of CEE countries, the CIS countries began pension reform, introducing a multi-tier
(mandatory and voluntary funds) pension system. However, these countries are still at the
11
14. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
beginning of the process and the new systems’ are only expected to have an impact in 15-20
years.
2.3 Recent reforms of tax and social contributions system and
current situation in Russia and Ukraine
2.3.1 Payroll taxes in Ukraine.
Currently, Ukraine has a rather complex system of four separate social insurance programs
that collect payroll taxes. Each program has its own tax rates, its own independent
administration and operation, and its own regulation. The list is comprised of: pension
insurance, unemployment insurance, temporary disability insurance, and industrial accident
insurance. The payroll taxes collected by these insurance funds are all imposed on the same
base (payrolls) but they have an income ceiling. Thus, rates are levied only on up to seven
times the average wage in the country.2 In total, the combined tax rate for all programs often
exceeds 40%, depending on the risk of industrial accidents, and as Table 2.1 shows, the vast
bulk is the employer’s share. The single largest contribution is to the pension insurance fund
(33.2%).
Table 2.1: Tax Rates of Social Insurance Programs in Ukraine (as a Percentage of
Employee Wage Income)
Contributions(*) Pension
12
Insurance
Unemployment
Insurance
Temporary
Disability
Insurance
(2)
Industrial
Accident
Insurance.
Total
Employer 31.8 1.3 2.9 1.5 (4) 37.5
Employee 1.0 /2.0 (1) 0.5 0.5 / 1.0 (3) --- 2-3.5
Total 32.8 – 33.8 1.8 3.4 – 3.9 1.6 39.5- 41
(*) Rates as established in the 2006 budget of Ukraine.
(1) Includes sickness, maternity and funeral insurance. The average total rate for the pension fund alone is 33.8 %
of wages.
(2) An average weighted rate. The rate the employer pays varies from 0.66% to 13.6% depending on the degree of
hazardous risk level. Overall, there are 67 different risk categories and some 30 rates. Moreover, there is more
variety in alternatives for companies that employ the disabled, working pensioners, and farmers. Thus, there is a
wide range of variations in individual liability even within a single company. This type of complexity adds an extra
burden to the withholders (and taxpayers) and makes collection monitoring and control more difficult.
(3) 1.0% of gross taxable income under UAH 150; 2.0% of gross taxable income over UAH 150.
(4) 0.5% for wages below the subsistence threshold; 0.1% for wages above the subsistence threshold.
Sources: MoF, MoL, Budget 2006, Ukraine: Creating Fiscal Space for Growth: A Public Finance Review. World
Bank Report No. 36671 – UA. September 14, 2006
Above that, there exists a system of simplified taxation (STS) for small business that
substitutes the general payroll taxation. The idea behind having such a system in Ukraine
2 The cap is established as seven times the average wage in the country. The monthly average wage in 2005 was
UAH 806, so the ceiling in that year was UAH 5,642. This ceiling is set in the annual Budget Law.
15. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
was to bring to light the small businesses operating in the shadow economy. The STS was
instituted by the Presidential Decree in July 1998. The small businesses falling under the
Decree include the following:
• physical persons or individual entrepreneurs with annual gross turnover not
exceeding UAH 500,000 and employing not more than ten persons, including family
members;
• legal entities (firms) with an average annual number of employees not exceeding 50
persons and with annual gross turnover not exceeding UAH 1,000,000.
Under STS, the taxpayer (either individual or a firm) is to choose one of the following rates
for the unified tax:
• 6 % of the gross turnover (less excise taxes) plus VAT, or
• 10 % of the gross turnover (less excise taxes) with VAT included into the unified tax
13
(see Table1.2 )
The tax collected from individual entrepreneurs is distributed according to the following
scheme:
• to local government budgets - 43%;
• to the pension fund - 42%;
• to social insurance funds -15% (including 4% to the employment fund).
• Taxes collected from firms are distributed in a similar way, with the exception of local
budgets receiving 23%, and the remaining 20% going to the central government
budget.
Table 2.2 The Simplified Tax System (STS) in Ukraine
Options Subject of
taxation
Eligibility criteria Base Tax Rate
6%; but not exempt
from VAT.
Legal entities
(firms)
Annual gross (last 12 months)
turnover
does not exceed UAH 1,000,000;
firm does not have more than 50
employees.
Gross
Turnover
10%; exempt from
VAT.
6%; but not exempt
from VAT
The unified
Tax
Physical persons
or
“individual
entrepreneurs”
(individuals)
Annual gross turnover (last 12
months)
does not exceed UAH 500,000;
entrepreneur does not have more
than 10 employees.
Gross
Turnover
10%; exempt from
VAT.
Fixed Tax Physical persons
(individuals)
Annual turnover (last 12 months)
does
not exceed UAH 119,000; do not
have more than 5 employees.
--------
Patents vary from
UAH 20-200 per
month.
Other (Trade
patents, fees
and permits)
Levied on legal
entities and
individuals.
Small firms as assed by local
governments (LG) --------
Various amounts
(assessed by LG).
16. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
The employees of the firms that opted for STS pay the same payroll taxes as those working
under a general tax scheme:
14
• 1-2% to the pension fund;
• 0,5% to the employment fund;
• 0,5-1% to the social insurance fund;
• 13% PIT (flat rate).
There is evidence, albeit mixed, that the STS has encouraged SMEs registration and entry.
However, the current system design has led to substantial abuses, inefficiencies, and an
erosion of the regular tax base in the following ways (World Bank 2006):
• it created incentives for legal and illegal migration from the regular tax system, which
generated revenue losses for the budget in all major taxes (payroll taxes, the PIT, the
VAT, and, more marginally, the CIT);
• it distorted taxpayer behavior in inefficient ways for the economy, potentially lowering
productivity in the economy (e.g., firms fragment their operations into smaller firms to
meet the threshold3, losing economies of scale; and production and sales are kept below
thresholds hampering output growth); and
• it introduced substantial horizontal (and vertical) inequalities to the system (e.g., an
individual working as a “consultant” under the STS may pay significantly lower taxes than
an individual with the same type of job description at a firm and the same level of income
under the regular income tax system).
2.3.2 Payroll taxes in Russia.
The Unified Social Tax (UST) was introduced in Russia in December 2001, replacing
insurance contributions paid by employers to four separate insurance funds – the pension
fund, the social insurance fund, the federal obligatory medical insurance fund, and the
territorial medical insurance funds. Later, the UST was included into Chapter 24 of the Tax
Code.
Initially, the UST basic rate for legal entities was set at 35.6%, and its effective rate – at 29%.
Beginning in 2005, these were reduced to 26% and 24% accordingly. UST is a regressive
tax: the rates are significantly lower for annual salaries exceeding RUR 600,000 (see Table
3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that businesses break their operation into pieces and use other schemes to fit the
requirements of the system (Creating Fiscal Space for Growth, p.17).
17. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
1.3). The whole of the UST is paid by the employer. In 2007, the UST was distributed
according to the following scheme:
• 20% - to the federal budget for pension financing;
• 2.9 % - for social insurance;
• 3.1 % - for medical insurance.
For individual entrepreneurs, the UST rate is set at 10% of the tax base (7.3% to the federal
budget for pension financing and 2.7% for medical insurance).
Table 2.3 The Unified Social Tax (UST) system in Russia.
UST rates since January 1st, 2007
Legal entities
Tax base, Obligatory medical insurance funds
annual, for each
employee
15
Federal budget
(pensions)
Social insurance fund
(federal budget) Federal (federal
budget)
Territorial
Total
Less than RUR
28,0000
20,0 % 2,9 % 1,1 % 2,0 % 26,0 %
RUR 28,0001 –
RUR 600,000
RUR 56,000 + 7,9 % of
the sum exceeding
RUR 280,000
RUR 8,120 + 1,0 % of
the sum exceeding
RUR 280,000
RUR 3,080 + 0,6 % of
the sum exceeding
RUR 280,000
RUR 5,600 + 0,5 % of
the sum exceeding
RUR 280,000
RUR 72800 + 10,0 %
of the sum exceeding
RUR 280,000
Over RUR
600,000
RUR 81,280 + 2,0 % of
the sum exceeding
RUR 600,000
RUR 11,320 RUR 5,000 RUR 7,200 RUR 104,800 + 2,0 %
of the sum exceeding
RUR 600,000
Individual entrepreneurs
Tax base, annual Federal budget (pensions) Obligatory medical insurance funds
Federal Territorial
Total
Less than RUR
28,0000
7,3 % 0,8 % 1,9 % 10,0 %
RUR 28,0001 –
RUR 600,000
RUR 20,440 + 2,7 % of the sum
exceeding RUR 280,000
RUR 2,240 + 0,5 % of
the sum exceeding
RUR 280000
RUR 5,320 + 0,4 % of
the sum exceeding
RUR 280,000
28,000 + 3,6 % of the sum
exceeding RUR 280,000
Over RUR
600,000
RUR 29,080 + 2,0 % of the sum
exceeding RUR 600,000
RUR 3840 RUR 6600 RUR 39,520 + 2,0 % of the sum
exceeding RUR 600,000
The major difference between Ukraine and Russia is not in the sizes of the tax wedge (in
fact, these are very close), rather the difference between the two countries is that in Ukraine,
‘social insurance contributions’ are insurance premiums (insuring against risks) rather than
taxes as such and are not included in the tax base, while in Russia, these payments are
taxes paid directly to the government that administers the corresponding funds.
For Russian SMEs, there exists a simplified taxation regime (either STS or unified tax on
imputed income) established in 1998 and introduced into Part 2 of the Tax Code. The unified
tax replaced most of the taxes (with the exception of the PIT) levied on SMEs. Generally,
SMEs pay taxes using the following rates:
• 6% of total earnings, or
• 15% of total earnings less expenses, or
• 15% of imputed income.
18. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
Individual entrepreneurs not using hired labor make a fixed-size payment to the pension
fund. The size of this payment is determined annually by the government. Currently, its
minimal monthly size is RUR 150.
The results of several entrepreneur opinion surveys indicate that the STS, in general, is not
totally rejected by small businesses. Moreover, a survey conducted in three regions in 2001
by the Resource Center for Small Entrepreneurship shows that the STS is somewhat more
acceptable for the small business as compared to the general taxation system.
3. The relationship between the social security net, taxes,
employment and the shadow employment
3.1 Theoretical model
In order to run the analysis of the relationship between social safety nets, the tax wedge and
employment, we would like to introduce a simple econometric model. Let us assume that we
have an economy with N individuals, and:
(1) Every individual in the country can consume either goods c or leisure l.
(2) Every individual has the same concave and twice differentiable utility function U(c,l)
16
that this individual tries to maximize.
(3) Every individual has an income I, which consists of government transfers and the
labor income, and is equal to the time the person works, multiplied by his/her wage:
i=b+w*(T-l).
(4) Each individual maximizes his/her utility given this budget constraint. Assuming there
is no savings and the whole income is consumed, the constraint is c=i. The general
solution to this problem is to choose the level of work at the point where marginal rate
of substitution is equal to the wage rate. Assuming for simplicity that utility is linear in
consumption, the utility-maximizing amount of work is given by: ∂U(c,l)/ ∂l = -w.
In order to introduce a social welfare system into this economy, we have to make at least two
critical assumptions about individuals in the country.
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(5) The individuals in the country have different abilities. For simplicity, we can assume
that λ percent of population has high abilities, able to earn wage aH, and (1- λ) has
low abilities and earns the wage aL.
(6) The individuals with low ability can not generate labor income sufficient to bring their
consumption to some minimum acceptable social standard of consumption
(subsistence level) M.
Therefore, the government has to step in and supplement the income of the low-ability
individuals to the level Z (which may be equal to or different from M, depending on the
generosity of the system), developing a simple safety net.
Finally, we assume that the government is interested in minimizing expenditures on the
social safety net given the necessity to bring the income of all individuals in the country to a
level at or above Z. We also assume that an individual does not consider this government
goal when making his/her decision. In this case, the total cost of the Social Security Net in
equilibrium is determined by the government’s ability to monitor individual abilities and
earnings.
If the government is able to clearly observe individual abilities and earnings, the total
expenditures for the social safety net will be minimized at the level E= N*λ*(Z- aL*(T-l(aL)).
Coate and Besley (1992) show in their article that under such conditions, the government will
have to pay only Z- aL*(T-l(aL)) in social benefits to the low ability individuals and will not pay
any social benefits to the individuals with high abilities.
If the government is not able to observe abilities, even if it is able to perfectly observe the
level of wage earnings, the theory leads to the conclusion that high-ability individuals may
modify their working behavior in order to receive the benefit Z- aL*(T-l(aL)). Since the high-ability
people are more productive, it will take them less time to work for the wage-income
generated by low-ability people, (only aL*(T-l(aL))/ aH hours). The high ability people will alter
their income if their utility from working less with total income at level Z will be higher than
utility from higher consumption and higher work U(Z,[( aH- 1)T+ l(aL)]/ aH) ≥ U(aH*(T-l(aH)),
l(aH)).
Coate and Besley (1992) show that in this situation, the government has two choices that
minimize the expenditures for the welfare system. First, they can offer the benefits of Z-aL*(
T-l(aL)) to people with wage income aL*(T-l(aL)) and smaller benefit B that will satisfy
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20. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
criteria U(B,[( aH- 1)T+ l(aL)]/ aH)= U(aH*(T-l(aH)), T-l(aH)) to the population with income above
Z. The total cost of the welfare system will go up to E2= N*(λ* (Z- aL*(T-l(aL))) +(1-λ)*B).
The second possibility is to offer the social security benefit only to people who identified
themselves as low ability, but require them to work R hours at government organized work in
exchange for this benefit. Given this solution, the low-ability individuals will lower their work
for wage to the level of T-l(aL)-R, therefore, the size of the welfare benefit will rise to Z- aL*(T-l(
aL)-R). However, the R is chosen so that U(aH*(T-l(aH))≥ U(Z,[( aH- 1)T+ l(aL)-R]/ aH). In other
words, with the work requirement, the high-ability individuals will not take this solution
because working R hours in the private market for a higher wage will generate more utility for
them than participating in the government program. This solution to the failure of the social
programs due to the behavioral response in called “workfare”. The workfare expenditures of
E= N*λ* (Z- aL*(T-l(aL)-R)) will be cheaper for the government than the first solution if there is
sufficient difference between the wages of high and low income groups (the difference must
be such that aL<(1-λ) aH ) (Besley& Coate 1992).
Most countries finance their social security programs by payroll taxes or other taxes on wage
income. The tax as the source of funding for the SSN can be introduced into the model.
Under the assumptions of the model, it is reasonable to tax income of high-ability individuals
only, because the social system will have to return to the low-ability individuals all the taxes
that they paid. It also does not matter if the tax is a payroll tax (tax on enterprise) or income
tax (tax on a person), because in any case, in a competitive labor market, the tax will result in
decreased wage income of the workers.
If the government imposes the tax of τ on the income of high ability people, the wage that
they receive will become (1- τ) aH. Given the concave utility function, the high ability people
will work less and their wage income will become (1- τ) aH*(T-l((1- τ) aH)). According to the
model, in this case the total expenditures of the welfare system will increase. If the
government is not able to observe individual’s abilities, the government will have to
implement a more costly system that provides benefits to everyone, but the benefit provided
to the high-ability population will rise. If the government implements the “workfare” system,
this task may become impossible if the tax is significantly high because the “workfare”
system is only able to be implemented if the following condition holds: aL<(1-λ)(1- τ) aH.. The
government will also have to increase the work requirement Rτ > R, since the difference in
the cost of leisure for high ability people will be lowered.
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If the welfare system is fully financed by the taxes on wages, the government faces an
additional constraint in terms of our model. The total expenditures of the system can not
exceed the total amount of taxes collected E=N(1-λ) τ aH (T-l((1- τ) aH)), and the tax rate must
be limited so that the condition U(Z,R)<U(aH (T-l((1- τ) aH), T-l((1- τ) aH) holds, otherwise the
high-ability people will exit labor market. The highest benefit that can be offered to poor
people in this case can not exceed (1-λ) τ aH (T-l((1- τ) aH))/ λ, and this benefit will not alter
behavior of high-ability people only if the “workfare” system is used in the country.
Increased taxes or a government deficit can crowd out investment; increased payroll taxes
can decrease labor demand; additional income of the poor population can increase demand
for some goods and, given limited supply, cause inflation. There is a wide array of literature
about the macroeconomic impact of an increase in government spending and social welfare
benefits in particular. The empirical evidence in these publications suggests that the negative
effect of the increase in social benefits on investment and labor supply likely outweighs its
positive impact on private consumption. The literature discusses three major channels for the
impact of benefits on an economy: decrease in employment, growth of the shadow economy,
and the direct impact on the GDP growth, which combines all factors together. Below we
discuss the empirical findings and the estimates of the size of the effect for all these
channels.
3.2 Effect on employment
Our model assumes that every individual in the country can consume either goods c or
leisure l. The simplest models assume that every individual has the same concave and twice
differentiable utility function U(c,l) which this individual tries to maximize subject to a budget
constraint c=b+(1-τ)*w*(T-l). The model implies that the larger benefit b received by an
individual, the less he/she will work, since he/she can afford larger consumption of both
goods and leisure. This effect also leads to the change in behavior for some people, who
prefer to work less (or cease to work) in order to qualify for the benefit. These effects are
widely observed at the individual level and they result in larger costs of welfare programs.
However, the effect of the increased benefits on total labor supply is relatively small because
only a small fraction of the labor force is affected.
A larger effect on the labor supply and employment is observed when the government
imposes or increases taxes on wages in order to finance the social benefits. Since the tax is
imposed on all workers, the effect is easier to observe at the macroeconomic level.
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The microeconomic model implies that a decrease in wages as the result of the tax will have
two effects: it will decrease the income of the person and stimulate him/her to work more in
order to achieve their former, pre-tax consumption level; and it will decrease the “price of
leisure”, causing the person to consume more leisure in order to increase their level of utility.
If the income effect dominates the substitution effect, the workers will work more after the
increase in the tax rate. However, most empirical estimates suggest that the substitution
effect likely dominates the income effect, and the elasticity of labor supply to an increase in
taxes is negative. The report of the Congressional Budget Office of the USA in 1996 (1996)
reviewed a number of studies and concluded that labor supply elasticity to a change in
wages ranges from 0 to 0.3 for the whole population.
An increase in taxes on wages does not necessarily result in a change of the net-of-tax wage
or is not fully translated into such a change. The effect of taxes on wages is better observed
at the macroeconomic level. For macroeconomic analysis, individual labor preferences are
aggregated into the labor supply function. Enterprise demand for labor is also aggregated
into the labor demand function. The conventional market economy model suggests that
employment and wages are set by the intersection of these two curves. A tax on workers’
wages shifts the labor supply curve up and the new wage is larger than in the previous
equilibrium, meaning that some portion of the tax shifted to the enterprise. If the tax is
imposed on the enterprise, it shifts the labor demand curve down resulting in a lower
equilibrium wage, and shifting some portion of the tax on workers.
The possibility to shift taxes on employees (in the form of reduced post-tax wages) depends
on the elasticity of labor supply. Less elastic labor supply allows wages to be decreased
without a significant loss in hours worked. A perfectly inelastic supply of labor allows for
shifting payroll taxes to employees. Kugler (2003) and then Góra et al. (2006) argued that
blue-collar (low-skilled) workers have a higher elasticity of wages than white-collar (high-skilled)
workers, and show empirical evidence that a payroll tax decrease(increase) causes a
larger employment gain(loss) for low-paid workers than for high-paid workers. The high
elasticity of labor supply of the low-paid workers in the country where this effect was studied
was attributed by the authors to the relatively generous system of non-employment benefits,
the large shadow economy and a binding minimum wage.
By design, social security contributions (payroll taxes) are social insurance for workers and
can be viewed as savings. If workers believe in the system they have to treat their payroll
taxes as part of their income (with some discount perhaps), and be indifferent between
packages of higher wages and no-taxes, and lower wages with payroll taxes. In this case,
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23. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
any change in payroll taxes could be passed through to employees without a change in
employment (Gruber 1997). However, there is little evidence of this intertemporal substitution
effect (Gwartney et al 1998).
Instead, a number of studies find a significant effect of changes in payroll taxes on
employment. Kugler (2003) estimated that a 10% increase in payroll taxes resulted in a 4-5%
reduction in employment in Columbia; Gora et al. (2006) estimate that the same increase
could result in a 5% reduction of employment in Poland, and Gwartney et al. (1998) suggest
that a 10% increase in the after-tax wage will result in a 3% increase in employment in the
USA. From the review of results found in the literature, we can expect similar results for
Russia and Ukraine.
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3.3. Effect on shadow economy
The effect of welfare programs on the shadow economy drew a lot of attention in CIS
countries (Kaufman, Kaliberda 1998) because of the large shadow economies in the
countries of the region and because of the recent experience of the country. The shadow
economy in Ukraine was estimated to be around 40% of the official economy in 1996, about
20-39% in 2000 (Mel’ota et al. 2001a, 2001b) and above 50% of GDP (41.2% of the working
age population) in 2000/2001 (Schneider, 2003), which was the highest level in Europe; in
Russia in 2000/2001, the share of the shadow economy in GDP was above 45% (40.9% of
the working age population) (Schneider, 2003).
The shadow economy in a country can be influenced by the social security net in two ways. If
the social security benefits, such as pensions, unemployment insurance, or health insurance,
are linked to employment (for example, as in the continental social security system model),
then the workers in shadow economy are not eligible for these benefits. If the workers trust
the social security system to deliver insurance when they need it, then larger amounts of
possible benefits will stimulate workers to find official employment or put pressure on
enterprises to hire them officially. There is evidence (Johnson et al 1999, Belev 2003) that
larger government expenditures are associated with a reduction of the shadow economy.
However, the positive effect of increased social security benefits on the reduction of the
shadow economy is only observable if it is separated from the effect of increased social
security contributions or other taxes that finance the SSN. Taxes are found to be one of the
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major causes of the existence of the unofficial economy by all studies reviewed. Large
payroll taxes increase incentives for employers to pay their employees off the record. A large
personal income tax stimulates employees to agree to receive payments off-the-book. If
other taxes are relatively low, large taxes on labor may result in hiding full salaries, which
lowers the tax base for labor taxes but does not necessarily result in a large shadow
economy because all the output remains in official economy. However, if other taxes are also
high, then both workers and enterprises are better off conducting part of their business in the
shadow economy. In the first several years of transition, most of the CIS countries had
payroll taxes of around 50%, progressive personal income tax rates up to 50%, and profit
taxes around 30-40%. This resulted in the development of massive unofficial economies and
shadow employment in these countries.
Both tax rates and the complexity of the tax system are important determinants of the size of
the shadow economy. Schneider (2003) and Johnson et al. (1999) showed that the
complexity of the tax system measured by the propensity of tax exemptions is a more
important determinant of the size of the shadow economy than the tax rates. A similar result
was described for Ukraine by U. Mel’ota et al. (2001a), who showed that the complexity of
regulations, including the tax system, is the most important determinant of the shadow
economy in Ukraine.
The tax burden, measured either as the tax rates or as tax revenues as a share of GDP, is
the most commonly discussed cause of the shadow economy. Different studies show that an
additional 1% of government tax revenues could result in a 0.3-0.9% increase in the share of
the shadow economy Studies that made distinctions between different taxes found that
indirect taxes are a less significant determinant of the size of shadow economy, while direct
taxes on wages and profits had a significant impact on the size of the unofficial activity. In
Ukraine, a combination of personal income tax and social security contributions were found
to be important determinants of the size of the shadow economy before the personal income
tax reform in 2004. Mel’ota et al. (2001b) estimated that if the taxes in Ukraine remained at
the level of 1993-1994, the share of the shadow economy in 2000 would be about 20%
higher than it was historically observed.
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4. Tax wedge and employment – estimation of possible
results of tax wedge shift for employment in Russia and
Ukraine
Let us begin with some simple theoretical considerations, explaining our research strategy.
Figure 4.1 (panel (a)) presents the theoretical relationship between productivity and (net)
wages. Let us assume this relationship is convex. This means that for high productivity
levels, the productivity-wage elasticity is very high and it decreases as the productivity level
goes down. For very low productivity levels, the wages are “rigid” – i.e. they do not react, or
react insignificantly, to productivity changes.
On our schedule (Figure 4.1 panel (a)), an exogenous increase of labour costs, such as an
increased tax wedge, results in a shift of the productivity-wage curve to the right. This means
that the productivity of an individual has to increase in order to earn the same (net) wage, or
that the wage must be reduced if productivity can not adjust. Essentially, the worker’s value
for the employer must increase as the exogenous costs of her/his employment go up. If the
productivity-wage relationship is convex, as on our schedule, substantial wage reductions
are possible only in the case of highly productive workers.
The rightward shift of the productivity-wage schedule is equivalent to the downward shift of
the labour demand curve for a given productivity level as on Figure 4.1 panel (b). Rigid
wages of workers with low productivity will result in large employment reductions and flexible
wages of high-productivity workers will result in smaller employment reductions. This leads
us to the concave productivity-employment relationship from Figure 4.1 panel (c). This
explicitly illustrates the effect of a tax-wedge increase on employment for the labour force
strata characterised by varying productivity levels.
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26. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
Figure 4.1 Illustration of theoretical relationship between productivity, wages and
employment consequences of a tax wedge increase.
(a)
Below we try to estimate the results of such a tax wedge increase on employment depending
on the productivity levels for both countries analysed. The calculations for Russia have been
run on the RLMS dataset for 2005 and the calculations for Ukraine on the ULMS dataset for
2003.
We have estimated the log linear wage model for both Ukraine and Russia. The model
specification in both cases included: age, age square, gender, region of residence and
education level of an individual. In both cases the model has been estimated only for full-time
24
p-high
employment
flexible wage
case
p-high
employment
rigid
wage
case
p-low
p-high
wage
productivity
p-low
wage
(b)
productivity
p-low
(c)
27. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
employees. In order to exclude outliers, the observations from the lowest and highest wage
percentiles have been excluded.
The next step of our analysis was to calculate the fitted values from the model (expected
wages) for the entire working age population (15-74). These would serve as the proxies for
individual productivity levels. Actual employment rates have been calculated for each
percentile of the expected wage distribution. A simple bivariate model has been estimated for
both countries relating the employment rate for each percentile of expected wage distribution
to the respective average log-expected wage. Log wage has been used as the explanatory
variable in order to take into account the concavity of the expected wage (productivity) –
employment relationship as is clearly visible on Chart 4.1. As a result, we have obtained two
functions of the employment rate to expected wage level as presented on Chart 4.1. This
function mimics the theoretical relationship presented in Figure 4.1 panel (c).
Using the estimated functions one can now calibrate the expected employment effect of a
proportional tax wedge change in Russia and in Ukraine for various labour force groups
defined by their expected wage levels. This has been done, and the results of a 10% tax
wedge cut for both countries are presented in Chart 4.2 where, for the sake of comparability,
the expected wage levels on the horizontal axis have been replaced by the respective
percentiles. The percentage change of employment has been placed on the vertical axis of
Chart 4.2.
Chart 4.1. The actual and fitted relationship between estimated expected monthly
wage and employment rates for Russia (2005) and Ukraine (2003).
Russia
25
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000
Expected w age
Employment rate
Actual wages and em ployment rates Estimated function (from logwage)
28. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
26
Ukraine
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Expected wage
Employment rate
Actual wages and employment rates Estimated function (from logwage)
Source: Own calculations based on RLMS 2005 for Russia and ULMS 2003 for Ukraine.
Chart 4.2 The calibrated percentage changes in employment for percentiles of
estimated expected wage in Russia and Ukraine.
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentiles of expected wages
Percentage Employment growth after 10% proportional reduction in
tax wedge
Employment growth % - Russia Employment growth % - Ukraine
Source: Own calculations based on RLMS 2005 for Russia and ULMS 2003 for Ukraine.
As one can see, the total employment effects of the tax wedge cut have been calibrated to
be much higher in Ukraine than in Russia. The total employment result of the 10% tax cut
29. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
increase according to our results would be 6% employment growth in Russia and as much as
15% employment growth in Ukraine.
There are also (and this is the most important result from our point of view) pronounced
differences between the employment effects for more productive workers (with higher
expected wages) and less productive workers (with lower expected wages) in both countries.
The number of employed with expected wages below the median would grow in Russia by
11% and in Ukraine by 24%. For those above the median, the respective changes would
reach 4% in Russia and 11% in Ukraine.
The results of this simple econometric exercise are only illustrative. They should not be
treated as point estimates of effects of any real processes. They shed some light, however,
on possible differences between the tax wedge influence on employment levels of
unproductive, unskilled workers characterised by low and rigid wages, and highly productive
skilled workers with high and flexible wages. The difference in results between countries
analysed is also very interesting. They obviously result from differences in the starting levels
of both total and relative employment rates for various groups of the labour force in Russia
and Ukraine.
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5. Tax wedge and shadow employment – estimations for
28
Ukraine
The next point of our analysis is to estimate the effect of a tax wedge change on shadow
employment. We tried to run such an exercise on the basis of the Ukrainian tax reform of
2005. One of the crucial points in studying shadow employment is the ability to identify
shadow activities, shadow income, or the simple fact of shadow employment. Unfortunately,
none of the data sources at our disposal provided the possibility to observe shadow
employment directly when the tax wedge changed in Ukraine.
The ULMS has attempted to ask for shadow employment directly. The survey questionnaire
contained the question, “Are you officially registered at this job, that is, on a work roster, work
agreement, or contract?”. Unfortunately, this question is related only to the current (or most
recent) job, which for the first wave of the ULMS was 2002 or 2003. We can observe the
distribution of the low-skilled and high-skilled workers who self-reported being officially
registered or not registered at their current job. However, because we do not have
longitudinal data over the time period when the tax wedge changed, we are unable to make
any statistical arguments about the effect of social security taxes on this distribution. Even if
we had the longitudinal data, we could not capture the entire phenomenon of unofficial
employment with the ULMS data. The question cited above allows capturing only fully
unofficial (unregistered) employment. However, conversations with Ukrainian employees and
employers suggest that, in some cases, shadow employment results from underreporting
hours of work or wages rather than non-registered employment. Nevertheless, we use this
information later to estimate the income effect of being employed in the shadow economy.
The UHES does not have an indicator for a person who has unofficial employment. However,
it has data on personal and family expenditures and, therefore, we can try to estimate
unofficial employment income as the difference between incomes and expenditures of a
family. Because expenditures are reported at the level of the household, we can not
determine if a specific member of the household is involved in the shadow economy. We can
determine only that the household has shadow (unreported) income, if the amount of
household expenditures exceeds the amount of household income. Because UHES is a
special tool to study household expenditures, it has more accurate and detailed information
about the expenditures than the revenues. One of the peculiarities of the survey is that it
allows for the estimation of the amount of household self-production consumed by the same
31. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
household. This amount is not reported by the household as a source of income. However,
this amount is included in the total household expenditures. Therefore, own production of
food for own household consumption is considered as “shadow income” according to our
definition. Unfortunately, the dataset available for this study was a reduced version of the
original UHES data. It excluded detailed information about expenditures, and contains only
information about total household income. Therefore, we were unable to calculate the
household expenditures without consumption of self-produced food.
In order to reduce disparities from inclusion of the production of food for personal
consumption into the total expenditures, and since even without this disparity it is unlikely
that income and expenditures in a given month or three-month period match exactly, we
mark the household as “receiving shadow income” only if the per-capita (difference divided
by number of members of the household) difference between expenditures and income
exceeds 100 UAH (approximately $20 in 2005).
The UHES data reports income from the same source at both the family and individual
member levels. In 1999-2002, these numbers do not always match. Because of this
discrepancy, we created three possible indicators of the shadow economy: one based on the
household-level income reported in UHES, another is based on the sum of individual
incomes reported by the household members (plus incomes from sources that are reported
only at the household level), and the third assuming that there is a shadow income if
individual and household level incomes do not match. All of these are based on the simple
assumption that, speaking about their individual incomes, the respondents are likely to report
only their official incomes, while when reporting on total incomes or expenditures they are
more likely to reveal actual income levels.
The distribution of households by education level of the head of the household (used as a
proxy for skills in this case) is significantly different for families that are identified as receiving
shadow income and families without shadow income. Table 5.1 presents the distribution for
the shadow income defined as total income reported in the household-level data and total
household expenditures. Because household-level data for 2003 available for this study
contained limited information, we are unable to report this distribution for 2003. However, this
problem was fixed by using individual-level income data in Table 5.2. Table 5.2 presents the
distribution of families by education level of the head of household in families with and
without shadow income. In this table the shadow income is identified as the difference
between total household expenditures (reported in household level data) and the sum of
incomes of household members (reported at the individual level in a separate dataset).
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32. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
Table 5.1 Distribution of households with and without shadow income by education
level of the head of household (shadow indicator: difference between sum of incomes
and sum of expenditures reported at household level)
No shadow income
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 q1 2004 q4 2005
Higher 16.08 14.43 14.44 16.08 19.80 18.30 20.15
Bachelor 1.11 2.32 0.51 0.57 1.11 1.11 0.64
Unfinished higher 23.73 19.50 20.84 22.83 21.23 20.40 20.90
High school 31.31 34.19 34.50 34.10 35.95 36.31 37.25
Middle school 11.02 13.32 14.10 13.98 12.88 13.55 12.61
Junior school 11.78 11.33 11.23 9.24 6.95 7.53 6.65
Does not have junior 3.99 3.27 3.34 2.23 1.44 1.63 1.32
Can not read 0.90 1.44 0.76 0.50 0.11 0.24 0.20
No answer 0.08 0.18 0.28 0.48 0.53 0.94 0.28
Shadow income
Higher 16.02 16.37 15.35 5.29 5.44 2.32 5.08
Bachelor 1.30 2.36 1.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.73
Unfinished higher 23.72 21.19 22.76 28.37 13.95 17.50 16.67
High school 29.54 32.78 33.69 33.61 40.55 53.46 53.59
Middle school 11.97 13.23 14.13 22.43 19.94 14.60 14.51
Junior school 13.12 10.20 9.64 5.47 13.96 6.77 6.77
Does not have junior 3.33 2.93 2.07 3.16 3.90 2.99 2.08
Can not read 0.83 0.67 0.55 1.67 1.26 0.51 0.00
No answer 0.18 0.27 0.48 0.00 0.51 1.85 0.57
Table 5.2. Distribution of households with and without shadow income by education
level of the head of household (shadow indicator: difference between sum of
members’ incomes and total household expenditures)
No shadow income
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 q1 2004 q4 2005
Higher 28.84 21.50 19.27 16.33 18.31 19.80 18.30 20.15
Bachelor 1.21 4.43 0.54 0.55 1.05 1.11 1.11 0.64
Unfinished higher 24.70 22.24 26.05 22.88 20.04 21.23 20.40 20.90
High school 26.09 33.57 34.68 33.60 35.39 35.95 36.31 37.25
Middle school 7.92 7.76 9.03 14.03 14.24 12.88 13.55 12.61
Junior school 7.61 8.14 8.21 9.41 8.23 6.95 7.53 6.65
Does not have junior 3.25 1.02 1.65 2.20 2.00 1.44 1.63 1.32
Can not read 0.38 1.34 0.17 0.51 0.41 0.11 0.24 0.20
No answer 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.48 0.32 0.53 0.94 0.28
Shadow income
Higher 15.45 15.80 14.78 8.98 8.54 8.01 6.46 7.57
Bachelor 1.28 2.26 1.20 0.80 1.60 0.68 0.94 0.75
Unfinished higher 23.67 20.86 22.00 22.18 14.94 15.73 16.50 16.73
High school 29.94 32.98 33.80 45.84 45.41 39.79 49.00 51.54
Middle school 12.02 13.50 14.56 13.54 16.69 18.69 16.40 14.55
Junior school 13.18 10.49 10.16 4.81 8.45 12.56 7.68 7.05
Does not have junior 3.42 3.08 2.42 2.97 3.25 3.39 1.59 1.21
Can not read 0.86 0.77 0.63 0.45 0.40 0.60 0.14 0.17
No answer 0.17 0.26 0.43 0.43 0.72 0.56 1.28 0.44
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The results of Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 are similar. As we approach the most recent years,
particularly 2004-2005, we observe that the proportion of households headed by high-school
graduates in the group with shadow income increases, while the proportion of people with
higher education significantly decreases.
One of the possible explanations for that is that new payroll taxes introduced in 2004
significantly reduced the tax wedge for salaries exceeding the “payroll tax maximum”
(incomes over 2400 UAH a month at the beginning). The reduction of the tax wedge reduced
the stimulus for engaging in shadow employment. The most educated (high-skilled) people
are most likely to receive high wages. It is also likely that working members of households
headed by a person with higher education have similar education levels. Therefore, once the
tax wedge on high wages is reduced, these people are most likely to stay out of shadow
employment. The category of the most educated persons may also include people with
incomplete higher education, since a university diploma is not a prerequisite of success at
work, but study at a university is a potential indicator of the high abilities of the individual.
The next category, people with completed high school education, should be affected by the
payroll tax maximum in the opposite direction. This category of people is sufficiently
educated (“semi-skilled”); therefore, they are likely to work for wages that are higher than
minimum wage. However, their wages are likely to be lower than wages of people with higher
education, and are lower than the maximum taxable by payroll taxes. Therefore, paying
payroll taxes on employees with complete higher education is most costly for an employer on
a per-employee basis. An employer might be interested in officially registering and paying an
extremely high official wage to a person with a high education, simultaneously decreasing
the wage or number of registered employees with high school diplomas. The increase in
wages for people with higher education is not taxed by the payroll tax since it is above the
maximum. This increase then can be unofficially re-distributed by the employer to the non-registered
employees with high-school diplomas. The overall tax obligation of the enterprise
will decrease. At the same time, it is less likely that such a tax evasion scheme will be used
for low-skilled (with education below high school) employees. These employees are working
at wages close to the minimum wage and the gain from unofficially employing such people is
smaller, while the risk for the employer of being caught by tax inspection remains the same.
In order to investigate this hypothesis, we combined our household-level UHES data into a
single file and ran a simple regression to determine if a reduction of the tax wage has an
impact on the probability of participating in the shadow economy. Combining the UHES
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34. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
datasets for different years does not produce panel data similar to that of a longitudinal
survey because we have only one observation per household and treat every observation
individually. This reduces our ability to estimate the size of the effect that a tax wedge has on
the probability to have shadow income. However, it allows us to determine the statistical
significance of a difference in the tax wedge, explaining the probabilities of having shadow
income before and after reform.
We ran a simple PROBIT regression in reduced form for the probability of having shadow
income. The aim of this analysis was to reveal the influence of tax reform on the probability
of having shadow income, depending on the education level of the household head. The left-hand-
side variable is equal to one if the difference between per-capita household
expenditures and per-capita household income (determined as the sum of personal incomes
of all members of a household) is higher than 100 UAH a month. The right-hand-side
(explanatory) variables consist of a dummy for the payroll tax reform (equal to one in 2004-
2005, and zero otherwise), dummies for the level of education of the head of household and
the multiplicative variable combining the reform dummy and education dummy. We added
dummies for years and for geographical locations in order to capture at least some fixed
effects and increase the quality of the estimate for the effect of the payroll tax reform dummy
(not reported in Table 5.3).
Table 5.3. Results of PROBIT regression, probability of household to have shadow
income for various education levels
Number of obs = 78192 LRchi2(47) = 54001.830
Log likelihood = -27136.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = 0.499
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|
32
[95%
Conf . Interval]
Payroll tax reduction -2.55368 0.03253 -78.51 0.000 -2.61743 -2.48993
Multiplicative tax reform X education level dummies
Higher -0.49091 0.03863 -12.71 0.000 -0.56663 -0.41520
Bachelor -0.29594 0.12674 -2.34 0.020 -0.54435 -0.04753
Unfinished higher
education -0.19395 0.03397 -5.71 0.000 -0.26053 -0.12737
Middle school -0.01626 0.03717 -0.44 0.662 -0.08911 0.05659
Junior school 0.09246 0.04305 2.15 0.032 0.00809 0.17684
Education levels
Higher -0.15456 0.02863 -5.40 0.000 -0.21068 -0.09844
Bachelor 0.08658 0.08837 0.98 0.327 -0.08662 0.25978
Unfinished higher
education -0.05849 0.02602 -2.25 0.025 -0.10949 -0.00749
Middle school -0.08163 0.02930 -2.79 0.005 -0.13905 -0.02421
Junior school -0.28883 0.03270 -8.83 0.000 -0.35293 -0.22473
35. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
Source: Own calculations based on UHES data for years 2000-2005. High school is the base category for
education levels.
The results of the regression seem to partially support our hypothesis of a much stronger
effect of the most recent tax reforms on the probability of having shadow income in the case
of households headed by a person with finished higher education. The coefficient for the
reform period, as such, is negative and significant, indicating the overall expected negative
influence of tax reform for the probability of having shadow income. The coefficients on the
multiplicative dummies indicate that the result of the reform was much stronger for those with
at least unfinished higher education. It seems, therefore, that the most recent tax reform in
Ukraine could lead to an overall reduction of shadow employment. It proves implicitly that
there exists a significant interdependence between tax wedge levels and shadow
employment, this being the most important result from the point of view of our analysis. On
the other hand, our findings indicate that the reform was not able to target those groups who
are expected to engage in the shadow economy most often, i.e. low-skilled persons.
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36. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
6. Shadow employment, wages and access to social
security in Ukraine and Russia
6.1 Some assessments of the size of the informal employment
According to existing evidence, the current scale of informal employment in Russia is
significant, albeit not as high as e.g. in less developed countries. The combined share of
non-agricultural, informal employment among the urban population is about 14% – 16%.
About two-thirds of the urban, non-agricultural, informal workers are not actually
unregistered; they do work legally but a significant part of their wage is paid off-the-record, by
so-called “envelope payments”. At the same time, persons working in enterprises of the
formal sector account for over half of the total informal employment headcount (Sinavskaya
2005).
Migration to informal employment is clearly stimulated by an excessive level of taxation.
According to the results of the survey of 1,000 SMEs in five Russian regions performed by
the National Institute of Systemic Studies of Entrepreneurship in 2002, small businesses
during 1999 – 2002 had not officially registered up to 30% of their payroll. Informal interviews
with business infrastructure representatives have shown that unofficial cash payments
amounted to 30% – 60% of the total SME payrolls (note that the lower limit of these
estimates coincides with SMEs’ self-assessment). The survey results confirmed that the UST
level is the major reason behind ‘migration to shadow’. (Liberal Hosting 2000) Moreover, the
larger the proportion of labor costs in production cost, the higher the share of the shadow
employment in SMEs, since high current rates of social insurance contributions induce small
businesses to understate their official wage figures.
The ILO bureau in Moscow reported that in the late 1990s, even in officially registered
enterprises, actual wage figures were substantially higher compared to those fixed in labor
contracts, with differences varying from two to twenty times. Informal cash payments are
largely a result of a flight from high social payroll taxes. According to minimal estimates, 12%
to 15% of the employees’ working time is actually ‘in the shadow’, which enables employers
to increase their wages by 13% on average. (Kosals 1999) Overall, the informal sector is
responsible for generating from 25% (Rosstat estimate) to 50% (Ministry of Internal Affairs
estimate) of the total wage bill. That is the reason why Rosstat publishes two estimates of the
households’ income structure: one figure corrected for the hidden payroll fund, and another
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37. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
one without such a correction. If we analyse the corrected income structure, we find out that
the proportion of wages in total incomes increases almost twice as compared to the
uncorrected one.
According to more recent data, the reduction of the UST rate has not turned the trend
towards informal employment growth and has not noticeably affected the scope of shadow
cash payments. (Development Centre 2006) The survey performed by Rosstat in February
2006 has demonstrated that informal employment in Russia continued to increase. In 2005,
the number of employed in the informal sector of the Russian economy increased by 0.1
million people to a total of 11.6 million, or 17% of the total number of employed. Importantly,
the number of employed exclusively in the informal sector has grown by 0.3 million, while the
number of those who combined formal and informal employment has decreased. Hence,
despite the reduction of informal employment growth rates in 2005, it has still accounted for
about a half of the total employment growth. This means that the reduction of the UST rate in
2005 was not radical enough to induce the legalisation of labor relations.
The growth of informal employment in 2005 has affected the majority of economic sectors. In
industry and construction, it was accompanied by a continuing reduction of the official
employment at large and medium-sized enterprises. This is most probably due to the fact
that in the situation of the growing demand for labor, its use is still being ‘optimized’ by
transferring it into the informal sphere.
A noticeable reduction of informal employment in transportation and agriculture could hardly
be attributed to employment legalization since it was accompanied by a decline in official
employment as well, which is indicative of a general reduction of demand for labor in these
sectors. It is only in the retail trade that the growth of official employment comparable in scale
to a reduction of its informal component could indicate the flow of employment into organised
forms. The reason behind this is that small retail outlets traditionally practicing “grey” turnover
and informal employment are being driven out by large retail networks. The latter, especially
those with foreign capital participation, as a rule tend to comply with existing legislation,
including employment regulations.
The available data on Ukraine is not so detailed, although accessible information
demonstrates largely similar results. The Institute of Competitive Society performed several
surveys of focus groups in order to identify entrepreneurs’ expectations regarding the STS
reform. Seven focus groups were organized in Khmelnitsky, Belaya Tserkov,
Dneprodzerzhinsk, Lutsk, Chernovtsy, and two focus groups in Kiev containing
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38. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
representatives from all over Ukraine. The surveys have identified the following trends
regarding employment:
• registration of employees as entrepreneurs and replacement of labor relations by
36
economic ones;
• retention of the number of employees accompanied by a formal reduction of working
hours paid for officially (use of unofficial ‘envelope’ cash payments);
• a real reduction of the number of workers (accompanied by production decline);
• a reduction of the number of officially employed workers and use of informal employment
with illegal payments.
As could be seen, any of the employment options induces a concealment of labor relations,
with the third option (legal behavior) leading to a reduction of entrepreneurial activities.
Available data indicate that the informal economy is common in Ukraine as well. However, it
is more often related to episodic or short-term activities, unofficial activities in the household
sector, and self-employment activities, for example, which are more oriented towards survival
(last resort providing subsistence income). Most likely, this is one of the substantial
differences between informal employment in Ukraine versus in Russia.
Ukraine presents a lot of opportunities for informal activities and unregistered employment,
often incidental and very short-term. According to information provided by Mel'ota and
Gregory (2001a), unofficial activities in the Ukrainian household sector are estimated at 16%
of official GDP and are a major source of the shadow economy in the country. In the situation
of a relatively low demand for labor and due to the very small size of unemployment benefits,
many people undertake various self-employment activities in order to survive; other people
leave the official labor market, preferring to engage in informal activities or at a household
plot; others are leaving the labor market completely, seeking additional income sources such
as a stipend, pension, child care allowance, etc. Many unemployed are occasionally involved
in unofficial labor or entrepreneurial activities which, to some extent, provide a means of
subsistence. The most popular types of incidental unregistered activities in Ukraine include
transportation services, construction and repair works, tutoring and writing of control tests
and term papers, tailor services and handicrafts, welding services and car repair, low-skilled
agricultural labor for private households and other personal services.
One of the explanations of existing differences between Ukraine and Russia in terms of
informal employment could be different levels of minimum wages. As distinct from Russia,
39. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
where this level is extremely low (less than 10% of the average wage), in Ukraine it has been
increased to 44% of the average wage in 2002. This has clearly served as an incentive for
entrepreneurs to legalize wages, as well as implied that the minimum wage has regained its
role as a tool for limiting wage inequalities and protecting wages of workers with weak
bargaining power (Rutkowski 2006).
Payroll taxes in Ukraine are likely to both dampen labor demand by raising labor costs
(particularly given the relatively high minimum wage which limits the scope for passing the
tax to labor) and to reduce labor supply by reducing the take-home pay. Moreover, they are
most probably an important factor behind the growth in the informal sector (Ukraine Jobs
Study 2005).
On the whole, as concerns illegal hiring of the labor force, the authors of the cited report on
Russia stress that factors affecting the probability of migrating into shadow employment are
not yet adequately studied due to the limited representation of this workers’ group in
sampling surveys (Sinavskaya 2005).
6.2 Informal employment and wages
The next step of our analysis was to assess the results of being employed in the shadow
economy for wages and access to social services provided by companies and public social
security. We have estimated the net incomes model in which shadow employment has been
used as one of the explanatory variables. Similar models have been estimated for Russia
using RLMS data for 2005 and for Ukraine using ULMS data for 2003. In both cases we have
run simple OLS regressions with the log of income from the main job used as the dependent
variable. The set of explanatory variables, apart from the dummy for unregistered activity,
included: age, gender, education, tenure, working hours, code of economic activity of the
enterprise and regional dummies.
As we have already mentioned, using the direct responses to the question about current job
of the respondent being registered or not either in RLMS or in ULMS does not result in full
coverage of shadow employment in either case. We are able to identify only those
performing fully unregistered jobs and not those employed legally for minimum wage or for a
wage close to the minimum and receiving the rest of their remuneration in the form of
additional, unregistered cash payments – “envelope payments”. Hence, any results we
describe below in this section relate to this specific kind of “clear” shadow employment.
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40. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
The results of our analysis indicate a negative, but only a marginally significant negative,
influence of the shadow employment on net incomes from the main job, as the coefficients of
the shadow employment variable are significant only at 5% confidence level in both
countries.
Table 6.1 Influence of shadow employment on net incomes from main job in Russia
and Ukraine. Results of econometric estimations.
Russia Ukraine
Education Education
Secondary
vocational
-0.33 Tertiary-Vocational -0.26
Vocational -0.47 Secondary general -0.36
Below vocational -0.48 Vocational -0.37
Below vocational -0.43
Female -0.34 Female -0.28
age -0.005 Age -0.005
tenure 0.008 Tenure 0.005
Hours worked 0.007 -
Shadow
-0.12* Shadow
Employment
Employment
38
-0.08*
Observations 4356 Observations 3357
R-squared 0.36 R-squared 0.31
* - Significant at 5% confidence level only.
In the case of Russia, work in shadow employment decreases the net wage by about 12%
and in Ukraine by 8%. This means that working in the shadow economy should not be
treated as a way to increase wages. Those taking unregistered jobs must accept lower
wages. It suggests that shadow employment in these countries is primarily a way to escape
unemployment and poverty and not a way of simple tax evasion.
One must take into account, however, that our results concern only those whose jobs are not
registered at all. In the case of those employed legally and receiving part of their wage off-the-
record, the motivation of income enhancement is an obvious one.
41. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
6.3 Impact of being informally employed on access to social
39
security benefits and EPL
Both theory and common sense suggest that unregistered employment is an unequivocally
negative phenomenon for an employee because of a lack of guarantees, formal rights,
grounds for court proceedings, etc. However, among 279 respondents from Moscow,
Novosibirsk, Perm and Nadym engaged in unregistered (without a written contract)
employment, 19% responded that “it is profitable for myself, employer has nothing to do with
it”, and 42% considered the situation as profitable for both employer and employee (NISP
2003).
All categories of workers think that losses from EPL non-compliance outweigh the respective
gains. However, those in an admittedly illegal situation (employed without a written contract)
regard this balance of gains and losses more optimistically. For instance, the opinion that
EPL non-compliance brings more losses than gains to workers, and they tolerate it only
because they are unable to change the situation, is characteristic for public sector employees
(75%) and industrial workers (64%). At the same time, this opinion is shared by only 43% of
those employed without a written contract and by 44% of SME workers, whereas EPL non-compliance
is widespread.
Research on Russia based on RLMS indicates that there are “enclaves” where labor rights of
workers in the informal sector are protected even to a greater extent than in the formal one.
(Sinavskaya 2005) RLMS data indicate that wage arrears and forced administrative leave are
more widespread in enterprises of the formal sector. According to a Moscow Carnegie
Center survey, 86% of respondents with primary, nonagricultural, informal employment
replied that their wages are paid in due time and only 7% mentioned wage arrears, while for
respondents employed formally, these proportions constitute 78% and 23% respectively.
According to RLMS data, 18% of respondents with primary informal employment and 23% of
those employed officially mentioned wage arrears. Thus, apart from higher remuneration,
informal employment generally ensures more stable current income, but is accompanied by a
lack of social guarantees and a higher level of instability.
The majority of workers cannot see any difference between formal (‘white’) and informal
(‘black’) wages. Since the size of most government guarantees (minimum wage,
unemployment benefits, pensions) is miserable, and they are not ‘insured’ against various
‘contingencies’ (lack of indexation mechanism, no guarantees of payments regularity), many
workers prefer to agree to informal cash payments, not thinking about contributions to the
42. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
funds that they would “probably” need later in their lives. The situation of widespread EPL
non-compliance to some extent equalizes the positions of the formally and informally
employed from the viewpoint of their labor rights protection. The situation of social protection
of workers also looks similar (Barsukova 2003).
On the other hand, in both countries, the status of being formally employed provides access
to a number of benefits financed through the system of obligatory government social
insurance – labor pensions, unemployment benefits, temporary disability benefits, benefits to
compensate the costs related to childbirths and funerals, and industrial accident benefits.
In Russia, informal employment deprives employees of the right for labor pension
insurance. However, in practice, individual motivation to comply is rather weak. Individuals
do not expect to get any return on paid taxes, for example, in the form of public good
provision or social security provision from the present unreformed PAYG system.
This is primarily connected with very low pension benefits: the ratio of average pensions to
average wages (pension replacement ratio) is about 23% and tends to fall further; in addition,
an average pension represents only 96% of a subsistence minimum. As a result, incentives
to contribute to the tax system are low. Moreover, unregistered workers mostly belong to the
younger generation who are not really thinking about future pensions, while those closer to
retirement age try to locate themselves within the formal sector.
The World Bank studies on Ukraine indicate a similar picture. Currently, the link between
social insurance contributions and pension benefits is weak and almost nonexistent, lowering
the incentives for individuals to comply. Despite some changes made in the legislation and
the benefit formula, the benefits are currently almost flat. Thus, the only significant link
between payments and benefits is to be a participant in the system and, consequently, to
receive a pension payment, almost regardless of the amount contributed. Clearly, this does
not create an incentive for contributors to report their “real” income to the system, particularly
contributors in the mid-range and higher income brackets (Public Finance Review 2006).
In Ukraine, the increase in the minimum pension currently occurs automatically up to the
level of the “subsistence minimum.” The subsistence minimum is a national amount set by
the government each year in the annual budget. This link between the “subsistence
minimum” and pension insurance blurs the distinction between social insurance and poverty-targeted
social assistance, confuses the pension dialogue, and leads to wasteful transfers
which poorly target poverty. More importantly, from the viewpoint of the current study, the
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43. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.398 Social security driven Tax wedge and its effects…
difference in accessibility of pension benefits between the “legally” and “illegally” employed
becomes blurred.
In Ukraine, the overall construction of the law "On obligatory state social insurance in case of
unemployment" does not stimulate participation in the system and the payment of
contributions. Moreover, the fact that the respective security benefits are missing is often of
minor importance.
Social benefits for the unemployed in Ukraine are also, on average, extremely low and
cannot be regarded as a significant factor affecting the duration of unemployment. (Kupets
2005) Their size, although related to the number of years for which social security payments
were paid, is in general rather low (58% of the minimum wage and 26% of an average wage
in 2003). In addition, the number of years of security payments adds very little to the overall
unemployment benefit. In fact, only a small proportion of those unemployed rely on benefits
as a means of subsistence. As regards sickness benefits, their size varies from 60 to 100%
of an average employee wage depending on the continuity of employment. It is only after
eight years of continuous employment that a worker becomes entitled to be paid 100% of its
wage as a temporary disability benefit.
Similarly, in Russia, the impact of being informally employed on access to social security
and social protection schemes is of rather marginal importance.
For Russian SMEs or other firms using STS or imputed income tax, the size of temporary
disability benefits is determined by the Federal Law No. 190-FZ of December 31st 2002 “On
the provision of social security benefits to citizens employed by organizations or by individual
entrepreneurs using special taxation regimes”. According to the law, temporary disability
benefits are paid from two sources:
• the Federal Social Security Fund refunds, to the employer, a part of his expenses
related to the payment of a temporary disability benefit to a sick employee, not
exceeding one minimum wage (MROT) per month;
• from the enterprise’s own funds as regards amounts exceeding one minimum, wage.
In other words, firms using STS could obtain directly from the Social Security Fund only RUR
1,100 (or somewhat more where regional coefficients are applied) for a full calendar month.
The remaining part would have to be paid by the entrepreneur from his own funds. This
41